Compilation Torts

TORTS AND DAMAGES
I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE CONCEPT OF A TORT
1. TORT IN COMMON LAW
A. Etymology
“Tort” is taken directly from the French word and is a derivation of the Latin
word “torquere” meaning to twist. The term was adopted in the old English language but
it gradually disappeared from common usage.
B. Definition
TORT is an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and

which gives rise to an action for damages. It is an act or omission producing injury to
another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission
may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.
A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.
C. Common Theme
It is a legal wrong committed upon person or property independent of contract.
2. TORT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
A. EXISTENCE OF PHILIPPINE TORT LAW
I. Intent of the framers
 The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which
merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve
as "for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice."
 To fix the dividing lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm
which he has done, and those in which he is not.
II. Civil Code Test
Art. 1902. Any person who by any act or omission causes damage to another by
his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
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negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
 limited to negligent act or omission and excludes willingness or intent
B. SCOPE OF PHILIPPINE TORT LAW
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
 This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.
Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or

negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
 It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
Article. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
 Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
C. DEFINITION OF TORT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
NAGUIAT vs. NLRC1
“tort” consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed
by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.
VINZONS-CHATO v. FORTUNE2
 A tort is a wrong, a tortuous act which has been defined as the commission or
omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury,
directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.
 Civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of
the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial.
1
G.R. No. 116123 March 13, 1997
2
G.R. No. 168512 June 19, 2007
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D. Elements of Tort
ELEMENTS OF TORTS
1. Act or omission;
2. Damage or injury is caused to another;
3. Fault or negligence is present;
4. There is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties;
5. Causal connection between damage done and act/omission.
GARCIA v. SALVADOR3
1. Duty;
2. Breach;
3. Injury;
4. Proximate causation.
LUCAS v. TUAŇO4
1. Duty - to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence;

2. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance
of such duty, when the patient is injured;
3. Negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of
an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
3. PURPOSE OF TORT LAW
1. To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might
otherwise take the law into their own hands;
2. Deter wrongful conduct;
3. To encourage socially responsible behavior; and
4. To restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this,
by compensating them for their injury.
B. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI DELICT
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
FAUSTO BARREDO v. SEVERINO GARCIA AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO (1942)5
 Head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro

Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned and its passenger Faustino Garcia (16 years old boy) suffered injuries
from which he died two days later. Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the
mishap and was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 1 year
3
G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
4
G.R. No. 178763 April 29, 2007
5
G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942
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and 1 day to 2 years of prision correccional. Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla was negligent in employing
Fontanilla who has several Automobile Law and speeding violations so an action
was brought against him. CFI: awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal
interest. CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest. SC: CA affirmed.
 Doctrines: Quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution

under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on
the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
PEDRO ELCANO, ET AL., V. REGINAL HILL ET AL. (1977)
 Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with
whom he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano.
 Doctrines: Acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him. The marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
2. NATURE
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and
5. Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
3. GOVERNING PROVISIONS
Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the

provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws. (1093a)
4. DEFINITION
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
5. SCOPE
A. Intentional Acts
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JOSE CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.6
FACTS: Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an
employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free.
When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though
the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still
slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to
notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and
he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks
of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he
failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: YES. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common
practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has
the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get
off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there
were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection
and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done
within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
ELCANO v. HILL7
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano
filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent
coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the
civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: YES. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of
a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
6
30 Phil 768
7
77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977
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the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the
marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of
his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s
liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
NATIVIDAD ANDAMO, ET AL., v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL.

(1990)
FACTS: Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built

through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial
lake within its land inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo's land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during
rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
July 1982: spouses instituted a criminal action. February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil
case for damages. CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in
Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case spouses contend that the trial
court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a
quasi-delict.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is quasi-delict even if done in private property
HELD: YES. While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains
that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will
continue to sustain damage due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an
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owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
 Whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the

independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31,
that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS8

FACTS: In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,
Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old
exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really
close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her
at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had
sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he
told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home
and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On appeal, Gashem averred
that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have
violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with
Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: YES. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because
of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals.
8
219 SCRA 115
Page | 7
She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to
Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country
and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our
traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where
the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law
penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to
marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may
be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust;
or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
B. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
PORFIRIO P. CINCO v. HON. MATEO CANONOY ET AL. (1979)9
FACTS: Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident. At the pre-trial
in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of
the Rules of Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered. City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case CFI by
certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD: YES. Granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for. Nature and character of his
action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
omission of the defendant primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized
in Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
9
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
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SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
 Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property
 The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done.
6. ELEMENTS
NATIVIDAD v. ANDAMO, ET AL., V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET

AL. (1990)
FACTS: Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built

through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial
lake within its land inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo's land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during
rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
July 1982: spouses instituted a criminal action. February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil
case for damages. CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in
Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal Case spouses contend that the trial
court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a
quasi-delict.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is quasi-delict even if done in private property.
HELD: YES. All the Elements of a Quasi-delict are Present, to wit:

(a) Damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) Fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond;
(c) The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
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It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such
a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an
owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
omission of the defendant.
 Whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent

character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT AND QUASI-DELICT
QUASI-DELICT is HOMOLOGOUS BUT NOT IDENTICAL to tort under the

common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
1. District Concept
 Spanish concept: Quasi-delict is a civil law concept.
 Anglo-American or common law concept: TORT is broader than culpa aquiliana

because it includes not only negligence , but intentional criminal acts as well, viz.,
assault and battery, deceit and the like.
 Philippine concept: Torts is the blending of common-law and civil law system
2. Framework
 In Philippines legal system (envision by the commission responsible for the

drafting of the NCC): intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions are
to be governed by the RPN, while negligent acts or omissions are to be governed
by the CC.
 The term quasi-delict was deliberately used by the code commission to designate
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal
offenses. The term tort was not used because it is broader in coverage as it covers,
acts which are intentional or malicious, which latter acts in the general plan of the
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Philippine legal system,are governed by the Penal code (see: Report, Code
Commission, pp. 161-162)
 The province of torts is wrongs (imposed as rules of law) and the province of
contract is agreements or promises (created by promises of parties (H.De Leon).
D. QUASI-DELICT AND DELICT
1. Distinguishing Quasi-Delict and Delict
BASIS QUASI-DELICT DELICT OR CRIME

1. Legal basis of There can be a quasi-delict as long There can be no crime unless
liability as there is fault or negligence there is a law clearly
resulting in damage or injury to punishment the act.
another. It is broader in scope than
crime
2. Criminal Criminal intent is not necessary for Criminal intent is essential
Intent quasi-delict to exist. Fault or for criminal liability to exist
negligence without intent will
suffice.
3. Nature of Right violated is a private right. Right violated is a public one.
right violated Quasi-delict is a wrongful act Crime is wrong against the
against a private individual. state.
4. Liability for Every quasi-delict give rise to Some crime (e.g. contempt,
damages liability for damages illegal possession of firearm)
do not give rise to liability for
damages
5. Proofs Proof of the fault or negligence The guilt of the accused must
needed requires only preponderance of be proved beyond reasonable
evidence doubt
6. Sanction or Reparation or indemnification of Punishment is either
penalty the injury or damage imprisonment, fine or both;
sometimes other accessory
penalties are imposed
BARREDO V. GARCIA, Supra
 Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
of the Philippines is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime under
the Revised Penal Code.
2. Overlap Between Quasi-Delict and Delict
BARREDO v. GARCIA, Supra
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 The same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability (subsidiary)
arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines;
or create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180
of the Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take.
 In the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of
Barredo:
1. a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the
latter’scriminal negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and
2. Barredo’s primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed negligence
as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free
to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the second, which is within their
rights. This is the more expeditious and effective method of relief because
Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no property. Barredo
was held liable for damages.
ELCANO V. HILL, Supra
 Art. 2176 covers not only punishable by law, but also criminal in character,
whether intentional, voluntary, or negligent.
 Civil action lays even the acquittal in criminal case
 Culpa Aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
ANDAMO V. IAC, Supra
 The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the
act or omission of Respondent Corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict
or culpa aquiliana.
L.G. FOODS V. PHILDELFA10
FACTS: Charles Vallereja was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and
driven at the time by their employee. Charles died as a result of the accident.A Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide was filed before the MTCC against the driver who
later committed suicide causing the case dismissed.
Later, the parents of the victim filed a complaint damages against the petitioners
as employers of the deceased driver alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The defendant
petitioners contended that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. But since there was no conviction
as the driver died, there is no cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Was there a cause of action on the part of the petitioner?
10
G.R. No. 158995, Sept. 26, 2006
Page | 12
RULING: YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
E. CULPA AQUILIANA AND CULPA CONTRACTUAL
1. Distinguishing Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual
BASIS CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CONTRACTUAL

1 Nature of Negligence is direct, Negligence is merely incidental to
negligence substantive and independent the performance of the
contractual obligation. There is a
pre-existing contract or
obligation
2 Defense of a This is a complete and proper This is not a complete and proper
“good father defense insofar as parents, defense in the selection and
of a family” guardians, employers are supervision of employees
concerned.
3 Presumption There is no presumption of There is presumption of
of negligence negligence. The injured party negligence as long as it can be
must prove the negligence of proved that there was breach of
the defendant. Otherwise, the the contract. The defendant must
complaint of injured party will prove that there was no
be dismissed. negligence in the carrying out of
the terms of the contract.
A. SOURCE
CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD, Supra
QUASI-DELICT and CULPA CONTRACTUAL: DIFFERENCE
Quasi-Delict - the culpa is substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the
source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie;
Culpa Contractual - culpa is considered as an accident in the performance of an

obligation already existing.
B. BURDEN OF PROOF
Culpa Aquiliana - when the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of
action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff
to prove the negligence – if he does not, his action fails.
Culpa Contractual – Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient

prima facie to warrant a recovery. It is not necessary to prove the negligence.
Page | 13
 The burden of proof shift to the respondent if it wants to show that plaintiff is guilty
of contributory negligence
 Case: The conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
FGU INSURANCE V. SARMIENTO11
FACTS: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS), driven by Eroles, carrying 30 units
of Condura S.D. white refrigerators collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall
into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes, being a
subrogee, and in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS but the later failed to heed the
claim.FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS
and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was not engaged in
business as a common carrier and that the cause of damage was purely accidental. The
RTC subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier
defined under the law & existing jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof?
RULING: GPS has the burden of proof. A default on, or failure of compliance with, the
obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part
of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed
to do so.
GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability
for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the
tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost/suffered.
C. APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate Cause
 An act from which an injury results as a natural, direct, uninterrupted consequenc
e and without which the injury would not have occurred.
CALALA V. CA12
FACTS: Eliza Sunga rode a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. As
jeepneystopped for a passenger to alight, a truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney which resulted Sunga’s was injury.Sunga filed
11
G.R. No. 141910, Oct. 6, 2002
12
G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000
Page | 14
a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging a violation of the contract of carriage.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Salva. The lower court
rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
driver of the truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
case, filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena for quasi-delict, in which the same court
held that Salva and his driver, Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
ISSUE: Would the negligence of Verena, as the proximate cause of the accident, negates
petitioner’s liability
under contract of carriage?
RULING: NO. The Court distinguished quasi-delict from breach of contract: The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.
The Doctrine of Proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,

not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability
to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
D. DEFENSE OF EMPLOYER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE
 Employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employees, he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family.
1. Is there an Intersection?
Art. 2176
 Breach of contract of common carrier and negligence of Manila Railroad
FORES V. MIRANDA13
FACTS: Respondent was one of the Jeepney passengers who got injured when its driver,
Eugenio Luga, lost control thereof, causing the jeep to swerve and to hit the bridge wall.
He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected
13
G.R. No. L-12163, March 4, 1959
Page | 15
to a series of operations.The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that or one day before the
accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a
certain Carmen Sackerman.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for moral damages?
RULING: NO. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same
must be discarded. The SC repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in
damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. The definition of
quasi-delict in Article 2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a "preexisting
contractual relation between the parties.
CONSOLIDATED BANK V. COURT OF APPEALS 14
FACTS: L.C. Diaz and Company (LC Diaz), an accounting firm, has a savings account
with Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (now called Solidbank Corporation).
The firm’s messenger, a certain Ismael Calapre, deposited an amount with the
bank but due to a long line and the fact that he still needs to deposit a certain amount in
another bank, the messenger left the firm’s passbook with a teller of Solidbank. But when
the messenger returned, the passbook is already missing. Apparently, the teller returned
the passbook to someone else. Apparently, an amount of P300,000.00 was already
withdrawn from the firm’s account. LC Diaz demanded Solidbank to refund the said
amount which the bank refused. LC Diaz then sued Solidbank.
In its defense, Solidbank contends that under their banking rules, they are
authorized to honor withdrawals if presented with the passbook; that when the P300k was
withdrawn, the passbook was presented. Further, the withdrawer presented a withdrawal
slip which bore the signatures of the representatives of LC Diaz.
The RTC ruled in favor of Solidbank. It found LC Diaz to be negligent in
handling its passbook. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC using the
rules on quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the relations between Solidbank and LC Diaz, the depositor, is
governed by quasi-delict in determining the liability of Solidbank.
RULING: NO. Solidbank is liable for the loss of the P300k but it’s liability is grounded
on culpa contractual. The act of the teller returning the passbook to someone else other
than Calapre, the firm’s authorized messenger, is a clear breach of contract. Such
negligence binds the bank under the principle of Respondeat Superior or command
responsibility.
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO15
14
G.R. No. 138569, September 2003
15
G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28,1966
Page | 16
FACTS: In March 1958, plaintiff Rafael Carrascosowas issued a first class round trip
ticket by Air France through its authorized agent, the Philippine Airlines. However, upon
reaching Bangkok for their stop over, he was asked by Air France’s plane manager to
vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Plaintiff
protested and after a heated argument, Carrascoso eventually, though reluctantly, gave up
his seat for the “white Man” and transferred to the tourist section of the aircraft for the
rest of the flight.
When Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages
for the inconvenience and embarrassment he suffered during his trip. The CFI of Manila
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France however contends that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was
not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact,
that was not the true intent between the parties.
ISSUE: Whether Air France is liable for damages.
RULING: YES. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty.
The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
The Supreme Court also ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between
Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
FAR EAST V. COURT OF APPEALS 16
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) issued a credit card to Luis Luna at its
Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita S.
Luna. When Clarita’s card was lost, he informed FEBTC. Later, Luis tendered a
despedida lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis
presented his credit card. Unfortunately, it was dishonored and he was forced to pay the
bill in cash and felt embarrassed by this incident. Luis demanded the payment of damages
from FEBTC. Festejo, vice-president of FEBTC, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis
and explained that in cases when a card is reported as lost, FEBTC undertakes necessary
action to avert its unauthorized use such as tagging the card as hotlisted. Festejo also sent
a letter to the Manager of the restaurant to assure that the Lunas were “very valued
clients”of FEBTC. Nevertheless, the Lunas filed a complaint for damages.The trial court
ordered FEBTC to pay the Lunas moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The
appellate court affirmed the ruling. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether FEBTC is liable for the said damages.
RULING: Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages and not to moral and
exemplary damages. The court explained that in culpa contractual, moral damages may
be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in
the breach of the contract and that bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence. Article 2219 states that, “Moral damages may be recovered in the
16
G. R. No. 108164, February 23, 1995
Page | 17
following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2)
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
The Court found that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally
inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, but there was nothing to sufficiently indicate
any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither
could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so
gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be
the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant . xxx The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of
a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact
that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict
provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of
cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.
PSBA V. COURT OF APPEALS17
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista, a 3rd year student of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA),
was stabbed in the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school.
Consequently, he died. This prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the
Regional Trial Court for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as
the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
ISSUE: Whether PSBA can be validly sued by the respondent.
HELD: YES. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the
former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
17
G. R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
Page | 18
SYQUIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 18
FACTS: Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente
Juan Syquia. They filed a complaint before the CFI against herein private respondent,
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract and/or quasi-delict.
According to the complaint, the petitioners and respondent agreed to inter the
remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. They also alleged that the
concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased had a hole approximately three (3)
inches in diameter. Upon opening the vault, it became apparent that there was evidence of
total flooding, the coffin was entirely damaged and the exposed parts of the deceased’s
remains were damaged.
ISSUE: Whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with
petitioners.
alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
RULING: NO. There was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery. Although a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a
culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there
was no negligence.
called a quasi- delict
Had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for
culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: “Those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
LRT V. NAVIDAD19
FACTS: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a
"token. While he was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, JunelitoEscartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck
by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
Later, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against JunelitoEscartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
18
G.R. No. 98695, Jan. 27,1993
19
G. R. No. 145804, Feb. 6, 2003
Page | 19
defendants Prudent Security and JunelitoEscartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally (about 500 k plus damages) On CA exonerated Prudent from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is Correct?
RULING: YES. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of
its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities
under the contract of carriage.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE
1. Determining the Diligence Required
Article 1173.The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of

that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
2, shall apply.
Page | 20
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
RTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. v. SPOUSES JORGE20
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia
de R. C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to
the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing
disbelief, and then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on
November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC
of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD,
MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as

petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which
reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the lost
jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession?
(Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are
not negligent at all.)
HELD: YES. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or

avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:(a) the cause
of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with obligations must be independent of human will;(b) it must be impossible to foresee
the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
to avoid;(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
20
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
Page | 21
obligations in a normal manner; and,(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury or loss. The burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or
misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time
of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983,
he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the
valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be
stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but
actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’
defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by
which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not
foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on
the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not
sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not at
fault. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding
that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article
1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special
laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiary, the
provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that
the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a
family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person
would as to his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence
shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall
apply.
Page | 22
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. We
expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable
care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business.
Sicam’s testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by petitioners
in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were
adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no
clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had
sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged
security guard exercised all that was necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to
ensure that no suspicious individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is
even doubtful that there was a security guard; since it is quite impossible that he would
not have noticed that the robbers were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were
allegedly poked at the employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not
presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not one of petitioners’ employees
who were present during the robbery incident testified in court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at the time of
robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe the care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they were negligent in
not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY VS. COURTOF APPEALS21
FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
(FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant
Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with
the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark,
one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov
relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, was dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After
Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the
21
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
Page | 23
pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable
for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his
negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by
the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD: (1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And
when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty
to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under
certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states
and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots
duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office
as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in
respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to
and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible
degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded
by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt.
Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of
pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is
no less responsible for the collision. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes
it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving
the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance
over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a
compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem.
Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense
that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no
exemption from liability.
Page | 24
Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of
the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are
liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences
of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect
to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is
limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused
by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a
general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of
her negligent management or navigation.
PNR v. BRUNTY22
FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, who came to the Philippines for a visit is the daughter of
complainant Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, died due to an accident when the car
she was in collided with a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train. Previously, Rhonda,
along with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia and their driver, was on their way to
Baguio on a Mercedes Benz sedan. Around 2:00 am, approaching a railroad crossing, the
driver speeding at 70km/hr overtook a vehicle. Unaware, they collided with the train.
Rhonda and the driver died, with Juan suffering severe injuries.
Brunty’s heirs filed a Complaint for damages claiming that PNR was negligent for
not having placed no flag bar, red light signal, and other mechanisms in the railroad
classing where the accident happen. PNR claimed that the law did not require it to put
such alarms.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNR is liable.
HELD: PNR was liable. PNR’s business is impressed with public interest; hence, it is
expected from them to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their work. Thus,
even if the law did not require it to put such alarms, it was still required to do so as a
matter of public duty or public safety.
In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a

given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing
the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence.
Petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary
safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is
liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
“It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of
the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall
make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good,
sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such
road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct
22
G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006
Page | 25
letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of
the necessity of looking out for trains.
“This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its
failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such
failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is
no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or
equipment be installed.”
PNR v. COURT OF APPEALS23
FACTS: In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose Amores (Amores) was traversing
the railroad tracks in Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the railroad
track, he stopped for a while then proceeded accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores
was at the intersection, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train with locomotive
number T-517 turned up and collided with the car.
At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the
intersection to warn motorists of an approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the
only visible warning sign at that time was the defective standard signboard STOP, LOOK
and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was lacking while that of Look was bent. No
whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it finally bumped the car of
Amores. After impact, the car was dragged about ten (10) meters beyond the center of the
crossing. Amores died as a consequence thereof.
On July 22, 1992, the heirs of Amores, consisting of his surviving wife and six
children, herein respondents, filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioners PNR and
Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNRs locomotive driver at the time of the incident, before the
RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 28 and was docketed as Civil Case No.
92-61987. In their complaint, respondents averred that the train’s speedometer was
defective, and that the petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap for
their failure to take precautions to prevent injury to persons and property despite the
dense population in the vicinity. They then prayed for actual and moral damages, as well
as attorneys fees.
In their Answer, the petitioners denied the allegations, stating that the train was
railroad-worthy and without any defect. According to them, the proximate cause of the
death of Amores was his own carelessness and negligence, and Amores wantonly
disregarded traffic rules and regulations in crossing the railroad tracks and trying to beat
the approaching train. They admitted that there was no crossing bar at the site of the
accident because it was merely a barangay road. PNR stressed that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the locomotive
driver and train engineer, Borja, and that the latter likewise used extraordinary diligence
and caution to avoid the accident. Petitioners further asserted that respondents had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident but recklessly failed to do so.
ISSUE: Is PNR liable for damages?
HELD: YES. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
23
G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007
Page | 26
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Using the
aforementioned philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast
rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the
circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is that it is
perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible
men under comparable circumstances.
The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that the train was running at a fast
speed because notwithstanding the application of the ordinary and emergency brakes, the
train still dragged the car some distance away from the point of impact. Evidence
likewise unveils the inadequate precautions taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the
public of the impending danger. Aside from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or
guard to man the intersection at all times was posted on the day of the incident. A reliable
signalling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage
because of many years of neglect, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in
working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.
B. DEGREES OF DILIGENCE
AMEDO V. RIO24
FACTS: This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her original complaint
instituted on October 18, 1950, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant
Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum of P2, 038.40 as compensation for the death of her son,
FilomenoManaguit, who worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The
main allegation of said original complaint was:
That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, while the deceased
FilomenoManaguit was on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped into the water
to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to him, and as a consequence of which, he was
drowned. This however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of action which defendant
filed stating that the allegation does not show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to
an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment". She was allowed to file an
amended complaint which was remanded to the trial court. Her amended complaint
stated: That on May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said
FilomenoManaguit was in the course of his employment, performing his duties as such
ordinary seaman on defendant's M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2
miles from the seashore of ArceliDumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the
breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.
ISSUE: Whether Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio.
HELD: NO. Plaintiff‘s basis for appeal is the Workmen‘s Compensation Act. Sections 2
and 4 of which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury
from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any
illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such
24
G.R. No. L-6870, May 24, 1954
Page | 27
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons
hereinafter specified.
Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries
caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or
another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by
notorious negligence of the same. From these provisions three conditions are essential to
hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2)
it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the
"notorious negligence" of the employee. Point in question is whether the accident was
committed under these 3 conditions - "The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words ìn the course
of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place - it
may be conceded that the death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his
employment, in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where-according
to the amended complaint-he was working. However, the accident which produced this
tragic result did not "arise out of" his employment.
The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have grown out of, or arisen from, his
employment. It was the result of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to
such work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to jump into the water to
retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of
his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the
M/S Pilar II, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed
had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno had.Filomeno’s accident was caused
by his notorious negligence.
"Notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to "gross negligence",

which, in turn, has been defined as follows: - By gross negligence is meant "such entire
want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable
consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to
person or property of others."
It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the
seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and
diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he
could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and
that he was "indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury. - this is distinguishable from
cases wherein the act done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops a
cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. So, also, if, while FilomenoManaguit was
working, his 2-peso bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the
floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled
to compensation, his act being obviously innocent.
MARINDUQUE V. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT25
FACTS: On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the
deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation,
(Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was
25
G.R. No. L-8110, June 30, 1956
Page | 28
then driven by one ProcopioMacunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way
to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another
truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of
said Mamador and injury to the others.”
ProcopioMacunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the deceased’s having violated the employer’s prohibition
against laborers riding the haulage trucks
HELD: NO. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular
instance because there was the employer’s prohibition.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence
of negligence. Section 6 provides as follows:
“Sec. 6.Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer,
under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case
compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid
such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured
employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in
case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or
allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any
other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the
costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount
of compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”
ILAO- ORETA V. RONQUILLO26
FACTS: Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel BenedictoRonquillo had
not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted
petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant and chief
of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical
Center. Dr. Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a
laparascope would be inserted through the patient‘s abdominal wall to get a direct
view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her
infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by

Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical
Center and underwent pre-operative procedures including the administration of
intravenous fluid and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled
time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out
26
G.R. No. 172406, October 11, 2007
Page | 29
that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5,
1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‘s
Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages
including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital,
moral damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and
other available reliefs and remedies. The RTC decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and
awarded Eva Marie actual damages but ruled that the failure of the doctor to arrive on
time was not intentional. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any
job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court
of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to
arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure.
HELD: It bears noting that when she was scheduling the dateof her performance of the
procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon,
and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her
negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out
its characterization as gross.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta‘s negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to
recover moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in
the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney‘s fees as, contrary to the
finding of the CA that the spouses “were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect their interest,” the records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the
matter before going to court.
C. STANDARD OF CONDUCT
"Good Father of a Family" under the Civil Code
PICART VS. SMITH27
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time
to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
27
G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
Page | 30
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to
the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge,
got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: YES. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against
that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of
this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is
this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as
we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
Page | 31
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SPS.TANJANGCO28
FACTS: Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos)

own Lots 68 and 69covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 2422454and
2829615respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is
managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other
hand, respondents-spouses Frank and TeresitaCuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is
adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was
necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under
the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous
surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos.
Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.6 Unfortunately, after the
Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz&Construction Co.,
Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69
by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused,
prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of
Possession with Damages.Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz
for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios
for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to
litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and
building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr.
De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised
diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary
dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held
answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.
On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It
ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87
square meters. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking
into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house. It, thus,
ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees to the
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De
Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether
such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
HELD: Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting
in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos’ property.
28
G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008
Page | 32
By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that
Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the
conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision,
is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the
construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the
Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.41 It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any
liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the
end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the
Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid." Moreover,
Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the
inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from
liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table
inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the
purpose of the rules would be defeated.
Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for

violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the
Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that
everything was in order.
In sum, Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter

wall into Tanjangcos’ property – despite the inspection conducted – constitutes
negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
In the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no fault of their own.
JONASAÑONUEVO, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND

JEROMEVILLAGRACIA29
FACTS: Villagracia was travelling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while
Añonuevo,traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and
Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of
making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia
instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC.
He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevobefore the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the criminal charge.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register
his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies
by analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
persondriving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
ISSUES:
29
G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004
Page | 33
1) Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
2) Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic
regulations.
3) Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence
HELD: NO.
1) Application of Article 2185
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his
bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil
Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of
vehicles. He points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code
was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of
then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators must
have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be
specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand the application of the law to
be more responsive to the times.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-
motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as
bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes
of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are
today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative
modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If
Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the
greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical
experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in
1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by
statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over
sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and
non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.Is
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sametime,
motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of
an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to themotor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater
combustibility due to the use of fuel.
2) Negligience on the part of Villagracia.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the

personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which
Page | 34
determines what would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was
negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However, Añonuevo was
speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a
good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the
turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such
negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle
was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have
acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
3) Contributory Negligence
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he

performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of
the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only
when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo asso
lely responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred
even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.
HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO, AND ELPIDIO ABIAD v. SGT. AMANDO

ALBAYDA, JR.30
FACTS: Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi
driver of a Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his
way to the office, when Completo's taxi bumped and side swept him, causing serious
physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he
was transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was
no orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to
11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through
reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint [against
Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action
for damages against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the

incident. He demanded the following damages and their respective amounts: Actual
damages - 276,550; Moral damages - 600,000; Exemplary damages - 200,000; Attorney's
fees - 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.
30
G.R. No. 172200, July 6, 2010
Page | 35
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab
when he heard a strange sound from the taxicab's rear right side. He found Albayda lying
on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General
Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver, and that he already
reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda
rode his bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said
that Albayda had no cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of
the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also
held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he
would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a
taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's
license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and
according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to
pay actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the
CA, the court affirmed RTC's decision with modifications [no more actual damages;
awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are
solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the
collision.
2. Whether or notAbiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of the family.
3. Whether or notthe award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees for
Albayda had no basis. NO / NO / YES
HELD: It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of
fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist
[10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages
the former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise

reasonable diligence. He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's bicycle; he did
not slow down even when he approached the intersection such negligence was the sole
and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda.
It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the intersection
ahead of Completo. Art. 2180 cited - obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable
also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage
caused by employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed
the diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The employer's civil liability for his
Page | 36
employee's negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in
selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in
the vehicle at the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their

qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
[secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
SPOUSES PACIS v. MORALES31
FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a
shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City.
Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales
agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which
killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs,
which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the
keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the
drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred
got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and
handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization
and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: YES. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’
son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC
or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In
this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against
Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:
31
G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010
Page | 37
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under
PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms
and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer,
otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession
or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being
done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no
risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree
of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about

firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to
avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure
that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive
use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for
repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the
first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to
prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from
another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the
weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded,
respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with
dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
4. CHILDREN
TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.32
FACTS: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature
than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
32
G.R. No. L-4977 ,March 22, 1910
Page | 38
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the
cinders and ashes from its furnacesthey found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it
may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.
The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end,
and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9
years old, and they went to Manuel's home.
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when
the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
surgeons
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable for damages.
HELD: NO. Cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted.
Two (2) years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on
one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning
mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he
obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for 6
months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say
that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as
might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held
civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as
to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the
commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so
to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on
the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences
He was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his
Page | 39
own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
JARCO MARKETING V CA33
FACTS: Zhieneth, 6 years old, was pinned by the bulk of the department store‘s gift-
wrapping counter/structure and died. The department store contended that it was the
child‘s own act of climbing into the structure that was the proximate cause of the fall of
the counter.
ISSUE: Is Jarco Marketing liable?
HELD: (Citing Sangco) Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9
years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a
child over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is
that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
YLARDE V AQUINO
FACTS: Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete block in
order to make a whole to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the loose soil
around the open hole but allegedly telling them ―not to touch the stone‖. They, however,
playfully jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete block to fall towards the
opening. Ylarde wasn‘t able to climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained.
ISSUE: Was the death of Ylarde caused by his own negligence?
HELD: NO. The child Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence.
(citingSangco) The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of
the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree
of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his own age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of
the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances.
5. EXPERTS
A. GENERAL (Expert and Professional)
 They should exhibit the care and skill of one who is ordinarily skilled in the
particular field that he is in.
 When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the
care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do.
33
G.R. No. 129792, Dec. 21, 1991
Page | 40
 An expert will not be judged based on what a non-expert can foresee.
 The rule regarding experts is applicable not only to professionals who have
undergone formal education.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY34
FACTS: M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
(FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant
Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with
the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark,
one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov
relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of
the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After
Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES: (1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable
for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his
negligence;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by
the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the
universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he
assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is
not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the
ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert
in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary
care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have
made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding
the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that
34
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998
Page | 41
he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire
docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this
risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of
a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is
imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the
provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be
paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability.
Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the
injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable.
But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his
own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to
navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is
limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused
by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a
general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of
her negligent management or navigation.
CULION vs PHILIPPINES MOTORS
FACTS: When Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went PMC where
Quest, PMC’s manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting
the carburettor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and
dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he took it
lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and burned the boat.
ISSUE: Whether or not PMC is liable.
HELD: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence of he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts
to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A
person skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the
circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the
skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine
on boats.
B. PHARMACIST
Standard of Conduct: The profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. The
Druggist must exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs. RAUL DE LEON
FACTS: Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He
also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a
doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter prescribed the drugs “CortisporinOpthalmic” and
“Ceftin” to relieve his eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De
Leon went to the Betterliving, Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to
buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon,
a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in
Page | 42
using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent’s left eye.
Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the
affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he
was given the wrong medicine, “CortisporinOtic Solution.” De Leon returned to the same
Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he confronted Ganzon
why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize
and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was
her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the
needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms.
Vivian K. Askuna, about the day’s incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office
and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied
his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against Mercury Drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.
HELD: YES. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability.
As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of
care and diligence is expected of them.
In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there

instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the
employer, either in the selection or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption
may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such
presumption.
Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high
standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly
negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon.
As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and
its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the
purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists
an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or
injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning.
Druggist must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and

vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to the
danger flowing from the substitution of deadly weapons for harmless medicines.
US vs PINEDA
FACTS: Pineda, a pharmacist, sold barium chlorate (poisonous) instead of potassium

chlorate which killed 2 horses.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pineda is liable.
HELD: YES. The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The
responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as “ordinary care,” “care of a
Page | 43
specially high degree”, which is “the highest practicable high degree of prudence,
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance and the most exact and
reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, in order that
human life may not constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of
deadly poison for harmless medicine. The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of
the business which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is
irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.
C. MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS (Doctors)

 The proper standard is whether, the physician if a general practitioner has
exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking
into account the advances in the profession.
 A physician who holds himself out as a specialist should be held to the standard
of care and skill of the average member of the profession practicing the specialty,
taking into account the advances in the profession.
 By the physician-patient relationship, a duty is imposed on the physician to use
the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. Stated otherwise, in treating his patient,
a physician is under a duty to the patient to exercise that degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same
general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS35
FACTS: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo,

accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in
Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30
in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a “Myoma” in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening
of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According to
Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were very
dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor with.
Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with the
operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed through
after the petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the
operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by another
instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR,
another bag of blood was requested to be bought, however, the same was not bought due
to unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person arrived to donate
blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was
attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath apparently, the oxygen tank is empty, so
her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later, without the knowledge of
Lydia’s relatives, she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to San Pablo District
Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced shocks, she
died.
35
GR NO. 122445 NOVEMBER 18, 1997
Page | 44
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has been criminally and civilly negligent which caused
the death of Lydia Umali.
HELD: Not criminally but only civilly liable. whether or not a physician has
committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient is to
be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science.
A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed
by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training,
care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that
expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession
but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation. In litigations involving
medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient.
In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that
the injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
reference of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of and the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would have occurred.
DELA TORRE v. IMBUIDO36
FACTS: At around 3:00pm of February 3, 1992, Carmen was brought to Divine Spirit
General Hospital’s operating room for her caesarian section operation, which was to be
performed by Dr. Nestor. By 5:30pm, of the same day, Pedrito was informed by his
wife’s delivery of a baby boy. In the early morning of February 4, 1992, Carmen
experienced abdominal pains and difficulty in urinating. She was diagnosed to be
suffering from urinary tract infection (UTI), and was prescribed medication by Dr.
Norma. On February 10, 1992, Pedrito noticed that Carmen’s stomach was getting
bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed the patient’s condition as mere fratulence. When
Carmen’s stomach still grow bigger despite medications, Dr. Norma advised Pedrito of
the possibility of a second operation on Carmen. Dr. Norma, however, provided no
details on its purpose and the doctor who would perform it. At around 3:00pm on
February 12, 1992 Carmen had her second operation. Later in the evening, Dr. Norma
36
GR No. 192973 September 29, 2014
Page | 45
informed Pedrito that “everything was going on fine with his wife.” The condition of
Carmen, however, did not improve. It instead worsened that on February 13, 1992, she
vomited dark red blood. At 9:30pm of the same day, Carmen died. Per her death
certificate upon information provided by the hospital, the immediate cause of Carmen’s
death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebro vascular accident, hypertension
and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy. An autopsy report prepared by Dr. Partilano,
medico-legal officer designate of Olongapo City, however, provided that the cause of
Carmen’s death was shock due to peritonitis severe with multiple intestinal adhesions;
status post caesarian section and exploratory laparotomy. Pedrito claimed in his
complaint that the respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of them
as members of the medical profession, and were negligent for practicing surgery on
Carmen in the most unskilled, ignorant, and cruel manner.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were liable for medical malpractice that resulted to
Carmen’s death.
HELD: NO. Medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type
of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such
a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this case, must prove that healthcare provider,
in most cases, a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the
patient.
Four essential elements must be established namely: 1) Duty; 2) Breach; 3) Injury

and 4) Proximate Causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the
physician negligent and thus, liable for damages.
CASUMPANG V. CORTEJO37
FACTS: Edmer Cortejo was brought to the Emergency Room of the SJDH because of
difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever.
Based on the initial examinations and the chest x-ray, Edmer was diagnosed with
“bronchopneumonia”. Edmer was referred to Dr. Casumpang and he confirimed the
initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia. While under observation, Edmer’s symptoms
were persisting which included fever and traces of blood in his sputum, and upon alerting
Dr. Casumpang, he reassured Mrs. Corteho that her son’s illness is bronchopneumonia.
The following day, Edmer vomited “phlegmn” with blood streak, and upon
examination ordered by Dr. Casumpang, due to the advice of Dr. Sanga, Edmer’s blood
test showed that he is suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, which prompted his
parents to transfer him to the Makati Medical Center, instead of the transferring him to
the ICU which Dr. Casumpang suggested.
Upon examination in the Makati Medical Center, the attending physician

diagnosed Edmer with Dengue Fever Stage IV that was already in its irreversible stage.
Soon, after Edmer died. Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action for damages
37
GR No. 171127, 11 March 2015
Page | 46
against SJDH, and its physicians: Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Sanga before the RTC of
Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SJDH is solidary liable with the physicians.
HELD: YES. We affirm the hospital’s liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, but on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.
Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the
petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from liability.
As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors.
However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as an
ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent
authority.”
Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a hospital can be held vicariously liable
for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether
the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor. SJDH cannot disclaim liability
since there is no showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have
known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the hospital.
BORROMEO vs. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, Inc
FACTS: The petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had
been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two days. She
was admitted at the hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso. Lilian underwent
multiple tests such as complete blood count, urinalysis, stool exam, pelvic ultrasound,
and a pregnancy test. However, the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she
had appendicitis. Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian
because of the findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured
appendix. Operation was conducted, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from
acute appendicitis.
He proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected and congested
with pus. six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that
her blood pressure was low. After assessing her condition, he ordered the infusion of
more intravenous (IV) fluids. Lilian did not respond to the blood transfusion. Dr. Inso
observed that Lilian was developing petechiae in various parts of her body. Petechiae are
small bruises caused by bleeding under the skin whose presence indicates a blood-
coagulation problem. Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests because the
immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian. Dr. Inso and the nurses performed
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Lilian. Dr. Inso also informed her family that
there may be a need to re-operate on her, but she would have to be put in an Intensive
Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU. Dr. Inso informed the
petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to another hospital. Lilian was taken to
the MMC by ambulance accompanied by the resident doctor on duty and a nurse. Dr.
Inso.
Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian.
Unfortunately, Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her. At the request of the
petitioner, Lilian’s body was autopsied at thePhilippine National Police (PNP) Camp
Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr.Emmanuel Reyes. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of
Lilian’s death was hemorrhagedue to bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding.
Page | 47
Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Family Care
and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Inso and Family Care were responsible in Lilians death.
HELD: In a Medical Malpractice Case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its
Elements, namely: (1) a Duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the defendant’s Breach
of Duty; (3) Injury to the patient; and (4) Proximate Causation between the breach and
the injury suffered. In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a
preponderance of evidence.
A medical professional has the duty to observe the Standard of Care and
exercise the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other
similarly trained medical professionals acting under the same circumstances. A breach of
the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the
defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient. The standard is based on the norm
observed by other reasonably competent members of the profession practicing the same
field of medicine. Because medical malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert
testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was
bound to observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the
acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard
caused injury to his patient.
The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus, a
pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an
anesthesiologist and an autopsy expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in
infectious diseases.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
A. IN MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS
1. Previous violation
Art. 2184
 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
 If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable.
 A person is not required by law to have a certain degree of proficiency in

driving or in the observance of traffic rules, before he can own a motor
vehicle. Under art. 2184 the test of his negligence is his omission to do that
which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to
prevent the mishap.
 Solidary liability is imposed on the owner not because of his imputed liability
but because his own omission is a concurring proximate cause of the injury.
Page | 48
a) Simultaneous violations
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
Effect of Presumption of Negligence
Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under

Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the
time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However,
in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic
regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto.Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of
Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere
violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability
for damages.38
B. POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS OR SUBSTANCE
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is
indispensable in his occupation or business.
C. COMMON CARRIERS
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes
only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.”
Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
38
Albert Tison and Claudio L. Jabon Vs. Sps. Gregorio Pomasin and Consorcia Ponce Pomasin, et al., G.R.
No. 173180. August 24, 2011
Page | 49
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Article 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting the liability of the
common carrier in the vigilance over the goods, the common carrier is disputably
presumed to have been negligent in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
D. RES IPSALOQUITOR
1. Definition
a Latin word which means “the thing speaks for itself”
 A doctrine of law that one is presumed to be negligent if he/she/it had

exclusive control of whatever caused the injury even though there is no
specific evidence of an act of negligence, and without negligence the accident
would not have happened. (Law Dictionary)
2. Statement of the Rule
 Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care. (Professional Services v. Agana, 2007)
3. Elements
The Requisites for the applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor are:
1) The occurrence of an injury;

2) The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant;
3) The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control and management used proper care; and
4) The absence of explanation by the defendant.39
4. Effect of Direct Evidence
 It has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the
Doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome; or the doctrine of Res
IpsaLoquitor becomes inapplicable. (Layugan v. IAC, 1988)
5. Nature of the Rule
 The doctrine is not a Rule of Substantive Law but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience. (Layugan v. IAC, 1988)
6. Effect of the Rule
 The doctrine of res ipsaloquitor as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of

negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
39
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007
Page | 50
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.40
7. Justification for the Rule
 It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience or common

knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the
accident itself. Hence, res ipsaloquitor is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.41
8. Res Ipsa Loquitor versus expert Testimony in Medical Negligence Cases
 As a general rule, in cases of medical malpractices, expert medical testimony

is relied upon to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure.
 The exception is that when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the
plaintiff since the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. All the patient
or plaintiff must do is to prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant.
E. DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE
A. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE TO PROXIMATE CAUSE

ARTICLE 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Bernardo v. Legaspi
FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained by plaintiff’s automobile by reason of defendant’s negligence in causing a
collision. Court also dismissed a cross complaint filed by the defendant, praying for
damages on the ground that the injuries sustained by his automobile, and those to the
plaintiff’s car were caused by plaintiff’s own negligence.
HELD: The Supreme Court Held that, both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in
handling their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action
by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence as one of the determining
causes thereof, he cannot recover
General Rule: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and defendant is the proximate
cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each other.
PLDT v. COURT OF APPEALS
40
Layugan v. IAC, 1988
41
Ramos v. CA,1999
Page | 51
FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Esteban’s jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an
open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that, accident was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of the street but it swerved abruptly,
causing the jeep to hit the mound. Proximate cause was the unexplained and abrupt
swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the jeep was running to fast, the negligence of
Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages.
MANILA ELECTRIC V. REMONQUILLO
FACTS: Magno was repairing the “mediaagua” when he was electrocuted to death. The
galvanized iron sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric wire.
HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But assuming it was Magno’s heirs still
can’t recover because the proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire
but the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without precaution. It is assumed that due to his age and
experience, he was qualified to do the job.
B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF

ARTICLE 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2214
In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that
he may recover.
1. Definition of Contributory Negligence
AONUEVO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, Villagracia was traveling
along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was
driving his car. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street
when the collision occurred. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter
and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo
HELD: Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant in
conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury. To hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link,
although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In
Page | 52
a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the
injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
SPS VERGARA VS. SPS SONKIN
FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Vergara and Spouses Sonkin are adjoining landowners. The
property owned by the Sps. Sonkin is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sps.
Vergara. The Sps Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the
partition wall as part of the wall of the master’s bedroom and bathroom.Sps. Vergara
levelled the uneven portion of their property making it even higher than that of the
Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the
Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing
cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor Sps. Sonkin filed the
instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order.
HELD: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection.
The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the
house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their
property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as
water seepage, the former is nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only
failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but
also for disregarding the legal easement (to receive water from higher estates) constituted
over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own
loss.
2. Contributory Negligence v. Proximate Cause
Contributory Negligence, both parties are negligent. Additional cause to the

injury or damage and recovery for damages may be mitigated.
While in Proximate Cause, only one party is negligent. Direct cause of the Injury
or damage, and recovery of damages.
3. Effects of Contributory Negligence
LAMBERT V. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON
FACTS: Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon and borrowed his
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. After
eating supper and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at
a high speed. They figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner.
HELD: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is

partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. It was established that Ray, at the
time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the
Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a
protective helmet.
Page | 53
GENOBIAGON V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Rig driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady who was crossing the street.
His defense was that it was the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal
cases committed through reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
C. FORTUITOUS EVENT
1. Definition
Article 1174 of the Civil Code:
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
In the case of Sicam v. Jorge42, the Supreme Court defined fortuitous event as
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must
be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is
not impossibility to foresee the same.
It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a person's participation -- whether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God. The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous
event rests on him who invokes it.
2. Defenses and Exceptions

Is there liability for loss due to fortuitous event?43
General Rule:
There is no liability for loss in case of fortuitous event.44 Butin order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.45
Exceptions:
1) Law;
2) Nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk;
42 G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

43batasnatin.com/law-library/civil-law/obligations-and-contracts/2340-act-of-god-fortuitous-event.html Accessed on
6 March 2017
44 Article 1174 of the New Civil Code
45 Sicam v. Jorge, see supra, note 1.
Page | 54
3) Stipulation;
4) The debtor is guilty of dolo, malice or bad faith, has Promised the same thing to
two or more persons who does not have the same interest;
5) The debtor Contributed to the loss;46
6) The possessor is in Bad faith;47and
7) The obligor is Guilty of fraud, negligence or delay or if he contravened the tenor of
the obligation.48
3. Elements
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a)The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b)It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the casofortuito or, if
it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c)The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury or loss.49
4. Three-Step Analysis
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that
1) He be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss
may have been occasioned.
 An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been
guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences.
 When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or
injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate causeof the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.
 When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man
whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God.
2) There should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act.
 In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others.It may be the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man,
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do.
3) A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss.
46 Tan v. Inchausti & Co., G.R. No. L-6472, Mar. 7, 1912

47 Article 552 of the New Civil Code, xxx A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in every case,
even if caused by a fortuitous event.
48 Juan Nakpil v. United Construction Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-47851, Apr. 15, 1988
49 Sicam v. Jorge, see supra, note 1.
Page | 55
 The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in
fact.
 What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind.
 The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown.50
D. PLAINTIFF ASSUMPTION OF RISK / VOLENTI NON-FIT INJURIA
AFIALDA V. HISOLE51
FACTS: The now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending the animals he was,
gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries.The mishap was due
neither to his own fault nor to force majeure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.
HELD: NO. The Court held that it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured
by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
Defendant's liability is made to rest on Article 1905 of the Civil Code. But action
under that article is not tenable for the reason that the liability shall cease only in case, the
damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it. On the other hand, if action is to be based on Article 1902 of the Civil Code,
it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of
the animal that caused the damage.
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS52

FACTS: A strong typhoonbuffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, after the typhoon had
abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan,
ventured out of the house and went to her shop to look after the merchandise therein that
might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood the deceased had been
electrocuted, and the body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the decedent's death.
HELD: YES. The Court held that while it is true that typhoons and floods are considered
Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
negligence that death took place.In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb.
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be".53 The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".
50
South Eastern College v. CA, G.R. No. 126380, July 10, 1998
51
G.R. No. L-2075, November 29, 1949
52
G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989
53
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427
Page | 56
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application
in the case at bar. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the decedent's property, a source
of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the
time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard
to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death
caused by petitioner's negligence.
CALALAS V. COURT OF APPEALS54

FACTS: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. She was seated on an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.When the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off,an Isuzu truckbumped therear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education because herleg was alreadydefective. Sunga filed a complaint for damages
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
ISSUE :Whether or not petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
HELD: YES. The Court held thatquasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor; and the breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.
In Quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely
by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code.
This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
A Caso Fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury
to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. REYES55

FACTS: Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya,"
alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was invited by
one Dr. Violeta Filart, whom he alleged to be his friend, in a party at the hotel’s
penthouse in celebration of the hotel’s manager. Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table
but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner, Ruby
Lim, whois theExecutive Secretary of the hotel. In a loud voice and within the presence
and hearing of the other guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang
kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Thereafter, Makati policeman
approachedthe respondent and was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for Millionsas damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria applies in this case.
54
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
55
G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Page | 57
HELD: YES. The Court held that the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria ("to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
When "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.
Article 2156 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following Elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.The liability arises
from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or
good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with
impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.
PANTALEON V. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.57

FACTS :Pantaleon, together with his family, went on a guided European tour.When the
tour group arrived in Amsterdam, due to their late arrival, they postponed the tour of the
city for the following day.Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase some diamond pieces
worth a total of US$13,826.00. When Pantaleon presented his American Express credit
card to pay for this purchase, Coster had not received approval from AMEX for the
purchase so Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager,
however, convinced Pantaleon to wait a few more minutes. 45 minutes later, AMEX still
had not approved the purchase.When the Pantaleons finally returned to the tour bus, they
found their travel companions visibly irritated.Pantaleon experienced the same delay in
securing approval for purchases using his American Express credit card on two separate
occasions which prompted Pantaleon to file an action for damages against the credit card
company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the own actions of Pantaleon is the proximate cause for
hisembarrassment and humiliation.
HELD: YES. The Court held that a person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes
himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury. The doctrine of Volenti
Non Fit Injuria58 refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
Under the Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria, or damages without legal wrong, loss
without injury59, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff
- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
56Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
57
, G.R. No. 174269, August 5, 2010
58 to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury
59 Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Page | 58
E. PRESCRIPTION
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1)
year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
Under the case Kramer v. CA60, Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based
upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
FACTS: The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island
vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent. As a consequence of
the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The Board conducted an
investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime
collision. The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on
board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The petitioners instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private respondent. The private respondent filed a
Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued
that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code,the prescriptive period for instituting a
Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by the petitioners should be dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the right of action accrues when there exists a cause
of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the
part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 61 The prescriptive
period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time
of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is
the time when the cause of action arises.The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an
action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after
the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such
negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
V. CAUSE
A. DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
1. PROXIMATE CAUSE is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
 Proximate Cause does not have an exact definition because it can only be
determined by common sense and logic. We adhere to the principle which states
60 G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

61Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 (1985).
Page | 59
that proximate cause may be foreseen or unforeseen.
2. CONCURRENT CAUSES is where several causes producing the injury are

concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all the responsible persons.
 In the case of Tamayo v. Senora62 where a police officer was riding a motorcycle
crossing an intersection. A tricycle bumped the motorcycle pushing the same into
the path of a truck. The Court observed that even if the motorcycle was nudged
into the path of the truck, there would have been no impact if the truck itself was
not moving and certainly not an impact that would pin the motorcycle’s drive
under the truck and throw the motorcycle a few meters away. Hence, the
concurrent negligence of both the drivers of the tricycle and truck makes the
solidarily liable.
EXCEPTION: Plaintiff’s negligence as Concurrent proximate cause, consistent with

Art.2179 of the New Civil Code.
3. REMOTE CAUSE is that cause which some independent force merely took
advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof. A remote
cause cannot be considered a legal cause of the damage.
 Ex. A fire destroyed three houses, House B and C put the fault to House A to
whom the embers of the train first hit, House A claims that the wind spread the
fire from his house to the houses of B and C, the one liable here is the train who is
negligent in not carefully maintaining the emission of the embers of the train. In
this case, the wind is only a remote cause.
4. INTERVENING CAUSE is a cause that destroys the causal connection between

the negligent act and the injury thereby negates liability. It will be the proximate
cause if the events is so broken that they become independent and the result
cannot be said to be the consequence of primary cause
 Example: If Moana throws a hot camote to Mawi, who, in turn, threw it to
Digong, there is an intervening cause in the absence of which Digong would not
have been injured. Moana is the original perpetrator who set in motion a force that
continued to operate until it caused injury to Digong.
But if Moana had placed the hot camote in a secluded place where it would not
have cause injury, and Mawi had taken it up anew on its habit of mischief, there
would have been a new cause not dependent upon the first, Mawi now is liable.
There is now an efficient intervening cause in this case.
B. TEST TO DETERMINE PROXIMATE CAUSE

1) Sine Qua Non or Indispensable Cause is a cause without which the injury would not
have occurred or is the efficient cause which set in motion the chain of circumstances
leading to the injury.
In the landmark case of Bataclan v. Medina63, the Court ruled that the overturning of the
bus is the indispensable cause which produced the burning of the bus. The helpers act of
carrying torch is a call of natural help. It would be different if looting took place when the
bus was overturned.
2) Sufficient Link Test is a test where the plaintiff must establish a sufficient link
between the act of omission and the damage or injury. The link must not be remote or far-
fetched,otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and
probable result of the act or omission.
3) Substantial Factor or Important Factor is the significant factor that is not
necessarily the only factor leading to the plaintiff’s injury but is sufficient to have caused
the injury by itself. It is important in cases where there are concurrent causes.
62 G.R.No.176946,November 14,2010
63 G.R. No. L-10126.October 22,1957
Page | 60
4) Mixed consideration states there is no exact formula to determine probable cause. It
is based upon mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy, circumstances and
precedent.
5) Cause v. Condition It is no longer practicable to distinguish between cause and
condition. This is because the two are always related. Such that, If a defendant who
“caused” a spill of gasoline in the premise creates a” dangerous condition.” If a spark
ignites the gasoline, then the defendant is liable. The important thing here is the relation
of cause and condition resulting to an injury.
6) Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds the
other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It is also called as “Humanitarian
Negligence Doctrine."
Elements:
1. Plaintiff is placed in danger by his own negligent acts and he is unable to get out
of from such situation by any means;
2. Defendant knows that the plaintiff is in danger and knows or should have known
that the plaintiff was unable to extricate himself therefrom;
3. Defendant had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident through
the exercise of ordinary care but failed to do so, and the accident occurred as a
proximate cause of such failure.
Additional Notes:
1. It applies also in the relation of a bank with a depositor;
2. If plaintiff is the proximate cause, no recovery can be made;
3. If plaintiff is not the proximate cause, recovery can be made but such will be
mitigated;
4. If negligence of parties is equal in degree, then each bears his own loss.
Cases where the Supreme Courts held that the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is
NOT applicable:
1. It does not apply if the plaintiff was not negligent, that is, only the defendant was
negligent.
2. It cannot be applied in the field of joint tortfeasors and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants who are concurrently negligent.
3. It does not arise where the plaintiff, a passenger, filed an action against a carrier
based on contract.
4. It is not applicable if the actor, though negligent, was not aware of the danger or
risk brought about by prior fraud or negligent act.
VI. PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
A. PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. Parents
Article 2180, Civil Code
“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Page | 61
The father, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
The liability treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
A. "Diligence of a good father of a family” – its meaning.

B. Parent’s liability is a PRIMARY LIABILITY and not SUBSIDIARY
LIABILITY.
LIBI V. INTERMIDIATE APPELATE COURT64
FACTS: Herein petitioners and respondents are the parents of deceased Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi. These two minors were then sweethearts until they broke up
as Julie Ann found Wendell to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell’s attempts of
reconciliation did not work out prompting him to resort to threats against Julie Ann. Until
one time, both were found dead with inflicted gunshot wound from the same firearm
licensed after the name of CresencioLibi, Wendell’s father.
The parents of Julie Ann submitted that Wendell caused their daughter’s death by
shooting her then shot himself to suicide. Wendell somehow got hold of the key to the
drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that
said gun had been missing from that safety box. Wendell had a picture taken proudly
displaying said gun and dedicated this picture to Julie Ann. A case was then filed against
the parents of Wendell based on Article 2180.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are vicariously liable.
HELD: YES. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child.
Defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of
the family by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to
their son for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety box after the crime had been committed.
The Supreme Court stated: “We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil code, is
primary and not subsidiary.
C. There has to be actual custody and control of the minor for the doctrine of
vicarious liability to apply.
TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS65
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which
led to her death. During this incident, Adelberto was living with his natural parents. Prior
64
G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
65
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Page | 62
to this, spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto. This petition
for adoption was granted after Adelberto shot Jennifer.
A case for damages was filed against Adelberto’s natural parents, who claimed
that, since adoption retroacts to the filing of the petition, the proper party to be sued are
the adoptive parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the adoptive parents are vicariously liable.
HELD: NO. Retroactive effect may be given to permit the accrual of some benefit in
favor of the child., but not to burden the adoptive parents with liability for a tortious act,
which they could not have foreseen or prevented. The SC ruled that the natural parents
are still liable, since they had the actual control and custody at the time of the
commission of the act.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
2. GUARDIANS

“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
3. OTHER PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Family Code:
Article 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following
persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order
indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and

other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary
judicial proceedings to heads of children’s hones, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Page | 63
B. TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS
1. Under the Civil Code
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
a. “…so long as they remain in their custody”. – its meaning.
PALISOC V. BRILLANTES66
FACTS: DominadorPalisoc, 16-year old, and VirgilioDaffon were classmates at the

Manila Technical Institute. During an afternoon recess time, in the laboratory room,
Daffon and another classmate were working on a machine while Palisoc was looking on
at them. Daffonmade a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.
Because of this remark, Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.Daffon, in retaliation,
gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on
the stomach. Palisoc retreated to avoid the blows but Daffon followed and both
exchanged blows until Palisocstumbled falling face downward. Palisoc fainted and
eventually died. Postmortem findings showed cause of death as shock due to traumatic
fracture of ribs, contusion of the pancreas and stomach intragastric hemorrhage and
hemorrage on the brain.
Defendants in civil case were the parents of Palisoc, a member of the board of
directors of the school, the owner and the president of the school, the instructor of the
class to which the deceased belonged, and VirgilioDaffon.
The trial court absolved the officials of the school holding that the school officials
could be held liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code only if the victim “lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school”. In the case at
bar, the trial court reasoned that there is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and
boarded with his teacher or the other officials of the school.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school officials were correctly absolved by the lower court
from liability under Art.2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court explained that the phrase “so long as they remain in
their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time.
“There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil
or student who commits tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held
by the lower court…”
66
G.R. No. L-29025, Oct. 5, 1988
Page | 64
B. Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic(technical or vocational in nature) – the interpretation of this provision: “Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”
AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS67
FACTS: PablitoDaffonshot his classmate, Alfredo Amadora, 3 days before graduation

day in high school. Amadorawent to the San Jose Recolitos and while at the auditorium,
he was shot by Daffon. Victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code against Colegio de San Jose Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher.
Daffon’s parents contended that their son was in school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite for graduation; hence, he was under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
The trial court ruled holding private respondents liable for damages. On appeal,
the CFI reversed the decision and all defendants were completely absolved. CFI
ratiocinated that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.
It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school officials and the teacher are liable.
HELD: NO. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. However, the SC
absolved the school officials and the teacher for failure to prove negligence on their part.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline.
Assuming that the physics teacher was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing
that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he waived observance
of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed ore required to report to school on that day.
C. The school is not liable for tortious acts of the student after dismissal
67
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Page | 65
SALVOSA V. IAC68
FACTS: Within the premises of the Baguio Colleges Foundation is an ROTC Unit under
the control of the AFP. The ROTC Unit had Jimmy Abonas its duly appointed armorer by
the AFP. Not being an employee of BCF, Abon received his salary from the AFP.Abon
was at the same time a commerce student of BCF.
One night at around 8:00 pm in the parking space, Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a
student of the University of Baguio, using an unlicensed firearm from the armory. Castro
died and Abonwas convicted of homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy Abon,
ROTC Commandant Ungos, President Benjamin Salvosa, EVP Jesus Salvosa, Executive
Trustee of BCF - Quetolio, and BCF Inc. The trial court rendered its decision sentencing
Abon, President Salvosa, and BCF Inc. jointly and severally liable, and absolving the
other defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Salvosa and BCF Inc. can be held solidarily liable with
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD: NO. The SC absolved the school, since Abon was no longer under its custody
when the incident happened. It held that he was not in recess, he was no longer in
attendance in the school at that time. He was already dismissed. Circumstance shows that
Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro. He was instructed “not to leave
the office and to keep the armory well guarded”.
2. Under the Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
a. The act or omission considered as negligent must be the proximate

cause of injury. Proximate causation needs to be proven rather than
presumed.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS69
FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, the jeep the students were
riding, owned by defendant Villanueva, was driven by James Daniel II then 15-year old
and a student of the same school. Allegedly,Daniel drove the jeep in reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle. Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained
from the accident.
68
G.R. No. 70458, Oct. 5, 1988
69
G.R. Mo. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
Page | 66
Facts proved as admitted by Daniel spouses and Villanueva that the immediate
cause of accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The trial
court rendered its judgment finding St. Mary’s Academy liable for damages as the
principal obligor. The CA promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages; hence,
St. Mary’s Academy filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school is liable for damages.
HELD: NO. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have causal connection to the accident. In this case, respondents failed to
show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits

establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel but
the mechanical defect in the jeep of Villanueva. Spouses Carpitanos did not dispute the
report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those
given authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
was unfounded.
ST. JOSEPH COLLEGE V. MIRANDA70
FACTS:Inside St. Joseph Colleges (SJC), the class of Jayson Miranda under teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder
and iron fillings in a test tube. The chemical suddenly spurted out from the test tube
hitting Jayson Miranda’s eyes when he was looking at it. He underwent surgery due to
the injury he sustained.
The parents of Jayson demanded from the school that the latter should shoulder
all the medical expenses. The school refused explaining that the accident occurred by
reason of Jayson’s failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment and
his teacher’s repeated warnings and instructions that no student must face, much less to
look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled. The trial
court held the school solidarily liable and the same was affirmed by the CA; hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school is liable for damages.
HELD: YES. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during
the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise
70
G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
Page | 67
the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and
devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers and
teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted
experiment, specifically, when the accident occurred.
C. OWNERS/MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS / EMPLOYERS
1) Distinguishing the 4th and the 5th paragraph of article2180
a) Paragraph 4 of article 2180 refers to owners and managers of establishments

and enterprises. In effect, the owners are employers if they are also managers
of their establishments or enterprises while paragraph 5 made it clear that the
employers referred to need not be engaged in business or industry.
b) The 4th paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the
service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while paragraph
5 encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task.
 Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in business

and industry are covered as long as they were acting within the scope of their
assigned task.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. PHIL-AMERICAN

“The terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise do not
include the manager of the corporation who himself is just an employee.”
2) When paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of Article 2180 applicable

A. There must be an Employee-Employer Relationship.
SPS. JAYME v. APOSTOL

 Before an employer be held liable, employee-employer relationship must be
proved and not be presumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
existence of employment relationship by preponderance of evidence.
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. YU
 Article 2180 states that, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on
the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the
employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent
employee.
B. Within The Range of Designed Tasks

 This includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage.
FILAMER v. IAC
Page | 68
 Funtecha need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order
that FILAMER may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of FILAMER.”
3) Presumption of Negligence
 Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or
supervision of said employee.
4) Rebuttal of Presumption
 In order to rebut the presumption of negligence, the employer must present
adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the
selection ad supervision of his employees.
LAMPESA v. DE VERA
 In order to rebut the presumption of negligence, the employer must present

adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the
selection ad supervision of his employees.
MERCURY v. HUANG
 The liability of the employer under article 2180 is direct and immediate. It is
not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. To relieve him from liability, the
petitioner should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the employee and supervision of the performance of
his duties.
D. STATE
 The state is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and
employees when they are acting as special agents.
SPECIAL AGENT
 One who receives a definite and fixed order of commission , foreign to the
exercise of the ordinary duties of his office
TWO SITUATIONS PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE 2180
1) When the state acts through special agent

 In here the state is subject to liability for damages caused by the agent.
2) When the act is performed by an official upon whom previously devolved the
duty of doing the act performed.
 In here it is the official and not the state who is liable for damages caused by
the act he performed.
FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN
Page | 69
 When the state is engaged in private business or enterprises, it becomes liable
as an ordinary employer.”
VII. PERSONS SPECIFICALLY LIABLE
A. POSSESSOR OR USE OF ANIMALS
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same
is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
AFIALDA v. HISOLE71
FACTS: Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Hisole. Without any fault
from Afialda or any force majeure. One of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his
death. Afialda's sister sued Hisole arguing Article 2183 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.
HELD: NO. The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal”. Afialda was
the caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend the carabaos. Therefore, he
is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in the position to prevent
the animal from causing damage. It would have been different if Afialda is a stranger.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the
provisions of the Worksmen's Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of the
occupational hazards.
VESTIL V. INTERMEDIATE AAPPELATE COURT72
FACTS: Respondents daughter was bitten by a dog in the petitioners house. She was
rushed in the hospital and was discharged after 9 days. However, she was readmitted due
to “vomiting of saliva”. Months later, the child died. Respondents sued petitioners
alleging that the latter are liable as the possessor of the dog. The petitioners
alleged that the dog and the house doesn't belong to them and owned by their deceased
father Vicente Miranda.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable?
HELD: YES. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house of the petitioners, regardless of the ownership of the dog or house.
While it is true that they are not the owner, there is no doubt that they are the posessor at
the time the incident happened.
B. OWNER OF MOTOR VEHICLE
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
71
85 Phil 67
72
GR No. 74431, Nov. 6, 1989
Page | 70
prevented the misfortune. It is disputable presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of Art. 2180 are applicable.
CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD73
FACTS: Chapman was hit by a car owned by Underwood which was driven by his
driver. Underwood was riding in the car when the incident happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not Underwood is liable for the negligent act of his driver.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue violating the law by the performance of
negligent acts, after he had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease there from, become himself responsible for such acts. In the case at bar,
Underwood had no reasonable opportunity to prevent the act because the driver's
negligent act was sudden although he is present during the incident. Underwood is not
civilly or criminally liable.
C. PROVINCES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN74
FACTS: While Guilatco is about to board a tricycle at the sidewalk at Perez Blvd.,
Dagupan City, she accidentally fell into a manhole on said sidewalk. As a result, her left
leg got fractured.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for the damage suffered by
Guilatco, in the absence of any showing that the City owns Perez Boulevard.
HELD: It is not necessesary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only required that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road.
D. PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS
Article 2190.The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the

damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
A. By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept
in a safe and adequate place;
73
GR No. 9010, March 28, 1914
74
22 SCRA 267
Page | 71
B. By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
C. By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
D. By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precauations suitable to the place. (1908)
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the
result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person
suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in
accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909a)
DE ROY V COURT OF APPEALS75
FACTS: A building got burned. Its firewall collapsed resulting in the destruction of a
tailoring shop. The members of the family residing therein were injured. Defendant
interposed the defense of “last clear chance” doctrine, that is, that the tenants could have
left before the collapse.
ISSUE: Is the owner of the firewall liable for the damages caused to the injured?
HELD: YES. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to buildings. The
defendant was held liable for damages.
E. ENGINEER/ ARCHITECT OF COLLAPSED BUILDING
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications
for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the
structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise
responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of
defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or
due to any violation of the terms of the contracts. If the engineer or architect supervises
the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
F. HEAD OF A FAMILY FOR THINGS THROWN/FALLING
Article 2193. The head of the family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is
responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
 Jose Dingcong being co-owner and manager of the hotel, with full possession of
the highs of the house, must respond for the damages caused by the things that
were thrown or fell of the same. He did not practice the diligence of a good father
of family to prevent the wetting of the articles and goods of the plaintiff, although
he knew that they could be caused by the ongoing repair of the pipes.76
G. Owners of Enterprises/Other Employees
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay
compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a
75
157 SCRA 757
76
Dingcong v Kanaan, GR No. L-47033 April 25, 1941
Page | 72
fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any
illness or disease caused by such employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's
own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be
liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or
injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker,

the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-
worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer
shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.
H. MANUFACTURERS/PRODUCERS
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles

and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or
harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
 The manufacturers duty of care must be exercised with respect to the ingredients
of his product, which include the duty to see to it that in the process of
manufacture of a food product, no deleterious or poisonous matter enters it. A
manufacturer or bottler or packer who prepares foods and seals it in containers
has the opportunity and the means, and therefore the duty, to insure that no
noxious or injurious substances shall get into the can.77
I. PERSONS WHO INTERFERED WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS.
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall
be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
GILCHRIST v. CUDDY78
FACTS: Cuddy, as the owner of a cinematographic film “Zigomar” rented it to Gilchrist.

In violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over the film also
under a rental contract to the defendants because they were paying about three times as
much as Gilchrist contracted.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendants should be liable for damages.
HELD: YES. “One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between others, and, for the
purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to break it, is liable to the party
injured thereby; and his continued interference may be ground for an injunction where
the injuries resulting will be irreparable”- Chief Justice Wells.
SO PING BUN v. COURT OF APPELS79
77
Krager Grocery Co. Lwelling (1933) 165 Miss 71, 145 So 726
78
GR No. 9356, February 18, 1915
79
GR No. 120554, SEPTEMBER 21, 1999
Page | 73
FACTS: Respondent Tek Hua Enterprises Corp. entered into lease agreement with
DCCSI over 4 premises to be used to store textiles. However, Petitioner So Ping Bun
used the premises for his own textile business. DCCSI demanded petitioner to vacate but
he refused. He requested for a formal contract of lease with DCCSI in violation to the
previous contract between Tek Hua Enterprises Corp. and DCCSI.
ISSUE: Whether or not So Ping Bun is guilty of tortous in interference of contract.
HELD: YES. So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the premises to his enterprises
at the expense of respondent corporation. The business desire is there to make some gain
to the detriment of the contracting parties. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
VIII. HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS

A. ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honest and
good faith.
GLOBE MACKAY v. COURT OF APPEALS (1989)

FACTS: Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as a purchasing agent. He uncovered
certain fraudulent transactions. However, Hendry, an EVP, accused him of being a crook
and a swindler. Tobias was charged with Estafa. The cases against him were dismissed.
Despite this, Tobias was fired. Hendry then sent a letter to Tobias’ potential employer
alleging his dishonesty. Tobias filed an action for damages against Hendry and Globe.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tobias was entitled to damages.
HELD: YES. There is no rigid test to determine when Art.19 has been violated; this is to
be determined upon the unique circumstances of each case. Uponthe facts of the present
case, it is clear that the petitioners abused the right that they invoke – right to dismiss an
employee. Although an employer who suspects an employee to be dishonest may dismiss
the latter, the employer may not do so in an abusive manner.
ALBENSON v. COURT OF APPEALS (1993)
FACTS: Guaranteed issued Albenson a check aspayment for the mild steel plates it
ordered. The checkbounced. Albenson found out that the check belongedto Eugenio
Baltao. It filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Eugenio S. Baltao. However, it
appearsthat the respondent had a namesake, his son EugenioBaltao III. The elder Baltao
then filed a suit for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE: Whether or not Albenson was liable for damages.
HELD: NO. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms of Article 19 and results in damage to another, a LEGALWRONG is
committed for which the Wrongdoer Must be held responsible.
The Elements of an Abuse of Right under Article 19 are:

1. There is a legal right or duty
2.Which is exercised in bad faith
Page | 74
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In this case, Albenson’s complaint was a sincere attempt to find the best possible means
to collect the money due to them. The law does not impose a penalty on the right
to litigate.
AMONOY v. GUTIERREZ (2001)

FACTS: The lot on which the Gutierrez spouses built their house was bought by
Amonoy in an auction sale. Amonoy was granted an order for the demolition of the
house. However, a temporary restraining order was granted enjoining the demolition. The
SC then made the TRO permanent. However, by the time the decision was rendered, the
house was already destroyed. The Gutierrez spouses then filed a suit for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Amonoy was liable for damages.
HELD: YES. Even though Amonoy’s were legally justified at the start, their
continuation even after the issuance of the TRO was issued amounted to an abuse of his
right. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others. Amonoy’s acts constituted not only an abuse
of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that was suspended.
UE v. JADER (2000)
FACTS: Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the
regular exam for Practice Court I so he was given an incomplete grade. He took the
removals but he was given a grade of five. Jader attended the graduation and prepared
for the bar. He later learned of his deficiency. Jader sued UE for damages. UE’s defense
was that Jader should have verified grade.
ISSUE: Whether or Not UE was liable for damages.
HELD: YES. UE had the contractual obligation to inform its students as to whether or
not all the requirements for the conferment of a degree have been met. It also showed bad
faith in belatedly informing Jader of the result of his removals, particularly when he was
already preparing for the bar. ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH MUST BE
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR A SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION BY
THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19. Good
faith connotes an honest Intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
Art. 19 intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically
in statutory law.-the ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under
conditions of civilized society- A person should be protected only when he acts with
providence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
PANTALEON v. AMERICAN EXPRESS, Supra, (2009)
 While on a European tour, Pantaleon and his family attempted to purchase

diamond pieces at Coster Diamond House using their American Express. This
they did 10 minutes before their tour group had to leave for Amsterdam. The
purchases were approved by American Express only after 45 minutes. The trip
to Amsterdam had to be cancelled. The tour group became annoyed and
irritated with them. Upon his complaint, the SC ruled that American Express
had not duty to act upon the purchases within a specific period of time. As
such, there was not breach of duty. Also, it had the right to review and either
Page | 75
approve or disapprove of the purchases. While it is bound by the principle of
abuse of rights, no bad faith was shown on its part.
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING v. QUINONES80

FACTS: Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific Air, bought
a pair of black jeans worth P2, 098.00 from Guess USA Boutique. While she was on her
way to Mercury Drug Store, a Guess employee approached her and said that she failed to
pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, she presented an official receipt and suggested that
they should talk about the matter in the Cebu Pacific Office located within the mall.
While they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly humiliated her in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded payment and even searched the
respondent’s wallet to check how much money she had. Another argument ensued and
after that, respondent went home. The Guess employees submitted two letters to the
Director of Cebu Pacific narrating the incident but the said letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners, California Clothing,
Inc. Excels is Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez, alleging that due
to the incident, she suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright,
serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and humiliation. She
demanded payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not
payment was made and that they approached and talked to the respondent in a gentle and
polite manner. They sought payment for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses as counter claim. The Regional Trial Court dismissed both the
complaint and counterclaim stating that the petitioners acted in good faith and the
respondent was the one who put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess employees
to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the issue of payment. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that there was
preponderance of evidence showing the petitioners acted in bad faith but, Hawayon and
Villagonzalo were absolved from liability due to good faith. Since petitioners acted in
bad faith, respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the Court of
Appeals awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones.
HELD: YES. Petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
The principle of abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in
the case. Respondent complained when petitioners embarrassed her and insisted that she
did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance of an official receipt in her favour.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of rights
were enumerated. “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.” The elements stated are complete in the present case. First, petitioners
continued to insist that there was no payment made when respondent already presented
the black jeans with the original receipt. Second, they accused the respondent that not
only did she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly left
the shop. Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask
for assistance in collection of the payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance with the
80
G.R. No. 175822 (October 23, 2013)
Page | 76
purpose of its establishment and not abused. Respondent was awarded P50, 000.00 as
moral damages and P20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SESBRENO v. COURT OF APPEALS81

