GUN & SPEAR

PART ONE THE GUN AND SPEAR IN AFRICA:

GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT
By Chris Peers

Chris Peers examines the tricky wargaming dilemma of This was fine, but if I was going to cover
people like the Zulus I knew I would
recreating the historical balance between primitive weaponry want, if not “thousands of ‘em”, at least
and firearms on the tabletop. In this first part of a two part a hundred or so - and if they were going
article he explores the introduction of the gun to tribal Africa. to be manoeuvred in a reasonable time
that meant multiple-figure bases. This
Recently I have been working on some been left out and will appear at intervals new basing system in turn meant that
new rules for warfare in late 19th on the North Star web site), but my differences in formations and fighting
century Africa, and the process has once previous rule set, In the Heart of Africa, styles could now be better depicted,
again focused my thoughts on the clash had perhaps not realised its full potential. opening the door to a more sophisticated
between modern and traditional fighting It was written specifically to accompany classification system for the men and
methods in the “Dark Continent”. There Foundry’s “Darkest Africa” figure range, their weapons.
is a lot more to this question than simply and I began to feel that this had saddled it
It was this system that brought me
“can I shoot the fuzzy-wuzzies before with a number of limitations. It covered
up against another problem with In
they break my square?”, and the subtle only the territories which were explored
the Heart of Africa. The shooting
interplay between different weapons and by Europeans after about 1860. Basically
procedure had been designed mainly for
tactics is fundamental to a recreation this meant between the Upper Nile and
things like exploring caravans firing at
of the period. So in this article I want the Zambezi, and excluded the Horn
charging tribesmen - which it did very
to share a few of my thoughts on what of Africa, South Africa and the West
well - but when it came to the depiction
actually happened and how best to coast. So there were no Abyssinians,
of musketeers versus spearmen, or
represent it on the tabletop. This subject Zulus or Ashantis, to name but a few
musketeers versus trained riflemen, its
is hard to beat for colour, atmosphere of the most successful opponents of
all or nothing figure removal approach
and the variety of forces involved (I have European colonialism. It was also very
had begun to feel rather unsatisfactory.
much a character-based, semi-skirmish
managed to fit thirty army lists into the Two points stood out in my reading of the
rule set, using forces of no more than
rule book, but about another thirty have period. One was that almost everybody
a few dozen separately based figures.
dropped their spears in favour of firearms
Below: Disciplined British firing lines struggle against hordes of Zulus. Figures by John Ray. as soon as they could get them, and

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Above: Two regiments of Foundry Zulus prepare for further conflict with the British.
those who had them quickly displaced
or enslaved most of those who did not,
giving rise to the Arab saying that “the
gun is the sultan of Africa”. The second
was that these same guns proved to be
pretty well useless against colonial forces
and most of the famous victories over
the imperialists were won with good
old-fashioned assegais. How to reconcile
these apparently contradictory “facts”?
BACKGROUND: GUNS IN
THE DARK CONTINENT.
European guns had been important trade
items on the coast of West Africa since
the 17th century, and by the middle of
the 19th they were beginning to infiltrate
the unexplored centre of the continent.
In 1862 the explorer John Speke found
that the people living on the shores of
Lake Victoria were familiar with flintlock
muskets brought by Arab traders, and
around the same time Richard Burton
mentioned a company which was
importing 13,000 guns a year into East
Africa. When Stanley sailed down
the Congo in 1876, the first clue that
he was approaching the Atlantic and
“civilisation” came when the Bangala
opened fire on him with muskets instead
of the spears and arrows which he had
been dodging so far. But it was not just
rusty old smoothbores that were getting
into the hands of Africans. This was a
time of rapid technological development,
with the introduction of the Minie rifled
musket in the 1850s, the single-shot
breech-loader a decade later, and finally
in the 1880s the magazine rifle using
smokeless powder. Each stage in this
progression saw European and American
armies discard hundreds of thousands
of obsolete weapons, many of which
found their way to Africa. In 1871
Stanley had found the Arabs of Tabora
already in possession of “German and
French double barrels, some English
Enfields, and American Springfields”
as well as flintlocks. Already by this
date military and exploring expeditions
were arming their local recruits with
Sniders and similar breech-loaders;
these men often kept their weapons after
they were discharged, and it was not
long before traders were buying them
up and selling them in the interior. In
1884 Harry Johnston visited a chief on
Mount Kilimanjaro who maintained a
force of four hundred warriors, half of
whom carried Sniders. The Zulus got
colonial
conflict
many of their guns via the Portuguese
in Mozambique, and others acquired
such weapons by defeating invaders in
battle. In the Sudan in 1875, for example,
the Bari massacred an Egyptian patrol
and captured thirty-three Sniders and
Remingtons. (This worried the Egyptians
for a while, though it turned out that the
tribesmen could not use them against
their former owners as they had forgotten
to take any cartridges.)
In 1888 the British consul-general
at Zanzibar reported on the influx of
breech-loaders, which were replacing
the “cheap and worthless” old trade
guns. Unless checked, he concluded,
this meant that “the development and
pacification of this great continent will
have to be carried out in the face of
an enormous population, the majority
of whom will probably be armed with
first-class breech-loading rifles.” So in
the Brussels Treaty of 1890 the European
powers agreed to ban imports of all
rifles and percussion smoothbores into
Africa between twenty degrees north
and twenty-two south. In practice,
though, this agreement it had little effect,
because gun-running was such a lucrative
business. Arab caravans transported
firearms smuggled in via the east coast

