Titles on Metaphysics and Epistemology in Prometheus's Great Books in Philosophy Series Anusrori bounve, Kar + DeAnna +The Crue of age 2 Metaphysics 5 cru of rca! Raion aa Cot of Pare Reaon + Ears (Gorrrmp Wasmenm Lem a 1 Dieu on Mophyics a9 ane en eels as nd Philos Jou Loca cas: + A any Concerting Hanan ndertiding CCuantrs S. Pence 4 The Bro Ble and Other Eye = Tae Een Wt ‘ene aro Jos Dewey 2 Pa oti rt rts oe nea {inc ne Dario * nk Paci, nt Si Rete Deno a Hoey one Breet Rest |¢ The Essential Epicurus: eee ee etre nen Paceline, ——_GBDRGE SATAYANA ig epee lib ae suo Hoo sexrs mcs oi ue Dg ° Oui oon Davo Hex Lome WeramareN anda once Haman gas at tnt Coe BIS Teta ta at wuss otc nt See the back ofthis volume fora complete list of tides in Prometheus's Great Books in Philosophy and Great Minds seis WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES Cambridge, 1932-1935 From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald Edited by ALICE AMBROSE GREAT BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY (@B Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive ‘Amherst, New York 14228-2197Published 2001 by Prometheus Books agentes Lecures, Combe, 192-135: From te Notes of Alice Anbroe nd Margaret Macdonald Copyright © 200 Ae ce Al ‘ip reserved. No prof ths pation may e oot, ered nt ‘evel syste, o tanita form o yan) tes, iil eee oe etal opig a oer eine ie meet or Wee wt tr snot per xe inti cue of bit utaons nbd intel es devi Ingles shoul be addressed to Prometheus Books 8 Jona Giemn Drive “Amber, New York 14228-2197 ‘VOICE: 716-891-0133,ext 207 FAX: T16-S64-2711 [WWW.PROMETHEUSBOOKS. COM: 05 04 08 3432 © 1979 by Alice Ambrose ‘int US, paperback eden, Phenix Books Divison of “The Universy of Chicago Press (1982). rary of Congress Caslogin n-Pulication Dats ‘Wingsntin, Ludwig, 1889-195. (Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935) ‘Witgenstl’s enures, Cambridge, 1932-193: from the notes of ‘Allee Acros and Margaret Macdonald/ edited by Allee Ambrose. P. cm. — (Great books i plesopy) Originally published Totowa, NJ. : Rowman an Lindfield, 1979. Includes biographical references ISBN 1-57392-875-5, 1, Pilsophy. 2. Mathematice—Philoopty. I. Ambros, Ale, 1906-2001, Macdonald Margaret I Tie, IV. Series, 13376 Ws61 2001, 192421 2001019087 Prine in he United Stas of Ameria on aide paper LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN was bor in Vienna, Aust, on ‘April 2, 1889, the youngest of eight children ofa leading Austrian ‘steelmaker, Educated at home until age fourteen, Wittgenstein then ‘studied mathematics and natural sciences in an Austrian school, and later studied mechanical engineering for two years in Berlin, Ger ‘many. In 1908 e engaged in aeronautical research in England. He reg- istered as a research student atthe University of Manchester, where he worked in an engineering laboratory. Bertrand Russell's bok The Principles of Mathematics (1903) had a profound influence on ‘Wingenstin, and he left the university in 1911 to study mathematical Jogic with Russell at Cambridge. ‘Wittgenstein remained at Cambridge uni 1913, when he traveled to Skjolden, Norway, where he secluded himself to continue his study of logic. Upon the outbreak of World War I he enlisted inthe Austrian ‘army, eventually serving aan artillery officer on both the easter and Westen fronts. Throughout the war, Witgenszin continued to work on the problems of philosophy and lopc, recording his thoughts in note- ‘books. At the end ofthe war, he sent his manuscript to Russ!l, who found a publisher fr his work. Published in 1921, the Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus has been universally admired. This work covers a vat range of topics the nature of language; the limits of what canbe sud; logic, ethics, and philoso- phys causality and iuction; the self andthe will; death and the mys- Neal; good and evi, ‘Upon returning to civilian ife in 1919, Witgenstsin gave away the large fortune he had inherited from his father, and ive a frugal and simple life, Feeling that he could conibute nothing more to philoso- ‘hy after publication of he Tractaus he searched for anew vocation, fist teaching elementary school in Austria for several years, then trn- ing to gardening ané architecture. In 1929 Witgenstin felt that once again he could do creative ‘workin philosophy. He returned to Cambridge in 1929, where he was rade a fellow of Trinity College. Through his lectures and the wide circulation of notes taken by his student, he gradually came o exer ‘powerful influence on philosophical thought throughout te Englsh- speaking world. In 1936 he began his second major work, Philosoph- ‘cal Investigations In 1939 Wingenstein was appointed tothe chair in philosophy at(Cambridge University. During World War II be left Cambridge and ‘worked as «porter in Guy's hoepital in London and then a labors tory asitant inthe Royal Victoria