FACTS: VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within
Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service
contract they had entered into on March 2, 1982.
It all has to do with an incident that occurred at around 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of May 11, 1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a
routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including
that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals,
conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio,
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter
and found that it had been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one
of the maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that
time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to inform him of the
inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to
enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in
the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the
Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11,
1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a
laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of
plaintiff-appellant.
Sesberano’s now contend that the inspection of hid residence by the VOC team
was an unreasonable search for being carried out without warrant and for being allegedly
done with malice or bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sesberano is entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
HELD: NO. The concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury.
Clearly, Sesbreno did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not
guilty of abuse of rights. Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the Standards to be
Observed in the Exercise of One’s Rights and in the Performance of One’s Duties,
namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty
and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights that in
the exercise of the rights, the standards under Article 19 must be observed. In order that
liability may attach under the Concept of Abuse of Rights, the following Elements must
be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad
faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
B. ILLEGAL ACTS
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
GARCIA v. SALVADOR, supra (2007)
81
G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014
Page | 77
 Salvador, who was then a trainee, was required by her employer to undergo,
medical tests as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia, a medical
technologist, conducted the test. The result showed that she was positive for
hepatitis, he did not qualify for regularization. Subsequent tests, however,
revealed that she was negative for the disease. She was rehired. In her
complaint for damages, the SC awarded damages based on Article 20, for the
actionable conduct of Garcia. The testing center was not supervised by a
licensed physician, the test was administered without supervision of a
pathologist, and the result was released directly to Salvador, without
authorization from a pathologist, all in violation of law regulating clinical
laboratories.
 Article 20 provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who
suffers damage whenever one commits act in violation of some legal
provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to
a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal
provision.
COMSAVINGS BANK v. SPA. CAPISTRANO

FACTS: Spouses Danilo and Estrella Capistrano agreed on a construction contract with
GCB Builders. To finance the construction, spouses Capistrano executed a deed of
assignment in favor of GCB Builders transferring the proceeds of their loan from
Comsavings Bank, a National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation accredited
originator. The Sps. Capistrano was required to sign a certificate of house completion and
acceptance.
After Comsavings Bank released the loan to GCB Builders as construction
cost,the later defaulted in complying with its obligations. Thereafter, NHMFC advised
the Capistrano spouse that they should start paying their monthly amortization payment
considering that they had not signed any certification and acceptance, it would have been
forged. Then they subsequently sued GCB Builders and Comsaving Bank for breach of
contract and damages, praying that the defendants be ordered jointly and severally liable;
(1) to finish the construction of the house according to the plans and specifications agreed
upon at the price stipulated in the construction contract; and (2) to pay them the
equivalent of the mortgage value in excess of the contract price; actual damages for the
expenses incurred by reason of the breach of contract; moral damages; attorney’s fees;
and exemplary damages. The Capistrano spouses amended their compliant to implead
NHMFC as an additional defendant.
ISSUE: Is Comsavings bank guilty of negligence in dealing with the Capistrano spouses?
HELD: YES. Comsavings Bank is solidarily liable with GCB Builders for the damages
sustained by respondents. However, we point out that such liability did not arise from
Comsavings Bank’s breach of warranties under its purchase of loan agreement with
NHMFC. On Article 20 and Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
Based on the provisions, a banking institution like Comsavings Bank is obliged to
exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high standards of integrity and
Page | 78
performance in all its transactions because its business is imbued with public interest.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties; it is a
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.
There is no question that Comsavings Bank was grossly negligent in its dealings
with respondents because it did not comply with its legal obligation to exercise the
required diligence and integrity. As a banking institution serving as an originator under
the UHLP and being the maker of the certificate of acceptance/completion, it was fully
aware that the purpose of the signed certificate was to affirm that the house had been
completely constructed according to the approved plans and specifications, and that
respondents had thereby accepted the delivery of the complete house. Given the purpose
of the certificate, it should have desisted from presenting the certificate to respondents for
their signature without such conditions having been fulfilled. Yet, it made respondents
sign the certificate (through Estrella Capistrano, both in her personal capacity and as the
attorney-in-fact of her husband Danilo Capistrano) despite the construction of the house
not yet even starting. Its act was irregular per se because it contravened the purpose of the
certificate. Worse, the pre-signing of the certificate was fraudulent because it was thereby
enabled to gain in the process the amount of P17, 306.83 in the form of several
deductions from the proceeds of the loan on top of other benefits as an originator bank.
On the other hand, respondents were prejudiced, considering that the construction of the
house was then still incomplete and was ultimately defective. Compounding their plight
was that NHMFC demanded payment of their monthly amortizations despite the non-
completion of the house. Had Comsavings Bank been fair towards them as its clients, it
should not have made them pre-sign the certificate until it had confirmed that the
construction of the house had been completed.
C. ACTS CONTRA MORES

Art. 21. Any person who will fully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
 Art. 21 is the actual catch-all provision according to Sangco.
WASSMER v. VELEZ (1964)

FACTS: Wassmer and Velez were about to get married. However, two days before the
wedding, Velezwrote a note stating that they would have to post pone the wedding
because his mother was opposed to it. A day before the wedding, he wired
Wassmer a note saying that he would return soon. He never showed up again. Wassmer
sued for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Velez can be held liable for damages.
HELD: YES. This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, but to formally set a wedding and
go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which Velez must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21.
C. ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Page | 79
1. In General
1) Malice - acting with inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy or humiliate.
2) Absence of Probable Cause - existence of such facts and circumstances as would

excite the belief of the prosecutor, that the person charged is guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.
3) Acquittal - presupposes that a criminal information is filed in court and final judgment
is rendered dismissing the case against the accused.
Article 21 – Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a

manner that is contrary to morals, goods custom or public policy shall compensate the
2. Moral Seduction
 Seduction by itself is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy.
 One is liable if he employed deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence in successfully having sexual intercourse with another.
 It connotes essentially the idea of deceit enticement, superior power of abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
 For seduction to be actionable there must be deception and the woman must have
yielded because of the inducement.
Seduction
 The act by which a man entices a woman to have unlawful sexual relations with
him by means of persuasions, solicitations, promises, or bribes without the use of
physical force or violence.
NOTE:
Article 337. Qualified seduction. - The seduction of a virgin over twelve years and
under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, home-
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon any person who shall
seduce his sister or descendant, whether or not she be a virgin or over eighteen years of
age.
Under the provisions of this Chapter, seduction is committed when the offender
has carnal knowledge of any of the persons and under the circumstances described herein.
Article 338. Simple seduction. - The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of
good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of
deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
TANJANCO v. COURT OF APPEALS (1966)
FACTS: Tanjanco, courted the Santos, both being of adult age. In consideration of
Tanjanco's promise of marriage, Santos consented to sexual intercourse. Tanjanco
Page | 80
succeeded in having carnal access with Santos until Dec. 1959. As a result, Santos got
pregnant. To avoid embarrassment, Santos resigned from her job. Santos then sued
Tanjanco for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tanjanco was liable for damages.
HELD: NO. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise
or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction. In this case, Santos was of age. Also, she maintained sexual relations with
each other for one year. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
 There is no seduction when there is mutual desire and the opportunity was merely
afforded to the woman.
BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS (1993)
FACTS: Baksh, an Iranian, courted Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married. When Baksh visited her home, Gonzales’ parents allowed
them to sleep together. Baksh then forced her to live with him. He beat her. Gonzales
later found out that Baksh was already married. Gonzales sued for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baksh was liable for damages.
HELD: YES. If a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a ploy to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21. This is not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation that followed. It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In this case, Gonzales was a
victim of moral seduction.
Art. 21: designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by

granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statue of torts.
3. Public Humiliation
 Public humiliation is the dishonoring showcase of a person, usually an offender or

a prisoner, especially in a public place. Extremely destructive to one's self-
respect or dignity. Strong feelings of embarrassment
 Plaintiff suffered humiliation through the positive acts of the defendant directed
against the plaintiff
PE v. PE (1962)
FACTS: Alfonso Pe, a married man and a collateral relative, frequented Lolita’s house
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Alfonso and Lolita
then fell in love. Lolita's parents heard about the affair (exchange of notes, “trysts” in
Page | 81
different barrios) so they refused to let them see each other. Lolita left the house and
disappeared. Lolita’s relatives filed an action for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso was liable for damages.
HELD: YES. Alfonso, a married man, seduced Lolita through trickery to the extent that
she fell in love with him. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
new Civil Code.
GRAND UNION v. ESPINO (1979)
FACTS: Jose Espino forgot to pay for a cylindrical rat tail file when he left Grand Union
Supermarket. He was approached by the guard and made to file an incident report.
Espino offered to pay for the file but instead, his money was taken as an incentive to the
guards for apprehending pilferers. A lot of people witnessed the incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not Espino can claim damages.
HELD: YES. Espino was falsely accused of shoplifting. Defendants willfully caused
loss or injury to the plaintiff in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy making them amenable to damages under Arts. 19 and 21 in relation to Art.2219
of the Civil Code.
It is against morals, GC, and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade
the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons. (Art. 26). And one must act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and GF (Art. 19).
CARPIO v. VALMONTE (2004)
FACTS: Valmonte, a wedding coordinator, was publicly accused by the bride’s aunt,
Carpio, of stealing her jewelry. She was searched and questioned by the guard and the
police. Carpio refused to apologize, so Valmonte filed a suit for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valmonte should be awarded damages.
HELD: YES. Carpio willfully caused Valmonte injury in a manner contrary to morals
and good customs. Although Carpio had the right to know the identity of the thief, she
should not have openly accused Valmonte without further proof.
Moral damages are awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission
is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong
inflicted by the defendant and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.
4. Malicious Prosecution
 An action for damages brought by oneagainst another whom a

criminalprosecution, civil suit, or other legalproceedings has been
institutedmaliciously and without probablecause, after the termination of
Page | 82
suchprosecution, suit or proceeding in favorof the defendant therein.
 Malicious prosecution is a common law intentional tort, while like the tort of
abuse of process, its elements includeS: (1) intentionally (and maliciously)
instituting and pursuing (or causing to be instituted or pursued) a legal action
(civil or criminal) that is (2) brought without probable cause and (3) dismissed in
favor of the victim of the malicious prosecution. In some jurisdictions, the term
"malicious prosecution" denotes the wrongful initiation of criminal proceedings,
while the term "malicious use of process" denotes the wrongful initiation of civil
proceedings.
 Criminal prosecuting attorneys and judges are protected from tort liability for
malicious prosecution by doctrines of prosecutorial immunity and judicial
immunity. Moreover, the mere filing of a complaint cannot constitute an abuse of
process. The parties who have abused or misused the process have gone beyond
merely filing a lawsuit. The taking of an appeal, even a frivolous one, is not
enough to constitute an abuse of process. The mere filing or maintenance of a
lawsuit, even for an improper purpose, is not a proper basis for an abuse of
process action.
Malicious Prosecution
 an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding
in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action of the pulling of legal
process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.
STATUTORY BASIS
 The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are
found in Articles 19, 20, 21, 26,29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8) New Civil Code.
ELEMENTS:
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
3. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by a legal malice that is by improper or
sinister motive.
To constitute Malicious Prosecution:
1. There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person.
2. That it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless.
NOTE: Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
Probable Cause
Page | 83
 a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are probably true
QUE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT (1989)
FACTS: Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas because of the checks the latter
issued as payment for canvass strollers were dishonored. Nicolas allegedly did not
continue payment because of the defective canvass strollers which he never returned to
Que. The charge was dismissed in the fiscal level. Nicolas filed a complaint for
malicious prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Que was guilty of malicious prosecution.
HELD: NO. Neither of them is guilty of malice. To constitute malicious prosecution,

there must be proof that the prosecution was:
1. Prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person;

2. Initiated deliberately by the defendant;
3. Knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence of

malice. One cannot be held liable for damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution
where he acted with probable cause.
General Rule: one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with Probable Cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in
cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause.
If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and
justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the
accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense.
MAGBANUA V. JUNSAY (2007)
 Magbanua, a househelper, was impleaded as an accused in a robbery case filed by

her employer, Junsay. When she was acquitted, she filed for damages against
Junsay for malicious prosecution. The SC held that there was probable cause in
filing the criminal complaint against her, as she admitted her participation. That
her admission was later declared inadmissible does not detract from that fact.
Also, there was no proof that the filing of the complaint was impelled by legal
malice.
 Malicious prosecution is an action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution,
suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant. Thus, for a malicious
prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the prosecution did
occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement, (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal, (3) in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (4) the prosecution
was impelled by legal malice, an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of
malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of
law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were
false and groundless.
Page | 84
5. Depressive Dismissal
 Employers have a right to dismiss anemployee in the manner and on thegrounds

provided for. If the dismissal is in non-compliance with the principles provided in
Art. 19 and 21, the employer may be held liable for damages
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects.
Art. 1701. Neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against the other, or
impair the interest or convenience of the public.
QUISABA v. STA. INEZ (1974)
FACTS: Quisaba, an internal auditor of Sta. Ines, was ordered by Robert Hyde, the VP,
to purchase logs for the company’s plant. Quisaba refused because it wasn’t part of his
job. As a result, he was demoted. Quisaba filed a complaint for damages, termination
pay, and attorney’s fees. Sta. Ines said that the NLRC had jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regular courts had jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. Quisaba’s complaint was grounded not on his dismissal but rather on the
manner of his dismissal and its consequent effects. If the dismissal was done anti-socially
or oppressively, then the respondents violated Article 1701, which prohibits acts of
oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article 21, which makes a
person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
D. VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Article 26 of the Civil Code
SPS.GUANIO VS. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL82
FACTS: Spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio booked at the Shangri-
la Hotel Makati for their wedding reception.Sps. Guanio claimed that during the
reception, their guests complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items
listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and
unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and they were charged for the extension
of time of the reception despite assurance from the Sales Manager that there will be no
charge for the extension of time. Sps. Guanio also complained that despite their open bar
agreement which allows them to bring in liquor, these were not served forcing the guests
to pay for their drinks.In its answer, Shangrila claimed that while there was a delay in the
service of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests beyond
the guaranteed expected minimum number of guests, and the insistence of the wedding
coordinator that certain guests be served first. RTC rendered judgment in favor of sps.
Guanio ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the actual damages (₱350,000); moral
damages (₱250,000); exemplary damages (₱100,000); and Attorney’s fees (₱100,000).On
82
G.R. No. 190601, February 7, 2011
Page | 85
appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that the proximate cause of
petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase in their guests.
ISSUE: Is the injury caused to the sps.Guanio attributable to the proximate cause of their
own making?
Page | 86
HELD: NO. The Court finds that sps. Guanio’s complaint arose from a contract and that
the doctrine of proximate cause does not apply. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads, “Those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.”Respondent admitted that three hotel functions coincided with petitioners’
reception. To the Court, the delay in service might have been avoided or minimized if
respondent exercised prescience in scheduling events. No less than quality service should
be delivered especially in events which possibility of repetition is close to nil. Petitioners
are not expected to get married twice in their lifetimes.In the present petition, under
considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to
during the reception. The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to respect of his
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Respondent’s lack of prudence is an
affront to this right.
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. v. CA and CONRADO J. ARAMIL83
FACTS: St. Louis Realty Corp. published two advertisements entitled “WHERE THE
HEART IS” in the Sunday Times depicting the Arcadio family owning a house for only
₱31,000.00, picture of the house depicted therein is not the house of the Arcadios but that
it belong to the family of Dr.Conrado J. Aramil, was used in the ads without the former’s
permission. Said advertisements elicited some remarks from Dr.Aramils’s medical
students and friends purporting doubts as to his professional and personal integrity. Such
sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you
renting from the Arcadios?", "like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to
another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental anguish on Dr.Aramil’s part and
reduced his income by about 1,000 to 1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of
Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code). Thus, the trial court awarded Dr.Aramil
P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not St. Louis Realty committed an actionable wrong

againsDr.Conrado J. Aramil
HELD: The Supreme Court found St. Louis Realty to have committed an actionable
quasi-delict under article 21of the Civil Code which says, “Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Also, Article 26 of the Civil
Code provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons.” ”Prying into the privacy of another’s
residence” and “meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another” and “similar acts”, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief”. In which case, the
SC affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC.
GREGORIO VS. CA, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC. AND EMMA J. DATUIN84
FACTS: Emma J. Datuin, an employee of Sansio Philippines, Inc., wrongfully filed a

case under BP 22 against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino
allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for numerous
appliances bought by them from Sansio. Zenaida was unable to controvert the charges
against her because her address stated in the complaint was wrong. Consequently, she
was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before a Metropolitan Trial
83
G.R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984
84
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
Page | 87
Court (MeTC) in Manila. The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest and eventually
arrested by the PARAC-DILG in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and
their two (2) daughters at their city residence. Zenaida was brought to the PARAC-DILG
Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained like an
ordinary criminal. She was released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband
posted bail for her temporary liberty. Zenaida then filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued
the bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on
which the checks were drawn. She also alleged that her signature was patently and
radically different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks. The MeTC
granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the course of the
reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Zenaida was not
one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution. Subsequently, the
assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss and the MeTC granted the motion and
ordered the B.P. 22 cases dismissed.
ISSUE: Was the actionable wrong committed to Zenaida R. Gregorio based on malicious
prosecution or quasi-delict.
HELD: Emma J. Datuin had wrongly accused an innocent person, albeit admitting that
the filing of the cases against Zenaida was an honest mistake or inadvertence on Datuin’s
part. Be that as it may, incalculable damage has been inflicted on Zenaida on account of
the defendants’ wanton, callous and reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept
that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" (Art. 26, Civil Code of the Philippines). Zenaida then filed
a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the RTC and rendered its
decision directing Sansio and Datuin, jointly and solidarily, to pay Gregorio P200,000.00
as moral damages; P10,000.00 as nominal damages; P35,000.00 as litigation
expenses; P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of the suit. The RTC expressly stated
in its Decision that the complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on
malicious prosecution. The SC affirmed the RTC decision including costs of litigation
against them.
SPS.BILL & VICTORIA HING vs. CHOACHUY85
FACTS: Sps. Bill & Victoria Hing (sps.Hing) and Aldo Development and Resources,
Inc. (Aldo) own adjacent lots. Aldo constructed an auto-repair shop (Aldo Goodyear
Servitek) in its lot. Aldo filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO in the RTC against sps. Hing for constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to sps. Hing’s property. The court denied Aldo’s application
for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations. To get evidence in to
support its case, Alexander and Allan Choachuy illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’
property. Also, through their employees, they took pictures of the on-going construction
without the consent of sps. Hing.With this, sps.Hing prayed that the Choachuys be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance as this acts violate right to privacy. The Choachuys in their Answer with
Counterclaim, denied all the allegations of sps. Hing. They also clarified that they are not
the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. The RTC in its decision granted sps.
Hing’s application for a TRO or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; ordered the filing and
approval of a bond by sps. Hing which the court sets at ₱50,000.00; ordered a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issue against the Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy
and directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left
side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
85
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Page | 88
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a
distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec facing the road. A MR
was denied and thus, an appeal to the CA. CA reversed the RTC’s decision hence the
petition to SC.
ISSUE: Is there is a violation of sps. Hing’s right to privacy?
HELD: YES. The Court explained that the right to privacy is "the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of
an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."
Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone.”The right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices (the Choachuys insist that
business offices are excluded) where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter. Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s
residence; x xx This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion
into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of
the latter.” The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not
mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy because it also includes "similar acts."
Video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone. The installation of video surveillance cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under the Anti-Wiretapping
Law (RA4200). The SC, after preponderance of evidence, set aside the decision of the
CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC.
E. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
F. UNDER COMPETITION
WILLAWARE vs. JESICHRIS86

FACTS: Jesichris Manufacturing Company (Jesichris) filed a complaint for damages for
unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products
Corporation (Willaware) the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Jesichris alleged that it is
a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris has been manufacturing
distributing plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware, on the other hand, is engaged in
86
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
Page | 89
the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its
office near that of Jesichris. Jesichris alleged that in view of the physical proximity of
Willaware’s office to Jesichris’ office, and in view of the fact that some of Jesichris
employees had transferred to Willaware,Willaware had developed familiarity with
Jesichris’ products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts. Jesichris discovered that
Willaware had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price as Jesichris’ plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers. Jesichris
alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of
automotive under chassis parts. Willaware’s manufacture of the same automotive parts
with plastic material was taken from Jesichris’ idea of using plastic for automotive parts.
Also, Willaware deliberately copied Jesichris products all of which acts constitute unfair
competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have
caused Jesichris damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of
2,000,000 as of the date of Jesichris’ complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the
parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris.
HELD: The SC explained that Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage." From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may
deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what the
law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means used are fair and
legitimate. In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code. However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual
damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and
lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
IX. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
A. VIOLATOR OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or

indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
Page | 90
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress
of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
MHP GARMENTS VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1994)
 After the dismissal of a criminal complaint for Unfair Competition against the
Private Respondents, they in turn filed a Civil Case for Collection of Sum of
money against MHP Garments (Orig. Complainant in the Crim. Case) which the
RTC ruled in favor of the Private respondents and judgment was affirmed by the
C.A.
 The S.C. held that both courts committed No Error in their judgments and ordered
MHP Garments and Larry de Guzman (the employee who effected the illegal
search and seizure) to pay damages JOINTLY and SEERALLY and return all the
seized items to the Private Resp.
Page | 91
 Needless to state, the Wantonness of the Wrongful Siezure justifies the award of
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
 Protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a
mere burst of rhetoric.
 MHP and Employee Larry de Guzman was ordered to pay JOINTLY and
SEVERALLY damages to the defendants.
SILAHIS VS. SOLUTA (2006)
 On suspicion of sale of Marijuana and prostitution by the union officers and

members, the Vice President for finance (Panlilio) of Silahis with the aid of his
personal secretary and security guard entered and searched the Union Officers.
The accused were acquitted on the ground of illegal search and seizure and
thereafter, they filed a civil case for damages against Silahis. The Trial Court
rendered judgment ordering SILAHIS and Panlilio JOINTLY and SEVERALLY
to pay for damages against the union office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moral Damages may be recovered by reason of illegal search and
other acts under Art. 32 and Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.
HELD: YES. It is necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals
civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The injured Citizen will always have adequate CIVIL REMEDIES before the
courts because of Independent Civil Action, even in those instances where the act or
omission complained of does not constitute a Criminal offense.
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
Page | 92
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
VINSONS CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO
 When R.A. 7654 was enacted and petitioner computed 55% Ad Valorem Tax
amounting to Php 9, 598, 334.00 of Respondent Corporation(based on RMC -37-
93, 2 days before R.A. 7654 took effect). Petitioner was held liable for
DAMAGES on the basis of Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
 It was held that the clear intention of the legislators is to create a DISTINCT
CAUSE OF ACTION in the nature of TORT Violation of Constitutional Rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant (2007 DECISION).
 However, on its 2008 Decision through a Motion for Reconsideration, the Earlier
Decision of 2007 was reversed.
 It was held that with no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is NO
delict or wrongful act/omission, and without such delict, the complainant then
fails to create a Cause of Action, because the COA is the act of omission by
which a party violates the right of another.
 The facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the Petitioner took nothing from
the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment
levied by the former by virtue of RMC -37-93 (2008 DECISION).
SESBRENO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2014)
 When Sesbreno’s house was inspected and the VOC (Violation of Contracts)
TEAM replaced his Electrical System with a NEW one since his old meter was
“turned upside down”, he filed a complaint with the RTC on the ground that the
inspection was illegal and not in compliance with a valid search as there was no
notice and he was not present in his house at the time of the inspection.
 After dismissal by the RTC/CA, the SC: Denied the petition for certiorari and
held that there was NO denial of DUE PROCESS by the refusal of the T.C. judge
to inhibit from the case since it was grounded on mere suspicion of BIAS and
PREJUDICE.
 Sesbreno did not establish his claim for DAMAGES, if the respondents were not
guilty of Abuse of Rights.
B. INFORMATION FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES
When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with

the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law,
but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings,
the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such
civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in
case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
Page | 93
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.
1. In General
MADEJA VS. CARO AND JAPSON (1983)
 While a Criminal case was pending against Dr. Eve Japson, who was accused
of HOMICIDE through Reckless Imprudence for the death of her patient
(Cleto Madeja), the WIDOW of the latter filed a CIVIL CASE against Japson
in the same courts on the ground that her husband died of Gross Negligience
by Dr. Japson.
 On Dr, Japson’s Motion to Dismiss, the motion was granted on the ground
that Sec. 2 of Rule 111 applies:
 “After a Criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until FINAL JUDGMENT has been entered in
the Criminal Action.”
 SC: Rule III – Sec. 3 should apply, which provides that Civil Action may
proceed independently in cases of Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries –
where physical injuries include homicide in whatever stage, not Section 2 of
Rule 111.
 It is not conclusive to Civic Spirit and to Individual Self-Reliance and
initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their private rights.
2. Defamation
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Definition
 Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name, by

communication to others which tends to diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff
is held, or to excite adverse feelings or opinion against him (Prosser, Handbook
on Law on Torts, p. 572).
Requisites for one to be Liable for Defamatory Imputations:
a) It must be defamatory;
b) It must be malicious;
c) It must be given publicity;
d) The victim must be identifiable
NOTES:
 Defamation includes the crime of libel and slander.
Page | 94
 RPC considers the statement defamatory if it is an imputation of circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of natural or juridical person
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
 Test in determining the defamatory character of the imputation: A charge is

sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person/s against whom they were uttered were guilty of a
certain offense, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
to hold the person/s up to public ridicule.
 Dissemination to a number of persons is not required, communication to single

individual is sufficient publication.
 GENERAL RULE: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,

even if it be true, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown.
 EXCEPTIONS:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty; and fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
 It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication.
 In order to escape liability, the defendant may claim that the statements made are
privileged.
Two kinds of privileged communication:
1. Absolutely privileged – Those which are not actionable even if the author acted
in bad faith.
2. Qualifiedly privileged – Not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention or justifiable motive.
ARAFILES v. PHIL. JOURNALISM87
87
G.R. No. 15026, March 25, 2004
Page | 95
FACTS: Emilita Despuig lodged a complaint against her superior, Arafiles, for forcible
abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emilita executed a
sworn affidavit which was later on written in a police blotter and perused by Morales, an
employee of herein respondent. He later on interviewed Emilita. The following day,
herein defendant published an article about the event which petitioner believed had
ruined his reputation. He files a complaint against respondents for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to
thus free the respondents of liability for damages.
HELD: YES. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work
alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The
succeeding paragraphs in the article (in which petitioner and complainant Emelita were
eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers that the narration of events was
only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. There is no
malicious denationalization of facts in a published article when the sources come from an
official public document, such as police blotter, and from the interview made with the
victim.
Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not
consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right
or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role
in our democracy.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., v. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC.88
FACTS: MVRS published in its tabloid an article stating that the Muslims do not eat
pigs because they are consider them as gods. Islamic Da'wah Council sued for damages,
based on Article 33, representing not only Muslims in the Philippines, but the entire
Muslim world.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.
HELD: NO. There is no cause for libel. Words which are merely insulting are not
actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse, however ill-
natured, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation
in the absence of an allegation for special damages.
Moreover, declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted

to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically
pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a
right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. THE MANILA CHRONICLE89
88
GR. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
89
GR. No. 184315, November 25, 2009
Page | 96
FACTS: The Manila Chronicle was sued by Yuchengco in a civil action for damages for
libelous publication and abuse of rights for the series of articles it published regarding
Yuchengco. The RTC and CA ruled for Yuchengco and found respondent liable as all
elements for the action were present including actual malice.
However, the CA later reversed in a resolution ruling that the articles published
were qualifiedly privileged communication as far as they are fair commentaries on
matters of public interest despite actual malice being present and therefore exempted
from liability for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not qualifiedly privileged communications are automatically

exempted from liability despite the finding of actual malice.
HELD: SC held that CA erred in ruling that qualifiedly privileged communications are
automatically exempted from liability despite the finding of actual malice. Article 354 of
the RPC only pertains to presumptions and as exemptions to such presumptions,
qualifiedly privileged communications like fair commentaries can still hold a person
liable if actual malice is proven as in the case at bar. Even if actual malice is proven, the
subject articles cannot considered as fair commentaries on matters of public interest as
Yuchengco is not a public figure or official but a private individual.
3. Fraud
Elements of Deceit
1. The defendant must have made false representation to the plaintiff;

