Programme of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised:

Operation Rivers Of Light

Cannes Creative Lions
Creative Effectiveness Lions, 2013
 Programme of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised: Operation Rivers Of Light
Cannes Creative Lions
Creative Effectiveness Lions, 2013

Programme of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised:

Operation Rivers Of Light

Lowe-

Advertiser: Colombian Ministry Of Defence

Brand: Programme of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised
Country: Colombia

Objectives

This paper is about Colombia's struggle against the oldest guerrilla group in the world, the FARC. Lowe-SSP3 were asked to
create an idea to demobilise them to deliver a message of peace, inviting them to give up their arms, recover their lives and
their freedom.

Delivering demobilisation messages to the guerrillas is a very difficult task. The remaining guerrillas are hard-core fanatics.
They eschew conventional media in the main and connecting with them is fraught with danger and risk. Those who want to
demobilise risk their very lives in attempting to leave as they face a life-long death sentence for desertion1.

Ground-breaking interviews revealed that Christmas is the most sensitive and emotional time for guerrillas. By taking the
innovative step of utilising the rivers (the highways of the jungle) as a medium of communication to deliver Christmas
messages from the guerrillas' loved ones, extolling them to lay down their arms and come home, we encouraged 194 FARC
guerrillas to demobilise2. The Rivers of Light campaign is estimated to return over $4.9m to Colombian government in tax
receipts, with wider benefits from the reduction in FARC's illegal 'fund raising' estimated to be $3.8 million in the first year
alone3.

Background

Colombia has lived under the shadow of war for over 60 years. Its adversary is the largest and oldest insurgent group in the
Americas: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 4, aka the FARC5.

As well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets; the FARC
conducts bombings, unlawful killings, mortar attacks, kidnappings, forced displacement, extortion and hijackings. It is
considered a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States Department of State and the European Union6.

With an estimated 8,000 current members7, the FARC primarily funds itself through ransom kidnappings, extortion and taxation

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of the illegal drug trade. It has been estimated that FARC supplies more than 50% of the world's cocaine8, with estimates of
FARC 'fund-raising' from taxation of the illegal drug trade estimated between $1 billion and $3.5 billion annually9.

Colombia's guerrilla war has caused more than 600,000 deaths during the conflict; and displaced 3.7 million Colombians, one
of the largest internally displaced populations in the world10. As a result of FARC activity, Colombia now has more landmines
than any other country in the world, maiming on average three Colombians each day11.

The FARC are estimated to control between 30 and 35% of the territory in Colombia12. The largest concentrations of guerrillas
are located throughout the south-eastern parts of Colombia's 500,000 square kilometres of jungle and in the plains at the base
of the Andean mountains. With minimal contact with the outside world, they are virtually inaccessible via mainstream media.

The Demobilisation Effort

Since 2002, the GAHD (the Colombian Ministry of Defence's Group of Humanitarian Attention to the Demobilised) has been
striving to promote the demobilisation of guerrillas to enable them to return to civilian life.

Efforts have included Government-sponsored TV and radio advertising campaigns, and supporting a process known as
"reinsertion", where the Government offers guerrillas amnesty and the chance for reintegration into society13.

The Campaign Challenge

FARC numbers have been reduced from a peak of 16,000 in 200114 to a hard-core of 8,000. However, recent efforts have
yielded diminishing returns and the demobilisations have fallen, down 24% in 200915 (Figure 1). To arrest this decline,
Operation Christmas was launched in December 2010.

Operation Christmas: During 2010 ground-breaking interviews with the recently demobilised revealed that Christmas is the
most sensitive and emotional time for guerrillas. Consequently OPERATION CHRISTMAS was created: 2 contingents, 2 Black
Hawk helicopters and 2,000 LED lights travelled into the jungle to cover a giant tree (subsequently 10 trees) with lights,
alongside banners exhorting them to lay down their arms.

The campaign was phenomenally successful, the innovative concept gained huge awareness, both within Colombia and
internationally, and encouraged 331 FARC guerrillas to demobilise and re-enter society16.

