Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pre-Week Remedial Law
Pre-Week Remedial Law
REMEDIAL LAW 1
by
ABELARDO T. DOMONDON2
These Notes were specially prepared by Prof. Abelardo T. Domondon for the
exclusive use of the 2001 Bar candidates who attended his Pre-Bar Lectures sponsored by
PRIMUS Management Unlimited Services, Inc. held at the Asian Social Institute from
August 6-9, 2001. Other reviewees he has personally authorized may also use these
Notes.
Only copies with the manual signature of Prof. Domondon, or his authorized
representative, on this page are considered as authorized copies. Holders of authorized
copies are requested not to lend their copies for xeroxing. Reviewees attending the
2002 Ateneo Bar Review are authorized to use these notes.
This work does not use the conventional method of discussing the subject on a "Rule
by Rule, Section by Section" method. Instead, it uses the procedural approach, which
tries to present, as far as practicable, the steps to be followed in the prosecution or
defense of actions. The words in bold are the exact wordings of the Rules of Court, so
the reader does not have to cross-refer to the codal provisions. Where the reader is
pressed for time he should read only the main headings in bold letters and browse the
text.
There are certain analytical processes that must be undertaken in order to solve fact
centered Bar questions. The processes point the direction as to how the Bar candidate
should analyze the Bar questions and how he should formulate his answer.
1
Sixth Edition, Copyright 2001 by Abelardo T. Domondon.
2
AB (Eco), BSC (Acctg.), LLB, MA (Eco), LLM, DCL (Cand.). Practicing Lawyer, CPA and Customs Broker.
Pre-Bar Reviewer in Mercantile Law, Remedial Law, Taxation, Labor & Social Legislation, and Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises.
2
It is suggested that the reader should master the processes by applying the concepts
contained in the Pre-Week Notes..
There are two groups of questions that are usually asked in Civil Procedure,
Provisional Remedies, Special Civil Actions, Special Proceedings and Criminal
Procedure. These two groups could be analyzed by answering certain questions.
When reading the Pre-Week Notes, the Bar candidate should cover the text, look at
the heading in bold letters and should try to recollect the concepts. He then removes the
cover and checks if his recollection is accurate.
If he has time the Bar candidate should write down the answers to the Review
Problems to test his ability to recollect and write down answers within the time
limitation. Each question should be answered in six (6) minutes. The Review Problems
are the author's forecasted questions. It is to be noted that some of the Review Problems
were copied from previous Bar Questions.
3
CIVIL PROCEDURE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
COURTS, IN GENERAL
***4. What are the measures which ensure the independence of the courts ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
b. Appointmens to the judiciary shall be made from the nominees of the Judicial and Bar
Council, which appointments do not need any Commission on Appointment confirmation.
c. Salaries of members of the judiciary shall be fixed by law and not to be decreased
during their continuance in office.
d. Members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
e. Only the Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal.
f. Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only upon reaching the
age of 70 years, incapacioty or through impeachment.
g. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
4
5. May the Supreme Court suspend the application of the Rules of Court ? Explain
briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. It is within the power of the Court to temper rigid rules
in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even
meticulously observed, the Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not
really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly
conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. (Lao v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 47013; Co v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60647; and the Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 60958-59, prom. January 17, 2000)
When they are rigid and strict in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend its own rules
(People of the Philippines v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 106581, prom. March 3, 1997), and except a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. (Fortich,
etc., et al., v. Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457, prom. April 24, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Examples where the Supreme Court suspended the application of the Rules of
Court:
1) The Court of Appeals may entertain a second motion for reconsideration of its
decision although the filing of such motion violates a prohibition thereof. (Lao v. Court
of Appeals, , et al., G.R. No. 47013; Co v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60647; and
the Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
Nos. 60958-59, prom. January 17, 2000 )
2) The Supreme Court allowed the submission of a certified true copy of the
Special Order granting execution pending appeal as substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that the petition “be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof.” (Lao v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 47013; Co v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60647, and the
Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.
60958-59 prom. January 17, 2000)
3) A petition for review of a CSC Resolution under Rule 45 with the Court of
Appeals, although an inappropriate remedy or wrong mode of appeal pursuant to Circular
No. 2-90 was reinstated. The Circular should be so interpreted and applied as to attain,
not defeat the ultimate purpose of the rules of procedure to achieve substantial justice.
(Romero v. Civil Service Commission, 276 SCRA 610, in turn citing A-One Feeds, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals et. al., 100 SCRA 590)
4) A dismissal of a petition by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
questioned orders submitted by the petitioner were unsigned duplicate copies, not clearly
legible duplicate original certified true copy was reinstated by the Supreme Court.
(Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 136478, March 27, 2000)
b. The Supreme Court does not always suspend the Rules. The payment of the
docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: “Failure of the appellant to pay the docket
and other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41 is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.”
Indeed, it has been held that failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal renders
the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who
seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or the rule.
The bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel the Supreme Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not
to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice
to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.”
5
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must
be done, “have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays
and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x x The reason for rules of this nature is
because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would
result, without rules governing practice. x x x Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper,
efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.” T Rules may be relaxed only in
“exceptionally meritorious cases.” (Lazaro et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 137761,
April 6, 2000)
c. Reason for allowing suspension of the rules. The rules on procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Strict adherence to procedural rules is not the end-all and be-all of litigation, although
strict adherence to procedural rules must at all times be observed. Adjective law is not to be
taken lightly, for without it, the enforcement of substantive laws may not remain assured.
Nevertheless, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, but primarily devised and
designed to help in the proper and expedient administration of justice. In appropriate cases
therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause
of substantial justice. (Lao v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 47013; Co v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 60647, and the Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 60958-59 prom. January 17, 2000)
d. Cases where the Rules of Procedure do not apply. The Rules of Civil Procedure
generally do not apply to land registration cadastral and election codes, naturalization and
implementing procedures except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. Election contests are subject to the Comelec Rules of procedure.
(Barrosa v. Hon. Ampig Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 138218, prom. March 17, 2000)
Examples:
1) The suppletory application of the non-forum shopping requirements under the
Rules of Civil Procedure to election cases does not automatically warrant the dismissal
of the case with prejudice. Reason: Strict application of the non-forum shopping rule
would not work to the best interest of the parties and the electorate.
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with public interest.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the
board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. An election contest involves not
only the adjudication of private and pecuniary onterests of rival candidates but paramount
to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. (Ibid.)
2) The appellate court could consider documents attached to the state’s brief in an
appealed naturalization case, even if not presented and offered as evidence in the trial
court as required under Sec. 34, Rule 132. The reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence not formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admisibility. There is no denial of due process because objections to the
authenticity of the documents could have been made in the briefs filed with the appellate
court. (Chia v. Republic, et al., G.R. No. 127240, prom. March 27, 2000)
4. Venue
5. Summary procedure
E. Pleadings and motions
1. Pleadings in general
a. Formal Requirements
b. Manner of making allegations in pleadings
2. The complaint
a. Joinder of causes of action
1) Permissive
2) Compulsory
3. Filing and service of pleadings and other papers
4. Motions in general
a. Filing, service and hearing of motions
F. Depositions and discoveries
2. Pleadings
a. Reply
b. Answer to counterclaims
3. Others
a. Pre-trial brief
b. Depositions and discoveries
B. Defendant's motions and pleadings after answer
1. Motions
a. Oppositions to plaintiff's various motions
2. Others
a. Pre-trial brief
b. Deposition and discoveries
PRE-TRIAL
A. Plaintiff's motions
1. To present evidence ex-parte and render judgment
B. Defendant's motion
1. Motion to dismiss
C. Common motions
1. To postpone
2. For consolidation or severance
3. For trial by commissioner
E. Expanding the scope of the suit
1. Joinder of claims or causes of action
2. Joinder of parties
TRIAL.
A. Trial
1. Order of trial
B. Common motions
1. To postpone
2. To amend to conform to evidence
JUDGMENT
AFTER JUDGMENT.
A. Common motions
1. For reconsideration
2. For new trial
B. Others
1. Notice of appeal
2. Petition for relief from judgment
APPEAL
A. In general
1. Preliminary concepts
9
Of course, even if the lack of cause of action is not apparent on the face of the complaint
or initiatory pleading, but the same is pleaded in an answer then failure on the part of
complainant (the plaintiff) to show the existence of a cause of action during the course of the trial
would ultimately lead to a dismissal of his complaint.
10. The owner of an estate fenced his property, as a result of which the tenants of the
apartment adjoining the property lost their passageway. There was no right of way enjoyed by
the tenants. Consequently, the tenants left. Could the apartment owner recover damages
from the estate owner ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The mere fact that the apartment owner suffered losses
does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
To warrant the recovery of damages there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy for the injury caused by a breach or a wrong.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff, a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
(Sps. Custodio, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 253 SCRA 483)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
*** a. Injury, defined. The illegal invasion of a legal right .(BPI Express Card
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120639, prom. September 25, 1998)
*** b. Damage, defined. The loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury, damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. .(BPI Express Card
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120639, prom. September 25, 1998)
11. Atty. Ricardo was the holder of a complimentary credit card issued by BPI Express
Card Corporation with a credit limit of P3,000.00 which was subsequently increased to
P5,000.00. The application for credit card privileges stated that BPI could automatically
suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days. Oftentimes he
11
exceeded the credit limit and BPI tolerated this as well as his payment of his account by
checks. In October, 1989 he was not able to pay his account amounting to P8,987.84, but BPI
demanded from him a check of P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card. Atty. Ricardo issued a December 15, 1989 postdated
check in the amount of P15,000.00 which was received by an employee of BPI on November
23, 1989.
On November 28, 1989 BPI sent a letter to Atty. Ricardo by ordinary mail informing
him of the temporary suspension of his credit card privileges and unless he settles his account
within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled. There
is no showing that Atty. Ricardo received the letter before December 8, 1989.
Confident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check,
Atty. Ricardo invited some guests on December 8, 1989 and entertained them at Cafe
Adriatico. When he presented his credit card for the bill amounting to P735.32, said card was
dishonored. One of the guests, Mary Ellen, paid the bill using a Unibankard.
Under the circumstances, is Atty. Ricardo entitled to damages as a result of the social
humiliation and embarrassment he suffered ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. It was Atty. Ricardo's failure to settle his obligation
which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Cafe Adriatico. He
can not now pass the blame to BPI for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. As shown
by the facts, the application contained the stipulation that BPI could automatically suspend a card
whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days.
As a matter of fact, as early as 28 October 1989, BPI could have suspended Atty.
Ricardo's card outright. Instead it allowed him to use his card for several weeks. Atty. Ricardo
was even notified of the impending suspension of his credit card, which he was presumed to
have received because of the disputable presumption that letters duly directed and mailed were
received in the regular course of mail . (BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 120639, prom. September 25, 1998)
12. Fernando filed a complaint for recovery of property against the children of
Remigio. The complaint alleged that Fernando bought the property from Alejandro, but was
unable to effect the immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his foreign nationality at
the time of the sale. As an assurance of his good faith Alejandro turned over the owner's
duplicate copy of the title to Fernando and in addition executed a lease contract in favor of
Fernando for 40 years. Subsequently, Alejandro sold the property to his brother Remigio with
the understanding that the property is to be held in trust for Fernando and that Remigio
would execute the document of sale in favor of Fernando upon the latter's demand. Another
lease contract, this time between Fernando and Remigio was executed in favor of Fernando to
safeguard his interest over the property. No rents were ever paid by Fernando nor were there
demands made upon him. Remigio was killed and during his wake, Fernando reminded his
children of the agreement and they promised to transfer the subject property to Fernando who
by this time has acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. The children never made
good their promise and in fact they transferred the property in their names.
Upon receipt of the complaint the defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming among
others that the complaint states no cause of action. At the time of the filing of the complaint
Alejandro was already dead. Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion denied. Fernando relies simply on the allegation that
he is entitled to the property by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro who is now dead.
Obviously, Fernando will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining,
cannot be allowed without violating the "Dead Man's Statue" found in Sec. 23, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and
relevant laws and jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action.
(Tan, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125861, prom. September 9, 1998)
ESTOPPEL
12
LACHES
PRESCRIPTION
16. What is the prescriptive period for the availment of the remedies of accion
publiciana or accion reinvendicatoria ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The remedies of accion publiciana or reinvendicatoria must
be availed of within ten (10) years from dispossession. This is so, because under Art. 555(4), of
the Civil Code the real right of possessions is lost after the lapse of 10 years. (Cutanda, et al., v.
Heirs of Cutanda, et al., G.R. No. 109215, prom. July 11, 2000)
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
The action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein which
can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued is acquisitive, not
extinctive prescription. For extinctive prescription, the applicable law is Article 1141 of the
Civil Code which provides that, real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty (30) years,
without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription. (Heirs of Seraspi v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135602, prom. April 28,
2000)
Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession of the property
being litigated, such action is imprescriptible. One who is in actual possession of a land,
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its
effects on his title. (Maestrado, etc. et al., v. Court of Appeals, etc. et al., G.R. No. 133345;
Maestrado, et al. V.. Roa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 133324, prom. March 9, 2000)
LITIS PENDENTIA
20. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the ejectmnt suit filed by the plaintiff
against the defendants over a parcel of land claiming that the defendants were occupying the
land upon his mere tolerance. While an appeal was pending before the RTC, plaintiff filed a
motion for immediate execution of the MCTC judgment which was granted. The writ of
demolition will be executed over the house owned by the defendants. However, the Court of
Appeals later reversed the RTC order granting the execution pending appeal, which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the defendants also filed before the RTC a new
action for quieting of title involving the same parcel of land but not the house.
The defendants also filed before the RTC a new action for quieting of title involving
the same property. Should the action for quieting of title justify the suspension of the
ejectment suit ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, on equitable considerations as an exception to the
general rule that a pending civil action invlving ownership of the same property does not justify
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
The ejectment suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. The ejetmnet of
the defendants would mean a demolitionof their house, a matter that is likely to create confusion,
disturbance, inconveniences and expenses. Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC decision
would cause the plaintiff to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing
the defendants from the premises. The plaintiff is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the
house. Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by
proceeding at a state wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and propbably irreparable. (Amagan, et al., v. Marayag, et al., G.R. No.
