See Braet wart INTER OFFICE MEMO | Sar a : As per distribution wae : AGM(AM) SR-ll, Bangalore | saa: sR-I/AM/F-23.0/2017-18/ faim :01.01.2018 faer; Compiled Technical Circulars, IOMs & Other Technical communications - reg All the Technical circulars, 1OMs & other technical communications issued from time to time by Corporate Center have already been communicated to all sites immediately by E-Mails & IOMs, The same are also available at CC-AM & RHQ. AM intranet websites. However for easy reference and quick access to all the working groups the technical circulars have been compiled in chronological order and attached. ‘Two copies of these technical circulars shall be maintained at each stations/TLM offices. One for circulation among employees and daily use and other asa library copy for reference. This is for information of all concerned and for strict implementation of the above wherever applicable. Agger ara. \ ar: Station-In-Charges: ‘SomanhalliSalem/Udumalpel/Trichur/Sriperumbudur/Madurai/Trichy/Kolar/Hosur/Mysore/Hiriyur! Narendra Trivandrum/Kalivanthapattu/Tirunelveli/Karur/Karaikudi/Hassen/Arasur/ Puducherry! Kochi Palakkad! Bidadi? Thiruvalam/Nagapattinam/Kudgi/Tumkur/Dharmapuri /Tuticorin PS/ Kozhikode/ Pavagada/Yelhanka GIS/ Tuticorin GIS/Sirsi TLM/Mallapur TLM/Neyveli TLM/Belthangady TLM/Pathanamthita TLM/ ‘swfefeht: 1) Gayam) - For kind information please. 2) ED(SR-IN - For Kind information please.POWERGRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED REGIONAL AM DEPARTMENT, BANGALORE ‘Technical Circulars & IOMs INDEX No. Description of Technical Circular/ioM Date of fasue Gis Building - Maintaining positive air pressure inside main hall 30.11.2017 2__|tiipping of Transformer/Reactors on Buchole alarm 13.11.2017 3. [feseine the defects/ascrepancies observed during the protection review oFWRT | 2 93 land NR 4 |Mocification in DC supply control scheme logic in relay panel & CB MBin Substations. 22.06.2017 5__|Reporting major protections/equipment outage to Regional AM 22.06.2017 [Svidelines for utilization of dismantled materials such as earthwire dismantled after 6 replacement by OPGW de-strung insulators, replaced with Polymer Insulators, 07.07.2017 rowers etc. 7_| Modification in inter-tripping scheme for ICTs having CBs with CSD 23.05.2017 8 [implementation of relay setting and standardization of DR channels 19.05.2017 ‘| Guidelines to check for single phasing while taking outare (09.05.2017 Regarding the tripping of a double circutline on faultin adjacentline due to 10 incorrect PSL in MICOM relays 93.05.2017 11 |Regerding maintenance of the SAS server installed by M/s GE{Erstwhile ALSTOM) 804.2017 12. [Transmission line tipping investigation/analysis mthodolony 18042037 13. [Disabling End Zone Protection Feature in Bus bar protection scheme 18.04.2017 [Adoption of new Over Voltage Relay(OVR) gradings for 400KV and 765KV 4 Trransmission tines of aieamaad 15,_[Follure oF ICT due to ahase reversal in 220KV Substation 77.04.2017 16_|Ferro-Resonance problem in 765KV lines 14.02.2017 17_ [Strengthening of Earthing for more than 25 years old Transmission lines 09.01.2017 48. |Strengthening of Earthing for more than 25 years old Transmission lines (Appd.note) | 04.01.2017 19. [Protection system check ist Doc:D-2-01-03-01-04 implementation regarding 02.01.2017 2a [Faking Ground Over carten/Brokencondeutr protection uncon io NGR Boring | 159 oa [single phasing of line reactor 21, [Fire in power/Control cables 12.07.2016 22 | Application of Silicon Sealant around Oil fling plug & Washer for Siemens make CvTs | 10.06.2016 23_ [Modification in protection scheme of Transformer/Reactor Auxiliary Greuit 10.06.2016 24 [Frequent flashovers in Substation equipment's near Coastal area 06.05.2016 25_|Guidetines for statutory compliance in case of any accident at POWERGRID work site | 03.05.2016No. Description of Technical Circular/IOM Date of issue 26_[Precautions during erection and testing of GIS stations 03.05.2016 27_|visit of Director (Operations) at 765/400KV Varanasi SS on 02.04.2016 08.04.2036 28 [Monitoring of online DGA data in NTAMC 23.03.2016 23, [Replacement of 400KV BHEL make circult breakers 29.12.2015 30 storage and handling of RIP bushings at site (With M/s MAZZA & M/s ABB manuals) 12.41.2015 31_[oit testing process in ERP and validation of oil test reports in Bi module of ERP 30.12.2035 32_| Installation of laminated float safety glass in GIS control room along with approved ane note & Standards) 33__[NGR Bye passing - 765KV line reactors 20.10.2015 34_[Integration for existing online DGA in NTAMC 10.08.2035 35_ [Disturbance recorder channel standardization 14.07.2015 36, |totking of Transformer/Reactors Rollers to avoid movement/shifing during aps ani Jearthquake '37 [Neutral connection of single phase 765KV line/Bus reactors and transformers 33.04.2015 ‘gg_ [checking of ol level and tan delta test tap connection for atthe time of, Tetons ‘commissioning of CT 39. | Procedure for request, issue & cancellation of permit - To- Work /Sanction for test 04.02.2015 40_[Fallure of 765KV Siemens make CB - Checklist 24.12.2018 “41_|Safety checks during construction of Transmission lines 20.05.2018 42_[Availability of Fire fighting system in Substations 22.04.2014 '43_[Certification by regional OS before issuing TOC of transmission lines 19.03.2014 144_linvestigation/analysis of tower failures by Corporate /Regional committees 16.11.2013 45_INGR Bye pass switching scheme for 765 KV system 30.09.2013 tional earth nismission line tower ize tripping of lines in ae A thing of Transmission line towers to minimize tripping of lines eae lightning prone areas. 47_|witching of 765KV Transformers and Reactors 28.05.2013, Provision of Glass/Porcelain Long rod insulators in Transmission lines/Rallway line/ “8 |road/River crossing spans to minimize de-capping of insulator in uch crossing spans | 1032043 49. [Revision of Busbar protection setting 15.01.2013, '50_|Closing of diameters after opening of ines on high voltage 10.01.2013 a4. [Sidelines For eration oT subssauent topping on wansien/parmanent enone 52. | Checking of test tap earthing connection healthiness in Transformers and reactors 21.42.2012 Pr Shing re rent in Power Transfor mn a sa_|Peeedve for bashing replacement in Power ransorers (ET end shunt Read ee 54, [Provision af yérant System for 220 8 182 KVSS and extension ofFivdrant for GORY | > [Transformers and Reactors Setting to be adopted for OTI & WI, Pump & fan for ICTs & shunt Reactors in service 55 l&.to.be commissioned in naw projects and calibration thereof epee 56. [Revised rating for Surge arrestors for O&M procurement 09.09.2009Date of issue INO. Deseription of Technical Circular/iOM. 57. [safety checks required during construction for Transmission tines 26.07.2007 58. |solation of Feeder/Bay equipment during maintenance/testing 15.02.2007 59. |Failure of equipment subsequent to charging of lines owned by other utilities 23.06.2006 60 [Norms for condition monitoring of surge arrestors (LAs) in service 30.07.2004 61 |Condition monitoring of EHV class CBs In POWERGRID. 