KANT
AND
HIS INFLUENCE
Edited by
George MacDonald Ross
and
Tony McWalter
Ww
THOEMMESPublished by
‘Thoemmes Antiquatian Books Ltd
185 Park Street, Bristol BSI 52)
1990 Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ld
All sights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, oF transmitted in
any way oF by any means, electronic, mechanical,
Photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written
permission of the copyright holder
Bh Library Caaloguing in Publication Data
Kaan is inflence
1" German phosphy. Kant, Inmanvel, 1724-1804
I. MacDonald Roe, George i. MeWalr, Tomy
198
ISBN 1 85506 072 8
‘Typeset by Mayhew Typesetting, Bristol
Printed by Athenaeum Press, Newcastle upon Tyne
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
“OUGHT? IMPLIES “CAN: KANT AND
LUSHER, A CONTRAST
Roger M. White
‘CONFUSED PERCEPTIONS, DARKENED
CONCEPTS: SOME FEATURES OF
KANTS LEIBNIZ-CRITIQUE
Catherine Wilson
THOUGHT AND SENSIBILITY IN
LEIBNIZ, KANT AND BRADLEY
Guy Stock
SORIGINAL NONSENSE’: ART. AND.
GENIUS IN KANT'S AESTHETIC
Peter Lewis
FICHTE, BECK AND SCHELLING IN
KANT'S OPUS POSTUMUM
Eckart Forster
73
126
146wi Contents
IMAGINATION AS A CONNECTING
MIDDLE IN SCHELLING'S
RECONSTRUCTION OF KANT
Joho Llewelyn
‘THE EARLY RECEPTION OF KANT
THOUGHT IN ENGLAND 1785-1805
Giuseppe Micheli
HAMILTON'S READING OF KANT: A
CHAPTER IN THE EARLY SCOTTISH
RECEPTION OF KANT'S THOUGHT
Manfred Kucha
ASPECTS OF KANT'S INFLUENCE ON
BRITISH THEOLO
Donald Mackinnon
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
INDEX OF NAMES
170
202
ais
348
367
m
INTRODUCTION
George MacDonald Ross and Tony MeWaler
The papers in this volume were originally delivered at 2
conference held atthe University of Leeds in April 1990,
‘The conference was organized by the British Society for
the History of Philosophy, one of che aims of which is to
promote a broader and more scholarly approach to the
Srudy of the history of philosophy than has generally
bbeen“charactrisic of philosophers in the analytic tradi-
tion, In particular, it was felt that, at least in England,
00 litle attention was being paid to Kant and the post-
Kantian philosophy of the nineteenth century; and itis
‘no accident that nearly all the contributors are from
Seatland or abroad.
‘The fist four papers are primatily concerned with the
interpretation of various aspects of Kant’s philosophy,
bb setting him firmly in a historical context. The order
in which they appear represents a gradual shift in
‘emphasis from his connections with earlier thinkers 10
‘comparisons with subsequent developments.
Roger M. White's paper, ““Ought” implies “Can”:
Kant and Luther, a Contrast, is untypical of the collee-
tion as a whole, in as much as his stance on. this
particular issue is untepentantly anci-Kantian. White
Argues that although Kant does not explicitly mention
Luther, he must have been aware of the opposition
between his ovn position and Luther's a debere ad posseih Introduction
nom valet consequentia (ought does not imply ‘can’) =
bur to have made this explicie would have brought him
into conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities, White
provides a detailed and critical analysis of what Kant
may have meant by “Ought implies ‘Can’, and of how he
might have argued for his position, He lays particular
stress on the paradoxical consequences of Kant’s
complete divorce between the absolutely free rational
will, and the causally determined empirical self. He then
compares Kant’ approach with that of Luther, and con-
cludes that Kant, like Erasmus before him, made the
mistake of putting the question of praise or blame before
that of the nature of the good life and how, if at all, i
‘ean be attained
Two authors concerned with Kant's metaphysics have
focused on his relations with Leibniz. If it was Hume
‘who awoke Kant from his dogmatic shimbers, it was
Leibniz. who provided the main starting-point for his
critical philosophy. Catherine Wilson's paper, “Confused
Perceptions, Darkened Concepts: Some Features of
Kant’s Leibniz-critique’, wll prove a useful corrective for
those in the Anglo-American tradition who think of the
Leibnizian stains in Kant’s work as an embarrassment oF
fan unnecessary encumbrance, It helps us to ascertain
how ambivalent Kant’s positon was, and how crucial itis
for us t0 recognize this ambivalence if we are to under-
‘stand the critical philosophy propery. Wilson focuses on
Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz’s notion of confused percep
tion. She maintains that i is by |o means clear that Leb
niz saw concepts and perceptions as differing only in
degree (the former being ‘distinc’, the later ‘confused’,
and that it is paradoxical to accuse him of failing 10
distinguish phenomena and noumena ~ although some of
his followers were indeed guilty of such confusions. In
his later weitings, Kant acknowledged che possiblity of a
Introduction ix
Platonic interpretation of Leibniz, in which phenomena and
roumena ate sharply distinguished; and Wilson suggests
that Kant himself was troubled by the claims of noumena
to be over or behind the appearances in some way.