138377, prom. February 28, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: In the above case the Suprem Court considered the
prevailing exceptional circumstances. As a general rule, a pending civil action involving
ownership fo the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings.
Unlawful detainer and forcible enry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or
forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claimsof
16
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption
of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their
claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncemens made on questions of ownership are provision in nature.
The underlying reasons why a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property subject of the ejectment proceedings does not result to a suspension of the ejectment
proceedings are that the actions in the RTC do not involve physical or de facto possession, and,
on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presnted in the former could quite s easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectmnt action and there resolved. . (Amagan, et al., v. Marayag, et al., G.R. No.
138377, prom. February 28, 2000)
RES JUDICATA
whether the same facts or evidence would support and establish the causes of action in each case.
(Vda. de Salanga, et al., v. Hon. Alagar, etc, et al., G.R. No. 134089, prom. July 14, 2000)
***23. Spouses de la Cruz ownd a residential lot which was leased to Dominga where
she built a two-story house where her family lived. The lessess religiously paid her monthly
lease ental undtil June 1979 when the lessor stopped collecting the same.
In June 1979 Theresa informed Dominga that she purchased the lot from the previous
owners. She wanted to take immediate possession of the propertysince she had no other
residential lot and she intended to make use of the lot for the construction of her own house.
Theresa gave Dominga three (3) months notice to vacate and to demolish the improvements
which the latter had built on the lot.
As a result of Dominga’s failure to vacate, Theresa filed an ejectment case based on
her alleged need for the property. The court dismissed the case and held that the defendant
has not been in arrears in the payment of the monthly rentals and noted that the plaintiff
never tried to collect. That decision had long become final and executory.
In 1982, Theresa filed a second ejectment case, this time against Almario who
succeeded his mother Dominga. The case was again dismissed as the rentals up to and
including February 1982 had been paid in full. The decision had also become final and
executory.
In 1989, Mariano, the new owner of the property filed another ejectment case against
Almario insisting the same premises subject of the first two ejectment cases. Almario again
prevailed.
In 1992, Mariano filed the fourth ejectment suit alleging that he is lwasing the
property to Almario, that the lessee has violated the terms of the lease agreement by not paying
rentals since December, 1987 which has accunulated to P17,564.45. That he has made
several demands upon Almario to pay his arrears and to vacate the premises the latest of
which is through a January 16, 1992 letter.
Almario is now raising the doctrine of res judicata contending that this latest ejectment
suit is barred by the final and executory decisions in previous cases. Rule on Almario’s
defense.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: There is no res judicata because of the lack of identity of
causes of action between the latest and previous cases.
The first ejectment case had for a cause of action based on the need for the premises. The
second ejectment case involved a different cause of action, that is, for non-payment of rentals up
to February 1982. The third case had for cause of action the need for the premises and non-
payment of rentals from Novembefr 1987 up to May 1988. In the latest ejectment suit the cause
of action is the non-payment of rentals from December 1987 accumulating to P17,064.65.
Clearly, the cause of action and the circumstances present in the instant case are not the
same but differ markedly from those in previous suits cited. Reliance on the doctrine of res
judicata is misplaced. (Siapian v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 11928, prom. March 1,
2000)
24. Bachrach Corporation entered into two lease contracts with the Philippine
Government, then under the control and management of the Director of Lands, for a term of
99 years, the first lease to expire 19 June 2017 and the other on 14 February 2018. During
the Aquino administration, the management and control of the entire Port Area was
transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), which forthwith issued a memorandum
increasing the rental rates of Bachrach by 1,500%.
As a result of Bachrach's refusal to pay, PPA instituted and ejectment suit which
resulted to a decision in its favor. An appeal to the RTC proved unavailing for Bachrach as
well as a subsequent petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals. Bachrach then
sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration Bachrach filed a complaint
with the Manila RTC for refusing to honor a compromise agreement said to have been
perfected between Bachrach and PPA that superseded the ejectment case. Bachrach prayed
for specific performance.
PPA sought the dismissal of the specific performance case on the ground of pendency
of another action between the same parties for the same cause. Decide.
19
filed by another insurer against the same shipping line on the basis of the same factual
circumstances. (Rizal Surety & Insurance Company v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 112360, prom. July
18, 2000 citing Smith Bell and Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 201))
***e. Bar by former judgment distinguished from conclusiveness of judgment:
1) There is bar by former judgment if all the identities (parties, subject
matter and cause of action) are present WHILE in conclusiveness of judgment
there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases, all other requisites
being present.
2) As to effect, in bar by former judgment, the first judgment constitutes
an absolute bar to all matters directly adjudged as well as matters that may have
been adjudged WHILE in conclusiveness of judgment, the first judgment is
conclusive only on matters actually litigated and adjudged in the first action.
(Penalosa v. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303)
***26. Distinguish from each other: res judicata, law of the case and stare decisis.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Res judicata simply means finality of judgments, or that issues
decided ion a case, once a decision has become final and executory cannot be litigated again by
the same parties in a subsequent action involving the same subject matter (Penalosa v.Tuazon, 22
Phil. 303); WHILE Law of the case means that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal,
whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty
and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become
and remain the law of the case in all stages, whether in the lower court or in the appellate court
on a subsequent appeal (Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747) while
Stare decisis means the doctrine that when the court has once laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere in principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same. (Government v. Jalandoni, 49 O.G. 1840)
FORUM SHOPPING
***c. Test for determining whether there is prohibited forum shopping: Where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata on the other. Where there exists between the two cases:
1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions, as well as
2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and the
3) indentity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action, will regardless of which party is successful amount to res adjudicata
in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.
(First Philippine International Bank, etc., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 115849,
prom. January 24, 1996)
d. Examples where there is forum shopping:
1) There would be forum shopping if all of the respondents acting as one group,
filed identical special civil actions in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court.
There must be identity of parties, of interests represented, rights asserted and relief
sought in different tribunals. (Ruby Industrial Corporation, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 124185-87, prom. January 20, 1998)
2) A lawyer filed nine judicial remedies in different courts, attacking the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial court in one case. (Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 123332, prom. February 3, 1997)
e. Examples of no forum shopping:
1) Where two groups of respondents appear to have acted independently of each
other when they sought relief from the appellate court, there is no forum shopping.
however, the adverse party can always ask for the consolidation of the two cases. (Ruby
Industrial Corporation, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124185-87, prom.
January 20, 1998)
2) Where the reliefs sought in the opposition in the Court of Appeals and the
petition before the Supreme Court are not identical. (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124554, prom. December 9, 1997)
3) Where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions
for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are
still pending the defense of litis-pendentia in one case is a bar to the other side; and, a
final judgment in one would constitute res judicata; and thus would cause the dismissal of
the rest. (Ibid., citing First Phil. International Bank v. Court of Appeals)
4) Forum-shopping concurs not only when a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are
present. The fiing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the sam cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment amounts to forum-shopping.
5) Only when the successive filing of suits as part of an appeal, or a special civil
action, will there be no forum-shopping because the party no longer availed of different
for a but, rather sought a review of a lower tribunal’s decision or order. The termination
of the case before a lower court and its elevation for review to a higher court does not
constitute forum-shopping for the latter is a recognized emedy under our procedural
rules. (Quinsay v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127058, prom. August 31, 2000)
28. On September 6, 1995, Hubert Webb filed a petition for contempt in Criminal Case
No. 95-404 against Jessica Alfaro and Viva Productions, Inc., complaining that their acts
concerning the promotion, advertising and marketing of "The Jessica Alfaro Story," in the
print and broadcast media and, even on billboards as well as the scheduling of the premiere of
the movie on September 11, 1995 and its regular public exhibition starting September 13, 1995
constitutes contempt within the contemplation of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
On September 8, 1995 after a full hearing, the court issued an order restraining the
premiere and showing of the movie. On the same day, Hubert instituted a case for Injunction
with Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which issued ex-parte an order
enjoining Viva and Alfaro from further proceeding, engaging, using or implementing the
promotional, advertising and marketing programs for the same movie and from showing or
causing it to be shown or exhibited in all theaters in the entire country until after the final
22
termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the criminal action pending before the
Paranaque RTC.
Was there forum-shopping ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. While there is no identity of causes of action, Webb sought
exactly identical reliefs when a prayer for the injunctive writ was likewise prayed for in the
Makati Court. (Viva Productions, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 269 SCRA 664)
29. "G" filed an action against "W" for quieting of title. During the pendency of the
action, "G" filed another suit also against "W" to eject him from the property subject of the
action for quieting of title. Is there forum-shopping ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve
the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances and the actions must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
An action for quieting refers to ownership while the action for ejectment concerns
possession. Surely there are different causes of action (Gachon, et al., v. Devera, Jr., etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 116695, prom. June 20, 1997)
If the criteria for invoking judicial process is not met then, the complaint filed by such
incapacitated plaintiff may be subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground That the plaintiff has
no legal capacity to sue. (Sec. 1 [d], Rule 16, ROC).
On the other hand if the ground is not raised in a motion to dismiss it may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. (1st par., Sec. 6, Rule 16, ROC)
32. "A" husband of "B," instituted an action for ejectment in the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in his name against "C" to recover the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land which was the paraphernal property of "B."
"C" filed a motion asking that "B" be made a party in the action. The court denied "C's"
motion and proceeded with the trial of the case. Is the court's ruling sustainable ? State the
reasons for your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Spouses shall sue and be sued jointly except only in the
cases provided by law. There is no showing in the problem that there is a judicial separation of
property, or that there was a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
that the husband has been appointed by a court as the administrator of the wife's property.
***33. What is the purpose why suits must be brought in the name of the real party in
interest ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In order to end litigations. If the suit is not brought in the
name of the real party in interest, no controversy would be resolved because another suit could
always be instituted for or against the "true" real party in interest.
As the latin maxim goes, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium. The interest of the
State demands end to litigation.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. Legal interest, concept of. The Court will only exercise its power of judicial
review if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the legal
question. “Legal standing” denotes a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act that is being challenged. The
term “interest” means material interest as distinguished from a mere incidental interest.
In the present case, aside from the fact that petitioners were not parties in the proceedings
before the lower court, they have not cited any acceptable or valid basis to support their legal
standing to question the probate court’s order. Since respondent estate is the undisputed owner
of the subject private lots, the right of the administrator to have the same fenced cannot be
questioned by petitioners who do not have any vested right over the subject lots. The fact that
petitioners are neighboring lot owners whose access to public roads will allegedly be affected by
the fencing of the subject lots, merely gives them an incidental interest over the questioned order
of the probate court and cannot serve as basis to support their legal standing to elevate the order
of the probate court to the Court of appeals and before this Court. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that the only person who can rightfully oppose the issuance of the fencing permit is
the City Engineer of Caloocan. (Tang, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117204, prom.
February 11, 2000)
b. Legal interest and interest, defined. The term interest is material interest, an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party must be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party. (Spouses
Tankiko, et al., v. Cezar, et al., G.R. No. 131277, prom. February 2, 1999)
34. HIB Tenants Association, composed of about a hundred heads of families who are
tenants in good standing of a 14-story building brings a suit contesting the conditional sale of
such building without notice to the tenants or prior clearance from the proper government
office.
Does the HIB Tenants Association have the personality to sue on its own, as a
corporation representing its members who are tenants of the building ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, it is not a real party in interest. It has no real, actual,
material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. The benefits are not really
meant for the Association, but for the members of the Association. Thus, a person who is not a
24
party to a contract and for whose benefit it was not expressly made cannot maintain an action on
it, even if the contract, if performed by the parties to it, would incidentally inure to his benefit.
It is the individual members who have personal and individual rights as tenants therefore
they are the real parties in interest. (House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 151 SCRA 703)
***35. Spouses Tondas acting both in their capacity as officers of Honey Tree Apparel
Corporation (HTAC) and in their personal capacities, applied for and wer granted commercial
letters of credit by METROBANK, in connection with the importoation of raw textile materials
to he used in the manufacturing of garments. The imported fabrics were withdrawn by HTAC
under 11 trust receipts executed by the Tondas. Despite repeated demands, the Tondas failed
to account to METROBANK the goods and/or proceeds of sale of the merchandize, subject of
the trust receipts.
METROBANK filed with the Provincial Prosecutor a complaint/affidavit charging the
Tondas with violation of P.D. No. 115 (Trust Receipts), in relation to Article 315 (1) (b), of the
Revised Penal Code which was dismissed by the Prosecutor. METROBANK appealed to the
Secretary of Justice which ordered the filing of the appropriate information. The Tondas
sought a reconsideration of the order which was denied. They filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court granted ordering the dismissal of the
criminal complaint.
Is METROBANK clothed with personality to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
or should the Office of the Solicitor General institute the suit ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, METROBANK has pesonality to elevate the decision of
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
The general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or Republic of the Philippines once the case is broguht
before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
However, an exception has been made that “if there appears to be grave error committed
by the judge or lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants
therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Tonda, et al., G.R. No. 134436, prom. August 16, 2000)
36. Cezar, et al., are the actual occupants and residents of Lot No. 3714 of the
Cadastral survey of Cagayan situated in Barrui Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City and are the
miscellaneous sales patent applicants of specific portions of the parcel of land. It appearts
that Lot No. 3714 was “declarado terreno publico” as of December 14, 1940, and
subsequently adjudicated to and ordered registered in the name of Salcedo but OCT No. 0-
740 was actually issued only in 1977. It is now the contention of Cezar, et al., that the
property covered by Lot No. 3714, the same as that covered by OCT No. 0-740 is public land
because Salcedo succeeded in registering in his name land previously declared as public land
as early as December 19, 1940. Consequently, OCT 0-740 should be cancelled and reconveyed
to Cezar, et al., the applicants for sales patent.
Would the suit for cancellation and reconveyance prosper ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, because it was not brought in the name of the real party in
interest. Only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being
the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, Cezar, et al,,have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
(Spouses Tankiko, et al., v. Cezar, et al., G.R. No. 131277, prom. February 2, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Unless authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (last sentence,
Sec. 2, Rule 3, ROC).
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (1st sentence, Ibid.)
37. William Uy and Rodel Roxas, as agents of the owners of eight parcels of land
entered into a series of sale for these lands with the National Housing Authority (NHA) for
development as a housing project. However, a report by the DENR showed that three of the
parcels are not suitable for a housing project so NHA cancelled the sale for these lots.
