329. 404 8725 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY TODAY Edited by Ken Booth and Steve Smith Polity Press9 ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered Barry Buzan ‘This chapter surveys the level of alysis prem i iwernaional relations Te look at how the ive ame ino the Feld, how deselopedh, why ic generated disagreement and conflict, where the debate is, and wiiere, in my view, it should be going. ‘The intellectual history approach is used because ie seems to be the let and most compact way of covering thi ag bry The argument ix shat although te concept feel fay hs dlone much to improve the rigoar of theoretical thinking in international relations, too little attention has been paid to the idea itself. A centeal confusion in understanding what ‘evel refers to arises feom a widespread flute to distinguish between sources of explanation and objects of analysis. THE “LEVEL OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM AND HOW IT CAME INTO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ln the soci unises evens often fare more shan one cus wd ‘causes can be found. in more than one trpe of location, For Sane {2531 ind statement titer "The Second Warld War was caused by Freach insecurity, German re fatally weakened balance of power nechanism.” This mul ality "may: reflect explanations that are all ia the same location. inthe example just given, tve French and German causes are in the same type of lecation, both concerning the behaviour The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 199 ives of states. But a weak balance of power is a feature of ernational system as a whole, a different type of locavion for the war than those derived fromthe Uchavioe of individual sates, Arguing that the war as caused by Flvle wougd bea thicd type of location, diferent from the site and gen based ones, though of the same type ass "The Sesord Word We rsa Combi rina Rone The eel of analysis problem’ is abou how to identity and treat different types ot loeaton in which sources of explanation for observed shores feng cin be found. ‘The issue of levels of analysis came into international relations during the 1950s, as part ofthe broader impoct of ie behen nd movement, which was trying to introduce the methodology ard rigour ofthe natural sciences into social seence. The main epncern wat to encourage a more postivis, scientific approcch ae ae discipline, stressing observed facts, quantitative measurement hypothesis-teting. and the develope of sumulaiee dens THe required het one spect ach atts eos sources of one's explanation. It slso resulted in part from the impact of feneral systems theory a8 a way of thinking about a wide ange of Physieal and social phenomena, Traditional approaches to free ational relations were informed more by history and law than by. natural scenee, and at that time only a fer analyse ie the discipline bad knowledge ofscentfie methods. Not everyone wee convinced (then and now) that the use of natural science’ methods ‘was appropriate in the social sciences, But forthe behnviguralses the problem was that explanation in international relations cnt methodologically confused and lacking in rigour, As in Kiecoeal method, the typical, analysis mixed different locations and sources of explanations, and this both weakened the attempt to crests iors general ype of understanding (eo) and prevented the development of @ cumulative science. ‘The heated argement between behaviouralists and traditionalists eventually died down into an uneasy stelemate, but the behaviouralists did carey the point that whatever their ‘approach scientists needed to be more ‘onsclous about the methodologies), ontologicl and epstemolog. iol specs of thee wor 'e fetendonalreliions, development of a general consciousness about levels of anal lysis was a principal, effect of this de ¥ pans The ‘behavioural revolution’ meshed wit ha long-standing epis- temologcal debate in the socialsciences about two pitas approaches to understanding socal evens: atomic ned fata200 Barry Brian lu international relations these two approsehes are more com= monly known ss reductionist and systemic after the usage of Keaeth Wal (1979 chapters 2). tonim/eductionisn the highly successful methodology of the natural sciences, anc requires the fragmentation of a subject into its eemponent parts. Ih the reductionist approach, undezstanding improves as one is xble to subdivile and expan te componeae ps of the syste sige miore finely, as has been done with such astounding suecess physics, chemistry, astronomy and biology during the twenticth century. A holistie/systemic approach rests on the premise that the whole is more than the sum of is parts, and that the behaviour and even construction of the parts are slaped and moulded by suruetures embedded in the system itsell. Where the effect of suas aon, a eduction approve i indent, and on inctive social this basis holism established a elaim to a 1 approach to analysis, ‘The reductionist v, holist debate continoes among philosophers of social science, with the holst claims rejected by ‘methodological individualits', who insist that all structural explanations ean and must be reduced to explanations couched in terms of individuals. Recently a‘structralst’ position hes been developed that seeks to reconcile the two approaches with a complex argument that structures and units are mutually constivutive (Giddens, 1984). In the discipline of international relations, however, «pragmatic