Social psychology,

science, and surveillance:

Understanding The Experiment

Stephen Reicher, University of St. Andrews

S. Alexander Haslam, University of Exeter

Social Psychology Review, 2002, 5, 7-17.

 The Experiment 2

Abstract

This paper examines issues relating to a recent study of intergroup relations

conducted in a simulated prison environment (Haslam & Reicher, 2002). The study
was designed as an intensive field test of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1979) and also broadcast by the BBC in four one-hour documentaries entitled The
Experiment (Koppel & Mirsky, 2002). The present paper examines the role that
surveillance played in the study's findings and the implications of this for the
scientific status of the project. Contrary to the argument that surveillance invalidates
the results, we argue that, as in all social psychological research (including the
Stanford Prison Experiment; Haney et al., 1973), it is a factor that needs to be taken
into account in explaining our findings. However, we argue that the simple fact of
surveillance cannot explain (a) the patterns of support for our various theoretical
predictions, (b) the correspondence between various forms of qualitative and
quantitative data, or (c) the emergence of tyranny towards the study's end. Indeed,
rather than seeing surveillance as inherently problematic, we argue that there is a
need to recognize, and theorize about, its general relevance for both social
psychology and society.

In May 2002, the BBC broadcast a series of four one-hour programmes entitled
The Experiment (Koppel & Mirsky, 2002). The series was introduced as part of a
scientific investigation into power and inequality and it examined the behaviour of 15
men who had been randomly assigned to roles as Guards or Prisoners within a
purpose-built prison over a nine-day period.

The findings of the study were complex and are reported extensively
elsewhere (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2002, in press; Reicher & Haslam, 2002a,
2000b). Broadly speaking, though, the study was designed to examine the social,
clinical and organizational consequences of assignment to low and high status
groups over an extended period during which a range of experimental manipulations
were attempted. Following social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), these
 The Experiment 3

manipulations related to the permeability of group boundaries, the legitimacy of

intergroup relations, and the participants’ awareness of cognitive alternatives to the
status quo. The results provided support for the theory in showing that these factors
all impacted on social relations within the prison — most notably, by increasing the
level of resistance among the Prisoners (cf. Ellemers, 1993; Reicher, 1996).

There were, however, a number of unexpected outcomes. In particular, the

Guards failed to identify with their high status position in the manner that previous
research — specifically, the Stanford Prison Study (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo,
1973; Zimbardo, Maslach & Haney, 1999) — might have led one to expect.
Moreover, as part of an unfolding dynamic, this paved the way for the overthrow of
the Guards’ rule and, ultimately, for the emergence of a more tyrannical regime.

From this brief summary it is clear that The Experiment addressed a number
of issues that are of both social psychological and of general social importance.
What is more, we argue that the findings have important implications for the way in
which we study and understand group processes in general and the psychological
bases of tyranny in particular. However, the validity of any of our claims clearly
depends upon the scientific credibility of the study, and that is what we intend to
explore in this paper.

Such an exploration is all the more important in light of suggestions

(particularly from media commentators) that, whatever its value as television, the
project had limited or at least only secondary value as a scientific enterprise. Writing
in Time Out, Tom Howard (2002, p.173) remarked that the programme was
“surprisingly riveting”, but after observing that “the BBC will have you thinking that
this is an experiment first, TV programme second” he concluded “don’t you believe
it.” Furthermore, in the wake of the broadcast, some commentators suggested that
few scientific insights could be gleaned from the study precisely because its findings
were shown on television. According to these analyses, such surveillance
fundamentally affected the participants to the extent that their actions were little
more than play acting — and hence of little or no general significance. We fully
accept the basis of this charge, but not the conclusions drawn from it. That is,
surveillance clearly did play a major part in determining the outcome of the study.
 The Experiment 4

However, that does not mean that participants were ‘merely’ play acting, nor does it
diminish the significance of the study. If anything, it increases its richness. Let us
consider each of these claims in turn.

Participants clearly were aware of being filmed at certain points in the study
and this did have an impact on their actions. Most notably, at the start, some
Guards were acutely aware that attempts to assert their authority could lead to them
being seen in a negative light by people who watched the eventual television
programs. This played an important part in their unwillingness to accept the role of
Guard and thereby fed into the overall dynamic of the study. However, those who
propose such points as a criticism of The Experiment are a little like Molière's
Monsieur Jourdain — a man who was shocked to discover that he had been
speaking in prose. What they fail to grasp is that they are not dismissing the science
of our study but rather offering an alternative scientific explanation of its findings —
one which implicitly emphasises the importance of (a) self-presentation, (b) the
audiences to which we are visible and (c) our accountability to those audiences.
Such accounts are hardly uncontroversial or insignificant either on a theoretical or a
practical level. They also speak to important dimensions of everyday social life —
the impact of surveillance cameras in public spaces, the consequences of televising
parliament and courts, the effects of media presence on human behaviour, to name
just three.
 The Experiment 5

