On the Knowledge of the Celestial Bodies:

al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt X.9 and Its Reception in the Commentary Tradition

M. Cüneyt Kaya

Istanbul University, Department of Philosophy

As a special work that Ibn Sīnā himself paid a particular importance on it in his

corpus, al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt has become one of the most popular philosophical

works after Ibn Sīnā and just the quantities of the commentaries and glosses on it show

its distinction in that period. al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, which has some peculiarities in

terms of its classification, style and terminology, has always been referred firstly to

figure out Ibn Sīnā’s preferences in philosophical issues both in classical and modern

times. Apart from these general features of the work, the mystical terminology in its last

two chapters, which are called “Stages of the Knowers” (maqāmāt al-ʻārifīn) and

“Mysteries of the Miracles” (asrār al-āyāt) respectively, has increased attention to these

chapters particularly throughout the post-Ibn Sīnā period, and one who wants to present

Ibn Sīnā as a “mystic” has usually preferred to support his arguments on the basis of

these two chapters.

In this paper, I will focus on the ninth passage (tanbīh) of the tenth and the last

chapter of al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt and the reception of this interesting passage in the

commentary tradition on this work.


This paper was presented at the international symposium entitled Avicenna Reloaded:
Analyzing a Muslim Polymath from a Present View, in May 12-13, 2017, Osnabrück, Germany, organized
by Institute of Islamic Theology at University of Osnabrück.

1
 The ninth passage, which provides the metaphysical and cosmological principles

of receiving knowledge about the non-sensible world (ġayb), initially explains the

standard theory on this issue through referring to the previous chapters of the work.

According to the standard theory, particulars of the sublunary world are imprinted in the

intellects of the celestial bodies in a universal manner. On the other hand, souls of the

celestial bodies perceive only the particulars and they have particular wills based on

these particular perceptions. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the souls of the

celestial bodies conceive the concomitants of the things occur in the sublunary world,

which are caused by the particular movements of the celestial bodies (Ibn Sīnā 1392hš, p.

375)

At this point, Ibn Sīnā attempts to go beyond –or if I may say so- stretch the

standard theory. It is worth quoting his words to follow the explanations made by the

commentators later:

“Furthermore, if what a kind of contemplation ‫يلوحه من النظر مستورا ً إال على الراسخين في‬
ّ ‫ثم إن كان ما‬
(naẓar) reveals implicitly (mastūran) only to those ‫الحكمة المتعالية أن لها بعد العقول المفارقة التي هي لها‬
who are well grounded (al-rāsiḫīn) in the
‫كالمادئ نفوسا ً ناطقة غير منطبعة في موادها بل لها معها‬
transcendental philosophy (al-ḥikmat al-
ً‫عالقة ما كما لنفوسنا مع أبداننا وأنها تنال بتلك العالقة كماال‬
mutaʻāliya) is true –namely, that the celestial
‫ما حقّا ُ صار لألجسام السماوية زيادة معنى في ذلك لتظاهر‬
bodies have, apart from the separate intellects that
‫رأي جزئي وآخر كلي يجتمع لك مما نبهنا عليه أن للجزئيات‬
belong to them as principles, rational souls that are
ً ‫في العالم العقلي نقشا ً على هيأة كلية وفي العالم النفساني نقشا‬
not imprinted in their matters, further possess a
(Ibn Sīnā .ً ‫على هيأة جزئية شاعرة بالوقت أو النقشان معا‬
certain relation to their matters (as do our

[rational] souls with regard to our bodies), and that 1392hš, p. 375-6)

by virtue of this relation, the celestial bodies attain

a kind of perfection– then the celestial bodies have

an additional function at this point which through

2
it they manifest a particular opinion (ra’y) and

another universal one. You gather from what we

have pointed out that particular things are

imprinted in the intelligible world in a universal

manner and are imprinted in the world of souls (al-

ʻālam al-nafsānī) in a particular manner and

perceiving the time, or are imprinted in the world

of souls in both manners simultaneously” (Inati

1996, p. 96, the translation has been slightly

modified, and the original terms have been added

by myself)