auitude towards levels of analysis by and large prevails, and except for a few enthusiasts, this philosophical debate (no matter how Jnyportant itis) takes place at the margins of most people's thinking and understanding, ‘The mainstream position in the discipline has been, and sill is, that both reductionist and holistic approaches n and must be used if anything like a complete understanding of imernational relations is to be achieved. ‘The use of levels of lysis therefore represents an eclectic, multi-causal position n reductionist and holist approsches. Levels of analysis made a strong impact on international rela- tions not least because the idea of levels scemed to fit easily and reatly into the organization of the discipline’s subject matter in terms of individuals, states and systems. Three US writers were mainly responsible for bringing the level of analysis problem into the mainstream of thinking about international relations theory: Kenneth N, Waltz, Morton A. Kaplan and j. David Singer (Hollis and Smith, 1990, pp. 97-100) Waltz made che most durable impact by demonstrating the power of an explicitly levelled” approach in The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 201 bis still widely read (959 classic (based om his 1954 Ph.D. thesis Aan, the State nd War. In hat book Wate Unpacked the classed lteraturs on war, and showed how all of ie could be organieed around theee stint ‘images’ each reflecting diferent lation and type of explanation, Some writers explained war by human tegmattrs by the nature of sates, and others by the nature of the international systam, Waltz’s scheme separated out the inven: nutional system, and particularly its anarchic. structure, as ¢ location of explanation in its own righ, and it was this develop. ‘ment more than any other that shaped the development of levels of analysis thinking in the discipline. Morton Kaplan picked it up in his 1957 book Systems and Process iy Taternational Politics, which stacted a vogue for system theory ‘Most ofthis took the form of attempts to construct typologies of international system type, usually onthe basis of paterns in the dlstibution of power and/or the configuration of alliances, and then to infer hypotheses about behaviour from these patrerns ‘Whereas Waltz favoured the system level ss the dom of explanation, Kaplan argued more in favour of the dominance of the state level, and this began debate kien costae the present cay. One ellc of tht heightened iisest ake Coes Search for ways of theoretically comprehending) what ‘inter national systein’ meant. Is ontological meaning was clear encugh {the sum of all ts parts and Une intersctong), ban cone something more than the sum of the parts ~ the structure o essence of the system ~ could be specified, could it be used xs ¢ basis for explaining intetnational relations. The aystem level sec had the attraction that it increased che distinctiveness of ine national relations asa field, and gave it some hope of establishing ach cipline in its own right, Singer's conteibution Iwas less substantive, but his 1960 review of Waltz's book. and hig {961 essay “The Level of Analysis Problem in. Intermetiotal Relaons! were inflata in moving trazeness of the problem, and use of the term ‘levels of analysis’ into the centre of theoreiien bate inthe fel othesenee of core hese three writers opened the debate about levels of analy: but they certainly did not close it. Once the importance of levels of analysis to any coherent understanding of international relator was accepted, two issues arose: 1 How mai nid shat, levels of analysis should there be for I relations?202 Bary Brezan 2 By what eriteia ean these levels be defined and differentiated from one another? hee of these issues isthe debate settled. A third issue, once pieces back te on this On ne a levels scheme is established, is how one puts th together sgain to achieve a holistic understanding. Del bas only just begun, HOW MANY AND WHAT ELS? The early stages of the level of analysis debate in inteenational tention projected an unwarranted impression of simplicity about the whole es. The neat fc berween the Nos of eels aes natural division of the subject matter into individuals, states and system, seems largely to have forestalled any intense enquiry into the eoneapt of els tele Indeed, mith he deel Tera on ee ta de ini ia ight is rear considering the huge impact that the idea has had on international tlatonsreeurch is conduced i 6 nse cis for example, whether levels of analysis is more an epistemological construct and thus about diferent appro knowledge) or whether tr onto (ad erelore sous the number and type of entities that are thought to actually exist in the inter- ational system). It i not sell eae whee the eles ae designating sometsing as a level, or for denying * Consequently, there is no agreement on how many or what levels there are (or could be) for the study of internat ions, In practice, the discipline has proceeded along very. pragmatic and simple lines, asking few fundamental questions, and not swaying far beyond its starting point, Levels of tnalysis in international relations has been closely tied to the idea of system, defines of ws itera within a structure’ Using this approach, two candidates for levels ace immediately obvious the units and the stractuce of the system. Waltz's original formulacion used three levels: the individual, the unit or state, and the system itself in terms of its anarchie structure. Singer