§ 17235.

Switchblade knife defined, CA PENAL § 17235

West’s Annotated California Codes

Penal Code (Refs & Annos)
Part 6. Control of Deadly Weapons (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. Preliminary Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Division 2. Definitions (Refs & Annos)

West’s Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 17235

§ 17235. Switchblade knife defined

Effective: January 1, 2012

Currentness

As used in this part, “switchblade knife” means a knife having the appearance of a pocketknife and includes a spring-blade
knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any other similar type knife, the blade or blades of which are two or more inches in
length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist or other
mechanical device, or is released by the weight of the blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever. “Switchblade knife”
does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb
stud attached to the blade, provided that the knife has a detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be
overcome in opening the blade, or that biases the blade back toward its closed position.

Credits

(Added by Stats.2010, c. 711 (S.B.1080), § 6, operative Jan. 1, 2012.)

Editors’ Notes

LAW REVISION COMMISSION COMMENTS

2010 Addition

Section 17235 continues the second paragraph of former Section 653k without substantive change. [38 Cal.L.Rev.Comm.
Reports 217 (2009)].

Notes of Decisions (3)

West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 17235, CA PENAL § 17235

Current with urgency legislation through Ch. 9 of 2018 Reg.Sess
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§ 17235. Switchblade knife defined, CA PENAL § 17235

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Ronald FLORES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT..., 2016 WL 2873950...

2016 WL 2873950 (Cal.) (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing)

Supreme Court of California.

Ronald FLORES, Petitioner,

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Parties in Interest.

No. S233071.
March 16, 2016.

(2D Dist. No. B270489)

(LASCNO. VA140906)

Petition for Review

Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender, Of Los Angeles County, California, Albert J. Menaster, Jesus De La Riva, Thomas
Moore, (State Bar No. 134720), Deputy Public Defenders, Appellate Branch, Law Offices of the Public Defender, 320 West
Temple Street, Room 590, Los Angeles, California 90012, Telephone No.: (213) 974-2834, Fax No.: (213) 626-3519, Email:
TMoore @pubdef.lacounty.gov.
TOPICAL INDEX

PETITION FOR REVIEW ............................................................................................................................................................. 1

ISSUE ON REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE ............................................................................................................................................................ 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................................................................. 8

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................. 14

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 15

I. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF POSSESSING A DIRK OR 15

DAGGER BECAUSE PETITIONER’S KNIFE FALLS UNDER THE LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION
IDENTIFYING KNIVES THAT DO NOT CONSTITUTE SWITCHBLADES AND PETITIONER
CARRIED THE KNIFE IN ITS CLOSED POSITION ........................................................................................................

II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE DECISION IN PLUMLEE BECAUSE 20
IN DOING SO IT IGNORED THE SWITCHBLADE EXEMPTION UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION
17235 ......................................................................................................................................................................................................

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

EXHIBIT A ORDER DATED MARCH 3, 2016

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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California State Opinions

In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514 ................................. 17

People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935 ........................... 2, 7, 12, 16

People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 ............................... 13

People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 13

1217 ..............................................................................................................

People v. Superior Court (Mendella) (1983) 33 Cal.3d 754 .... 13

California State Statutes

Health & Saf. Code, section 245(a)(1) ............................................. 8

Health & Saf. Code section 667(b) .................................................... 8

Health & Saf. Code, section 11550 ................................................... 8

Health & Saf. Code, section 17235 ................................................... 10

Pen. Code, section 653(k) ..................................................................... 10

Pen. Code, section 653k ........................................................................ 4, 5

Pen. Code, section 995 ........................................................................... 11, 13

Pen. Code, section 999a ........................................................................ 13

Pen. Code, section 12020 ...................................................................... 10

Pen. Code, section 16470 ...................................................................... 3, 6, 14, 17

Pen. Code, section 17235 ...................................................................... 2, 3, 6, 7, 12, 15, 17, 20

Pen. Code, section 21310 ...................................................................... 6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 19

Pen. Code, section 21510 ...................................................................... 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17

Pen. Code, sections 16470, 21310, 21510 ...................................... 7

Pen. Code, sections 17235, 16470 ..................................................... 3

*1 TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA:

Ronald Flores respectfully petitions this court for review of the summary denial of his petition for writ of mandate by the
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, on March 3, 2016. A copy of the order of the court of appeal is
attached to this petition as an Appendix. Review is necessary to settle an important question of law raised by *2 respondent
court’s interpretation of People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935, 940-941.
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ISSUE ON REVIEW

Petitioner is charged with carrying a dirk or dagger, but the knife he carried falls squarely within an express statutory
exemption. Penal Code section 17235 provides the precise language detailing the characteristics necessary for the exemption
and petitioner demonstrated at his preliminary hearing that his knife met those requirements.1

Respondent court ruled that because petitioner’s knife could be opened quickly, it qualified as a dirk or dagger, citing
the People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935, 940-941. But, the Plumlee court addressed a different question entirely.
There, it was undisputed that the defendant’s knife was in fact a switchblade, so the only question presented was whether it
could be carried in the closed position. The Plumlee court had no occasion to interpret the switchblade exemption
under Section 17235, which goes to the heart of petitioner’s claim.

The issue presented before this court is whether Plumlee’s holding can be so broadly construed as to overrule the express
exemption in *3 Section 17235 permitting non-switchblade knives to be possessed and carried safely in their closed positions
pursuant to Section 16470.

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE

California citizens should be able to clearly understand the laws intended to protect and to punish them. The unnecessarily
confusing language of the statutes defining and banning illegal knives fails to achieve that goal. Buried under a series of
exemptions, the express statutory language legalizing the knife carried by petitioner was overlooked or ignored by respondent
court. Whether petitioner’s knife was legal to carry presents an issue of great consequence, not only to petitioner, but to all
those who purchase knives that open automatically. Sometimes referred to as assisted opening knives, many Californians
believe they are legal to carry so long as they are closed under the provisions of the Sections 17235 and 16470.

Section 16470 defining illegal knives as a dirk or dagger creates three categories of exemptions. These exemptions include
folding knives, pocket knives, and knives not prohibited by Section 21510. Written in the double negative, the language of
the latter category invites confusion. Further, Section 21510 must be read in conjunction with the statute defining
switchblades, Section 17235. Here too, the switchblade definition creates another exemption, presenting an additional
complication. Moreover, that *4 exemption describes the non-switchblade with highly technical language. The resulting
effect is that of a set of Russian stacking dolls requiring the application of an exemption within an exemption before
comprehending the entirety of the express language of the statute.