25
William and Rodel then filed suit against NHA dor damages as a result of the
cancellation of the sale of the three lots. Will the case prosper ?
NOTES AND COMMENTS: No, because William and Rodel are not real parties in
interest. The Rules provided that an action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
William and Rodel are not parties to the contract of sale. Even if they are entitled to
commissions resulting from the sale, their recourse should be to the owners and not to NHA.
There is no contractual relation between William and Rodel one hand and NHA on the other.
(Uy, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120465, prom. September 9, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. General rule. Contracts take effect only between the parties, hence agents may not
sue upon a contract.
Exceptions: Agents may sue upon a contract without joining the principal, if they are
assigns and heirs of their principals eccept where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation, or by provision of law. (Uy, et al., v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120465, prom. September 9, 1999)
***IMPT: Do not forget that an agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal, except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal. (Sec. 3, Rule 3, ROC)
38. The mayor of Santiago City, the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng
Santiago City and residents of Santiago City assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528,
which downgraded the status of the city from an independent component city into a mere
component city. Do the suitors have locus standi to sue ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, it is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of a law
can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
(Miranda, et al., v. Aguirre, etc., et al., G.R. No. 133064, prom. September 16, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. When taxpayers have locus standi to impugn the validity of a law. A citizen
acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
A taxpayer is deemd to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in allegd contravention of the law or the
constitution. Thus, a taxpayer’s actiuon is properly brought only when there is an exercise by
congress of its taxing and spending power. (Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, etc., et al., G.R. No.
140835, prom. August 14, 2000)
Taxpayers have locus standi to question the validity of tax measures or illegal
expenditures of public money.
REASON: They are parties in interest to be prejudiced or benefited by the avails of the
suit, but not if executive acts do not involve the use of public funds. (Gonzales v. Marcos, 65
SCRA 624)
b. Public officials have locus standi because it is their sworn duty to protect public
interest. (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771)
***c. Objections to taxpayer's suits for lack of sufficient personality is a procedural
technicality which the Supreme Court could brush aside, where the issues are of such
transcendental importance in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution and
the laws, to determine whether public officers have abused the discretion given to them.
(Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110)
***39. Gonzales, filing suit as a citizen and taxpayer, questioned the validity of
Executive Order No. 43, creating the Preparatory commission on Constitutional Reforms
(PCCR) in order, “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Gonzales claims, that the
President encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose
amendments to the charter by forming the PCCR. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the
amount of P3 million was “appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be
sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.”
26
Is Gonzales clothed with locus standi as a taxpayer to question the validity of E.O. No.
43 ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Gonzales has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is
only Congress, not Gonzales, which can claim “injury” since its powers are alleged to have been
encroached upon by the President. Gonzales has sustained no direct, or even any indirect injury.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,
nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities.
A taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. There is no such exercise in the instant case because the funds were
taken from funds intended for the Office of the Presidnt, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s
power to transfer funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. (Gonzales v.
Hon. Narvasa, etc., et al., G.r. No. 140835, prom. August 14, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: There is no “appropriation” by Congress so to speak.
Appropriation in its strict sense, is “the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury,” while “appropriation made by law” refers to the
“act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sumn to be used in
paymnt of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.” (Ibid.)
41. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944, survived by
their heirs, Carmen, Josefa, Angel, Amparo married to Hernando, Concepcion and salvador.
Subsequently, the estate was divided equally distributing Lot No. 3046 to Concepcion, Angel,
Amparo married to Hernando and Ramon, the sole heir of Salvador who likewise died; while
lot nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872 were distributed equally between Josefa and Carmen.
Lot No. 5872 was not included in the inventory of properties submitted to the Court,
the project of partition submitted to and approved by the Court. The decedent Ramon
acquired the property and delivered it to the spouses Amparo and hernando. It was
subsequently delivered to Josefa and Carmen during the actual partition in 1956, and they
have been in possession since then.
Angel, Concepcion and Ramon (the sole heir of Salvador) and the heirs of Amparo
married to Hernando, signed notarized quitclaims over Lot 5872 in favor of Josefa and
Carmen. Subsequently, the heirs of Salvador, Amparo and Concepcion laid claim to their
alleged shares in Lot 5872 claiming that the same is a common property of the children of
Ramon and Rosario because it was not included in the project of partition because Lot No.
5872 was still in the name of the deceased Ramon and Rosario.
Josefa and Carmen then filed an action for quieting of title. It is now contended that
Josefa and Carmen are not the proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title, since the
Certificate of Title to Lot 5872 is not in their names. Is this contention tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Persons having legal as well as equitable title to or
interest in a real property may bring action to quiet title and “title” here does not necessarily
denote a certiticate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. (Maestrado etc., et al., v.
Court of Appeals, etc. et al., G.R. No. 133345; maestrado, et al., v. Roa, Jr., G.R. No. 133324,
prom. March 9, 2000)
An action to quiet title is a common land remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Also, the deed, claim or encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged is a cloud on
plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact involved or in operative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or lead efficacy. (Robbs, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
123509, prom. March 14, 2000)
27
46. Aguila filed a petition for exemption from the coverage of the land reform
program. The alleged tenants opposed the petition. The DAR Regional Director granted the
application but on appeal the DAR reversed its ruling and denied the exemption. Aguila
appealed to the Office of the President which reinstated the grant of the application. The
tenants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the petition was dismissed for failure to implead
the Office of the President which is an indispensable party to the case as it is from where the
questioned decision and resolution was issued. Was the dismissal proper ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The issue in the petition before the Court of Appeals is
whether a private land should be exempted from the coverage of the land reform program.
Whatever happens to that case and whoever wins would not bring any prejudice or gain to the
government. The only participation of the Office of the President in this case is its role as the
office which entertains appeals from decisions of the DAR.
It is clear that the Office of the President is merely a pro forma party, in the same way
that a respondent court is a pro forma party in special civil actions for certiorari. (Samaniego, et
al., v. Aguila, et al., G.R. No. 125567, prom. June 27, 2000)
28
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Under Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action without that party being impleaded.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their prescence.
“Interest”, within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly in issue and to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.
On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or
defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject matter or because any relief
is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such
party on the record.
1) The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable
cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party. (2nd par., Sec. 9,
Rule 3, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
1) The non-inclusion of a necessary party does
a) not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and
b) the judgment rendered therein shall be
c) without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (3rd
par., Sec. 9, Rule 3, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
***50. Maximino dela Cruz, Jesus Santiago, et al. filed suit alleging that dela Cruz
inherited the property from the original possessor of the land in question, and that the heirs
of Joaquin Asuncion succeeded in obtaining title over said land and registered in their name.
They likewise prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The heirs filed their answer with
counterclaim. The court issued the injunctive writ. A petition was filed with the Supreme
Court without including the names of dela Cruz and Santiago.
May the petition be dismissed for falure to join dela Cruz and Santiago ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
1) on motion of any party or
2) on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
3) on such terms as are just.
Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
(Sec. 11, Rule 3, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied; Heis of Asuncion, etc., v. Hon,.
Gervacio, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 115741, prom. March 9, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. Failure to include indispensable parties results to dismissal of the action.
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, ROC)
REASON: Their presence is a sine qua non to the exercise of judicial power (Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345). So that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all
in the litigation preventing multiplicity of suits. (Palarca v. Boguisi, 38 Phil. 177)
***b. The procedure for dismissal if indispensable party is not impleaded.
1) A motion should be filed for the inclusion of the indispensable party. and not a
motion to dismiss.
2) The court then orders the inclusion of the indispensable party or opportunity
afforded for amendment by the pleader.
3) If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed
refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion (Sec. 3, Rule 17, ROC; Dael v.
Teves, 136 SCRA 196),
4) Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to
amendment is the action dismissed. (Cortez v. Avila, G.R. No. L-9782, prom. April 26,
1957)
SPECIAL JOINDER DEVICES. There are three special joinder devices whereby parties
may be joined in an action. These are class suits, intervention and interpleader. Class suits and
interpleader may be considered as part of the initiatory joinder devices because the parties are
joined at the inception of the suit. They may likewise be considered involuntary joinder devices
because the parties joined may or may not know that they are being joined. On the other hand
intervention is a joinder device after the suit has been filed and is voluntary in character because
a party asks for leave of court to be allowed to intervene.
***53. Four hundred residents of Barrio Ramos initiated a class action suit through
Albert, a former mayor of the town, to recover damages sustained due to their exposure to
toxic waste and fumes emitted by the cooking gas plant of Top Fuel Gas Corporation located
in the town.
Is the class suit proper ? (1994)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the class suit is not proper. There is no cause of action
belonging in common to the 400 residents. The extent of damage suffered by them is individual
and separate from each other. The numerousness of the parties and object of the suit a single
entity are not the only determinants of a class suit. There must be unity of cause ro right of
action. The 400 residents did not suffer to the same extent and degree, consequently there have
different causes of action.
54. A labor union brought suit involving a matter of common or general interest in
behalf of its members who are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring all of them before
the court. Is this a class suit ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. This is a suit brought in a representative capacity by the
class suit. It is the function of a labor union to carry out the representation of its members and to
file an actual suit for their benefit and behalf without joining them and avoid the cumbersome
procedure of joining each and every member as a separate party. (Liana's Supermarket v. NLRC,
et al., G.R. No. 111014, prom. May 31, 1996)
31
56. What is the nature of claims that survive the death of a party ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
These are the claims that could proceed as if the prospective plaintiff or defendant is still
alive. Thus, the executor, administrator or any legal representative of the deceased may bring or
defend suits.
57. Give some examples of claims that survive the death of a party.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Actions
a. For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased. (Sec. 2,
Rule 87, ROC)
b. to recover real or personal property, or an interest thereon, from the estate, or
c. to enforce a lien on real or personal property and
d. to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. (Sec. 1,
Rule 87, ROC).
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. The litmus test in determining whether an action survives depends on the nature
of the action and the damage sued for.
In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
WHILE in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person,
the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (Ruiz, et al., v. The Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116909, prom. February 25, 1999)
In the above Ruiz case, attorney’s fees were considered as basically a monetary claim
which does not survive, under the old Sec. 21, Rule 3, ROC. IMPT. However, the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure now allows the continuation until entry of final judgment of an action for the
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, if the defendant dies before entry
of final judgment. (Sec. 20, Rule 3, ROC)
b. Real actions survive death.
32
***58. What are the claims that do not survive the death of a party ?
These are the claims which cannot be instituted against the executor, administrator or any
legal representative of the deceased. These claims could however be prosecuted in the estate
proceedings of the deceased.
Examples: No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator. (Sec. 1, Rule 87, ROC) Claims other
than those stated in the previous heading referring to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, ROC.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Contractual money claims survive. If the action for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, is not yet filed, it could not filed against the executor, administrator
or legal representative. It should be filed as a claim against the estate.
However, if the case is already filed, and the death occurred before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the case was pending, the case shall be allowed to continue. (Sec.
20, Rule 3, ROC)
If the action for recovery of money did not arise from contract, express or implied, it does
not survive.
b. Claims that do not survive are dismissed even if attachment levided on
defendant’s property. REASON: The purpose of the attachment which is to secure the
outcome of the trial no longer exists, and so with the reasons for the issuance of the writ of
attachment, insofar as the deceased is concerned. (Malolos v. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation,
147 SCRA 61)
c. As a general rule personal actions do not survive . Exception: action for the
recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, if the defendant dies before entry of
final judgment. (Sec. 20, Rule 3, ROC)
60. Uy filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against the “estate of Carlos
Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura.” Ventura moved to dismiss on
the ground of defendant’s lack of legal personality. A motion to dismiss was seasonably filed
by Ventura. Uy then amended his complaint deleting the estate of Carlos Ngo and named
Ventura as the defendant. Should the complaint be dismissed ? Should the amended
complaint be allowed ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the complaint should be dismissed. No, the amended
complaint should not be allowed.
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party in a court action. A deceased person
does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to
suibstitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court.
An action begun by a decedent’s estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such a n action is a nullity and a motion to amend the
party plaintiff will not likewise lie. There is nothing to amend. Considering that capacity to be
sued is a correlative of the apacity to sue, to the same exent, a decedent does not have he
capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate
estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 63145,
prom. October 5, 1999)
61. What is the duty of the attorney upon the death of a party whether plaintiff or
defendant, occurring at any state of the action ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. If death occurs during the pendency of the action
b. And the claim is not extinguished by death
c. Counsel shall inform the court of such death
d. Within thirty (30) days after such death
e. Giving the name and address of the legal representative(s). (1st par., Sec. 16, Rule 3,
ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. Counsel’s failure will not vitiatee proceedings and judgment. The failure of
counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client and no substitution
of the deceased party, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action
33
survives the death of such party. (Benavidez v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125848, prom.
September 6, 1999)
IMPT: Ignore the holding in theHeirs of Lorilla, etc., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 118655, prom. April 12, 2000 which held that the provisions Sec. 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, which provides for the dismissal of the action for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon where the defendant dies before final judgment in the Regional Trial Court and a
prosecution of the claim in the estate proceedings of the deceased, should not be applied where
the counsel does not inform the court of the defendant’s death.
This above Lorilla doctrine should be ignored because Sec. 21 of Rule 3 has been
amended (it is not Sec. 20, Rule 3), to the effect that contractual money claims survuve.
***62. What should be done and what is the effect of the death of the PLAINTIFF
while the action is pending in the trial court or on appeal before entry of final judgment in the
court ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The counsel reports the death;
b. There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased plaintiff,
whether the claim survives or not.
c. The court requires the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to explain why the
action should not be dismissed because of the death of the plaintiff, where the claim does not
survive.
d. If the claim is extinguished by the plaintiff's death the case is dismissed. If the claim
survives the death of the plaintiff, the case continues, with the substitution of the deceased
plaintiff by his legal representative (s), or his heirs.
e. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the decedent dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.
A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in the Rules of Court for prosecuting claims against the estate
of deceased persons. (Sec. 20, Rule 3, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Procedure and effect of death of prevailing plaintiff after entry of judgment or
order:
1) The counsel reports the death;
2) There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased
plaintiff, whether the claim survives or not.
3) The substitute executor, administrator or successor in interest may apply for
the issuance of a writ of execution. (Sec. 7 [a], Rule 39, ROC)
b. Procedure and effect of death of prevailing plaintiff after execution is issued:
1) The counsel reports the death;
2) There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased
plaintiff, whether the claim survives or not.