proffered two levels, system and state, but then hedged his bets br saying: ‘it must be stressed that we fave dealt here only with wo of the more common orientations, and that many others are availa perhaps even more uitful potentially than either of those selected here’ (I861. p, 901 In bis later work, Walez ends up close to The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 203 Singers original position, though for different reasons: Arguing {rom the general dstinetion between reductionint a hole (oe ories, Waltz lumps together ‘theories of international patcs th goncentate causes a he individual o¢natonl level” casing both as ‘reductinnis’. Theories that concsve causes operating & the international level he classifies as ‘ystemte’ (1579 p18 In logic, this approach privileges the epstemologiea) over the ents logical, but in paccce it simply blurred the distinction: system and unit could be (and were) seen as both objects of analyse aed sources of explanatio Following in the track set by Waltz and Singer, most inte national relations scholars accept at least three levels: individus (ten focused on decision-makers}, ni (suly sng bos pes tilly any group of humans designated as an actor) and syste ho Turse aeputs, this basic classifestion is inclusive, eventhough it can be further subdivided especially in the middle level (1985 PP, 80-2). Some writers insert a Sureaucrates lewd tees: individval nd unit (Jervis, 1976, p. 15; Hollis and Smith, 1990, Pp. 7-8). Others insert a ‘proces "level between unit and system ‘e capture the difference between explanations based on the eaten of the units, and those based on the dynamics of inmreetone among units (Goldmann, 1979, pp. 1-25 Buzan, Jones and Lich 1993, chapeer 5), 0 ers that the system, ae should be divided into two distnet levels, eicher structure and intencton eae ea {defined as the level of transportation, communication and a n ization eapabiliyy inthe system) (Buzan, Jones and Lil, 169, hapter 4) or ‘international’ and "world" (Goldstein, ched Yurdusev, 1993, p. 82). Some have their own schemes of lovee donot fit weil with more mnventional views: Rosenau is five — idios) tic, role, governmental, societal and systemic (1966p. 43) ‘Much of this confusion ean be removed by observing that what underlies these Proporas isan unresolved dispute been two overlapping schemes for idemtfving what ‘levels ace soppeced represent. One (ontological) sees levels a5 being about “ilecers units of analysis, and the other (epistemological) sees then nt being abou the pes of rable te explain a particular units chaviour’ (Moul, 1973, p. 4 5). Yurdusev proposes distinguishin bern nis 0 gral and “levels of abstaction"in mehoiae GRY (Philosophical, cheorecal and empivcal) (1993, pp. 78-9, 87), but in. view Nou’ tne is more fel in sedvessing i confusion inthe levels debate201 Barry Brean ‘The Girst, and simpler, scheme focuses on levels as units of analysis organized on the principle of spatial scale (small to large, individwal to system), The term ‘levels’ does suggest a range of spatial scales or ‘heights’. In this sense, levels are locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located. They are ontological referents rather than sources of explanation in and of themselves, The introduction of levels of analysis ino ice: national lations by Waltz, Singer and Kaplan could be concel in these terms and much of the debate about levels of analysis has de facto taken place within this framework. In this perspective, levels range along « spectrum feom individual, theough bureau cratic and state, (0 region (subsystem) and systera, ‘There are some advantages to thinking of levels in this way. In a recent book, Helis ant Sith (1990) ster an ingenious seseme ‘which seems to allow them both to retain the simplicity of a basic dlaisin between system and unit, and atthe same time to elaborate more levels, They argue (echoing the reductionist/holist debate) that ‘the dispute between system and unit is a formal dispute ‘which can be filed out according to what i claimed to be the televant system and what the relevant unit’. They then offer four levels of explanation from international relations theory (inter gatonal sem nation-state burencrcy a india gop ing. these into thtee possible pairs “of system-unit d syHentestate, state-bureaucracy, bureaucracy-individual ( ‘each pair the left-hand level serves as the system within which the Fight-hand level isthe unie — for individual units, bureaverac the system, for bureaucratic units, the state is the system, and so forth). Within each of these dyads, the debate is whether expla nation proceeds top-down (system to unit, and therefore system level thoes) or boom (unio sate, and hereore valleve theory) (1999, pp. 7-9). Curiously, they do not consider a regional feeel "which would. seem to be a logical component It any ontological system of levels In the second scheme, levels are understood as different types cr sources of explanation for observed phenomena. In principle, anything that can be established as a distinct source of explanation can qualify. In practice, debate in international relaions has largely developed around three ideas: 1 Interaction capacity, defined generally asthe level of transpor= jon, communication and organization capability in the system, Inceraction capacity focuses on the types and intensi= The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 205 ties of interaction that are possible within any given unit/ subsystem/system atthe point of analysis: how muck goods and information can be moved over what distances at what speeds and what costs. 