To understand how these statutes became so convoluted, a brief description of California’s relationship with the switchblade
knife is instructive. Legislative history suggests that the first California law specifically banning switchblade knives in 1957
was triggered by the popularity of the 1955 movie, Rebel Without A Cause. In its dramatic climax, switchblade knives are
employed with great theatrical effect. The dangerousness was evident and the spring-loaded action opening the knife
appeared sinister.

In 1996, legislature amended Section 653k, the former statute governing switchblade knives. The noted intent of this
provision was to cover knives widely used by law enforcement and sports persons for lawful purposes. (Sen. Com. on Public
Safety, Sen. Bill No. 274, Bill Analysis, (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.)

In response, Senate Bill 274 was introduced in 2001, was passed in the Senate and signed into law. The statute amending
653k took effect in 2002. Its stated intention was to close the loophole created by the 1996 amendment.

*5 “Unfortunately, the 1996 amendments created an unintended loophole for criminals to carry dangerous weapons. After
passage of the new law, law enforcement began finding imported knives possessed by criminals which appeared to meet the
technical language of the exemption; namely switchblade knifes equipped with thumb studs which served no real purpose. As
a result, law enforcement or the courts have been compelled to return these dangerous weapons. SB 274 would close this
unintended loophole. The legislation would clarify the Legislature’s intent by further defining the exemption to require that
the knife must have a “detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade, or that
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biases the blade back toward its closed position.” This provision would ensure that knives that are functionally switchblades
remain in violation of Penal Code section 653k.”

(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Sen. Bill No. 274, Bill Analysis, (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.3-4.)

The list of law enforcement organizations supporting the bill include: Riverside Sheriffs Association; Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs; Los Angeles Police Protective League; Riverside County Sheriffs Department; California State
Sheriffs Association; California Peace Officers’ Association; California Police Chiefs; Sacramento County Sheriffs
Department; Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Sen. Bill No. 274, Bill Analysis,
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.)p. 1.)

The bill successfully passed, in all likelihood, because of the formidable respect associated with these agencies. Originally
intended to *6 protect police officers and other innocent knife owners, the exemption is now disregarded by law enforcement,
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, and respondent court as applied to petitioner.

The current definition of switchblade knives in Section 17235, provides the same technical description for the exemption.
Knives that open with pressure applied solely to a “thumb stub attached to the blade” and that “provides resistance that must
be overcome in opening the blade” qualify as non-switchblade knives and are exempted under the statute. (Section 17235.)

Recognizing that knives are valued for their utility as tools used by sports enthusiasts, warehouse workers, and emergency
responders, California legalizes carrying various assisted opening knives so long as they are carried safely. Section 17235
currently specifically exempts qualifying assisted opening knives from the definition of switchblades. These knives are not
prohibited by Section 21510 and therefore, are not a dirk or dagger pursuant to Section 16470, if carried closed. Therefore,
they do not qualify for prosecution under Section 21310.

Petitioner carried a Kershaw assisted opening knife. These types of knives, exempted by Section 17235, are sold at
Amazon.com in the Sports, Industrial, Outdoor, Tools, and Home Improvement departments, and can be located online at the
following internet address: http://tinyurl.com/zyltshr. *7 They are also available at Walmart stores. These knives are not
designed as stabbing weapons, but as everyday utility tools.

However, confusion surrounding the legality of these knives causes persistent concerns among lawful knife owners. A simple
Google search input asking whether “Kershaw assisted opening knives are legal in California” yields numerous forum
discussions citing the undue confusion of the law governing these knives in this State. Some discussion users have assured
buyers that Senate Bill 274 made clear that Kershaw assisted opening knives are an exemption to the ban against switchblade
knives. Morever, it would be irrational to legally allow purchasing such knives, but to criminalize carrying them safely in the
closed position.

Even respondent court seems to have ignored the express language of Section 17235. In its summary denial, the court
references Sections 16470, 21310, 21510 and People v. Plumlee (2008)166 Cal.App.4th 935. Attached as Appendix A. This
is an indication that the court failed to recognize the significance of the precise description of the knife as expressly provided
in the Section 17235.

While petitioner would have the right to appeal any felony sentence that might result from his prosecution, petitioner
contends that the remedy of appeal is neither speedy nor adequate. This court should hear this matter via an expedited
petition for writ of mandate, rather than by the slow method of *8 appeal in order to prevent petitioner’s further prosecution
of this matter and to prevent additional unlawful arrests and convictions of law abiding citizens using assisted opening knives
for innocent purposes. Therefore, review should be granted to settle this important issue.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 4, 2016, petitioner was charged in a two-count felony complaint. Counts I alleged that petitioner possessed a dirk
or dagger within the meaning of Penal Code section 21310, on December 31, 2015. Count II alleged that petitioner was under
the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, on that same date. The
complaint also alleged that petitioner had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony, a violation of section

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245(a)(1), within the meaning of section 667(b)-(j) and 1170.12, one “strike” under the three-strikes sentencing scheme.
(Felony complaint in case VA140906, attached as Exhibit A to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition (hereafter “COA
Petition”).)

Respondent is the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Real party is the People of the State of California,
represented by their attorney, Jackie Lacey, the District Attorney for County of Los Angeles.

The preliminary hearing was held in the matter on January 15, 2016. (Reporter’s Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, hereafter
“PHT,” attached as *9 Exhibit B to the COA petition.) At the hearing, the prosecution called one witness: Los Angeles
County Deputy Sheriff, Ryan Vaccaro.

Deputy Vaccaro testified on direct examination that on December 31, 2016, he was on patrol in the city of Whittier when he
made contact with Mr. Flores at approximately 4 o’clock in the morning. (PHT 2:18-28; 3:1-8.) Deputy Vaccaro contacted
Mr. Flores and found a knife in Mr. Flores’s right front pocket. (PHT 3:9-22.) Deputy Vaccaro observed that the knife was in
the “closed position,” when it was retrieved from Mr. Flores’s pocket. (PHT 9:3-17.)

On cross-examination, Deputy Vaccaro described the knife as a “Kershaw” knife, having a 2.5 inch blade which is activated
by a lever. That lever, or “flipper,” is connected to, and is “part of,” the blade itself. The application of pressure or force to
that lever, by a thumb for instance, will activate the blade and cause it to be “unlocked” in an open position. According to the
deputy, when the flipper is depressed, the blade opened immediately, in a “fraction of a second.” The tip of the blade was
sharp and, when opened, would be readily available as a stabbing weapon. (PHT 4:1-14.) (PHT 11:25-28, 12:1-6.)

In order to return the knife to the closed and locked position, the application of some pressure or force is required to
overcome the slight resistance from the spring-loaded mechanism. (PHT 18:1-12.)