13.11.2003 62 [Repeated tripping of Transmission line of single phase to earth fault 21.02.2003 63 [Guidelines for replacement of Old Battery Bank/Battery collin POWERGRID SS 03.01.2008 64 [Start up power for generating units in the event of total blackout due to grid failure 02.11.2001 jintenanc vents ins iit be 65 [Testing & maintenance of equipment's installed in POWERGRID bays at SEB. 09.03.2001 Substations 66 [Repeater Auto restart of + SOOkV HVDC RihandsDadri Bipole 32.12.2001 [Frequent failures of Magnetic Ventils and Actuator Rings in M/s. ABB make SF6 CBs 87 liouenoea 12.01.2001 68 [Condition monitoring of EHV Transmission lines 03.08.2000 69. [Condition monitoring of Current Transformers 03.08.2000 70 |Operation of Isolators and earth switches 09.06.2000 71_|Monitoring of DC earth fault in Substation 05.05.2000, 72. [Time synchronization of monitoring equipment’s avaiable in the region 15.03.2000 73_[Indiseriminate operation of directional over current and earth fault relays 13.03.2000 74 |Mechanical stresses on Bus/Line CVTs due to misalignment in 4" iPS connection 18.11.1999 75_|Re-energization procedure for transformers/reactors after fault tipping 07.12.1989, 76 |Condition monitoring of Station Batteries 23.09.1999 ‘77 |D.C. Earth Leakage in POWERGRID Substations 24.09.1999 78. [operation of isolators at POWERGRID Substations 11,1199 79, [Operation of isolators at POWERGRID Substation 20.08.1999 80 [Investigation /Analysis of equipment failures by Regional Level Committee 29.07.1999way fis witaRert site sfeser aires ae wae daovic Per Hae aT TTT were endear (ier ta a: nenrdws (ehitr wie aesniz) oa Wie aasriz) SOAS 8 VY LRU SLA TT A Say TAY astern) vid: rire Pees evs ew se RY TAPS LR TTT WY TAY TA agen) apron fareere (NTAMC) feaie: 13 adax 2017 weak: 0 aria we actanic / fava; Tripping of Transformer/ Reactors on Buchhulz alarm This has reference to the earlier circular of AGM (OS) ref: C/OS/TR/Gen Dated 12" Oct“09 (Copy enclosed), where in it was mentioned that no alrm shall be extended from Buchholz relay of Transformer & Reactor and only trip command shall be extended, However, in recent incidences at Lucknow and Malerkotla $/s, it: was observed that the wansformer/ reactors were manually switched off after buchholz alarm. Further, in one failure case of Transformer, it was observed that buchholz, alarm was observed few minutes prior to failure of the Transformer, In the above case, if trip command was extended {rom the Buchholz, ‘Transformer could have been saved from catastropic failure. In view of the above, it is once again requested to review the configuration of buchholz for all the Transformers’ Reactors under your region and if the Buchholz relays are not configured for tripping, immediate action may be taken for modification of the same. Matter may be treated as urgent. Gr & Bah fever aerark: aaroverey fergere (Arr wae atenle), sate Y/Transformer/Corespondence/IOMre “ap Haens) wen: agus (Rie Hasric)- War A: agaetrae (We asic) adh are SUS RAV UTE SRA UT OU SRRTS Pash: CC/AM-PROT/2017-13 Reetrer: 28.09.2017 Subject: Regarding the defeets/discrepancies observed during the protection review of WR-L and NR-IL, The detailed protection review of the critical stations of WRel and NR-IIl has becn completed, Similar review exercise for remaining regions is being planned and shall be executed sequentially, During the exercise, following major deticiencies were observed. CT for future-bay was wired for Bus-Bar protection. In bay, the Tie CT is to be used for Bus-Bar protection. CB LBB configured to trip bus after 400ms (200ms Tie LBB+200ms Future PU LBB delay), In such a case the Tic CB LBB needs to be configured to trip the bus-bar without waiting for Future Bay LBB time delay, LBB initiation Opto inputs incorrectly configured. 4. STUB protection incorrectly configured in Micom P444 relays, The isolator open status was not being checked for enabling STUB. 5. IN>4 element used in PSL instead of m4 ‘element enabled in the setting file for STUB protection 6. PSB settings incorrectly configured. In REL670 relays, the PSB Blocking is to be configured through ‘Application Configuration’, Same was not done in several cases, Moreover, the blocking scheme has to be made in accordance with the respective RPC guidelines. 7. In case of Single phase Bank with Spare ICT/Reactor, the GOO: in the tripping logic for Spare Selection were not configured, 8. Wrong configuration of the protection logic in case of REF of Single phase bank with Spare Reactor. signals being used Ve°- Bus-Bar Fiber Com error not reporting in SCADA. In ease of a peripheral unit of istributed bus-bar protection being disconnected, the corresponding alarm was nr being updated in SCADA 10. Several protcetion settings were enabled inadvertently, 1. Wrong VT selection logic made in the SAS. Incorrect VT selection logic resulted in ‘0 VT selection or more than one VT selection, 12. STUB enable alarms not available in SCADA, '3.SAS redundaney disturbed, teaming not catried out, both the LAN eables connected to the same LAN switch, 14. Fire-fighting system and Kiosk-fire alarms not connected to SCADA. 'S: Bus Earth Switch interlock not configured correcly, extension bays not added to the logic. 16, Buchholi-l and 2, PRD 142 connected to the same relay, either REF or Differential relay. 17, The DC fuse-MCB co-ordination was improper, lower rated fuse/MCB placed upstream to a higher rated fise/MCB, Tou me fequested to kindly vetify whether any: similar issues are present at various substations in your region and ensure the rectification For any clarifications/support in rectification, _concemed Person may contact: Sh B.B.Singh, Dy Manager(AM) Mob;7042954333 §-mail:brijendra@powergridindia.com (ane cary 23°29 21 F Copy for kind information: 1. Director(Operati mn) cocutive Director (NRI/NR2/N: R3/ERVER2/WRI/WR2SR /SR2/Odisha/NERY Asset Management/CMD Cell)uray fis acter sin gfesar fens: Sen erates ater ore: apforea fergerar wa ardorewn fereers ae) (air we shsnie) Rare: 22 91 2017 wie: werdarers Prearn(a.3.0d. FF) weak: 0 araieay we Hasniz / fave, Modification in DC supply control scheme logic in Relay pancl & CB MB in substations, got CB of this line gone under lockout upon failure of both DC sources control supply to the tie CB. There was DC ekt fault in the DC Source-1 in CB MB prior to wipping of line and the IC change over scheme provided in CB MB acted and switched the DC Source-II to the faulty DC circuit resulting into complete DC supply failure (both DC sources) in CB MB. This led to complete black out of the station [rots rest of the Grid On investigation, following shortcomings are noticed in the DC control supply logic in the relay panel as well as in CB MB: J, ‘The DC supply cirewit for the LBB relay was taken from the same branch of DC ekt feeding to wip coil 11 while L13B relay DC supply must be taken independently from separate fuse ) ‘The rating of DC fuse in the relay panel in Kiosk for both sources was lower (i.e. 10 A) than the rating of MCR (ic. 16A) in the CB MB. ‘The DC changeover logic in CB MB is not reliable as the changeover taking place on already faulty DC cireuit me does not ta ce care the This may please be looked into for immeditte corrective action in the schematic drawings/schemes for both relay panel as well as CB MIB. A list of such substations where this type of DC change- over in CB MB and looping of LBB DC supply from CB DC_ in relay panel exists, may please be shared with us. DC logic provided by the suppliers of CB MB and