Mark Damazer

From . Mark Damazer

Sent : 18 July 2003 02 49 PM
To Richard Sambrook-internal
Subject : Provispral draft 3

The BBC viishes to express its deepest sympathy to Dr Kelly's family and friends

In the appalling circumstances ofDrK's death the BBC will new set out the dealings of itslourrialists with Dr Kelly

Dr Kell v was the principal source for both Andrew Gilligan's report on The Today programme and for Susan Watts's
Newsnight
' reports

Dr Kelly clearly ~Pii ihe wasu[such concern 'hat he wished to talk about the matter - against officialruies
The BBC felt he was acting as a man of conscience and believed it had a duty to protect him as much as possible

set out below a detadeci account of the conversations held between Dr Kelly and Andrew Gilligan

Andrew Gilluzan had four face to face meetings with him - the first one about 2 years ago

" They spoke on thephone whenever Iraq w as in the News -probably about 12 times in all.
" The second face to face mectin2,~N as about IS months ago, then again in May 2002 and then on the 22
Nla~ 2003
" Andres Gilhvan always understood Dr .Kcll%,'s position to be ambiguous - reporting both to the FCO and
the MOD
" Dr Kcfl~, was the Government's Chief Scientific Officer and Senior Advisor to the Counter ProliferaLlOn
and A=.s Control Secretariat at the MOD and to the 'Non-Proliferation Dept in the FCO.
" Andrew Gilli-an understood him to be the Government's most senior advisor on Biological and
Chemical weapons and uniquely well placed to discuss Iraq's WMD programme . Dr Kelly told Aiidre~,,,
Guh2ari that he was the Chief British hispeetor in the Iraq Survey Group
" Dr. Kellv told Andrew Gilli2an that he had been a former Head of Microbioloav at Porton Down vhich
is where lie first developed his expertise in Chemical and Biological weapons
Dr Kell~ had been invited by M16 in the mid 1990s to debrief the Soviet defector Vladimir Pasechruk
and Dr Kelly said that he had drawn out of him previously unknown details of a major Soviet CBW
proganinic .
Dr Kelly made clear to Andrew Gilligan that he had been privy to high level intelligence assessments -
including relating to the 45 minute claim over Iraq's ~VNTD capability
0 Andrew Gilligan understood that Dr Kelly assessed and interpreted intelligence on biological and
chemical weapons for the Government and the intelligence scr-vices .

" As regards the Sept 2002 dossier, Andrew Gilligan rang lum when he ( Gilligan) returned from
Baghdad and asked to meet to discuss WMD and why none had been found
" The~ agreed to meet in the Charing Cross Hotel on May 22nd He was keen to hear what I had learned
%vIule in Iraq
" Dn Kelly said he wanted to go out there
" Andrew Gilligan did not 20 with an agenda. The two started talking about Hans Blix. Dr. Kelly had
been reading the 1UN-MOVIC reports to the UN Security Council and said he thought they'd misstd
things
Andrew Gilligan asked how the absence of WN[D squared with the September dossier
Dr Kelly had told Andrew Gilligan at their previous ineeting that lus view of the dossier Nv as
"uneventful" He said it was until a week before publication
C ) LD
-1
 Andrew Gilligan asked if he could start taking notes
" Dr Kelly told Andrew Gilligan that he had been involved in drawing up the September dossier
" He discussed issues relating to the dossierwhich made it clear he was privy to the process These
included that the 45 minute claim had com-, from a smgI,- Iraqi intelligence source and that it had not
entered the dossier until September . He also said Downing St had asked if anything else could ggo into
the dossier

(Insen Notes transcript)

" He spoke about Iraqi Scientists who had been detained and said not much was coming from them in
spite of financial incentives He said M16 had 10 to 20 of them in custody
" He spoke about the risk of proliferation from Iraqi 'V\`MD programmes - not people crossing borders
with shells but supply chain information

a The two disuussec "hat could be said and how it could be attributed Dr. Kellv said he should be
described as "a senior official involved in drawing up the dossier "
There were technical details he didn't want used as they could identifv~ him.
Dr Kellii, didn't want his personal views about the war reponed He thought it had been mishandled He
called it a tragic failure of diplomacy He couldn't understand why no-one talked to the Iraqis in the run
up to war Hewas convinced the war was unnecessary - he did not believe Iraq had posed a serious
threat

0 This was consistent vvith his N iews previousk reported In October 2001 he had told'The Independent'
he thought leakage from Russia's CBWprog,,-amme was a bigger threat that Iraq (Duringtheanthrax
scares in the US~~)
9 He said the same thing in an interview with CBC on October 23 2002

0 AndrcA Gilligan said hc,~~ould never izive Dr.Kell-Y away as our source and told Dr Kelly that he
must not himslef away He replied "Fine" .
Liv,-

0 Andre~N Gilh2an reports scrupulously matched the words lie used in their conversation .

9 Andrev,, Gilligan has now read Dr KellvTS evidence to the FAC Andrew Gilli-zan has indicated where
his account differs from the conversation held,n Mav, Andre-w Gilligan assumed this was Dr Kellv
attemptin .-to protect himself which Andrew Gilligan believed was legitimate for him to do . Andrew
Gilliam therefore told the FAC that he had "no problem" with Dr Kelly's evidence .