*10 The remaining testimony related to the deputy’s observations supporting count two is omitted here because petitioner
does not challenge the holding order on that count.

At the close of testimony, counsel for petitioner made a motion to dismiss count I on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
(PHT 19:21-28.) Petitioner made no specific argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence for a holding order on II, the
under the influence charge. But as to the dirk or dagger charge in Count I, counsel for petitioner argued that the particular
knife seized from petitioner fell within a specific statutory exception to the charge under section 17235. (PHT 19:21-28;
20:1-8.)

The magistrate at the preliminary hearing eschewed the idea that any particular knife could be legal to carry. “It’s not so
much about the item itself. It’s the combination of having an item that’s readily capable of being used as a stabbing
instrument and then having it concealed on your person.” (PHT 20:15-22.) The court compared the facts in Plumlee to the
facts in the instant case. “The whole issue in Plumlee was the switchblade knife as defined in Penal Code section 653(k) can
be a dirk or dagger concealed on a person as defined in section 12020 even if it is concealed in its closed position...And here,
that’s the evidence I have. (PHT 21:17-26.)

*11 Petitioner countered that non-switchblade or “normal” pocket knives, if carried in a closed position, as was the case here,
is not illegal. (PHT 20:23-27.)

Respondent court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and held petitioner to answer on Count I, possession of a dirk or
dagger, and Count II, under the influence of a controlled substance.

The prosecution filed an information against petitioner on February 1, 2016, alleged the same two counts for which he was
held to answer. (Information in case VA140906, attached as Exhibit C, to the COA petition.)

Petitioner was arraigned on January 29, 2016, and he entered a plea of not guilty. (Docket in case VA140906, attached as
Exhibit D, to the COA petition, at p. 1.)

On February 1, 2016, petitioner filed his motion to set aside count I alleged in the information, possession of a dirk or dagger,

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pursuant to Penal Code section 995. (Motion to Set Aside Information, attached as Exhibit E, to the COA petition, at p. 1.)
The prosecution did not file a written opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss was heard on February 11, 2016, in Department SE “E” before the Honorable Patrick T.
Meyers. At the hearing on the motion, petitioner argued that the decision in Plumlee was *12 not applicable because that case
specifically involved a switchblade. Furthermore, petitioner drew the court’s attention to CalCrim 2501, that a knife or
folding knife “that is not prohibited by Penal Code section 21510 is not a dirk or dagger unless the blade of the knife is
exposed and locked into position.” (RT: 2:1-10.)

Petitioner argued that Penal Code section 17235 which defines a switchblade knife also contains a carefully worded
exception containing great attention to detail, as follows:

A switchblade knife does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of
the knife or a thumb stub attached to the blade. (RT 2:18-25.)

Petitioner further argued that the knife presented in evidence at the preliminary hearing fell under the express exception in the
plain language of the statute because petitioner’s knife automatically opens by applying pressure on the blade itself or on the
thumb stud attached to the blade. (RT 2:26-28; 3:1.) (Exh. E, at pp. 3-4.)

The prosecution countered that “this case is on all fours with the Plumlee case. In Plumlee the exact same argument was
made.” (RT 4:26-28.) The prosecution detailed how the court in Plumlee “found that under such a circumstance a
switchblade can be alleged as a dirk or dagger.” (RT 5:23-28.)

*13 Petitioner re-asserted his argument that the knife in question is not a dirk or dagger because it is not prohibited by section
21510. (RT 6:5-17.) Furthermore, petitioner argued the distinction between these knives. A switchblade opens by a flick of a
button on the handle whereas petitioner’s knife is activated by a device attached to the blade itself. (RT 7:21-28.)

Respondent court denied petitioner’s motion under section 995. The court focused on the decision in Plumlee, holding that a
switchblade could be a dirk or dagger even in its closed position because it is capable of ready use. (RT 8:17-28; 9:1-3.)

A defendant cannot be held to answer unless the prosecution produces evidence establishing each element of the charged
crimes. (People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.) Here, the prosecution failed to produce
evidence that petitioner met the elements of count I, possession of a dirk or dagger under section 21310.

Petitioner has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. Appeal is not an adequate remedy, and the Legislature has
provided that an extraordinary writ is the appropriate remedy for improper denials of motions to dismiss under section 995.
(Pen. Code § 999a; People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, People v. Superior Court (Mendella) (1983) 33 Cal.3d
754.) No other petition for writ of mandate or *14 prohibition, or for any other extraordinary relief, has been made on the
petitioner’s behalf.

The matter is presently set on March 21, 2016, set for trial as day 52 of 60. (RT 10:8-17.) Petitioner believes respondent court
will grant continuances necessary for this writ petition to be heard.

INTRODUCTION

Used interchangeably, the words dirk and dagger conjure images of medieval stabbing weapons, threatening and dangerous.
But these are terms of art and not all knives are treated equally. Many knives qualify as dirks or daggers, if concealed.
However, an express statutory exception exists for folding knives, pocket knives and other, non-switchblade knives. These
are recognized by law for their utility and non-criminal value. They are legal as long as they are carried in their closed
positions.

But switchblade knives are in a class of their own. If petitioner carried a concealed switchblade knife he would, without a
doubt, be guilty of the charge of carrying a dirk or dagger. Switchblades are illegal to possess under any circumstances and
the switchblade also qualifies as a dirk or dagger when carried concealed, whether open or not. (See, Pen. Code § 16470.)

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Petitioner brings this challenge to respondent court’s order denying his motion to dismiss because, as a matter of law, the
knife in evidence does *15 not qualify as a switchblade under the express statutory exemption provided in section 17235.
Therefore, the knife carried by petitioner can only be defined as a dirk or dagger if it was carried concealed in an open and
locked position.

ARGUMENT

I THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE OF POSSESSING A DIRK OR DAGGER
BECAUSE PETITIONER’S KNIFE FALLS UNDER THE LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION IDENTIFYING KNIVES
THAT DO NOT CONSTITUTE SWITCHBLADES AND PETITIONER CARRIED THE KNIFE IN ITS CLOSED
POSITION

California law prohibits carrying a concealed dirk or dagger under section 21310.

California law further defines a dirk or dagger as follows:

As used in this part, “dirk” or “dagger” means a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard
that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death. A
nonlocking folding knife, a folding knife that is not prohibited by Section 21510, or a pocketknife is
capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death only if the blade of
the knife is exposed and locked into position. (Pen. Code § 16470.)