THE ENFIELD, MODEL 1853 BRITISH PERCUSSION RIFLE-MUSKET

This British-made rifle-musket was originally issued to the British Army in the Crimean War to replace their smoothbore
muskets. Although it got its name from the British Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, the owner, the British government,
was sensitive about remaining neutral and so the rifle-muskets used in the American Civil War were made at private factories
in London and Birmingham. It weighed 9.20 pounds, was 55.25 inches long with an angular socket bayonet and fired a .577
conical bullet that was normally interchangeable with Springfield’s .58. The 1856 model, which was a shorter version with a
sword bayonet, was often called the “Sergeant’s Rifle.” Maximum range 1,100 yards, effective battlefield range up to 800 yards.

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 REMINGTON RIFLE
The single-shot, rolling-block Remington rifles of the 1860s and 1870s were of extremely rugged construction. In America they
remained mainly a civilian weapon, although the U.S. Army and Navy purchased some rifles and carbines in small numbers.
Remington, however, sold hundreds of thousands of the weapons to foreign governments—some of which remained in service
well into the twentieth century.
as far north as the Sudan. Officials in
German East Africa happily sold guns in
Uganda, as did Charles Stokes, a former
Church Missionary Society employee.
The Ethiopians re-equipped much of their
army with breech-loaders captured from
the Egyptians or supplied by France,
Italy and Russia, while Samori Toure,
who led the Mandinka of West Africa in
their wars against the French, set up his
own workshops to manufacture rifles and
ammunition with considerable success.
Altogether around a million guns
were sold in Africa between 1885 and
1902 alone, so why didn’t the consul’s
nightmare come true? Well, sometimes it
did. Not all African warriors were poor
marksmen, and some of them could win
a firefight even against European-trained
troops, especially when they had the
benefit of cover. The Mahdist victory
over Hicks in 1883 was partly due to
the accurate shooting of the “Jihadiyya”
(though later on the Khalifa’s armies
seem to have lost the knack). At Adowa
in 1896 the Ethiopian army overwhelmed
the Italians with close range fire from
modern rifles. And in Angola in 1904,
Below: A British expedition comes under attack from Masai tribesmen.
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Kwamatvi riflemen firing from the cover
of the bush massacred a Portuguese
column which included cavalry and
artillery, as well as infantry armed with
bolt-action rifles.
But more often the standard of
musketry was abysmal. Charles Gordon
complained that even the Egyptian
soldiers he led against the Bari in 1872
were “not a match for a native with spear
and bow; the soldier cannot shoot, and is
at the native’s mercy, if the native knew
it.” J. H. Weeks, writing with thirty years’
experience of the Congo, put it even
more forcefully: “I have seen the native
make war with both kinds of weapons,
and I would prefer to fight twenty natives
with guns than two armed with spears.”
The reasons for this failure to make the
most of the new weapons were complex.
Many of them were of poor quality -
either worn out and obsolete military
surplus, or cheaply manufactured “trade
guns”. In 1845 a writer in Birmingham
had condemned the city’s gunsmiths for
exporting “horribly dangerous” weapons
made of poor iron, and pointed out that
while a good quality musket cost 16
shillings to make, “African guns” were
being knocked out for a third of that
price. Later in the century cheap and
inferior copies of more modern weapons
were also manufactured specifically for
the undiscerning African market, and
by the 1890s a factory in Spain was
even producing counterfeit Winchesters.
Furthermore the powder supplied for
these guns, Weeks tells us, “is generally
adulterated, and is warranted to make
more noise and smoke than do damage”.
Not only were their weapons often
inferior, but African warriors seldom
received proper training and shared the
Right:
1. Hlubi warrior, Langalibalele
Rebellion, 1873. The majority of Hlubi
warriors were probably dressed in this
way during the skirmish at Bushman’s
Pass. The braided iziyendane hairstyle
was once characteristic of the Hlubi,
but by this time was just a young man’s
fashion. The rest of the dress and the
weapons follow Zulu styles.
2. Zulu warrior, Nokhenke ibutho
(regiment), 1879. This man wears
typical ‘war dress’, an abbreviated
form of regimental regalia. He retains
a headband and cow tails around the
legs; as well as a bag for percussion
caps and a bandolier, he wears a wooden
‘bravery bead’ necklace indicating his
prowess as a warrior, and a variety
of magical charms around his neck.
A high percentage of Zulu warriors
carried firearms in the war of 1879. The
Nokhenke ibutho formed part of the right
horn at the battle of Isandlwana. They
carried black shields, sometimes with
white spots.
3. Pedi warrior, Sekhukhune campaign,
1879. His breech-hide and cloak are
typical Sotho costume, and he carries a
mix of traditional and modern weapons,
a knobkerry, axe and rifle. Because
large numbers of Pedi had worked at
Kimberley, they had acquired many
firearms. Many probably also wore items
of European clothing.
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© Osprey Publishing Ltd. www.ospreypublishing.com