As the quoted text indicates, Ibn Sīnā seems to reach a different conclusion from

the widespread theory about the nature and the knowledge of the celestial bodies. Using

an indirect style, he says that he himself has reached this consequence through “a kind

of contemplation”, which has an obscure nature, and argues that this contemplation

makes only one who is well grounded in the transcendental philosophy –which most

probably refers to the discipline of metaphysics- reach this conclusion. Then, every

celestial bodies, except its separate intellect which is the cause of its existence, has a

rational soul that is not imprinted in it. The relationship between the celestial bodies and

their rational souls is similar to the relationship between our rational souls with our

bodies, and the celestial bodies, like our bodies, obtain “a kind of perfection” through

this relation. Furthermore, for Ibn Sīnā, this new situation provides an additional

function to the celestial bodies, namely they have both universal and particular opinions

simultaneously. Although the standard theory offers that the particulars of the sublunary

world are known by the separate intellects in a universal manner and by the souls of the

3
celestial bodies in a particular and temporal manner, Ibn Sīnā’s new theory proposes

that the souls of the celestial bodies can know the particulars both universally and

particularly.

What Ibn Sīnā refers at the beginning of this passage as “as you have learned

earlier” is apparently tenth passage (tanbīh) of the sixth chapter (VI.10). This passage,

which aims to argue that the movements of the celestial bodies are not derived from the

separate intellects, but from their souls, ends mysteriously like X.9. For Ibn Sīnā, the

relation of the separate intellects with the celestial bodies is not comparable to the

relation of our rational souls with our bodies. Because, our rational souls attain

perfection through their relation with our bodies and thus they compose “an animal”

together. In the case of the absence of this relation, our bodies and rational souls will be

two different substances and they will not affect each other. Consequently, celestial

bodies must have, for him, either a particular will that is imprinted in it or a universal

will that is separate from it. Abstaining from using a certain judgment, Ibn Sīnā says

that if the second option is accepted, then the soul, which has a universal will, is going

to get perfection through the relationship between itself and the celestial sphere and he

describes clearly this conclusion as a “mystery” (sirr) (Ibn Sīnā 1392hš, p. 298-99).

I am sure that you have immediately realized what these two passages offer

anew to Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical doctrine: While he clearly mentions the rational souls

of the celestial bodies, it is ambiguous that whether he qualifies the souls in the standard

doctrine as “rational” or creates a new category, which is “rational soul”, apart from the

souls of the celestial bodies which are the causes of their movements. Moreover he

argues that the celestial bodies that are actual and perfect beings eternally attain a kind

of perfection through their relation with those rational souls. The new conclusion in the

4
context of the passages is that the souls of the celestial bodies have the knowledge of

the particulars in the sublunary world particularly, temporally and universally.

Since the opportunities and contradictions that these new elements raise in the

philosophy of Ibn Sīnā need to be searched independently, I will restrict myself here

with how these passages has been commented by the scholars who wrote commentaries

on al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, and present the first outputs of my ongoing research.

However, I must remind a constraint at this point: Apart from al-Masʻūdī’s (d. right

after 582/1186) criticisms on al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, the first initiator of the

commentary tradition is Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). Although al-Rāzī’s

commentary, which according to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1273) report was known

not a commentary (šarḥ), but a wounding (ǧarḥ), represents a real challenge to the

philosophy of Ibn Sīnā on the basis of al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, he stops criticizing

when he reaches the ninth chapter saying that the rest of the work is the most valuable

part of it and Ibn Sīnā put the knowledge of sufis in order there. It seems that al-Rāzī’s

explanatory, uncritical style in the last two chapters of his commentary affected the

following literature profoundly. Neither al-Ṭūsī, whose aim was to support Ibn Sīnā’s

philosophy against al-Rāzī’s attacks, nor scholars who wrote commentaries on al-Išārāt

wa al-tanbīhāt to reconcile between al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī commented on the last two

chapters, but they just paraphrased the content. Despite these restraints, I will discuss

the subject on the basis of the commentaries of al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna (d.

683/1274) and Akmal al-Dīn al-Naḫǧuwānī (d. after 701/1302) focusing on the X.9

primarily and using the VI.10 to support the argument.

