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Korssjoen Czechoslovakia
Korssjoen Czechoslovakia
Dana Korssjoen
March 8, 2018
1
Overview
The study of nationalism is rife with contradictory theories which seek to explain the
origins of nations and nationalism. The best way to test those theories is by analyzing them in
light of real, historical case studies and evaluating which theory offers the most fitting
explanation. In this paper, I will briefly outline the three dominant theories of nationalism, which
are primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism. I will then examine their validity in
analyzing formation of Czechoslovakia and conclude which theory fits best. I focus specifically
on the formation of Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak identities prior to the 1918 establishment
of the Czechoslovakian state. Through this study, I conclude that ethnosymbolism presents the
best explanation for the development of the Czechoslovakian identity (or lack thereof).
Theoretical Framework
The theories of nationalism that are contrasted in this paper, namely primordialism,
nationalism: the nature of ethnic ties and the antiquity of the nation. This section gives a brief
Primordialism can be divided into several bodies of theory, but all primordialists hold the
belief that ethnic ties are primordial; that is, they are an innate, natural part of human nature that
has always and will always exist. These ties stem from (or, according to cultural primordialists,
are attributed to) shared ancestry, language, social practices, and other deep-rooted attributes. It
follows, then, that the nation itself is ancient and immutable.1 This is the view that nationalists
themselves espouse.
1 Umut Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (London: Palgrave, 2017), 51-52, 54-62.
2
that nationalism and national interest are constructed by elites to serve some political, economic,
or social purpose which primarily benefits themselves, not the nation. In other words, the
theorize that nations are inherently modern phenomena, fundamentally linked to the concepts of
citizenship and constitutional rule.2 Unlike primordialists, modernists heavily stress the influence
modernism. Like modernists, ethnosymbolists believe that the national identity is constructed by
elites, especially using cultural myths, symbols, and traditions to elicit emotional responses and
group identification. Like primordialists, ethnosymbolists posit that the nation is a pre-modern
units.3 This approach differs from modernism in that it stresses the continuity between pre-
modern identities and modern nations, rather than dividing them into two distinct epochs.
Shared history
Moravia, and Slovakia) was originally settled by Celtic tribes in the fourth century BCE. In the
second century CE, nomadic Germanic peoples also settled the region, though most of them
continued migrating to the west. In the fifth and sixth centuries CE, the remaining inhabitants
were gradually assimilated by incoming Slav peoples, who are the shared ancestors of Slovaks,
2 Özkırımlı, 81-130
3 Özkırımlı, 154-168
3
Czechs, Moravians, and Poles.4 By the ninth century, these groups were united under the Czech-
speaking Great Moravian Empire.5 In this period, missionaries from the Orthodox Christian and
the Roman Catholic churches fought for dominance, with the Roman Catholic church eventually
prevailing. Regional unity, however, was brief, as the Hungarian army annexed Slovakia into its
empire in 906, creating a division of Czech and Slovak lands that would last until the First World
War. For that reason, Czech and Slovak history are recounted separately in the following
sections.
After the collapse of the Great Moravian Empire in 907, Bohemia and Moravia were
briefly united under the Přemyslid dynasty, then collectively integrated into the Holy Roman
Empire. Life under the Holy Roman Empire was characterized by technological innovation,
Catholicization, and political stability. At its height, the empire reigned over Hungary and
Poland.6 In 1356, Emperor Charles IV established the Kingdom of Bohemia (including Moravia)
as one of the empire’s seven electoral principalities and founded Charles University in Prague,
which was central Europe’s first university.7 During the course of Holy Roman rule, Bohemia
and Moravia became more ethnically and linguistically mixed. Especially after the twelfth
century, large numbers of Germans formed their own exclave communities in cities and rural
areas. This ethnic heterogeneity would spell trouble for the national movements that would
4 Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, s.v. “Slovakia,” 697; Janet Pollak, “Slovakia,” in Countries and Their
Cultures, 2001-02.
