480 puatic orion uncover. We do not know enough to characterize the fuller relationship. of course, isa compelling subject for hard work, Beyond the basic result, we can say that American national institutions va the mechanisms that produce responsiveness. Its the Senate, not the Hi Representatives, that most clearly mimics the eighteenth-century ‘meant to produce electoral accountability. When comparing the effectiven ‘umover and rational anticipation, we find that for the Senate (and also fort presidency), the most important channel for governmental representati electoral replacement. Equally responsive, however, is the House Representatives. Its members employ rational anticipation to produce a si effective public policy response, without the overt evidence of pe "The Supreme Court appears to reflec public opinion far more than ally expected; but, in comparison, it s the institution that responds Finally, the dynamics prove interesting, Each ofthe electoral institutions lates immediately public opinion into public policy. That i ro say, when e politicians sense a shift in public preferences, they act directly and effect shift the direction of public policy. We find no evidence of delay or hesitation ‘Court, not surprisingly, moves at a more deliberate speed. But equally impos rational anticipation is based not only on the long-term trends in public but also on year-to-year shifts. That is to say, politicians constantly and ately process public opinion changes in order to stay ahead of the politcal c ‘Understanding polities wel, the constitutional framers were correct in € short-term politics ro be a fundamental part of dynamic representation ‘The United States government, as it has evolved over the years, complex response to public demands. The original constitutional design different political calculations into different institutions so that no personal tion, no political faction, no single political interest, or no transient passion: dominate. We now sce the founders’ expectations about complexity ‘contemporary policymaking, Constitutional mechanisms hamess politicians ‘egies to the public's demands. in the end, the government combines both and long-term considerations through both rational anticipation and composi change to produce a strong and resilient link between public and policy. REFERENCES Durr, Robert H. 1993. “What Moves Policy Sentiment?” Arerean Political cence 7158-70, Kingdon, John W. 1984, Agendas, Alternates and Pubic Police Boston: Lite, Brown, ‘Stimson James A 1991. Pblic Opinion in America: Moos, Cycles, and Swings Boulder: We 10-3 from Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America Morris P, Fiorina Many observers of polities have assert that Americans are tncreasngly oariced, particularly over cultural or social issues, That polarization, iis claimed has intensifielpartisanshipin he electorate and in Washington. In ‘he ilowing essay, Moris Fiorina challenges the assumption that Americans hase hecome more deeply. divided on clbwalisses He argues, rater, that political elites, particularly candidates for office, along party and ideclogcal ines, thus changing voters. That, in turn, has produced a sorting of the e tive appearance of polarization inthe mass public, [Many oosenvers or American politics in recent years refer} to “the 50:50-nation.” During the Tate 1990s and early 2000s this phrase began to appear in popular discussions of American politics, as did a similar phrase, “the 49 percent nation.” Such phrascology referred to the closely divided national elections of the late 1990s, when the winning party's popular vote share repeatedly came in right around 49 percent of the total vote: © 1996 Clinton Vore 19.2% + 1986 Republican House Vote 489 + 1998 Republican House Vore 489 + 2000 Gore Vore 484 ‘2000 Republican House Vore 403 ‘2002 Republican House Vote 509 If we consider only the two-party vote the parties are almost exactly evenly ‘matched nationally—50:50—or at leas they were until the 2002 House elections, when the Rej ans broke through that ceiling and got to 52.9 percent. Clearly, jons have been exceedingly close. No presidential candi- rity of the popular vore since 1988, the past three elections Sowee: Moras . Florina, Cutre War? The Myth fa Plarsd America (Upper Sade River, NJ. Peseson Education, Inc, 203). aa482, puatic opmion constituting the longest such streak since the so-called “era of indecision,” when presidential candidate won a majority of the popular vote in the four elec from 1880 to 1892. ‘The question is what to make of these recent close elections? For most ca the answer is obvious: the American el ‘The top panel of Figure t depicts this claim graphically. The electorate is high polarized: a large number of “progressives” on the let support the Democrat large number of “orthodox” on the right support the Republicans, and le occupy the mide ground, With a polarized electorate like this, elect wile very cn Falti votes wl cer, and bal te vues wl ee USA Today asserts. But the U-shaped distribution in the top panel of the figu configuration that will produce close elections. Most