Francisco Chavez v. Raul M.

Gonzales and National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February
15, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact

disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between
then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent
DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he
had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV
network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to
them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly
provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false
information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or
broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional
Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement
which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with
sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary

Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

 1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga
in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and
Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary
Gonzalez’s press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by
JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the
same insofar as NTC’s press statement was concerned.]

1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will

NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This
rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger
test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording
in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are
confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the
identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the
evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape,
it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an
adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national security.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation
to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by
the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and
of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all
these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court
should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations
of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump
the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead
to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear
and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the
NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution.

[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of
Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act”
does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

Gaanan vs IAC

R No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed

by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to
Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their
complaint.聽

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also

a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about the
proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
After enumerating the conditions, several calls were made
to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both
parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money

to the complainant's wife at the office of the Department
of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to
the complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by

the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted
earlier before the exchange.

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant

demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to
the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed
against the complainant.聽

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico

with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant
heard the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent.

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of

violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an

interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known
as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that
telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law.

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is

embraced and covered by the term "device" within the
context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part
or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the

prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its
use to overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.

HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph
or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in
the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of

a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same

category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not

exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed
to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount
to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of

the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200.

RAMIREZ V CA

7 NOV

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence
the instant petition.

Issue:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation

Held:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s
meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Felipe Navarro vs Court of

Appeals
November 28, 2010

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 ADVERTISEMENTS

Aggravating Circumstance – Crime Committed in Places where Official

duties are discharged

Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police
station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose
between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then poked
his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then
irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against

Navarro due to the fact that he committed such crime in the police
station?

HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as

policemen are engaged in the discharge of their duties. Since Navarro, who
is a cop, committed the crime inside the police station, an aggravating
circumstance is appreciated against him.

Felipe Navarro vs Court of Appeal

Aggravating Circumstance – Crime Committed in Places where Official

duties are discharged

Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police
station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose
between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then poked
his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then
irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against
Navarro due to the fact that he committed such crime in the police
station?

HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as

policemen are engaged in the discharge of their duties. Since Navarro, who
is a cop, committed the crime inside the police station, an aggravating
circumstance is appreciated against him.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

7 NOV

G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However,

the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied
her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with
the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and
any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on
how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest
of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition
for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting
evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it
impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal
from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The
error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law,
properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of
by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained,
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge
an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as
a mode of redress.