The Network Approach

Key points:
Social networks consist of two basic elements: a set of
actors and the relations between pairs of actors.
The two dimensions of network approach
correspond to these two fundamental aspects of social networks: (1)The first
dimension refers to the actors� attributes, and (2)
deals with the interaction mode in policy
networks, which refers to the degree of cooperation among actors and actor
Coalitions(which has three forms: conflict/competition, bargaining/negotiation, and
cooperation.

Metaphor:
The image of the policy network represents an intuitively comprehensible
metaphor: regular communication and frequent exchange of information lead to
the establishment of stable relationships between actors and to the coordination
of their mutual interests.
However, the problem with that is that the
difficulties already begin with the definition of policy
networks and end with the confusion created by the large number of authors
who use this concept in widely different ways. There are three approaches in which
we can use the network approach:
First, there is the approach that uses the policy network concept to designate a
distinct, new governing structure, which is to be distinguished from, on the one
hand, vertically organized hierarchical forms and, on the other hand, horizon
tally
organized market structures.
A second way to use the concept is to apply it generically to different types of
empirically possible patterns of interaction among public and private actors in
policy-specific subsystems
Third, there is the formalized, quantitative approach of social network analy
sis.
Policy networks constitute �(more or less) stable patterns
of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy
problems and/or policy programmes. The success of network approach according to
Kickert and Koppenjan depends on:(1)
number of actors to be a crucial condition: the fewer the
number of actors involved in interaction processes, the easier it becomes to
reach an agreement, (2) Complexity of policy networks constitutes another key
factor for their management, a factor related to the number of actors involved, (3)

The degree to which networks are self-referential constitutes the third key
aspect for network management, (4)
the absence of sharp
conflicts of interest, (5)
the absence of sharp
conflicts of interest.

Limitations:
The classification of political reality in terms of networks has not allowed us to
make much theoretical progress.
Policy networks, in this perspective, constitute �(more or less) stable patterns
of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around pol
Icy problems and/or policy programs.

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Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory
Punctuated-equilibrium theory seeks to explain a simple observation: political
processes are generally characterized by stability and incrementalism, but
occasionally
they produce large-scale departures from the past.
The punctuated-equilibrium model was originally developed to understand the
dynamics of policy change in subsystems, but it has been extended to a more general
formulation of punctuated change in policymaking
The theory focuses on the interaction of political.
institutions, interest mobilizations, and boundedly rational decisionmaking. And
the dynamics of the interplay among institutions, interests, and attentiveness
have been usefully applied to other advanced democracies as well as a variety of
other policymaking venues. Embedded in the punctuated-equilibrium theory of policy
change is an implicit
theory of individual and collective decisionmaking.

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The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a framework of the policy process
developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith to deal with �wicked� problems�
those involving substantial goal conflicts, important technical disputes, and
multiple actors from several levels of government.

The ACF starts with three �foundation stones�: (1) a macro-level assumption
that most policymaking occurs among specialists within a policy subsystem but
that their behavior is affected by factors in the broader political and
socioeconomic
system; (2) a micro-level �model of the individual� that is drawn heavily
from social psychology; and (3) a meso-level conviction that the best way to deal
with the multiplicity of actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into �advocacy
coalitions.
The recent empirical research still does not explain how coalitions overcome the
free-rider problem of collective action to form and maintain coalition membership
over time (Olson 1965). The ACF provides three rationales for overcoming
the free-rider problem.
First, the
transaction costs of participating in a coalition are relative low compared with
other forms of collective behavior because of shared belief systems, high trust,
and
willingness to distribute costs fairly. Second, the perceived benefits of
participating
in a coalition are exaggerated, especially when policy participants experience the
devil shift in high conflict situations. When policy participants experience the
devil shift, they exaggerate the power and maliciousness of their political
opponents,
which amplifies the severity of losses to a rival coalition and boosts the
benefits of coordinating with coalition allies.
Third, the level of coordination within a coalition varies from strong (e.g.,
developing
a common plan and implementing that plan) to weak (e.g., monitoring ally
activities and responding with complementary strategies) (Zafonte and Sabatier
1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).

Limitations:
ACF states the
Obvious that any experienced policy practitioner can identify the sides of a
political debate.
Second, a growing criticism of the ACF is that it is constantly being revised
and modified.
Third, a long-standing criticism of the ACF is that it does not address the
collective
action problem.
Fourth, one of the underdeveloped aspects of the ACF is the absence of clearly
conceptualized and operationalized institutional variables that structure coalition
formation and behavior, as in the institutional analysis and development framework.