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 Above: Before the introduction of firearms, Shaka’s men defend the hill. Foundry figures.
usual tendency of inexperienced shooters
to fire too high. Samuel Baker believed
that their main problem was an inability
to estimate range accurately, or to
understand the use of their sights. Aiming
high was a perennial failing with shooters
accustomed to the curving trajectories of
spears and arrows, and was no doubt still
necessary with the low muzzle velocities
which poor quality gunpowder produced.
But when this habit was carried over to
more modern cartridge weapons with
a flatter trajectory, it must have made
the tendency to fire over the enemy’s
heads even worse. Africans often tried to
compensate for the inadequacies of their
muzzle-loaders by ramming in enormous
charges of powder. This not only risked
bursting the barrels, but the recoil made
Below: These Askaris fight off various jungle tribesmen who have launched an attack on their river-side trading post.
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it difficult to hold the gun to the shoulder.
According to Weeks the method used on
the Congo was as follows: “he holds the
butt of the gun against the palm of his
half-extended right hand, and, without
taking aim, he pulls the trigger with a
finger of his left hand. By this mode of
firing he guards his eyes from the sparks
of the powder as it flashes in the pan, and
his head from being blown off should the
barrel burst from the excessive charge of
powder...” Not surprisingly the results
were less than impressive. For example,
on one occasion during F. D. Lugard’s
campaign in Bunyoro an estimated
thousand rounds were fired
at his marching column with both
muskets and breech-loaders from the far
side of the Semliki River, a distance of
about a hundred yards, but no one was
hit.
Even troops in European employ were
often inadequately trained, because
ammunition was too expensive to be
wasted on target practice. Commander
Cameron, who took thirty-five “askaris”
with Sniders on his trip across the
continent in 1873, once had each of them
fire three rounds at a packing case set up
a hundred yards away. “Although there
were no hits”, he remarked resignedly,
“the firing was fairly good.” Another
British officer, Captain Wellby, once saw
two of his men firing repeatedly (against
orders) at a friendly Turkana tribesman
who was walking slowly towards them,
obviously not appreciating the danger.
Luckily they missed him completely,
leaving Wellby unsure whether to be
3/7/09 12:35:42
 WINCHESTER 73
In 1873 Winchester produced an improved version of the Model 1866 chambered for a new, centerfire version of the .44 round.
The “Winchester ‘73” became the most famous of the Winchester rifles and one of the most celebrated guns of the West, period.
The gun shown here was owned by Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII (1841-1910); the silver medallion
inset into the stock is engraved with imperial symbols including the Star of India. The rifle received a special blued vision by the
gunsmith James Kerr at the London Armoury Co.
more angry about their disobedience or
their marksmanship! Another problem
was that the world view of most Africans
encouraged them to think of shooting
skill in magical terms, and countless
European soldiers and explorers were
asked for charms that would make their
musketry as effective as the invaders.
Speke encountered a classic statement of
this attitude from King Mtesa in Uganda:
“The king turned to me, and said he
never saw anything so wonderful as my
shooting in his life; he was sure it was
done by magic, as my gun never missed,
and he wished I would instruct him in
the art. When I denied there was any art
in shooting, further than holding the gun
straight, he shook his head...”
RITUALISED WARFARE.
On the other hand an African musketeer
was not necessarily just an inferior
version of his European counterpart.
His tactics and equipment might be
well adapted to the conditions of tribal
warfare, however useless they appeared
to outsiders. In June 1873, for example,
an interpreter reported to the British
authorities that two dead Ashantis left
behind after a skirmish had been carrying
oddly shaped pieces of iron - apparently
taken from doors and shutters in captured
villages - instead of conventional shot for
Below: an intrepid European explorer makes use of the local transport.
Gun & Spear Complete.indd 7
their muskets. He had assumed that this
was due to a shortage of ammunition,
but was told by the local people that
the enemy were well supplied with
lead shot, and that these projectiles
were deliberately issued to men “in the
hottest part of the fight”, “as the most
destructive and hurtful”. No doubt the
Ashanti soldiers were expected to open
fire at such short range that the damage
done to those struck by these jagged
chunks of metal would outweigh their
inferior ballistic properties. Similarly the
actions of the Fan of Gabon, whom Mary
Kingsley observed filing the rifling out
of the barrels of expensive sporting guns,
made perfect sense in their own terms.
They bought these weapons for their
solid workmanship, which made them
less prone to burst than the trade muskets,
but they could not get a reliable supply
of cartridges to fit them, and in any case
had no need of long-range accuracy for
jungle fighting. So by converting them to
smoothbores they made it possible to use
the assortment of improvised ammunition
which they had available.
Lack of lethality was in any case not a
handicap in the semi-ritualised warfare
which was practised by many African
tribes, especially in the western and
central forest zone. Here the aim was not
to inflict heavy casualties, but to satisfy
honour by making a display of strength,
and perhaps to acquire an enemy corpse
or two so that the skull could be put on
show as evidence of success. Outflanking
moves, or any manoeuvre which might
corner an opponent and force him to
fight to the death, were deliberately
avoided. Weeks describes a battle which
he witnessed in 1882 in which the
contending parties formed two lines in
full view of each other: “we could see
a man loading his gun, then he walked
forward, pointed his gun in the direction
of the enemy, and fired, after which he
hurried back to cover; then another went
and repeated the former’s action, and so
on up and down the line. The lines were
more than two hundred yards apart, and
no fighter went in close enough to the
other side for his gun to send a bullet
among the enemy. The grass hid them
from one another, and the only chance
of damage was for two men to meet
accidentally in the space between the
lines, when they had gone forward to fire;
but apparently they listened too carefully
for every rustle in the grass.” In the 1873
- 74 campaign against the Ashanti, British
officers repeatedly complained about the
conduct of their Fante allies, who were
obviously playing by similar rules: they
refused to contemplate flank attacks or
follow up a retirement, but retired to their
original position after every fight and
allowed the Ashantis to do the same.
SO WHY BOTHER?
Why, then, were guns so sought-after?
Not all the reasons are explainable
in terms of technical performance -
they no doubt included questions of
prestige (firearms being expensive
foreign imports, hence associated with
wealth), and simple fashion. But there
were practical reasons as well. Most
traditionally armed warriors carried
shields made of animal hide, which were
effective against spears and arrows but
could be penetrated by a musket ball.
Guns were also popular because of
their usefulness for hunting. Even large
antelopes were seldom killed outright,
even by poisoned arrows, and usually had
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© Osprey Publishing Ltd. www.ospreypublishing.com