What is more, we would add that surveillance is a factor that impacts upon all
research in social psychology and indeed upon all of our social being. On the former
point, it is worth noting that in a recent interview with the San Francisco Chronicle,
Zimbardo himself is quoted as observing that "in a sense, [our] prison study was one
of the first examples of reality TV, because we videotaped the whole procedure"
(Stannard, 2002). Indeed, if anything, the filming of Zimbardo's study was more
obtrusive than in our study due to the nature of available technology. Yet it makes
no sense to suggest that the presence of cameras rendered Zimbardo's study
worthless or unscientific. And indeed, to the extent that we are critical of Zimbardo’s
conclusions, it is certainly not on these grounds. Not least, this is because, carried
to its logical conclusion, such an argument would invalidate all scientific study in
which participants know they are being observed — in other words, almost all
psychological science. Since the Hawthorne studies of the 1920s (Roethlisberger &
Dickson, 1939; see Haslam, 2001, for a recent discussion) researchers have been
well aware of the fact that the act of observation can change what is observed (i.e.,
the Hawthorne effect, or, as some have referred to it, albeit less accurately, the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle). However, it is generally acknowledged that this is
a factor that needs to be integrated into our analyses rather than something which
invalidates our studies.

Moreover, given that surveillance is an integral part of human social being,

the very idea that behaviour which is displayed when people are being filmed or
monitored is somehow less relevant or less real than that which occurs when they
are not monitored constitutes a rather bizarre form of solipsism. It presupposes that
people are only truly themselves when they are totally isolated, and that behaviour
should only be taken seriously when people are cut off from all relations with others.
But human beings are social animals. We live in a world where the monitoring of
behaviour by others is the rule rather than the exception. Surveillance is therefore
an important component of social reality rather than something that subverts it.
Indeed, one of the basic insights of the Foucaultian perspective is that different
forms of surveillance — and the different forms of knowledge they reveal about who
and what we are — play a fundamental role in constituting us as social subjects
(Foucault, 1979). As a result, the impact of various forms of surveillance is, and
needs to be, part of the very subject matter of psychology (e.g., Reicher & Levine,
 The Experiment 6

1994; Levine, 2001; Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992; Spears & Smith, 2001). From this
perspective, psychological claims become suspect not so much because of the
presence of surveillance in our research as in the absence of surveillance within our
analyses of that research.

Thus, we go further than our critics in acknowledging the significance of

surveillance within The Experiment. For us, it was no mere epiphenomenon or
distraction. Rather it permeated all aspects of the social environment and all
aspects of the participants’ responses to the environment. It literally formed the two
terms that shape action: person and environment. However, by now, it should be
clear that the more seriously we take the charge that surveillance shaped what
happened, the less plausible it is to dismiss the consequences of surveillance as
trivial, artificial or uninteresting. More precisely, the conclusion that people were
simply play-acting because they were on television is untenable on a number of
levels.

First, one cannot reduce the issue of surveillance to the impact of television
cameras. The Guards and Prisoners in our study may well have been concerned
about the television audience at times, but they were also under surveillance by
other audiences — members of their own group, members of the other group,
ourselves as experimenters — and at times these audiences took precedence over
those implied by the cameras. Indeed, as the study developed its own history and
as these more immediate groups gained greater salience, so the distal audience
became less significant. For these reasons, any attempt to explain behaviour as a
response to just one form of surveillance must be a gross simplification.
 The Experiment 7

Second, the notion of ‘play acting’ is unhelpful on both conceptual and

empirical grounds. Conceptually, play acting implies behaviour that is at odds with
an underlying ‘authentic’ self. To argue that surveillance leads to play acting is
therefore to ignore the more profound point that surveillance serves to (re)create our
very notions of selfhood. In this sense, surveillance acts in a way that affects the
underpinnings of our social being and there is no need to suggest that the ensuing
feelings, thoughts and actions are any less authentic than any others.

Empirically, too, we have shown that surveillance affected the willingness of

our participants to assume the roles imposed upon them as their own identities.
However, we also have more direct empirical grounds for dismissing the notion that
what the participants did was play acting. As well as observing what people did, we
also administered psychometric and physiological measures throughout the study.
Indeed, one of the most distinctive features of The Experiment was that we were
able to collect extensive qualitative and quantitative data and to base our analysis on
the convergence between these different data sources. This practice is routinely
recommended in methods texts, but it is a practice more honoured in the breach
than in the observance.