{in “Thought and Sensbiity in Leibniz, Kant and
Bradley’, Guy Stock starts out from Whitehead’s dictum
that "Kant, in his final metaphysics, must either retreat
to Leibniz, or advance to Bradley’. He concentrates on the
connected problems of the relation berween thought and
individual reality, and of the distinction between the
factual and the merely possible. Leibniz resolved the
former through his privative account of sensibility and his
doctrine of the individual as an infima species, but he
failed to distinguish adequately between the actual and
merely possible words. Kant, on the other hand, made a
sharp separation between thought and sensibility, and
‘maintained that the actual world isthe one which is given
in empirical intuition. Bradley rejected both Leibnir's
account of sensibility, and) Kant’s epistemological
dualism, together with the consequential doctrine of the
thing-intselt. However, the resultant metaphysical
system was closer to Leibnia’s than 10 Kane's,
Peter Lewis's paper, "Original Nonsense”: Arc and
Genius in Kan’'s Aesthetic’, aims to identify what Kant
means by “original nonsense in the context of his discus-
sion of art and genius in The Critique of Aesthetic Judge
tment. Lewis argues that Kane's preat insight Is that works
fof artistic genius, im virtue of being original and
‘exemplary, are essentially embedded in traditions
‘constituted by works of art, Works of genius provide
rules to be followed in the work of non-genias, and set
standards of excellence for the work of future genius.
In the course of the paper, Lewis draws attention to
significant similarities between the views of Kant and
‘Witagenstein on genius and taste in at.x Introduction
The remainder ofthe paper in the volume are con
cerned more history with Rants dea nar Oo
subsequent thinkers in aos Gniplines and counts
fast, with sexi nfoene in Geman. Fehr Forte
is carey preparing am Engl edn of Kans Opes
Postnum, &machneested werk in whch Kant del
wih he anton fom the metaphyi foundaton of
‘aural scence to phys Pete, Beck and Selig
in Kats Opus postman, Foster deeb the it ad
Content of the work, and angus that conse a
Sigulan revision of Rants cia poston, I the
Op postu there are retraces wo Pee Bek nd
Scheting who wee flower of Kt. Some scars
ve claimed thatthe changes in Ken's poston ere
dco ther infuence Aer examining the eden
Foeser condudes that Kant may have fer infeed
by Schling and Beck (hough not by Fe ba hae
‘Nowghs were in any ce youn in much the aime
Girton a ti
Im his paper, mapinaion as 2 Connecting Mile in
Scheling! Reconstruction "af Kant, John lewsyn
concentrate on Schelings development ofthe Keen
oneept of imagination at the "conecing. me
berween theory and practice. ‘Aer dering, Kans
sccaun of imagination, Leven anaes the ailernce
made to Kants crs eam by Schelings dai hat
wre have non-dacusive inlecnal constuction
wel sr empiil cuton, The focus shit from the
‘laonhipbeweenphionpiy and mathemati to tat
Berween pinoy andar and Sehling een he
connecting mile henween Kant and Hetegger
"To tm o Brin, i emarable how small 2 role
Kant thought hat played the ineletual eof
the Englsvipeaking’ philosophies! won, The last
thre pape wll pact of the sory of this neler
Introduction xi
However any dicusion ofthe hor of picnophial
‘askin sheen and inn eta
me pret» shaip ston oswecn Engand
we Soaks ens pilsophy war way
Shc st an uct aig sri oy
Sede sting te rend ao "he meet
sy sath pisos cbt ase wat cated
Ista mide te uersy worl nay bead
jets n Sots coma loupe ie
scaamong ie scaly war anderped byt
sae tacalum whch ha plop #8
tor ee Dale, The Demon lec)
is Se enusive say The Early Recep of Kans
renin Elan 1748-1805 spe Mh
abe may on eves and ail eae
Mt ete wendaton an sommeman a
seta between ths yes The pcre pana
Bee ee hwo tees Ka
ibephy, and even ee unending of ce
ee Rea ced may to poll writes
Sheet tear at eouragng he lowe
te the ead pols rd ga be
ear aes ye tum oft ctr eentng
Tpreion and Cnoraip owes cana om he
eam’ paca ul op tote wy oR work
Wah th ouepion of Coleg, Kant oman oe
Soak Engh tinker he 130
‘ts the el ecapion of Kani Solin,
dee Kann his "Hamfons Resin of Rane A
aimee nthe Bay Scott Recon kan
Tease, hows hay espe the wyrnd Ine
cary amt wets mere fn uneraoed hry
Sey fever tan hey mere Enlai The comenso
Saver a i iia Hao (1788086) as
ete Seo pilwopher tobe sbnanoayii Introduction
influenced by Kant. Kuehn argues that, although
Hamilton had an intimate knowledge of Kant’s texts, he
‘was in fact quite hostile to his ideas, and much less
influenced by him than has generally been supposed.