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 to be followed on foot for miles before
they succumbed. A gun, however, would
bring them down much more quickly,
saving the hunter hours of walking. In the
same way, if a man was hit by a musket
ball he seldom got up and carried on
fighting as would often be the case with
a superficial arrow wound. The musket,
despite its poor long range performance
compared to more modern firearms, may
also have had a slightly greater effective
Left: Cape Frontier Wars, Mid-19th C.
1. Xhosa warrior in typical traditional
dress, naked except for a hide cloak
held across the body for protection. The
majority of ordinary Xhosa warriors
would have worn this style of dress
throughout the Cape Frontier Wars. Note
the throwing spear with a sharpened
metal prong instead of a blade.
2. A young Xhosa warrior wearing a
headdress of grey wing feathers. The
exact significance of this headdress
is uncertain, although it may have
been worn by young initiates keen to
demonstrate their prowess. It features in
engravings depicting warriors as late as
1850. The shield is of a mid-nineteenth
century pattern; earlier shields were
more oblong in shape. By this time
shields in general were not common,
although isolated examples were taken
from 1877 battlefields. Early accounts
mention warriors wearing sandals
of this type.
3. Chief Maqoma, c.1835. Maqoma was
the son of the early Xhosa hero Ngqika,
and served as regent during the minority
of Ngqika’s heir, Sandile. Evicted from
his lands by the British, and a bitter
opponent of white expansion, he was a
principal Xhosa leader in the Sixth and
Eighth Wars, when his flair and daring
greatly impressed his enemies. He is
credited with having invented many of
the Xhosa guerrilla tactics. He is shown
here in the dress of a Xhosa chief, a
leopardskin cloak and crane-feather
headdress. Maqoma was a
noted horseman.
4. Cape Mounted Rifles renegade,
c. 1852. The Cape Mounted Rifles were
one of the most important Colonial units
used against the Xhosa in the Frontier
Wars. In the Eighth War a number
of troopers of Khoi descent, hitherto
staunch allies of the Europeans, felt
so aggrieved at their treatment by the
Colonial authorities that they defected
and joined the Xhosa. This man is
wearing his CMR tunic, and carrying
the double-barrelled carbine issued
to the CMR for bush fighting. The
remainder of his dress is the mix of
European and African styles typical of
the Khoi at this time.
Gun & Spear Complete.indd 9
range than traditional missile weapons.
Most African bows were designed for
hunting in dense cover rather than for
distance shooting, and the arrows rapidly
lost hitting power at more than a few
dozen paces, as well as being easily
deflected by intervening vegetation.
The noise and smoke of gunfire could
have a decisive morale effect on
opponents who were not used to it,
and there are numerous examples of
spearmen who refused to face firearms,
even though theoretically they should
have defeated them easily. When Major
Serpa Pinto was attacked in his camp
by an overwhelming force of Barotse,
one of his askaris accidentally loaded
his Snider with explosive rounds filled
with nitro-glycerine (probably brought
along for use against elephants). After
firing a few rounds the gun inevitably
burst, but by then several of the enemy
had been blown to pieces. The Barotse,
faced with this gruesome spectacle,
quickly retreated even though the weapon
which had done the damage was now
out of action. According to Burton the
Tuta, who terrorised the region south of
Lake Victoria, had “a wholesome fear of
firearms”, and would avoid contact with a
caravan carrying the red flag of Zanzibar,
knowing that it would be accompanied by
men with guns.
Firearms could also be an effective
counter to skirmishing tactics. Among
the Karamojong of northern Uganda
it was customary to advance to within
spear range of the enemy, taunting him
with gestures, and then either dodging
his missiles or deflecting them with a
shield before throwing their own. Acholi
Return with us to the Dark Continent next month as
Chris explains how all of these factors can influence game
design, rule mechanics, and army lists, and we also throw in a
scenario, pitting gun against spear...
Above: Enfield and Frobisher will be back in colonial Africa next month. Do you dare return?
musketeers inflicted heavy casualties on
the Karamojong in their first encounter
because their balls travelled too fast to
be seen and dodged. The Karamojong
seem to have adapted quickly, however,
because the elephant hunter “Karamoja”
Bell says that they learned to duck as
soon as they saw the smoke from a
musket, and that they massacred several
Arab caravans using this tactic.
Of course it should not be forgotten that
not everybody did bother with guns.
Most Africans who came into contact
with firearms eventually adopted them
- even successful warrior peoples like
the Zulus and Matabele, although they
tended at first to incorporate them into
their traditional close combat tactics as
a sort of superior throwing assegai, to
be discharged just before getting stuck
in with stabbing weapons. But there
were those who never saw the point,
no doubt agreeing with Weeks that a
couple of trusty spearmen were better
than twenty bad musketeers any day. The
best known of these conservatives were
the Masai, who in the Kedong Valley in
1895 speared around 900 Swahili and
Kikuyu gunmen with minimal loss to
themselves. Their neighbours the Hehe
had actually been quite keen on guns in
the 1870s, but by the time of their fight
with the Germans at the Rugaro River in
1891 they seem to have fallen back on
traditional methods. In this battle,
a Hehe eyewitness said, they “shot one
gun (probably as a signal to attack); they
all moved quickly and fought
with spears”. Certainly the results were
all that could have been desired, the
German column being almost annihilated
in a few minutes.
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 Gun & Spear
part two The Gun and Spear in Africa:
Getting the Balance Right
By Chris Peers

