FRANCISCO de GUZMAN, Deceased, Substituted by ARTEMIO CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. MARIA CALMA, FRANCISCO CALDERON and DEMETRIA CALMA, Defendants and Appellants.
FRANCISCO de GUZMAN, Deceased, Substituted by ARTEMIO CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellee, Vs. MARIA CALMA, FRANCISCO CALDERON and DEMETRIA CALMA, Defendants and Appellants.
FRANCISCO de GUZMAN, Deceased, Substituted by ARTEMIO CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. MARIA CALMA, FRANCISCO CALDERON and DEMETRIA CALMA, Defendants and Appellants.
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, deceased, substituted by ARTEMIO CRUZ, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARIA CALMA, FRANCISCO CALDERON and DEMETRIA CALMA, defendants and appellants. Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac which held that: (1) the plaintiffs had sold to the Calderons two lots only, to wit: Lot No. 623 (30 hectares) and the whole 1089 of Lot No. 1541; (2) that all other stipulations in Exhibit J were not known to him; (3,) and that Exhibits K, L, and M, were null and void. Appealed judgment revoked and it is held: (1) that plaintiff’s request for reformation of Exhibit J should be and is hereby denied. However, the question whether the 31 parcels listed therein are paraphernal or conjugal property is not now decided, the matter belongs to the proceedings for the liquidation of the estate of Francisco de Guzman. We merely say he signed document Exhibit J, with full knowledge of its contents. (2) Powers of attorney Exhs. K and M, were duly signed by Francisco de Guzman with full knowledge thereof. It is unnecessary to make any pronouncement as to the effect of the revocation thereof since it has been duly recorded, and Francisco de Guzman has already died, and there is no claim of any transaction made by his attorneys-in-fact. (3) The “Escritura de Renuncia”, Exhibit L, has been duly signed by Francisco de Guzman with full knowledge of its contents. The results thereof and the validity of the stipulations should be discussed in the proceedings to wind up the affairs of his state. (4) Costs shall be paid in both instances by the plaintiff-appellee. Bengzon, J., ponente.
VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 339 Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence ANNOTATION WEIGHT, EFFECT, AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE By Atty. ROBERTO A. ABAD
1. § 1.Degrees of Proof Required, p. 339.
1. A—In Criminal Cases, p. 339.
2. B—In Civil Cases, p. 340.
1. § 2.Positive versus Negative Evidence, p. 341.
2. § 3.Number of Witnesses and Their Credebility, p. 341. 3. § 4.Need for Corroboration of Testimony, p. 342. 4. § 5.Circumstantial Evidence, p. 343. 5. § 6.Expert Testimony; Opinions, p. 345.
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§ 1. Degrees of Proof Required
a) In Criminal Cases. —In criminal cases, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element constituting the crime, upon which the conviction and punishment must be based. U.S. vs. Capa and Cariño, 19 Phil. 125. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence and to preclude every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It has been said that a reasonable doubt is the doubt of a reasonable man under all circumstances of the case. The statement is too general and includes too much. Neither does the rule that the judge must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt mean that he must be convinced to an absolute certainty. This construction would preclude a conviction upon circumstantial evidence. U.S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3. 340 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence By reasonable doubt of guilt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. U.S. vs. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90. Moreover, the doubt, to the benefit of which the accused is entitled in a criminal trial, is a reasonable doubt and not a whimsical or fanciful doubt, based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence, U.S. vs. Brobst, Moreland and Johnson, JJ., dissenting, 14 Phil. 310. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances in a criminal case are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. People vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1; People vs. Agpangan, 79 Phil. 334; People vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78; and People vs. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711. b) In Civil Cases. —In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. The preponderance of evidence is where the superior weight of evidence on the issues lies. Sec. 1, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court. The phrase preponderance of evidence means the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” 30 Am. Jur. 2d 338-339. It has also been invariably construed as meaning the slightest difference in the weight of the evidence or as the more credible or the more probable evidence or as evidence which is more convincing and satisfactory to the mind of the court or as evidence of greater convincing force. Vivian Collieries Co. vs. Cahall, 110 N.E. 672; U.S. vs. Southern Pacific Co., 157 F. 459; US. vs. McCaskill, 200 F. 332; Browning vs. Bailey, 261, S.W. 350; Thurman vs. Miller, 98 N.E. 379. Preponderance of evidence is not meant the mere numerical array of witnesses, but it means the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side. It means that the testimony adduced by one side is more credible and conclusive than that of the other. Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 190. It is a phrase which, in the last analysis, 341 VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 341 Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence means probability of truth. 