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However, the very success of Operation Christmas, increased the already almost insurmountable difficulties faced in reaching
potential demobilisers, as the FARC retreated deeper within the jungle, banned the use of radios (one of the main
communications channels used by the Program) and extended their death threat from the ex-guerrillas to their families.

To counter these developments we needed to develop an innovative Christmas campaign for 2011, to reinvigorate the
demobilisation strategy.

Campaign objective

Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, the GAHD has never set numeric targets for demobilisations. However, their
challenge - and therefore the campaign challenge - was to reach an increasingly hard to reach - and hard to convert -
audience and positively influence demobilisations.

Whilst the expectation was that demobilisations would be lower than for Operation Christmas due to FARC counter actions,
the objective was to maximise demobilisations to reduce the terrorist threat facing Colombia; and in particular to demobilize
higher ranking, longer serving officers.

Strategy

The difficulties involved in this challenge cannot be underestimated and fall into three main areas:

1. The campaign needs to resonate extraordinarily strongly,

- Firstly, to generate a change in behaviour amongst hard-core individuals who may have held particular views for
years, even decades, and
- Secondly, because those who seek to demobilise become a FARC military target, with desertion punishable by
death;
2. The campaign needs to touch an audience who by definition are incredibly hard to reach and outside the reach of
conventional media channels;
3. The campaign needs to operate successfully in highly dangerous locations and a fragile situation.

The campaign task was therefore to build a demobilisation message in this context and to make sure that guerrillas received it.

Insight applied

Despite the difficulties involved it was recognised early on that insight from ex-guerrillas was needed to identify key insights
that could be utilised.

The importance of Christmas

One major theme that emerged from previous research was that in this highly-religious Catholic society, Christmas is the time
when many guerrillas begin to think about the idea of quitting. It is a sensitive and emotional time when they feel furthest from
their homes, families and children and feel nostalgia towards civilian life.

"When you are in the jungle, Christmas is a time of feelings and nostalgia"

Juliana Ipuana, ex-guerilla, 8 years with the FARC.

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The power of a personal connection

More recent interviews with ex-guerrillas also revealed that the more personal the message the more powerful its impact. In
particular those coming from the guerrillas' friends and family rather than Government resonated more.

Utilising the highways of the jungle as a communication medium

As the guerrillas eschew traditional media, and following Operation Christmas, move further into the jungles, rivers have
become their most important channels of communication and transportation. Every FARC base camp is built close to a river.

Interviews with ex-guerrillas following the annual 'Mission Playback' demobilisation campaign17, revealed the following insight:

"You guys should have thrown those balls on the rivers. That is how we communicate and receive stuff in the guerrilla."

Luis Antonio Gallo, AKA "Zipper": Commander of the 16th Front of the FARC, August 2011.

The importance of rivers and waterways was confirmed by other demobilized guerrillas:

"The Rivers are their highways, their roads."

Abel Padraza, ex-guerilla, 28 years with the FARC.

And corroborated by former hostage, Sergeant Herazo of the National Police, kidnapped and held hostage for 12 years18:

"
there we would go on a footpath and send us to the Mandur River, and from the Mandur, it practically went downstream into
] in a slider we would be taken into the Orteguaza River,
from there we would go to the Drenario and from there we would go on the Palmar River "

Sergeant Luis Alberto Herazo of the National Police

Creative strategy

These insights led to the creation of a unique strategy to take Christmas, and the power of its sentiment, to the heart of
FARC's jungle strongholds, using the rivers (the highways of the jungle) as a medium of communication.

Creative approach

Creative solution

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Lowe-SSP3 therefore created Operation Rivers of Light, taking the spirit of Christmas, through personalised messages from
loved ones, to the heart of the jungle using the rivers (the highways of the jungle) as a medium of communication.

In order to create greater resonance with the guerrillas the demobilisation message would come not only from the government
but also from the guerrillas' family and friends. In November 2011, through the Army's Radio service, the Military invited people
from all over the country to send a Christmas message, note or small gift to their loved ones in the jungle. The Army would
then deliver the messages for them.