The statute proscribes carrying concealed knives capable of ready use as stabbing weapons. But the plain language of the
statute also deliberately and specifically exempts certain knives, including nonlocking folding knives, folding knives not
prohibited by Section 21510, and pocketknives under this statute unless, and only if, their blades are exposed and locked into
*16 position. The express exception for folding knives and pocketknives includes folding knives not prohibited by section
21510. Looking to the relevant language in section 21510, the Legislature prohibits the possession or sales of all switchblade
knives. (Pen. Code § 21510.)

Since switchblade knives are expressly excluded from the statutory exemption above, they are barred by the provisions
of section 21310, whether or not they are carried in the closed position. (Plumlee, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 935.) If petitioner
carried a switchblade, he would undeniably be guilty of carrying a dirk or dagger. However, the statute expressly allows
California citizens to carry non-switchblade knives as long as they are carried concealed while the blade is exposed and
locked in position.

Switchblade knives are defined as follows:

“As used in this part, “switchblade knife” means a knife having the appearance of a pocket knife and
includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any other similar type knife, the blade or
blades of which are two or more inches in length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a
button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of
the blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever.

The statutory language that follows contains an express exemption:

“Switchblade knife” does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied
solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, provided that the knife has a detent
or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade, or that *17
biases the blade back toward its closed position.” (Pen. Code § 17235.)

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The switchblade exception was introduced in 2001 by Senate Bill No. 274. The legislative history behind the switchblade
exemption as set forth in the court’s decision in In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, is instructive.
The legislative history for Senate Bill No. 274 reflects its purpose was to “narrow[ ]” existing statutory “language to only
allow knives to fall under the exemption from the switchblade law if that one-handed opening knife contains a detent or other
mechanism. Such mechanisms ensure there is a measure of resistance (no matter how slight) that prevents the knife from
being easily opened with a flick of the wrist. Moreover, a detent or similar mechanism is prudent and a matter of public
safety as it will ensure that a blade will not inadvertently come open. [] Although some one-handed opening knives can be
opened with a strong flick of the wrist, so long as they contain a detent or similar mechanism that provides some resistance to
opening the knife, then the exemption is triggered. These knives serve an important utility to many knife users, as well as
firefighters, EMT personnel, hunters, fishermen, and others.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 274
(2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2001, pp. 1-2, italics added.) (Id. at p.520.)

Read in combination with section 16470, this statute expressly defines what does not constitute a switchblade knife, and is
therefore not prohibited by section 21510.

The technical distinctions between switchblades and non-switchblade knives were addressed by the court in Gilbert R. on a
claim with considerable similarity to the instant case. In Gilbert R., a juvenile court placed Gilbert *18 R., a minor, on
supervised probation based on his misdemeanor possession of a switchblade knife as defined in former Penal Code section
653k (now codified at § 17235). The minor appealed, asserting that the knife he carried fell within the express exception
identifying knives that do not constitute switchblade knives. The appellate court agreed and reversed the juvenile court’s
order.

In doing so, the court held that because the knife had both a thumb stud and a detent mechanism, it fell within statutory
exception to prohibition against switchblade knives.
“We find the statutory definition of a switchblade and its exempting language quite clear. (Citing, Angel R., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 911, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 [section 653k is “clear and unambiguous”].) As we explained in Angel R., for the
exemption to apply, “the knife must be one that ‘opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of
the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade’ and has the detent or resistance mechanism.” (Citation omitted.) (In re
Gilbert R., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 514, at p. 519.)

Here, petitioner established both elements identified above. First, it was established that the knife at issue had a flipper on the
blade itself and by pressing a thumb on that flipper the blade is activated. (PHT 12:1-6.) Secondly, the knife had a
spring-loaded locking device that required some pressure to overcome the spring loaded “resistance” when closing the knife.
(PHT 18:2-12.) These facts, though undisputed, were disregarded by respondent court.

*19 Respondent court disregarded the plain meaning of the statute and grouped all knives together in its decision. At the
preliminary hearing the court stated, “It’s not so much about the item itself. It’s the combination of. having an item that’s
readily capable of being used as a stabbing instrument and then having it concealed on your person.” (PHT 20:15-22.) But,
this is not an accurate interpretation of the statute. The type of knife carried is an expressly necessary fact to determine
whether or not it qualifies as a dirk or dagger.

Furthermore, for the purposes of section 21310, petitioner’s knife falls under the express exception for folding knives, pocket
knives, and non-switchblade knives. Petitioner’s knife is thereby legal to carry concealed so long as it is not exposed and
locked into position.

Here, the knife was retrieved by Deputy Vacarro from petitioner’s right front pocket; the closed position is undisputed.

Petitioner argued that the knife in evidence in the instant case fits precisely within this exception. Therefore, the knife may
qualify as a dirk or dagger under Section 21310, if, and only if, it is carried in the exposed and locked position.

*20 II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE DECISION IN PLUMLEE BECAUSE IN
DOING SO IT IGNORED THE SWITCHBLADE EXEMPTION UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 17235

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Respondent court erred when it relied on the decision in Plumlee, because the holding in Plumlee did not address the factual
scenario at issue here, the switchblade exemption under section 17235. Petitioner does not disagree with the decision in
Plumlee, but its holding does not undermine petitioner’s position. The court in Plumlee was not presented with the legal issue
presented here: the application of the switchblade exception.

Respondent court ignored the plain language of the express statutory exception folding knives, pocketknives and all other
folding knives identified as non-switchblade knives. Respondent court therefore erred in its misapplication of Plumlee, by
holding petitioner to a higher standard than is required by law.

*21 For the foregoing reasons and the reasons advanced in the in the petition for the writ of prohibition below, petitioner
respectfully requests that this court grant the instant petition for review.

Appendix not available.

Footnotes
1
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

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Ronald FLORES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR..., 2016 WL 1381194...

2016 WL 1381194 (Cal.) (Appellate Brief)

Supreme Court of California.

Ronald FLORES, Petitioner,

v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest.

No. S233071.
2016.

2d Dist. No. B270489

LASC No. VA140906
Original Proceeding in the Court of Appeal from the Los Angeles County Superior Court
The Honorable Patrick T. Meyers, Judge Presiding

Answer to Petition for Review

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Phyllis C. Asayama, Deputy District Attorney, State Bar No. 88919,
Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorney, State Bar No. 238867, Appellate Division, 320 West Temple Street, Suite 540,
Los Angeles, California 90012, (213) 974-5911, (213) 217-9112 fax, for Real Party in Interest.
*2 TOPICAL INDEX

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ......................................................................................................................... 5

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

I A 995 motion must be denied if any reasonable evidence supports the magistrate’s order. ................................. 7

II Flores’s knife was a switchblade, which qualifies as a concealed dirk or dagger even while in a closed 8
position. ..................................................................................................................................................................................................