To illustrate how this worked, we can look more closely at the way in which
intergroup relations impacted on participants’ stress over the course of the study. In
the first instance, we can look at behaviour. From events portrayed in The
Experiment (Koppel & Mirsky, 2001) it is clear that, over time, the Prisoners became
more comfortable in their position while the Guards became more distressed. This
was particularly true once opportunities for promotion had been ruled out, and
relations between Guards and Prisoners became more conflictual (as depicted in the
first episode of the programme; Haslam & Reicher, 2002).
 The Experiment 8

Moreover, as the conflict escalated, the Guards became the targets of

bullying, they became demoralized, and they became burntout — a state most
clearly manifested in the decision of two Guards to withdraw from the study once
their regime had become un workable. This stress, we argue, was secondary to the
declining sense of shared social identity among the Guards as set against the
increasing sense of shared social identity among the Prisoners.

Turning to psychometric data, we can see from Figure 1 that these patterns
were mirrored in the self-reports of participants on standardized scales designed to
measure the three main components of burnout (exhaustion, callousness and lack of
accomplishment; after Maslach, 1978; see also Cooper et al., 2001). Thus while the
burnout levels of Prisoners remained constant and low throughout the study, that of
Guards increased significantly. Notably too, the interaction here was not only
statistically significant (F(1,11) = 5.06, p < .05), but the effect size was also very
large by the standards of experimental research (
2 = .32).

4
Prisoners Guards
3.5

3
Burnout

2.5

1.5

1
Day 2 Day 7
Study Phase
Figure 1 Burnout as a function of group and study phase
 The Experiment 9

Finally, as a physiological measure of stress, we can look at the levels of

cortisol in participants’ saliva to see how these varied as a function of participant
group and time (e.g., see Laudat, Cerdas, Dournier & Guiban,1988; Umeda,
Hiramatsu, Iwaoka, Shimada, Miura & Sato,1981). As can be seen from Figure 2,
the same patterns again emerge. So while there was a general increase in cortisol
levels over time (and particularly after group boundaries were made impermeable;
F(2,22) = 20.32, p < .001;
2 = .65), this increase was most marked for the Guards.

2.5
Prisoners Guards
2
Cortisol levels

1.5

0.5

0
Day 1 Day 3 Day 5
Study Phase

Figure 2 Cortisol levels (
mg/10ml) as a function of group and study phase

The fact that people (a) acted in a stressed manner, (b) indicated on self-
report measures that they were stressed, and (c) displayed the physiological
correlates of stress, therefore gives us confidence in concluding that they weren’t
just playing at being stressed. For while it may just about be possible to maintain a
behavioural simulation of stress, it is harder to contrive convincing scale responses,
and it is obviously impossible to fake hormone levels. One should therefore not
confuse the argument that behaviour was (in part) produced by surveillance with the
inference that it was any less ‘real’ as a result.
 The Experiment 10

Third, the very distinction between play, pretence and reality is unhelpful.
While we reject the suggestion that all our participants were doing was play acting,
we do not deny the importance of play and pretence in The Experiment. Clearly our
participants did play games and did seek to fool their various audiences — just as
we do in our everyday lives. Humans, as Whiten and Byrne (1997) tell us, are
machiavellian animals. What is more, as we have argued elsewhere (Reicher,
Spears & Postmes, 1995), surveillance obviously impacts upon our ability to fool
others and pursue our games. However, even events which had relatively contrived
origins typically ended up in something much more full-blown and intense that had a
dramatic (and often quite different) impact on other participants. This means that (as
clinicians who use role-playing techniques are aware; e.g., Yablonsky, 1992) even if
participants were knowingly acting out a role or 'playing up', the consequences of
such actions quickly became real for everyone else and rebounded back on
themselves in ways that took them well beyond their initial starting point. What was
fascinating for us was precisely how ‘play’ became real and how imposed roles
became assumed identities (something we could only see because our study
allowed us to watch behaviour develop over time). Once again, to dismiss what
happened as 'mere' play is a gross simplification of complex, shifting and socially
significant phenomena.
 The Experiment 11

All in all, then, the ‘playing for the cameras’ argument is insufficient to explain
the richness of our findings: it cannot explain responses that clearly are not
pretence, it cannot even explain the significance of behaviours that are pretence,
and more fundamentally still it cannot explain what is possibly the most powerful
outcome of a longitudinal study like ours — the fact that identities, behaviours and
relations shift over time. The purpose of any scientific explanation is to explain
patterns of variability within a data set. In our study, the cameras were always on,
so how could their presence explain the change in Prisoner behaviour after
promotion from Prisoner to Guard was no longer possible? How could it explain the
dramatically shifting patterns of group identification and group organisation as the
study progressed? Above all, how can it explain why 15 men who initially rejected
even mild forms of inequality shifted towards acceptance of a much more draconian
order? One might argue that this was mere random variation – a matter of people
just trying different things for the sake of it. However, that is more to acknowledge
an impasse of understanding than to offer enlightenment.