The one who indicated the contradiction between the two theories was, of

course, al-Rāzī. For him, the theory that was justified in the previous chapters of al-

5
Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt and repeated at the beginning of the X.9 by Ibn Sīnā himself can

be reduced to two propositions: (i) Abstract intellects know the particulars in a universal

way, because all particulars are based on these intellects ultimately in the sense of their

existence and the knowledge of the cause necessarily requires the knowledge of the

caused. (ii) Each celestial sphere has a soul, which is a corporal power. Celestial bodies

know through these souls the particulars, because the things that take place in the

sublunary world temporally are based on the movements of the celestial bodies and the

approximate causes of these movements are the souls. Since the knowledge of the cause

requires the knowledge of the caused one, the souls of the celestial bodies know all

particulars in the sublunary world (al-Rāzī 1384hš, p. 639-40).

Al-Rāzī thinks that the account of Ibn Sīnā in X.9 implies that we face with a

different and new case in this context. According to this new case, the celestial bodies

have rational souls apart from their separate intellects and corporal souls. This new

element is neither a body nor corporal in itself, however has a kind of relation with its

celestial sphere and through this relation obtains the renewed perfections. So, the

rational souls of the celestial bodies are similar to our rational souls: Our rational souls

are neither bodies nor corporal, but since they have a kind of relation with our bodies,

they have the possibility to obtain the rational perfections. Consequently, al-Rāzī says

that the particulars of the sublunary world are known by separate intellects, and rational

souls and corporal souls together. Al-Rāzī explains the nature of the additional function

of the two souls of the celestial bodies –one knows the particulars, and other knows the

universals- in terms of their movements. Two souls of the celestial bodies caused by

their movements are composed of two opinions: the universal opinion of the rational

soul and the particular opinion of the corporal soul. For al-Rāzī, in this case the

6
movements of the celestial bodies become similar to the acts of human beings. Because

the movements whose principles are both understanding (taʻaqqul) and imagination

(taḫayyul) are more valuable than the movements whose principle is just imagination,

and it seems that, as a new element, the rational souls of the celestial bodies refer to the

aspect of understanding (al-Rāzī 1384hš, p. 640-41).

Al-Rāzī who indicates the two types of imprinting at the end of the passage says

that Ibn Sīnā emphasized this point to explain the different modes of knowing in terms

of the souls (both corporal and rational) and separate intellects. For him both the

separate intellects and the souls of the celestial bodies know the particulars constantly.

Although it is true in the case of the separate intellects, it is also true in the case of the

souls of the celestial bodies, because they are the causes of the particulars. These two

types of knowledge are found in the celestial bodies without any priority and

posteriority. Finally, al-Rāzī links these explanations with the general aim of the

section: Since the rational souls of the human beings can get in touch with these

principles, i.e. separate intellects and the souls, and these principles know all particulars,

knowledge of the particulars can be imprinted in rational souls of the human beings.

Thus, the rational souls of the human beings can perceive the particulars before they

emerge and give information about the non-sensible world (al-Rāzī 1384hš, p. 641-42).

Another interesting point in the context of al-Rāzī is that, in his famous al-

Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya fī ʻilm al-ṭabīʻiyyāt wa al-ilāhiyyāt written before the

commentary on al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, he referred to the doctrinal contradiction in the

works of Ibn Sīnā on this subject. According to al-Rāzī, Ibn Sīnā argued in his Risālat fī

al-saʻādat wa al-ḥuǧaǧ al-ʻašara ʻalā anna al-nafs al-insāniyya ǧawhar, known as al-

Tuḥfat also, that the souls of the celestial bodies must be rational, neither vegetative nor

7
animal, while he maintained in his al-Šifā’, al-Naǧāt and al-Išārāt (most probably al-

Rāzī refers to VI.10 of it) that the souls of the celestial bodies are corporal, and they

cannot be separated from the matter, and their relation with their matter is similar to the

relation of our animal souls with the bodies (al-Rāzī 1990, vol. II, p. 110-12). Al-Rāzī,

who repeats this criticism somewhere else in the same work, thinks that this is a very

problematic subject and it originates from Ibn Sīnā’s argument according to which one

cannot know the universals and particulars simultaneously. I think al-Rāzī explains the

“mystery” in VI.10 with this problematic theory: It is a mystery to argue in a certain

way that the celestial sphere has both a separate rational soul and another soul

simultaneously and its relation with the celestial sphere is similar to the relation of our

animal souls with our bodies (al-Rāzī 1990, vol. II, p. 451-52).