3) The usual procedure for execution is then followed.
4) The amounts recovered through execution form part of the estate of the
deceased prevailing plaintiff.
***63. What should bge done and what is the effect of the death of a DEFENDANT
while the action is pending in the trial court or on appeal before entry of final judgment in the
court ?
a. The counsel reports the death;
b. There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased plaintiff,
whether the claim survives or not.
c. The plaintiff is asked to explain why the suit should not be dismissed as a result of the
death of the defendant.
d. If the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, the
case shall be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. If the claim for money does not
arise out of contract (but not for recovery arising from physical injuries), it should be dismissed.
34
A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in the Rules of Court for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person. (Sec. 20, Rule 3, ROC)
e. If the action is otherwise, it shall be dismissed.
f. If it is a claim that survives another case may be filed against the executor,
administrator, estate or other legal representative of the deceased.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Procedure and effects of death of a defendant after lapse of period to appeal or
after entry of final judgment in the court:
1) The counsel reports the death;
2) There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased
plaintiff, whether the claim survives or not.
3) The plaintiff:
a) In case the judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property, or
the enforcement of a lien thereon, applies for a writ of execution which is
enforced against the defendant's executor, administrator or successor in interest.
(Sec. 7 [b], Rule 39, ROC)
b) In case the judgment is other than for the above, the plaintiff files a
claim against the estate for the amount of the judgment. (Sec. 5, Rule 86, ROC;
Py En Cheng v. Herrera, 70 SCRA 1307)
b. Procedure and effects of death of a defendant after execution:
1) The counsel reports the death;
2) There is substitution by the legal representative or heirs of the deceased
plaintiff, whether the claim survives or not.
3) The property actually levied is sold for the satisfaction of the judgment
obligation and the person making the sale shall account to the deceased defendant's
executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands. (Sec. 7 [c], Rule 39, ROC)
***64. A filed a complaint against Y with the RTC of Argao, Cebu, for payment of a
promissory note in the sum of P500,000.00, for liquidated damages of P50,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P50,000.00. After he filed his answer, Y died, but his lawyer did not file a
motion to dismiss. In the meantime, Y's widow filed with the above court a special proceeding
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Y. The widow, Z, was appointed the administratrix
of the estate. A filed in the civil case a motion to have Y substituted by the administratrix; the
latter did not object. The court granted the motion. Trial on the merits was had. In due
course, the court rendered a decision in favor of A. At the time it was rendered, the period to
file claims in the intestate estate of Y had already lapsed. The administratrix, Z. did not
appeal from the decision; and after it became final, A moved for the execution of judgment. Z
opposed the motion contending that the decision is void because the claim does not survive.
The case should have been dismissed upon the death of Y since upon his death, the court lost
jurisdiction over the case.
1) Rule on the issue.
2) If the opposition is without merit, can the writ of execution be validly issued ?
3) If it cannot be issued, what is the remedy of A ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The claim survives because it is upon a contractual money claim. (Sec. 20, Rule 3,
ROC) Consequently opposition is without merit.
2) No, because a judgment for money cannot be enforced by a writ of execution.
3) The favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff A, shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in the Rules of Court for prosecuting claims against the estate of deceased
persons. (Sec. 20, Rule 3, ROC)
The doctrine which requires that certain matters or controversies be resolved utilizing
nonjudicial methods before resort could be had to judicial intervention. Failure to do so could
result in a dismissal of the action on the ground of prematurity of failure to comply with a
condition precedent for filing the claim. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule 16, ROC)
For example, prior resort to settlement under the Katarunggang Pambarangay,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, earnest efforts towards a compromise, etc., are required in
certain instances before filing a suit in court.
65. Are there instances where there is a requirement for efforts to compromise prior
to the institution of s suit ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, no suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code. (Art. 151, The Family Code)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Suits between members of the same family that are subject to efforts towards a
compromise are those:
1) Between husband and wife;
2) Between parents and children;
3) Between other ascendants and ascendants; and
4) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (Art. 150, The
Family Code)
The author submits that the requirement for efforts towards a compromise does not
include illegitimate relations because of the natural antipathy between illegitimates and
legitimates. This view is buttressed by reference to Art. 150 of the Family that the requirement
does not apply to collateral relatives, except as between brothers and sisters. (However, see no.
34 below which interprets the law as including “half-blood” relationship) Of course, there may
some disagreement to the above views considering the Filipino extended family system. But
where does the line stop ?
b. Cases not subject to compromise: No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
1) The civil status of persons;
2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
3) Any ground for legal separation;
4) Future support;
5) The jurisdiction of courts;
6) Future legitime. (Art. 2035, Civil Code of the Philippines)
66. Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson alleging that the latter are married. Augusto and
Gregorio are brothers. The defendants denied that they were married and alleged that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. Is there need for showing that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were taken but failed ? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Whenever a stranger is a party in a cased involving
family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
The inclusion of Teodora as defendant and Maria as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of
36
the phrase “members of the same family,” which reders only to husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” do not comprehend “sisters-in-law” (hence
also brothers-in-law).
Furthermore, religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, defendant Teodora, who was described in the complaint
as the wife of Gregorio, and plaintiff Maria, who is admittedly the spouse of Augusto, are
considered as strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of earnest efforts towards a
compromise. (Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, etc., et al., G.R. No. 125465, prom.
June 29, 1999)
KATARUNGGANG PAMBARANGAY
67. The Heirs of Vinzons are co-owners of a parcel of land a portion of which was
occupied by Mena Edoria as a lesee since 1951. Sometime in 1986, the Heirs filed suit against
Mena and several others also occupying the same lot owned by them, docketed as Civil Case
No. 1923, on the ground of non-payment of rentals. The trial court found that the respondent
was not in arrears but was even advanced in his rentals. Both parties appealed.
While Civil Case No. 1923 was on appeal, the Heirs filed another ejectment suit, Civil
Case No. 2061, against Mena and 39 others on the ground that they refused to enter into an
agreement as tenants-lessees and refused to pay the increased rent of P1.00 per sq.m. per
month. The court dismissed Civil Case No. 2061 due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 1923.
This decision was appealed to the RTC.
While Civil Case No. 2061 was pending appeal before the RTC, the Heirs filed another
case, docketed as Civil Case No.2137, likewise againstg the same defendants for expiration of
the lease contract, refusal to sign written renewal of contract of lease and non-payment of
rentals. Should Civil Case No. 2137, be dismissed for failure to comply with barangay
conciliation despite allegations of the Heirs that there were undertaken barangay conciliation
for Civil Case Nos. 1923, and 2061 ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. The Heirs cannot rely on barangay conciliation
proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law. (Heirs of
Vinzons, etc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 111915, prom. September 30, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Barangay referral condition precedent to filing of a complaint:
1) Before a court, or
2) Before any other government office for adjudication. (Sec. 412 [a], R.A. No.
7160)
There is substantial compliance with the law even though no pangkat was constituted if
the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement yet the efforts of
the barangay chairman proved futile as no agreement was reached. (Diu v. Court of Appeals,
251 SCRA 472).
All disputes are subject to referral. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city of municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes. (Sec.408, R.A. No. 7160)
The referral must be made irrespective of the amount and nature of the dispute and
whether the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court or the Regional Trial
Court.
b. Disputes which need not be brought for barangay conciliation:
1) When the party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.
2) When one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his public functions.
3) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon.
37
9) Where the parties have agreed to arbitrate, the Punong Barangay of the
Pangkat, as the case maybe, shall after the hearing make the award not later than the sixth
day but not later than the fifteenth day following the date of such. (Sec. 10 [c], Rule VI,
Katarunggang Pambarangay Rules)
f. Forms of settlement under the Katarunggang Pambarangay:
1) Mediation and conciliation. Interchangeable terms indicating the process
whereby disputants are persuaded by the Punong Barangay or Pangkat to amicably settle
their disputes. (Rule II [1], Katarunggang Pambarangay Rules)
2) Arbitration is a process for the adjudication of disputes by which the parties
agree to be bound by the decision of a third person or body in place of a regularly
organized tribunal. (Rule II [h], Katarunggang Pambarangay Rules)
***68. On August 7 , 1996 Boleley filed suit against Surla for collection of sum of
money stating in his complaint: "“that plaintiff is of legal age, married, Filipino and a residnt
of No. 100 Imelda Village, Baguio City while defendant is also of legal age, Filipino and wih
postal office address at C-4 Ina Mansion, Kisad Road, Baguio City where he may be served
with summons and other legal processes.” The defendant f iled a motion to dismiss alleging
that he also resided in baguio City, alleging, among others, that there was failure to refer to
barangay conciliation. Resolve the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion denied. It is clear from the complaint that the
defendant does not reside in Baguio City. Post office address is not considered as residence.
This is not affected by the defendant’s motion stating that he also resided in Baguio City. There
is no need for prior referral to the barangay in the absence of showing in the complaint itself that
the parties reside in the same city or municipality. (Boleyley v. Hon. Villanueva, etc., et al., G.R.
No. 128734, prom. September 14, 1999)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Membership and residence in batangay required. Residence alone, without
membership in the barangay would not be an accurate and reliable criterion considering that
such residence may be actual but merely temporary, transient or categorized into other
permutations as in the case of a house guest or a sojourner on a visit for a day or two.
On the other hand, mere membership in the barangay alone without residence would
defeat the purpose of the law which provides for an alternative to litigations in dispute settlement
to members of the corresponding barangays who are actually residing therein. This is so because
of lack of the common bond and belonging generally fostered in members of an identified
aggrupation.
Thus, the requirement is resident coupled with membership or vice-versa. (Bejer v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 169 SCRA 566) Transient or temporary residence is not enough to vest
"jurisdiction" upon the barangay "courts." (Domingo v. Rosero, 173 SCRA 135)
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the barangay
under the Local Government Code are filed, may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the
case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement. (last par., Sec. 408, R.A. No. 7160)
b. Waiver of non-referral. The failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there
was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense. (Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117005, prom. June 19, 1997)
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. (1st sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 9, ROC)
The ground for a motion to dismiss if there is failure to comply with the barangay
referral is now, That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (Sec.
1 [j], Rule 16, ROC)
If the non-referral is raised only after arraignment, this is deemed a waiver. (Banares II,
et al., v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000)
69. On June 14, 1994, a complaint for ejection was filed before the MTC by Amparo,
assisted by counsel. The parties reside in barangays of different cities which do not adjoin
each other. The defendant filed a motion for referral to the proper barangay for arbitration
and/or conciliation which the court granted through its Order dated November 7, 1994
directing the parties to conciliate before the Chairman of barangay 676, Zone 73, Ermita,
Manila. Meanwhile, Atty. Raul entered his appearance as counsel and filed a motion to set
aside the Order of November 7, 1994. The Court denied the same and referred the case to the
39
said barangay for conciliation proceedings under penalty of the case being dismissed. The
Court’s action was premised upon section 408 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Katarungan
Pambarangay provisions of the Local Government Code), which provides that, “The Court in
which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are
filed, may at any time before trial, motu proprio, refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement.”
Was the action of the Court correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Referring a matter covered by the above cited provision
that falls under the Rule of summary procedure to the Lupon is an unsound exercise of
discretion. The Rule of summary Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an
“expeditious and inexpensive determination of the case.” (Gachou v. De vera, Jr., SCRA 540)
The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is
thus deemed a matter of public policy. Thus, the Rule frowns on delays. Manifestly, the act of
referring the subject case to the lupon subverts the very nature of the Rule and defeats the
objective of expediting the adjudication thereof. (Farrales, et al., v. Judge Camarista, A.M. MTJ-
99-1184, prom. March 2, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: The above doctrine is applicable only where there is no
requirement for prior referral to the lupon. Where the parties reside in the same city or
municipality, or in adjoining barangayss of different cities or municipalities, prior resort to the
barangay is a requirement before filing the case in Court, and the Court does not have the
discretion to make a referral.
70. Elizabeth filed 16 estafa cases against Fidel and others. All of the parties reside in
Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. Each of the cases did not exceed P200.00. After
arraignment and the accused pleading not guilty, they then filed a Motion to Dismiss the cases
for prematurity in view of the failure to undergo conciliation before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Dalig in accordance with Sec.
412 in relation to Sec. 408 of the Local Government Code and Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
On November 13, 1995, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed the 16 criminal cases
without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1901 Rule of Summary Procedure.
More than two months later on February 26, 1996, Elizabeth through counsel, filed a
Motion to Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against Fidel and other; stating that the
requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation has already been complied with. On
March 18, 1996, the Municipal Trial Court issued an order granting Elizabeth’s Motion to
Revive.
Fidel, et al assailed the March 18, 1996 order contending that the November 13, 1995
dismissal of the case against them had long become final and executory; considering that the
prosecution did not file any motion for reconsideration of said order. Rule on the contention.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Contention is with merit. The dismissal has attained a state of
finality. The order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The order becomes outside the court’s power
to amend and modify. The party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file
a new complaint. (Banares II, et al., v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Dismissal without prejudice may become final. The dismissal without prejudice of
a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any less final. Such order of
dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of
the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
(Banares II, et al., v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000)
When a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed
without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after
the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under
the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived
by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the
Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former.
40
b. Rule applied not only to civil cases but also criminal cases. In Jaca v. Blanco, the
Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement threof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a
new information for the offense. (Ibid.)
c. Rule applies to cases covered by the Summary Procedure.
73. What are the reasons for the existence of the doctrine of ehxaustion of
administrative remedies ? In short, what are its purposes.
a. Ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly
with respect to matters, peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency,
b. Avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding
judicial action until the administrative process had run its course,
c. Prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by resort to them in the first instance.
(Carale, et al., v. Abarintos, et al., G.R. No. 120704, prom. March 3, 1997)
d. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy
solutions to disputes.
e. For reasons of law, comity, and convenience. (Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 131729, prom. May 19, 1998)
74. What are the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies ?
a. Where the question is purely legal.
b. Where judicial intervention is urgent.
c. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage.
d. When the controverted acts violate due process.
e. Failure of a high government official from whom the relief is sought to act on the
matter.
f. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
(Carale, et al., v. Judge Abarintos, et al., G.R. No. 120704, prom. March 3, 1997)
g. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
h. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned.
i. When there is irreparable injury.
j. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the later.
k. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable.
l. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim.