30 Am. Jur. 2d 339. The rule is that where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or, in other words, is evenly balanced between the parties, or there is any doubt on which side the evidence preponderates the party having the burden of proof fails upon the issue. 32A C.J.S. 639-640. § 2. Positive versus Negative Evidence Evidence of a positive nature is entitled to more weight than that which is merely negative in character. People vs. Velayo, L-7257, February 8, 1955; People vs. Peralta, L-4497, February 18, 1953; People vs. Antonio, L-3458, October 29, 1951; People vs. Osi, L-2688, February 27, 1950; People vs. Aribas, 82 Phil. 395; People vs. Lansanas,82 Phil. 193; People vs. Macalindong, 76 Phil. 719; People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 719; People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473. The negative testimony of a witness cannot prevail as against the positive affirmations of persons testifying to facts observed and investigated. People vs. Solon, 79 Phil. 214. Pure surmise on the part of the defense in a criminal prosecution cannot overcome the positive testimony of state witnesses. People vs. Telan, 17921 & 17922, June 29, 1962. It has been held that mere denials by the defendant in a murder prosecution cannot in any degree weaken the positive testimony of a prosecution witness that appears to be intrinsically credible. People vs. Sawah, L-15333, June 29, 1962. Further still, negative evidence cannot overcome the state’s positive proof, especially where there is absence of adequate motive for the state witnesses to testify falsely against the accused. People vs. Repato, L-17892, September 29, 1962. § 3. Number of Witnesses and Their Credibility The weight of evidence is not ordinarily to be based upon the number of witnesses appearing for one side or the other, but rather upon their credibility. People vs. Marasigan, L-2235, January 31, 1950. The testimony of a lone witness, if credible, is sufficient to prove a point or claim, and the fact that the witness is an employee of one of the parties is not sufficient to discredit his testimony. De Santos vs. Concepcion, L-11068, April 30, 1958. 342 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence It has been held, however, that when one or two witnesses who testify to a particular fact or state of facts are contradicted by six or seven other witnesses, equally candid, fair, intelligent and truthful, and who have no greater interest in the result of the suit, and are equally well corroborated by all the remaining evidence, the preponderance of testimony may in such cases be determined by the number of witnesses. Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184. So too, in an action for the cancellation and reformation of certain documents on the ground that they were induced by fraud and that the plaintiff did not understand their contents when he signed them, it was held that the evidence of the plaintiff alone in support of his contention was insufficient to contradict that of three eyewitnesses to the contrary and that the findings of the trial court must accordingly be reversed. De Guzman vs. Calma, L-6800, November 29, 1956. § 4. Need for Corroboration of Testimony It has been invariably held that the presumption of innocence will prevent conviction of the accused upon the uncorroborated identification of one witness whose statements are discredited by circumstances and by contradictions. U.S. vs. Asiao, 1 Phil. 304; U.S. vs. Santa Cruz, 1 Phil. 726; U.S. vs. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329. The individual declaration of a single witness, without any other corroborating or supporting circumstances of the truth of his affirmation, and not conclusive by reason of contradictions by the witness himself in substantial points of his statements, does not constitute conclusive evidence on account of the doubt that is left in the mind. U.S. vs. Garcia, 8 Phil. 589. In a case, it was held that the substantially uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness as to the fact of his marriage with one of the two defendants convicted of the crime of adultery is not sufficient to establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal action for adultery, it appearing that if his testimony were true, it might readily have been corroborated by the introduction of originals or duly certified copies of the corresponding notes in the proper church register, or of the certificate of the marriage, issued in accordance with the practice in vogue at the time of its alleged celebration, and no explanation having been offered for the failure of the 343 VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 343 Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence prosecution to introduce such evidence. U.S. vs. Nebrida,32 Phil. 160. In a homicide case, it was held that the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain conviction of the accused where the attitude of the witness is inconsistent with the truth of his testimony and the witness has contradicted himself on an important detail. People vs. Ricarte, 78 Phil. 112. § 5. Circumstantial Evidence It is the theory of circumstantial evidence that indicia that are separately of little importance may, by their concordant combination and cumulative effect, satisfy the legal requirements for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People vs. Viernes, L-9326, June 18, 1956. In order that circumstantial evidence may constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there must be a series of circumstances satisfactorily proved and consistent with each other, of such nature that every one of them is consistent with defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. People vs. Mahlon, L-5198, April 17, 1953. To put it another way, there must be more than one circumstance and all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. People vs. Labita, L-8481, September 15, 1956. Thus, where the prosecution has succeeded in weaving a net of incidents, facts, and circumstances all belying the claim of the appellant that some