Al-Ṭūsī’s comments on X.9 are astonishing because of his justification of the

contradictions in Ibn Sīnā’s views. He says that the first part of the passage argues in

harmony with the Aristotelian tradition that all sensible particulars, which are the result

of the movements of the celestial bodies, are imprinted in the souls of the celestial

bodies, but the rational universals must be placed at somewhere else. For al-Ṭūsī, the

quoted part of the passage expresses Ibn Sīnā’s own view that is against the Aristotelian

approach. Ibn Sīnā maintains there that the celestial bodies have rational souls and these

souls know both particulars and universals together. Al-Ṭūsī’s comments on VI.10 also

support his evaluation on X.9. For him, the Aristotelian approach defends that the

celestial bodies have particular wills that are intrinsic in their bodies. However Ibn Sīnā

thinks that the celestial bodies should have separate universal wills. Therefore this soul,

which has a separate universal will, has a relation with the celestial sphere and the soul

obtains perfection from the rational substance, i.e. separate intellect, through the

8
celestial sphere. This, for al-Ṭūsī, is similar to the affluence that our rational souls attain

from the active intellect through our bodies. Then, why did Ibn Sīnā use an imprecise

style to express his own preference? Al-Ṭūsī thinks that since Ibn Sīnā did not want to

stand against the Aristotelian tradition in a definite way, he preferred to use this kind of

vague language. He also explains the “mystery” at the end of the VI.10 with Ibn Sīnā’s

own theory: To argue that there is a soul that has a universal will apart from the soul

that has a particular will is a mystery (Ibn Sīnā 1375hš, vol. III, p. 400).

While al-Rāzī did not mention the “transcendental philosophy” in particular, al-

Ṭūsī is the first one who comments on it as a new method of philosophizing. Referring

to the terminology of al-Suhrawardī, al-Ṭūsī considers that while the Aristotelian

philosophy is based on the rational investigation (baḥt), this kind of subjects must be

solved not just by using rational investigation and demonstration, but through mystical

experience and illumination (kašf and ḍawq). Thus this type of philosophizing

transcends the Aristotelian philosophy because of its comprehensive character of both

demonstration and mystical illumination. For him, the last sentence of the X.9 also

consists of the elements that present us the new approach of Ibn Sīnā. While the first

part of the sentence, i.e., “(...) particular things are imprinted in the intelligible world in

a universal manner and are imprinted in the world of souls in a particular manner and

perceiving the time”, refers to the standard Aristotelian doctrine, the second part of it,

i.e., “or are imprinted in the world of souls in both manners simultaneously” is related

to Ibn Sīnā’s own preference (Ibn Sīnā 1375hš, vol. III, p. 401).

As a striking follower of Ibn Sīnā and al-Suhrawardī in the post-classical period,

Ibn Kammūna’s comments on the X.9 should be noted here because of his clear

reference to al-Suhrawardī. Following al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna thinks that the celestial

9
bodies’ having rational souls can only be known implicitly by ones who are well

grounded in the transcendental philosophy which includes both the rational

investigation and mystical experience together. In the case that the souls of the celestial

bodies are immanent in the matters of the celestial bodies without being abstracted, they

cannot know the universals, and just know the sensible particulars. This means that the

rational universals are imprinted in one thing, and the sensible particulars are imprinted

in another thing. However, if it is accepted that the celestial bodies have rational souls,

since the universal and particular opinion will be in the rational souls, the particulars

will be imprinted more perfectly. Namely, some universal rules will emerge in the souls

of the celestial bodies through their principles, such as “When it happens so and so, then

it happens so and so”. When these souls imagine all consequences of these rules, they

know the concomitants of their movements in a conditional manner, i.e., “It happened

so and so, then it happened so and so” or “It did not happen so and so, then it did not

happen so and so”. For Ibn Kammūna, while the Aristotelian doctrine makes possible

for a heavenly soul to know the particulars in a particular manner and perceive the time,

for ones who argue that the celestial bodies have separate souls, both “imprints” can

appear in the world of the souls. It is interesting to note that Ibn Kammūna justifies his

comments not by referring to the previous arguments of Ibn Sīnā, but by using his own

comments on al-Suhrawardī’s al-Talwīḥāt. Although Ibn Kammūna refers to his own

commentary on al-Talwīḥāt, the quotation is based on al-Suhrawardī’s al-Mašāriʻ wa

al-muṭāraḥāt. According to the doctrine that al-Suhrawardī narrates as a common

opinion of the Babylonians, Ḫusrawānīs (Sassanid), Indian philosophers, ancient

Egyptians and Greeks, the existence of a thing that knows all things which will happen

in the future in the sublunary world in a hierarchical order requires that everything in