Current numbers estimate that there are 8,000 FARC guerrillas; 6,823 messages and gifts were received from friends and
relatives inviting their loved ones to demobilise:

Campaign implementation

Then from a military base in La Macarena, Meta, the Colombian Army, Air force and Navy initiated Operation Rivers of Light,
packaging the messages inside individual waterproof Christmas balls with blue LED lights on them, and shipping them out to
rivers where different guerrilla fronts were known to be located. The balls were transported on Piranha boats and Black Hawk
Helicopters, to be turned on and released by the military at pre-determined places where the river currents would take the
balls to where the guerrilla camps were located. Within every ball, a message from the Program read:

DON'T LET THIS CHRISTMAS SLIP AWAY, COLOMBIA AND YOUR FAMILY ARE WAITING. DEMOBILIZE. AT CHRISTMAS
EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE.

TV campaign

Coverage of the operation was filmed and broadcast in a 30" commercial spot, released on December 5th by the Ministry of

Rivers of Light in action

Creative : The Colombian army releasing luminous balls of Christmas messages into the jungle rivers

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The military operation was broadcast live to the whole country, a first time in Colombia's history.

Television

Media Plan

Figure 2: Rivers Of Light Media Plan

Launch of campaign: 5th December 2011

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End of campaign: 6th January 2012

TV Channels: RCH (32%) and Caracol TV (68%), both leaders in national TV

Schedule: early (10%), Day (12%), Prime (74%), Late Time (4%)

Number of spots on air: 74

Campaign Budget

Total media spend, including production and fees, was only $283,36019 (Figure 3).

Effects

Although specific targets were not set, the campaign objective was to maximise demobilisations; and to demobilize higher
ranking, long serving officers:

Performance against Objectives

Rivers of Light saw 194 Guerrillas demobilise, with 1 guerrilla demobilising, on average, every 6 hours 20.
Demobilising guerrillas acknowledged the impact of Rivers of Light campaign:

The first that happened is to be frighten to see those balls coming to us. And even if the guerrilla didn't get it, probably some
civilian did it, and he'll tell to the guerrilla the message as soon as he meet them. It's important to remind them that at
Christmas they could meet their relatives, rebuild their lives."

Commandant of the 7th front, 22 years at FARC

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 On December 23rd 2011, a historic demobilisation saw "Jefferson", Chief of the Special Commandos of the 30th front of
FARC, a principal bomb-makers, demobilise alongside 9 other guerrillas. The average time as a FARC member for this
group was 14 years, and the ammunition and weaponry delivered (figure 4) represents 6% of the total armament handed
over by the guerrillas since the demobilization program started in 200221.

Figure 4: Munitions surrendered by "Jefferson", Chief of the Special Commandos of the 30th front of FARC

102 hand-made mortar grenades

Half a ton of TNT explosives
3.081 Magazines of different calibers
51 portable communication radios
12 ramp-type mortars
6 AK 47 rifles
One RPG warhead
One AA .50cal machine gun
One M-60 Machine gun
One MGL Grenade Launcher
One Colt Magnum Pistol, .44cal
One 60 mm comando mortar
Two double-engined motorboats
An unexpected outcome was that one-fifth of demobilisations came from under 18's, a 62% increase in underage
demobilisations22.
Information from demobilised guerrillas confirmed that the FARC Top Commander, AKA Timochenko, is currently located
in Venezuela. This confirmation enables the Colombian government to bring pressure to bear on the Venezuelan
government to help find him.

The wider impact of Rivers of Light

In addition to the 'direct' metrics outlined above, a number of 'externalities' were also identified that would leverage the activity
to drive campaign awareness and illustrate the wider impact of the campaign: Social media coverage; and International /
national media coverage of the operation.

Externalities

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The campaign had a broader impact, and to some degree changed the context for the on-going conflict as the idea touched
the hearts of the entire country and was shown all over the world. There was extensive social media coverage, including over
10,000 views on YouTube , and national and international media broadcasted the operation:

Social Media Coverage

News Coverage

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Even the President Juan Manuel Santos, his family and the entire cabinet of ministers sent their own message, on December
21st from the Orteguaza River which was picked up both nationally and internationally.