Finally, in his paper "Aspects of Kant’s Influence on
British Theology’, Donald MacKinnon stresses that
the pivot of Kant’s influence lies in his doctrine of
the primacy of practical reason. He criticizes the view
‘of Kant as the "philosopher of Protestantism’, and he
displays his influence on a wide range of British
theologians from different denominations. MacKinnon
concludes that Kane's influence did not eake the form of
slavish imitation, but of conversion of his insights 10
uses he could not have foreseen, and of which he might
ot have approved
‘The papers in this volume give only a taste of Kant’s
range of interests and of his influence, There is ample
scope for a series of conferences and accompanying
volumes. covering his influence at different periods,
in different countries, and in different disciplines. In
particular, there is the issue of the revival of interest,
im his philosophy in Britain in che 1830s, and the sub-
Sequent decline in any fundamental inluence of his
thought during the twentieth century. This raises the
‘question of whether Kant’s philosophy deserves eo be
‘more influential
The Europe of 1989 shared with the Europe of 1789
the distinction of heralding a new political order. The
year 1989 was one of progressive and. democratically
orientated revolution, and the influence of German
culture is an issue for us in the later part of the twen
tieth century as it was an issue in the latter part of the
eighteenth, What Kant offers is the prospect of a world=
view which portrays the ethical as fundamental to
politics; and he provides an account of human nature
Introduction ie
which atleast makes posible an ethical commonseath
“Thee concerns are relevant not merely tothe poles of
the lve twentieth cenury, Dut to politi theory in
mera
Cents thesis that human nature is so constituted that
an chia commonwealth spose ive grovnded on
metaphysis. He sought to produce a Welanchauung In
thick epstemalogy i logically rir to eth in thai
trust prepare the ground for 4 philosophally defensible
ets, tin wh hs el pray pr
epistemology, because the developmen of an adequate
‘ponemology ist nk ser by te ages poo? (Van det
inden: p10), For Kant, epistemology and ethics,
tr more generally philosophical theory and rans, are
inextricably iterewined
it has long been ashionable for intellectuals in the
Betis trait told wha one a il ode view
{of pilosophy, Invgral to this tei he ies tha, while
nce al knowledge was the province of philosophy, the
History of ts subsequent development 18 a history of
fubjectsemancipatng, themes from ther
Sisclines. Ever preter specialization and ever greater
fxpertse is required. for work atthe frontiers of
nowedge, The modest ew has tha, a subjects shit
from philosophy. they develop thei own methods, and
arte knowledgebase becomes ever pester, 50 the held
for philosophy conwact and becomes more foused.
Some have let thatthe philosophical residuum forthe
fwentith century hae been the analyss of Knguistic
Expressions, whi others have gone so fr ato maintain
Ghat liguisc analysis can telf be bived of, 50 tha
toting remain forte philosophers co study other than
the thesis hat philosophers have nahin to sty. If such
Snceptons of philosophy were to remanasendant, then
there would be no serios fare for the subject.iv Introduction
‘There is, however, a brighter prospect. While itis true
that the knowledge industry grows ever mote volumi-
nous, it is also true that we have become ever more
‘conscious of the limitations which the fragmentation of
knowledge has engendered. Often the most exciting
work, the search for solutions to pressing theoretical and
practical problems, involves thinking at the frontier
between two of more disciplines, What is needed is just
the sort of overview of a whole problem area which
philosophers have traditionally sought to attain, Reflec:
tion on the limitations of the methods used to acquire
knowledge in particular disciplines can make us humble
about the attainability of absolute truth; but ie can also
make us realize the importance of approaching problems
from a different direction, or of setting up new forms of
enquiry,
Prominent English-speaking philosophers have mai
tained that philosophy provides no answers: but to adopt
this as a motto for general philosophical practice is a
recipe forthe long-term decay of philosophy. leis entirely
reasonable for the public to ask what sorts of problems
4 philosophical training enables one to tackle. We should
not be seduced by the frequent demand for yes-or-no,
answers where these are inappropriate; but we must be
willing at least to say what kinds of judgement are
cultivated by a philosophical training. If we believe th
the philosopher's judgement is more widely informed,
mote objective, based on sounder reasoning, and less
bound by the presuppositions of partcslar disciplines,
than that of the on-philosopher, then we must
emphasize that philosophy is not just a pleasant, abstract
pastime, but a practical and useful activity, the diminy-
tion or absence of which would impoverish society in
multifarious ways.
‘The claim chat philosophy must be practi
as well as
Introduction xv
theoretical isa thoroughly Kantian ideal; and it is
testimony tothe limited influence Kane has had in Britain
that it should still be necessary co plead the case. Ifthe
‘case is accepted, it follows that philosophy should play a
far more central role in the educational curriculum =
role it used to play in Scotland, and which it still plays
in most of the continent of Europe.