ribution in the bottom panel of Figure 1, which inverse of the U-shaped distribution in the top. In the lower figure most rely few are extreme partisans if the Democratic and Republican parties postion themselves equidistant fo SN bell-shaped Le or centrist posit Figure 1. Two Very Different Close Election Scenarios Closely and deeply divided Democrat Republican Democrat Republican Morris P Fiorina 483, center on opposite sides, then the bottom configuration too produces close ecuions. In both examples the electorate is clasely divided, But only in the op panel ofthe figure would we say that the voters are deeply divided. Inthe top would be accurate to say that voters are polarized, but in the bot- m panel we would more accurately call most vot ar 50:50 outcome, the standard interpretation polarized as in the top panel of Figure 1. Why ion? When an individual voter reports that whom to ve for, everyone underst jausible imerreaton ie ind yA dates equally, dislikes both candidates equallsor really doesn't give a =n) i one suggests thatthe individ is polarized. But the aggregate and al situations are analogous, In cach case a continuous variable (percent the vote/probabilty of voting fora given candidate) is compressed into a omous variable (Republican or Democratic victory/Republican oF te Vote), with enormous oss of information. lose elections may reflect equal numbers of vote -one whether Is the Country Polarized? ee 80% to 9096 ofthe country that ok at eck athe ik they ae on separate (Bush reclection strategist, Matthew Dowd). Oe “Is America polarized? Strictly speaking the question should be “has America fsome more polarized?” for that isthe claim. But ifthe country is not polarized ‘begn with, the question of whether it has become more polarized is moot. ro months before the supposed “values chasm seperating the blu red ones" emerged in the 2000 election, the Pew Research Center Press conducted an extensive national survey that included of issues, a number of those whieh figure prominently in discussions of eeculture war, We have divided the Pew survey respondents into those who ‘ded in scares that two months later were to be categorized as blu states and two months later were ro be categorized as red states, The question is \484° PunLic OPINION Morris P Fiorina 485 "whether there is any indication in these data that the election results would lea ‘one half the country “seething” and one half “chee: USA Today reports. “Table 1 indicates that the residents of blue and red states certainly intended Table 2. Red Versus Blue States: Group Evaluations (Percent very/mostly favorable toward...) ‘vote differently: che percentage expressing an intention to vote for George Ba The ‘was ten points higher in the red states, Reminiscent of our discussion of dichote ty = ‘mous choices, however, the partisan and ideological predispositions under sat these voting differences were less distinct. The difference between the propo erat Paty “ ss tions of red and blue state respondents who consider themselves Democrat Chane 7 e rot statistically significant, and the difference in the proportions themselves Republicans is barely so—in both red and blue states » 7” independents are the largest group. Similarly, about a fith of the ” » ‘both red and blue states consider themselves liberals (the four point dlference a ‘not statistically significant), and while there are more conservatives in the x 7 a states, there are more conservatives than liberals even in the blue states. In the red and blue states the k p of peop crates, In sum, while the aggregate voting patterns o ‘um out to be quite distinct in November, the underlying pat ‘identification were much less so. “Table 2 reports similar results for the group evaluations reported by resident of red and blue states. Unsurprisingly, red state residents regard the Republics arty more favorably than the Demoerats, but 55 percent of them regatd th Democratic Party favorably. Conversely, blue state residents regard thy Democratic Party more favorably than the Republic > favorable evaluations ofthe Republican Party. Evang ated equally positively by solid majorities in both red. and Catholics. Muslims fare less well overall and red state residents regard the lower still, but one wonders how much experience many people have vil actual Muslims—especially in many of the red states—as opposed to the abst Sncept of a Muslim, Finally, in a standard finding, neither red nor blue state like atheists: Americans do not care very much what or how people mit they are generally negative toward people who don’t believe in ange of other matters, blue and red state residents differ lite, if at in Table indicate that similar proportions regard the government as always waste and inefficient—relatve to the red stats, the blue sates Table 3 Red Vers Ble tates: Bel an Perens (Percent songysuporing satemen) Table 1, Red Versus Blue States: Political Inclinations i en = Decne aa eon backs cama shed sow pms eng ou coun ue Va enon ah er couny Heh or wrong eaniiee Democratic self1D E mach power concentrated in large companies 6 e