2 Structure, defined generally as the principle by which units within a system ate arranged. Structure focuses on how unite axe diferntiated from one another, how they are arranged into a system, and how they stand in relation to one another in terms of fae capabilities. 3 Process, defined generally se interactions anang unic, particu larly durable or recurrent patterns in those interactions. Pro- cess focuses on how units actually interact with sue epetior within the constraints of interaction eapacity and strvcune, and particularly on durable or recuzcent patterns in he dynam” ies of interactions. . Bach of these sources can itself be subdivided into more specific classifications along the lines of Waltz’s three tiers of struct Levels in this sense are notin and of themselves units of snalys ‘The two schemes can be integrated as a matrix in which each unis of level of analysis contains, in principe, all of the sources or types of explanation. Thus structures, process and interaction expscity can be found as sources of explanation in individuals, states and the international system, Differentiating nits of analysis. and sources of explanation resolves much of the incoherence about hhow many and what levels. Given the centrality of levels of analysis to most international relations theory, i is nt clear to me why this nily obvions sed crucial distinetion between units of analysis and sources of expla- tation has not surfaced ester in the discipline’ theoretical discourse. One possible explanation is the convenient overlap between them and Walz’s influential work, which blurred the distinetion between system and structure (Buzan, Jones and Litle, 1993, pp. 22-8). Another is the generally weak understanding of the philosophy of social science within international relations’ As Rill be shown in the next section, the great bulk of debate about levels of analysis in the discipline has focused on the opening differentiation between system/structure and unit/state levels Thi debate confused both system and structure, and the location of explanation with its source atthe unit level.206 Barry Bua WALTZ AND THE STRUCTURE VERSUS UNIT DEBATE ‘To understand why basic questions about levels of anal international relations remain either unanswered o¢ unexplored it helps to return to the intellectual history. Much ofthe explanation for what has not been done can be found in the story of what has preoccupied debate within che discipline since ube late 1970s. At the centre of this debate has been Kenneth N. Waltz, his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, and the responses to it, both positive and negative. What might be called the Walte-Singer dyadic approach to levels of analysis, focusing mainly on system/ sirvetute and univ/state is unquestionably still the dominant one in the field, despite much unhappiness with its severe simplifica- ion. Surprisingly. there has Ween litle stempt to follow up Sings escape eluse that many other (lrels} ae avaiable and erhaps even more fruitful potentially than either of those selected ‘Most ofthe action has been concentrated on how to distinguish between the (collective) anit and the system level. Neither Waltz nor Singer attempted much precision in his early works, The individual and state levels were seen as largely self-evident, and Singer defined the system level rather hazily as ‘encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the eystem an environment’ In his later work, Waltz made it his principal aim to specify the two levels clearly, and thus to define the boundary berwveen them: Steve hat tobe studied i ts own right 8 do units. To claim to efelloming a systems approach or tobe construing tssteme theory requires one to show how system and unt lets ah be ‘istsedy defined, Flore to mark and preserve the sini Between structs, onthe one han, and nits and processes, on the ate, makes ie inpowtble co disentangle causes of ferent tons and to distinguish beween causes ang eects Duvrng the Gisnedon between the diferent levels of» stem fs, | beleve been the major impediment tothe development of theres about interetional plies (170, p78). Waltz defined a system simply as ‘composed of & structure and of inceracting units.’ Following his earlier division of the universe of international politcal theory into reductionist and systematic The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 207 categories, he defined the unt level of the eystern as ‘the attributes and interactions of its parts, and the system level ‘by the arrange- tment of the systen’s parts and by the prineiple of that arrange- ment’ (1979, pp. 18, 79, 80). Hlis purpose in focusing on system level theory’ was to “explain why kifferent unite bene sinilarly + Political structure produces a similarity in process and per- formance so long as a structure endures’ (pp. 72, 87). He then ‘went on to elaborate in considerable detail a three-tiered concep. tion of structure (chapter 5). The deepest ter was the principle of arrangement of the units, and in the political universe the options were anarchy or hierarchy (respectively absence or presence of central government), The next tier concerned the dilferentiation of units by function, but Waltz closed chis off, arguing thae under anarchy sates were always like unit’. This view is contested but the debate is