Kant himself regarded the whole of human knowledge
as the province of the philosopher, and in presenting this,
book we hope to do something to rehabilitate the view
that philosophers should be concerned with the full range
fof intellectual and practical problems facing mankind,
His life's work is aot simply an episode in the history of,
philosophy, but a rich resource from which we can derive
Taspiation for the future development of philosophy as
an academic discipline
Bibliography
Davie, George E., The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her
Universes ithe Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh Unive
sity Press: Edinburgh, 1961
Kantian Ethics and. Socialism‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’:
KANT AND LUTHER,
A CONTRAST
Roger M. White
‘The aim of this essay is to examine a central idea of
Kane's moral philosophy by setting it in the context of 3
radically opposed set of ideas ~ the ideas which inform
the thinking of Martin Luther; in particular, the early
Luther of The Disputation against Scholastic Theology
and The Heidelberg Disputation, together with the post:
tions that he develops in the famous controversy with
Erasmus. For, ifthe idea chat ‘Ought’ implies ‘Can? (that
‘we may infer from the fact that we aught to do some:
thing that we are able to do it) has centeal structural
significance in Kant’s whole moral thought, the directly
‘opposed idea a Debere ad Posse mom valet comequentia
is equally fundamental in Luther's thought.
How far, in doing this, Iam setting Kant in a
historical context is impossible to determine. For in those
places where one would most naturally look fora diseus-
sion of Luther ~ Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone and The Dispute of the Faculties ~ Luther is not
‘explicitly referred to, and even if that which Kant calls
‘ecclesiastical faith’ has distinctly Lutheran features at
‘many points, its named representatives - above all,
Spener and others from the Lutheran pitist tradition ~2 Kant and Hie influence
are closer to Kant than to Luther on many of the key
issues that confront us here, Given the sheer extent of
Kant’s writings, I cannot say for certain that he never
‘expliciay discusses Luther, o even that he was conscious
‘of Luther's theological positions other than through the
frequently distorting glass of pietism. But, in view of
Kane's eeligious background and upbringing, he must
clearly have been familiar, if not with Luther's own
Wetings, at least with texts such as the Heidelberg
Catechism with its formative influence on the pietst
movement, and therefore, it seems, would have to be
conscious of the extent ro which he was putting forward
positions that were indirect conflict with the theologians
of the classical Reformation. For instance, in the
Heidelberg Catechism we find:
‘Question 8: Are we then so depraved that we are
utterly incapable of performing any good work and are
inclined to all that is evil?
Yes: unless it be that we are born again by the sprit
of God,
in chat in His law He requires of him what he cannot
perform?
No: for God has so created man that he is capable
‘of performing the good; but, by the instigation of che
evil and through wilful disobedience, man has
yposhes! nothing but subjective conditions but, in conse-
‘quence, it can be known in advance of experience, of
prion, (i) that any possible object as it appears to inner
Sense willbe locatable in time and stand in temporal rela-
tions of certain general sorts and (i) that any possible
dbject as it appears to outer sense will be locatable in
space and stand in spatial relations of certain general
‘Objects as they appear to outer sense are not as such
ih ae 1525; eB -P0 ne ete ison nt 1 be
ed ws pp ich pec tee ofthese yf
‘Thought and Sensibility in Leibwis, Kant and Bradley 11S
subject 10 the form of inner sense but since any intuition
‘or representation whatsoever, outer or inner, must ise
bbe am inner state of some subject, objets of outer sense
will of necessity appear in a subject's experiences not
merely as in space but also as subject to temporal deter-
Apart from the well-known argument from the syn-
thetic @ priori nature of geometical propositions” the
‘motivation for Kant’s account of space and time, and our
knowledge of i, it seems to me, comes primarily from
the difficulties he located in Leibnia’s account ofthe rela-
tion between thought and sensibility. These difficulties he
recounts explicitly in “The Amphiboly of Concepts of
Reflection’.” Buc itis very dificult co sort out the real
dificulties in this section since the very notion of an
amphiboly of a concept of reflection (if | understand it
correctly) just presupposes the structure of Kant’,
epistemological theory. Transcendental reflection is
‘concerned with the relations which objects have t0 one
another in virtue of the relation they have to our dual
cognitive faculties, i.e, to sensibility and to understanding,
construed as radically disparate faculties, A tanscen-
dental amphiboly consists. in the “confounding of an
object of pure understanding with appearance’. So the
source of Leibniz’s errors is in general his confounding
appearances, oF objects of sensibility, with objects of
pure understanding, with snteligibilia
1k seems impossible to evaluate the force of Kans
derailed criticisms of Leibniz when they are formulated
A 'S5)8 6h migh ae be dha Kasil
count tpce a tine wat, tne, ony wk Ne116 Kant and His Influence
within the framework of Kant’s own epistemology. How-
‘ever, thete does appear ro be an internal incoherence in
Leibnia’s system which in a general way Kant'serticisms
point toward. Ir is in essence the well-known problem
Which Leibniz himself ar times was worried about =
namely that of giving a satisfactory account of con-
tingeney and freedom." This also relates to the problem
of giving an account ofthe difference between the actual
and the merely possible.