rclay panels may also be reviewed at your end to ensure correct DC changeover and proper co-ordination of Fuse/MCB. ratings. Copy: ED -NRUNR2/NR3/WRI/WRSRISRUERUERI/INER 1(UC)-Odisha Project with a requested to kindly arrange to replace immediately the 1UA\ fuse with 20A rating in the relay panel feeding DC supply to CB MB wherever J6A MCB is used in the 765KV CB MB. Copy for kind information: Dir (Opn)NK mn) watt CiAM/O&M/ ‘Geri: 22" June, 2017 fava : Reporting major Protections/Equipment outage to Regional Asset Management {In the recent times complete blackout of major substations and tripping of associated transmission fines have Been experienced in various regions due to outige of erica protectins ke Pus Bar & LBB protections and CB lockout conditions, ta se of responsibility has boon ubserved on part of OM stall and ion availability tthe operating tuetions wt te st ° r situations, tn the event of outage of critical proteetion systems, jon and remedial actions are requieed to avert major disturbances. In view of above. operation staff may be sensitized 10 report allowing in Asset Management departatent through phone! SMS in adklition to recording the s: defect register and intimation to Substation in-charge: dents urgently to Regional in’ S/S logbook, a. Blocking/Failure of Bus Bur protection relays bh. Blocking/Faiture of Local Breaker Backup protect ys of main’ tie bay CBS Circuit Breaker Lockout Condition (SE6 low pressure Spring Discharwed/Trip Circuit Faulty/D.C. Supply Failure/Hydrautic or Paeumatic pressure loss). i case CB under tock out condition can not be attended immedistely the aflected CB need to be isolated as per the attached guideline at Annesure-1 Non Availability of complete Auyiliary Power Supply in substation including Backup Power source (IG set) for more than 30 min, fe. Banery Ch yer Failure f. PLCC protection channel failure Iv is requested that the shift operation stall in ¥ criticality oF above alarins’ conditions and the repo substation’ RTAMC may be made aware about the ing usar must be ensured ys sie above, ye =a ED (Asset Management) Distribution: 22D (NR-VINRAUNR-I/ER-VERAUWR-1 WRC SRel/ SRL /NER/Orisss) Copies for kind inform Director (Operation)ANNEXURE: Guidelines for tsolating CB under Lockout Condition 1. Complete Dia (Both Main CBs & Tie CBs Installed) a Isolating Main CR: In case Main CB is under Lockout condition then power follow through Main CB is to be interrupted hy tripping all other CBs connected to Bus to which problematic CB is connected. Hoth side isolators of tic bay CB to be opened subsequently to isolate it, Both side isolators of tic buy CB to be opened subsequently to isolate it. Aficr Isolating problematic CB, all other CBs connected to Bus are 10 be closed in order to restore the Bus. Isolatin CB: In case ‘Tie CB is under Lockout condition then power flow through Tie CB is to be interrupted by ‘rst tripping both the Main CBs of the Dia then tripping command is to be given to problematic Tie CB so that Direet Trip/Inter- Trip (incase of IC's) command is sent to remote end CBs, On opening of both side Feeders to Tie CB, Isolators on both sides of problematic C’3s arc to be opened. Alter Isolating problematic CB, both feeders of the Dia to be restored, through respective Main CBs in co-ordination with remote end. fl, In-Complete Dia (Only One Main CB & Tie CB installed) b. Isolating Main CB: In case Main CB is under Lockout condition then power follow through Main CB is to be interrupted by tripping all other CBs connecied to Bus to which problematic CB is connected. Hoth side isolators of tie bay CB tw be opened subsequently 10 isolate it, Afler Isolating problematic CB, all other CBs connected to Bus are to be closed in order to restore the Bus. Isolating ‘Tie CB: In case ‘Tie CB is under Lockout condition then power flow through Tie CB is to be interrupted by tripping all other CBs connected 10 Bus to Which problematic tie CB is connected directly (only through Isolutors). Both side isolators of tie bay CB 1 be opencd subsequently to isolate it. Afier Isolating problematic CB, all other CBs connected to Bus are to be closed in arder to restore the Bus. Pee GAPOWER GRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. CORPORATE MATERIALS MANAGEMENT CIRCULAR No. 01/2017 C/MM/Oismantied materials/Potcy/ Deted:07.07.2017 PSanledconventanal insulators replaced trough Polymer Insulators should not be ‘Ullsea for construction / O&M Ines inthe similarly poled area, 2. Very old tsmantedporcel from reliability, ‘Point of view, POPs ee alr ox er 10 yar sea be tern yp fegonat eI OF Motor ce ars Ater nese oe dau ee Bolan instltors 10 other ceglns where these ee sli us, © Dlsmantied glass dice insulators may be retained ana lised in non-polluted stretches / Polluted stretches after RTV coating. ged7. Alter meeting own requirement excess insulators shauld be offered to respective SEBS ‘on depreciated rates 8. The balance insulators, after ahove actions may be retained in store and region shall ‘explore any other option forts utlsation icroRS: RE: 4. All the conductor bits up t0 200m, after retaining good conductor bits for msintenance purpose should be dsposed off through MSTC. Good / new conductor bits of length hoetween 100 P10 500 m can be utilised in the substations for equipment droppers wherever damage is there, Keeping adequate quantity for the above said purpose and ‘excess quantity of conductor bits upto 500m may be cisposed off, 2, Regions are carrying-out addtional earthing of the existing lines with removed earthwire. ‘Region may estimate the requirement of earthwire for these additional earthing and the: ‘excess material may be disposed off through MSTC. 3, Good conductors and earth-nire of more than S00m length may be wrapped on drums (Greferably on metallic drum, if available th the substation). Region may assess the ‘quantity requirement In the region and excess material, ifany, may be declared excess ‘or utilisation in other regions. 44. Damaged conductor and Earth-wire of any bit size should be declared as SCRAP through ‘SSIDC of the region and disposed off through MSTC. 5. An attempt should be made to Sale the small bts of conductors to local S85, if they are using the available conductors in their ine 6. ‘Sctap for conductors and Earth wire should be disposed off on welghment basis. que TAZ : Domett) GL, van. 2 3, Healthiness of dismantled equipments should be monitored as per norms. A time frame of Sot months is allowed to the concerned reglons to complete the-actions as per the above guidelines for the existing tems and for future the above guidelines shall be treated £8 policy for vtlisation of surplus materials. ‘This is issued with the approval of the Competent authority Pl uped on ioe ong ere oe (saan 07 At ‘Adgl.GM (Nan) ae “STAVESZPS fa CM/O(FIN.)/O(PERS.]