41
75. Meszellen sued drawee Allied Bank for damages which it allegedly suffered when
checks were not paid to it but to some other person. Allied then filed a third-party complaint
against Bank of Philippine Islands, for reimbursement in the event that it would be adjudged
liable to pay plaintiff Meszellen.
BPI filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Rule
on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion granted. While a trial court that has jurisdiction over
the main action, also has jurisdiction over the third-party complaint, even if the said court would
have no jurisdiction over it had it been filed in an independent action.
However, this doctrine does not apply in the case of banks, which have given written and
subscribed consent to arbitration under the auspices of the PCHC.
By participating in the clearing operations of the PCHC, Allied agreed to submit disputes
of this nature to arbitration. Accordingly, it cannot invoke he jurisdiction of the trial courts
without a prior recourse o the PCHC Arbitration Committee. (Allied Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123871, prom. August 31, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Ground should be prematurity. It is suggested that the ground for dismissal should
not be lack of jurisdiction (Section 1 [b], Rule 16, ROC) but failure to comply with a condition
precedent for filing the claim (Section 1 [j], Rule 16, ROC) This is so because jurisdiction is
conferred by a Judiciary Act and not by mere agreement of the parties.
***b. Arbitration defined: The submission of a controversy for the resolution of a non-
judicial third party chosen by the disputants.
***c. Nature of arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution : Arbitration has been
held valid and constitutional. Even before the approval on June 19, 1953 of Republic Act No.
876, the Supreme Court has countenanced the settlement of disputes through arbitration. (BF
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120105, prom. March 27, 1998)
Republic Act No. 876 was adopted to supplement the New Civil Code's provisions on
arbitration. (Ibid.)
Its potential as one of the alternative dispute resolution methods that are now rightfully
vaunted as "the wave of the future" in international relations, is recognized worldwide. (Ibid.)
To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement
between the parties would be a step backward. (Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 126212, prom., March 2, 2000)
Arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution is encouraged by the Supreme
Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens solutions especially of
commercial disputes. (Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123871,
prom. August 31, 1998)
COURT SELECTION
76. State and explain an instance when an action quasi in rem becomes both an
action quasi in rem and in personam.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If the property is attached and later the defendant appears,
"the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident that the property attached
remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any demand which may be established
against the defendant by the final judgment of the court. (Villareal, etc., et al., v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 107314, prom. September 17, 1998)
The main action in an attachment or garnishment is in rem until jurisdiction of the
defendant is secured. Thereafter, it is in personam and also in rem, unless jurisdiction of the res
42
HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Appeals, and ultimately with the Supreme Court. (Pearson, etc., et al., v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 74454, prom. September 3, 1998)
2) It is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Supreme Court's time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket . (Fortich, etc., et al., v.
Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457, prom. April 24, 1998)
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe. (Yared, etc. v. Hon. Ricardo M. Ilarde, etc., et al., G.R. No. 114732, August 1,
1000 ciiting Vergara v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, 766)
***b. Exceptions to the concept of hierarchy of courts : There are instances where a
petition that is properly cognizable by lower courts may be filed directly with the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has full discretionary powers to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it under the following circumstances:
1) If compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant, or justify direct referral to the Supreme Court. (Pearson, etc., et al., v.
Intermediate Appellate court, et al., G.R. No. 74454, prom. September 3, 1998)
2) To avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to a controversy which
has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the
issuance of the assailed resolution of a lower court. (Fortich, etc., et al., v. Corona, et al.,
G.R. No. 131457, prom. April 14, 1998)
3) The Supreme Court could resolve to take primary jurisdiction in the interest of
speedy justice (Eugenio v. Drilon, et al., 252 SCRA 106, 110)
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
79. How do courts acquire limited or special jurisdiction ? Explain briefly and give an
example.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Similarly with general jurisdiction, it is the jurisdiction laws
which prescribes the parameters of limited or special jurisdiction.
For example, the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
municipal trial courts over civil actions, probate proceedings, testate and intestate proceedings
including grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, is limited only to instances where the
value of the personal property, estate, or the amount of the demand does not exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate,
or amount of the demand does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs." (Sec. 33
[1], B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, specifically Sec. 5 which increased the
jurisdictional amount effective April 16, 1999 or after five (5) years from the effectivity of R.A.
No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 took effect on April 15, 1994 (par. 1, Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 09-94)
WARNING: For Bar examination purposes, you must take note of the date of the
factual setting given in the question. If the date of the filing is before April 16, 1999 then
apply the old rule which provides for the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for courts
outside of Metropolitan Manila, and P200,000.00 for courts within Metropolitan Manila.
If the date of filing as shown in the problem is April 16, 1999 or is undated use the
new jurisdictional amounts of P200,000.00 and P400,000.00 for outside Metropolitan
Manila and for Metropolitan Manila respectively.
44
83. What determines the character of the subject matter whether the court has
jurisdiction ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The complaint determines the character of the subject matter
whether the court has jurisdiction.
A court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration but only upon the allegations of the
complaint (Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, et al., G.R. No. 126603, prom. June 29, 1998, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein – a
matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. (Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon.
Fernando P. Cabato, etc., et al., G.R. No. 118216, March 9, 2000)
This is so because the complaint comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. (Ibid.)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
45
84. What is the exclusive oiginal jurisdiction of the four (4) lower trial courts in
civil cases under the Expanded Jurisdiction Law (R.A. No. 7691) ?
a. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate including grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand
1) Does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00), **or
2) In Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Four Hundred Thousand pesos (P400,000.00),***
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the
amount of which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees.
b. Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession;
and
c. Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein:****
1) Does not exceed Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or
2) In Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes the value of such property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Sec. 33, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
46
a. Jurisdiction in probate proceedings is determined by the gross value of the estate. (Lim
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124715, prom., January 24, 2000)
b. Note that under Sec. 33, B.P. No. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, grants
jurisdiction to MTC over actions involving title to real property for any interest therein release
etc. The holding in Ddurub v. Judge Paras, A.M. No. MTJ – 00 – 1242, prom. January 20, 2000
to the effect that MTC have no jurisdiction over actions for quieting title and recovery of
ownership is not doctrinal because the factual antecedents occurred prior to R.A. No. 7691.
** After five (5) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 7691, or on April 16, 1999 the
jurisdictional amount is adjusted to P200,000.00. (Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7691)
*** In Metro Manila, the amount is P400,000.00. (Ibid.)
**** There is no change in jurisdictional amounts.
***85. What is meant by the totality rule which is applicable only to the four (4) lower
trial courts (the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, and the Metropolitan Trial Court) ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:Where there are several claims or causes of action between
different parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions. (Sec. 33 [1], B.P. Blg. 129)
The rule on joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties should be applied.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Illustrationof the totality rule: The following amounts are
the claims of various parties against Benjie, where the plaintiffs are all residents of Victoria,
Tarlac, and all the claims arose out of the same transaction:
Remy = P 75,000.00
Randy = 75,000.00
Raymond = 150,000.00
Total = P300,000.00
There could be no proper joinder of parties if the claims are to be filed before the
Municipal Trial Court of Victoria, Tarlac because under the totality rule, the joined claims of the
parties exceed the jurisdictional amount of said court.
The illustration presupposes that the filing took place after April 16, 1999 when Sec. 5,
R.A. No. 7691 finds application increasing the jurisdictional amount to P200,000.00.
86. What is the delegated jurisdiction of the four (4) lower trial courts in cadastral and
land registration cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in cities.
b. May be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases
c. Covering lots
1) Where there is no controversy or opposition, or
1) Contested lots where the value of which do not exceed One Hundred
Thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained
a) By the affidavit of the claimant, or
b) By agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or
a) From the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. (Sec. 34,
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Decisions of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in cities in exercise of their
delegated jurisdiction shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts. (Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
87. What is the special jurisdiction of the four (4) lower trial courts in certain cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. In the absence of the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city,
b. Any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge.
47
c. May hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or application for bail in
criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Court Judges sit. (Sec. 35,
B.P. Blg. 129)
88. What is the exclusive orginal jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or
claim exceeds Four hundred thousand (P400,000.00);**
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00); **
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial;
(7) In all civil actions special proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided
by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds Two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00). ** (Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
** After five (5) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 7691, April 16, 1999 the
jurisdictional amount is adjusted to P200,000.00. for places outside of Metro Manila, and
P400,000.00 for Metro Manila. (Sec. 5, R.A. No. 7691)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. RTC has jurisdiction as the issue was not title to the property but whether the bank can
be compelled to issue a board resolution confirming the Deed of Sale. (Rural Bank of Milaor,
Camarines Sur v. Octevnia, et al., G.R. No. 137686, prom. February 8, 2000)
***89. What is the criteria for determining whether the subject matter is or is not an
action not capable of pecuniary estimation. Explain briefly.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. First ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy.
1) If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the regional trial courts would depend on the amount of the claim.
2) However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, such actions are cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by regional trial courts.
Rationale: The second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instanced (now regional trial courts), which were the lowest
courts of record at the time the first organic laws of the Judiciary (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901) were enacted allocating jurisdiction. (Spouses
48
de Leon v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104796, prom. March 6, 1998) (Barangay
San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, et al., G.R. No. 138896, June 20,
2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Actions not capable of pecuniary estimation:
1) action for rescission of contract one not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Reason: The court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that
would justify one act or the other. No award of damages may be had in an action for
rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting
aside of a contract, in the same manner that regional trial courts would have to make
findings of fact and law in actions in other cases not capable of pecuniary estimation.
2) action relative to the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the
determination of the validity of the money deposit made. (Arroz v. Alohado, et al., L-
22153, March 31, 1967)
3) action contesting the validity of a judgment. (De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285,
April 18, 1950)
4) action relative to the validity of a mortgage. (Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707,
December 23, 1959)
5) action concerning the relations of the parties, the right to support created by
the relation, etc., in actions for support. (Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960)
6) action where the issue is the validity or nullity of documents upon which
claims are predicated. (De Rivera, et al., v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963)
Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission
has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an
action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of
pecuniary estimation - a prayer which must be included in the main action if the plaintiff is to be
compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by the
defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a
cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits. (Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., 24 SCRA 479)
***90. What courts have jurisdiction over the following cases filed in Metro Manila ?
a) An action for specific performance or, in the alternative for damages in the amount
of P350,000.00.
b) An action for a writ of injunction;
c) An action for replevin of a motor cycle valued at P300,000.00;
d) An action for interpleader to determine who between the defendants is entitled to
receive the amount of P380,000.00 from the plaintiff;
e) A petition for the probate of a will involving an estate valued at P400,000.00. (Bar:
1997)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
a) and d) the Metropolitan Trial Court. In alternative causes of action it is the claim for
sum of money which determines jurisdiction.
b) and c) The Regional Trial Court because the action is not subject to pecuniary
estimation.
e) Metropolitan Trial Court because the jurisdictional amount falls within that court.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: If amount in the alternative cause of action is within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
it should be brought in those courts. Inclusion of the alternative claim which is not subject to
pecuniary estimation does not vest jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court. (Cruz v. Tan, 87
Phil. 627)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: With the Regional Trial Court because there could be no
enforcement by motion considering the lapse of the five (5) year period. A should file a separate
action for enforcement of the judgment which is one not subject to pecuniary estimation.
92. What is the original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in other cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
a. In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
b. In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls." (Sec. 21,
B.P. Blg. 129)
93. What is the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try special cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: "The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases,
agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial
bodies and agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice." (Sec. 23, B.P. Blg. 129)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Family relations. Republic Act No. 8369, the "Family Courts Act of 1997," approved
on October 28, 1997 established Family Courts which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide various juvenile and domestic relations cases, whether civil or criminal.
b. Agrarian cases. “Special Agrarian Courts which are Regional Trial Courts, are given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) ‘all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners'’and (2) '‘he prosecution of all criminal
offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].’ The provision of Section 50 must be construed in harmony
with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred
on the DAR. Indeed, there is reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency
which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are taking [sic]
under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sunulong v.
Guerrero it was held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s Department Store v.
Micaller the Supreme Court struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations
jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.
It would subvert the ‘original and exclusive’ jurisdiction of the RTC [Regional Trial
Court] for the Department of Agrarian Reform to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases
in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions.
What [agrarian] adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate
power to decide the question.” ((Escano, Jr., et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101932,
Prom. January 24, 2000)
c. Complaints for overcharging of electric rates. The Regional Trial Court is a court
of general jurisdiction. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6173, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1206 empowered the ERB to regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by
electric companies. The power to fix rates of electric consumption does not carry with it the
power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers for
consumption of electric power. This falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The question of determining the breakdown and itemization of the power adjustment
billed by an electric power company to its customers is not a matter that pertains to the ERB’s
supervision, control or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rate but falls within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts. (Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. v. Collera , et al., G.R.
No. 102184, prom. April 12, 2000)
Example: Regular courts would have jurisdiction where the complaint only alleged that
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (a public utility company) charged the full rate
of electric consumption despite absence of any increases in the cost of energy. If the public
utility company used the deposits, discounts, surcharges, power cost adjustment (PCA) and the
currency exchange rate adjustment (CERA) rates as instruments to obtain undue profits through
various loan activities and benefits provided to its employees, then the cause of action against the
50
public utility may have to be litigated before the regular courts. (Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Company, Inc. v. Collera, et al., G.R. No. 102 184, prom. April 12, 2000)
d. Violation of the Omnibus Electric Code. Under Sec. 268 of the Omnibus Electric
Code, RTC’s have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for
violation of the Code, “except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote.” This is so even if the penalty does not exceed six years. It is evident from Sec. 32, BP
129, as amended by Sec. 2 of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts, does not cover
those criminal cases which by specific provision of law are cognizable by the RTC. (Juan, et al.,
v People, G.R. No. 132378, prom., January 18, 2000
***94. Mendoza purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunction tickets for
Manila-Singapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-NewYork.
American Airlines is not a participating airline in any of the segments in the itinerary under
the conjunction tickets. In Geneva, Mendoza decided to skip Copenhagen and go straight to
New York. As there was no direct flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva to New
York, Mendoza exchanged the unused portion of the ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva
to New York from American Airlines. American Airlines issued its own ticket to Mendoza in
Geneva, and claimed the value of the unused portion of the conjunction ticket from the IATA
clearing house in Geneva.