beyond the scope of this chapter (Ruggie, 1986, p. 148; Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, pp. 37-47). The third tier was the distribution of capabilities across units, This is essentially about polarity: how many great powers does the system contain? ‘This conception of stcucture has dorsinated the discipline. Though it has many critics, it has no serious rivals. Interestingly, nobody has questioned the status of Waltz’s innovation of subdividing a level into thre tiers, or asked why exch tier does not have the status ofa level in fs own right. Woalta's principal concem ‘was to define system structure, His broect ws thu abuts snl uni (sen) pls a single source of explanation (structure), though the general perception through= ot the debate was that these ewo things constituted a single level, His reasons for concentrating on this single level were perfectly sound: he thought (1) thae ic was the most important for explaining, the general characteristics of international relations, and (2) that within the discipline system and structure were much less well tundeestood than units, and therefore more in need of development. But because the book became so influential, chs lopsided attention to system structure distorted the debate about levels of analysis in a number of ushelpful ways. One way of understanding what happened is to see it in terms of a conflation between the deeper philosophical debate about reductionist and holist approaches on the one hand, and the more pragmatic isues of levels of analysis fan the other. In effect, Waltz presented his argument in such ‘way as to make the two indistinguishable. This not only confined debate to two different types of level (ervtut and uni, bur als saw them as constituting the whole universe of levels. ‘This208 Barry Braen formulation choked off the possibility that other levels might be explored and, indeed, made it dificult to find a place for them in the scheme of things. Part of the problem was generited by Walz’ choice of terms, Because of the very close linkage in his argument between the issue of reduction versus syste epprenshes, and the specrhe thoice of structural snd unit levels of analysis, Wale osed the teem ‘system level’ and ‘sretur’ interchangeably. This conflac eit largely unnoticed, and had the elfeer of shuting off ng about other systemic qualities (such as interaction capacity) tha might count as levels of analysis, Tt mesat te Walte's notably parsimonious definition of structure effectively occupied both the entirety of the holst postion, and the mening Of the term ‘system level Following the reduetionisv/hole logis Wale then defined everthing that if not stocture as belonging the unit (ie, reductionist) levels ‘structure includes only what's required to show how the units of the system are positioned of arranged. Everything else is omitted’ (1979, p. 82). Since he had dlefined structure in highly restrictive terms (as well as inadve tently restricting its use xo the system level) he could not av pushing a vast atray of causes and effects down to the uni level, which ad then to contain all other units of analysis and all ether sources of explanation. Waltz’s restriction of the levels of analysis debate to the confines f the reductionist/holist one thus had three distorting effects. it rammed. the whole debate about levels into an inappro- priate dyad, confining ft to only two levels, and importing ine the relationship between those two levels the oppositional qualities associated with reductionism versus holism. Second, it created a very narox conception of holisn/system, confining i to Walt's ‘pare deftion a plieal scustare Th, creed « bose and incoherene “nit level, to which Wty pid eelavely attention. While many people inthe discipline acknowledge the important ontbiion tat Wal's ideas on sector haee made ihe development of international relations theory, few are comfortable with his conclusion that all else is thereby relegated to the unit level. As Reohane and Nye argue it, ‘making the unit level the dumping ground for all unexplained variance fs an impediment to the development of theory” (1987, p. 74), But beenee sts tworlevel scheme fas nt been adequately challenged. there hee been continuous presse to push hat Walt county a unt level tle The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 209 Factors back into the structural level, Waltz acknowledged ‘how ditfcule ie is to keep the levels of a system consistently listings and separate’ (1986, p, 328), but uncompromisingly defended Iie ‘Arict Boundary. This strugele over the boundary has too esily ignored the possibilty that Waltz's mistake lay not inthe place. sheng atthe fine berweenstructre and unt levels, but i confining the debste to only ew levels in blurring the distineton berwece ts of analysis and sources of explanation, and in asaming that structure i the only source of explanation athe sypten lock he argument about the nature and placement of the boundary beeween the system and unit levels (and therefore sbous shee, Goncent) sets much of the tone of response to Theory of Inter, national Politics, as indicated by the title of the 1586 velane Neorealism and Its Critics. One main line of eriticiam ‘the Walte’s theory is too nasvow, in pact because of its restriction va the international politcal sector, and within that confine the sparse definition of structure. In combination, these two reser ia ers of imrenalig range of fectors tht other ae cing: (1) ‘structural’ (2) important to ovtcomes, and/or (3) pig both beyond a sry poltesl domain, ant neers eine level of analysis. The debate over defining the levels here spills over into that about what counts as a level. Ruggie focusee on Sprnamic densy’, defined as ‘the quantity, velocity and diversy piitransactions that go on within society’ (1986, p. 148). Keohncs looks at richness of information rules and insiteions namin Ugh (1986, pp. 190-7), Keohane and Nve highlighe processes ra patterns of interaction among states, referring to “ion-strectord tncentives for state behaviour’ and ‘the ability of ststes to cone ‘municate and cooperate" (1987, p. 746). Both Ruggie and Cos alo Fa to bring socio-economic fctrs into the aalrss: Ropeie daveng atention tothe linkage of propery rights and eaptaling io lal sovereigns, and Cox ting to include the social forces engendered by: the organisation of production (Roses 1986, pp. 141-8; Cox, 1986, eo0) : (see In theit various ways, Waltz’s ecties all think that a holist/ systemic approach needs to contain more than Walt Their concerns with factors such as dv namic densi fichness, communication facilites and suchlike donot obclonte fic into, Waltz's structural level or into the unit one Th Qn be made to_do sv because, a5 argued abore, that dyad ie heal incoherent. The problem goes gt back to the basic definition of ‘Eten as units, interactions ard structures, Becase his thinking structure information210 Bary Bazan is dominated by the epistemological opposition of reductionisin ‘versus i ‘Waltz sees oe part of a (rd I~ tionist) level, vatying according to the dispositions and capabilities al the yess madned by strecrl pregeres Many of Rees ink that the interetion component of system nezds a higher profile in the theory, but are blocked by Wal's pre-emptiog of structure asthe soe system level component of neorealst theory, by the blending of units of analysis and levels of explanation, and by the confinement ofthe debate of two levels of analysis. Many of these problems can be solved by separaing units of analysis from sources of explanation, and seeing them as a matrix: described above. In this matrix, all of the units of analysis sveen individual and system are quite familiar end straight- lies work, ‘structure is by now also ion. Though only spelled out at the system level, its applicability to other Jevels (where any unit can be defined as.a system 4 la Hollis and Smith), is clear enough. But interaction capacity and process are not yet clearly articulated in a widely understood ee ts a i cil fi Interaction capacity is about the technological capabilites, an the shared norms and organizations, on which le type. and ‘intens iy eee eee nn he the 5) Rae ‘or within i unit, depend. These things clearly fall outside the meaning struture, and repeset a slleent source of explanuion ros ‘As new technologies of transportation and communication spread, ther change the quality and character of the interacions among and within units in the system asa whole, The sharing of norms and values is a precondition for establishing organizations, but ‘once established, such organizations greatly facilitate, and even romote, interactions that shared norms snd values make pe be quite diferent in seale and character from one that is richly endowed sth them. Inter action capacity captures both the technical and the social of capabilities that are system or unit wide, These capabilities are both a defining characteristic ofall units of analysis, anda distinct source of shoving and shaping forees playing alongside those from the structural level ‘The standing of interaction capacity as a distin source of explanation is demonstrated by its profound impact on the oper= ation of neo-ralism’s whole steuctural logic. As the basic deliai= tion of system indicates. the absolute quality of intersction The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered aL capacity is fundamental to the existence of a system. How much interaction, and of what type, is necessary before one can say tie an international system exists? This. question has not. been addressed in neo-realism, Yet so basic is the effect of ineeaetion ity that unless its level and type are specified first, one cannot say whether structural lpi vw operate oF noe tn hisoreal perspective, the impact of low density on the logic of anarchy comes very clear: the variable of interaction crucially alfects the raeaning and construction of the system. When interaction capacity is low, even the existence of a meaningful international system is in question, Structural logic ie suppressed or weakened by thinness of interaction, Waltz simply: presupposes that an Adequate level of the right type of interaction (strategie) exists to take structural logic work, but in faet this hag not been the case for most of history. Interaction eapacity is a distinct variable, not constant (Buzan, Jones and Litle, 1993, ehapter 4), Process is also a distinct source of explanation applicable to all units of analysis. Looked at from the bottom up, explanations in terms of intersetions among or within units seek to understand behaviour and outcomes in terms of the sways in which units at any level respond to one another's attributes and behaviours, Looked at from the top down, process is about the dynamics of a system or a unit, These are essentially action-reaction theories, in which the Key clement is a dynamic of stimulus and response. n international relations, many