5 Zdenek Salzmann, “Czech Republic,” in Countries and Their Cultures, 601.
6 Harald Haarmann, “Czechs,” in Native Peoples of the World: An Encyclopedia of Groups, Cultures, and
Contemporary Issues, 231.
7 Howard Louthan, “Bohemia,” in Europe, 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World, 276.
4
In 1438, the Habsburgs gained control over Bohemia and Moravia. Except for a brief
period of Polish control towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Habsburgs administered
Bohemia and Moravia from Vienna until the empire dissolved in the aftermath of World War I.
Czech national historiography refers to this period of foreign rule as the “time of darkness.”8
During this time, the elective power of the Bohemian crown was abolished, the Bohemian
Chancellery was merged with the Austrian, and the administrative power of the local elite was
gradually dissolved.9 In the second half of the eighteenth century, rapid economic modernization
and industrialization resulted in the region becoming the most economically advanced in the
empire. These reforms eroded the traditionally rigid social structure of Bohemia, in which
Germans had gradually become the economic and political elite, liberating a Czech peasantry
that increasingly advocated against German-dominated policy.10 Those claims also become
imbued with ethnic fears of extinction, as, in 1851, the ratio of Czechs to Germans in Bohemia
was reported to be 60 to 38.5 - while still a majority, the Czech share of the Bohemian population
had noticeably shrunk under imperial rule.11 Ethnic fears and political agitation came to be
One of the most prominent narratives in Czech national historiography was that of the
Hussite Revolution and its leader, Jan Hus. Hus was credited with profoundly reforming the
Catholic church through his idea of devotio moderna, which emphasized the importance of the
individual, not the maxims of a papal authority, in true faith. Predictably, he was burned at the
8 Haarmann, 231.
9 Louthan, 278-79.
10 Eagle Glassheim, “Ambivalent Capitalists: The Roots of Fascist Ideology among Bohemian Nobles, 1880-
1938,” in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, ed. Mark Cornwall and Robert John Weston Evans
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28.
11 Salzmann, 601.
5
stake in 1415. His influence persisted in Bohemia, however, where several armies sent by the
pope to suppress the religious reformation movement were defeated by Hussite forces in 1419.
Hus and the Hussites took on a mythical role in Czech historiography as competing
narratives of their history became political tools to arouse or suppress Czech national pride.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth century rule of the Habsburgs, Hus was demonized for his
rebellion against the Catholic church, a narrative that is accused of having deeply political
motivations on behalf of the evangelical Catholic elite of the Hapsburg Empire. Leaders of the
Hussite movement were accused of being simple robbers and murderers, while the movement
national historian František Palacký characterized the Hussite movement as a symbol of German
determination to exterminate the Czech population and as a greater myth of Czech resistance to
religious and political absolutism. Palacký’s narrative inspired not only generations of similarly
nationalistic works on the history of Bohemia, but also leading politicians such as Tomáš
Masaryk and Kamil Krofta, who became central figures in the founding of the Czechoslovak
state.13 Masaryk himself suggested in his 1895 work on the “Czech question” that the
development of the Czech ideology of Slavonic humanism derived heavily from the “ethical
concepts of the Hussites.”14 In fact, the anniversary of Hus’ death became the most popular
Czech national celebration in the second half of the nineteenth century.15 Today, a monument in
Prague’s Old Town Square commemorates Jan Hus, attesting to his symbolic importance.
12 Frederick G. Heymann, “The Hussite Movement in the Historiography of the Czech Awakening,” in The Czech
Renacence of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Brock Peter and Skilling H. Gordon (University of Toronto Press, 1970),
224-28.
13 Heymann, 231-33.
14 Robert Auty, “Changing Views on the Role of Dobrovský in the Czech National Revival,” in The Czech
Renacence of the Nineteenth Century, ed. Brock Peter and Skilling H. Gordon (University of Toronto Press, 1970),
19-20.