Mendoza allegedly encountered difficulties before he could board the American
Airlines plane in Geneva. He was allegedly subjected to embarassment and mental anguish at
the Geneva Airport when American Airline security officers prevented him from boarding the
plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the
passengers have boarded.
Mendoza then filed a complaint for damages in the RTC of Cebu. American Airlines
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It asserts that under Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, an action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, either
before the court of the carrier’s domicile, the carrier’s principal place of business, the
carrier’s place of business through which the contract was made, or at the place of
destination. It asserts that the Philippines is neither of these options, and that the ticket it
used in geneva for Mendoza’s final leg of his trip was a separate and distinct contract of
carriage from that entered into by Mendoza and Singapore Airlines in Manila which
incidentally was already a terminated contract. Thus, American Airlines, not being a
participation airline in the conjunction ticket issued by Singapore Airlines,its contract of
carriage cannot be deemed an extension of the contract of carriage under the conjunction
ticket.
Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Denied, as all the allegations are without merit.
The contract of carriage between Mendoza and Singapore Airlines although performed by
different carriers under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by petitioner, constitutes a
single operation. Members of the IATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein
they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket
sales worldwide and at the same time provide passengers easy access to airlines which are
otherwise inaccessible in some parts of the world. Booking and reservation among airline
members are allowed even by telephone and it has become an accepted practice among them. A
member airline which enters into a contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be
performed by different carriers is authorized t receive the fare for the whole trip and throught the
required process of interline settlement of accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an airline
is duly compensated for the segment of the trip serviced.
Thus, when American Airlines accepted the unused portion of the conjunction ticket,
entered it in the IATA clearing house and undertook the transport of Mendoza over the route
covered by the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, i.e. Geneva to New York, American
Airlines tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent of
the principal contracting airlines, Singapore Airlines, as to the segment of the trip the petitioner
agreed to undertake. As such, American Airlines thereby assumed the obligation to take the
place of the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket.
The American Airlines argument that it is not designated carrier in the original
conjunction ticket and that it issued its own ticket is not decisive of its liability. The new ticket
was simply a replacement for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both tickets being for
51
the same amount of US$2,760 and having the same points of departure and destination. By
constituting itself as an agent of the principal carrier, American Airlines’ undertaking should be
taken as part of a single operation under the contract of carriage executed by the private
respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. (American Airlines v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R.
No. 116044-45, prom. March 9, 2000)
VENUE
***97. Roy represented by his attorney-in-fact Crispin filed with the RTC, Branch 53,
Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint against Jose as owner and operator of the J.B. Bus Lines.
Roy sought to recover actual and exemplary damages after a bus owned by Jose rammed
Roy's car along the Maharlika Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
The complaint alleged, among others, that Roy is a resident of Rosales, Pangasinan
before he went to the U.S.A. where he now resides, and is represented by Crispin his attorney-
in-fact who resides in Quezon City. It was likewise alleged that Jose's business address is at
Pasay City. Jose filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He alleges that
since Roy was not a resident of the Philippines, venue should have been laid in Gubat,
Sorsogon, Jose's residence.
Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Granted. Roy has transferred his actual residence to the
U.S.A. For purposes of venue, actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e. physical
52
presence and actual stay thereat. This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than
temporary and must be with continuity and consistency. (Baritua v. Court of Appeals, et al., 267
SCRA 331,335-336) There is no showing that his stay in the U.S.A. is merely temporary in
character, neither has he reinstituted his residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. The residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode. It does not mean fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning.
For purposes of venue, actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e. physical
presence and actual stay thereat. This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than
temporary and must be with continuity and consistency. (Baritua v. Court of Appeals, et al., 267
SCRA 331,335-336)
b. Venue must not be left to the whim or caprice of the plaintiff : The rule on venue,
like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or
the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this
objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose the court
where he may file his complaint or petition.
The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not
allowed by the rules on venue. (Sy, et al., v. Tyson Enterprises, et al., 119 SCRA 371, 372)
The choice to be exercised by the plaintiff should always be in accordance with the Rules
of Court. This choice cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon
him by the Rules of Court. (Baritua v. Court of Appeals, et al., 267 SCRA 331,338)
98. When are the instances where the rules on venue are not applicable ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
b. Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. (Sec. 4, Rule 4, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Instances where a specific rule provide for a venue other than that under Rule 4:
1) Venue for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled in the
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, in the Regional Trial Court of any province which he
had estate. (1st sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 73, ROC)
2) Escheat proceedings. When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the
Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may
file a petition in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the deceased last resided
or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines. (Sec. 1, Rule 91, Ibid.)
3) Guardianship proceedings. Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor
or incompetent may be instituted in the Regional Trial Court of the province, or in the
justice of the peace court of the municipality (now the municipal trial court, municipal
circuit trial court) or in the municipal court of the chartered city (now in certain instances,
the metropolitan trial court) where the minor or incompetent resides, and if he resides in a
foreign country, in the Regional Trial Court of the province wherein his property or part
thereof is situated. (Sec. 1, Rule 92, ROC words in parentheses supplied)
The court taking cognizance of a guardianship proceeding, may transfer the same
to the court of another province or municipality wherein the ward has acquired real
property, if he has transferred thereto his bona-fide residence. (Sec. 3, Ibid.)
4) Adoption and custody of minors. A person desiring to adopt another or have
the custody of a minor shall present his petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province, or the city or municipal court of the city or municipality in which he resides.
(Sec. 1, Rule 99, ROC)
5) Proceedings for hospitalization of insane persons. A petition for the
commitment of a person to a hospital or other place for the insane may be filed with the
53
Regional Trial Court of the province where the person alleged to be insane is found. (1st
sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 101, Ibid.)
6) Change of name. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides. (Sec. 1, Rule
103, Ibid.)
7) Voluntary dissolution of corporations. A petition for dissolution of a
corporation shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the principal
office of a corporation is situated. (1st sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 104, ROC)
8) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children. Where
judicial approval of a voluntary recognition of a minor natural child is required, such
child or his parents shall obtain the same by filing a petition to that effect with the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which the child resides. (Sec. 1, Rule 105, Ibid.)
9) Constitution of family home. The head of a family owning a house and he
land on which it is situated may constitute the same into a family home by filing a
verified petition to that effect with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where
the property is located. (Sec. 1, Rule 106, Ibid.)
10) Appointment of absentee's representative. When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without having left an agent to administer
his property, or the power conferred upon the agent has expired, any interested party,
relative or friend, may petition the Regional Trail Court of the place where the absentee
resided before his disappearance, for the appointment of a person to represent him
provisionally in all that may be necessary. (Sec. 1, Rule 107, Ibid.)
11) Cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Sec. 1, Rule 108, Ibid.)
12) Petition for deposition before action. In the court of the place of the residence
of any expected adverse party. (Sec. 1, Rule 24, Ibid.)
99. Unimasters, a corporation has for its principal place of business Tacloban City
while Kubota has its principal place of business in Quezon City. Unimasters then instituted
suit against Kubota in Tacloban City. Kubota now files a motion to dismiss considering the
contractual agreement that, "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the
proper Courts of Quezon City." Resolve the motion to dismiss.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Denied. The agreement does not contain additional words
and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties desire and intention that actions
between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City - or other
contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention. Thus, the stipulation
should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon
City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff
Unimasters. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 267 SCRA 759,778)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Requirements for mandatory or restrictive agreement by the parties to be
determinative of venue. Where the parties have
1) validly agreed in writing
2) before the filing of the action
3) on the exclusive venue thereof. (Sec. 4 [b], Rule 4, ROC arrangement and
numbering supplied)
4) The waiver must not be contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third
persons. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 267 SCRA
759,767)
***5) These agreements are usually characterized by the use of restrictive or
limiting words like, "only," solely," "exclusively," "alone," "limited to," "in no other
place," "to the exclusion of," and other terms indicative of a clear and categorical intent
to lay the venue at a specific place and thereby waiving the general provisions of the
Rules or the law on venue or proscribing the filing of suit in any other competent court.
(concurring opinion of Justice Regalado in Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 267 SCRA 759,781)
54
Trial Court); they merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court without
waiving their right to seek recourse in the courts specifically indicated in Sec. 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Court. (Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794)
5) "The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in Section 12.01
shall be in the City of Manila." (Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 592)
6) The sales invoice of a linotype machine stated that the proper venue should be
Iloilo. REASON: It is obvious that a venue stipulation, in order to bind the parties, must
have been intelligently and deliberately intended by them to exclude their case from the
reglementary rules on venue. There are no restrictive or qualifying words in the
agreement indicating that venue cannot be laid in any place other than that agreed upon
by the parties. (Moles v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 169 SCRA 777)
g. Waiver of venue: That venue is improperly laid is among the grounds for a motion to
dismiss. (Section 1[c], Rule 16, ROC). If not raised in a motion to dismiss it may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. (Sec. 6, Ibid.)
However, Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. (1st sentence, Sec. 1, Rule 9, ROC)
Consequently, improper venue if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer is
deemed waived and may not be raised in proceedings after filing the answer.
h. Rationale for waiver of improper venue if not seasonably objected to: A contrary
rule would encourage the undesirable practice of parties submitting their case in one court in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with the intent of attacking its jurisdiction/venue should
the decision be unfavorable. (Vda. de Suan, et al., v. Cusi, et al., 125 SCRA 349)
101. For failure of the tenant, Albert, to pay rentals, Jun, the court-appointed
administrator of the estate of Nani Baure, decides to file an action against the former for the
recovery of possession of the leased premises located in Davao City and for the payment of the
accrued rentals in the total amount of P450,000.00.
Is the case covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure ? (Bar: adapted)
SUGGESTED ANSWER Yes. All actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered shall be governed
by the summary procedure under Rule 70, Rules of Court. (Sec. 3, Rule 70, ROC)
PLEADINGS
PLEADINGS IN GENERAL
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
105. Spouses Surla filed a complaint for damages against SantoTomas University
Hospital predicated on an allegation that their son while confined at the said hospital had
accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the child.
The hospital filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that the
spouses Surla still owed the hospital P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for their child's
confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney's fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against it.
The plaintiffs moved the court for the dismissal of the counterclaim for not having
been accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. Decide the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The motion should be partially granted. The claim for
P82,632.10 is a permissive counterclaim in an initiatory pleading which requires a certification
of no forum shopping while the second for damages being in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim is not covered by the requirement. (Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, et
al., G.R. No. 129718, prom. August 17, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. The certification is primarily intended to cover:
1) an initiatory pleading or
2) an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief (Santo Tomas
University Hospital v. Surla, et al., G.R. No. 129718, prom. August 17, 1998), such as a
permissive counterclaim
b. Requirement for certification does not apply to compulsory counterclaims: The
requirement has not been contemplated to include a claim which, by its very nature as being
auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support
therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for
58
independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends (Santo Tomas University
Hospital v. Surla, et al., G.R. No. 129718, prom. August 17, 1998) as in compulsory
counterclaims.
c. Effect of failure to comply with the requirement. Failure to comply shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. (1st sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 5, Rule 7, ROC)
d. Effect of submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the
undertakings. This shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without preejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. (2nd sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 5, Rule 7,
ROC)
e. Effect of willful and deliberate forum shopping. This shall be a ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (last sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 5, Rule 7, ROC)
f. All parties must sign. All petitioners must be signatories to the certification of no
forum shopping unless one is authorized by other petitioners. Substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. ((Loquias, et al., v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000)
g. While rule must be strictly followed there may be substantial compliance. With
respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with, it
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on
this aspect of its provision under justifiable circumstances. The rule was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.
Illustration: Consideration should have been taken of the fact that the parties were sued
jointly, or as “Mr. And Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being
the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on
certification of non-forum shopping. (Dar, et al., v. Hon. Alonzo-Legasto, etc., et al., G.R. No.
143016, August 30, 2000)
h. Instance where there IS forum shopping. Forum-shopping concurs not only when a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of
litis pendentia are present.- Forum-shopping concurs not only when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are present.
The filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment amounts to
forum-shopping. Only when the successive filing of suits as part of an appeal, or a special civil
action, will there be no forum-shopping because the party no longer availed of different for a, but
rather sought a review of a lower tribunal’s decision or order. The termination of the case before
a lower court and its elevation for review to a higher court does not constitute forum-shopping
for the latter is a recognized remedy under our procedural rules. (Quinsay v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 127058, prom. August 31, 2000)
i. Instances where there is NO forum shopping.
1) The two cases, one for the annulment of deeds of sale and the other for
ejectment; although concerning the same property, are distinct litigations, neither
involving exactly the same parties nor identical issues.
2) There is no identity between a petition for probate of will and petition for
issuance of letters testamentary. The first, is solely for the purpose of authenticating a
will and after the allowance of the will, the proceedings are terminated. The second, is
for the purpose of securing authority from the court to administer the estate and put into
effect the will of the testater. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing
of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devices to
59
the persons named in the will. (Maloles II v. Philipps, G.R. No. 129505 and Maloles I v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133359, prom. January 21, 2000)
3) No forum shopping where the five actions filed by the petitioner were for
quieting of title based on separate certificates of title. Hence, the subject matters
involved are different in each case. As such, the cases alleged different causes of action.
Corollarily, a judgment in any case will not affect the issue in the other cases inasmuch as
those portion to different lands covered by different certificates of title. (Valisno v.
Ayala)
4) No forum shopping between petition before the Court of Appeals where the
issue is to determine entitlement to the benefits and protection under the CARL, and a
case before the RTC for injunction to stop anyone from using force and intimidation to
eject the lawful possessors of the same property. (Greenfield Realty Corporation and
Data Processing Services v. Cardoma, et al., G.R. No. 129246, prom., January 25, 2000)
Upon failure to receive payment on June 15, 2001, the creditor may file suit for
P50,000.00. Should the June and July installments be not paid, then the creditor ought to
file suit for the total amount of P100,000.00. If the August installment was not paid
while the suit for the collection of the June and July installments is still pending, then the
creditor may file a separate suit for the March installment.