/0{PROI./O(0P.yCVO ard nei ot ye) -erderaee PREURLOAR), CMO Coord. Celly sree FeEIAM) /cOO(BOD IVAN, EA)/COOICTU & So)/ amin Fear (CFRCEY/ -mrSeTETe Frtermicigy/ tures Rie nee T/VS/ARCiu/ wrroas PR{ERP & I)/ EMR - VCIOMS)/ erferere: Fatwe(Engg WDC), adres Pee (ESMO,CSRALACY/ -arésr Freee) Shsvishasferiae ewm(HA)/ weirs Mawe(e\/ srdurcer RARLDEC/ arid fuer (NTAMCYerdarer fee: (TDYCOO (Telecom)/ Company Seeretary/ Dy. CVO FRIES (F)SHARG/ sree (Engg-t/t/) eater (Eng 5/s)-ShAKK/Sh KRY / TERRACE (oMsy/ sree (1o)/ areas (ce)/ ante (ce)/aeruius(TECAY/ me (CommaRC]/ rRNA (Engg HVDCY/ mee (HRY RGR (LORC)/ Sra AAA (MM)/ ae BACH (Fin) Regions/Proiects: sectors RAT -NR/ N/R AI/ER-V/ERWSRASRAVWR-/WRAI/ NER/Kurukshetrs/ NEA/Odishe/Roigath Pugalur Sr AEMaRtR / ATI (Projects) NRA/ NRAYWR-I/ ER-/ ER-IVSR SRll/ WRHI/WR- WNER/ Kurukshetra/NEA/ Odtsha/Raigarh PugalurWye. sat memes (Ge Atovic) Bar A: HEaEH eae AAC) (FA 3 ty FH M1 HL / Geblaeticeeize/2e IEG SENT) : Hest; C/AM/CSD/intenrip ‘featter: 23° May 2017 85a : Modification in Inter— Tripping scheme for ICTs. having CBs with CSD Please refer Record Notes of Discussion for Co-ordination mecting held between Engg. QA&L and Asset Management on 12" Fcb. 2016 (copy attached) vide which it was agreed to minimize aroing time for CBs with CSD used for controlled ICT switching. In this fea following are jo be implemented: 4) During manual wipning of ICTs ether through SCADATRCU or Breaker TAC switch, delay of | second is to be builtin the scheme as per following: Opening of ICT through CSD installed in CBs on HV side: A cee is to be developed to incorporate 1 second delay so that HV side CB opens |. second after tripping of CB on IV side (tripping on account of inter — trip command recived from HV side). By opening IV side CB first, ICT shall come onno — load prior to final opening by CSD on HY side and only no ~ load/magnetizing current is interrupted by HV side CB. ii, Opening of ICT through CSD installed in CBs on TV side: A scheme is to be developed to incorporate 1 second. delay so that IV side\CB. opens 1 stcond after tripping of CB on HV side (tripping on account of inter ~ trip command recived from LV side). By opening HV side CB ist. ICT shall come on no— load prior to final opening by CSD on IV side and only no -load/magnetizing current is interrupted by IV side CB, b). Arcing time for CB is also to be modified as 1 — 1,5 ms (approx.) in CSD settings to sod current chopping before current zero crossing and minimize residival flux. 1L is requested to implement aforesaid inter — trip scheme. modification (Manual Tripping through BCU/SCADA/T&C switch) for ICTs having CBs with CSD in your region. isk ma anes (aftaifr-aa eet) - Wilh a requested to implement aforesaid ‘inter =i | le in future projectsRecord Notes of discussions of Coordination tasting between Engineering, QA&l A) Transformers/Reacto Ay 2 and AM on 42th February 2018. Use of RIP bushings in 768KV Tiansformers’@2actors similar to 400kV and below: Considering problems in 765i ABB make OIF bushings and also external flashovers in Trench make bushings, it was proposed that RIP bushing may be specified for 765kV Transformers/ Reactors: Z Engineering Deparment ifformed that the type tests for 400KV RIF type bushings are stil under progress and incomoration of RIP bushings for 760KV may delay projects since limited experience i available on 765KV RIP bushings. In view of the above, it was decided thet, under vendor developmer department wil procure 2 nos. bushings (one no, each for transformer and feactor) from each manufacturers. Type tests as per IEC! POWERGRID technical specifications shall be carted out After successful type tests, RIE bushings shall also be specified for 76SkW Transformers and Reactors to avold catastrophic failures of Transformiers/ Reactors on account of CIF ‘bushings. TD ‘will initiate’ procurement action for 765kV RIP bushings. : ‘Action: CC TD/ Engg./ AM. standardization of Gurrent rating of 429KV & 245KY bushings of Transformer and reactors: it was decided that to reduce the inventory, standardization of current catings® ‘ther dimensions for 400KV bushings for 766/ A00KV , 400/ 220KV. 400 192K {aneformers and 400KV reactors needs to de done, Similarly standardization of ‘2O0KV bushings for 400 220KV & 220/ 132kV Transformers is required. it was agreed that 220kV and below, RIF faushings shall be standardized by Engineering. For standardization of 400KV bustiings. since current rating is 2600Amp and may Tequire new design of the bushing, & was decided that under vendor Gevelopment, TD department will procure 2 qos. bushings (one no. each for transformer and reactor) from each menufackurers, Type tests as per IEC/ POWERGRID technical specifications. Aker successful type tests, standard AOOKV Bushings shall be incorperated in technical specifications of Transformers! Reactors, TD shall initiate procurement action acec:singly. Acti : CC TD/ Engg AM Poge dots BA3) A) it was. decided that procurement of Regions on experimental basis vil “specification and after taking oy 5) a a specification It was decided that the technical _ Based on the feedback, { "future packages, 8) ‘Engineering mentioned that the seme: feta ady Inclusion of UHE PD sensors in Teenst oe D will engage 0 detailed ae and a Eakin _votective: sellabilty, inductors shall be posed for single phase 8B9) 10) second jn Inter tep soto LCSD shallonen at less Action: CC Engg. Provision of VTs or bushing test adapie's fon compensating residual flux it case of switching of ICTS.: 2 s Engg. told that in the recent ‘SVG peckege, provision of VT fs there ‘whieh can be feed ae feedback to CSD remy fegerdlng yesidual flux. Based on the performance in SVC Transformels, further course of action to be decided Action: CC Ergg/ AM ‘Tan delta at variable frequency of bushings #5 routine test at factor ‘AM department informed they have detected a no. ‘of faulty bushings through arable frequency tar-aatia reethod (20 Fz 45042). Further the replaced PGA yolated bushings are also having change in ten cette ot variable frequency Honce measurement of tan-delta al vatlad'e ‘requerioy has proved to be 2 Very vital tool in detecting healt of ie BUSHINGS: itwas decided thet tan-delte at variable frequency: (Range 20Hz to S80H2) shall ‘be carried out at factory as coutine test for the bushings, so thet the results C27 be compared at ste duriog testing and ©) Sa ‘of any problem. during manufacturing of bushings, the same can be detected at factory: ‘Accordingly, Mecessary change in technical specification to be done by Engg for the Tan daft at variable frequency es routine tert : . ‘mation: CC Engg! @A&! page 3015are: ONT AeaE ant: wenden (Gata We dese) oa (ate We Hascic) Sa Sa TA Ga TAT SRL SAM SY aA state) : we: ) Stree fiue @a_vsaav se- Rati, 19 AE 2017 HUGE Tea ces R35 Te) 2) Aerasiaray sad caitstem) Feat So sata wae Atle / fara: Implementation of Relay setting and standarisation of DR channels. is has reference to email dated 10-Jul-15, 11-Aug-15, 24-Aug-15, 01-Sep-15, 12-Nov-15, 17- Nov-15, 02-Dec+15 & 17-Mar-16 regarding the above mentioned subject, Recently on dated 18-May-17, 4 Nos 400KV. lines tripped which lead to total black out of a generating station with apprx 3000MW generation toss On analysis, it has been observed that the shib’ protection was enabled in one of 400kV Line protection without taking the physical status of line isolator which led to un-intended operation of stub protection and consequent tripping of the line. Also it has been observed that in DR, the Digital channels (Stub operated etc) are not configured as per the Standard DR list circulated vide 10M C/AMICP dated’ 14-Jul-15. It is requested to ensure provision of wiring/scheme for correct status of line isolator for stub protection action at the