Leibniz himsell concluded that each individual sub-
stance, like Aquinas’ angels, must be a species infima.™
“Moreover, even possible individuals must have complete
concepts, f€, concepts sufficient to determine all their
characteristics and their positions in infinitely complex
possible Universes, The constituents of these possible
Universes, as Leibniz puts it, all tend toward existence
according to the degree of their perfection." However,
merely possible Universes do not depend for their natures
fon God's will. Ex bypothest God exercised his will simply
in choosing to create, from the infinity of possible
Universes, the best of them. But what difference could
God's act of creation conceivably have made to that possi
ble Universe? On Leibniz’s account there is no room for 2
sensible, or non-ineligible, difference between the actual
and the merely possible (as there is for Kant’s actual
phenomenal world and his mercly possible Universes the
‘actual isthe one given in empirical intuition}. Ofcourse, 25.
just pointed out, there is, for Leibniz, an intelligible
difference between the actual and the possible~ namely is
degree of perfection ~ but, unfortunately, that isnot the
kind of difference that can conceivably depend on God's
will.
|
Thought and Sensibility in Lebmis, Kant and Bradley 117
‘The incoherence of Kan’s notion of a thingimiself
provides Bradley with a solficent reason for rejecting
"Teanscendental Idealism.
Te would be much as if we said, ‘Since all my faculties
ate coally confined to my garden, 1 cannot tell if the
roses next door ate in flower.’ And this seems inconsis-
tent. ... Ifthe theory were really tue, then it must
be impossible, There is no reconciling our knowledge
‘ofits truth with that general condition which exist
For Bradley it isa fundamental precept that no satisfactory
metaphysics can divide appearance ~ what we experience
and know in the activities of our everyday lives ~ from
reality, What we know and experience exists and what
exists must belong to reality. As he puts it: “The assertion
of 2 reality falling outside knowledge, is quite non-
sensical’. At least Leibnie is not guilty of that error. But,
of course, Bradley would not accept Leibnir’s account of,
‘how appearances belong to reality: namely, by courtesy of
4 reator God and an infinite plurality of essentially active
individual substances which represent the Universe with
varying degrees of adequacy and confusion,
There are three features of Bradley's account of
thought that I wish to draw attention to. Firstly, like
Kant but unlike Leibni, for Bradley sentient experience
is not to be seen as merely privative: it plays a quite
fundamental role. If anything, for Bradley, thought is
“EH tad, Eoye on Toth and Ret (Caen: One, 191,118 Kant and His Influence
the inadequate partner. Secondly, Bradley rejects what
might be called the determinateness of sense’: in other
words, for Bradley there are ultimately no judgemental
contents, or propositions, which are uncondivionaly true
‘or unconditionally false.” Leibni’s realism would have
required this possiblity, and Kant’s empirical realism
‘would have required it to be possible with respect to our
judgements about phenomenal objects. This second
point, although very important, | will simply mention
here, "What it can be seen as ruling out is a radically
‘ruth-functional account of the relation between thought
and realty of the kind posited in logical atomism.
"Thirdly, Bradley admits that our thought when exer-
ised, for example, in relation to objects in space and
time, necessarily proceeds by means of the ‘machinery of
terms and relations." In other words, it will of
necessity involve an application of those concepts which
Kane regards as categories. However, Bradley argues
that, because these concepts are internally incoherent, the
metaphysician cannot allow that reality could be as it
necessarily appears in our empirical thought
‘A grasp of this argument 1s, of course, essential co
understanding Bradley's metaphysics. However, for
present purposes, I wish to concentrate on the role of
Immediate experience and its relation to discursive
thought in Bradley's philosophy.
‘Asis well known, Bradley, as much a5 Frege, was an
anti-psyehologise with respect to logic.” So far 38 logic
is concerned there is nothing. psychological about the
ideal contents that we refer f0, oF (t0 use Bradley's
abt ne ri of te Caran Oso, 9671 ape
"oneal Mp
Te Od ea Pinay of £8 tty Conn
os, Mi aes To gen 6 oh ps 8.
Thought and Sensibility n Lebnis, Kant and Bradley 119
alternative expression) predicate of, realty in our acts of
judgement. The ideal contents that we predicate of
reality and which we understand when people
‘communicate their judgements to one another by means
fof declarative sentences must be what Bradley cals,
“universal meanings’ or, “universals."° And. although
Bradley is well aware of the necessity of syntactical, or
symthetic, complexity in the ideal contents of our
judgements he nevertheless argues that in a sense any
judgement is to be regarded as having but one idea.
Even if we take for example an analytic judgement of
sense i.e. a judgement expressed by a declarative
sentence containing indexical demonstratves like ‘I have
toothache now’) the ideal content of the judgement
must be a universal. The sentence can, in effect, be
regarded as a single general term since identically’ the
same ideal content, or meaning, can be used on
indefinitely many different occasions, in indefinitely
many different judgements, in relation to indefinitely
many different facts.