60
There is no splitting a single cause of action because when the suit was filed for
the June and July installments, the August installments was not yet due and demandable.
b. Instance of a cause of action that is not divisible. Recovery of personal property with
damages is indivisible. If suit is brought for possession only, a subsequent action cannot be
maintained to recover damages resulting from the unlawful detainer. There is only one wrong
committed, the unlawful detainer which resulted not only the right to recover the property but
also damages.
c. When divisible and when not divisible. Contract to pay interest may or may not be
separate from payment of principal. Suit may be brought separately for interest due prior to the
time the principal becomes due. When the interest has not yet been paid at the time the
principal becomes due, then unpaid interests already due becomes merged with the principal into
a single cause of action.
107. On February 15, 2001, Leon filed with the Regional Trial Court against Sharon
an action to quiet title, annulment of titles and deeds, declaration of sole heirship and/or
ownership with damages involving a parcel of land registered in Sharon's name.
Later, on February 19, 2001, Leon filed with the Municipal Trial Court an action for
forcible entry with damages against Sharon involving the same property subject of the suit in
the Regional Trial Court.
Sharon now raises in the answer filed in the ejectment suit the defense of splitting a
single cause of action. Rule on the defense.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The defense is impressed with merit. In the first case the
determination of ownership is at issue. While it could be seen that the forcible entry case arose
out of conflicting claims of ownership over the land; the issue of ownership is indispensably
involved.
This is evident, because in the second complaint for forcible entry, Leon anchors his
claim for rightful possession his alleged ownership over the subject property.
Leon has thus brought two separate suits for a single cause of action. The result therefore
is that the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. the forcible entry
case should therefore be dismissed. (De Luzuriaga, Sr. v. Adil., et al., 136SCRA 279)
***109. Does the rule on joinder of causes of action include special civil actions ?
Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. There is no relation between an ordinary action and a
special civil action, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law, which cojointly could warrant their joinder. The two actions do
not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under
the Rules.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Purpose of joinder of causes of action. To encourage joinder of actions which could
reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs and the dominant idea is to permit
joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join many separate claims as he may have there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. (Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, prom.
February 9, 1996 underlining supplied)
Service of notice when a party is represented by counsel should be made upon counsel,
and not upon the party. Purpose: To maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in
competent hands the prosecution of a party’s case. (Mancenido, etc. et al., v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 118605, prom. April 12, 2000)
111. An answer was filed but it was served by mail despite the fact that the offices of
the two lawyers were only 200 meters apart from one another. The post office however is
more than two (2) kilometers away from the office of the counsel for the defendant. No
explanation was given why service by mail was resorted to. Should a motion to strike be
granted ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. The Rules mandate that Whenever practicable the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally (11, Rule 13,
ROC). Use of the word "shall" indicates that personal service is mandatory in character, if no
explanation was given. (Solar Entertainment, Inc. v. Hon. Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007,
prom. August 5, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Instances when no personal service is required but always with explanations:
Where personal service is not practicable as:
1) Where the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served with a pleading
seldom reports to office and no employee is regularly present to receive pleadings;
2) Where service is done on the last day of the reglementary period and the office
of the adverse party or opposing counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason. .
62
(Solar Entertainment, Inc. v. Hon. Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007, prom. August 5,
1998)
112. The adverse decision of the Court of Appeals was sent to the defendant
appellee's counsel. The counsel did not receive the same, it was returned with the notation
"Unclaimed Return to Sender " stamped on the envelope containing the decision.
A certification was then issued in the following tenor:
"This is to certify that according to the record(s) of this Office Registered Letter
No.7115 (with Delivery No, 30175) was sent by (the) Court of Appeals, Manila on
June 15, 1995 addressed to Atty. Anacleto S. Magno of 208 Associated Bank Bldg.,
Ermita, Manila was returned to sender as unclaimed mail on July 4, 1995 after the
lapse of reglementary period provided for under postal regulations following the
issuance of notices on the dates hereunder indicated (underscoring supplied):
First Notice- June 15, 1995 Third Notice -June 21, 1995
Second Notice - June 19, 1995."
Was the decision duly served upon counsel ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. It was not enough for the Postmaster to have certified
that the notices were issued because this is just a prelude to service by registered mail. And
definitely, it would not be in consonance with the demands of due process and equity to
automatically conclude that from the word "issued" alone, the notice was in fact received by the
addressee or somebody acting on his behalf and on the same date of the notice. The postmaster
should have included in his certification the manner, date and the recipient of the delivery.
(Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 128061, prom. September 3, 1998)
MOTIONS IN GENERAL
113. Are there any exceptions to the rule that a motion without a notice of hearing is
a mere scrap of paper ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130314, prom.
September 22, 1998 it was held that liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by the
Supreme Court in the following cases:
a. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
(Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498, 504-505), especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein (Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of
Appeals, February 12, 1992);
b. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served (Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA
518, 522);
c. Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court (Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685, 696-702); and
d. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed (Galang v. Court of Appeals,
199 SCRA 683).
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Requirement for notice. A motion that does not meet the notice requirements of
Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is pro forma, and the trial court has no authority to
act on it. The requisites laid down in the aforementioned provisions are categorical and
mandatory, and the failure of the movants to comply with them renders their motions fatally
defective. (Juan, et al., v. people, G.R. No. 132378, prom. January 18, 2000)
b. Purpose of notice. To bring the party into court at the time of the motion, or at least
to inform him that a motion is to be made, thereby enabling him to appear and contest the motion
if he desires to do so. Prior notice enables the adverse party to appear for his own protection and
be heard before an order is made. (Odono v. Judge Macaraeg, etc., et al., etc., A..M. No. RTJ-00-
1542, prom. March 16, 2000 citing Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. v. Vda. de
Hernandez (67 SCRA 256)
63
of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things.
This would enable the parties to inform themselves, even before the trial, of all the facts
relevant to the action, including those known only to the other litigants. Through this procedure,
“civil trials should not be carried on in the dark. (Security Bank Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135874, prom. January 25, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. The different modes of discovery under the Rules of Court:
1) Deposition. The written testimony of a witness given in the course of a
judicial proceeding, in advance of he trial or hearing, upon oral examination or in
response to written interrogatories, and where an opportunity is given for cross-
examination.
2) Interrogatories. These are the questions in writing served directly on the
adverse party to be answered by him or by his officer. Its scope is as broad as the field of
inquiry which a person interrogated is called upon to testify in an actual trial.
3) Production or inspection of documents or things. This mode of discovery is
an exception to the constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and
correspondence. It allows the production or inspection of documents and other things but
does not allow them to be distrained without the knowledge of their lawful owner or
possessor.
4) Admission by adverse party. This may be made at any time after the
pleadings are closed. This may be availed of by a party by serving upon the other party a
written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant
documents described in and exhibited with the request, or of the truth of any relevant
matters of fact set forth therein.
b. How depositions may be used:
1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness.
b. The deposition of a party or any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership,
or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
c. The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party
for any purpose, if the court finds:
1) That the witness is dead; or
2) That the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of the trial or hearing;
3) That the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity or imprisonment; or
4) That the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of his witnesses by subpoena; or
5) Upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist
as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used; and
d. If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party; the adverse
party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and
any party may introduce any other parts. (Sec. 4, Rule 23, ROC)
Hence, the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment.(Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
110495, prom. January 29, 1998) Courts are given a wide latitude in granting motions
for discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for trial or otherwise settle the
controversy prior thereof. (Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 135874, prom. January 25, 2000)
***116. The spouses Uy filed an action for injunction and damages against Security
Bank (SBC), Domingo and the Ex-officio Sheriff of Quezon City to enjoin the extrajudicial
foreclosure over a parcel of land registered under the spouses’ name. The action sought the
amendment of two deeds of Real Estate Mortgage between Jackivi and SBC. SBC and
Domingo had a cross-claim against each other. Thereafter, the spouses Uy and Domingo had
65
a cross-claim against each other. The spouses Uy and Domingo filed their separate motions
for production, inspection and copying of documents relating to the mortgage. Domingo
averred that the subject documents were “material and important to the issues raised in the
case in general, and as between defendant (Domingo) and defendant SBC in pareticular. “On
the other hand, the spouses Uy said the documents were “necessary for a full determination of
the issues raised” in the suit.
Rule on the motions.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Granted. A good cause for inspection of documents is to
enable a party to intelligently prepare his defenses and to come up with a full determination of
the issues. (Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135874, prom.
January 25, 2000)
DOCKET FEES
***118. On March 7, 1983, Adrian filed a complaint with the RTC against Shell,
Caltex, Mobil and Petrophil. No mention was made in the complaint of the amount of damags
claimed but Adrian alleged that the conservative amount of the combined gross sales of his
invention by the oil companies ius P934 million annually. At the November 13, 1984 hearing,
Adrian estimated the yearly royalty due him to be P236 million.
The oil companies filed a motion to dismiss upon discovery that Adrian paid only
P252.00 filing fee based on his claim for attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00. the court
denied themotion and ordered Adrian to pay additional docket fees in the sum of P945,000.00.
Adrian filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the oil companies.
The trial court then ordered the plaintiff to pay the required additional docket fee after the
termination of the case to be deducted from whatever judgment in damages awarded to the
plaintiff. The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals thence to the Supreme Court which
ordered the case resumed upon payment of all the lawful fees or upon exemption from
payment thereof uopn proper application to litigate as pauper.
The plaintiff then filed an application to litigate as a pauper which was denied. He
then filed an amended complaint. Subsequent amendments were made paying additional
amounts for the filing fees in order to accommodate the plaintiff’s finances ? Does the
plaintiff have the right to amend his complaint to accommodate his finances for payment of
the prescribed docket fees ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Normally, the manner of payments made by the plaintiff
of the docket fees in installments should be disallowed. However, equity demands that
procedural rules be relaxed considering the peculiar circumstances availing in the case. It would
be grossly unust if the plaintiff’s claim against the oil companies, who have allegedly reaped the
profits of his liftime work, would be dismissed for the sole reason that his fiances are not
sufficint to allow him to file his claim. (de la Paz v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.r. No. 120150,
prom. March 27, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
66
a. General rule: The timely filing of corect docket fees is jurisdictional. However, that
the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the matter have always been influenced by the
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances surrounding each case.
The rule is not as simple and uncomplicated as Manchester makes it appear. There are
other determining circumstances, equally important. The timely filing of correct docket fees is
jurisdictional, but considerations of law and equity come into the picture. (Yuchengco v.
Republic, etc., et al., G.R. No. 131127, prom. June 8, 2000)
b. Manchester doctrine and subsequent doctrines. Manchester Development, et al.,
ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docketing fees.
The allegation in the body of the complaint of damages suffered in the amount of P78
million, and the omission of a specific prayer for that amount was intended for no other purpose
than to evade the payment of correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the correct fee. The ruling was intended to put a stop to such an irregularity.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al., v. Asuncion, et al., 170 SRCA 274 modified the
Manchester doctrine by holding that a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, there was demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. Thus, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not acompanied by payment of the docketing fee, the court may allow payment of such fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period.
c. Two situations that may arise.
One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money
or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event,
the rule is that the pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed
or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as
aforestated the court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of
the fees povided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the
fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.
d. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well,
the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total
amount of related damages sought. The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of
the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the paymenbt of the requisite fee, or, if the fees are not
paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within
such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where x x x the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been
paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being
demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed.” (Yuchengco v. Republic, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 131127, prom. June 8, 2000)
e. Manchester doctrine not applicable to election cases. (Pahilan v. Tabala, et al., 230
SCRA 205, 216-217 cited in Enojas, Jr., v. judge Gacott, Jr., etc., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513, prom.
January 19, 2000)
SUMMONS
There is a presumption that a sheriff has regularly performed his official fnctions in
utilizing substituted service of summons. To overcome the presumption arising from the
sheriff’s certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing. (Umandap v.Judge Sabio, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 140244, prom. August 29, 2000)
***124. Duraproof Services sued for damages various parties including Banco do
Brazil, a non-resident foreign bank which was served summons through the ambassador of
Brazil to the Philippines as well as through publication. For failure of Banco do Brazil to file
its answer, it was declared in default and judgment rendered against it awarding damages in
favor of the plaintiff. Did the court obtain jurisdiction over Banco do Brazil ? Why ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. The action is one that is in personam because the
plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged commission of an injury to the person or
property of the plaintiff. Since the action is one in personam, personal or, if not possible,
substituted service of summons on the defendant, and not extraterritorial service, in necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon the person of Banco do Brazil. (Banco do Brasil v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.r. Nos. 121576-78, prom. June 16, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Extraterritorial service of summons applicable only in actions in rem or quasi in
rem. Extraterritorial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, an action against
the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. This is so inasmuch as, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Any relief granted in in rem or quasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the
court cannot lawfully render a personal judgmnt against the defendant. (Banco do Brasil v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 121576-78, prom. June 16, 2000)
Property Registration Decree provide the statutory basis for a notice of lis pendens. From these
provisions it is clear that such a notice is proper only in actions to:
1) Recover possession of real property
2) Quiet title thereto;
3) Remove clouds thereon;
4) Partition property; and
5) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.
Thus, all the applicant has to do is to assert a claim of ownership to put the property
under the coverage of the rule. It is not necessary for her to prove owneership or interest over
the property sought to be affected by lis pendens. (Yared, et al., v. Hon. Ilarde, etc., et al., G.R.
No. 1114732, prom. August 1, 2000)
It is proper where a claim is made of an interest or right in the property specifically
subject of the alleged simulated sale, where the object of the complaint is not only to enforce a
lien or encumbrance against the subject property but to enforce a valid claim. The notice is
specific where it refers to a portion covered by the TCTs covering 23,609 sq. m. of the subject
real property. (Albnerto v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 119088, prom. June 30, 2000)
d. Absence of technical description not ground to reject application for lis pendens.
Absence of the property’s technical description in either the notice of lis pendens or the
complaint is not a sufficient ground for rejecting the application, if referral is made in the notice
of the TCT No., and a copy of the TCT is attached to and made an integral part of the two
documents.