earliest. ‘Compliance feedback may be provided by 31-May-2017, of Rawr wart tq: 1) faders (were) 2 arias Poem (wae AAwiz)POWERGRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED Corporate Asset Management Ref: CC/AM/Circular/ May, 2017 TECHNICAL CIRCULAR NO.03/2017 Sub: Guidelines to check for single phasing while taking outage {f the breaker of any feeder is tripped on protection operation, breaker pole stuck condition will be taken care of by LBB protection, since sufficient current is available for LBB operation, However, when feeder is being taken out manually or tripped due to receipt of direct trip due to manuai trip command at other tend, the current is below LBB pick-up threshold and thus LBB falls to actin case of stuck breaker condition, Thus, operator action is required to handle the condition of stuck breaker which occurs during manual ‘opening of Circuit Breaker or on receipt of Direct Trip due to manual opening at other end. in order to handle the said condition, the operator needs to follow the following procedure: {l)_ SUBSTATION WITH ONE AND HALF BREAKER SCHEME: (A) Local Substation: 1) If the feeder is only through Tie Breaker: a) Open the Tie bay circuit breaker by giving opening command b) Observe breaker status on control panel/SCADA/event logger ¢}_ Observe all the three phase currents and three phase voltages 4} If the breaker is in intermediate/open position AND if current is still flowing in any of the phases then action to be taken. Inform RTAMC and substation in charge ji, In consultation with RTAMC, trip main breaker of the other feeder in the Dia. ii, In case the other Main Bay in the Dia is Future Bay (w/o CB) then trip the all the Main CBs connected to the Bus to which the Future Bay is connected, - shall be OPEN. 2} Ifthe feeder is only through Main breaker: a) Open the Main circuit breaker by giving opening command. b) Observe breaker status on control panel/SCADA/ event logger ©) Observe all the three phase currents and three phase voltages. @) If the breaker is In intermediate/open position AND if current is stil flowing in any of the phases then action to be taken: Inform RTAMEC and substation in charge {In consultation with RTAMC, trip main breaker of all the feeders connected to the ‘main Bus to which faulty breaker is connected - shall be OPEN. 3) Ifthe feeder is through Main and tie break 4) Open the Tie circult breaker by giving opening command b) Observe breaker status on control panel/SCADA/event logger---- shall be OPEN ©) Ifthe breakers in intermediate position, ask the person available in the control room to check in the switchyard for physical status of pole indication, if one of the poles is in closed condition, Do not open Main breaker. (if Main CB is opened first, follow Step b and c. If ane of the poles of Main CB is in closed condition, Do not open the Tie breaker ). 6) Inform substation in charge/RTAMC, €) If the breaker status is not intermediate position and if it is in open position, Trip the main breaker of the feader on which outage is required.8) A} Observe the Mein Breaker status on Control panel/SCADA/event logger—If Main CB is in intermediate/open position & current is present in any of the phases then Open all the Main CBs connected to Bus to which Main CB of the feeder is connected, Check the 2. if current is found to be zero then this means that Main CB was stuck. 2. In case, current is still present in any of the phase then trip Hother Main Breaker of the same Dia and check current in all the phases. If no current is present that means Tie CB hhad stuck h} Incase Main CB has stuck (point no : £2 ) then first open both the Isolators of stuck Main Bay a C8 and then restore Bus by closing all the CBs (except stuck CB) connected to Bus. In case Tie CB has stuck (acint no: F.2) then first open both the Isolators of stuck Tie Bay CB ‘and then restore Main Bus Bar connected to Main Bay of the concerned Feeder by closing all the CBs (except Main C3 of the concerned Feeder) connected to Bus Bar & restore the other feeder of the Dia by Closing other Main CB of the Dia in co-ordination with RTMAC/Remote end. #f Other Main Breaker: In case other Main Bay in the Dia is Future Bay (w/o CB] then following is tobe done: * First restore the concerned Feeder Main Bay Bus Bar by closing the connected Main Bay CBs (except Main Bay C8 of the concerned Feeder) ‘+ Then Trip Main Bay C8s connected to the Future Bay Bus Bar |i case only voltage is present in any of the phase (i.e. no current is persisting in any of the phase) after tripping of the fine then that means any of the CB (Main/Tie) has stuck at remote end and same needs to be informed to remote end immediately. Remote end: ) If feeder is through Tie breaker, this breaker will trip on Direct trip received due to manual tripping/L88/Bus bar protection operation at ather end, b) Observe the current in all the three phases ) if current persists in any of the phase, inform S/S in charge and RTAMC 4} Inconsultation with RTAMC, trip main breaker of the Hlother feeder in the Dia. e ) If the feeder is through main breaker, this breaker will trip on direct trip received fH current. persists in any of the phase, communicate to RTAMC , trip main breaker of all the feeders connected to main Bus to which faulty breaker is connected 2) If Main and Tie breaker are both In service, both breakers will trip on Direct trip received command. h) Check the position of Main & Tie CB in SCADA/EL/Control Panel. i) If Main CB is showing intermediate position AND current is present in any of the phase then Open all the Main CBs connected to Bus to which Main CB of the feeder is connected. If current {s found to be zero then this means that Main CB was stuck. i) IFTie C8 is showing intermediate position AND current is present in any of the phases then trip main breaker of the other feederif in the Dia | If Main & Tie CB are showing open position but current is present in any of the phases, Thea Open all the Main CBs connected to Bus to which Main CB of the feeder is connected and check for the current in all the phases. if no current is present that means Main CB had stuck. {m case, current is stil present in any of the phase then trip Hother Main Breaker of the same Dia and check current in all the phases. if no current is present that means Tie CB had stuck. ')_ In case Main CB has stuck (point no : (i) & (k)} then first open both the Isolators of stuck Main Bay C8 and then restore Main Bus Bar to which Main CB of the concerned feeder is connected by closing all the CBs (except stuck CB) connected to Bus In case Tie CB has stuck (point no: () & ()) then first open both the Isolators of stuck Tie Bay CB and then restore Main Bus Bar to which Main C8 of the concerned feeder is connected by closing all the CBs connected to Bus & restore the another feeder of the Dia by Closing other Main C8 of the Dia in co-ordination with RTMAC/Remote end.