By contrast, we do offer an explanation of this variability (see Haslam &

Reicher, 2002; Reicher & Haslam, 2002b). Moreover, as noted above, the study as
a whole was designed in order to test this explanation. This is a key point. For
much of the scientific value of any experiment derives not from the ability to
generalize directly from specific findings to the world at large (i.e., naive empiricism),
but rather from the fact that it provides a systematic test of theoretical hypotheses
that have been developed and specified in advance (Haslam & McGarty, 2003;
Turner, 1981). In this regard, it is wrong to see The Experiment as a simulation
study whose goal was to reproduce the conditions of a real prison. Rather, the study
employed elements of a prison and other institutions (an office, a school, a barracks)
in order to create a context of group inequality. It was primarily designed as a test of
hypotheses deriving from social identity theory as to the conditions under which
people would impose or resist this inequality (see also Ellemers, Spears & Doosje,
1999; Haslam, van Knippenberg, Platow & Ellemers, in press; Hogg & Abrams,
1988; Reicher et al., 1995; Turner & Reynolds, 2002). And in the process of testing
ideas related to group status, boundary permeability, and the security of intergroup
relations, it not only provided support for this theory, but it also extended it.
 The Experiment 12

This was particularly true of the study’s latter phases where the spectre of
tyranny provided a rare opportunity for hypothesis generation (see Haslam &
Reicher, 2002, Reicher & Haslam, 2002b). This is because the dynamics of tyranny
were explored here in a way that has rarely (if ever) been possible in previous
empirical work. There is an important lesson here too about the relationship
between method and theory and the dangers of building theories that mirror
methodological limitations. In recent years, social psychology has become
increasingly dominated by the 30-minute laboratory study in which social action and
social interaction are increasingly rare (see Haslam & McGarty, 2001). By contrast,
our study allowed us to manipulate and measure human interaction using multiple
methodologies over an extended period of time. And once history and interaction
were allowed into the study it became quite obvious that many factors which are
traditionally seen as either intrapsychic constructs (e.g., authoritarianism; Altmeyer,
1988; social dominance; Sidanius, 1993) or features of the external environment
(e.g., stressors, Kahn & Byosiere, 1990) are actually the outcomes of the
developing relations between groups. We would argue, then, that to understand
such features properly, history and interaction need to become equally central to
our theory.

In much the same way, The Experiment allows us to see that most of the
impact of surveillance lies precisely in the way in which it contributes to the shaping
of interaction. Surveillance has particular significance because it can invoke
audiences that are not immediately present and hence bring to bear constraints
upon action from elsewhere in space and time. For instance, as we have already
pointed out, the way our Guards acted was not limited by what was going on there-
and-then in the Prison but was also affected by their imaginings of what others might
say and do on viewing their actions at some point in the future. On the one hand,
then, to invoke surveillance is indeed to enrich our analysis of how and why people
acted as they did in our study. But, on the other hand, it raises an issue of yet wider
theoretical importance.

For once one appreciates that people can be guided through their
imaginations to consider and to act in relation to other places and times, then it
obviously becomes impossible to sustain simple situational determinism. Or, to put
 The Experiment 13

it slightly differently, behaviour may well be shaped by context, but for humans,
context is far more than just the here-and-now. One example of just such
determinism is the original explanation of the Stanford Prison Study, according to
which Guards and Prisoners were helpless to resist the behavioural cues implicit in
the roles ascribed to them by the researchers (Zimbardo et al., 1999). Certainly, no
analytic consideration was given to the possibility that people might use their
imaginations to stand outside these roles and adopt a critical stance towards them
— precisely the point that is implicitly raised by considering the impact of
surveillance in The Experiment. For this reason, a consideration of surveillance
does not so much raise questions about the scientific validity of our study, as
challenge the theoretical adequacy of the study we set out to question (e.g., as
presented by Zimbardo et al., 1999).

Far from the issue of surveillance undermining the scientific status of

psychological studies, we therefore believe that psychology needs to devote far
more effort to developing a science of surveillance. That is why we welcome the
attention paid to this issue. It is also why we hope that one contribution of The
Experiment will be to play some small part in demonstrating the significance of
surveillance both for important forms of action and for theory.

Note

This paper elaborates on ideas presented in a keynote address to the Annual Conference of
the Social Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, The University of
Huddersfield, September 13, 2002. We would like to thank the participants and the BBC for
their commitment to this research and their contribution to our ideas. The authors had equal
input into this paper and into the research as a whole. Order of authorship was decided by
the toss of a coin.
 The Experiment 14

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