Case: Umali vs.

GUingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)

Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for Certiorari Prohibition and
Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents. It was on October 27, 1993 when Osmundo
Umali was appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos.
The late President received a memorandum alleging against the petitioner in violation of internal
revenue laws during the incumbency as Regional Director. On October 6, 1994, President Ramos issued
an Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing the petitioner from service with forfeiture of retirement and
all benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Office of the President
denied the motion for reconsideration. December 1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial
Court of Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of Administrative Order No. 152.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure

(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no.
152

(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise
the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision

(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner,
there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no.
152

Ruling:

(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure

NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure.
The petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO eligible
entitled to security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he wasn't
able to provide sufficient evidence on this matter.

(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no.
152

NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure, petitioner was not denied
the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and
other pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he
attended the hearings before the investigatory body.
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise
the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision

The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage
of the proceedings below

(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner,
there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no.
152

The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and
not on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.

Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the petitioner does not constitute any valid
legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals. However considering
antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has decided to consider the dismissal and because the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally the
Solicitor General has no more basis to enact Administrative Order No. 152.

Dispositive:

Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of
its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition Accordingly Administrative order no 152 is
considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits No pronouncement as to
costs.
Arceta vs. Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004]

Facts:

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an
Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued
a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well-
knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to
make arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice. Arceta did not move to
have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional.
She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was
highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21
October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. However, she manifested that her
arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend
proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayers for a temporary restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).
On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the Information that on or
about the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the amount of P2,500,000.00
dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
subsequently dishonored for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay
the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check
has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on
the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment
or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with the
Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.

Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the present economic and financial crisis, else
due to the undue burden made upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases.

Held:

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case
and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very
lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of
unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel’s spirited advocacy in both cases,
the Court was unable to agree that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the
constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the contentions
of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed
a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis
to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano,
it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in
the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be
deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial
courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity
of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
MACIAS VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-18684 32 SCRA 1 September 14, 1961
LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO MERCADO and
MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as National
Treasurer, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan
and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented
to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their
respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege
that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because:

1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3
calendar days prior to passage.
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population.
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Issues:
Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is in accordance with the
constitution.

Discussions:
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives “shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective
inhabitants.” A law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those
with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by
the Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is “arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of
equality.” as held in Houghton County v. Blacker.

Rulings:
No. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said
constitutional provision in several ways namely:

 It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only.
 It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only
 Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having
been assigned to it.
 Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only.
 Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three.
 Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904)
got two. These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment.
 Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And
then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only.
And Leyte with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and
not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the
new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq.
km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
“the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No.
136781. October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives
although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as
the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001

Facts: Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections.
Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or
overrepresented.

Issues:

a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections

b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations.

Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC which will determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court
directed the COMELEC “to refrain proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain in force
until after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.

a. Yes
b. No.

Rationale:

a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution
and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3
expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties
or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system
is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be
provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.
 AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)

Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition
for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and
13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community
for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION OF
ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300

Facts:

March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification
with the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the
constitutional requirementfor residency. March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected
certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. The
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not
qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of Representatives for the
First District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the election.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined
that Marcos posses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until
1995 election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration
record in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming
20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his
residence for the preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio
Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency
requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for
annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming
choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that
the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect.
Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor
and even paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends
to prevent the possibility of a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the
community from seeing an elective office to serve that community.”
SANTIAGO v. GUINGONA

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to
2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position
of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also
a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the
majority leaderinformed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the
7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona
as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators
Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator
Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from

the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the
Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipsofacto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President

and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art.
VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by the Court.
Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco
83 Phil. 17 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election of
Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate
floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to
do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed
the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked
by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being
out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad
however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino
just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his
followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was
so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to
Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was
unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case.
This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should
not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case
because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the
petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving
the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met
with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor
was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session
(presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum
constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes
entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each
House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority
of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and
that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong.
Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president.
There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other
abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which
if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There
being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the
result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become
a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would
result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from
the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s
persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC
believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of
the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision
was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but
on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who
are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance
of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each
house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to
constitute a quorum.That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and
not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which
required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a
member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require
“the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual
members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and
therefore 12 constituted a majority.
 PAC ET E V. CO M M ISIO N O N APPO INT M ENT S (1971)

Fer na n do , J .:

FA CT S:

- O n A pr i l 14 , 1 96 6 , P e ti t io n er F e l i za rd o P ac et e, a l l eg i n g th at he was ap p o in t ed b y t h e
Pr es id e nt as t h e M u n i c i pa l J ud g e of P igc a w a ya n , C ot a ba to , f i l ed a s u i t f or m an dam us
an d pro h i bi t io n t o c om pe l th e Sec r e tar y of C om m is s i on on A p po i nt m ents t o is s u e h im
c ert if ic a te of c o nf ir m at i on .