recurrent patterns have been found the system and subsystem levels in these often very complex iynamics, including war, alliance, the balance of power, arms racing and the security dilemma, and the whole range of inters national paltical economy patterns arising from protectionist and liberal policies on trade and money. The concepts of international Society and the related idea of regimes are also process phenomena Process dynamics can also be found within all pes of colleetce organizations, and within individual human beings, Taking all of this discussion into accouuiy’one version of definitions and differentiations for levels of analysis in. inter- ational relations theory might begin to be arranged 3¢ in igure22 Bary Bran Unite Sourees of explanation of analysis ‘Interaction capacity Structure Process System Sulpsystem Unie Bureaeraey Individoal Figure 9.1 Levelof analysis international relations dheary ‘TIF FALSE CONFLICT BETWEEN STRUCTURALISA AND UNIT LEVEL ANALYSTS ne unforsunate consequence of the confusion between the epis- renologedsraniarsboat kolanihaetne a debe about levels of analysis is tht it generated an wanecessary canon tation between strueturaiais and foreign poliey analysts, The central issue was whether or not structural explanations were thought of as deterministic. If they were, foreign poliey analysis as a inainstream approach to the study of international relations was drastically devalued. Many took Waltz to be a steuctaral detecminist, and interpreted Theory of International Polvics as a dismissal of reductionist approaches to analysis. Waltz was fully aware that structural causes could never offer more than a partial explanation of international outcomes, and that it was important ‘to keep open the theoretically interesting and practically import- ant question of what in differen systems, the proportionate enusal weights of unit-level and of systems-level factors may be’. He says this in many places throughout his works, and these are not the statements ofa siruciural determinist (1979, pp. 48-9, 78,87, 123; 1986, pp. 328-9, 13; 1990, p. 34). ‘Agaitty the confusion between levels of analysis and the episte- mological debate about holism/reductionism parent. The necessity to choose between systemic and ceduetionist approaches is one position within the wider, and still unresolved, epistemolog- ical argument. I is not necessary to transfer this opposition to the level of analysis debate. The important issue in international relations theory is which units of analysis and which sources of The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered 23 explanation ‘ell us most about any given event or phenomenon, No one level of unit or source of explanation is always dominant gapbining inerntional evens, ‘aking this perspective sweeps away a host of irrelevant ques- tions about who is winning, whether the unit evel is about to have 4 resurgence, and whether itis time to ‘bring the state back in" Because it was a fresh development, and powerfully argued, structural logic dominated international relations theoty dtl the 1980s. Iv also gained a boost from the Cold War, because it concer with polariy (the structural effets of the numberof great Powers in the system) in general, and Walta's argument in Particular that bipolarity was a desirable sructure, resonated with the world events going on around the theory. Now the pendulum is swinging back. With the Cold War over, it is easier to assert arguments from other levels. Fukuyama’s fashionable ‘writings about the triumph of the liberal state, and ‘the end of history", stem from the unit level, and build on an argument made muck earlier by Gourevitch that powerful states project their domestic characteristics out into the international system (Gourevitch, 1978); Fukuyama, 1992). Arguments about regimes and inter national society stem from the process a the systern and subsystem levels, and mulch of the argument about interdependence ceflects the systemic effects of changes in interaction capacity. In this perspective, the question of which Jevel is winning (or losing) is not a very interesting one except in telation to some specific phenomenon to be explained, In international relations enerally, all the levels are powerfully in play. ‘The important theoretical question is if two or more units and sources of explanation are operating together, how are ther different analyses to be assembled into 2 whole understanding? To this there Is yet no clear answer. Waltz's position, probably widely shared, sig- gests that explanations on different levels can be aided together and assigned relative weights in relation to any given analysis. But is not clear how this weighting might be done, or even whether it is methodologically sound (Moul, 1973, p. 499; Hollis and Smith, 190, pp. 6-7). There is also rather comples debate going fon in the background about the relationship between ‘agents (ons) and structures (Giddens, 1984) Wendt, 1987; Buran, fones nd Livle, 1993, chapters 6-7), The ideas of structure developed by Waltz are, unlike some conceptions of structure, dependent on Structure ofthis sort cannot precede unies but only grow up ‘with them, Because of this, itis possible to argue that units anda Barry Buzan stcuctures are mutually constitutive: states make the structure, and the structure makes states. Once this line of reasoning is entered 0, the whole differentiation of units of analysis is Brought into guestinn. ‘This form of