In this second part of a two-part article, we return to the same highly visible flash, and so the
situation is less clear-cut. Naturally we
Chris Peers’ exploration of the introduction of the gun have no precise data on things like the
to tribal Africa and present a scenario for his Death in the muzzle velocities of African firearms,
Dark Continent rules. but let us assume that the low quality of
the powder and the large amounts used
From where we left off... How to Spear a Musketeer would cancel out, so that when it left the
muzzle a round from a smoothbore would
“Firearms could also be an effective The ducking tactic described by Bell was be travelling at about the same rate as
counter to skirmishing tactics. Among widely adopted by those warriors who one from a contemporary British Army
the Karamojong of northern Uganda still relied on hand-to-hand fighting; it musket. This could be as high as 1500
it was customary to advance to within required agility and quick reactions as feet per second, but some modern tests
spear range of the enemy, taunting him well as courage, but it was frequently have suggested 800 feet per second as
with gestures, and then either dodging successful and it is worth examining the more reasonable, especially if the round
his missiles or deflecting them with a facts behind it. When a flintlock is fired does not fit tightly in the barrel. Even
shield before throwing their own. Acholi there is an appreciable delay between the with a proper round ball the velocity falls
musketeers inflicted heavy casualties on flash of the priming powder in the pan to about half that after 200 yards, and a
the Karamojong in their first encounter and the detonation of the main charge. I chunk of scrap iron would certainly lose
because their balls travelled too fast to do not know exactly how long this “hang speed more quickly because of increased
be seen and dodged. The Karamojong fire” would be, but after you pull the air resistance. To do a proper calculation
seem to have adapted quickly, however, trigger it seems a very long time indeed, is beyond my mathematical abilities, but
because the elephant hunter “Karamoja” which lends credence to the theory we can make a rough guess that over
Bell says that they learned to duck as that the target might be able to duck in the first 100 yards (ie. 300 feet) the ball
soon as they saw the smoke from a time to avoid the bullet. But percussion might average 600 feet per second, giving
musket, and that they massacred several ignition, which was common in Africa by an attacker half a second to dive for cover
Arab caravans using this tactic.” the late 19th century, does not produce when he sees the smoke from an enemy’s

Above: Askaris, armed with a variety of guns, advance ahead of this heavily laden baggage column.