However, Bradley argues that the ultimate logical
subject of which the ideal content in a judgement is
predicated, and in virtue of which, in so far as itis true,
the judgement is true (in other words that which he uses
the dummy name 'R’ to refer t0 in his formulae for the
‘general form of a judgement, "Ris such that S is P*)
‘Cannot itself be an ideal content.”
Here we might see a version of the problem that Kant
saw in Leibni’s system arising again. If the ideal oF
communicable content of any possible judgement is
Sad section
SIR tte 7p
ot od 9p. nt tn 8, 4a esion120 Kant and His Influence
universal and yet the ultimate subject of predication of
any judgement, ie. reality, is necessarily individual, how
can our thought succeed in relating unambiguously to
reality? Bradley gives a version of what seems to be the
only kind of answer possible to this question ~ a version
Of the kind of answer supplied, in very different ways, by
Kant’s notion of empirical intuition and (10 use an exam-
ple from a theory of knowledge contemporary with
Bradley's) Russell's notion of acquaintance in sensation,
If the ideal, or conceptual, content of our judgements is
to be able to relate unambiguously to the individual it
must somehow be underpinned by an immediate, ic.
non-ideal, non-coneeptual, mode of cognition. In other
‘words, it must be underpinned by a mode of immediate
experience,
Now the question arises: how is this mode of
immediate experience to be construed? Clearly, for
Bradley, it cannot be interpreted as Kant construed it:
namely a relation between a subject (qua thing-invtslf)
fand objects (qua things-inthemselves); nor as. Russell
fame to construe sensation in the atomism of his Lectures
fom Logical Atomism, namely 35 a relation between
2 momentary subject and momentary sensedata"*
Bradley's postive account of the nature of immediate
experience is not easy to characterize briefly. I will do my
best
In Bradley's epistemology our waking sense perceptions
play a fundamentally important role in our knowledge,
For convenience at this point we can again concentrate
fon the waking experience of normal adule human beings
who; like ourselves, have mastery of a natural language
like English. Also, for ease of exposition, I will use ~ as
LEB Bt ae od Koln, RC, Mah sd Uri:
‘Thought and Sensibility m Lebmis, Kant and Bradley 121
Bradley often docs in similar contexts ~ the first person
singular form of expression, But for Bradley this should
not be taken to imply privacy of a Cartesian sort in the
‘objects of knowledge.
“The world chat I wil regard in a fundamental way 2s my
real world (or the world of actual fact), Bradley argues,
willbe the world that I can, at each waking moment, think
‘of 38 a unique spatio-temporal syste of unlimited extent
‘containing my body and the objects 1 can currently
perceive around it. I will think of this world as, for
example, containing not only every presently existing
human being but every actual human being who ever has,
‘or ever will, exist. This world, 5 I make it an object of my
thought at any moment, will be, what Bradley calls, an
‘deal construction, It will, in other words, be an inten-
tional abject identified in terms ofa complex ideal content
predicated of reality in judgement. Or, to put it another
‘way, realty will appear, or be present, in ideal form in the
contents of my present thoughts and Sense perceptions as
an object of a certain sort ~ namely a spatiosemporally
‘extended system containing (among indefinitely much els)
all actual human beings.
‘Now, with what justification do I think of my real
world (ie. this world containing my body and the index-
really demonstrable objects I an see and point to around
my body now) as being, as it surely must be, unique?
Bradley argues that there is nothing in the idea of
spatio-temporally extended system which excludes the
logical possibilty of the existence of an indefinite series
cof qualitatively similar spatio-temporally extended series
Sspatio-temporally unelated to one another. The ideal122 Kant and His influence
content that I predicate of reality when I think of objects
existing in my real world is like any other ideal content
universal and as such cannot guarantee its own
uniqueness of application. So Bradley is arguing that we
have no right co take our ideas of space and time to have
(in Kantian fashion) a special cognitive status ~ to be
ure intuitions ~ and thus to be guaranteed, by defini.
tion, uniqueness in their objects
‘As Bradley concludes ina very important passage from
the Principles of Logie:
Ie is not by its quality as a temporal event or
phenomenon of space, that the given is unique. It is
lunique, not because it has a certain character, but
because it i given. Ic is by the reference of our series
to the real, a8 it appears direcly within this point of
contact, oF indirectly in the element coatinuous with
this point, that these series become exclusive.”