2. The representation must be one of fact;
3. The defendant must know that the representation is false or be reckless about
whether it is false;
4. The defendant must have acted on the false representation;
5. The defendant must have intended that the false representation should be acted
on;
6. The plaintiff must have suffered damage as a result of acting on the false
representation.
NOTES:
 Half-truths are likewise included; it is actionable if the withholding of that which

is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false.
 Misrepresentation upon a mere matter of opinion is not an actionable deceit.90
HEIRS OF SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN91
FACTS: Herein respondent filed a case for violation of BP 22 against Simon before the
MeTc of Manila. Chan, aside from filing a criminal case,also sued for collection of the
amount of the checks he issued to herein petitioner. He claims that the action is
independent of the criminal case, based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the independent civil action may be filed in violation of BP 22.
90
Torts and Damages, Timoteo B. Aguino, 2005
91
G.R. 157547, February 23, 2011
Page | 97
HELD: The SC held that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which applies
retroactively, provides that the civil liability in BP 22can only be enforced in the criminal
case since a separate civil action for violations of said law is prohibited. Article 33may be
availed of in estafa, but not in this case. The criminal action for violation of BP 22 is
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately is allowed or recognized.
CONSING VS. PEOPLE92
FACTS: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother various loans
at Unicapital Inc., which was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of
land, the title of which was held by a certain de la Cruz, appeared to be spurious.
Unicapitaldemanded the return of the amount to no avail. Consing then field a civil case
on injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal case for esafa through
falsification of public document against herein petitioner in the Makati City Prosecutor’s
Office. Unicapilta also sued petitioner in the RTC of Makati City for the recovery of a
sum on money and damages.Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pending of
the Makati civil cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an existence of a prejudicialquestion that can warrant the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case.
HELD: NO. It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical
injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code and does
not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
4. Physical Injuries
1. The term Physical Injuries under Art.33 of the Present Civil Code should not be
understood as that described in the Revised Penal Code which is more specific.
The term physical injuries connote bodily injuries causing death.93
2. The civil code described physical injuries in general term which include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.94
3. Criminal negligence (Reckless Imprudence) is not one of the crimes (Defamation,
Fraud, Physical Injuries) mentioned in Art 33 of the Civil Code, which authorizes
the institution of an Independent Civil Action, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal case which only require preponderance of evidence.95
92
G.R. No. 16075, July 15, 2013
93
Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
94
Madeja v. Japzon; Dulay v. CA
95
Corpus vs. Paje; Bonite vs. Zosa
Page | 98
4. Physical Injury could also be battery and assault.
Battery
 An intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive bodily contact; bodily contact is
offensive if it offends a reasonable person’s sense of dignity.
Assault
 Intentional conduct by one person directed at another which places the latter in
apprehension of immediate bodily harm or offensive act. Also includes bodily
injuries causing death.
5. Physical injuries which resulted because of negligence or imprudence is not

included in Article 33; they are already covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
CAPUNO v. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES96
FACTS: A Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi collided (1953) with a private
car driven by Capuno. The passengers, spouses Florencio Buan and RizalinaParas, died.
The truck driver Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence
(1953). While the criminal case was pending, without reservation, an independent civil
action for damages based on quasi-delict was instituted (1958). The defendants prayed
for the dismissal of said civil action for the action has already prescribed.
ISSUES: (1) Was the institution of the civil action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code
correct?
(2) Was the independent civil action instituted under Article 33 of the Civil Code
already prescribed?
HELD: (1) YES. Though the criminal case filed was homicide through reckless
imprudence NOT Physical injuries only, the institution of an independent civil action
based on Article 33 of the Civil Code was correct because as explained in this case the
“term physical injuries” includes bodily injuries causing death.
(2) YES. The SC held that such claim, based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, has already
prescribed; such action must be instituted within four (4) years (Art 1146 of the CC)from
the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. In this case 4 years had lapsed since
the death of the passengers.
CORPUS v. FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO.,

INC.97
FACTS: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by
FelardoPaje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's
death and in physical injuries to two other persons (1956).
Paje was charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (CFI of Pampanga). The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The trial court found the defendant
guilty but on appeal, CA found the defendant-appellant not guilty of said crimes for the
collision was a case of pure accident.
Beforehand while the case was pending before the CA, the heirs instituted a
separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence
against the driver and the bus company(1961). The defendants moved for the dismissal of
96
G.R. No. L-19331, April 30, 1965
97
G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
Page | 99
the civil case on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal of defendant Paje
by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action. The motion was denied.
But the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action
was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to
this Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the civil action proper?
HELD: YES. The acquittal of the defendant by the CA in the criminal action on the
groundthat the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not
exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for
damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same
criminal negligence of which the defendant was acquitted in the criminal action (Art. 100
RPC).
“In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged
against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based
upon the same act.” (This can now be found under Sec. 2(par4), Rule 111 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended)
Article 33 of the present Civil Code is not applicable, since criminal negligence
(reckless imprudence) is not one of the three crimes (namely: Defamation, Fraud, and
Physical Injuries) mentioned in Art. 33.
CARMEN L. MADEJA v. HON. FELIX T. CARO
FACTS: DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for
the death of CletoMadeja after an appendectomy. DrJapzon was charged with homicide
through reckless imprudence. The widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madejareserved her
right to file a separate civil action for damages.
While the criminal case was still pending, a civil action for damages was
instituted against Dr. Japzon. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. A motion to dismiss by the defendant was granted due to
Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court(Now Sec.2, par1, Rule 111 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended), stating that a civil action may be instituted only after final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. Hence, this petition which seeks to set
aside the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: May the independent civil action against Dr. Japzon proceed?
HELD: YES. The SC held that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed
independently of the criminal action against her based on Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court: (Now Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the1997 Rules of Court, as amended):
“Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles

31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence."
While the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is
the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him.
Page | 100
NOTE: In this case it was reiterated that the term "physical injuries" is used in a
generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
The filing of separate civil action under Art. 33 of the CC without the requirement
of reservationis possible, because the law itself make such reservation. However with
the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, the requirement of reservation has been declared as
un lawful being unauthorized amendment of the substantive law which does not require
reservation, thus it was stricken out under the present Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 111 of
the 1997 Rules of Court)
Sec. 3.When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided
for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
BONITE, ET AL VS. HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA98
FACTS: Florencio Bonite, a caminero (street sweeper) was hit by a truck (1968) driven
by private respondent Abamongaresulting to Florencio’s death. Private respondent
Abamonga was charged with homicide through Reckless Imprudence by the surviving
heirs (now petitioners). Hon. Zora (Presiding judge) dismissed the criminal case against
Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His heirs (petitioners)did not appeal but filed a civil action based on Art. 29 of the
Civil Code for recovery of damages against the same accused for the death of Bonite
(1970).The private respondent claimed that Art. 29 is not applicable but Art 33, because
Art. 29 is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding from a tortious act.
Hon. Judge Zora dismissed the complaint for damages for failure of the heirs to
reserve the right to file an independent civil action. A motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the civil case proper?
HELD: NO. It is a right of every party to be compensated for damages that they have
incurred by way of the criminal action. The petitioners anchored their right to bring a
separate civil action for damages under the express provisions of Article 29 and Art 2176
of the Civil Code.
Article 29 of the present CC:

“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
courtshall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.”
98
G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988
Page | 101
The court further stated that a criminal action is distinct from that of a civil action.
So upon this, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court
and remanded the case to the lower court for the trial of the merits of the case.
NOTE: It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the
right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of
only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the
exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been
acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. It was further discussed that Art. 33assumesthat defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries as intentionally committed, not through criminal negligence.
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.99
FACTS: An altercation between BenignoTorzuela (security guard on duty at the said

carnival) and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred (1998) at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,”
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, which resulted Torzuelato shootAtty. Napoleon Dulay
causing Dulay’s death. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, in her
own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against
BenignoTorzuela and private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Corp,
Inc. (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the

complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act
of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that the alleged act of shooting
was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), making the civil liability governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one
filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent
argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is premature considering that the
conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s
subsidiary liability.
Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant

on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed
both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on
their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge dismissed the
civil action which was affirmed by the CA, that the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability ofcompany respondents is subsidiary under the Revised
Penal Code.
HELD: (1) YES. Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict. Article
2176 of the present Civil Code provides that:“Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
99
G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995
Page | 102
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
(2) NO. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at
bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in
Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
(3) NO. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Therefore the decision appealed from was set aside and the case was remanded to
the trial court for trials on the merits.
C. NEGLECT OF DUTY
Independent Civil Action For The Liability Of City Or Municipal Police Force
ARTICLE 34 OF THE NCC

“When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall be primarily liable for damages and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.”
1. Primary liable – are those city or municipal police force who refuses or fails to render
aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property.
2. Subsidiarily liable - is imposed on the city or the municipal government concerned in

case of insolvency of the city/municipal police force. Subsidiary liability of cities and
municipalities is imposed so that they will exercise great care in selecting conscientious
and duly qualified policemen and exercise supervision over them in the performance of
their duties.
Action For Damages Where No Independent Civil Action is Provided
ART. 35 OF THE NCC

“When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another
with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or
Page | 103
any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or
fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by

the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination
of the criminal proceedings.”
PART TWO - DAMAGES
I. THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGES
A. IMPORTANCE AND DEFINITION
The right of action for death and the presumption in favor of compensation being
admitted, the difficulty of estimating in money the worth of a life, should not keep a court
from judicially compensating the injured party as nearly as may be possible for the
wrong. true, man is incapable of measuring exactly in the delicate scale of justice the
value of a human life. True, the feeling of a mother on seeing her little son torn and
mangled expiring dead could never be assigned with money. true, all the treasure in
nature's vault could compensate a parent for the loss of a beloved child. Nevertheless,
within the bounds of human powers, the negligent should make reparation for the loss.
Damages pertains to the actionable loss, hurt, or harm which result from the
unlawful act, omission or negligence of another. it is the unlawful act, or omission or
negligence of another. it is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury and damages
are the recompense or compensating awarded for the damage suffered. The word
"damages" includes any and all the manifestation of his life, physical, material, moral, or
psychological, mental, spiritual, financial, economical, social, political or religous.
When damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is a damnum absque

injuria. There can be no damges to be charged on those who may exercise such precious
right in goodfaith, even if done erroneously. It lementary rule that goodfaith is presented
and that the burden of proving badfaith rests upon the party alleging the same.
B. WHEN ALLOWED
 To maintain an action for damages, it is necessary to show proof of its existence.
The party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. A court cannot rely on mere speculation, conjectures or guesswork. The
fact, amount, and the cause of the damage must be proven by preponderance of
evidence.
CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
 The custodios and the Santoses fenced their properties, effectively closing the
access of the tenants to the public highway. Santoses reasoned out that their
daughter was dragged by a bicycle driven by a son of a tenants and that their
footwear were lost. Also, when the tenants were drunk, they bang the doors and
windows of the Santoses. In any case, upon the application of the Mabasas. they
were granted easement and damages. The Supreme Court, however, deleted the
award of damages, ruling that there was no legal injury since the owners have the
Page | 104
right to fence their properties, and the Mabasas had no right to easement, prior to
the grant.
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages , there must be both a right
of action for a legal wrong inflicted inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong , does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by breach or wrong.
HOW TO ALLEGE DAMAGES
 The amount of damages sought must be specified not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer portion. The court cannot award damages if the
parties fail to claim it nor award damages that is different from that prayed for.
There are instances that even if not allege but maybe recovered such as when a
party move to amend the pleading to conform with the evidence due to failure of
the other party to raise an objection during the presentation of evidence in proving
the amount of damages.
E. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGE
PEOPLE VS HALIL GAMBAO (2013)

 The accused-appellants were charge with a crime of kidnapping for ransom in the
person of Lucia Chan, a ish dealer based in Manila. Two of the accused forcibly
took the victim from their house and demanded a PHP 400,000.00 ransom. The
RTC rendered a decision convicting 12 of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA, on appeal, affirm the decision but with modified the civil liability,
holding tha each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the
amount of PHP 50,000.00 by way of moral damages. The SC increase the amount
of damages to PHP 300,000.00 in total. In their decision,the SC held that the
entire amount of civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their
liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal
accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than Larina Perpenian who was adjudged as only an
accomplice. In accordance to the difference in the degrees of their participation,
all of them shall be liable for the total amount of PHP 300,000.00 divided among
the principals who shall be liable for PHP 288,000.00 or PHP 32,000.00 each and
Larina Perpenian who shall be liable for PHP 12,000.00.
II. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE

 Actual damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover
for the wrong done and injuries received when none were intended. It pertains to
such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and suceptible of measurement.
They are intended to put the injured party in the position in which he was before
he was injured.
B. PROOF REQUIRED
 Article 2199: except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him AS HE HAS
DULY PROVED.
Page | 105
GATCHALIAN V. DELIM (1991)
FACTS: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger
a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a
“snapping sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower
pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and
their bills were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had
the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against
respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said
document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of
employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar
on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by
petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint.
The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not
entitled to damages.
ISSUES: Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages
HELD: At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages
on the basis of speculation or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual
or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the
common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner
must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS v. BARRETO (2011)
FACTS: Barretto and petitioner Oceaneering entered into a Time Charter Agreement
whereby the latter hired the aforesaid barge for a renewable period of thirty calendar
days, for the purpose of transporting construction materials from Manila to Ayungon,
Negros Oriental.
Barretto’s Bargeman, Eddie La Chica, executed a Marine Protest, reporting that

the barge reportedly capsized in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Batangas. Barretto
apprised Oceaneering of the supposed fact that the mishap was caused by the
incompetence and negligence of the latter’s personnel in loading the cargo and that it was
going to proceed with the salvage, refloating and repair of the barge.
Oceaneering caused its counsel to serve Barretto a letter demanding the return of
the unused portion of the charter payment. However, Barretto’s counsel informed
Oceaneering that its unused charter payment was withheld by his client who was likewise
seeking reimbursement for the amount he expended in salvaging, refloating and repairing
the barge.
Page | 106
Contending that the accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence
which attended the loading of the cargo by Oceaneering’s hired employees, Barretto
sought indemnities for expenses incurred and lost income before the RTC.
Alongside its claim for reimbursement of the sums expended for the salvage
operation it conducted which was denied for lack of evidence to prove the same,
Oceaneering’s claim for the value of its cargo was likewise denied on the ground, among
other matters, that the same was not included in the demand letters it served Barretto.
The CA reversed on the ground that the agreement executed by the parties, by its
express terms, was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was
retained by Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him; and, that the
sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which
Barretto failed to overcome.
Applying the rule, however, that actual damages should be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the CA denied Oceaneering’s claim for the value of its
lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the money it paid for the time charter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the claims for actual damages.
HELD:YES. Actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured
party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were
intended. Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement, they are intended to put the injured party in the position in
which he was before he was injured.
The rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In this regard, Oceaneering correctly
faulted the CA for not granting its claim for actual damages or, more specifically, the
portions thereof which were duly pleaded and adequately proved before the RTC. While
concededly not included in the demand letters Oceaneering served Barretto, the former’s
counterclaims for the value of its lost cargo and salvaging expenses were distinctly
pleaded and prayed for in the answer it filed
C. LOSS COVERED
1. In General
Article 2200: Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value
of the loss suffered , but also that of the profits which the obligge failed to obatain.
PNOC VS COURT OF APPEALS (1998)
FACTS: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault. Maria Efigenia sued
the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of
P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of
M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorney’s fees and
later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities. During the pendency of the case,
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it
acquired Petroparcel. Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of
the fishing boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit.
Page | 107
ISSUE: Whether the damage was adequately proven?
HELD: YES. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of
evidentiary bases therefore. P2M nominal damages instead.
In connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on
doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of
the court.
If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente) failure to receive as a benefit
that which would have pertained to him in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to
be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and
place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to
existing and pending engagements.
If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually
certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of
charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice
over. If the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in
the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value
thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable
to fulfill.
Damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out
specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne proven through sole testimony of general manager without objection
from LSC.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value
of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is èntitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property
right has been invaded.
Damages in name only and not in fact amount to be awarded as nominal damages
shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent
considering the concept and purpose of such damages.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of
the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is
causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower
court’s jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the
judgment.
2. In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts

Article 2201: In contacts and Quasi-Contacts, the damages for which the obligor
who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation.
Page | 108
SPOUSES ZALAMEA VS CA (1993)
FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld
Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses
were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket.
All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the
wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already
taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were
given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the
full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,
could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on
breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor
of petitioners . CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a
matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines
in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral
and Exemplary damages.
HELD: The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was
presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is
issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,

entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v.
Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on
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the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the
passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he
does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an
airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers
of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.
For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty
to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to
self-interest or enrichment.
Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed
tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations
on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice
to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the
flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident
that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent
in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any
qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily
have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last
minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the
rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of
contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent
TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that
a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a
flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused
TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York
to Los Angeles.
BPI FAMILY v. FRANCO (2007)
FACTS: Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
The said amount used to open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco.
The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI
from FMIC’s account (with a deposit of P100,000,000.00) and credited to Tevesteco’s
account pursuant to an Authority to Debit which was allegedly forged as claimed by
FMIC.
Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its account amounting to
P37,455,410.54 including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco. He later issued two checks
which were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment of his account
filed by BPI.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which consisted of part of the
money allegedly fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s
account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of FMIC’s forgery claim is that the
money transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was able to
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recover possession of the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the
right to set up its ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bank has a better right to the deposits in Franco’s account.
HELD: NO. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been
unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current
possessor, BPI simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the
value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s account and credited to
Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s account.
Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this characteristic is all the
more manifest in the instant case which involves money in a banking transaction gone
awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without
other evidence of its title. Money, which had been passed through various transactions in
the general course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.
In this regard, we are guided by Article 2201 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonable foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
3. In Crimes And Quasi-Delicts
 Article 2202: In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defemdants shall be liable for all
damages whihch are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foressen by the defendant.
PEPLE VS SARCIA (2009)
FACTS: A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-appellant and
upon review of the evidence by the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape.
The prosecution alleged that accused-appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA
who was then 5 years old. AAA was playing with her cousin and two other children in a
neighbor’s house when accused invited her to the backyard of the house and raped here.
AAA’s cousin witnessed what happened.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as well as civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.
The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review and then transferred
to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the

following defenses: The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin
The inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was committed
The delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the alleged rape was
committed; Absence of proof of force or intimidation; Medical report on negative
lacerations. The CA affirmed the conviction. The case was elevated to the SC for further
review. Later, RA 9344 took effect while the case was pending before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.
HELD: YES. The proper imposable penalty for accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
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Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death. However,
accused-appellant is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because he
was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Since the prosecution was
not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain
that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996.
In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.
Civil indemnity maintained. Imposition of exemplary damages proper. Moral and

exemplary damages increased to P75,000 and P 30,000.00. Reason: award of moral
damages is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact
that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. For exemplary damages, the act must be accompanied by bad
faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
LLORENTE VS SANDIGANBAYAN (1991)
FACTS: Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA a public corporation. When he was the
Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services, Finance Services and Legal Affairs
Departments , Mr. Curio, Mrs. Perez, Mr. Azucena and Mrs. Javier applied for PCA
clearances in support of their gratuity benefits as they had resigned as a result of a
massive reorganization. Atty. Llorente was among the approving officers with respect to
clearances of rank-and-file employees, and as such he signed the clearances of Mrs.
Perez, Mr. Azucena and Mrs. Javier despite pending accountabilities but did not sign the
clearance of Mr. Curio who was similarly circumstanced with the afore-named three
employees. The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was
presented to him, he was already aware of the affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in
which Mr. Curio assumed to pay any residual liability for the disallowed cash advances,
which at the time, December 8, 1981, stood at P92,000.00. Moreover, Mr. Curio had
other pending obligations noted on his clearance. Mr. Curio appealed the non-issuance of
his clearance to higher officers who however advised him to wait for the resolution of the
Tanodbayan with which he had filed this case initially against Atty. Llorente. While Mr.
Curio eventually was able to secure a clearance in 1986, he had been deprived of gainful
employment between December 1981 and December 1986 because he could not present
his PCA clearance. Thus, on December 10, 1986, an Information for violation of Section
3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against Atty Llorente. The
Sandiganbayan acquitted the petitioner in the absence of any evidence that he acted in
bad faith, however it took the petitioner to task civilly, and ordered him to pay
"compensatory damages" in the sum of P90,000.00. According to the Sandiganbayan, the
petitioner was guilty nonetheless of abuse of right (under Article 19 of the Civil Code)
and as a public officer, he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved party (under
Article 27). The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan's Decision is erroneous even if
the Sandiganbayan acquitted him therein, because he was never in bad faith as indeed
found by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be held civilly liable in spite of his acquittal.
HELD: Petitioner is civilly liable having acted in bad faith in violation of Article 19 of
the Civil Code. The acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to procedures), yet
it does not follow that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid
reason to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three
employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, were all similarly circumstanced in that
they all had pending obligations when, their clearances were filed for consideration,
warranting similar official action. Thus, the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against
Mr. Curio. It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill-will (a grudge,
according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves. It is no defense
either that he was, after all, complying merely with legal procedures since, as we
indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring other employees. There
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can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr.
Curio. It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which the petitioner was
made to pay damages, together with Article 27, that the performance of duty be done
with justice and good faith. The Court finds the award of P90,000.00 to be justified by
Article 2202 of the Civil Code, which holds the defendant liable for all "natural and
probable" damages.
4. Earning Capacity and Business Standing

 Article 2205: Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent physical injury; (2) For injury to the
plaintiffs business standing or commercial credit.
D. DEATH BY CRIME OR QUASI-DELICT