40

shot at that range. That should not be
too difficult for a fit young warrior. But
as we have seen, if a musketeer fires at
100 yards you hardly need to duck, as
the odds are he will miss you anyway. At
50 yards you might only have a quarter
of a second, but even that could make
the difference between losing a plume
from your headdress and losing your
head, especially if the nervous gunman is
aiming too high.
Of course this whole system is
oversimplified. Ducking would only work
as advertised against a single opponent,
or a unit firing a simultaneous volley on
a word of command, which is unlikely
to have happened with the undrilled
troops who formed the bulk of African
armies. A more likely scenario would
be that one man would open fire and
his companions would then follow suit,
producing a scattered volley or ripple of
fire over several seconds. Perhaps the
main advantage of the tactic lies not in
the physics but in the psychology: if you
believe you can avoid being shot then
you will charge more determinedly, and
Above: Masai warriors of all castes rush to defend their village, Elbejet, from the
“German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition”, who are intent on stealing their cattle.
the more determined you look the more
scared and shaky your opponent will be at
the sight of you, making your confidence
self-fulfilling. The time taken to reload
a muzzle-loading musket would vary
according to the training and steadiness
of the shooter, and whether prepared
cartridges were supplied or - as was
usually the case in Africa - loose powder
had to be measured out for each shot.
But there seems little reason to doubt the
general assumption at the time that a man
on the receiving end of a charge would
only ever get off one shot. As Carl Peters
observed of the Masai, “long before the
muzzle-loader has been made ready for a
second discharge, he has come bounding
up, to finish the matter with a thrust of
his lance... Generally, in fact, the (Arab)
caravans fire their guns once, and then
immediately take to flight, whereupon they
are regularly massacred to the last man.”
None of these tactics would be much use
against breech-loaders, which had higher
colonial
conflict
muzzle velocities as well as being much
quicker to reload - though the effect
might be much the same if the rifleman
had forgotten to lower the sights as the
enemy got closer, as happened sometimes
even to British regulars. Writing of his
fight with the Banyoro at Masindi in
1872, Baker recalled “how impossible
it appeared for natives in masses to
produce any effect against Snider rifles”.
Most African successes against troops
equipped with such weapons were the
result of ambushes and surprise attacks,
though the Zulus at Isandhlwana seem
to have minimised the advantages of the
British Martini Henrys by clever use of
ground, even after the element of surprise
had been lost.
Rule Mechanisms
So how do we deal with this complicated
business in our games? In general I like
to err on the side of simplicity in my
rules, as while I am as keen as anyone
41