Republican slFID Prgcratons make to0 much profit “ e Liberal self1D MGoreis more liberal han he les on ss » Conservative sele1D 3B a George Bushs more conservative thane les on 38 ” Moderate sD 6 a h Clinton could run aga (strony cise) a “486 puatic oPi1oN Americans can’t get ahead—the blue states are not hotbeds of racial liberalism Immigrants receive a warmer reception among blue state residerit, but mali culturlism remains a minority postion even in the blue states, Blue state rsh dents ae less likely to endorse unqualified patriotism. (On the other hand, ed state residents are just as likely as blue state resident to believe that large companies have too such power and to think that corpora: tions make too much profi—the red states are not the running dogs of corporate ‘America, Amusingly, majorities in both red and blue states agree that Al Goseis and that George Bush s more ofa conservat {HTT Tets on—they Were Not fooled by all the talk about “progressives” “compassionate conservatives.” And finally—and counter to sugge: ‘numerous Democrats afer the clection—majorities in both red and blue sat strongly disagree with the proposition tht they wish Bill Clinton could run again. ‘Clinton was more favorably regarded in the blue states, but Clinton fatigue b ‘more of liberal than he lets ‘no means was limited to the red states. When it comes to issue sentiments, Table 4 shows that ‘Table 4, Red Versus Blue States: Issue Sentiments Should ti up ae cpwyotenaiontate ule ah rs omenic pending tober Sand ede rr nhs of ogra jut oxpniaton chal et Bc cde oi pe pus pitzaton of ee tena Do whatever ic takes to protect the environment cates sine ae citizens. Neary equal numbers of and red state residents think the surplus should be used to pay off the nation ent. A higher proportion of Morris P. Florina 487 inerease domestic spending, and bolster Social Security and Medicare. dogma, Bi state citizens are equally as enthusiastic as d state citizens about abolishing the inheritance tax, giving government grants religious organizations, adopting school vouchers, and partially privatizing cial Security. Overwhelming majorities in both red and blue states favor pro- prescription drugs through Medicare, and solid majorities endorse pro- the environment, whatever it takes. Neither red nor blue state residents high priority o increasing defense spending. Looking at this series ofissue cone wonders why anyone would bother separating respondents into red 1ecategories—the differences are insignificant. _But, we have not considered the specific issues shat-deline-the culture war. ‘able 5 brings us to the heart of the matter—questions of religion, morality, and, =nuality. The proportion of Procestants is significantly higher in the red states, of course, as is the proportion of respondents who report having a "bom again” sperience. There is a real difference here between the heartland and the coasts. significance of this difference fades when we dig deeper. Only a minority state respondents reports being very involved in church activities only ‘more than those blue state respondents who report heavy involve- state respondents report that religion is very Ithy 62 percent majority of blue state sespon- portant in their lives, but a fents feel similarly, Very similar proportions think chusches should stay out of altics, and the minority of red state residents who approve of the clergy talking, Table 5. Red Versus Blue States: Religion and Morals dangerous books from schoo! libraries (yes) ty shouldbe accepted by sociesy Age szongy a an Agee not strongly 16 1488 PUBLIC OPINION Morris P Fiorina 489 politics from the pulpit Book-burners are only fa clear difference in one of the major issues of the culture war, homosexuality, tly smaller than the minority in the blue states. ‘more common in the red states. Finally, there is ‘Table 6. Red Versus Blue States: Political Incinations 4 He Red but probably less-of.a difference than many would have expected, The level of I Frege gave gence cee ‘support for societal acceptance of homosexuality is ten percentage points higher 2 we a ve points if we add those who wafile to those who fully pPsmocrae etf1D* 0 2 accept homosexuality). The differen Republican s1D a a conjures up an image of two coalitions of deeply opposed states engaged ina SaINt ver Opmos saa dd wine ean te Bets — » nu is bevween them. Significantly, this ten-to twelve-point difference on the issue Conservative selF1D Be = ‘ofhomosexual acceptance is about as large a difference as we found between ed oe ———— tnd blue state responcients in the survey. Readers can judge for themselves de justify the military metaphors usualy Thon reign policy jb approval 7 ~ Glinton economic job approval a ” uused to describe them. ‘A legitimate objection to the preceding comparison: Democrats better able to handle econo! citizens rather than just voters. Only about half of the age-cligible clectorate goes E Heme ecomcnty, ca a to the polls in contemporiiy presidental elections, and far fewer vote in lower Republicans beter able to handle economy 2 » is well known that partisanship