(ll) SUBSTATION WITH TWO MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS SCHEME: 1) If the feeder is through Main Breaker: While tripping Main breaker manually or on DT received, if one of the poles is found stuck after observing current in the phases/oreaker pole status from Control panel/SCADA take following action a) Shift feeder to TBC and after ensuring proper closing of TBC breaker, Open Bus side and ling side isolator of main breaker b) If TBC breaker is not available then trip all the breakers connected to the bus to which faulty breaker is connected along with Bus coupler 2) Iffeeder is through TBC breaker: While tripping T8C breaker manually or on DT received if one of the pole is found stuck after ‘observing current in the phases/breaker pole status from Control panel/SCADA, take following action 2) Shift feeder to Main breaker if it is available and after ensuring proper closing of Main breaker, open both side isolators of T8C breaker. 5) Main breaker is not available then trip all the breakers connected to the bus to which faulty TBC breaker is connected along with Bus Coupler. requested to instruct the concerned personnel to follow the above procedure and steps. Every site ‘may be instructed to make operating procedure for each sub-station. In this regards sample operating procedure is enclosed herewith as a reference at annexure-t. Site may also be advised to arrange operator refresher training quarterly at Site to familiarise the operating procedure, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (AN) CC Distribution: 1. ED (€R-1/ER-2/NER/NR-1/NR-2/NR-3/SR-1/SR-2/WR-1/WR-2)/ GMII/C)-Odisha Project 2. All Regional Gm (aM) Copy to: 1, Director (Operation). for kind information pleaseA os) Wem: sre HeMaree (wee aatoniz). Rat Fh Aer yarn (wae Adawic: ‘Sette aratert S.8F 5.85.08... Ma S| LOLS TSRTS.A Wasi: Cc/AM-PROT/2017-06 ‘aria: 03.05.2017 Subject: Regarding the tripping of a double circuit line on fault in adjacent line due to incorrect PSL in Micom Relays Recently, at one of the stations, multiple: element tripping incident was observed due to incorrect configuration is PSL. Ut was observed that in the PSL of MICOM P444.signals namely 2Ph fault (DDB 318) & 3, Ph fault (DDB 320) were configured wrongly 10 Main & ‘Tie breaker tripping (Annexure-l}. Due to this, despite sensing Phasé to Phase fault of adjacent line correctly in Zone-2, the relay issued tripping to Main & Tie breaker instantaneously, without waiting for Zonv-2 time delay. Thus, the two lines having this configuration tripped, for the fault in an adjacent line, Such incidents eould be avoided through thorough testing of the protection scheme durine pre-commissioning, Tt is thus recommended that during pre-commissioning testing, for each test, the concerned official shall verily the relay DR and Events for ensuring the corect sequence of operation. Further. the feedback for the lest-kit needs to be taken such that it accurately represents the signals going for CB trip and not just the "Any signal, ‘The commissioning engineers may also be advised to check the PSL, logie of relays during pre-commissioning and keep a signed copy for record and future reference, Compliance of the same may please be enswired aaa eo HORS . (ans gery 1ST ce. tExecutive Director (Asset Management)- For kind information please. i}ray KT) vaies TS) NIVIVATYL Hay ud UOD. 1 [PFadr arate B.S. AVS MU AY, re SALES. UT atsems.7.8 ‘Wash: cc/AM-PROT/2017-04 feeriem: 28.04.2017 Subject: Regarding maintenance of the SAS server installed by M/s GE (Erstwhile ALSTOM). jhe issue of frequent data freezing of SAS servers was taken up with M/s GE in a recently held review meeting, M/s GE had sugeested for regular maintenance of the SAS sere database for avoiding the said issue. In this reference a procedure has been prepared by M/s GE (enclosed) for the maintenance of SAS server at 20 days interval, Sites having ALSTOM SAS may please ho advised to undertake the maintenance activity once in each month and create a ZI notification for each maintenance activity. For ensuring compliance please. ce 1 oR 4 se Ban, (aiRaat Saree) Encl: As above ‘ccutive Director(Asset Management). For kind information please. @)SERVER MAINTENANCE DOCUMENT GE Substations Doc er ESE [This document and all information contained herein are proprietary to GE. Any lunauthorized use, distribution, or reproduction of this dacument (in whole or in part) or of any information contained herein is specifically prohibited. This legend must appear on any authorized reproduction {in whole or in part)INDEX TABLE SECTION 1: ROOT CAUSE. 1.4 VISUAL EFFECT. 1.2 ANALOG VALUES DEAD BAND SECTION 2: IDENTIFY SERVER HANGING PROBLEM... 2a DATA FLOW. 2.2 HISTORIAN SIZE. 2.3 RAMUSAGE FOR SQL. 24 — CPUUSAGE, SECTION 3: CREATION OF HISTORIAN. 3.1 STOP S2K SERVER...» 3.2 CONNECT TO SQLSERVER... 3.3. NEW DATABASE. 3.4 DEFINE MEMORY FOR HISTORIAN DATABASE, 3.5, CLEAN HISTORIAN LOG..... 10f1911 @ SECTION 1: ROOT CAUSE RAM consumes unwanted running applications such as Visual Effects Control panel>Performance and Information tools>Visual effects > Performance Options window will open and select “Adjust for best performance” option.(This Visual Effect Settings applicable for windows7 OS only) etre 0 1 wre [gr ia cee een | Seen “ae hp sntey: artist pmeenoang [7 sat rsa ets fever tide vere ens pve sors ‘ omndsheon povce te (a ec ce at yee saufertex spare & adit ea pafomeree 6 sin: Ty tints cera od aenars oor Ey Mat nds sonny mary Esato nt tr Sa one IE) enaiesaarncooosten ED Foe ersten vw | [a resear aie etystea vow Ey rte aurmenstone ste slg 5 Setanta Ey Seostadoender on porter 1 stonstacorunde wears TD tovthannss nade ne Ty Sontrentcen eecton cane i Storrs eontntete ogg 5) Se cpon endo tne IG Smear coontots 1 | secarszretia te IE tsdepshatooterean ites tacetn 2 vn ser on ards arta 6? Gemedbr so ete i ape a atemaren nd || fs? srtomrfoncton aaa SE Iain er Aa Dead band settings for analog values will log Frequently to server when transmission on eyent is set for : cyclic short period particular meaning) 17 1 Fonersw ftransmission S Es ranamnsson’on avert [Seeded (hs variation) \Graphical representation liv pansl assignment 20f29@ 2.1 Frequent Logging of Analog Data points in Sever which leaves to Data over flow. It was recording in C drive->Temp->Trace->Dataflow as below SECTION 2: SERVER HANGING PROBLEM LOGGING STARTED Wed Feb 15 17:37:33 2017 jwed wed Feb 15 2017) Report Flows/s} avge238; mine0} max=24 wed Feb 15 2017} Report Flows/s; avg-238) wad Feb 15, 3017! Report flows/s} avd=238) fwed Feb 15, Zor7i Report Flows/s; avge238) min=0; wed Feb 15 2017; Report Flows/s} avge238) min=0; red Feb 15 2017} Report Flows/s} avge220; mineO; jed) Feb 15 2ou7} Report Flows/s; avg-228 min-0; jed Fab 23, Report flows/s; avgq709} mi wed Feb 25, Report Flows/si avg-220) wed Feb 25 E Report Flows/si ave-71L; bwad Feb 15, Report flows/3; ava-707; Wer! Fah 15 Ronarr Flmwe/s ava? 20° Feb 15 2017; Report ‘Flows /s5 avg=238; mineo; maxe23} 2.2 Data over flow in Historian which crosses beyond our predefined Memory size allocation. Historian database> Rig] Lou 3of19 sae eee i S i) 5 Se sf ht click>select pre operties Botan eospeagiat we Sis | Dash oes z Prec Sers : (ote foot |2.4 Increasing Cache Memory in RAM. 4ofag@ SECTION 3: CREATION OF HISTORIAN To overcome this issues “Data over flow in Historian which crosses beyond our predefined Memory size allocation”, Manual deletion and Recreation of Historian to be done for regular interval of 20 days’ time for Main and Standby Server. Steps to be followed for Manual Deletion and Recreation of Historian: 3.1 First stop the $2K Server by clicking on the windows Taskbar of Tower icon ITE AE Ser sity coconterarmctigs Toes. MICIOHOAT ‘uncioeoanipe-srsvzesT#a1.04] Bite rir diate oT FS 8 RRC Se oe) oC Secon amceran oeet7-2017 13. = 50 sar O0OD) Oey Taree, AALCIOONAY AALCLODSALLDI/SKSHTA#STSBLAY Babee ne SE AT earn ascimanaonsioute Spay inst sega tet Ge ee HD. cps Miroir OES RA Ge te SEEMED at noe, mci mccoy SonseT Sri Ut on Stee Pe Te sae) : Ce eee eee ann ne ca \eeeisezatt Bt E889 Seeoerepocerocetmsteat SrA 2 L451 guawe chectvon | (cris Beaiaae Se ae See tee cae sncioiaht alcLGbOATDY SOSTSSSTIONE Sesipeanat 13.60 39 487 Gace reifad(). k oBeOnbancr nncigasns aascigosaninyrscswTessTesiKe FR ‘atcean tox i6008) (00) natal SEARG 1S 38 409 queue overt HAvaGi 138 33309 Sicoanere: Fe ee Cee, yeee, SANCLOSS4t AnICHOUSAIGDO/ SCORED eSTOBINE ascucnsht anteigo9x0200/Programs>Microsoft SQL Server 2005>SQL Server Management Studio. 