The campaign, and the media coverage, has had a unique 'humanising' effect which led to wider shifts in perception as the
guerrillas increasingly feel they are still part of society and their families; and by touching of the hearts of ordinary Colombians,
helping to smooth ex-guerrillas reinsertion into society by destroying some barriers that society has against having them in
their workplaces or neighbourhoods.

Other factors

Other potential influences on demobilisation have been considered and can be ruled out as having a significant effect.

There were no major changes in the following:

1. GHAD demobilisation efforts

All other demobilisation activities throughout the calendar year were carried out as in previous years.
Although Operation Christmas in 2010 was very successful, it made the task of future campaigns increasingly
difficult as the FARC increased attacks, up 24% against the military and 32% against the country's infrastructure,
accounting for 79% of all terrorist attacks in the Western hemisphere23; they became less accessible by withdrawing
deeper into the jungle, forbidding the use of radios on certain Fronts (one of the main channels the Program used to
send demobilization messages); and they extended the death threat from the deserters themselves to their families.
2. The underlying trend in demobilisations
The trend for demobilisations is downwards with a 8.75% annual average reduction over the past 4 years (Figure 5).

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 3. Colombian public or international support for FARC.
Nothing had happened recently in this area. 2008 saw the most significant recent anti-FARC public rallies/protests

armed struggle, encouraging them to lay down their arms24.

4. The underlying political positioning or leadership structure of FARC
The underlying political positioning of FARC and its aims have not altered.
Although there were changes in FARC leadership during 2011 with the Colombian military killing of FARC's top
leader, Alfonso Cano in November, his successor, "Timochenko", was named the following day25. Such changes
have occurred in previous years26.
5. Colombian government and military activity
There has been no change in Colombian political leadership since the 2010 Presidential elections, or in the status of
FARC as a terrorist group or in activity to reduce their presence.
Whilst peace talks were initiated between the Colombian government and the FARC to seek an end to the conflict in
August 2012, this was 7 months after the Rivers of Light campaign27.
6. The Christmas weather
Christmas 2011 was very consistent with 2010 (Figure 6), any differentials are unlikely to have triggered significant
demobilisations28.

Commercial results

The Costs of War

Statistics do not adequately convey the human costs of the war the number of dead, wounded or displaced. The war has
severely crippled Colombia's tourism industry and traditional agribusiness. Reduced funds from foreign countries and domestic

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organisations have adversely affected investment; and economic sabotage, including attacks against the national
infrastructure such as bridges, energy towers and oil pipelines, and the cost of maintaining its military forces, continues to
impact upon Colombia's fiscal deficit.

Thus the benefits to Colombian society from reducing the number of FARC guerrillas and their activity are huge.

The Impact of Demobilisation

194 guerrillas demobilised in 2011. Whilst we have eliminated other factors, we recognise that not all will have been driven by
Rivers of Light. We therefore consider the underlying trend in Christmas demobilisations to extrapolate the expected number of
demobilisations for 2011. The underlying 3 year trend for Christmas demobilisations, pre Operation Christmas29 shows that
numbers are declining at around 105 demobilisations (-26% CAGR) per year30. Regression analysis predicts 86
demobilisations for 2011 (figure 7).

Given that we saw 194 demobilisations, this analysis shows an uplift of 108 demobilisations for the Rivers of Light campaign
compared to what we ought to have seen. 108 demobilised guerrillas represents a 1.4% reduction in the total number of FARC
(8,000 members) as a result of the campaign31.

We consider the impact and benefit to society of this 1.4% reduction in FARC guerrillas:

1. A reduction in Colombian casualties

In 2011, the FARC killed 429 members of the Colombian government's security forces, and wounded 1,80632. 259,000 people
were forcibly displaced 33.

A 1.4% reduction in these numbers would see 6 fewer Colombian security force members killed, 24 fewer wounded and 3,497
fewer displacements (Figure 8).