15 Nancy M. Wingfield. “Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia,” in Europe 1789-1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of
Industry and Empire, 261.
6
In the second half of the nineteenth century, in fact, Czech politicians were increasingly
Such a division had the potential to make the growing Czech population a Slav minority within a
largely German state, constraining them not only geographically, but also politically and
culturally. These fears motivated a movement to “recapture” the regions of former Bohemia and
Moravia where Germans had settled.16 This movement began to take shape especially during the
1848 revolutions, when Czech politicians pressured the emperor for Bohemian-Moravian
autonomy based on historic right. As their demands became more radical, they were imbued with
Foundational was the concept of reviving the Kingdom of Bohemia, which was depicted
as the historic Czech state. Conveniently absent from the myth of Bohemia were its
böhmische Sprache (Bohemian language), not the tschechische Sprache (Czech language).17 This
omission was made politically significant in context of the antagonism between Czech and
German nationalisms; Czech agitation for autonomy threatened German minorities in Bohemia,
who created their own myths to de-legitimize Czech statehood. Especially controversial were
fierce debates over Czech language rights in schools and public administration, which began in
the 1830s. In 1880, “National Defense” organizations - the Deutscher Schulverein and the Matice
Školská - were formed by both sides to enforce the use of the German and Czech languages,
respectively, in schools. By the 1890s, Germans and Czechs were calling for national boycotts of
one another, and inter-ethnic violence recurred periodically. An 1897 imperial ordinance
requiring civil servants in Bohemia and Moravia to demonstrate proficiency in both languages
16 Dan Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia,
1914-20 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), 12-13.
17 Hugh Lecaine Agnew, “New States, Old Identities? The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Historical
Understandings of Statehood,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 4 (2000): 621.
7
prompted mass, violent demonstrations, primarily by local Germans.18 At the turn of the century,
each side had legitimate ethnic fears of extinction that were barely contained by imperial policy.
In 907, Slovakia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary, politically isolating it
from the other western Slav lands. Slovakia remained part of the Kingdom of Hungary even after
it was integrated under the Habsburg dynasty in 1526, solidifying the influence of the Catholic
church in all its territories. After that, Hungarian rule over Slovaks continued until the end of
World War I. A brief period of peaceful administration from afar disintegrated when, in the
beginning of the seventeenth century, Magyar ethnic consciousness began to develop in response
to religious turmoil in Europe. Originally only advocating against the German Habsburgs,
Magyar leaders came to support a united Magyar nation in Hungary, leading the movement to
target all ethnic minorities living in Hungarian lands, including Slovaks. Magyar immigration,
periodic affirmations by the Diet of Hungary that the Magyar language was the sole language of
Hungarian schools, and the founding of cultural organizations like the Magyar Academy of
Magyarization efforts. A characteristic example of anti-Slovak rhetoric is the 1878 claim made
by Béla Grünwald, a noted Hungarian pundit, that Slovaks “lack self-awareness and are
exceptionally meek ... The Slovak and the lord are two mutually exclusive concepts.”20 The
proposed solution was assimilation of such minorities. This type of assimilationist thinking led to
18 Wingfield, 261-62.
19 Gilbert Lawrence Oddo, Slovakia and its People (New York: R. Speller, 1960), 99-101.
20 Robert John Weston Evans, “Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks: Some Mutual Perceptions, 1900-1950,” in
Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, ed. Mark Cornwall and Robert John Weston Evans (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 111.
8
the closure of the Matica Slovenská, a Slovak cultural base, in the 1870s; mandatory Hungarian
language learning; and the closure of Slovak secondary schools. This was met with increased
determination on behalf of the Slovaks to preserve their cultural, religious, and ethnic identity.21
Time would reveal that Hungarian imperial politics were not amenable to these cultural revival
efforts - from 1875 to 1892, not a single one of more than 400 members of the lower house of the
Diet of Hungary was a Slovak.22 Such suppression politicized the Slovak ethnicity and culture.