Bradley's point is at follows, If employ the framework
of ideas in terms of which I think of my teal world I will
necessarily, and for ordinary purposes quite properly,
think of my sense perceptions, thoughts and so on,
themselves as dateable events of, as successive states, in
‘my personal psychical history. But 1 will then be prone
to think of the uniqueness of my perceptions, thoughts
and s0 on, as being a function of their occurrence ~ thei
boeing caused - at determinate positions ina unique
spatiostemporal series, However, to do this within the
‘context of epistemology and metaphysics, according t0
Bradley, is a mistake. To think of the uniqueness of my
perceptions and thoughts, as being « function of their
positions in unique spatio-temporal scree i to get it the
‘wrong way round. On Bradley's view i isthe uniqueness
Pm of Lop econ 22.64,
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‘Thought and Sentblty im Leibniz, Kant and Bradley 123
of these perceptions now as immediate experiences (not
as items existing in a uniquely actual spatio-temporal and
causally interrelated nexus) which enables me 10 identify
in thought my teal world and distinguish it from other,
non-actual, spatiotemporal series of which I can
think. *
Reality is present in ideal form in the contents of these
perceptions “now, and in my logically interrelated
thoughts, a8 2 unique spatioxemporally extended system
fof objects and events. But these perceptions and thoughts,
ddo not merely have communicable ideal concents. They
willbe items in an indefinitely complex centre of
jmmediate, non-relational experience or feeling. On
Bradley’s view, such centres of immediate experience are
to be taken as epistemologically basic. And ic isin virtue
fof my present perceptions being. unique ites in such
centre that I'am able to distinguish in choughe my real
world (ie. the one containing the intentional objects of
these immediately felt perceptions and thoughts) from
other thinkable non-actual series.
‘According to Bradley's epistemology and metaphysics
i isin such finite ceneees of experience, which cannot be
‘thought of as locatabe in any particular spatio-temporal
series, that reality (i.e. the ultimate genuinely individual
subject of our judgements) is immediately present;
moreover, it isin virtue of being items in such a centre
‘of immediate experience that my present perceptions and.
thoughts themselves are (a) unique and (b) provide,
through their ideal contents, my fundamental point of
cognitive contact with reality.
‘Thus characterized, the notion of a finite centre is no
vtec SEB. Tes Min and Rese Now, Wa124 Kant and His Influence
doube a difficult one co grasp.” But, as TS. Eliot
‘suggested, finite centres can be thought of as in many
ways analogous to Leibniz’s monads."” Like monads
they are ‘gradable’ ~ from merely sentient to rational and
self-conscious ~ nom-relational eentres of experience, And
at lease part of whar the latter means is that they are not
to be construed as deriving thei individuality from being
‘externally related, and in particular from being causally
intertelated, within 2 spatio-temporally extended system
fof existents, So a finite centre of experience is (i) that
within which the ultimate, genuinely individual, subject
of all our judgements (true and false) is immediately
present and (it) that within which che genuinely
individual can appear more or less adequately in ideal
form (and thus be known more or les adequately depen-
ding on the coherence and comprehensiveness ofthe ideal
contents exercised)” as a. spatio-temporaly extended
system of causally interrelated and enduring. objects,
animate and inanimate. However, finite centres are not
themselves to be construed as ultimate subjects of predi
cation. They ate that in which the genuinely individual is
present both immediately and in ideal form and thus they
are not themselves to be consteued as genuinely indivi-
dual
Reality, then, for Bradley, is not to be construed (like
Kant’sthings-in-themselves are) as something other than,
for transcendent to, an indefinite muleipliciy of finite
centres of sentient experience.** But the finite centres of
‘on Truth nd Reavy, XIV. Mae the Rel Jos Cath
SP Mal dey ae Canes Tr Monit, XX¥1
Thought and Sensibility im Leonie, Kant and Bradley 125
experience themselves are not 0 be construed (like Leib-
nit's monads) as. genuine individuals. Theit mode of
existence can ultimately be merely adjectival. But ic isin
and through the activities of finite centres of experience
alone that the genuinely individual (ehe Absolute) can
exist and realize itself
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Brae. FA. Piles of Loge (Clarendon: Ono, 1967) Vols
Beale. EH. Appearance and Realy (Clarendon: Oxf
Kant 1 Crue of Pore Reason, rat N- Kemp Sih
Tendon, 1368).
ews, Ds ‘Anim and Aci’, Nous, Vo, 4 (1970)
Lecmice," Lote). Phonopcal Papers and’ Levers (Rid
‘Dandie, 1976.
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‘bon: Onto, 1984
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1968).
The Philosophy of FH. Bradley (Clem‘ORIGINAL NONSENSE’:
ART AND GENIUS IN
KANT’S AESTHETIC
Peter Lewis,
‘The words ‘original nonsense’ are taken from §46 of the
Critique of Aesthetic Judgment in which Kant examines
the nature of genius in relation to art, Kant offers no
explanation of his use of the term ‘nonsense’; atleast, he
does notin che immediate context ofits fist appearance.
He uses ie again in §50, almost atthe end of the discus”
sion of genius, but again without any definite elucidation,
Most commentators, though nor all, tend to repeat Kant’
usage without comment, while subjecting almost every
‘other concept in Kant’s argument o exhaustive scrutiny.