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................................... 12

*3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514 ........................................................... 11

People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711 ....................................................................... 8

People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935 ..................................................... 4, 8, 10

People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217 ......................... 7

Statutes

Health and Safety Code Health & Saf. Code, Section 11550, subdivision 5
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Ronald FLORES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR..., 2016 WL 1381194...

(a) ............................................................................................................................................

Penal Code Former section 653k (2008) ................................................................... 9

Section 995, subdivision (a)(2) (B) ............................................................................. 7

Section 999a ........................................................................................................................ 8

Former section 12020 (2008) ........................................................................................ 9

Section 16470 ..................................................................................................................... 9

Section 17235 ..................................................................................................................... 4, 5, 10, 11

Section 21310 ..................................................................................................................... 5, 7, 8, 9

Section 21510 ..................................................................................................................... 9

Statutory Enactments Stats. 2010, ch. 711 ................................................................ 9

*4 SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENT

After a preliminary hearing, Ronald Flores was held to answer for violating Penal Code1 section 21310, possessing a
concealed dirk or dagger. The Superior Court denied his motion under section 995 to set aside the information (hereafter 995
motion), and the Court of Appeal summarily denied his petition for a writ of prohibition challenging that order. Flores now
petitions this Court for review.

The sole issue presented here is whether Flores’s preliminary hearing contained sufficient evidence that the knife he carried
was a “dirk or dagger.” Under People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935, 940 (Plumlee), a “switchblade knife” may
qualify as a dirk or dagger, even if concealed on one’s person while in a closed position (i.e., while the blade is not exposed).
Here, Flores’s knife was closed, but the evidence established that it was a switchblade, since it had a mechanism that opened
it in a “fraction of a second.” (See § 17235.) Plumlee therefore controls, and the magistrate properly held Flores to answer on
the charge.

Flores’s arguments to the contrary contain a fatal flaw. He contends that his knife falls under an exception to the switchblade
definition for knives that open via thumb pressure on the blade, and which have some resistance that must be overcome when
opening. (Petition for Review, p. 18; *5 see § 17235.) But even assuming his knife opened only via thumb pressure to the
blade (which was not clear from the record), there was no evidence of resistance while opening. The only evidence of
resistance was that, once opened, the knife resisted being closed. This does not satisfy the exception in the statute, so the
magistrate properly found that Flores’s knife was a switchblade, and qualified as a dirk or dagger.

Review here is unnecessary because Flores presents no important question of law. Plumlee is directly on point. Flores has not
otherwise demonstrated that he is entitled to extraordinary relief that would justify transferring the matter back to the Court
of Appeal. This Court should deny review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The People charged Flores with carrying a concealed dirk or dagger ( § 21310) and being under the influence of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)). (Exh. A, p. 2.)2 The sole witness at Flores’s preliminary hearing was Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan Vaccaro. (Exh. B, p. 11.) On December 31, 2015, he testified that he searched Flores,
and found a knife in Flores’s front right pocket. (Id. at p. 12.) When he found the knife it was in a closed position. (Id. at p.
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18.) He described the knife as follows:

It had a blade that was 3.25 inches long. Upon examining the knife, I noticed it had a lever which when it was activated by a
sliding motion on the thumb upon sliding that lever, the blade would open in a fraction of a second -- in less than a fraction of
a second, and into a full unlocked3 position and would be readily available to be used as a stabbing weapon.

*6 (Id. at p. 13:3-9.) The lever, also described as a “flipper,” was connected to the blade itself.4 (Id. at p. 20.) By pressing
one’s thumb on the “flipper,” the “blade will be activated.” (Id. at p. 21:3-5.) The knife also had a sharp point. (Id.at p.
13:11.)

Vaccaro later elaborated that the knife was spring-loaded, and once open was held open by a spring:

Q Now once the switchblade is in the open position, were you able to close it?

A Yes.

Q And did it have somewhat of a resistance when it was closed as you closed it?

A It had a locking device.

Q Right.

A It was spring-loaded and you push against the spring to close it.

Q So you do have to push against the spring, so it had basically it had somewhat of a resistance, a slight resistance as you
close it; is that right?

A Yes.

(Exh. B, pp. 27:28-28:12.) This was the only evidence about resistance or springs. Evidence of the second count will be
omitted, since Flores does not challenge it here.

*7 The magistrate held Flores to answer on both counts. (Exh. B, p. 31.) After hearing argument, the court relied on Plumlee,
and remarked that Flores’s knife was a switchblade because it was spring-loaded:

In this one it was closed. In Plumlee it was closed. The whole issue in Plumlee was the switchblade knife as defined in Penal
Code section [653k, now sections 17235 and 21510] can be a dirk or dagger concealed on a person as defined in section
12020 [now section 21310] even if it is concealed in its closed position. The whole issue there was that if it was
spring-loaded as it was in that case it could be opened a fraction of a second after he pushed the button, then it could qualify
as a dirk or dagger. And here, that’s the evidence I have.

(Id. at p. 30:17-26.)

The People filed an information charging Flores with the same two counts. (Exh. C, pp. 35-36; Exh. D, p. 39.) Flores filed his
995 motion to set aside count 1 of the information ( § 21310) on February 1, 2016. (Exh. E, p. 48.) The court denied the
motion on February 11, 2016, relying on Plumlee. (Exh. F, pp. 61-62.)

Flores petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition challenging the denial of his 995 motion on February 26, 2016.
The court summarily denied the petition on March 3, 2016, again citing Plumlee. Flores has now petitioned this Court for

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Ronald FLORES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR..., 2016 WL 1381194...

review.

ARGUMENT

I A 995 MOTION MUST BE DENIED IF ANY REASONABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE MAGISTRATE’S
ORDER

After a preliminary hearing, the defendant may move to set aside the information if he or she was committed without
probable cause. ( § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B).) In reviewing the preliminary hearing on a 995 motion, the court does not reweigh
the evidence or assess credibility. (People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.) If some evidence
supports *8 the information, the reviewing court does not reassess its sufficiency. (Ibid.) The information will only be set
aside if no evidence supports it. (Ibid.)

A defendant may challenge the denial of his or her 995 motion by filing a petition for writ of prohibition. ( § 999a.) In such a
proceeding, the reviewing court essentially disregards the ruling of the superior court and directly reviews the preliminary
hearing magistrate’s holding order. (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718.) Thus, the reviewing court is essentially
bound by the same standards that govern the 995 motion.