Every detail

Reasons for Kelly as a credible source for tne particular allegations

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------
Account of Watts conversation with Kelly - every detail

Reasons 'Or Kelly as a credible source

Contact with Kelly since story published - for both Gilligan and Watts (Note - Gilligan said yesterday at the FAC
that he had tried to get the source to 'come out ') Susan Watts did have a conversation with Dr Kefly on xth
July

2 ,1
 The BBC can conf)rm that Susan Watts and Andrew Gilligan have never spoken, met or had any transaction of
any kind -either directly or through a third party - on this story or on any other rnatter.

I Were there separate attempts to substantiate Dr Kelly's story ?

Dr l<ejj V tq~,C rapidlypreved Oghf on sore cetra,'elemcnts of the s7cr~ i_-ld to in Ala/ Tn~ FAC
, the 45 rrinofe W!vlD intpllige!ee had indeed been Dased art a single tin-corrotoia7ec~ sxjrce and
furtller thal, :[ fac only been included silortilv before 'he Joss)ers pablricaticn IT) these citcumstances thc 3-9l- dij rst
~ee! il -oLila cfsown Dr KeYv cl- his,oformaucii
SECTION 2

BBC response to Kelly evidence to the FAC and Gilligan to the FAC yesterday

When the MoD statement suggested that Dr Kelly was the source the BBC did not believe it right to confirm tl)&!r
Dr Kelly had not spoken for himself at this stage andwe were stillseeking to proect It no titre hac D,
K~P)l jr~,j!ca!edtC, eit~er AndreLv Gilfclan or t:-, Susaii Watts triaz he was wilhng for them ;a id'o-n(VIV Nm as P'ejr sourco
it-, ,-,is evfa~~Ce r~ tire commirl'- ;i was --l1earmar he aid,,3 .1 Lv!sh, to be, seer, as Providing the t,",forma~)1-n lor tne Nvo
se:'ara*c- lorom3

.0ifter Dr Kelly had given gave his evidence those in the BBC who knew his role considered carefully whal Dr Kelly had
Wosen to say
As regards his tra!~sa_,tions with Susan Watts - she felt that Dr Kelly had said nothing untrue He confirmed that he
~ad spoke- to her and he did not deny some asPects of theirsonversations Rather Dr Kelly chose to deflecr the
Drnmittee's inquires by saying he could no, recall many matters of substance

Andrew Gihigan likewise noted the attem.pts by Dr Kelly to confirm some matters ofdetail - though he too noted that
Dr Kelly had not ePeated at, confirmed the remarks h~ raJ maLies in their conversation(s) of ~

Neither Aqdiew Gilligan no!, Susan Watts felt that it was the job of the BBC to correct or contradict his evidence by
publishing the transcripts of the conversations that he had held with Andrew Gilligan and Susan Watts or by a
contradiction of his account. He was clearly under considerable strain and we did not believe it to be right to accuse
him of any lack of frankness

When Andrew Gilligan was recalled to the committee yesterday he decided that he could again not say that Dr Kelly
had beer, misleacing He chose not to ccp.hrm or deny any question pertaining to the identification of the source He
fell" tha, wotild ha~_- reen wrong Andrew Gilligan agreed he had met Dr Kelly and that he had been content with Dr
Keflv's evidence Mr Giffigar, feff ;t was iint.nable to ~i,~cuse Di Kelly Cfa,-(1Vthln0

S -Ri- ! ias tnis rnatl&( f&ll it ha(_ ~j Lj~,hr,ld lti-'r-e dt,!Y of all jaullia;lsrs whic d-a! ". ffn s5br--es tno! Proode
nnlat!on oo a onftcleritai ras,s
Barbara Kerr
From : Richard Sambrook-Internal
Sent: 18 July 2003 03 59 PM
To, Mark Damazer
Subject draft

ED
BBC Draft
aternent doc (29 KE
 BBC Draft Statement

The BBC deeply regrets the death of Dr David Kellv We send our condolences to his family
and fti ends

Over the past few weeks the BBC has been at pains to protect the source of Andrew Gilligan's
and Susan Watts' stories broadcast separately on Today on 29"' May and Newsrught on 3
June Since Dr Kelly's death hasbeen formally confirmed, the BBC can now say that Dr
Kell-~ was the source for both these reports . We have informed his family of the contents of
this statement

We have decided that in view of the tragic events we should be entirely open about Dr Kelly's
coriv-,zsations with both Andre-,A, Gilligan and Susan Watts and to explain whv these two
journalists and their editorial manaaers believed lie was a senior and credible source whose
views should be placed in the public domain

We will of course fully co-operate with the Judicial Inquiry.

Dr Kelly was the Chief Scientific Officer and Senior Adviser to the Non Proliferation
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Proliferation and Anns Control
Secretariat, Ministrv of Defence .

He was for many years been the British Government's principal scientific adviser on
biological and chemical weapons He was chief British inspector on the Iraq Survc~y Group,

Dr KellvA-as one of three officials who accompanied the Forcic-'11 Secretary when he gave
evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee about Iraq's WMD Programmes on 25 September
2002, one day after publication of the Government dossier .

Between 1991 and 1998 he was chief field inspector of UNSCOM, dunng which time he
undertook 37 inspection missions in Iraq . He led both the first and the last BW inspections
carried out bv UNSCOM .

'A,7hile in Iraq we understand he was personally responsible for several significant discoveries
including that Iraq had been experimenting with smallpox and that Saddam had developed a
radiation weapon .

As such he was a world renowned expert in his field. We believe him to be a man of integrity
and of conscience . Throughout recent weeks we believed our duty towards Dr Kelly was to do
our utmost to protect hmi as the source of our reports .

We again express our sympathy to his family and friends