Top: Carl Peters and his “German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition” march into Uganda.
Above: Masai warriors stand proudly in all their battlefield finery.
for my games to play like real battles, I
believe that nothing can be less realistic
than over-complicated mechanisms which
slow things down and prevent the game
being played to a satisfactory conclusion.
One obvious way to represent the low
rate of fire of muzzle-loaders is to require
their users to spend a turn reloading after
every shot, and that is what I did in In
the Heart of Africa. This system has the
advantage that it reproduces something of
the musketeer’s real-life dilemma about
exactly when to fire at an enemy who is
charging with cold steel, but on the other
hand it perhaps gives the player rather
too much control over this decision.
This time round I dropped the idea of
legislating specifically for reloading,
mainly because I was getting fed up with
all the pieces of cotton wool we used as
markers for men who had to reload, and
42
which never seemed to stay where we
had put them! In any case I have never
specified exactly how long a turn is, so
it is hard to justify a fiddly rule like this
in “time and motion” terms. So in my
new rules, Death in the Dark Continent,
everything can shoot every turn, though
breech-loaders get better modifiers to
represent their higher rate of fire.
Instead of simply “killing” a figure, a
“hit” can now either inflict a disorder
marker on the target base or - in
exceptional circumstances - remove it.
This requires the use of more markers,
but in practice it is bearable, especially as
they are allocated per base, not per figure,
and we no longer need all the reloading
ones. One advantage is that damage to
a unit is now reversible to some extent,
as it can remove disorder markers by
rallying, rather than always having to
suffer a permanent reduction in fighting
capacity through the removal of figures.
It also makes it easier for players to
envisage a “hit” as implying something
other than somebody falling over with a
bullet in his head. So the target might be
temporarily shocked by the discharge of
the guns or frightened into taking cover
by a near miss, rather than someone
actually being hit. There is also provision
for gunfire to cause a morale test for
those not used to it.
I also introduced a new troop category,
“untrained”, which applies only to men
with firearms and is independent of the
usual training, fighting style and morale
classification. This allows for some more
realistic distinctions between troop-types.
Some men who are trained with muskets
can be upgraded to breech-loaders,
but will be untrained when using these
unfamiliar new weapons. An Arab slaver
might be Elite (reflecting his sense of
superiority over the infidels and boosting
his effectiveness in close combat as
well as his morale) but untrained with
his musket. Most Africans fall into
this untrained category, which means
that their shooting accuracy (and their
maximum range if using breech-loaders,
because of the range estimation problem)
is reduced. But the effect of last minute
shooting against opponents charging into
contact is now dealt with as part of close
combat, and not in the shooting phase.
Therefore shooters are not penalised for
being untrained in this situation, and what
counts is their morale state relative to
that of the enemy - though if they have
breech-loaders the extra volume of last-
minute fire gives them a useful bonus.
So how do our different troop-types
interact using this system? Playtesting
suggests that native musketeers will not
usually be able to stop charging spearmen
by inflicting casualties, but the morale
impact of their shooting can often have
the same effect. They will not be able to
do the same to regulars, of course, as they
will be outranged, but an effective tactic
for skirmishers is to advance to close
range, fire and then fall back, hoping for
a lucky hit. This was often attempted
historically, and can work well on the
tabletop because there will be fewer
of the more expensive regulars. The
balance between charging warriors and
a firing line of regular soldiers is about
where it was before - in other words, the
regulars are fairly safe unless something
goes wrong, but there are an awful lot of
things that can go wrong if you are not
careful. Overall it seems to work, but I
do not suppose that my rules - or anyone
else’s - are the last word on a subject like
this. That is one of the fascinations of
wargaming!
Carl Peters Against
the Masai
- A Death In The Dark
Continent Scenario
Having worked out the principles behind
the shooting rules for Death in the Dark
Continent, I was keen to try them out by
refighting some historical encounters.
One obvious candidate was the clash
at Elbejet between the Masai and the
German explorer Carl Peters, a classic
fight between spears and repeating rifles.
This battle has been discussed in these
pages before, but this time I will present
it as a game scenario, with an account of
how my refight turned out and the lessons
I learned from it.
In December 1889 Peters’ “German Emin
Pasha Relief Expedition” was crossing
the Laikipiak Plateau in Kenya on its
way to Uganda. This brief statement
immediately raises two questions in the
mind of anyone familiar with the history
of the region. Why was Peters still
trying to reach Emin Pasha, the Egyptian
governor who had already been “rescued”
by Stanley? And why was he going that
way, when most of the alternative route
through Tanganyika was already under
German control? The short answer is
that Peters’ real mission was no less than
the forcible occupation of Uganda and
most of British East Africa. Actually
his fighting strength was ridiculously
small for such an ambition, because the
British, who owned most of the shipping
on the east coast, had managed to strand
most of his 300 soldiers at Zanzibar. So
Below: The Masai were reluctant to fight Carl Peters and his Askari, but were pushed too far when their village of Elbejet was assaulted.
Peters had sneaked ashore at Witu with
a total of two white men (himself and a
Lt. von Tiedemann), 21 Somali askaris
and 85 porters. Nine of the Somalis
were equipped with repeating rifles,
while the other askaris had single-shot
breechloaders. They also had a supply of
signal rockets, which on the one occasion
they were used failed completely to
intimidate the Masai as intended. Their
leader later claimed that he was expecting
to have to fight a contingent of Royal
Marines at Witu, but (luckily for him)
they were not there. The only British
force in the area was a trading caravan
led by a young shipping clerk, who
shadowed Peters as he marched inland
but was too weak to stop him.
Peters, who never passed up an
opportunity for a fight, was expecting
trouble as he advanced into Masai
territory, but was disappointed. The
tribes had been impoverished by a recent
epidemic of cattle disease, and showed
little inclination to resist the expedition.
But at last, when he reached the hilltop
village of Elbejet, he found somebody
worth attacking. The Masai politely asked
him not to come too close so as not to
frighten their cattle; so Peters wandered
around firing his gun into the air, and
when this had no effect shot some bulls
on the grounds that they were threatening
his camp. Even then the warriors
refrained from attacking him, so one
cold dawn he decided to raid the village
anyway. The Masai were not early risers,
and he managed to deploy 35 askaris and
porters undetected in a wood at the base
of the hill. Peters commanded the right
flank, with his Somali headman leading
the centre and von Tiedemann on the left.
The first person they saw as they
advanced was a sentry watching the
cattle. He was shot, but the sound woke
the rest of the villagers, who rushed out
to confront them. After a brief exchange
of shots the tribesmen fell back, leaving
Peters in possession of the village.
He ordered up the rest of his men, but
before they could move the Masai had
regrouped, swung round the base of the
hill and charged them. So Peters had
to abandon Elbejet and concentrate on
defending his own camp. From now
on things went from bad to worse.
Although the askaris’ shooting halted
the first rush and gained a brief respite,
they were using up their ammunition
at a dangerous rate. So the expedition
began to retreat down a wooded valley.
After a running fight through the forest
the Masai eventually withdrew leaving
43 dead, but Peters had lost seven men,
and most of the ammunition was gone.
He claimed a victory, but actually he
had only saved his expedition by a hasty
retreat. It was the performance of the
Masai which was most impressive. Peters
remarks that although they had never
before seen repeating rifles, which “must
have appeared to them supernatural”,
they still pressed the attack for several
hours. Far from being demoralised by the
hail of fire they instinctively adapted their
tactics to it, advancing cautiously in short
rushes from tree to tree. So much for the
stereotype of the spear-armed “savages”!
43