Here, Flores would only be entitled to a writ of prohibition of there was no evidence that he possessed a concealed dirk or
dagger. As will be shown, his preliminary hearing contained sufficient evidence that he did.

II FLORES’S KNIFE WAS A SWITCHBLADE, WHICH QUALIFIES AS A CONCEALED DIRK OR DAGGER

EVEN WHILE IN A CLOSED POSITION

The People agree with Flores’s characterization of this case as a kind of Russian nesting doll of definitions and exceptions.
(Petition for Review, p. 4.) Still, once unpacked, the question presented here is simple: was Flores’s knife a “switchblade
knife”? If so, this case falls squarely under Plumlee, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 940, which held that a concealed
switchblade may be a “dirk or dagger,” even though it is concealed with the blade closed and unexposed. As will be shown,
the evidence established that his knife was a switchblade, so he was properly held to answer, and this petition should be
denied.

As background, section 213105 prohibits carrying a concealed “dirk or dagger” on one’s person. The only contested element
here is whether Flores’s knife qualified as a dirk or dagger. The general definition of a dirk or dagger covers any knife that is
“capable of ready use as a stabbing *9 weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death.” ( § 16470.) Flores’s knife meets
this general definition because Deputy Vaccaro testified that it was capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon. (Exh. B, p.
13.)

Flores contends that his knife fell within an exception to the general rule, which specifies that “[a] nonlocking folding knife,
a folding knife that is not prohibited by Section 21510 [prohibiting switchblade knives], or a pocketknife” does not qualify as
a dirk or dagger unless the knife is locked in an open position with the blade exposed. ( § 16470, italics added.)6 Here, the
testimony generally established that Flores’s knife was some kind of folding knife, and the blade was not exposed when
Deputy Vaccaro recovered it. (Exh. B, p. 18.) But this does not end the inquiry, because under its plain terms the
folding-knife exception does not apply to switchblades. This was the holding of Plumlee (referring to the relevant code
sections as they were numbered prior to 2011)7:

The meaning of the language in section 12020 is fairly straightforward. Subdivision (c)(24) of that section states that a
folding knife not prohibited by section 653k - i.e., a knife that is not a switchblade - can be a dirk or dagger only if the knife
is open. This implies that a folding knife that is prohibited by section 653k - a switchblade - can be a dirk or dagger even
when it is closed. The reference to section 653k here would have no point if the Legislature did not intend to treat
switchblades differently from other folding knives in exactly this respect.

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Ronald FLORES, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR..., 2016 WL 1381194...

*10 (Plumlee, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) Flores does not dispute the holding of Plumlee. (Petition for Review, p. 20.)
Thus, the key issue here is whether the evidence further showed that Flores’s knife was a switchblade, and still qualified as a
dirk or dagger while closed under Plumlee.

The magistrate could reasonably have found that Flores’s knife was a switchblade. A “switchblade knife” is generally any
folding knife that can automatically open by some kind of mechanism, including a “flip of the wrist,” or even the weight of
the blade itself:
As used in this part, “switchblade knife” means a knife having the appearance of a pocketknife and
includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any other similar type knife, the blade or
blades of which are two or more inches in length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a
button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of
the blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever.

( § 17235.) Here, the testimony showed that Flores’s knife had a blade over two inches, and also had some kind of
mechanism that quickly opened the knife, which was variously described as a “lever” or a “flipper” attached to the blade.
(Exh. B, pp. 13, 20-21.) Deputy Vaccaro testified that by “sliding” the lever, the blade opened in a “fraction of a second,”
which was also described as “activating” the blade. (Ibid.) He also testified (and the magistrate found) that the knife was
“spring loaded.” (Id. at pp. 28, 30.) Thus, the evidence established that the Flores’s knife met the general definition of a
switchblade.

Again, Flores tries to invoke an exception to this general definition, but the facts do not support his argument. The general
definition of a switchblade excludes certain knives which open only via thumb pressure to the blade (or a “thumb stud”
attached to it), but which also provide some kind of resistance to opening:
“Switchblade knife” does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied
solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, provided that the knife has a detent
or other mechanism that provides *11 resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade, or that
biases the blade back toward its closed position.

( § 17235.) Flores argues that his knife falls under this thumb-stud exception in section 17235, but the evidence at the
preliminary hearing did not establish either element. First, there is no evidence that the knife opened via any kind of “thumb
stud,” or solely by pressure applied to the blade. Rather, the only references are to the “lever” or “flipper,” which then
“activated” the blade, causing it to open very quickly. (Exh. B, pp. 13, 20 - 21.) Even though this mechanism was attached to
the blade, there is no indication that this was just a tab that facilitates opening the blade using only thumb pressure. Instead,
Deputy Vaccaro described the knife as “spring loaded.” (Id. at p. 28.) Second, there is no evidence of any resistance in
opening the knife. The sole evidence of resistance was that, once open, the knife resisted closing - i.e., it was then biased to
an open position by a spring. (Exh. B, pp. 27-28.) Flores mistakenly argues that this kind of resistance falls within the
exception. (Petition for Review, p. 18.) But the statute clearly requires the opposite kind of resistance - i.e., resistance in
opening the knife, or that biases it toward a closed position. ( § 17235.) Flores’s argument has it backwards. In sum, his knife
met neither element of the thumb-stud exception.

Since the preliminary hearing testimony established that Flores’s knife was a switchblade, this case falls squarely under
Plumlee. It is immaterial that the knife was closed when Deputy Vaccaro found it, since it could be opened in a fraction of a
second, and was readily available to use as a stabbing weapon. It therefore qualified as a dirk or dagger, and Flores was
properly held to answer for violating section 21310.

This case is also distinguishable from In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, on which Flores relies. (Petition for
Review, p. 17.) There, the undisputed evidence established that the knife had both a thumb stud and a detent mechanism
which held the blade closed. (In re Gilbert R., supra, at p. 520.) There is no testimony in Flores’s case establishing any
similar resistance in opening his knife.

*12 Based on this record, the magistrate’s holding order was supported by the evidence, and the 995 motion was properly
denied under Plumlee. The Court of Appeal correctly denied Flores’s writ petition, and this Court should deny review.
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CONCLUSION

The People respectfully request that this Court deny the petition for review. The preliminary hearing transcript contained
sufficient evidence that Flores was guilty of the charge under Plumlee. He did not make a prima facie case for extraordinary
relief in the Court of Appeal.