and ideology are strong core lates of who votes: more intense partisans and more extreme ideologues are” ‘more likely to vote. Thus, itis possible that the wters in ted states differ more from the votes in blue states than the residents do, To consider this possibility we ‘tum to the 2000 National Election Study which—afier the election—asks ind viduals whether and how they voted. In 2000, the NES reported a vote distribu tion reasonably close 10 the actual national division: 50.6 percent of the” respondents reported voting for Gore, 45.5 percent for Bush, and the remainder for minor candidates. ‘Tables 6 and 7 report differences among reported voters in the NES that are only marginally larger than those reported among all respondents in the Pew Survey. Again, the largest difference is forthe vote itself. To reiterate, even fan individual feels 55:45 between the two. es, she has to vote one way orthe ‘ther, The reported vote for Bush is 54 percent in the red states versus 37 percent inthe blue states—a seventeen-point gap, whichis larger than the ten-poin gp in vote intention in the earlier Pew Survey. Selfidentiied Democrats were sig nificantly more common among blue state voters and selFidentified Republica voters. Only minorities of both blue state and fone party could better handle the economy. Fis residents favoring Democratic control ofthe Presiden le 7 indicates that issue preferences in the two categories of states ate sur- imilar in many instances. Four in ten voters in both red and blue states smigration should decrease, and seven in ten believe that English (the proportion is actualy Four in ten voters in both eategories put : employment considerations, a surprising third of the actual electorate in both categories, SelPidentified liber ex light of the image of red states as hotbeds of clear-cutters and blue , but selfidentified conser strongholds of tree-huggers. Narrow majorities of voters in both categories port school vouchers, and large majorities support the death penalty. In nei er bluc nor red states are people wildly in favor of government intervention to490 Pustic oPtstoN ‘Table 7, Red Versus Blue States: Issue Preferences Immigration should decrease* Make English oficial language Environment over jobs Favor school vouchers BS savor desth penalty ‘Government should ensue fair treatment of blacks in ‘employment Blacks should get preferences in hing Seicter gun control [Equal women's ole"* Antend church regularly Moral climate: much worse somewhat worse BD Tolerate others moral views Abortion —always egal Allow homosexual adoption [No gay ob discrimination Favor gaysin miliary (strongly) “mos” of "somewhat ype” response "Seale postions 1-2 ‘ensure fair treatment of Aftican Americans in employment, and virtually ident «al (small) proportions support racial preferences in hiring. Again, when we tum to the specific issues that define the culture war eierences emerge, br there lo ae mmerous surprises. cal. miot iter gun control laws, but sadaesa narsow-majors of zed sate voters. Suppor for women's equi overwhelming and dena ‘among votersin both categories of states. Although regular church attendersa significantly more common in the red states, similar proportions in both red and blue states believe the moral climate of the country has deteriorated since 1992 Morris P Fiorina 491 ntical proportions believe that others’ moral views should be tolerated. "unrestricted abortion is eleven points higher among blue state vot- +h unqualified support fills short of a majority, and more than a third ‘voters offer similarly unqualified support. The 2000 NES is particu- “aly rch in items tapping people's views about matters related to sexual orienta- jon. Here we find diferences between blue and red state voters that are tistical significant, though smaller in magnitude than regular consumers of the news might have expected. A narrow majority of blue state voters would ow homosexuals to adopt children, but so would four in ten red state voters. Solid majorities of votersin both categories support laws that would ban employ- ent discrimination against gays. Sixty percent of blue state voters fully support in the miliary, contrasted with 44 percent of red state voters. This 16 per- ent difference is the single largest disparity we found between the issue prefer- nets of red and blue state voters. Perhaps Bill Clinton picked the one issue in ‘ealm of sexual orientation that was most likely to create controversy. But e evidence support the altemative hypothesis that Clinton's executive order ized the clectorate: according to Gallup data, popular support for gays in military rose through the 1980s and had reached 60 percent in 1989 before slammeting in the wake of Clinton’s executive order. Allin all, che comparison of blue and red state residents who claim to have ated in 2000 scems consistent with the picture reflecting comparisons of all of blue and red states. There are numerous similarities between red and Ue state voters, some differences, and a few notable differences, but litle that 0 mind the portrait ofa culture war between ee