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
PLEYTO v. LOMBOY (2004)
FACTS: A head-on collision between a bus and a car along McArthur Highway in
Gerona, Tarlac happened on May 16, 1995 at around 11:30am.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL), bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at the
time of the accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare servicing
various routes in Central and Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto Pleyto.
Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo
Asuncion, Ricardo’s brother-in-law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a passenger
to said car, suffered injuries requiring hospitalization. But her father Ricardo Lomboy
died. Ricardo’s heirs filed an action for damages against Pleyto and PRBL.
A witness and one of the bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla, testified that Pleyto tried
to overtake a tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved in to the left opposite lane
and smashed the Manila-bound car killing Arnulfo and Ricardo Lomboy while the other
passengers, Carmela and friend Rhino Daba suffered injuries. According to Pleyto, the
tricycle suddenly stopped without warning to which Pleyto stepped on the brakes and bus
lost speed but swerved to the other lane to avoid hitting the tricycle. Unfortunately, it
collided with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs awarding P1,642,521.00
for lost earnings of Ricardo Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is negligent and lacked
precaution when he overtook the tricycle disregarding completely the approaching car in
the other lane. Pleyto should have been more prudent in overtaking considering the
slippery road. The court held that Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations and was
negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code and PRBL liable as owner of the bus and
as employer of Pleyto under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to observe the
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required diligence in its supervision of its employees and the safe maintenance of its
buses.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross
earnings considering that no substantial proof was presented to prove Lomboy’s gross
income.
HELD: NO. In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages,
the net earnings, which is computed by deducting necessary expenses from the gross
earnings, and not the gross earnings, is to be utilized in the computation. The amount of
net earnings was arrived at after deducting the necessary expenses (pegged at 50% of
gross income) from the gross annual income. This computation is in accord with settled
jurisprudence. (Villa Rey case).
The testimony of the wife, Maria Lomboy, that her husband was earning a
monthly income of P8,000.00 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages
for loss of earning capacity. Jurisprudence provides that the factors that should be taken
into account in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number
of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and, (2) the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Factor No. 1
 Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-age at death])
adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial
Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
Factor No. 2
 Multiply the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e, the total
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and
less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed
at fifty percent of the gross earnings. Thus, in the given case, the formula used by
this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at the time of death) x (gross annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses)]
PHILIPPINE HAWK v. LEE ( 2010)
FACTS: A motorcycle driven by Tan, with his wife, when it was hit by a bus, killing
Tan. In the complaint based on quasi-delict, the wife alleged that her husband made 1M
operating a gasoline station, and 36,000 a year for their copra business. The Supreme
court, based on the Certificate of Creditable income tax, showing that tan had earned a
gross income of P950,988 for 1990, for the gasoline station, determined that his net
earning capacity was !m. To determine his net earnings, 80% was deducted from the
income, as expenses for operation of the business. Then %0% of the remaining income
was deducted as his reasonable expenses. Civil indemnity was also awarded based on
article 2206.
DOCTRINE: The indemnity for loss of earning capaity of the deceased is provided for
by article 2206. Compensation of these nature is awarded not for loss of earning, but for
loss of capacity to earn money. As a rule documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
Damages For Loss of Earning Capacity may be Awarded Despite the Absence of
Documentary Evidence when: 1) The deceased is self-employed and earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that in the deceased line of work, no documentary evidence is available; and 2)
The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
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PEOPLE v. LOPEZ (2011)
FACTS: On 10 August 2006, Lopez was charged with the murder of Melendres. on 31
July 2006 at about 8:30 a.m., he saw Melendres buying cigarettes from a store when
Lopez suddenly appeared and shot Melendres from behind with a caliber .38 revolver,
hitting him on the right side of the head. Acibar added that Lopez again shot Melendres
on the chest and on the lower abdomen. Lopez then fled from the scene. Acibar
immediately reported the incident to the barangay authorities.
Ma. Liberty Francisco Melendres (Liberty), Melendres wife, testified as to the civil
liability of Lopez. Liberty presented receipts to show that she spent P33,000 for the burial
and the interment and P7,500 for the wake. She also presented a certification from Tanod
Publishing, Inc. (Tanod Publishing), Melendres employer, as to his monthly salary range,
honoraria and transportation allowance. She also sought to recover moral damages. The
RTC ruled in favor of Melendres. The CA affirmed the same but modified the award for
damages. The Court of Appeals reduced the award of actual damages from P40,000 to
P33,000, the latter amount having been substantiated by receipts. As to the loss of
income, the Court of Appeals noted that there was no accurate way to determine
Melendres earnings since the certification issued by Tanod Publishing did not reflect a
fixed amount but only a salary range. However, the Court of Appeals held that the heirs
of Melendres are still entitled to a reasonable amount as a result of Melendres loss of
earning capacity and deemed it proper to increase the award from P45,420 to P200,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred with respect to the amount of damages awarded.
HELD: The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a

claim for loss of earning capacity. In this case, Liberty presented a certification from
Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres was a photo correspondent for Tanod
Newspaper and that his monthly salary ranges from P1,780to P3,570 on per story basis.
Liberty presented another certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that
Melendres received the total amount of P24,990 representing payment of honoraria and
transportation allowance from 1 January to 31 July 2006. The Court notes that the
defense did not object when the prosecution presented these documents before the trial
court. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. It was also established that at the time
of his death, Melendres was 41 years old.
E. IN RAPE CASES
PEOPLE v. ASTROLOGO (2007)
FACTS:
Astrologo raped her daughter. He was convicted as such for simple rape, sentence to
reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P75,000 as civil indemnity and P75,000 as mora
damages. The sumpreme court reduced both to P50,000, since the crimewas simple rape.
It awarded P25,000 as exemplary damages to deter fathers from sexually abusing their
own daughters.
DOCTRINE: Civil indemnity, which is actaully in the nature of actual or compensatory

damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. The case law also requires
automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from
the nature of the crime , it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such award, separate and didtinct from civil indemnity.
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES (ARTICLE 2208)
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Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litifation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
1. When exemplary damages may be awarded;
2. When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
3. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
4. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
6. In actions for legal separation;
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's

liability laws;
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from crime;
10. When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be covered.
In all cases attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY100
FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) won an ejectment case against several
persons allegedly illegally occupying its properties in Baesa, Quezon City. To execute
such, NPC requested from MERALCO that the electrical service connection of those
residential and commercial establishments beneath the NPC lines be immediately
disconnected and MERALCO agreed upon determination of the affected establishments
by NPC. One of which includes the residence of the plaintiffs- the Ramoys.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages to the Ramoys for the sudden
disconnection of their electric power supply.
HELD: YES. MERALCO is liable for damages to the Ramoys for the sudden
disconnection of their electric power supply which turned out to be without any valid
ground, pursuant to Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code. Therefore, MERALCO
failed to exercise the required utmost diligence as a public utility service provider, hence,
liable for culpa-contractual being negligent in its performance of its obligation derived
from the Service Contract between MERALCO and its consumers, one of which is the
Ramoys.
100
G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
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LUCIANO BRIONES AND NELLY BRIONES v. JOSE MACABAGDAL AND
VERGON REALTY INVESTMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: Respondents’ spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in a

subdivision in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon on the other hand owns
the adjacent land (Lot 2S).
In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of Vergon, Jose
Macabagdal constructed a house on Lot 2R which they thought was Lot 2S. After being
informed of the mix up, spouses immediately demanded for demolition of the house
constructed. Jose, refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership and
possession of the said land in RTC Makati.
Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was the lot which
was consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's agents over the 7-year period of paying
the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded
indemnity from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the suit is
decided against them.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to demolish their
house and vacate the premises and return the possession of the lot to the spouses with
damages. Defendants counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were dismissed for
lack of merit and with no cause of action. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC. Saying that,
there was no basis that the error was Vergon's fault and that they cannot invoke the
defense of a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the land.
HELD: RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to
pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527[14]
of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake
was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house
in good faith (Art. 448).
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with
the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the
owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either
option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the
owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for
the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having
the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
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ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to
the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has
embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor
in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on
the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to
oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably
more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to

show negligence on Vergon's part. It is the plaintiff who has to Prove by a
Preponderance of Evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.
BANK OF AMERICA v. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB101
FACTS: Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with
petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company President and
Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they pre-signed checks to
accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a business trip.
The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer.
Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks came into the hands of one of its employees
who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check was filled in with the use
of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the 'Payee', the amount in words was written,
with the word 'Cash' written above it.
PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower court awarded actual
and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and held
that the bank was negligent. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that it was merely
doing its obligation under the law and contract in encashing the checks, since the
signatures in the checks are genuine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and thus should
pay damages to PRC
HELD: Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance to
prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .
There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the
presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the bank to exercise
caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the business impressed
with public interest that they are duty bound to protect their clients and their deposits at
all times. They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest
degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence
required of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.
The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent and

highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. It's own negligence
must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person who stole the
checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in its accounting department at that.
As the employer, PRC supposedly should have control and supervision over its own
employees.
101
G.R. 150228 July 30, 2009
Page | 118
The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages
while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.
SPS. MOISES and CLEMENCIA ANDRADA v. PILHINO SALES CORPORATION
FACTS: Respondent Pilhino sued Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife, Maxima to recover a
sum of money. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which came to be
implemented against two trucks owned by Jose Andrada, Jr. However, the Hino truck
could not be transferred to Pilhino’s name due to its having been already registered in the
name of petitioner Moises Andrada. Pilhino thus instituted an action in the RTC to annul
the deed of sale between Jose and Moises. The RTC dismissed the case for all the
respondents in that case, except for the Spouses Moises and Clemencia. This was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pilhino should be held liable for the damages the petitioners
sustained from Pilhino’s levy on execution upon the Hino truck.
HELD: Petitioner’s insistence that abuse of rights was not established requires the
consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise
of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.
Perforce, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.
G. INTEREST (ARTICLES 2209-2213)
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to
the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence
of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
Article 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon
damages awarded for breach of contract.
Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may,
in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon
this point. (1109a)
Article 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages,

except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
FRIAS v. SAN DIEGO-SISON
FACTS: Bobie Rose Frias and Dr. Flora San-Diego Sison entered into a MOA over
Frias’property. The MOA consideration is 3M. Sison has 6 months from the date of
contract’s execution to notify Frias of her intention to purchase the property with the
improvements at 6.4M. Prior to this 6 month period, Frias may still offer the property to
other persons, provided that 3M shall be paid to Sison including interest based on
prevailing compounded bank interest + amount of sale in excess of 7M [should the
property be sold at a price greater than 7M]. In case Frias has no other buyer within 6
months from the contract’s execution, no interest shall be charged by Sison on the 3M. In
the event that on the 6th month, Sison would decide not to purchase the property, Frias
has 6 months to pay 3M (amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last 6
months only). 3M treated as a loan and the property considered as the security for the
Page | 119
mortgage. Upon notice of intention to purchase, Sison has 6 months to pay the balance of
3.4M (6.4M less 3M MOA consideration)
Frias received from Sison 3M (2M in cash; 1M post-dated check dated February
28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale). Frias gave Sison the TCT and
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. Sison decided not to purchase the property,
so shenotified Frias through a letter dated March 20, 1991 [Frias received it only on June
11, 1991],and Sison reminded Frias of their agreement that the 2M Sison paid should be
considered as a loan payable within 6 months. Frias failed to pay this amount. Sison filed
a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment.
ISSUES: Whether or not Sison is entitled to moral damages.
HELD: YES. There is nothing in the MOA that suggests that interest will be charged for
6 months only even if it takes forever for Frias to pay the loan.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money, and
until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue
since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. For a debtor to continue in
possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of
the loan without payment of the monetary interest constitutes unjust enrichment on the
part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.
DARIO NACAR v. GALLERY FRAMES
FACTS: Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe
Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery Frames on
January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found Gallery Frames
guilty of illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded Nacar P158,919.92 in damages
consisting of backwages and separation pay. Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court (SC). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
the decision became final on May 27, 2002.
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for
recomputation as he alleged that his backwages should be computed from the time of his
illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the finality of the SC decision (May 27, 2002)
with interest. The LA denied the motion as he ruled that the reckoning point of the
computation should only be from the time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24,
1997) until the decision of the LA (October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date
should be the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that decision
became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.
HELD: NO. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal dismissal cases
(referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or loses but wins on appeal). The
first part is the ruling that the employee was illegally dismissed. This is immediately final
even if the employer appeals – but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The
second part is the ruling on the award of backwages and/or separation pay. For
backwages, it will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end date shall be
extended until the day when the appellate court’s decision shall become final. Hence, as a
consequence, the liability of the employer, if he loses on appeal, will increase – this is
just but a risk that the employer cannot avoid when it continued to seek recourses against
the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This is also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code.
H. DUTY TO MINIMIZE (ARTICLE 2203)
Page | 120
 The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.
I. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES(ARTICLE 2214-2215)
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall

reduce the damages that he may recover.
Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may

equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following
instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted
upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiff's loss or injury.
III. MORAL DAMAGES
A. PURPOSE
VICTOR KIERULF, LUCILA H. KIERULF v. COURT OF APPEALS102
FACTS: Pantranco bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue towards
Clover Leaf, Balintawak. The driver lost control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the
left, and then to fly over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The
front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi, which
was moving along Congressional Avenue heading towards Roosevelt Avenue. As a
result, the points of contact of both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were
inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf, both of whom were treated at the
Quezon City General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then
crossing EDSA.
Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion
rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing
equipment. Lucila suffered injuries. The injuries sustained by Lucila required major
surgeries and prolonged treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries. The front
portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to pieces.
Pantranco, in its petition, adds that on said day, the above-mentioned bus was
driven by Jose Malanum. While cruising along EDSA, a used engine differential
accidentally and suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus. Said differential
hit the under chassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose
control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the center island, and bumped the
pickup of the spouses.
ISSUES: Whether or not the husband of the victim of the vehicular accident claims
moral damages for the loss of his right to marital consortium which, according to him,
has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his wife.
102
G.R. No. 99301 March 13, 1997
Page | 121
HELD: NO. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration,
as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. The established guideline in awarding moral damages takes into
consideration several factors, some of which are the social and financial standing of the
injured parties and their wounded moral feelings and personal pride. The Kierulf spouses
add that the Respondent Court should have considered another factor: the loss of their
conjugal fellowship and the impairment or destruction of their sexual life. 19
Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for loss of
consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that this claim is factual
in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in the findings of
the Respondent Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this
Court at this time.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding

moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no "rude and
rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive
language and highly scornful reference" was given her. The social and financial standing
of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he
or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or
her social and financial standing. It is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner
Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded
feelings.
B. WHEN RECOVERABLE
Article 2219-2220
ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. v. DAN T. LIM103
FACTS: Dan T. Lim works in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons, and other
raw materials, under the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products, Enterprises, to
factories engaged in the paper mill business. He delivered scrap papers worth
7,220,968.31 to Arco Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. (Arco Pulp and Paper) through its
Chief Executive Officer and President, Candida A. Santos.The parties allegedly agreed
that Arco Pulp and Paper would either pay Dan T. Lim the value of the raw materials or
deliver to him their finished products of equivalent value.
Dan T. Lim delivered the raw materials, Arco Pulp and Paper issued a post-dated
check dated with the assurance that the check would not bounce.When he deposited the
check on it was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. On the same day,
Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum of agreementwhere
Arco Pulp and Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished products to Megapack
Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy, for his account. According to the
memorandum, the raw materials would be supplied by Dan T. Lim, through his company,
Quality Paper and Plastic Products. Dan T.Lim sent a letter to Arco Pulp and Paper
demanding payment of the amount of 7,220,968.31, but no payment was made to him.
ISSUE: Whether moral damages can be awarded.
HELD: YES. Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in
case of breach of contract where the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
103
G.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014
Page | 122
Moral damages are not awarded as a matter of right but only after the party
claiming it proved that the breach was due to fraud or bad faith. As this court stated:
Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They
are recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad
faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive.
Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s actions clearly show "a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.” Moral damages
may, therefore, be awarded.
A. Crime Offense Resulting in Physical Injury
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEODORICO CLEOPAS and FLORENCIO

PIRAME104
FACTS: Cipriano Supero saw Pedro Torrenueva being held by Florencio Perame was
struck with an iron pipe by Epifanio Cleopas and Teodorico Cleopas with a piece of
wood hitting him in the forehead so he fell on the ground dead. He was then buried in the
well near the house of Demetrio Cleopas, father of the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the surviving spouse should be awarded moral and exemplary
damages.
HELD: NO. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional
distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. The absence of any generic
aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise precludes the award of exemplary
damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BASILIO VILLARMEA105
FACTS: That on the night of the killing, the victim were buying something from a store
which is located around 30 meters from the place of the incident. When they walked out
of the store, seven persons followed them. Candelada was first boxed by appellant. He
fell down with the victim since they had their arms around each other’s shoulders.
Candelada was again hit several times at the back and was too dazed to get up. When he
was finally able to regain his composure, he saw the group ganging up on and stabbing
the victim. He ran away after he saw the victim being stabbed by the assailants. He
recognized appellant as one of the members of the group who stabbed the victim. He
knew that appellant was working at J. King Construction – located about 40 meters from
the place of the incident. He had also seen appellant in the area several times in the
past.Candelada informed the wife of the victim about the incident. She then proceeded to
the scene of the crime while he remained in the house. Three policemen later arrived and
he accompanied them to Police Precinct 2. In the precinct, he identified appellant as the
one who boxed him. He also identified appellant in court. He admitted that he did not
know Canlom, the other co-accused.
ISSUE:Whether or not moral damages is proper even in the absence of proof.
HELD: YES. Moral damages should be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental
and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs as a violent death necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.
104
G.R. No. 121998. March 9, 2000
105
G.R. No. 200029, November 13, 2013
Page | 123
CARLOS ARCONA y MOBAN v. COURT OF APPEALS106
FACTS: It appears that at around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong
and Edgardo Talanquines were walking along the national highway at Barangay Labog,
Brookes Point, Palawan, on their way home after coming from a birthday party. When
they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around
saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo from behind with a
piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises except
petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar Umapas to ask for
help. Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he was standing in front of Jerry
Boston house, about seven (7) meters away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages be awarded.
HELD: YES. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity is
automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without need
of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.
It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his
love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an
injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in
the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
B. Quasi-delicts Casusing Pysical Injuries
B.F. METAL (CORPORATION) v. LOMOTAN107
FACTS: Respondent Rico Umuyon was driving the owner-type jeepowned by Spouses
Lomotan. The jeep was cruising at a moderate speed of 20 to 30kmph.Suddenly, at the
opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by
invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a
total wreck. Umuyon suffered an injury which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days.
Due to the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive.
Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages against BF
Metal Corporation and Rivera. The complaint alleged that Rivera’s gross negligence and
recklessness was the immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that
petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
Rivera. The complaint prayed for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages
and attorney’s fees in favor of respondents.
The court declared Rivera negligent when he failed to determine with certainty
that the opposite lane was clear before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he was
driving. Also negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees when it failed
to prove the proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to moral damages.
HELD: YES. Petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered by respondent
Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision and
selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent
Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on either
culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal case, which found
Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award moral damages, the same may be
awarded in the instant civil action for damages.
106
G.R. No. 134784. December 9, 2002
107
G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008
Page | 124
There is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan
whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the
negligence of petitioner under Article 2180.Article2219 speaks of recovery of moral
damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for
moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral
damages where there is injury to property, but the injure must be willful and the
circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being no proof that the
accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
PRUDENCIO LACONSAY v. FIDEL BEROG108
FACTS: Berog, as represented by his parents, filed a complaint for damages against
Prudencio Laconsay, Severo Ontuca (Driver of Harabas), Felisa (registered owner), and
daniel bautista. Laconsay ordered Ontuca to drive the Harabas in his instead for a
contract. An enraged Daniel baustista demanded the key of the harabas, in his hand was a
bolo. For fearing of his life Ontuca handed the key of the Harabas. Bautista sped up the
Harabas along Dona Soledad street where Fidel was busy fixing his bicycle between two
corolla park along the gutter. The Harabas collided with the corolla which pinned down
Fidel. Fidel saw the driver flee from the scene and saw another man take over of the
Harabas where he was ran over again for the second time. Fidel was rushed to the
hospital where his right leg was amputated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is just and proper.
HELD: YES. Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical

injuries. And that, moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of
the defendant. Article 2180 provides that Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry, this
obligation is demandable as imposed by Article 2176 of the civil codes which reads:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.
C. Seduction, Abduction, Rape or Other Lascivious Acts
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FILOMINO LIZANO109
FACTS: The victim, AAA, been staying in her grandmother’s house in Barangay Sta.
Cecilia, Tagkawayan, Quezon, together with Filomino Lizano and his wife, BBB who is
AAA’s aunt. Sometime in January 1996, AAA, who was then only 11 years old, was
sleeping inside the house when accused lay down beside her and began undressing her
while threatening to kill her, her grandmother and aunt should she reveal his acts to
anybody. Afterwards, Filomino also took off his clothes. He then went on top of AAA
and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain.[7] A year later, on 18
January 1997, Filomino raped AAA again. The following day, at around 10:30 a.m.,
appellant raped her for the third time. AAA was only forced to disclose the incident to an
uncle, a brother of her mother, upon the prodding of BBB, who chanced upon AAA while
inside the room of Filomino.
ISSUES: Whether or not civil indemnity is automatically imposed without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of rape.
108
GR No. 188686, December 3, 2014
109
G.R. No. 174470, April 27, 2007
Page | 125
HELD: YES. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need
of proof other than the fact of the commission of rape. Moral damages is also
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim had actually suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such award.
D. Illegal or Arbitrary Detention or Arrest
 Moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention as a result of

serious anxiety and fright suffered by the detained or victim.
PEOPLE V. MADSALI110
FACTS: Through the use of force, threat, violence and intimidation, Petitioners Sajiron
and his father Maron took and carried away AAA, a sixteen-year-old girl, to the forest.
In the forest, Sajiron had carnal knowledge of her while his father, Maron, stood guard.
On the morrow, Sajiron took AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained with a
warning that she will be shot if she escapes.Afterfive months, Sajiron, Maron and Egap
were arrested. After the trial, the RTC foundSajiron and Maron guilty of abduction with
rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty of serious illegal detention. Sajiron, Maron
and Egap were also ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity. The CA affirmed the Trial
Court decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not a victim of rape and illegal detention is entitled to moral
damages?
HELD: A rape victim is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the civil
code, without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.
Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victims injury necessarily resulting from
the odious crime of rape. Such award is separate and distinct from the civil indemnity.
A victim of illegal detention is also entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. This is predicated on AAA’s having suffered serious anxiety and fright when
she was detained for more than five months.
E. Illegal Search
 Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral Damages can be claimed as a
result of illegal search. A victim of such illegal search can claim moral damages
for the mental anguish, besmirched reputation and fright resulting fromthe illegal
search.
F. Libel, Slander or Any Other Form of Defamation
 A victim of slander or any other defamation is entitled to moral damages as a

result of the injury to the victim’s feelings and reputation.
OCCENA v. HON. PEDRO ICAMINA111
FACTS: Petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted a complaint for grave oral defamation
against private respondent Cristina Vegafria. He alleged that respondent openly, publicly
and maliciously uttered offensive and insulting words against him. After trial, private
respondent was convicted of Slight Oral Defamation but no damages were awarded to
110
G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010
111
G.R. No. 82146, January 22, 1990
Page | 126
petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case
as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to moral damages resulting from the
defamatory remarks uttered by private respondent?
HELD: It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to
certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and
Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him
embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and
anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. It is patently error for the
trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and
circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of
moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect
thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of
P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
G. Malicious Prosecution
 The institution of an unfounded civil suit is not a ground for an award of moral
damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose
a penalty on the right to litigate. Unless, the unfounded civil suit was instituted
with bad faith.
EXPERTRAVEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS112
FACTS: Petitioner Expertravel& Tours, Inc., filed a collection suit plus damages against
respondent Ricardo Lo. Respondent Lo alleged in his answer that his account with
Expertravel had already been fully paid and such fact was proven during the trial. On
account of the suit, Lo demanded damages in his answer. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent Lo moral damages, attorney’s fees
and the cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the Trial Court Decision.
ISSUE: Whether the award for moral damages is proper?
HELD: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal
justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an award of moraldamages. The rationale for the rule is
that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish
suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no
different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a
situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the
rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the
prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
SPS. SUNTAY v. KEYSER113
112
G.R. No. 130030, June 25, 1999
113
G.R. No. 208462, December 10, 2014
Page | 127
FACTS: Through a Contract to Sell, Keyser Mercantile purchased on installment Unit
“G” and two parking slot from Bayfront Development Corporation. The Spouses Suntay
also purchased several condominium units from Bayfront Corporation through another
contract to sell. However, despite payment of the full purchase price, Bayfront failed to
deliver the condominium units to the Suntays. The Spouses filed an action before the
HLRUB against Bayfront for the latter to reimburse the purchase price of the
condominium units with interests.
Upon application by the Spouses Suntay, the Sheriff of the RTC Manila levied
Bayfront’s titled properties, including the unit and parking slot purchased by Keyser
Mercantile. Keyser filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for annulment of auction
sale, writ of execution, declaration of nullity of title, and reconveyance of property
against Spouses Suntay.
In their answer, Spouses Suntay contended that moral and exemplary damages
should be awarded them in view of the reckless and wanton attitude of Keyser in
instituting a groundless action against them.
ISSUE: Whether the institution of a civil action could be a ground for claiming moral
and exemplary damages?
HELD: The filing alone of a civil action should not be a ground for an award of moral
damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil action is not among the grounds
for moral damages. Spouses Suntay failed to show a compelling reason to warrant the
award of moral damages aside from their bare allegations.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the New Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
The claimant, however, must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. In this case, because Spouses Suntay failed to prove their
entitlement to moral or compensatory damages, there could be no award of exemplary
damages.
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE v. BONDAD114
FACTS: The jeepney driven by LigorioBondad was parked on the right shoulder of te
road due to a flat tire when the DM Transit bus bumped the rear left of the jeepney.
Afterwhich, the bus swerved to the left and hit the right side portion of the car driven by
Morales. After Industrial Insurance Company paid Morales for the damages, both the
Insurance Company and Morales filed a complaint against the driver of DM bus and
LigorioBondad and the owner of the jeepney Pablo Bondad.
In their answer with counterclaim, respondents Ligorio and Pablo Bondad denied
the allegations in the complaint and alleged that complainants were in bad faith in
impleading them. After the trial, the complaint was dismissed insofar as the Bondads is
concerned and ordered plaintiffs to pay the Bondads moral and exemplary damages as
well as other legal expenses.
ISSUE: Whether the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper?
HELD: To sustain the award of moral damages, it must be shown that (1) the claimant
suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Article 2219
and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts
114
G.R. No. 136722, April 22, 2000
Page | 128
of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad
faith or ill motive.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioners acted in bad faith in
compelling respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, respondent Ligorio
cannot concentrate on his job and Pablo got sick. Indeed, they were innocently attending
a flat tire on the shoulder of the road; the next thing they knew, they were already being
blamed for an accident. Under the circumsances of the case, the award for moral damages
is justified.
Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is affirmed because petitioner’s