3.2 Network name will be appear in the Server name: ”OISERVM” then Click Connect in SQL management Studio Frais taigosot : ENGR Server System | SQL Server.2005 = _ Sever pe. [Database Engine He [Windows Authentication = (mere ed 70f19Bof1s3.2.¢. click “OK” 9of193.2.d. Historian is deleted and window appears as below (J Databases | series Up Sew RTT samt 10 of 193.3.a. New database window will be open Ten Srtpeauenaoet | | an of 193.4 In new Database window, edit Database Name as Historian and select initial size: 10,000MB and Historian log Initial size: 5000MB. Aaah Hitoion Data PRIMARY — [fi9.000 ==] 8) 1 MB, unesticied gomh _| Histon tog Leg NotApofcable”” 5.000 By TOpercent unestcted ont E le 5 | 3.4.a. And then Click in the link “Change Autogrowth for Historian” choose 20 percentage for file growth and Unrestricted file size. 12 of 193.4.b. Next Click in the link for Historian Log “Change Autogrowth for Historian_log” Choose 20 percentage for file growth and Unrestricted file size. Eves Poonam 3.4.c, Finally Enter OK for Historian Creation 13 of 19Server Objects Replication Management 1 [i Notification Services BB 5Q1 Server Agent 14 oF 19 =a ee i OTSERVM Sa Sen | Databases, | Bseauty | | | Server objets "el aRepleation | ‘Camenagement i Eancteaton serves | | | 4 | [BsaL sewer aga3.4.e. Then Go to File->Exit. 3.5. Launch the installCleanLog. bat file in DSagile & Pacis Package folder } DASAS\PACIS\pacis-v4.6.7.2-basE\0i 01.36\Tools\sqlcleanHistorianJob 15 of 133.5.a. It will install the job CleanLogHistorian on MS SQL Server. This will be install a new job on SQL Server, This job will be periodically flush the Historian_log file 3.5.b. This will be install a new job on windows, flush the RAM cache Memory. this job will be periodically 16 of 19ise boston Tesla dee aa BD My documents @ shwreddocmerts inahoo ot a : Text Dounert My Computer he Q vy verraes ea ato pet Faso intalercache bat eedeeaie Sebostacntie bate Mode: Wesnestn, Fetruny 0, 2017, 3:03 ine 189 bytoe SeadaTcesmes ecooare 3.5.¢. Afier launch this bat file SQLCMD window will be appear and installs the job successfully. Pago esa 3.5.d In archive Poller, Database configuration setup to be reloaded 27 of 19To execute this process Open Poller>DSagile setup>Re load this configuration 3.5.f. In archive Poller Events and Analog values to be Deleted for 90days older datas, To Execute this process Open Poller>MySQLDatabase Setup>Purge now 18 of 19Rel Sub: 10 20 ver fits ariitert arn dian fae Sntht uite Aerie fare Technical Circular No, 02/2017 /AM/TC/ Dated: 18-04-2017 ‘Transmission line tripping investigation/ analysis methodology. Instances of tripping/ auto reclosures of transmission lines online faults has been eported in regions mainly due to tree infringement in ROW, insulator flashover due to lightning, pollution Oehest bird droppings on insulators, reduced clearance between conductor and Cann wire/ OPCW, st power line railway ine crossings, jumper to tower (due tots large size). Post fault patrolling is being carried out to identify the root cause of ‘tripping and taking cerrective/ preventive actions. However, in number of the cases, lt has been obtenes that Senet Cause of tripping In a line is not being ascertained by the patrolling staff for initiating methine For fective identification of root cause of line tippings following ‘methodology for post fault patrolling needs to be adopted: 0) iter Wipbing/auto-eciose ona tine, concerned line maintenance engineer shal check the {aul lecator reading of both ends to identity the location of faul, Pest fault patrolling of about 10 towers on both side of fault location is tobe carried out if foul locenne readings are mot matching, post fault patrolling ofthe involved section is tobe carried ace, b) Line Maintenance Engineer will personally associate in post fault Patrolling. High optical comers eta shall Be used to take close photographs of components In upper portion at SENGTs covering conductor, jumper bolts, insulators, hardware ete. for detection of any abnormality like pitting/flashover marks. Tower top patrolling using Drones on critical ‘ransmission lines, which are cleared for drone patrolling by DGCA & MHA, may be taken up. <) ible carrying out post fault patrolling, Line maintenance Engineer should atk the nearby thagers for any abnormal sound at the time of tripping. Following points needs be checked: + Tree infringement, * jumper clearence (Requirement of counter weight/ insulation tape etc, to overcome Feduced jumper clearance) * Sag of OPGW/Earthwire with top phase conductor, + Clearance at power/ railway line crossings etc., Availability of copper bonds, Proper fixing of hardware lke corona rings, grading rings, arcing horns, * falltion deposits on insulators lke bird droppings, dust pollution, brick kilns in the vicinity ‘* Broken/ damaged insulators ‘+ High tower footing impedance + Ground clearance * Foreign object on live conductor like polythene, kite thread ete + Any other defect 4) In case of lightning related tripping, which can be established by asking nearby villagers, line Staff shall measure tower footing impedance at affected lccation(s), 1’ touce footing a9} In case of lightning related tripping, which can be established by asking nearby villagers, ine staff shall measure tower footing impedance at affected location(s). If tower footing impedance of affected tower is higher than 10 ohms, necessary actions like, counter poise, chemical earthing etc. may be taken up and a post measurement of tower footing Impedance may be carried out to ensure that impedance is within the limits. in case tower footing impedance does not improves, transmission line LAs may be installed in consultation with CC-AM. ©) Handheld laser rangefinder equipment needs to be used for measurement of electrical Clearances at power line crossings/ suspected jumpers. 