Footnotes
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
All exhibit references are to the exhibits Flores filed in the Court of Appeal supporting his petition for writ of prohibition. Page
designations are to the continuous pagination on the bottom of each page.
3
Vaccaro would later testify that the knife opened into a “locked” position. (Exh. B, p. 19:27.) It is unclear what he referred to by
originally calling the position “unlocked,” perhaps indicating that it was no longer held in a closed position by a catch of some
kind.
4
The testimony about the “flipper” was somewhat confusing, and referenced several photographs that were not marked as exhibits.
On cross-examination, the defense showed Vaccaro photographs of the knife, describing it as a “Kershaw” brand knife. (Exh. B, p.
19.) Vaccaro testified that he was familiar with a Kershaw “spring-assisted” knife, and it was similar to the one in the photograph.
(Ibid.) The defense then showed Vaccaro a photograph of a “Kershaw Kuro” knife in a package. (Id. at p. 20.) Although it looked
similar, and had the same handle, Vaccaro did not know if it was the same model as Flores’s knife. (Ibid.) Vaccaro then testified
that “this particular knife” had a “flipper” on the blade, but it is unclear if he was referring to the Kuro knife, Flores’s knife, or
both. (Ibid.)
5
That section reads, in relevant part: “[A]ny person in this state who carries concealed upon the person any dirk or dagger is
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.”
6
The full section reads: “As used in this part, ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ means a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that
is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death. A nonlocking folding knife, a folding
knife that is not prohibited by Section 21510, or a pocketknife is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great
bodily injury or death only if the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.”
7
Plumlee referred to former sections 12020 and 653k, the relevant parts of which were renumbered in 2011 to new sections
16470, 17235, 21310, and 21510 without substantive change. (See generally Stats. 2010, ch. 711.)

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In re Gilbert R., 211 Cal.App.4th 514 (2012)
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

211 Cal.App.4th 514

Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division 3, California.

IN RE GILBERT R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Gilbert R., Defendant and Appellant.

G045929
|
Filed November 29, 2012

Synopsis
Background: Juvenile delinquency proceeding was commenced. The Superior Court, Orange County, No. DL036725, David
A. Hoffer, J., sustained the delinquency petition and placed juvenile on supervised probation based on his misdemeanor
possession of a switchblade knife. Juvenile appealed.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeal, Aronson, Acting P.J., held that knife, which had both a thumb stud and a detent mechanism,
fell within statutory exception to prohibition against switchblade knives.

Reversed.

**609 Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David A. Hoffer, Judge. Reversed. (Super.Ct. No.
DL036725)

Attorneys and Law Firms

Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney
General, Scott C. Taylor, Melissa Mandel and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

OPINION

ARONSON, ACTING P.J.

*516 Gilbert R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order sustaining the district attorney’s delinquency petition (Welf. &
Inst.Code, § 602) and placing him on supervised probation based on his misdemeanor possession of a switchblade knife as
defined in former Penal Code section 653k (now codified at § 17235). (All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.) Gilbert contends the knife he possessed falls under the Legislature’s express exception identifying knives that do not
constitute a switchblade (former § 653k [“ ‘Switchblade knife’ does not include ...”] ), and therefore the evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s delinquency finding. We agree and accordingly reverse the juvenile court’s order.

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In re Gilbert R., 211 Cal.App.4th 514 (2012)
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anaheim Police Officer Erin Moore stopped Gilbert on foot near an area where graffiti had recently been sprayed because he
matched a description of the suspect. He denied involvement in the offense, but when she asked if he possessed “anything
illegal,” he produced a knife from his sweatshirt pocket. It was approximately seven inches long, with a three inch blade
folded in a closed position, and Moore discovered she could open it with a flick of her wrist. The district attorney filed a
delinquency petition based on Gilbert’s **610 possession of the knife, and Moore demonstrated at the hearing her ability to
open the knife by flipping her wrist.

Sam Martin of Plaza Cutlery at South Coast Plaza testified as a knife and cutlery expert called by the defense. He explained
that while military or law enforcement personnel and others trained in the use of knives might be able to open the knife with
relative ease by a flick of the wrist, lay users generally *517 would not be able to do so, at least at first. But with practice,
“[t]hose who have it in their hand a good number of hours a day would learn a dexterity that could indeed flip the blade like
this open.”

Martin demonstrated that the knife did not easily open because it had a “positive detent, ... a mechanism which holds the
blade in the closed position and you have to provide enough resistance to overcome that for the blade to swing open.” Martin
held the knife upside down and shook it, but the blade did not descend despite the shaking. Martin explained the detent
operated as “a positive retention device” to keep the blade closed. The detent feature was held in place by a “set screw,”
which had become “a little bit wobbly,” reducing the detent pressure by approximately 15 percent according to Martin, but he
explained it remained “well within” the manufacturer’s parameters, “functioning in all [sic ] fashion.”

Martin identified other features of the knife. It did not open with the push of a button alone or in conjunction with a wrist flip.
Rather, it had a “thumb stud or thumb disk” along the top part of the blade, which Martin opined conformed to state law
governing switchblades (former § 653k) because the knife was “designed to be held in one hand and opened with pressure to
the thumb [stud] overcoming the positive detent mechanism.”

Martin also explained the knife had other “extra features not found on ordinary pocket knives.” Martin identified a
mushroom-shaped protrusion on one end as a “glass impactor[:] a button protruding from the end for emergency extraction.
You would be using it in a fashion to frankly break the glass and extract a person [from] a vehicle.” Martin also pointed out
as a feature for “an E.M.T. or ... other emergency person[nel]” an opening in the body of the knife “which is for ... seat belt
cutting ... [i]t’s to cut straps or other restraints to get a person out of a car.” Martin identified the knife in “industry” parlance
“as a SARK, S–A–R–K, search and rescue knife.”

The juvenile court found Gilbert’s knife was a switchblade, and therefore sustained the petition. The court explained it had
concluded “a switchblade knife is one that can be opened—one that can be opened by a flip of the wrist, and this knife can be
opened by the flip of a wrist. We saw it several times, both from the officer and from Mr. Martin. [¶] And, as I said, I
inspected the knife myself and found that is true, it can be opened by the flip of the wrist. That makes it a switchblade.”

II

DISCUSSION

Gilbert contends the juvenile court misinterpreted the Legislature’s prohibition against “switchblades” as applying to all

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In re Gilbert R., 211 Cal.App.4th 514 (2012)
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

knives that may be opened by *518 flipping one’s wrist, even against mechanical or other resistance and in conjunction with
other actions. We agree the court erred and that the evidence could not be reconciled with the conclusion Gilbert possessed a
switchblade as that term is defined by law, given that the knife met the requirements of an express statutory exception.