Finally, despite attempts to be clear and explicit in the concepts and causal
processes within the ACF, there remain many unanswered and unexplored questions
like how political opportunity structures affect coalition beliefs, resources
stabilitya nd startegies and what the causal processes are that lead to policy
change after an internal or external shock,

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Innovation and Diffusion Models
in Policy Research

Students of policy innovation explicitly chose to study policy invention inspired

by the idea that the governmental jurisdiction
can innovate by adopting a program that numerous other jurisdictions established
many
years ago.
There are two principal forms of explanation for the adoption of a
new program by a state: internal determinants and diffusion models.
Internal determinants models posit that the factors leading a jurisdiction
to innovate are political, economic, or social characteristics internal to the
State while
diffusion models are inherently intergovernmental;
they view state adoptions of policies as emulations of previous adoptions by other
states. Both types of models were introduced to political scientists in Walker�s
(1969) seminal study of state government innovation across a wide range of
policy areas.
Diffusion models sees states emulate each other for three basic reasons: (1)
states learn from one another as they borrow innovations perceived as
successful elsewhere, (2)
states compete with each other: they emulate policies of other states to
achieve an economic advantage over other states or avoid being disadvantaged, and
(3)
despite the autonomy that states possess
in a federal system, there is pressure on all states to conform to nationally or
regionally accepted standards.
The National Interaction Model
assumes a national communication network among state officials
regarding public-sector programs in which officials learn about programs from
their peers in other states.
This model was developed and formalized by communication theorists
analyzing the diffusion of an innovation through a social system (assumed
to be of fixed size) consisting of individuals.

The Regional Diffusion Model assumes that

states interact with each other
on a national basis, the regional diffusion model posits that states are influenced
primarily by those states geographically proximate.
Both learning and competition can be the basis for assuming that diffusion
channels are regional in nature.

Leader-Laggard Models assumes that

that certain states are pioneers in the adoption of a
policy, and that other states emulate these leaders

Isomorphism Models
argues that a state is most likely to take cues about adopting a new
policy from other states that are similar, as these states provide the best
information
about the nature of the policy and the likely consequences of adopting it.

Vertical Influence Models

sees states as emulating not the policies of other
states�as part of a �horizontal� diffusion process�but, instead, the policies of
the national government.

INTERNAL DETERMINANTS MODELS

Internal determinants models presume that the factors causing a state to adopt a
new program or policy are political, economic, and social characteristics of the
state.

For Internal Determinants Models, several problems with this cross-sectional

regression strategy are immediately
apparent. The first pertains to the year for observing independent variables.
If one measures the independent variables in a year that is later than some states�
adoptions, one winds up attempting to account for the behaviors of these states
with variables measured after the behavior has occurred.
The cross-sectional approach to testing an internal determinants
model does not permit an assessment of the effects of variables that change
substantially
over time; each state is a single case in the analysis, having a fixed value
for each independent variable.
Finally, although the cross-sectional approach is
suitable for testing an internal determinants model in which the propensity to
adopt is defined as the �earliness of adoption,� a cross-sectional model cannot be
used if the dependent variable is conceptualized as the probability of adoption in
a particular year. In addition,
the cross-sectional approach
to testing internal determinants models cannot be trusted to discern whether the
adoptions of a policy by states are actually generated by internal determinants.
For the National Interaction Model,
for any policy for which a graph of the
cumulative proportion of states having adopted against time approximates an
S-shape, the regression approach will generate support for
the national interaction model. Unfortunately, this S-shape will result from any
process that produces a period of infrequent adoptions followed by a period of
more frequent adoptions.
For the Regional Diffusion Models,
the technique is not able to distinguish the two similar�but still distinct�
types of regional diffusion.

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The Policy Process and Large-N
Comparative Studies
Large-N comparative studies are studies with 20 cases or more. The chapter includes
comparison of policy outputs at athe national, subnational, and local levels.
This chapter will consider all of
those types of studies, while focusing primarily upon large-N comparative studies
that have involved the American states.
The Dye Sharkansky-Hofferbert Approach
depict policies as outputs of the
political system, and DSH-style empirical studies have tended to operationalize
those outputs as discrete policy-adoption events or as levels of public
expenditure.
The DSH-style studies demonstrated that, however the new field of
policy studies was to be constructed, it would have to involve more than an
examination of political actors operating within governmental institutions.
The studies also showed that policymakers are constrained
by a host of conditions over which they have limited control, at least in
the short run.

Limitations:
Levels of public expenditure are not valid indicators of policy choices across
political systems because (1) costs and prices vary from place to place, and (2)
efficiency
and level of corruption also vary from place to place, making it still less
clear whether level of expenditure translates into a similar degree of activity or
commitment.
There are three deficiencies involved
in employing policy-adoption events as dependent variables.
First, such counting
begs the question of which policy-adoption events a researcher should select to
represent incidents of policy change produced by the political system in response
to environmental conditions and/or political behavior.
Second, there is the problem of capturing the context within which a policyadoption
event occurs.
Third, there is the challenge of selecting the time period within which
policyadoption
events are counted.
The inability of rhe DSH approach to provide an account of policy change over time
is due to the fact that
the data-selection bias in favor of initial policy adoptions over occurrences
of policy modification or abandonment