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2. An increase in Government income tax receipts

A direct benefit from ex-guerrillas re-entering civilian life and the workforce is the increase in income tax receipts. The average
lifetime income from tax receipts per demobilised guerrilla is estimated to be $47,66834.

108 demobilised guerrillas will deliver incremental tax receipts of over $5.1m. Deducting campaign costs, net payback is
$4.9m. This shows that Operation Rivers of Light delivered a return on investment of $17.17 for every $1 invested (Figure 9).

In order to cover the cost of the campaign, only 6 additional guerrillas would have needed to demobilise rather than the 108
the campaign realised35.

3. An increase in savings to society through reduced FARC financing

FARC 'fund-raising' from taxation of the illegal drug trade is estimated at $1 billion annually about 78% of its overall
income36 .

If we exclude the taxation of illegal drugs, and consider a reduction in funds from ransom, kidnappings and extortion, the
benefits to Colombian economy through a reduction in FARC 'fund-raising' is estimated to be in excess of $3.8 million in the
first year alone (Figure 10).

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How else might Operation Christmas funds have been deployed?

The campaign cost was $283,360. Deploying these funds against addition military personnel, FUDRA37, would have meant an
additional 20 professional soldiers or 5 captain-commanders 38, an increase of +0.4% in soldiers or +0.1% captains39.

We feel it is unlikely this would have delivered 194 demobilisations (or guerrilla reductions), as the increase in forces would be
marginal, and any increased FUDRA presence is unlikely to reach the target audience to deliver the message given that the
guerrilla are entrenched in highly dangerous jungle territory.

Creative effectiveness

This paper demonstrates how the application of creativity can achieve the impossible.

By gaining access to demobilising guerrillas as soon as they were laying down their arms we gained immediate and accurate
insights into their motivations and behaviours to shape strategy and delivery. The research conducted threw up three
genuinely new insights regarding a) the emotional power of Christmas, b) the potential power of personal messages, and c)
the severity of the restrictions on media access.

Operation Rivers of Light was created and executed as a direct result of these insights, creating a unique strategy to take
Christmas, and the power of its sentiment, to the heart of FARC's jungle strongholds, using the rivers (the highways of the
jungle) as a medium of communication to 'share' a message from loved ones in an environment where social networks are still
analogues.

The Rivers Of Light campaign shows how, even in the most difficult circumstances imaginable, a campaign can still function
and be effective. With its sustainable and replicable success, it demonstrates how communications can be utilised to give
hope to all those immersed in the conflict of war.

2998 words

Creative effectiveness

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 1. Howe, K. and Nussio, E. 2012. What if the FARC Demobilizes?. Stability: International Journal of Security and
Development 1(1):58-67, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.aj
2. Source: The Colombian Ministry of Defence
3. See section 6: Commercial gain
4. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
5. FARC are not the only guerrilla group operating in Colombia, nor are they the only group invited to demobilise. The

operate alongside FARC. For the purposes of this paper we refer to FARC as they were the key target for this campaign.
6. FARC is on both the US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations as well as the EU list of terrorist groups.
7. Colombian government estimate cited by abcnews http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/colombia-peace-talks-
ultimate-guide-farc-guerillas/story?id=17503105
8. US Department of Justice, 2006 (http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr032206a.html).
9. Source: http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/features/saii/features/main/2011/11/21/feature-02;
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/26661-farc-makes-up-to-35b-from-narco-trafficking-defense-minister.html
10. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/colombia/9618050/Colombian-government-and-Farc-launch-
peace-talks.html
11. Landmine and Cluster Munition monitor reports that up to 100,000 landmines have been buried in Colombian soil.
http://www.themonitor.org/index.php/publications/display?
act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=colombia&pqs_section=.
12. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FARC
13. The Independent, March 2010 (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/after-the-revolution-why-are-farcs-
young-soldiers-laying-down-their-guns-1922847.html). About 50,000 former members of outlawed guerrilla and militia
groups are being re-educated in schools and colleges; practical job training and psychological support are also available
14. Colombian government estimate cited by BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7217817.stm).
15. Source: The Colombian Ministry of Defence. Annual demobilisations: 2006 2460, 2007 3192, 2008 3461, 2009 -
2638
16. Source: The Colombian Ministry of Defence.