conduct needlessly dragged innocent by standers into an unfounded litigation. Indeed,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
H. Acts Mentioned in Article 309
Article 309
“Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a
funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material or
moral.”
I. Acts and Actions Referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35
Article 21
“Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
 The act done in Article 21 is willful. The act is done not merely voluntarily but
with a bad purpose.
TRIPLE EIGHT v. NLRC115
FACTS: Private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner as waitress for the Gulf
Catering Company (GCC), based in Saudi Arabia. However, she was made to perform
tasks that were unrelated to her job designation as waitress and was even made to work
for twelve hour shift without overtime pay. Due to strenuous work, respondent suffered
numbness and pain and had to undergo surgical operation. On the ground that respondent
Osdana was no longer physically fit to continue her employment, although without a
certification from a public health officer, the Gulf Catering Company terminated
respondent.
Upon her return to the Philippines, respondent filed a complaint praying for
unpaid and underpaid salaries, salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract as well as moral and exemplary damages.The LA ruled in favor of respondent
and ordered petitioner to pay moral and exemplary damages.
In their appeal, Petitioners assertedthat the award for salaries for the unexpired
portion of the contract and damages was improper because Osdana was validly
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the award for moral and exemplary damages was proper?
115
G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998
Page | 129
HELD: The award of moral and exemplary damages is proper. Worth reiterating is the
rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Article 26
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief.
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, or other personal condition.
CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS116
FACTS: For accusing private respondent Nestor Nicolas as having an adulterous

relationship with his sister-in-law before his family neighbors and friends, Petitioner
Rodrigo Concepcion, was ordered by the trial court to pay respondent moral and
exemplary damages. The decision was affirmed by the CA. In challenging the decision,
petitioner argued that the award of damages was without legal basis. Petitioner alleged
that the acts imputed against him does not constitute defamation. Neither does it involve
prying into the privacy of another’s residence nor meddling with or disturbing the private
life of another.
ISSUE: Whether there was basis in law for the award of damages?
HELD: The factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages in
favor of respondents. Petitioner's posture that no legal provision supports such award, the
incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code is
rejected. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was
no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy
behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted.
The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently
protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of
persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
Article 27
116
G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
Page | 130
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
further disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
 The article refers to a public servant or employee who, for some flimsy excuse,
delays or refuses to perform his duty unless he gets some kind of gift.
 This article applies if there is no contract or transaction where the public officer or
employee has the duty to intervene under the law. Otherwise, the law applicable
shall be RA 3019.
Article 28
Unfair competition in agriculture, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person
who thereby suffers damage.
 This article speaks of unfair competition in:
(a) Agricultural enterprises;
(b) Commercial enterprises;
(c) Industrial enterprises; and
(d) Labor.
 While competition is necessary in a free enterprise, it must not be unfair. The

article is intended to law down a general principle outlawing unfair competition,
both among enterprises and among laborers. Thus, the following acts are
prohibited:
(a) A strike for trivial, unjust or unreasonable cause;
(b) A strike carried out thru force, intimidation or other unlawful means;
(c) A strike in order to circumvent valid obligations entered into a collective

bargaining agreement;
(d) Cutthroat competition;
(e) Making false statement in the course of trade to discredit the goods,
business, or services of another;
(f) The making of goods so as to deceive purchasers; and
(g) Selling goods above the maximum prices set by the State.
Article 32
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or

indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
Page | 131
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical

publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of

law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for
public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in ones’ person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of association or societies for

purposes not contrary to law:
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the

Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
on his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self,

from being forced to confess his guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such confession except
when the person confessing becomes a state witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel unusual punishment, unless

the same imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which
has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not defendant’s act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
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relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
 The article is intended to punish, not only direct and indirect violations of
constitutional liberties, but also their impairment.
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS117
FACTS: Plaintiff Eduardo Cojuanco won sweepstakes horse races on various dates.
However, his price winnings were withheld by PCSO on the advice of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Thus, this case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
After the trial, the trial court ruled that (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent
Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of petitioner and his family. It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay
in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests and to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. The CA reversed the trial court's finding of bad
faith on the part of Carrascoso. The Court of Appeals held that the latter was merely
carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the award of damages is warranted?
HELD: The rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the
grounds provided therefore under the Civil Code.
Nevertheless, respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of

the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages.
Under the afore cited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with
malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith
in the performance of one's duties.
MERALCO v. SPS. CHUA118
FACTS: Respondents spouses Chua complained the unusual surge of their electric bill to
MERALCO. After investigation, MERALCO found that the electric meter of the Chuas
was tampered. In view thereof, MERALCO billed the Chuas for the differential of rate of
charge, energy tax, surcharges and penalties. Despite demand, the Chuas refused to pay
117
G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999
118
G.R. No. 160422, July 5, 2010
Page | 133
the bill, thus, MERALCO disconnected their electric service. Respondents filed an action
for mandamus and damages praying that their electric service connection be restored.
After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
MERALCO to pay them moral damages and other expenses. The trial court ruling was
affirmed with modification by the CA. In their petition for certiorari, MERALCO, among
others, contended that the Chua's are not entitled to moral damages in the absence of
evidence that they sustained damages resulting from the electric service disconnection.
ISSUE: Whether the award of moral damages is proper?
HELD: Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages are proper when the
rights of the individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated. Jurisprudence has established the following Requisites for
the Award or Moral Damages: (1) there is an injury – whether physical, mental or
psychological – clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages
if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
J. Willful Injury to Property
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. RAMOY
FACTS: The electric power supply of the defendant was disconnected by the
plaintiff's(MERALCO). However, during the ocular inspection, it was found out that the
residence of the plaintiffs-spouses was indeed outside the property subject of
disconnection.
HELD: MERALCO willfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by withholding from him
and his tenants thesupply of electricity to which they were entitled under the Service
Contract. MERALCO’s failure to exercise utmost care and diligence in the
performance of its obligation to Leoncio Ramoy is tantamount to bad faith. Leoncio
Ramoy testified that he suffered wounded feelings because of MERALCO’s actions.
Leoncio Ramoy is entitled to moral damages in the amount awarded by the CA.
REGALA V. CARIN
FACTS: Carin sued Regala, claiming to have suffered from the construction conducted
by the latter in hisproperty. Earlier, Regala asked Carin's consent for extending his
residence. Regala, however,intended to build a second floor to his house. Carin claimed
that dust and dirt from the constructionfell on his property, and that the laborers entered
his property without his authority.
HELD: The SC did not award moral damages, since Carin failed to establish that his
injury was the proximate result of Regala's act or omission, and that Regala was in the
lawful exercise of his property rights.
He was in good faith.
 Under Article 2220, the damage caused to the property must have been inflicted
maliciously or willfully, for moral damages to be recovered.
K. Breach of Contract in Bad Faith

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FRANCISCO v. FERRER
FACTS: The petitioners failed to deliver the wedding cake on the wedding day as
ordered and paid for. Petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed
because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got
lost.
HELD: The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence, for the law always presumes good faith. The Court found
no such fraud or bad faith. To recover moral and exemplary damages in an action for
breach of contract, the breach must be palpable wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive. Only nominal damages are awarded.
BANKARD v. FELICIANO
FACTS: Antonio Novak Feliciano is the holder of PCIBank Mastercard. respondent met
with Dr. Bumanlag to reimburse her for the cost of the breakfast the previous day.
Thereafter, Dr. Bumanlag accompanied the respondent to the Eddie Bauer Fairview Mall,
a prestigious mall in Toronto, where the latter bought several dressing items. Respondent
presented his PCIBank Mastercard for payment. which was dishonored to the
embarrassment of the respondent. Worse, the manager of the department store
confiscated the card in front of Dr. Bumanlag and other shoppers. According to the bank
he failed to pay his last billing which he denied and he also connected with his secretary
in the Philippines to verify the payment.
HELD: It is undisputed that respondent’s PCIBank Mastercard was dishonored in a

foreign country where the respondent was not expected to have family members or close
friends nearby to lend him a helping hand. Itwas twice dishonored in public places.
Worse, the card was first dishonored during a breakfast business meeting with respected
medical colleagues based in that country. Respondent had absolutely no inkling then that
there was a problem with his card. Moreover, he had no reason to think that something
was amiss since he is a member in good standing for more thanten (10) years and had no
previous bad experience with the card. Moral damages granted.
BPI EXPRESS v. ARMOVIT
FACTS: Ma. Antonia R. Armovit treated her British friends to lunch at a restaurant. She
handed to the waiter her BPI Express Credit Card to settle the bill but to her
astonishment, the waiter returned and informed that her card had been cancelled upon
verification with the BPI Express Credit (BPI). Armovit called BPI and the latter told her
that her credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding
obligations.
She denied having defaulted on her payments and demanded for compensation for
the shame and embarrassment she suffered. BPI claimed that it send Armovit a
telegraphic message requesting her to pay her arrears for three consecutive months. As
she did not comply with the request, it temporarily suspended her credit card with due
notice to her. BPI further claimed that Armovit failed to submit the required application
form in order to reactivate her credit card privileges.
Later on, Armovit received a telegraphic message from BPI apologizing for its
error of inadvertently including her credit card in Caution List sent to its affiliated
merchants.
HELD: The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found inthe card
membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties.
In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Page | 135
PAL v. LOPEZ
FACTS: Vicente Lopez claimed that PAL had unjustifiably downgraded his seat from
business to economy class in his return flight from Bangkok to Manila and PAL was not
able to offer any valid explanation for the sudden change when he protested the change.
Lopez added that although aggrieved, he nevertheless took the said flight as an economy
class passenger because he had important appointments in Manila.
PAL denied any liability and claimed that whatever damage Lopez had suffered
was due to his own fault. PAL explained that the terms and conditions of the contract of
carriage required Lopez to reconfirm his booking for the Bangkok-to-Manila trip, and
that he did not protest the economy seat given to him when the change in his
accommodations was read to him by the person who received his phone reconfirmation.
PAL also asserted that Lopez did not complain against his economy seat during the
check-in and that he raised the issue only after the flight was over.
HELD: PAL is guilty of raising prohibited new matter and in changing its theory of
defense since it is only in the present petition that it alleged the contributory negligence
of Lopez.
PAL's procedural lapses notwithstanding, we had nevertheless carefully reviewed
the records of this case and found no compelling reason to depart from the uniform
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that: (1) it was the negligence
of PAL which caused the downgrading of the seat of Lopez; and (2) the aforesaid
negligence of PAL amounted to fraud or bad faith. MORAL DAMAGES AWARDED.
VALENZUELA VS MANO
FACTS: Defendant encroached the property of the plaintiff and through bad faith he was
able to acquire a title over it.
HELD: Having ruled that Defendant committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed
property then he should be liable for both moral and exemplary damages. Likewise,
since petitioners were compelled to litigate to protect their rights and having proved that
Jose acted in bad faith, attorney’s fees should likewise be awarded.
To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty
party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. As regards attorney’s
fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered
as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. MORAL DAMAGES AWARDED.
C. WHO MAY RECOVER
1. Relatives of Injured Person
SULPICIO LINES v. CURSO
FACTS: Tito Duran Tabuquilde (Tito) and his 3-year old daughter Jennifer Anne (Anne)
boarded the M/V Dona Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila. Storm Signal No. 2 had been
raised by the PAG-ASA authorities which was subsequently raised to Signal No. 3.
Depite the warnings, ship captain ordered the vessel to proceed to Tacloban when
prudence dictated that he should have taken it to the nearest port for shelter, thus
violating his duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely
to their destination.
The wife of Tito, Angelina, contacted the Sulpicio Office to verify radio reports
that the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn was missing. Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship
was merely "hiding" thereby assuaging her anxiety. She tried to seek the assistance of the
Sulpicio Lines in Manila to no avail and spent sleepless nights worrying about her
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husband and daughter in view of the refusal of Sulpicio Lines to release a verification of
the sinking of the ship.
Later on, Tito wrote a letter to his wife, reporting the sad fact that Jennifer Anne
was dead, Angelina suffered from shock and severe grief upon receipt of the news.
HELD: Moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of

carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier
was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result. However, moral damages
may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately
injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
2. Juridical Persons
ABS-CBN v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The vice president Charo Santos-Concio, requested Viva Production, Inc. to
allow ABS-CBN to air at least 14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant to this request, a
meeting was held between Viva’s representative.During the meeting Viva proposed a
film package which will allow ABS-CBN to air 104 Viva films for P60 million. ABS-
CBN proposed a counterproposal of 53 films (including the 14 films initially requested)
for P35 million. In other words, the meetings were unsuccessful. Viva made an
agreement with Republic Broadcasting Corporation (GMA 7) which gave exclusive
rights to GMA 7 to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially requested by ABS-
CBN.
ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific performance against Viva as it
alleged that there is already a perfected contract between Viva and ABS-CBN. ABS-
CBN also filed an injunction against GMA 7 to enjoin the latter from airing the films.
The injunction was granted. GMA 7 now filed a countersuit with a prayer for moral
damages as it claimed that its reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows
that they promised to their viewers.
HELD: The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation

because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it
has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous
system. No moral damages can be awarded to a juridical person.
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING v. AGO
FACTS: Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program “Expose”. Respondent Ago
was the owner of the Medical & Educational center, subject of the radio program
“Expose”. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine
(AMEC) claimed that the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC
claimed for damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning
institution. With the supposed expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre “transmitted malicious
imputations and as such, destroyed plaintiff’s reputation. FBNI was included as
defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The trial court found rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre
liable for libel except Rima. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that
FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
HELD: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a
natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim,
or moral damages fall under item 7 of Art – 2219 of the NCC.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a
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corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implied
damages.
REPUBLIC v. TUVERA
FACTS: The instant action originated from a civil complaint for restitution and damages
filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Marcos and his longtime aide Juan
Tuvera, as well as Tuvera's son Victor and a corporation the younger Tuvera had
controlled. Trial on the case against the Tuveras proceeded separately before the
Sandiganbayan. After the Republic had presented its evidence, the Tuveras successfully
moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence. The demurrer was
sustained, and it falls upon this Court to ascertain the absence or existence of sufficient
proof to support the relief sought by the Republic against the Tuveras. The Complaint
prayed that respondents pay moral, temperate and exemplary damages, litigation
expenses, and treble judicial costs.
HELD: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the
Civil Code. It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article
2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say that the
action at bar does not involve any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed
upon an intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic could
sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein. Any lawyer for the Republic who poses
a claim for moral damages in behalf of the State stands in risk of serious ridicule. NO
MORAL DAMAGES.
SPS. CRYSTAL v. BPI
FACTS: Spouses Raymundo and Desamparados Crystal obtained a loan in behalf of the
Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. (CCCC) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands-
Butuan branch (BPI-Butuan). The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on heavy
equipment and machinery of CCCC. CCCC failed to pay its loans to both BPI-Butuan
and BPI-Cebu City when they became due. CCCC, as well as the spouses, failed to pay
their obligations despite demands. Thus, BPI resorted to the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage and the real estate mortgage. The spouses claimed that the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgages is illegal because BPI should have exhausted CCCC’s properties
first, stressing that they are mere guarantors of the renewed loans. They also prayed that
they be awarded moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
cost of suit. BOTH PARTIES CLAIMING MORAL DAMAGES.
HELD: No moral damages are awarded for both parties. As to the petitioners- moral
damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.Such damages, to be recoverable,
must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is
satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.There being no wrongful or unjust act on
the part of BPI in demanding payment from them and in seeking the foreclosure of the
chattel and real estate mortgages, there is no lawful basis for award of damages in favor
of the spouses. As to the defendants- Neither is BPI entitled to moral damages. A
juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
D. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
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LOPEZ v. PAN AMERICAN
FACTS: Reservation for first class accommodation in Pan American Airlines from
Tokyo to San Francisco was made by Delfin Faustino for then Senator Fernando Lopez
and company. First class tickets were issued and paid for. The party left Manila for
Tokyo as scheduled. Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine
Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations
for that evening's flight. . However, they were informed that there was no
accommodation for them. Because of some urgent matters to attend to in San Francisco,
they were constrained to take the tourist flight “under protest”.
FACTS: As to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith

of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings,
serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets
issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they
were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them,
only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as
tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is
rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like
defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. It may also be
mentioned that in his aforesaid office Senator Lopez was in a position to preside in
impeachment cases should the Senate sit as Impeachment Tribunal. And he was former
Vice-President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend
a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his
aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind, and in fact he had a second
engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in
his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. For the moral damages sustained by him,
therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate.
IV. NOMINAL DAMAGES
A. PURPOSE AND WHEN RECOVERABLE
1. Violation of a Right
 Vindicating or recognizing the injured party’s right to a property that has been
violated or invaded.119
Manner of Determination
 No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. Proof that a legal right has been violated
is what is only required.
Nominal damages are awarded when:
1. Violation of a right
PEOPLE v. MARQUEZ120
FACTS: Appellant Aida Marquez is found guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure
to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code,
and was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
119
Art.2221 NCC, Tan v. Bantegui, 473 SCRA 663
120
G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011
Page | 139
ISSUE: Whether or not Appellant is liable for nominal damages for violation of a right.
HELD: YES. The award of nominal damages is allowed under Article 2221 of the New
Civil Code which states that: Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him. It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Evidently,
Merano’s right as a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and
recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages.
ALMEDA v. CARINO121
FACTS: Petitioner failed to pay outstanding balance of sale of properties to the

respondent after several demands from the latter. RTC of Laguna rendered the decision
ordering petitioner to pay the respondent jointly and severally the with a 12% rate of
interest per annum as agreed upon from the date of demand until fully paid; to pay the
respondent jointly and severally as nominal damages; and to pay the respondent jointly
and severally the amount of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus costs of this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in awarding nominal damages to
respondent.
RULING: NO. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that
right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus
not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of
a right. Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. When
granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply
a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A violation of the plaintiffs right,
even if only technical, is sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely,
so long as there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of
nominal damages is proper.
 Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right,
and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is
thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and
vindication of a right. Indeed,nominal damages are damages in name only and not
in fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A
violation of the plaintiffs right, even if only technical, is sufficient to support an
award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as there is a showing of a
violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is proper.
GONZALES v. PCIB122
FACTS: Petitioner was a client of PCIB for a good 15 years and was granted a credit line
with the aggregate amount of his accounts as collateral for the availment of the said line.
Petitioner served as an accommodation party to spouses Panlilio who obtained loans
covered by promissory notes, notably stating that petitioner is solidary liable with the
spouses for the payment of the loans. The loan was granted and the spouses received the
proceeds but subsequently defaulted in the payment of said dues. As a result, the credit
line was terminated and the FCD account of petitioner was frozen. In the meantime,
Gonzales issued a check but was dishonored which resulted to a falling out and a heated
121
G.R. No. 152143, January 13, 2003
122
G. R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011
Page | 140
argument causing him great embarrassment and humiliation. Petitioner filed a case with
the RTC on account of the alleged unjust dishonor of the check. RTC ruled in favor of
PCIB. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCIB is liable for nominal damages.
RULING: YES. The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the
modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized society banks
have attained a ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them
with respect and even gratitude and most of all, confidence, and it is for this reason,
banks should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part.
The termination of the COHLA by PCIB without prior notice and the subsequent
dishonor of the check issued by Gonzales constitute acts of contra bonus mores. Art. 21
of the Civil Code refers to such acts when it says, Any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damage.
Accordingly, this Court finds that such acts warrant the payment of indemnity in
the form of nominal damages. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is
technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind. The nature of nominal damages is thus not for the purpose
of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right.
Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. When granted by the
courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply a recognition
of the existence of a technical injury. A violation of the plaintiffs right, even if only
technical, is sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as
there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal
damages is proper.
2. No actual loss caused or proven
AREOLA v. COURT OF APPEALS123
FACTS: Prudential Guarantee cancelled Areola’s personal accident insurance on the