Infirmary In 1944 he returned to (Cambridge as profesor of philosophy, but resigned his cairn 1947 ‘He complete the Investigations in 1949, which he instructed should ‘be published ony after his death. Frequently ll during his remaining years, Wingenstein was diag ‘nosed with cancer in 1949. He did in Cambridge, England, on April 29, 1951. Philosophical Investigations was published in 1953, Contents Bair’ Preface Pact I, Ploophy. Lectures, 1932-33 Part IL. The Yellow Book (Selected Pa) Par Il. Lectures, 1934-35 Par IV. Philosophy for Mathematicians. Lectures, 1932-33 3 20sEditor’s Preface ‘The difficulties I have encountered in editing these notes, which were taken from 1932 o 1935 when I attended Witgenstein's lectures, have been multiplied by my not having notes of other members ofthe same classes against which to check my own, except for the year 1934-35, when Dr. Margaret Macdonald and I shared our notes. The first draft I made on leaving Cambridge was a compilation of her notes and mine for that year, and the original drat of her notes was kindly, made available to me by Mr. Rush Rhees, together with scattered notes which Witgenstein made atthe time he gave the lectures ofthe Easter term of 1934-35. For the lectures of 1932-33, my fist year in Cambridge, Ihave had to depend solely on my notes and my memory, both of lectures ofthat year entled “Philosophy for Mathematicians” and of lectures t a larger clas throughout the year. "The so-called Yellow Book consists of notes taken during the year 1933-34 by Ms, Margaret Masterman and myself of lectures and in formal discussions during intervals in the dication of The Blue Book. ‘What appears here as Part II includes only my own notes, not those of ‘Ma. Masterman, Notes taken on the same material by Francis Skinner, ‘now deceased, were included in the Yellow Book but formed only small part of the total. It seemed to me better on the whole to use notes for which I alone was responsible 'My concern has been to presenta connected and faithful account of what Wingensten said, Some of the people who might have aided me in this endeavor by providing me with notes for comparison with my ‘own are now dead. The nots of others who were in the classes Were too meagre to be used. Wingerstein’s published writings, wherever they contain material overlapping, with my own, are of course‘confirmation, Where materials are not ieated in the manuscripts now published, Ihave simply recorded what I had, in order o make related Jexis available 10 philosophers. A few ofthe noles were loo confused (oF obscure to permit of inkeligible econsircion, and these T have ‘omined, my reason being that my notes raer than Wiligensei’slec- tures were a fall Ihave also omied notes which were duplications of well-known material already published in his Tractats. 1 hin he ‘would have been in agreement, and iat his own deletions would have been far more extensive 1s reasonable 1 suppose thatthe lectures entitled “Philosophy for “Mathematicians” followed fairly closely the materials published in Philosophische Bemerkungen and in Phlosophische Grammatit. For this set of lecres was given in 1932-33, at about the time when igensiein had writen, of was writing, these 1wo books. The notes of these lectures are placed ale those of the Easier term of 1934-35 Father than in their chronological order because of their connection With the subject-mater of that ser, I am much indebied 10 two mathematicians, Dr. G. T. Kneebone of Bedford College, London, and Professor H. $. M, Coxeter of Toronto University, who read cer tain mathematical pars ofthese nots, ‘As might be expected, problems treated inthe Yellow Book are for ‘the mos part those treated in The Blue Book. Their main value lies in ‘their sometimes being beter stated than in The Blue Book dictation, ‘hough certain things which T have included and which I think are important are not tobe found elsewhere. In addition lo taking notes of lectures of 1933-34, Ms, Masierman and I took notes of his informal Aiscussions in the imervals between dictation when, a8 be thought, and sometimes regeted, no record had been made of what he sad ‘Subsequent, explicit permission was given us to continue with note ‘aking of his informal discussions ‘have made litle aiempt here 10 colle what Ihave with his pub- lished works on a given topic, though in a few cases I hive made references. Nor have I aiempied always 10 follow the exact order of his presentation in lectures. Those who know hs syle of leturing will remember tha «topic often recured, if only in a recapitulation, in a Subsequent lecture, and that even within a lecture comments on some Imaner whose relevance was not clear 10 his class would be noted, q.>-¢ does not depend on the meanings of “and” and “implies it come {utes their meaning. If itis said thatthe rules of negation are not arbi ‘rary inasmuch as they must not contradict each othe, the reply is that if tere were a contradiction among them we should simply no longer call certain of them rues. ("It is part of the grammar of the word ‘rule’ that if pis re, ‘p.