Top: Masai archers shoot from behind the relative safety of a boma.
Above: Carl Peters and his Askaris push forward into the village, seeking to capture the herd.
Forces
Masai (Tribal)
Three units, each Six bases of elite
Warriors w/spears 144
Four units, each Four bases of elite
Warriors w/spears 128
One unit of elders: Six bases of
Skirmishers w/bows 24
Total points 296
As the Masai are a Tribal force,
they do not have an independent
Chief. Instead one of the ordinary
bases within a unit is nominated
as the Chief. It costs no extra
points, but cannot leave that
unit during the game.
44
Exploring Expedition (Organised)
One Chief for Organised force (Peters):
Muzungu (white man) w/repeater 45
One Muzungu w/repeater
(von Tiedemann) 30
One unit of askaris: One base of Soldiers
with repeaters, plus three bases
Soldiers w/breech-loaders 84
One unit of armed porters: five bases
untrained Skirmishers w/muskets 25
One unit of armed porters: four bases
untrained Skirmishers w/muskets 20
One rocket launcher w/crew 20
Total points 224
As Chief of an Organised force Peters
is represented by an independent base,
which costs 15 points extra.
The Refight
I played the game as a “Raid” scenario
(from Death in The Dark Continent),
focussing on the attack on the village.
All you need for this in the way of terrain
is a small native village on top of a low
hill in the Masai deployment area, and
a stream in the attacker’s deployment
area with a couple of woods alongside
it. The Masai player must deploy a
baggage train - in this case a herd of
cattle - inside his village or in an adjacent
enclosure or “boma”. The village can
also be surrounded by a “boma” which
will provide cover and slow an attacker,
but Peters’ baggage must be undefended.
Peters has the advantage of surprise but
is likely to be outnumbered once the
Masai are alerted, so he fields 75% of the
defender’s points total. The Masai player
can place up to a third of his units on the
table at the start of the game, and rolls
a D6 for the rest, as late arrivals. These
need a 6 to arrive, dicing every turn from
the fourth onwards, and must appear over
their own base edge. Normally in a Raid
the attacker need not deploy a baggage
train, but in this case, to represent the
vulnerability of an expedition far from
any means of resupply, we will require
him to do so. Peters wins if he captures
the village and the cattle, and loses if he
has failed to do so after eight turns of
play, or if he loses his own baggage first.
Both sides will find that this scenario
exposes some of their weaknesses. In
a surprise attack Peters’ men would
normally be able to force non-firearm-
equipped opponents to test morale for
the effect of gunfire and especially of the
rockets, but being elite, most of the Masai
are relatively immune to this. A Tribal
army is at a disadvantage when defending
against a raid, though, because it is harder
for late arrivals to get the dice scores
needed to turn up.
In our refight “Peters” did the obvious
thing and sent the white men and askaris
up the hill, while the porters stayed
Above: Carl Peters and an animated
Lieutenant von Tiedmann discuss the
strategy they’ll use in separating the
Masai of Elbejet from their cattle.
behind to guard the camp. The rockets
were deployed in the rear, firing into the
village in a futile attempt to frighten the
defenders. The Masai player placed a unit
of Warriors and the Skirmishers to defend
the village and the cattle, which were
behind the village on the reverse slope of
the hill. At first it seemed unlikely that he
could hold out long enough for the off-
table reinforcements to start arriving, but
in the fourth turn, as the tabletop Peters
approached the base of the hill, he made
a fatal mistake. The Masai got lucky and
two more of their Warrior units were now
on the table. Our player was facing the
same dilemma as the real Peters. What
should he do now? Carry on attacking in
the hope of grabbing the cattle before his
camp is overrun? Turn back to support
the porters? Or split his force and try to
do both? The third of these is usually the
worst possible option, and so it proved.
Peters and von Tiedemann turned back
for the camp, leaving the askaris to
advance on their own. But white men
don’t move very fast, and for two crucial
turns their firepower was unavailable.
Meanwhile the Masai swung round
both sides of the hill, sheltered from the
askaris’ long range fire, and hit them
from both flanks. The askaris did not rout
straight away, but it was only a matter of
time before superior numbers told. In the
seventh turn, seeing them break as fresh
Masai units closed in on his weakened
force, “Peters” was forced to concede.
Actually this was not a very good test
of what I had been examining - the
ability of men armed with repeaters to
survive a massed charge. But it was not
an unreasonable result considering the
expedition’s disadvantages - a divided
force, its field of fire interrupted by the
terrain, attacked from three sides by
superior numbers. Other playtesting
games have confirmed that soldiers with
rapid-firing guns in defensive formations
are usually fairly safe, but where would
the fun be in a game where absolutely Top: These Masai use the boma to sneak up on the already-engaged “Expedition”.
nothing could go wrong? Above: Peters’ baggage train was left with little protection as he launched his attack.

Suggested Reading, W. D. M. Bell, The Wanderings of an J. H. Weeks, Among the Primitive

Sources, and
Acknowledgements
S. Baker, Experience in Savage
Warfare. Journal of the Royal United
Services Institution, 1873.
Reprinted by Pallas Armata, 1995.
R. W. Beachey, The Arms Trade in
East Africa in the Late Nineteenth
Century. Journal of African History
vol. III, 1962.
British Parliamentary Papers,
Vols 57 & 58, Ghana 1850 - 1874.
Irish University Press.
Elephant Hunter. London, 1923.
R. Burton, The Lake Regions of Central
Africa. London, 1860.
V. L. Cameron, Across Africa.
London, 1877.
M. Pegler, Powder and Ball
Small Arms. Crowood Press,
Marlborough, 1998.
J. H. Speke, Journal of the Discovery of
the Source of the Nile. Edinburgh, 1863.
H. M. Stanley, How I Found
Livingstone. London, 1872.
Bakongo. London, 1914.
Death in the Dark Continent should
be released by the time you read this,
and will be available from North Star,
and no doubt from other discerning
purveyors of wargames stuff.
www.northstarfigures.com
The miniatures are from by Wargames
Foundry and Copplestone Castings and
come from the excellent collection of
Richard Gillingham.
Photographs were taken by Paul Davies

45