As ethnic tensions rose, Slovak nationalist historians began to “uncover” national myths.
They traced the roots of their civilization to the ancient Slavic tribes who first inhabited their
territory in the fifth and sixth centuries CE, three centuries before Magyar settlement in the area.
This supported an argument of precedence that rejected Magyar nationalistic claims over the
same land. These historians also pointed out that the first unification of western Slavic lands was
under the Great Moravian Empire, which later provided a justification for what could be
considered as the long-awaited re-integration of Slovak and Czech lands under one state.23 Long-
term separation of the two populations had led to cultural divergence, however, which was
movement as early as the mid-seventeenth century. In that period, Slovak intellectuals began to
laud their native language as a symbol of their national individuality, as well as their short-lived
history of independence, in the face of Magyar repression. Myths revolving around the Great
Moravian Empire and of the antiquity of the Slovak nation were popularized in Slovak-language
literature. In 1801, the Society of Slovak Literature was founded.24 Notably, many of these early
movements towards national consciousness were limited to educated, wealthy spheres - Slovak
masses did not spend their time perusing literature, and it would be many centuries before a mass
national consciousness emerged. Some scholars believe that, partially owing to Magyarization,
there was no definitive, mass concept of a Slovak nation until after 1918.25 Thus, in its early
Nevertheless, there were disagreements over what form, exactly, the Slovak nation should
take. While Catholics (the vast majority) pursued this vision of an independent Slovakia revived
from the depths of history, Lutherans (who were never more than fifteen percent of the
language and increasingly drawn to the Czech myth of the reformist Hussite movement,
Lutheran Slovaks saw themselves intimately tied to the neighboring Czech community.
Abandoning it would mean abandoning their religion and culture.26 In the nineteenth century, the
conflict became linguistic, with two orthographies of the Slovak language competing for
dominance - one which preserved the Slavic influence and regional peculiarity of the written
Slovak language, and one which became known as the “Czecho-Slovak language” because of its
similarity to the Czech alphabet. Separatists succeeded in establishing the former as the norm for
Slovak education, though roughly half of the Slovak population were still illiterate at the turn of
the century anyway, and the spoken differences between the orthographies were insignificant.27
That is, the triumph of a distinct Slovak orthography only directly affected the elites.
As ethnic and cultural consciousness evolved into nationalist agitation, various arguments
were made to justify the Slovak national right, especially ethnolinguistic and so-called “natural”
claims to legitimacy. By the early nineteenth century, Slovak historians such as Ján Kollár and
Jozef Miloslav Hurban justified the Slovak right to independence based on the distinct language
and culture of the Slovak community. In his 1848 leaflet “Bratia slováci!” Hurban wrote:
What makes a nation a nation is mainly its national language; thus the Slovak nation has
that name because its national language is Slovak. … In the Slovak language the millions
of Slovaks have that unique bond, a holy bond, in which the dispersed strength of
millions of Slovaks is united, that is, without the Slovak language the Slovaks are like
scattered twigs which may easily be broken; but if they will keep their Slovak tongue in
honor, then they will be like a thick sheaf tied by a strong cord, which no one will be able
to break up as long as they do not cut it.28
The basis of this argument was that regardless of the presence of a historical Slovak state, a
linguistic and ethnic Slovak nation had continuously existed in the same territory since before
Magyar invasion, and it was this ancient ethnic community that entitled them to a state. Further
evidence was found in the fact that even without a politically defined state, the word “Slovakia”
was already in use in the eighteenth century to refer to the area of traditional Slovak settlement.29
For this reason, the “naturalness” of the Slovak nation became an important national myth.
on the legitimacy of the former Bohemian state, which is essentially a civic/political argument.