intruder might have entered the room and shot her husband, and none of the incidents, facts or circumstances is consistent with her claim of innocence but, on the contrary, each one of them points to her guilt and each is consistent with all the others, putting them all together, the evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction in the mind of the court that it was appellant, and no other, who had a motive to end the life of the deceased and that it was she herself who deliberately shot the deceased. People vs. Murray, L- 4467, April 30, 1959. In a prosecution for murder, the following circumstances were held insufficient for the conviction of the accused: that defendant, a sergeant in an army unit, was the first to report, at about 5:30 a.m. of October 15, 1957, that the army captain to 344 344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence whom defendant was an aide was not in camp; that at 4 a.m. of the same day, defendant, went to a house of ill repute alone, looking for women; that after 4 a.m. of the same day, defendant, at the camp’s kitchen, asked the mess sergeant if he heard a shot and the latter replied “No”; that shortly afterwards, another sergeant came, embraced defendant, and said, “Peacetime,” and talked about women; that defendant’s pants were stained with human blood; that the murder victim was seen going with a group of enlisted men, but defendant was not seen with him or with the group that went with him; that the ante-morteminjuries of the victim indicated that he was assaulted by several persons; that the paraffin test conducted on the defendant proved negative but the tests conducted on other enlisted men proved positive; and that it was not shown that defendant had any motive for killing the murder victim. People vs. Alipis, L-17214, June 21, 1965. The rule is that if the inference of guilt of murder rests solely upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be grave and conclusive, and the conviction which the combination of evidences produces must leave no room for reasonable doubt of the criminality of the accused in the ordinary and natural order of things. U.S. vs. Santos, 1 Phil. 222. In a prosecution for robbery with homicide, where it was shown by the prosecution that the accused, in a conversation, imputed the crime to one of his co-accused in the absence of the latter and not in open court; that during said conversation the accused was somewhat drunk and his words were uttered not without a touch of levity as the conversation was marked by laughing and joking; that two of the accused were seen together on the night the crime was committed along the part of the road that was the scene of the crime, allegedly walking with a third man whose identity was not clearly established; and that the three accused subsequently executed affidavits, each denying his participation in the crime but tending to impute the crime to one or both of his co-accused, the circumstances under which the accused were seen leave so wide a field for speculation and conjecture that on the basis of said circumstances, they cannot be convicted of the crime. People vs. Fraga, L42005, August 31, 1960. Circumstantial evidence is less susceptible of fabrication than direct evidence, and when it constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each 345 VOL. 64, JUNE 11, 1975 345 Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the opposite party. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Exconde, L-4792, September 30, 1953. And whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. U.S. vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 456. § 6. Expert Testimony; Opinions In deciding questions of fact upon which expert witnesses, equal in number and standing, differ flatly, the court must look for outstanding facts from which the lay mind can safely draw inferences as to the probabilities, and consider the care and accuracy with which the contrasted experts respectively have determined the data upon which they base their conclusions. North Dakota vs. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365; 68 L. ed. 342. In a case, the testimony of two experts as to the falsity of the signatures of a testatrix to her will was rejected—one being of the opinion that the signatures were more recent than those of the witnesses, and the other that they were not genuine—in the face of the testimony of another expert that they were genuine, and of the categorical and positive declarations of veracious witnesses who affirmed that the signatures had been written by the testatrix herself. Gabriel vs. Mateo, 51 Phil. 216. Whether a witness asserting knowledge is entitled to greater weight than a witness asserting opinions depends upon the subjects in regard to which the testimony is given. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. vs. Foley, 105 U.S. 350, 26 L. ed. 1055. In a case, the conclusions of a ballistics expert based on similarities between test cartridges and the marks thereon after firing by weapons found in possession of the defendants with the markings on empty shells, found at the scene of the crime, although not conclusive, were given considerable weight in the absence of probability that others could have perpetrated the crime in question. People vs. Valerianoy L- 4306, April 25, 1952. In another case, the manufacture of the Chinese sauce toyo was held to fall within the classification of noxious and unwholesome industries coming within the restrictions of the zoning ordinances of the City of Manila, on the testimony of a doctor, an official of the Bureau of Health, as attracting flies, cockroaches and other unhealthy insects, carriers of disease. 346 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Weight, Effect, and Sufficiency of Evidence This was expert testimony based upon conclusions from personal inspection of the factory, and the court rightly denied the motion to strike out this evidence. Seng Kee & Co. vs. Earnshaw, 56 Phil. 204.