reassembling the whole fs much more complex than that envisaged by Waltz, and its implications for the nding of levels of analysis as an’ approsch to the study of thal eon isnot yt clear. Can Level be reasembled without undoing the initial validity of their separation? CONCLUSIONS ‘There can be no doubt thatthe idea of levels of analysis has had « rofound impact on the way international relations is studied. It Fas foredarslyes to be mor aytemate about how they prsene explanations. It has structured much of the mainstream debate about theory, and it has provided a potent way of dividing up the vast and complex subject matter of international relations. It has stimulated thinking ebovt what the concept ‘international system" actually means. It has begun to esise awareness in the discipline of the need to considera tange of epitemolgia! and ontological lwestions. What counts ag knowledge in diseipline, and ivhat are the legitimate methods of explanation? What is the relationship between analytical constructs and ‘real? entities that exist in the vworkl? Te has therefore done much to increase the rigour of analysis in the field, and it has opened lines of theory that would otherwise have been difficule to find, In some areas quite major advances have been made, most notably Waltz's conception of structure ‘But much remains to be done, many core issues and concepts ae still poorly understood, and many serious questions are unanswered or unaddressed. International relations theory i stil in its infancy, and there is no disguising the fact that the discipline is stil theoretically primitive. Fewr have bothered to enquire as to hhow levels relate to the practice of dividing the international system up into political, economie, military and societal sector. “The debate about levels of analysis cemains confined largely within the political and military sectors, and this inhibits linkage to increasingly important bodies of international relations work (international political economy, historical sociologr) that deal with the economic and societal sectors Nevertheless, thinking in cerms of levels of analysis now The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered us firmly established as pact of international relations theory. Te has een a potent and useful stimulus to theory in the discipline even though the concept of levels is still not properly understood in its ova right, Levels of analysis has defined a way of thinking about the intervational system that has dominated theory for several decades. The work of several generctions of academics has been shaped by it to such an extent that it is now crucial to. an ‘understanding ofa good del of he dasplincs teovecal dt Course, But ke much ee in internaonalFeltions theory ks yet only a very parti construction on which much work stil ‘needs to be done. Note 4 would like to thank Hayward Alker, Ni Peter Gleitse, Richard Lite, sap de Wilde, Ole Waever and the editors or comments on earlier drtts of this chapter, References Buzan, By Jones, Cand Lil, R, 1993: The Logic of Anarchy: Neoralon {oSiacial Reali, New Yorks Caluna Universty Pes, Cox, R198: Socal lore tes yon intentions ‘ning theory In Keone 1986 Folate, F982: The End of Hier and the Last Man. London: Penguin Giddens, 198: The Canataton of Seciy: An Oulne of the Theory of Sirntiretion Cambrie: Ply Press Gollan, K-1979: Is my enemy's emery my reds rend? Lund, Sweden Call Inctrs The Steed Sma Sytem, [45-73,Repor No. Govrevitch, P1978 The second rage rercaees the mernatiant sours of domestic pls. Inermtionl Orgniv in, 32 (4) £01291 is Meand Smith, $1980: Explain wn Undersending Intemational Relaon, Oxford: Clarendon. Jervis R126: Pevepton and AMipercton in Imemtinal Pais Princeton, Nie Pintion Unicersig Pre Kaplan, 311987: Sytem and roc latemtinal Poli ‘i Keohane R. O. 19863: Theory of world poles: sirvewral rain and been In Keohane (1986), 138-20. Keohane, RO. (el) 1986b: Nroreelion and Jus Cri. New York: Camis Universi Press 1. New York:216 Barry Buzan Keolne 8. O. snd Nye J. 8. 1987: Power and interdependence revised, ‘nremational Organization, 414), 225-55, Mou! WB 173; The level af analysis problem revisited. Canady Journal of Peel Science, 61(), 494-513. , J RosenaiJ-N. 1966: Pretheories and theories af foreign pole, Ia R. B. Farr (ed) proaches to Comparative and Intematanel Polen Brena, ton: Nocthwestrn University Press, 27-92, Roeti, J. G. 1986: Continuity and tensformation in she world polis tevard a ncorealit synthesis. In Keohane 1966 131.57, uggie,). G. 1993: Teritrility and beyond: preblematiing modem intersaonal eeions. Internation Organization, 47(1), edo Singer, J.D. 1960: International confit tee levels of says, World Polis 20). 48-61. = Sings | D. 1961: The vet of soalyes problem in ieroatonal eation. In phone a8. Veto (es), The International Stem: Tooretiel Bape Princeton, N.J: Pieeton University Pres ‘Waly K..N. 1954/1959: Afan, the State and War, Nese York: Columbia Univasicy Press, ‘Wale, K. N. 197% Theory of Inernaionl Plt, Reading, Mass: Addie son-Wesley. ‘Waltz, KN: 1986: Reflections on Ticoryof International Polit a response {o my cies. kn 1986, 22-45. Wola, KN. 1990: Rest thoughe and neoreist theo. Joma of nterntons Affi, 441), 21-97 Wendt, AE. 1987: The agent-structure probleny in internat theory. lntemsaional Organization, AIG), 1350) ‘Yurduser, A. N. 1993: Level of analysis and unt of analyst ease or Aistineion. Millenium Journal of Intemational Senden 231) 77-98, nal relations