- P et i ti o ne r wa s a p po i nt e d o n Au g us t 31 , 1 96 4 . H e as s um ed of f ic e o n Se p tem be r 1 1,
19 6 4 a nd d is c h ar g e d h is d ut i es as s uc h.

- His a pp o i ntm en t was m ade d ur i ng r ec es s of C o ng res s ba n d was s ubm it t ed at i ts n ex t

s es s io n i n 1 96 5 , O n M a y 2 0, 1 9 65 , H is ap p o i ntm en t was un a n im ou s l y c o nf irm ed .

- O n Fe br ua r y 7, 1 9 66 , T he S ec r e t ar y of J us t i c e s e nt h im a l et t er or der i n g h im to vac at e
h is pos i t io n b ec a us e h is c o nf ir m at i on was b y - pas s e d.

-W hen he i nq u ir ed a bo u t i t, he l ear n ed t ha t o n M a y 2 1 , 1 9 65 , o ne da y af te r h is
c onf irm at io n, S e n. R of o lf o G a n zo n , m em ber of Com m is s io n o n A pp o in tm ents , wr ot e t o
Ch a irm an of t he Com m is s io n o n Ap p oi n tm ents t o f i l e f o r a m oti o n f or r ec ons i d er a t io n
on pe t it i o ner ’s c onf ir m at i on i n v i e w of de ro g a tor y i nf orm at io n rec e i v ed b y S e n. G a n zo n.

- T he Sec r et ar y of Com m is s io n o n A pp o in tm ents no t if i ed S ec r et ar y of J us t ic e re g ar di n g

th e pr ac t ic e t h at a m o ti o n of r ec ons i d era t io n a ut om at ic a l l y c anc e ls th e c o nf irm at i on of
ap p o in tm ent in qu es t i o n.

- P et i ti o ne r c o nt e nds t ha t t h e C om m is s i on o n A p p oi n tm ents ex erc i s es p o wer to ap pr o v e

or r ej ec t a p po i ntm e nt s thr u m aj or it y v o tes of m em bers in t he q uor um an d no t t hr u
m em bers i nd i v i du a l l y as pr o vi d e d b y S ec . 1 0 of its R u les .
- Res ponden ts c ontend that the Suprem e Court has no j uris dic tio n bec aus e the c as e
on l y i n v ol v es i nt er n al r u les of C om m is s io n o n A pp o i ntm en ts . T her e are n o c o ns t it u ti o n al
qu es ti o ns i n vo l v e d.

IS S U E S A ND R UL IN G :

IS S U E # 1: W O N SU P R E M E CO U RT H A S J UR IS DI CT IO N

Ye s . T he c as e in v o l v es i nt er pr et at i on of t he C o ns t i tu t io n re g ar d in g t he po we rs of
Com m is s io n o n A pp o i ntm en ts .

IS S U E # 2: W O N P ET IT IO NE R ’ S A P PO INT M ENT MU ST B E CO NFI RM E D

Ye s . T he c o n tr o l l i ng pr inc i p le is A lt ar ej os v. Mo l o wh ic h i n ter pr et e d Ru l e 2 1 of t h e
Re v is ed Ru l es of Com m is s io n o n A p po i ntm e nts . It he l d t ha t m er e f il i ng of m ot io n f or
rec o ns i der a ti o n d i d n o t h a ve th e ef f ec t of s e tt i ng as i d e a c onf irm at i on . I ns t e ad , i t wi l l
on l y re o p en t h e ap p o i ntm en t a nd s u bm it it f or a ppr o v a l or d is ap pr o va l b y t h e m aj or i t y
of m em bers of t he C o m m is s io n on A pp o in tm en ts .

Mo re o v er, t h er e is d is ti nc t i o n b et we e n a p po i ntm en ts m ad e dur i n g rec es s of Co n gres s

an d a p p oi n tm ents wh i le Co n gr es s is in s es s io n. W hen C o ng r es s is i n s es s io n ,
pres i d en t ia l nom i ne es c a n o n l y as s um e of f ic e o nc e c onf irm ed b y t he Com m is s io n o n
A pp o i ntm en ts .

W hen C on gr es s is i n r ec es s , th e P res i de n t m ak es a d i n ter im a pp o i n tm ents wh ic h

tak e ef f ec t a t onc e. T he in d i v id u a l c hos e n m a y q u a l if y a nd p erf o rm his f u nc t i o n. T h e
ap p o in tm ent is ef f ec t i v e un t i l th e d is ap pr o v a l of t he C om m is s io n on Ap p o in tm ents or
nex t a dj o ur nm ent of C on gr es s .
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which

amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners,
who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated
so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack
of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections
to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr.
Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House

with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum
is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
case no. 45 Congress Power to discipline its members

Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)

F: The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent the 12th
Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate
composed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924, depriving Alejandrino
of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of 1
yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de
Vera on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of
the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's
complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect.

Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate
him in his official position?

Held.
The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore
pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they have exclusive control.The
courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.
Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada
Pendatun

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations
were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the
lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered
in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.