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17. A campaign in May 2011 where footballs signed by the Colombian National Football teams were thrown from helicopters
by the Colombian army into the jungle encouraging guerrillas to demobilise.
18. Luis Alberto Erazo, who spent nearly 12 years as a prisoner of the FARC, was rescued by the Colombian armed forces in
November 2011. Four other hostages, also members of the security forces, were shot dead by the guerrillas as troops
closed in.
19. 1,000 km fuel for 4 Piranha Boats: Calculated value of the average consumption rate of a Piranha Boat (80 KM7 gallon),
and the Price of ACPM on the city of Villavicencio on December 2011: (USD 4,34); 2 Armed forces Contingent Salaries
(14 Army Soldiers, 16 Navy Soldiers, 4 Commanders, 2 pilots and 2 gunners): Calculated value based on the average
monthly salary of the members of the contingent. Soldier: USD 928; Commander and Pilot: USD 2.731; Gunner: USD
1.638.
20. Source: The Colombian Ministry of Defence. Calculation as follows: a 7 week campaign = 1176 hours. 1176 hours/194
demobilsations = 6.1, so 1 demobilsation every 6 hours.
21. Source: Colombian Minstry of Defense
22. Source: Colombian Minstry of Defense: 41 under 18 demobilisations in 2011 vs. an average of 25 under 18's from 2007 -
2009
23. Source: Congressional Research Service: Colombia Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf Think tank, Centro Seguridad y Democracia (CSD) reported an increase in
attacks by 24% (against the military) and 32% (against the country's infrastructure) in comparing data between January
and November of 2010 and 2011. According to the US State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism , Colombia
faced increased attacks by the FARC in 2011, with 377 attacks between January and November, 79% of all terrorist
attacks in the Western Hemisphere.
24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_Armed_Forces_of_ColombiaAnti-
FARC_ralliesandhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_Armed_Forces_of_ColombiaHugo_Ch.C3.A1vez.27s_call_to_di
25. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/farc-appoint-timochenko-as-new-top-commander
26. For example, FARC military leader, Mono Jojoy, was killed in a large-scale military assault in September 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11399914
27. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19393096
28. Source: Tutiempo.net
29. Operation Christmas is excluded from the data set as, whilst this arrested the decline in demobilisations, it would not be
likely to impact on the underlying trend.
30. 2007 saw 473 demobilisations, 2009 saw 262 demobilisations, a reduction of 105.5 p.a., a CAGR of -26%.
31. 8000 FARC members / 108 campaign demobilisations = 1.4%
32. http://www.worldcrunch.com/down-not-out-why-colombia-s-farc-guerillas-just-wont-
goaway/world-affairs/down-but-not-out-why-colombia-s-farc-guerillas-just-won-t-go-away/c1s4727/ January and October
2011
33. http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/colombia/report-2012
34. We have calculated financial payback based on the COI's Payback and Return on Marketing Investment (ROMI) in the
Public Sector (Source: http://coi.gov.uk/blogs/bigthinkers/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/coi-payback-and-romi-paper.pdf)
which recommends using a Lifetime value calculated over 30 years , discounted at 3.5% discount pa.
35. Rivers of Light campaign costs of $283,360 divided by the Government income through Income tax per guerrilla (Lifetime
value at net present value) of $47,668 = 5.94 ex-guerrillas needed to cover the cost of the campaign.

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36. Source: http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/features/saii/features/main/2011/11/21/feature-02.
37. FUDRA -reaction force
tasked with conducting counterinsurgency operations throughout the country. Its motto is "any mission, any place, any
time, in the best way, ready for victory."
38. Source: Colombian Ministry of Defence. FUDRA average contract salary of 18 months: professional soldier $13,500,
Captain-Commander $54,000. Campaign costs of $276,477/$13,500 = 20 soldiers; Campaign costs of $276,477/$54,000
= 5 captain-commanders.
39. Based on 5,000 in the FUDRA military.

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