**611 The relevant statutory terms define a prohibited “switchblade knife,” followed by an express exception. The definition
is as follows: “As used in this part, ‘switchblade knife’ means a knife having the appearance of a pocketknife and includes a
spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any other similar type knife, the blade or blades of which are two or
more inches in length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist
or other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of the blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever.” (Former §
653k, now codified at § 17235.)
[1]
The spring-blade, snap-blade, and other categories of knives expressly prohibited by this language are not exhaustive;
rather, the statutory language embraces knives that operate in a similar fashion to those listed. ( People ex rel. Mautner v.
Quattrone (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1395, 260 Cal.Rptr. 44.) Thus, the statute bars possession of a knife having (a) the
appearance of a pocketknife and (b) a blade two or more inches in length that releases mechanically or automatically through
pressure on the handle, a flip of the wrist, gravity or the weight of the blade, or in a similar manner. ( In re Luke W. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 650, 656, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905.)

The Legislature has provided as an express exception, however, that a “ ‘[s]witchblade knife’ does not include a knife that
opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade,
provided that the knife has a detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade,
or that biases the blade back toward its closed position.” (Former § 653k, now codified at § 17235.)
[2]
A “detent” is a “a device (as a catch, dog, or spring-operated ball) for positioning and holding one mechanical part in
relation to another in a manner such that the device can be released by force applied to one of the parts.” (Merriam–Webster
m-w.com Dictionary < http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/detent> (as of November 27, 2012); see also 4 Oxford
English Dict. (2d ed.1989) p. 545 [defining “detent” as “[a] stop or catch in a machine which checks or prevents motion”].)
The expert below, for example, described a “detent mechanism” as one that “holds the blade[ ] in the fixed and closed
position,” allowing the blade to be “opened with pressure [by] the thumb overcoming the positive detent *519 mechanism.”1
Conversely, the absence of a functioning detent or similar mechanism in In re Angel R. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 905, 77
Cal.Rptr.3d 905 (Angel R. ) was evident when “the knife opened if held ‘upside down with the blade facing the floor and you
just drop your hand.” ( Id. at p. 912, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 905.)
[3] [4]
**612 “ ‘In interpreting statutes, we follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual
words of the law.’ ” ( People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313; see People v. Ramirez
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 474 [“ ‘the words the Legislature chose are the best indicators of its
intent’ ”].) Absent ambiguity, “ ‘ “we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs.” ’ [Citation.]” ( Angel R., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 911, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 905.)
[5]
We find the statutory definition of a switchblade and its exempting language quite clear. ( Angel R., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th
at p. 911, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 [section 653k is “clear and unambiguous”].) As we explained in Angel R., for the exemption to
apply, “the knife must be one that ‘opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of the knife or a
thumb stud attached to the blade’ and has the detent or resistance mechanism.” ( Angel R., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 912,
77 Cal.Rptr.3d 905.) Nothing in these requirements prevents a user from more quickly opening a knife by employing a wrist
flip in conjunction with pressure on the blade or its thumb stud and disengaging the detent or other resistance mechanism.
[6] [7]
Reviewing courts may turn to the legislative history behind even unambiguous statutes when it confirms or bolsters their
interpretation, and that is the case here.2 (See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf (2010) –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2287,
176 L.Ed.2d 1047, fn. 9; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 316, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 207 P.3d 20.) Before 2001,
the switchblade exemption covered “a knife that opens with one *520 hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the
blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade,” which unquestionably would include defendant’s knife. In 2001, the
Legislature in Senate Bill No. 274 added to the exemption the current language requiring a detent or similar resistance
mechanism.

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In re Gilbert R., 211 Cal.App.4th 514 (2012)
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

The legislative history for Senate Bill No. 274 reflects its purpose was to “narrow[ ]” existing statutory “language to only
allow knives to fall under the exemption from the switchblade law if that one-handed opening knife contains a detent or other
mechanism. Such mechanisms ensure there is a measure of resistance (no matter how slight) that prevents the knife from
being easily opened with a flick of the wrist. Moreover, a detent or similar mechanism is prudent and a matter of public
safety as it will ensure that a blade will not inadvertently come open. [¶] Although some one-handed opening knives can be
opened with a strong flick of the wrist, so long as they contain a detent or similar mechanism that provides some resistance to
opening the knife, then the exemption is triggered. These knives serve an important utility to many knife users, as well as
firefighters, EMT personnel, hunters, fishermen, and others.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 274
(2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2001, pp. 1–2, italics added.)
[8]
Here, the uncontradicted testimony of the expert demonstrated Gilbert’s knife had both the necessary thumb stud “intended
for this knife to stay closed” and “a detent mechanism” to hold the blade “in the fixed and closed position” until “opened with
pressure to the thumb [stud] overcoming the positive detent mechanism.” **613 The expert acknowledged the detent
mechanism required “minor maintenance” because it had loosened to where it provided 85 percent of the resistance it
achieved when the knife was new. But 85 percent effectiveness is still a substantial measure of resistance and falls within the
plain terms of the exemption language requiring “resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade.” (Former § 653k.)
The expert, for example, shook the knife upside down and it did not open. The juvenile court, however, imposed a standard
beyond that required by law, namely, that the knife could not be opened by any flip of the wrist, even in conjunction with the
requisite thumb pressure and disengaging the detent mechanism. Consequently, we must reverse.

*521 III

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and dispositional order is reversed.

WE CONCUR:

IKOLA, J.

THOMPSON, J.

All Citations

211 Cal.App.4th 514, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

Footnotes
1
The American Knife and Tool Institute has published on its Web site an article entitled, Understanding Bias Toward Closure and
Knife Mechanisms, which explains that a ball detent mechanism operates as follows: “When the blade is in the fully closed
position, a detent or depression in the blade is engaged by a ball partially embedded or set in the liner” against which the blade
rests, and “[t]he lateral spring load of the liner pushing the ball into the detent provides a way of keeping the blade in the fully
closed position. [¶] ... [¶] Opening the blade of a liner-lock design knife requires sufficient force to overcome the spring load
pushing the ball into the detent.” (Understanding Bias Toward Closure and Knife Mechanisms, American Knife & Tool Institute <
http://www.akti.org/resources/additional-definitions> (as of Nov. 27, 2012).) We take judicial notice of this reference material.
(Evid.Code, §§ 452, subd. (h); 459, subd. (b).)
2
We grant Gilbert’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the legislative history of former section 653k. (Evid.Code, §§ 452,
subds.(b) & (c); 459, subd. (b).)
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In re Gilbert R., 211 Cal.App.4th 514 (2012)
149 Cal.Rptr.3d 608, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 13,093, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,035

End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5