grounds that the latter failed to pay his premiums 7 months after issuing the policy.
Areola was supposed to pay the total amount of P1,609.65 which included the premium
of P1,470.00, documentary stamp of P110.25 and 2% premium tax of P29.40. The
statement of account had a stipulation not considering it a receipt. It also reminded the
customer to ask for a receipt after payment. There was also a stipulation calling for a
demand for a provisional receipt after payment to an agent. A provisional receipt was
sent to petitioner telling him that the provisional receipt would be confirmed by an
official one. The company then cancelled the policy for non-payment of premiums. After
being surprised, Areola confronted a company agent and demanded an official receipt.
The latter told him that it was a mistake, but never gave him an official receipt. Areola
sent a letter demanding that he be reinstated or he would file for damages if his demand
was not met. The company then told him that his payments weren’t in full yet. The
company replied to Areola by telling him that there was reason to believe that no
payment has been made since no official receipt was issued. The company then told him
that they would still hold him under the policy. The company then confirmed that he paid
the premium and that they would extend the policy by one year.
Thereby, the company offered to reinstate same policy it had previously cancelled
and even proposed to extend its lifetime on finding that the cancellation was erroneous
and that the premiums were paid in full by petitioner-insured but were not remitted by the
123
G.R. No. 95641, Sept.22,1994
Page | 141
company's branch manager, Mr. Malapit. However, they were too late for Areola already
filed an action for breach of contract in the trial court.
ISSUE: Did the subsequent act of reinstating the wrongfully cancelled insurance policy
by respondent insurance company, in an effort to rectify such error, obliterate whatever
liability for damages it may have to bear, thus absolving it?
HELD: NO. Due to the agreement to enter into a contract of insurance where Prudential
promised to extend protection to petitioner-insured against the risk insured, there was a
debtor creditor relationship between the two parties. Under Article 1191, the injured party
is given a choice between fulfillment or rescission of the obligation in case one of the
obligors fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. However, said article entitles
the injured party to payment of damages, regardless of whether he demands fulfillment or
rescission of the obligation.
The damages would be nominal because the insurance company took steps to
rectify the contract . There was also no actual or substantial damage inflicted. Nominal
damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or
where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.”
PNOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS124
FACTS: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault. Maria Efigenia sued
the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of
P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of
M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as attorney’s fees and
later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities. During the pendency of the case,
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it
acquired Petroparcel. Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of
the fishing boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the damage was adequately proven.
HELD: YES. In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is èntitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property
right has been invaded.
Damages in name only and not in fact amount to be awarded as nominal damages
shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent
considering the concept and purpose of such damages. Ordinarily, the receipt of
insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss
for which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower
124
G.R. No. 107518, Oct.8, 1998
Page | 142
court’s jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the
judgment
FRANCISCO VS. FERRER125
FACTS: The petitioners failed to deliver the wedding cake on the wedding day as
ordered and paid for. Petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed
because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got
lost. The respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, for
breach of contract with damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs
and against Erlinda Francisco who is ordered to pay an amount of P30, 000 for moral
damages. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the appealed
decision increasing the award of moral damages from thirty thousand (P30,000.00) to two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) and awarded an additional exemplary
damages of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are liable nominal damages?
RULING: YES. The petitioners liable for nominal damages (an amount of P10,000) for
insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer’s anxiety and need of the hour.
“Nominal damages are ‘recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must
be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or
where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.” Nominal damages may be awarded “to a
plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered.”
CHINA AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS126
FACTS: Petitioner breached contract of carriage to private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for nominal damages.
HELD: YES. Private respondents suffered some form of injury. CAL confirmed the
reservations of private respondents carelessly. Private respondents relied on this
confirmation. Private respondents went through the trouble of going to the airport at the
appointed time expecting that they would be able to board CAL Flight 632. To their
consternation, CAL personnel prevented them from boarding because Morelia cancelled
their reservations. When plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages.The court may award
nominal damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which defendant has violated
and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered.The court may award nominal
damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157 of the
Civil Code, or in any case where there is an invasion of any property right. We find
P5,000 as a reasonable award of nominal damages to each of the private respondents.
The fact that private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect
and enforce their claim does not justify the award of attorneys fees.[74] The court may
award attorneys fees only in the instances mentioned in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
and this case is not one of them. Moreover, when there is no basis to award moral and
exemplary damages, there is also no basis to award attorneys fees
TURIN ACE VS. RUFINA127
125
G.R. No. 142029, Feb, 28, 2001
126
G.R. No. 129988, Jul 14, 2003
127
G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006
Page | 143
FACTS: Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in themanufacture of rhum,
wines and liquor under the name and style Tanduay Distillers. It has registered its mark
of ownership of itsbottles with theBureau of PatentTrademarks and Technology Transfer.
In the conductof its business, it sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. On
the otherhand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extractionfermentation and
manufactureof patisand other food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling
of all kinds of foods,merchandise and products for domestic use or for export to other
countries. In the production of patisandother food seasonings,Rufinauses as containers
those of Twin Ace without permission from the latter.
ISSUE: Is Rufina entitled to damages?
HELD: YES. In the issue of nominal damages, Article 2222 of the Civil Code states that
the court may awardnominal damages in every obligation arising from any source
enumerated in Article 1157 or in every other case where any property right has been
invaded. Nominal damages are given in order that a right of theplaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and notfor the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The award of nominal
damages to Rufina in the amount of fifty thousand pesos is reasonable, warranted and
justified.
3. Under Consideration of Equity
SPS. GUANIO v. MAKATI SHANGRILA128
FACTS: For their wedding reception, petitioners booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati.
Petitioners claim that during the reception, their guests complained at the delay in the
service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; and the
hotel waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay. Petitioners
filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC of Makati City.
Respondent however avers that while there was a delay in the service of the meals, the
same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to 470 from the guaranteed
expected minimum number of guests of 350 to a maximum of 380. The Court of Appeals
held that the proximate cause of petitioners' injury was an unexpected increase in their
guests.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages.
HELD: YES. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The Court deems it just to award
the amount of Php50,000.00 by way of nominal damages to petitioners, for the
discomfiture that they were subjected to during the event. The Court recognizes that
every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
Respondent's lack of prudence is an affront to this right.
B. NATURE AND DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT
1. Small but Substantial
 The amount of money awarded in nominal damages may not be a lot, but they are
still important because they may open the door to other types of damages. For
example, punitive damages cannot be awarded unless the plaintiff is first awarded
compensatory, nominal, or restitution damages.
 Punitive damages are not usually awarded in contracts cases, except in the
instances mentioned above involving bad faith or combined tort claims. In these
128
G.R. No. 190661, Feb.7, 2011
Page | 144
types of cases, nominal damages become an important consideration when courts
are calculating monetary awards.
2. Commensurate to Injury Suffered
 (only a portion of/little/small)
 Nominal damages are awarded to the aggrieved party when there is only technical
violation of the legal rights. Here no substantial loss is caused. These damages are
very small in amount. They are awarded simply to recognize the right of the party
to claim damages for the breach of the contract.
 Nominal damages are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent
of the harm done to the injured party. They are damages in name only and are
allowed simply in recognition of a technical injury based on a violation of a legal
right.
NOTE: Nominal damages cannot co‐exist with actual or compensatory damages because
nominal damages are recoverable when the damages suffered cannot be proved with
reasonable certainty. The law presumes damage although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven. Award of actual, moral, temperate or moderate damages
preclude nominal damages. But it may be awarded together with attorney’s fees.129
GONZALES vs PEOPLE130
 The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court
according to the circumstances of the case. Generally, nominal damages by their
nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm
done to the injured party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a
substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the
law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven.
In truth, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are
allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury.
PEDROSA VS COURT OF APPEALS131
 Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff’s right, which has
been invaded or violated by defendants, may be vindicated and recognized.
3. Special Reasons Extant in the Case
ROBES-FRANSISCO vs CFI132
 Under the provisions of the Civil Code nominal damages are not intended for
indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right
violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the
amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left
to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.
 It is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the
violation of a legal right; in such case, the law presumes a damage, although
129 Pineda, pp. 284‐285, 2009 ed

130 G.R. No. 159950, Feb. 12, 2007
131 G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001
132 G.R. No. L-41093, October 30, 1978
Page | 145
actual or compensatory damages are not proven; in truth nominal damages are
damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.133
C. EFFECT OF AWARD
 Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the
vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded.134
WHEN AWARDED
 The Court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has
been invaded (Article 2225 of the Civil Code).
V. TEMPERATE DAMAGES DEFINED
 Temperate damages are those which the court grant when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case be proved, with certainty.
A. WHEN AWARDED
 The amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and
correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for
pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would
meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of
the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and
should be awared on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where
the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such
cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
1. Nature of Care Prevents Determination of Actual Loss
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, maybe recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty.
2. Cases Where Amount of Loss Not Proven
PLENO v. COURT OF APPEALS135
FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
if Rizal against defendants Philippine Paper Products and Florante de Luna. It was
alleged that on December 21, 1971 at about 12:45 P.M., de Luna was driving a delivery
truck owned by Paper Products, Inc. He was said to be driving in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner. As a consequence, the delivery truck hit, bumped and sideswiped
plaintiff’s Volkswagen delivery van causing it to swerve to the right that it rammed into
the rear part of a truck parked at the shoulder of the road. That as a result of the vehicular
accident, plaintiff suffered various serious injuries, was hospitalized and because he
suffered injuries affecting his brain, he acted beyond normalcy at times.
133 Fouraker v. Kidd Springs Boating and Fishing Club, 65 S. W. 2d 796-797, citing 17 C.J. 720
134 Ventanilla v Centeno G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961
135
G.R. No. 56505, May , 1988
Page | 146
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant court was correct in reducing the amount of
temperate damages awarded to the petitioner.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that the lower court’s awards of damages are more
consonant with the factual circumstances of the instant case. The trial court’s findings of
facts are clear and well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately supported by
evidence on record. The CA has shown no sufficient reasons for the altering factual
findings which appear correct. The Court therefore affirmed the lower court’s award of
damages and hold that the appellate court’s reduction in the amounts of temperate and
moral damages is not justified.
Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages,

where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
although the court is convinced that there is a loss.
TAN vs. OMC CARRIERS136
FACTS: A truck with a trailer owned by OMCCarriers, suddenly lost its brakes. The
driver jumped put leaving it ramming into the house and tailoring shop of the Tans. The
husband was instantly killed. The trial court, applying res ipsaloquitor held OIMC
Carriers and the driver liable, awarding, inter alia P355,895.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P500,000as loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court held that the claim
for actual damages, for the damage on the house, tailoring shop and equipments inside
cannot be upheld since there were no receipts submitted to prove their monetary value.
The same is true with loss of earning capacity since documentary evidence were not
presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reduction of actual damages for loss of property and the
removal of actual damages for loss of earning capacity was proper.
HELD: NO. Temperate damages are awarded when the exact amount of damages is
unknown. The petitioners clearly suffered damages. Their home and property were
damaged. The provider of the family passed away. It is clear and undisputed that they
did suffer losses. However, since the value of the properties damaged could not be
determined with certainty because of the nature of the property, temperate damages are in
order. Also, even if there are no documents supporting the earning capacity of the
deceased, the damaged caused is still undisputed . Temperate damages must be awarded.
Absent competent proof of the actual damages suffered, a party may still has the
option of claiming temperate damages, where, from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced there is pecuniary
loss.
3. In Addition to Actual Damages
VENTANILLA vs. CENTENO137
FACTS: Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to
represent him in a civil case which was an action for recovery of P4,000.00 an damages.
However, due to defendant’s neglect in perfecting within the reglementary period his
appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the Court of First Instanbce (CFI) of
Manila, the plaintiff filed an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by
him as a result of such neglect. After the trial, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of the
136
G.R. No. 190521, January 12, 2011
137
G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961
Page | 147
plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of
P200.00 as nominal damages and the costs. The plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to award temperate damages.
HELD: NO. The trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate
damages to the appellant. Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the
appellant, considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has
been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of
temperate or moderate damages.
A. Chronic and Continuing Injury
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS138
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent cholecystectomy, a surgical procedure to remove

stone from her gallbladder. She hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon to conduct the surgery at
the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC) Dr. Hosaka assured them that he would find
a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned. Dr. Hosaka arrived
three (3) hours late for the operation. Dr. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the
administration of anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into coma and suffer brain damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff should be awarded of temperate damages.
HELD: In cases where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, the amount of damages which should be
awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be
one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved up to the trial; and one
which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the
nature of the case be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and
should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the in
injury is chronic and continuing. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a
certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
B. FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
1. In General
DE GUZMAN vs. TUMOLVA139
FACTS: Petitioner Emerita M. De Guzman (De Guzman) represented by her attorney-in-

fact, Lourdes Rivera and Dhonna Chan, and respondent Antonio Tumolva (the
contractor) entered into a construction agreement for the construction of an orphanage in
Silang, Cavite. Incorporated in the agreement was the plan and specifications of the
perimeter fence. The contractor, however, made deviations from the agreed plan with
respect to the perimeter fence of the orphanage. During typhoon Milenyo, a portion of the
perimeter fence, collapsed and other portions titled. Through counsel, De Guzman
demanded the repair of the fence in accordance with the plan. In response, the contractor
claimed that the destruction of the fence was an act of God and expressed willingness to
discuss the matter to avoid unnecessary litigation. De Guzman, however, reiterated her
demand for the restoration of the wall without additional cost on her part, or in the
alternative, for the contractor to make an offer for a certain amount by way of
compensation for the damages she sustained.
138
G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
139
G.R. No. 188072, October 19, 2011
Page | 148
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to temperate damages.
HELD: YES. De Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate damages as provided under

Article 2224 of the Civil Code for the loss the she suffered. When pecuniary loss has
been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.
2. Receipts Amounting to Less that P25,000.00
PEOPLE vs. LUCERO140
FACTS: An Information was filed charging the appellant with the crime of murder. The
accused Lucero with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Edgar
Aydaon, a Barangay Kagawad, with the use of abolo, thereby hitting the victim’s head
which wound and injury caused the instantaneous death of the victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Aydaon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of temperate damages is proper.
HELD: YES, under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
presented in the trial court. Thus, the Court delete the award of P3,000.00 as actual
damages given by the Court of Appeals. In lieu thereof as actual award to the heirs of the
victim the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SERRANO vs. PEOPLE141
FACTS: A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the

stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano.
During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was beaten
until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang claimed that when he
inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim
received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed
home for one month to recuperate.
ISSUE: Whether or not temperate damages should be awarded in lieu of actual damages.
HELD: If the actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less than
P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. The award of temperate damages is based on
Article 2224 of the New Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate damages
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its
amount cannot be proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of damages is only
P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.
PEOPLE vs. ANDRES142
140
G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010
141
G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010
142
G.R. No. 13569-98, August 15, 2003
Page | 149
FACTS: The appellants were charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder.
The information for murder read that on or about the 31st of July, 1992, at Barangay
Central East, Bauang, La Union, the accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, stab and hack one William Ducusin, with the use of a bladed weapon
causing his death to the damage and prejudice of the offended party. The crime of murder
was thus charged against the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not temperate damages be awarded.
HELD: YES. When actual damages proven by receipts during the trial mount to less
than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely actual receipts
presented during trial should instead be granted. With respect to actual damages, the
amount of P24,363.85 was duly proven by competent documents during the trial. The
victim’s heirs should, thus be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
3. No Receipts Provided
PEOPLE vs. GIDOC143
FACTS: Accused Rolly Gidoc and one john Doe were charged in the regional Trial
Court (RTC) with two (20 counts of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
for the deaths of brothers Cesar Perez y Espinosa and Arnel Perez y Espinosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not temperate damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.
HELD: YES. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder

cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot
be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount
was not proved. Thus, the Court awards P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count
of murder.
PEOPLE vs. ABRAZALDO144
FACTS: In the information dated August 3, 1995 filed with the trial court, accused-
appellant was charged with the crime of murder committed as follows: That on or about
July 15, 1995 in the evening at barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Federico
Abrazaldo, the accused, armed with a bolo, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed
DelfinGuban y. Guinto inflicting upon him a stab wound which caused his death to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not temperate damages is to be awarded.
HELD: YES. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual

amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty. The Court held that where the
amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to
prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages may
be awarded. Such temperate damages taking into account the current jurisprudence
fixing the indemnity for death at P50,000.00, should be one-half there of or P25,000.00.
This makes temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary damages which is
likewise fixed at P25,000.00 in cases where its award is justified.
143
G.R. No. 185162, April 24
144
G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003
Page | 150
VI. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE
1. Definition
 Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid
in case of breach thereof. (Article 2226)
SUATENGCO v. REYES145
 It is common for liquidated damages to be referred to as attorney’s fees.
 The Court ruled that the attorney’s fees were in the nature of liquidated damages
and not the attorney’s fees recoverable as between attorney and client enunciated
and regulated by the Rules of Courts.
 Article 2228 provides that when the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the
liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.
2. Purpose
 It is either indemnity or penalty
HL CARLOS v. MARINA146
 Liquidated damages are not punitive in nature.

The Court held that liquidated damages take the nature of penalties, though it said
that the amount agreed upon in the contract answers for damages suffered by the
owner due to delays in the completion of the project. In the case, the quoted
provision of the contract states the amount is “not by way of penalty” and the
party claiming liquidated damages was not required to prove he has incurred
actual damages to be entitled to liquidated damages
TITAN v. UNI-FIELD147
 It is possible to receive liquidated damages and attorney’s fees even if both are in
the nature of penal clauses.
 The Court said that the AF stipulated in the contract is in the nature of liquidated
damages because the intention is that it is a penal clause. In this case, the award of
attorney’s fees was in the nature of liquidated damages, though it was still
considered a separate item of damages.
B. Reducing the Amount
1. When iniquitous or unconscionable
 The Court would simply say the stipulated amount is unconscionable or

iniquitous without explaining why.
145
G.R. No. 162729
146
G.R no. 147614
147
G.R. No. 153874, March 1, 2007
Page | 151
 Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides that liquidated damages, whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they
are iniquitous or unconscionable.
2. Possible Tests
A. Apply rules on Penalty Causes
LINGUITAN v. COURT OF APPEALS148
 The Court said the question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can
be partly subjective and partly objective, taking into account the type, extent,
purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach, its
consequences, supervening realities, the standing and relationship of the parties,
and the like.
 Liquidated damages may be reduced when a partial or irregular performance is

made by the debtor. The Court also pointed out the stipulated penalty might even
be deleted in the ff cases:
(1) When there has been substantial performance in good faith by the obligor
(2) When the penalty clause itself suffers from fatal infirmity, or when
exceptional circumstances exist as to warrant it.
RCBC v. COURT OF APPEALS149
 It is a case where it considered the circumstances of Goyu, noting its “pitiful

situation”.
B. Attorney’s Fees Test
 The Court applied the rules on the award for attorney’s fees. The Court conceded
that the professional character and the social standing of the attorney in
determining the iniquity and unconscionableness of the attorney’s fees as
liquidated damages.
C. Applying Precedent
 The Court reviewed recent jurisprudence to determine whether the award of

liquidated damages were iniquitous or unconscionable. It also cited recent
jurisprudence in determining whether the stipulated liquidated damages were
unconscionable150
D. Proportionality Test
 It takes into account whether the damages were punitive or compensatory.
E. Necessity Test
HENRY DELA RAMA CO v. ADMIRAL UNITED SAVINGS BANK151
 The Court determined whether the liquidated damages were iniquitous and
unconscionable according to the necessity of awarding such damages as
indemnity or penalty. The Court allowed for both liquidated damages and
148
G.R.no.138677, February 12,2012
149
G.R.No.128833, April 20,1998
150
Citing Social Security v. Almeda
151
G.R.No.154740, April 16,2008
Page | 152
attorney’s fees even if the attorney’s fees were in the nature of liquidated
damages. A doctrinal issue, however, arose: If the stipulated amount of liquidated
damages by its own is unconscionable, any amount added to it is additional. Any
additional amount given in the concept of liquidated damages or as a form of
penalty is unsconscionable. Any amount awarded as attorney’s fees would be
unconscionable, yet damages were still awarded.
F. Where in Pari Delicto
SY v. COURT OF APPEALS152
 The Court tempered the liquidated damages because the other party also
committed the breach. A doctrinal issue also arose in this case, because if
damages are to be halved, as both parties were equally in breach, it makes no
sense to award damages.
G. Consider Actual Damages
 The Court considered the actual damages awarded to the nonbreaching party, and
tempered the stipulated damages, citing 2227 saying a court may very well take
into account the actual damages sustained by a creditor who was compelled to sue
the defaulting debtor, which actual damages would include the interest and
penalties the creditor may have had to pay on its own from its funding source.
VII. EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE
A. PURPOSE
Article 2229 Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
 Exemplary damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings

and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The theory is that
there must be highly reprehensible conduct by the defendant associated with
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence, or recklessness, oppression,
insult, or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies the injury; to punish outrageous
conduct.
 The imposition of exemplary damages is a means by which the State, through its
judicial arm, can send the clear and unequivocal signal best expressed in the pithy
but immutable phrase “never again”. It goes beyond the parties to the case as it
helps curb reprehensible conduct in society.
B. WHEN IMPOSED
1. In General
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
152
G.R.No.L-398853, August 17, 1983
Page | 153
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
2. In addition to Other Types
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before
the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to
the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
PNB v. COURT OF APPEALS153
 Exemplary damages are to be awarded in a breach of contract if the defendant

acted in a malicious, reckless, oppressive, insulting, or fraudulent manner.
Court deleted exemplary damages because though there was a breach of an
obligation to pay, there was no evidence it acted in malicious, reckless,
oppressive, insulting, or fraudulent manner. 2232 applies only in contracts and
quasi-contracts and that act must be accompanied by BF or done in a malicious,
reckless, oppressive, insulting, or fraudulent manner. Court here applied Art. 2232
to a case not based on a contract/quasi-contract.
Requirements for exemplary damages:
(1) Imposed in addition to compensatory damages;

(2) Cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
(3) Act must be done in bad faith (pertains only to actions based on contracts on
quasi-contracts.
3. Renunciation in Advance
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in

advance shall be null and void.
 The public interest function of exemplary damages is meant to serve as a deterrent

to similar acts in the future, there is a public interest element to the award, which
cannot be stipulated away by parties to a contract.
4. In Crimes
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
PEOPLE v. CATUBIG154
 The aggravating circumstance cannot be special in order to award exemplary

damages.
153
G.R. No.100630, April 2, 1996 (expropriation case)
154
G.R.No.137842, August 23, 2001
Page | 154
 The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. Unlike the
criminal which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. The
ordinary or qualifying nature of an AC is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender.
 The aggravating circumstances need to be alleged in the information so the Court

may award exemplary damages. It is in conjunction with the Sections 8 and 9 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE v. DIUNSAY-JALANDONI155
 The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot apply to crimes committed

before December 2000.
 The accused committed the crime on March 31, 2000. The retroactive application
of procedural rules cannot adversely affect the rights of the private offended party
that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said rules. The offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of the new rules and the civil liability already
incurred b appellant remains unaffected thereby.
PEOPLE v. DALISAY156
 An award of Exemplary Damage where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
 The Court held that exemplary damages may still be awarded based on 2230 if the
criminal case was instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules. This
statement was not completely accurate as the non-application of the rule applied
to cases instituted after the effectivity of the Revised rules. The Court held that it
can also award exemplary damage where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
PEOPLE v. DADULLA157
 The Court held that the established presence of one or two aggravating
circumstances of ANY kind or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary
damages under 2230 because the requirement of specificity in the information
affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The award
of damages is intended for the offended party who suffers thereby; the criminal
liability is the State’s concern. The crimes, however, were committed in 1998 or
prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
5. In Quasi-Delicts
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the

defendant acted with gross negligence.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE v. CORONADO158
 Gross negligence cannot be presumed.
155
G.R.No. 174277, February 8, 2007
156
G.R.No.188106, November 25, 2009
157
G.R.No.172321, February 9, 2011
158
G.R.No.85331, August 25,1989
Page | 155
 The Court found the bus driver grossly negligent in his reckless disregard of other
vehicles and their passengers and of pedestrians. Court however did not explain
why the driver’s negligence amounted to gross negligence; it is the duty of the
claimant to prove there was gross negligence on the part of the defendant in order
to be entitled to exemplary damages.
BALIWAG TRANSIT v. COURT OF APPEALS159
 The Court affirmed the award of exemplary damage when it found the bus driver
acted with gross negligence when he moved the bus without checking its brake
system. The Court however reduced exemplary damage without any explanation.
PHILTRANCO v. COURT OF APPEALS160
 The Court awarded exemplary damage upon finding gross negligence on the part
of the driver who jumpstarted his bus in an intersection.
6. In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award

exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
 There is no explicit rule which constitutes such manner though it is often

associated with bad faith. However, the Court held that failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence does not amount to any of the circumstances contemplated
in Art. 2232.
MUNSAYAC v. DE LARA161
 An employer, who is vicariously liable for the negligence of her employee, cannot
be held for exemplary damages on account of her actions subsequent to the breach
of contract.
 The owner refused to assist the plaintiff after her jeepney vehicles damaged the
latter. The court found it difficult to conceive how the defendant in a breach of
contract case could be held to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner within the meaning of 2232 for something he
did or did not do after the breach, which had no casual connection therewith. The
law does not contemplate a vicariously liable on his part: the breach is his as party
to the contract and so if he is to be held liable at all for exemplary damage by
reason of the wrongful act of his agent, it must be shown he had previously
authorized or knowingly ratified it, in effect making him a co-participant.
SINGAPORE AIRLINES v. FERNANDEZ162
The Court awarded exemplary damage after finding

(1) a clear breach of contract; and
(2) bad faith on the part of Singapore Airlines.
The court, however, did not explain why the petitioners acted in bad faith.
159
G.R.No.116624, September 20, 1996
160
G.R.No.120553, June 17,1997
161
G.R.No.L-21151, June 26, 1968
162
G.R.No.142305, December 10,2003
Page | 156

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. THE CONCEPT OF A TORT

1. TORT IN COMMON LAW

TORT is an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and

It is a legal wrong committed upon person or property independent of contract.

2. TORT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW

A. EXISTENCE OF PHILIPPINE TORT LAW

I. Intent of the framers

II. Civil Code Test

 limited to negligent act or omission and excludes willingness or intent

B. SCOPE OF PHILIPPINE TORT LAW

Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or

C. DEFINITION OF TORT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW

NAGUIAT vs. NLRC1

1. Duty - to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence;

3. PURPOSE OF TORT LAW

B. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI DELICT

FAUSTO BARREDO v. SEVERINO GARCIA AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO (1942)5

 Head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro

 Doctrines: Quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution

PEDRO ELCANO, ET AL., V. REGINAL HILL ET AL. (1977)

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the

NATIVIDAD ANDAMO, ET AL., v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL.

FACTS: Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built

ISSUE: Whether or not there is quasi-delict even if done in private property

 Whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS8

PORFIRIO P. CINCO v. HON. MATEO CANONOY ET AL. (1979)9

NATIVIDAD v. ANDAMO, ET AL., V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET

FACTS: Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built

ISSUE: Whether or not there is quasi-delict even if done in private property.

HELD: YES. All the Elements of a Quasi-delict are Present, to wit:

 Whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT AND QUASI-DELICT

QUASI-DELICT is HOMOLOGOUS BUT NOT IDENTICAL to tort under the

 Anglo-American or common law concept: TORT is broader than culpa aquiliana

 In Philippines legal system (envision by the commission responsible for the

D. QUASI-DELICT AND DELICT

1. Distinguishing Quasi-Delict and Delict

BASIS QUASI-DELICT DELICT OR CRIME

BARREDO V. GARCIA, Supra

2. Overlap Between Quasi-Delict and Delict

BARREDO v. GARCIA, Supra

ELCANO V. HILL, Supra

ANDAMO V. IAC, Supra

L.G. FOODS V. PHILDELFA10

ISSUE: Was there a cause of action on the part of the petitioner?

E. CULPA AQUILIANA AND CULPA CONTRACTUAL

1. Distinguishing Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual

BASIS CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CONTRACTUAL

CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD, Supra

QUASI-DELICT and CULPA CONTRACTUAL: DIFFERENCE

Culpa Contractual - culpa is considered as an accident in the performance of an

Culpa Contractual – Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient

FGU INSURANCE V. SARMIENTO11

C. APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

The Doctrine of Proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,

D. DEFENSE OF EMPLOYER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE

CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD, Supra

 Breach of contract of common carrier and negligence of Manila Railroad

ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable for moral damages?