28 Agnew, 625.
29 Heiss et al, 397.
11
both nationalisms had aspects of each argument). This distinction was made even more
problematic by the respective opponents of Czech and Slovak nationalism - German and
Hungarian nationalism. German minorities in Bohemia opposed Czech nationalism on the basis
that the Germans had a natural right not to be absorbed into a Czech state because of their
distinctive language, culture, religious practices, and history - an ethnic/cultural argument in the
spirit of the Slovaks. Hungarian nationalists, on the other hand, claimed they had a right to
Slovak-inhabited land because they had ruled it for centuries - a civic/political argument much
like that of the Czechs.30 For this reason, it was difficult to support one another’s national rights
Nevertheless, they did eventually support each other in the form of a movement for
collective autonomy. The first serious proposal for an independent Czech-Slovak state was made
at the Kroměříž Assembly of 1848 by František Palacký as part of a larger scheme for
reorganizing all of the Austro-Hungarian territories into ethnically homogeneous areas, namely
German-Austrian, Czech-Slovak, Polish, Illyrian, Serb, Magyar, and Romanian. This idea was
attractive not only because it liberated Czechs from the threat of Germanization and Slovaks
from that of Magyarization, but also because it would create a river route leading to the sea for
Bohemia. That is, it satisfied ethnic fears in a way that was politically beneficial. After Palacký
first articulated this concept, it “recurred periodically” in Czech national discourse.31 Still, for a
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Tomás Masaryk provided exactly the sort of
important to understand his vision. Masaryk rejected Palacký’s proposal for an ethnically
homogeneous state, which would in practice mean the assimilation of Slovaks by the more
numerous Czechs, especially in the face of centuries of cultural suppression by the Hungarian
empire against the Slovaks. Instead, Masaryk’s vision of a Czech-Slovak nation was
“Czechoslovakia.” Many Slovak intellectuals took to this idea, including Milan Hodža, editor of
the Slovenský Týždenník, a popular Slovak newspaper. In it, he condemned Magyar nobles for
social and economic exploitation of Slovaks while praising Czechs for having “raised themselves
by their unaided incremental endeavours.” Implicit in his comparison was a call for directing
ethnic fears generated by Magyarization and imperial exploitation into an allied movement with
Czechs for a shared state.33 The idea of such a state rested on several key considerations.
Czechoslovak nationalists often pointed out the ethnic and linguistic similarities between
Czechs and Slovaks. Both hailed from the same ancient Slavic roots; they had even been briefly
united under the Great Moravian Empire, a myth that was already central to Slovak national
identity. These shared roots led to a shared language which, despite diverging into several
regional dialects due to political separation, was still mutually intelligible in spoken form.34 The
orthographical debate that had occupied Slovak intellectuals for decades had almost no effect on
the still-illiterate Slovak masses, and the choice of a distinct Slovak orthography over a
Czechoslovak one was relatively recent. Moreover, the majority of both populations were
Catholic due to their shared history under the Habsburg empire. Thus, ethnic, linguistic, and
After the First World War, Czechoslovak nationalists saw their opportunity to establish a
32 Rychlík, 16-17
33 Evans, 112.
34 Maxwell, 338-39.
13
however, they needed political arguments. Masaryk supplied these. To appeal to the Allied
victors, Masaryk and his deputy, Edvard Beneš, proposed an alliance of small Slav states to
to the power of Germany. Among this alliance would be Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
depicting Czechoslovakian autonomy as a fair repayment for the bravery of Czech and Slovak
soldiers in the war.35 His arguments generated broad international support, particularly from
Russia and America, and Czechoslovakia was formally made an independent state in 1918.
