G.R. No.

118712 October 6, 1995

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried
out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As
eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:

. . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we
are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly
extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because
they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be
served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.

Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745)
and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated.3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is

declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;

b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not merely

"earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" — with an accessible bank designated
by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following
amounts in cash and in government financial instruments — within the
parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
 P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the

above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just
compensation by the proper authorities; and

d) Respondent DAR is ordered to

1) immediately conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days
from notice within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the cases within 30
days after they are submitted for decision.4

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5 denying their motion for
reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).

Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment
of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private
respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending
summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and
the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and
"deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.

As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:

Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred
in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with
a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been
earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and
6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of
listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in
cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).

The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.

Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of
a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT
No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late
Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners,
the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking
 (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least
25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order
directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust
fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust
P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual
Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p.
133).

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual
Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although
armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries
(Rollo, p. 99).

Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity)

alleges — with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon — that the properties
of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314
with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area
of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of
the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without
notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F")
fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust
account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust
account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco,
Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of
1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999
hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the
DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of
AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having
been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is
taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the
fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in
their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power
pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were
also used.13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents.14Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same. 15

Hence, the instant petitions.

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the
appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however,
denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2)
in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the
amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.

Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of
deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely
exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it
appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a
"trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there
is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment.18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment,19 for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot
invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their
properties, petitioners assert the negative.

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821 of the same law. According to
petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final
valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no
reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the
landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property
pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the
case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".22

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle
of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found
that:

. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which
led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" — even as the Supreme Court
admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other" — the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . .
. that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the
extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however,
dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the
expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and
use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding
that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the
"Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the
Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The
immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:

. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite
this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still
optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must
be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.