30. I fault could not be identified by the concerned line maintenance engineer, cross patroling of affected section is to be carried out by regional AM/ other group to identify the cause of tripping, 40° Regional AM shall forward post fault patrolling findings of each Incident of line tripping to Corporate AM within ten (10) days of tripping/ autoreclasure along with proposed corrective? Preventive action on email id ccamtl@nqwerarid.co.in. Findings of trippings should be backed yp with supported close up photographs taken by the patroling staff during post fault patrolling for all the towers checked by the team. 5.0 Please advise concerned officials of your region to strictly follow above guidelines for identifying/ rectification of the defects in the line. ees ain AE enfant Frere (giz Saiz) fren: arferé Pitre : (ar Bay (aad Aaa) (oat B83) aT ae-1y/ ci 2) / (Stster Fee) | (aft aaa) / (sfart aa-2)/ (efi aa D/ cafe ea-2)/ cere yt aa) Wer reer (eH): (TT Aaa) / cert a-2)/ (seh aa-3)/ (get a1) (gf aa 2)/ (aster sz) / (Prt are) / coPift f-2) / (@Peh ae-2) / GRR a2) / oe YT aay weft ere aver arqeern refer rd af fae gar: armen ware Pere Pers (rreayy (afta) ander t Fits Of, o,f, HoréPert aa)POWERGRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED ‘Corporate Asset Management Ref: CC/AM/Circular/ Date: April 18, 2017 TECHNICAL CIRCULAR NO.04/2017 ‘Sub Disabling End Zone Protection feature in Bus bar protection scheme Based on the Coordination meeting between CC-AM, CC-Engg and CC-QARi, it has been decided to disable/block the End Zone Protection feature in AIS/GIS Bus bar protection scheme. Hence it Is advised to ensure blocking/disable the end zone protection feature in Bus bar protection ‘scheme through necessary changes in settings and/or logic of the relay. Site shell ensure the implementation of blocking /disabling of end zone protection in future project. Compliances may be sent to CC-AM after necessary changes in Relay Settings. a ‘faa: wpiarear (wate AetaraTS)~ 5.67. VSA IVS NNT BS STE TY Ta ASUS. A seme (STO-STHE, He.zTe) aft Rar quench: 1. fears (area) 2, arebereres fete aren. 2a1, (5.88.3. FSF. BV ST, BR WEN HSS LA! sNO-suey, He Spe EL TTAes Tstgee Cve = ABB Open HMISO0 with password “System” (Password is common for all the vers. of HNIISOO) | HMIS00 - REBWIN = [ REBS00 Demosetfie] File] View - Configuration Settings Testing. Tool Open Save as. [Ulead trom protection ayitem Download te protection systers Compare. Bit Go to file and select “upload the protection system” to read the latest config. file from relay. {Bl Hnasc0 - neawin [REBSG0 Demesetnie "EIST File View | Configuration [Saings). Testing. Tools Windows 2 Breaker failure protection Voltage clesse Bay Protection Cireuit-breakers Isolators Go to settings and select “End Fault Protection”Select bay 01 and double click to open, remove the selection as shown above to deactivate EFP, similarly deactivate rest of all feeders,Goto file and select “Download to protection system” to write the modified fle to relay.i thew Fax / tei Post [ aa Government of India ta Rage afte Central Electricity Authority efor eter Reger MS Soutltem Regional Power Committee rotaatt mete No 29, Race Course Cross Road BENGALURU- 560.009 args. 560009 *""180:9001:2008 180:9001:2008 ase Z Fianes OSOTDSTS FART OBO RE, STOTS Enaitnssge@yshoosom re cs Ne sRPCSENVOVNDIY 908.5 ~ 5S Bais bae iotao | Rar Hy To: Fara Ala a BAM As per enclosed list Feraisub: Adoption of New Over Voltage Relay (OVR) Gradings for 400 kV and 765 kV ‘Transmission Lines of Southern Region - reg. GH HRA {Sir Madam, You are kindly aware that in the past one year, 2 number of new 400 kV and 765 kV transmission lines have been added to SR-Grid in addition to reconfiguration (including LILO) works of the existing 400 kv and 765 KV transmission lines. In this regard, a comprehensive exercise of OVR grading for 400 kV andl 765 kv transmission lines of Southern Region (existing as on March, 2017) has been carried Out and the new OVR Gradings proposed to be adopted for these lines (along with study results) have been circulated to all Constituents for mocitcations/ omissions/ coniments, if any, vide SRPC mail dated 06.04.2017. After duly Incorporating Constituents’ comments, the final OVR gradings to be adopted for 400 kv and 785 kY lines in the Southern Region are enclosed for kind implementation. The OVR grading’ as 2pplicable to their system shall be implemented by the concerned Constituent/ Utility with immediate effect. The gradings have also been kept in SRPC website (http: /mww.sroc.kar.nicin for easy reference, Confirmation wart. implementation of new OVR gradings may please be intimated to stp¢:protection@email.com latest by 30.04.2017. | this regard, Constituents’ attention is also drawn to the following general recommendations: * For over voltage detection, even though Ph-to-N voltage Is preferable to Ph-to-Ph voltage, in case there is a difficulty in achieving required discrimination for OVR grading on account of limitation imposed by voltage resolution of the relay, itis recommended that Ph-to-Ph Voltage ‘be used for Over Voltage detection. * For OVR grading to be effective, itis recommended to use anly those Main relays thot offer a drop-off to pickup ratio better than 0.97. IPF© In order to verify Voltage and Time grading in operation of OVR, Stage-l (OVR4) protection, it is recommended that OVR_START signat is configured for triggering corresponding Event Logger (El), ond OVR-L_TRIP is configured for triggering corresponding Event Logger (EL) and Disturbance Recorder (OR). 7 © Since the given gradings are meant for only VR, Stage-I protection, it is recommended that OVA, Stage-lI protection be implemented with 140% of nomtnal voltage with a time delay of 100 msec. adhe Yours faithfully, ava! Enel : arate As above ie ee on ares area Superintending Engineer () V Coy SIR aoe Hersey, rata, WHSITASRT, STL AGM (I/c), SRLDC, POSOCO, Bengaluru10 A 2 FEE 3 3 3 0 5 Te eae 410 cE a) 6 iio mE fel ns: FEC) 6 Ey 4 103 6 € 3 09 3 i 2 103 4 1 T 2. Qver Voltage Relay Gradings: "fumbey|——FromBosnane| TOBY ToBusName| cha] Length io ‘aro ee, 5 is] caw wwecaooas] aoa g "| Rl ar a aston] (7 Rlezw/invpe sono] asacia| 7] es al 2 ‘ceil oor aol ca 1 fa ssi e200 eeu aT mule sen "soon sed] son) assess aoa’ SP “oan es son] “soon saci] os] —humoaces engl "J “oan a Page 4 of 23wat fis aiten aitp sar fetes aedtr wae Aaente feat = aS are: aartorers freera(est), ar anno Great: aegra wratert Sa (5 SA sO YAS R/T ave Oye M/s Te werrate sant: steer sistec aie: 17" April 2017 dah Sars wate Adele / creeTAy 107 fava: Failure of ICT due to Phase reversal in 220kV Substation. Recently these was a failure of 3ISMVA. 400/ 220K ICT! in one of subsiation of POWERGRID at the time of first time synchronization due to change of phase sequente in 220KV side. To avoid this type of incident in future following actions are requested to be taken: 1. in case synchronization facility is not available in 220kV system and 220kV substation belongs to other utility, synchronization may be done at 400kV side CB of POWERGRID. 2. 220KV bays should be first test charged on no loud. 5 In case Bus Bar proteetion is not operatcnal and the 220kV ineomer is directly connected ir Githe switchyard of other mility, during first time synchronization, the highest value of can testional Over curtent relay may be Kept Tower than the through fault eutrent (0.8 Ise), which may be changed to normal after successful synchronization. 4, Bletuical phasing out must be done fiom both sides of each line! Transformer feeder getting connected to other subsiation before synchronization. 5, he JOLY CB coniacis to be wired in REF/ Directional Oe relay, where 220kY voltage input is-also therefor triggering the DR during first tine elosing/ tripping oF ihe cB saty action at your end please. is for your kind information and nec ty, Rar ase BI Parana Tare) artaras Piers tens sone Fe) (