~p is nota ule, 3. Lopie proceeds from premises jus a physics does. But the primi- ive propositions of physics are iesulls of very general experience, while those of logic are not. To distinguish between the propositions of physics and those of logic, more must be done than to. produce Dredicates such as experiential and self evident. It must be show that ® grammatical rule hols for one and not for the other. 4 In what sense are laws of inference laws of thought? Can a reason be given for thinking as we do? Will this require an answer outside the game of reasoning? There are two senses of "ret. Son" reason for, and cause. These are wo different orders of things One needs to decide on a eiterion for something's being a reason before reason and cause can be distinguished. Reasoning isthe calcu. lation actually done, anda reason goes back one step inthe calculus ‘A reason isa reason ony inside the game. To give a reason isto go *Philosopische Grammar, Oxford and New York, 196, p 304 ruitosorny, 1932-33 i dough ce fon, ak fr aren ak bow Are aved ute rel The cn ass cane ane SE Slat avays ge arson for aeson. Bu 8 des nt i fenong ssi The are gusto, Why We 900 then iva a pes case is gen. Bl Aypotctcaelonct in # een. ea thg ora con sn may mean seve gs When 4 pees hs mao ing on ae Sek one ow th an? Toe ren ‘evctnan jut te nee gives when sed. Agia reson may be tay ee avs concn eg hen om maps Thesis sean, ane sito forte re The sn ig nt mip cos nan ng HORN Tine ot checking sary and ing + fe tne. The reson Bese Shen te bene inthe athe proms Acne cold ot Dele nie ese, sane Wer ing hoof he gma of te woh “eon” end vc int cars o wey We hve vena reso fr dig 8 cut hing ot oat ch 2 case Hoe nes sin : amove your wm by giving bie expan ‘eee ak pce teu Cant may be dove by exe tens, bot expen dona pe ren: Te worden ea in connection wih exertion. ese sy i fond by expemen Te aera, "atemaal wi ‘em eapenentl evens?” congo 0 “eason or eu neato i. 5 wae cs dee snbe sendy se. 5) Rca eg pate yee ne Eg., iif. = fafofe, and Anke, = favfovse. nples Celie eat es an esos fe oe Srey Rititectay wtismda hes awed ene ite! al ry eon me Tieden pee and Dae and ad “nd esa a icky SIS ap ew tan “Tse all." ‘whereas to add t0 "a,b, ar people inthe room” that a,b, ¢ ar all the people inthe room says more than “xe is a person in the room", land to omit itis to say less, If it is correct fo say the general propos tion isa shorthand fr logical product or sum, asi is in some cases, the he clas of things same in th rset rs it defined in he frammar, not by properties, For example, being atone of the octave6 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES ‘or a quality of « note. The tones of an octave are alist, Were ‘world composed of "individuals" which were given the names “b", "e'", ele..then, as in the case of the tons, there would be no Proposition "and these ar all the individuals" ‘Where a general proposition is a shortband fora produc, deduction of the special proposition fa from (yf is straightforward, But where {is not, how does fa follow? "Following" is of a special sor, just as the logical product i of a special sort. And allhough x) ja. = fa {is analogous 10 pv¢.p. =.p, fa "follows" in a different way in the {Wo cases where (2x)fr i a shorthand for a logical sum and where it is ‘ot. We havea different calculus where (Beis not a logical sum. fo {is not deduced as pis deduced in the calulus of T's and F's from pv 4@. 1 once made a calculus in which following was the same in all ‘cases. Bu this was a mise, "Note thatthe dors inthe disjunction fav vfe V. . . have diferent ‘grammars: (1) “and so on" indicates laziness when ihe disjunction Is 4 shorthand fora logical sum, the cass involved being given by en ‘enumeration, (2) “‘and so on" isan entirely different sign with new Tues when i doesnot comespond to any enumeration, e.g, "2s even v4 is even v 6 is even . . .", (3) “and So on" refers 10 postions in visual spice, as contrasted with postions corelated with the numbers, ofthe mathematical continuum. As an example of (3) consider "There {sa circle in the square™. Here it might appear thar we have logical sum whose terms could be determined by observaiion, that there is a number of positions a circle could occupy in visual space, and that their number could be determied by an experiment, sty, by coor lating them with turns of a micrometer, Bur there is no number of Positions in visual space, any more than there is a numberof drops of Tain which you see. The proper answer 10 the question, “How many rops did you see?" is many, not that there was a number but you don't know how many. Although there aze twenty circles in the Square, and the micrometer would give the number of postions coor