10
the external world will occur repeatedly. However, for al-Suhrawardī, this does not

emerge through the creation of he same thing that disappeared, but through the creation

of its similar. Moreover, although al-Suhrawardī’s words in his al-Talwīḥāt are inspired

by Ibn Sīnā’s account in al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, he comments on it in a different way:

For al-Suhrawardī, the celestial bodies have rational souls that have particular wills. On

the other hand the celestial bodies have two other aspects; one is similar to our

theoretical faculty, and the other to our practical faculty. Thus they have universal

opinions, knowledge and particular movements which are obtained from their principles

(Ibn Kammūna MS, fol. 277r-279v).

Finally, I want to touch on al-Naḫǧuwānī’s contribution briefly. Following al-

Ṭūsī, he comments first on X.9 and then focuses on clarifying the relationship between

VI.10 and X.9. For him, Ibn Sīnā’s account in VI.10 is completely different from what

he said in X.9, because he says there that the celestial bodies have rational souls. He

also argues there that the rational souls of the celestial bodies obtain perfection through

the movements of the celestial bodies. However, since all eternal beings are perfect

from all aspects and do not need any actual beings, it must be justified from the

perspective of the philosophical system of Ibn Sīnā. For al-Naḫǧuwānī, although the

view that the celestial bodies have rational souls apart from their corporal souls was not

accepted by Aristotle and the “columns of wisdom” (asāṭīn al-ḥikma) and Ibn Sīnā

himself tried to show that view is impossible, but, when this view has become

widespread among the muḥaṣṣilūn, he tolerated his colleagues’ preference and said at

the end of VI.10: “As for the soul of the heaven, it has a universal will or a particular

will, and through this it, if it is possible, gains perfection. There is a mystery in this

subject”. Al-Naḫǧuwānī argues that this does not mean that Ibn Sīnā says that the

11
celestial bodies have rational souls and become more perfect through it, rather he wants

to show that how it can be justified if it is admitted (al-Naḫǧuwānī MS, fol. 160r-163r).

Consequently, X.9 and VI.10 of al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt provide us with

remarkable insights into the change or evolution in the philosophical views of Ibn Sīnā.

Although I have restricted myself in this paper especially with these two passages and

the comments on it, one should examine particularly what this evolution means in his

philosophy in general and how it was viewed and commented by his pupils and direct

followers apart from the later commentators. Besides their contents, these passages

should also be studied with regard to the new methodology that the term of al-ḥikmat

al-mutaʻāliyat offers according to some commentators. I think it can be evaluated as a

good starting point to scrutinize the reception of Ibn Sīnā as a mystic and/or

illuminationist philosopher in the post-classical period.

Bibliography

Ibn Kammūna: Šarḥ al-uṣūl wa al-ǧumal min muhimmāt al-ʽilm wa al-ʽamal.

MS Süleymaniye Library, Laleli 2516.
Ibn Sīnā: al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt. ed. Muǧtabā al-Zāriʽī. Tahrān 1392hš.
Ibn Sīnā: al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt (with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s šarḥ and Quṭb al-
Dīn al-Rāzī’s šarḥ al-šarḥ). Qum 1375hš.
Inati, Shams: Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism: Remarks and Admonitions (Part Four).
London & New York 1996.
al-Naḫǧuwānī, Akmal al-Dīn: [al-Ḥawāšī wa al-taʽlīqāt ʽalā kitāb al-Išārāt].
MS Süleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye 2689.
al-Rāzī, Faḫr al-Dīn: al-Mabāḥiṯ al-mašriqiyya fī ʻilm al-ṭabīʻiyyāt wa al-
ilāhiyyāt. ed. Muʽtaṣim-billāh al-Baġdādī. Beirut 1990.
al-Rāzī, Faḫr al-Dīn: Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa al-tanbīhāt. ed. ʽAlī Rıḍā Naǧāfzāda.
Tahrān 1384hš.

12