‘This practice suggests that what Kant means strikes most
people as obvious, though so far as I can ell unsinn is
‘an unusual term for Kant to use at all, lt alone in the
third Critique. OF course, it cannot be understood
without considering the other terms in Kane's discussion
‘of art and genius: my hope is cha i will be enlightening
to confront them with questions about nonsense,
According to Ernst Cassrer, Kant’s account of genius
stands ‘atthe crostroads ofall aesthetic discussions in the
eighteenth century’* Two of the roads in question here
"Kant Le ond Thong ae Univer Pre: New Hee, 1980-9320
126
Aviad Genin in Kant Aesthetic 127
are the neo-classical emphasis on the rules of art and the
Tomantic notion of genius as ‘a power of producing
cexcellencies, which are out of the reach of the rules of
fart? Kant’s presentation of the problem in §46 reflecs
his view of judgements of taste argued for earlier, that
the judgement that something is beautiful is an aesthetic
rather than a logical judgement (51); that is, i concerns
an individual's response to an object as opposed to an
ttibution of a property to an object. In judging that
Something is beautiful, [do not subsume the object under
2 concept, I do not apprehend the object in accordance
‘with a rule for the application of a peedicate. Rather, the
determining ground of such 2 judgement is a feeling of
pleasure resulting from the harmonious fre play of the
cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding.
Judgements of taste, then, ate not determinable by
concepts (535); of, as Kant sometimes puts it, “There can
é. be no rule according to which any one is to be
compelled to recognize anything as beautiful’ (58)."
‘This analysis runs into a problem when Kant considers
the nature of art. For works of art ate artefacts, which
‘means to Kant that they are made in accordance with
rules for the achievement of an end or goal specified in
terms of a concept, and that in our appreciation of chem
we must recognize them as such, as works made for some
tend or goal, This leads to a dilemma: either we estimate
works of art as works, in which case we violate the
conditions for judging things to be beautiful, or we judge
artworks to be beautiful, in which case we violate the
conditions for estimating them as artefacts, 28 works of
1. Reed in Dicom Arty Roert R, Wk (oh (Yale Une
rot: Now en, 9H p96
gles acl kero alates ae om LC. Mee on of
‘he Cony udp (Caenon Onrd 96)128 Kant and His bfluence
art. Kant resolves the dilemma by employing the notion
fof genius. Works of fine art are products of genius, and
‘genius is the innate mental aptitude throwgh which
nature gives the rule co ar (§46). Having introduced this
definition, Kant raises the question whether i is adequate
to the concept usually associated with the word ‘genius:
Tehink itis clear thae itis no, for ici noc the case chat
everything we are prepared 10 call a work of art is a
work of genius. Ordinarily, we think of genius 2s
producing very special works of art, great works 25
‘opposed to merely good or mediocre works. This is how
Twill employ the expression ‘product of genius, taking
for granted that Kant has established a necessary connec:
tion between the concept of genius and the concept of
fine art
‘Kant proceeds to elucidate his notion of genius in four
numbered points, the fist ewo of which are as follows.
Genius
(1) isa talent for producing that for which no definite
rule can be given: and not an aptitude in the way of
cleverness for what can be learned according to some
rule; and... consequently originality must be its
primary property
(2) Since there may also be original nonsense, its
products must at the same time be models, ie. be
exemplary; and, consequently, though not themselves
derived feom imitation, they must serve that purpose
for others, ie, asa standard or rule of estimating
‘The combination of these two sentences seems to me
to be a sulficent justification for Schopenhauer's
reference inthe first sentence of his doctoral thesis co the
marvellous Kant They indicate the way in which Kant
resolves the eighteenth century's conflict over genius and
Art and Genius in Kant's Aesthetic 129
rules in art. The products of genius are not the result of
the application of rules, no matter how ingenious the
rules or their applications: this means thatthe judgement
of artistic beauty is not constrained by rule. However,
the product of genius, the work of fine ar, is not thereby
arbiteary of accidental, for it must serve as a rule in
relation to future work; that is, the artefact cannot count
as a work of genius, a8 a work of fine at, if it cannot
function as a rule within the ants,
The notion of originality is itself a richly complex one,
but at least part of what Kant means when he says that
ic must be the primary property of genius is novely
“Everyone is agreed’, says Kant, ‘on the point of the
complete opposition between genius and the spirit of
Jmitation’ (547). A work of genius is not an imitation of
any existing work, it is something new, am invention, an
innovation. Given this, then Kant’s second point, that
there can be original nonsense, seems eminently plausi-
ble. Being novel or new is certainly not a guarantee of
being good or great. Buc ! am intrigued by the fact that
Kant does not say just this. He chooses to say that
Something new or novel may be nonsense, My question
is, with what right does Kane employ such a term in this
setting? What justifies im in saying this?
‘One commentator who does not ignore this question is.
Timothy Gould, in his essay “The Audience of
Originaliy’.* Gould explores 2 suggestion made by Ted
Coen that ‘a metaphor may be the best available exam-
ple of what Kant called products of genius. Thus, a
successful metaphor isto be construed as a new way of
‘making sense: # cannot be made sense of according t0
Acsberch, T Cohen and P Goyer eds) Wanery of Cheagy Pres
ocse in