Evaluation of Theories
One might wonder why two ethnic groups, who previously had developed distinct
national identities, could so readily support their union under one state. This is especially curious
since the appendage of Slovakia to the Czech state was entirely in conflict with the nationalist
myth of reviving historic Bohemia, which had never included Slovakia. This section examines
the reasons for such an unexpected change of trajectory and uses them to analyze the strengths
and weaknesses of each theory of nationalism. Ultimately, it is ethnosymbolism that provides the
best explanation for the formation of Czechoslovakia. The following paragraphs analyze each
First, the ethnic, linguistic, and religious similarities of Czechs and Slovaks which were
compatibility. This argument lends credence to the primordialist theory, as it substantiates the
idea that shared ancestry, language, and religion are the basis for ethnic ties. What it does not
explain, however, is why Czech and Slovak identities initially became distinct in the face of these
35 Perman, 27; Victor S. Mamatey, “The Birth of Czechoslovakia: Union of Two Peoples,” in Czechoslovakia: The
Heritage of Ages Past, ed. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes (Columbia University Press: New York, 1979), 81-87.
14
similarities, nor does it explain the timing of the two identities merging into one state. It follows,
Second, centuries of political domination and cultural exchange with their respective
imperial rulers meant that the realistic alternative to shared independence was absorption into the
German sphere of influence and the Hungarian state, respectively - this was especially feared by
the Slovaks, who had less wealth and political influence than the Czechs.36 This also meant that,
in order to withstand political challenges from these foreign powers, any Czechoslovak
movement had to demonstrate strong ethnic affinity for one another.37 This Realpolitik-style
strategizing is the result of a rational calculation of risks in the quest for more political power. It
provided an incentive to emphasize existing similarities between the Czech and Slovak identities
while emphasizing differences between Czechs and Germans, as well as Slovaks and
Hungarians. Empirically, this sort of rhetoric dominated among late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century nationalists like Masaryk when he spoke of reviving the Great Moravian
Empire, or Milan Hodža when he redirected the existing ethnic fears of Slovaks into a shared
movement for a Czechoslovakian state. In this light, elite maneuvers to direct Czech and Slovak
nationalisms into a single movement were calculated manipulations of national identity to attain
the ultimate political goal of independence. This would imply that ethnic ties are constructed and
Third, the Czechoslovak concept included the promise of dual autonomy, where both
ethnic groups could effectively concern themselves with their own cultures and politics. Slovaks
even referred to the state as Czecho-Slovakia, symbolizing their concept of dual autonomy.38
This consideration problematizes the efficacy of the elite maneuvers outlined above. That is,
36 Evans, 112.
37 Evans, 114-5.
38 Maxwell, 339-40; Rychlík, 18, 21.
15
their efforts were enough to justify the establishment of a Czechoslovakian state, but not enough
to create an actual Czechoslovak identity that could unite their cultures and perceived national
myths and symbols. Despite actual similarities like shared ancestry and language, despite elite
maneuvering to create a shared Czechoslovak identity, Czechs and Slovaks retained a perception
of distinct national cultures and interests. Elites were successful in using existing myths and
symbols to construct a shared identity that was viable enough to justify a shared state, but this
projection was primarily used alongside politically compelling reasoning to win over foreign
actors, while the domestic populations remained unconvinced. This is a heavily nuanced
analysis, but due to the lasting influence of pre-modern ethnic ties and the evidence for elite
manipulation of identity (even if it was only partially successful), it favors the ethnosymbolist
interpretation.
about the separate Czech and Slovak identities that had been developing prior to the turn of the
century? In both narratives, persistent linguistic, cultural, and genealogical differences existed
between the ethnic communities and their imperial rulers. Immigration, imperialist language
policy, and economic inequality created ethnic fears of extinction that politicized those existing
differences. Only once those fears developed did nationalism become broadly relevant, and even
then, nationalism was directed by the elites who established literary societies and media outlets
and, in the case of the Slovaks, national orthographies. In other words, the character of long-
standing ethnies and newfound ethnic fears were voiced in elite-directed nationalist movements,
which centered around popular myths and symbols. This should all sound familiar; it, too, is an
ethnosymbolist narrative that stresses the strength of the pre-modern ethnic tie.
16
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