Thus, the notice of lis pendens submitted for registration, taken as a whole, leaves no
doubt as to the identity of the property, the technical description of which appears on the attachd
TCT. The main purpose of the requirement that the notice shall contain a technical description of
the property is to ensure that the same can be distinguished and readily identified. (Viewmaster
Construction Corporation v. Hon. Maulit, etc., et al., G.R. No. 136283, prom. February 29, 2000)
e. Remedy where Register of Deeds denies registration. Under P.D. No. 1529, the
“Property Registration Decree of 1978,” the Register of Deeds may deny registration of the
notice of lis pendens which denial may be appealed by the applicant en consulta (Section 10,
paragraph 2) to the Commissioner of Land Registration. (AFP Mutual Benefit Associaition, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104769; Solid Homes, Inc. v. Investco, Inc., G.R. No.
135016, prom. March 3, 2000)
126. May the plaintiff dismiss his complaint by mere notice to the court ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of motion for
summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. (1st two sentences, Sec. 1, Rule 17, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. General rule: The dismissal by mere notice is without prejudice. (last sentence,
Sec. 1, Rule 17, ROC)
b. Exceptions or when dismissal with prejudice:
1) The order states that the dismissal is with prejudice. (last sentence,
Sec. 1, Rule 17, ROC)
2) Application of the Two Dismissal Rule: A notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. (Ibid.)
***e. Filing of amended pleading does not retroact to date of filing the original
because the original is superseded by the amended pleadings.
Hence, the statute of limitations runs until the submission of the amendment. (Republic
of the Philippines, etc., v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 119292, prom. July 31, 1998)
f. Purpose of supplemental pleading. To supply deficiencies in aid of the original
pleadding and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It is not like an amended pleading
which is a substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the
original pleading is to stand. The issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be
tried in the action. (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 81024, prom.
February 3, 2000)
g. Supplemental pleading retroacts . An amendment which merely supplements and
amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement
of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after service of the
original complaint. (Republic of the Philippines, etc., v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 119292,
prom. July 31, 1998)
However, such rule does not apply to a party who is impleaded for the first time in the
amended complaint that was filed beyond the prescriptive period. (Ibid.)
h. When cause of action substantially altered. In determining whether a different
cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what must be ascertained is
whether the defendants shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly
different from that stated in the original complaint.
An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the fact alleged
in the amended complaint shows substantially the same wrong with respect to the same matter
but is more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made
express, or the subject of the controversy or the liabilty sought to be enforced remains the same.
(Que v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135442, prom. August 31, 2000)
a. Motions
1) For extension of time to plead or respond
2) To expunge the complaint or portions thereof.
3) For bill of particulars.
4) To dismiss.
5) To lift order of default. Refer to previous discussion.
b. Pleadings
1) Answer.
2) Counterclaim.
3) Cross-claim.
4) Third party complaint.
c. Others
1) Opposition to plaintiff's various motions.
MOTION TO EXPUNGE
130. How may a pleading or any matter contained therein be stricken out ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or,
b. if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules of Court ,
c. upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the
pleading upon him, or
d. upon the court's own initiative at any time,
76
e. the court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false,
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalously matter be stricken out therefrom.
(Sec. 12, Rule 8, ROC numbering, arrangement and words not in bold supplied)
MOTION TO DISMISS
***c. Defenses and objections not waived. Even if motion to dismiss is filed after the
answer, the court shall dismiss the claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on
record
1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
2) that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or
3) that the action is barred by prior judgment, or by statute of
limitations. (2nd sentence, Sec. 1, rule 9, ROC)
d. Motion to dismiss that needs hearing. A motion to dismiss raising an affirmative
defense such as lack of cause of action poses a question of fact that should be resolved after due
hearing. This is unlike a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action which may be resolved solely on the basis of the allegations of the complaint. (Heirs of
Paes v. Hon. Torres, etc., et al., G.R No. 104314, prom. February 2, 2000)
***133. The general rule is that the filing of a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits
the material allegations of the complaint. Are there any exceptions to this rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: There are equally established limitations to the rule on
hypothetical admission, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit:
a. the truth of mere epithets of fraud;
b. nor allegations of legal conclusions;
c. nor an erroneous statement of law;
d. nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated;
e. nor mere conclusions of law;
f. nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice;
g. nor matters of evidence;
h. nor surplussage and irrelevant matter;
i. nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insert (sic, should be to insult ?) the opposing
party;
j. nor to legally impossible facts;
k. nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a
document referred to; and
l. nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments. (Tan, et al., v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125861, prom. September 9, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Test for determining sufficiency of complaint as to cause of action. In determining
the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be
considered. Lack of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint and its existence
can be determined only by the allegations of the complaint, consideration of other facts being
proscribed and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being allowed.
The test of sufficiency of the facts found in the complaint as constituting a cause of action
is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by
the defendants. (Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 133576, prom.
July 13, 2000 citing Navoa v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 545)
***b. Exceptions to the above test. The trial court and the Court of Appeals should not
have been too rigid in applying the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, only the averments in the complaint and no other are to be
consulted. The rule admits of exceptions:
First: All documents attached to the complaint, the due execution and
genuineness of which are not denied under oath by th defendant, must be
considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.
Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the
complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
It is only logical for the lower court to consider all these pleadings in determining
whether there was a sufficient cause of action as the order of dismissial is summary in nature. So
78
long as those attached pleadings are procedurally responsible to the complaint, then they may be
considered in evauating the sufficiency of the cause of action in the complaint.
In addition, since the dismissal of a complaint by virtue of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state or for insufficiency of cause of action would be tantamount to a summary judgmnt, the
lower court should at least have considered the attached documens and pleadings as a matter of
due process. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the merits ot the complaint to its averments or
allegations would be too constricting an interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that
the complaint itself is accompanied by documentary evidence attached annexes. The responsive
pleadings, in adition, though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since they are
already part of the records of the case and should therefore be considered. (Sea-land Services,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126212, prom. March 2, 2000, citing Fil-Estate Gold
and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 265 SCRA 614; Alberto v. CA, et al., G.r. No.
119088, prom. June 30, 2000)
135. Jaime filed a complaint for ejectment against Amor with the Municipal Trial
Court. In his answer with motion to dismiss Amor averred that the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the case because it involved a landlord-tenant relationship and should have been filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reform. Since the answer was filed out of time, the MTC
considered the same submitted for decision and subsequently ordered Amor to vacate the land.
Was the MTC correct in rendering judgment on the case ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The MTC should not have disregarded Amor’s answer and
should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case. (Corpin v. Vivar, et al., G.R. No. 137350, prom. June 19, 2000)
ANSWER
***137. What are the facts deemed admitted by the failure to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable document ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The party whose signature appears on the document signed it.
b. If signed by another, the document was signed for the party whose name appears on
the document with his authority.
c. At the time the document was signed, it was in the words and figures exactly as set out
in the pleading and of the party relying upon it.
d. The document was delivered.
e. Any formal requisites of law, such as seal, acknowledgment or revenue stamp which
the document lacks, are deemed waived. (Hibbered v. Rhode, 32 Phil. 476)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Instances where the benefit of admission of genuineness of actionable document
is waived:
1) Where the pleader presented witnesses to prove the genuineness and
due execution, and the adversary proved, without objection, the contrary. (Yu
Chuck v. Kong Li Po, 46 Phil. 608)
2) Where the pleader fails to object to evidence controverting the
genuineness and due execution. (Legarda Koh v. Ongsiaco, 36 Phil. 185)
b. Instances where there is no admission even if no denial under oath:
1) When the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument.
2) When compliance with an order for inspection of the original
document is denied. (Sec. 8, Rule 8, ROC)
138. INK filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for the annulment of deeds of
mortgage over certain lots, inmpleading Ligon, Linzag, Sampaco and IDP. In its answer, IDP
interposed a cross-claim against Ligon. On the other hand, Ligon filed an answer with
counterclaim; a cross-claim against IDP; and a third party complaint against de Leon,
Guillermo and Aida.
IDP charged in its answer with cross-claim that Ligon should have known that the
persons she transacted with had not authority to bind IDP to the loans and mortgages she was
trying to enforce.
Ligon on the other hand, alleged in her cross-claim that IDP unjustly refused to pay
the loans it contracted from her which had become due and demandable.
Ligon filed a motion to declare IDP in default for its failure to file an answer to her
cross-claim. Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion denied. The answer to a cross-claim is meant to join
the subsidiary issues between co-parties in relation to the opposing party's claim against the
cross-claimant.
From the foregoing, it is inevitable that IDP's cross-claim effectively joined the
subsidiary issues between the co-parties. Requiring an answer to Ligon's cross-claim would be
superfluous. (Ligon v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127683, prom. August 7, 1998)
COUNTERCLAIM
80
The above rule applies where the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint but
interposes a compulsory counterclaim. The permissive counterclaim is not dismissed because it
is as if, it is a separate case. This is so, because the defendant is required to pay docket fees for
his permissive counterclaim.
If the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted no jurisdiction remains for any grant of
relief under the counterclaim. (Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, et al., G.R.
No. 115088, prom. June 20, 1996) There is implied waiver of the compusory counterclaim
because the basis for the counterclaim does not exist. (Financial Building Corporation v. Forbes
Park Association, Inc., G.R. No. 133119, prom. August 17, 2000)
CROSS-CLAIM
142. What are the requisites for the application for substitution of counsel ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Filing of a written application for substitution.
b. Written consent of the client.
c. Written consent of the lawyer to be substituted, if such consent can be obtained.
d. Where such written consent cannot be obtained, substitution must be accompanied
with proof of service of notice of such motion in the manner required by the rules, on the
attorney to be substituted. (Morales, et al., v. Fabello, et al., 149 SCRA 338)
a. Motions
1) To withdraw or dismiss complaint.
2) To amend or supplement the complaint.
3) To expunge the answer, counterclaim or any part thereof.
4) For judgment on the pleadings.
5) For summary judgment.
6) To set pre-trial.
b. Pleadings
1) Reply
2) Answer to counterclaims
144. What is the burden of the movant in a motion for summary judgmnt ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The controlling factor in a motion for summary judgment is
not the submission or non-submission of counter-affidavits, but the presence or absence of any
genuine issue as to any material fact that would require he presentation of evidence. Where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot
take the place of trial.
Thus, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly
the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
insubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of
such an issue is resolve against the movant. (Sps. Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
120040, prom. January 29, 1996)
Testimonial evidence is not needed only documetnary evidence to prove absence of
genuine issues. ( Sec. 3, Rule 34, ROC)
145. In consequence of a petition for certiorari filed before it the Supreme Court on
September 4, 1987 issued a TRO against Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. from
withdrawing and/or further disposing of the plywood inventory inits plant or warehouse.
On October 26, 1987, the sheriff seized eleven (11) crates of plywood allegedly being
transported to the wharf at Ilang, Davao City in violation of the TRO. These crates had the
markings of Sta. Clara and Firmwood.
On November 18, 1987 Firmwood claiming to be the owners of the eleven (11) crates
of plywood filed with RTC of Davao City a complaint for delivery if personal property and
damages as well as attorney’s fees.
The defendants alleged in their answer that the owner of the plywood was Sta. Clara
and not Firmwood. The answer further admitted that the goods contained the label and
markings of Firmwood. Sta. Clara filed its complaint in intervention stating that it is joining
Firmwood in its suit to recover possession of the plywood seized and detained by the
defendants; that Firmwood was the same was milled by Sta. Clara for Firmwood; that Sta.
Clara had the right to the possessionof the plywood in order to comply with its obligations
83
under a warranty to deliver the goods to Firmwood; and finallym that the TRO issued by the
Supreme Court which was the basis for the service had already been lifted.
On August 30, 1988 Firmwood filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that
aside from the amount of damages due it there was no genuine issue as to any material fact of
the case, Sta. Clara having confirmed Firmwood’s ownersp over the eleven (11) crates of
plywood. Sta. Clara also filed a motion for summary alleging the same grounds raised by
Firmwood and further contending that the defendants did not have the authority to hold the
property in custodia legis.
Should the motion for summary judgment be granted ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. there are no genuine issues with respect to the ownership
of the eleven (11) crates of plywood. furthermore, it is clear that the defendantshad nbo
authority to seize the plywood considering that the TRO did not contain any cdirective
whatsoever to any of the defendants to seize property belonging to Sta. Clara, or to keep the
property seized in their possession. (Velasco, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121517,
prom. March 31, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Nature of authority to grant relief by summary judgment. Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure as amended. which gives authority to trial courts to grant relief by
simmary judgment is intended to expedite and promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits.
This rule does not vest in the court summary jurisdiction to try issues on pleadings and
affidavits but gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment only if it clearly
appears tht there is no genuine issue of material fact. On a motion for summary judgment, the
court is not authorized to decide an issue of fact but to determine whether the pleadings and
records before the court create an issue of fact to be tried.
It is impossible to state a general rule for determining whether a genuine issue of fact
exists in a particular case. The determination will depend upon the particular circumstances of
each case. Nevertheless, the language used by courts in making a determination in particular
cases may serve to indicate the manner in which a court should approach the question to be
determined. It is repeated often enough that the court is notauthorized to try the issue of fact but
to dtermine whether there is an issue to be tried. Where the motion is made by a claimant, the
defending party must show that he has a plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable
and of a substantial character. (Velasco, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121517, prom.
March 31, 2000)
Courts are quite critical of the papers presented by the moving party but not of the papers
in opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take
that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such
party the benefit of all favorable inferences. (Garcia, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
117032, prom. July 27, 2000)
b. Grounds for summary judgment. If the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. (Sec. 3, Rule 35, ROC)
c. Where summary judgment not proper, definition of genuine issue. Where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e. an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for
presentation of evidence, as distinguishehd from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived,
set-up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. (Mallilin, Jr., v.
Casstillo, G.R. No. 136803, prom. June 16, 2000; Ley Construction and Development
Corporation, et al., v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133801, prom. June 27, 2000)
d. Hearing not required for summary judgment. In proceedings for summary
judgment, the court is merely expected to act chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the
case and he hearing contemplated in the Rules is not de riguer as its purpose is merely to
determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up
in the pleading. (Ley Construction and Development Corporation, et al., v. Union Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 133801, prom. June 27, 2000 citing Carcon Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348)
REPLY
84
146. What is the procedure to be followed if new claims arise out of the answer ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of
the new matters so alleged in the answer such claims shall be set forth in an amended or
supplemental complaint. (2nd par., Sec. 10, Rule 6, ROC words not in bold supplied)
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF
PRE-TRIAL
148. It is the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. What is
the effect of the failure of the parties to appear during the pre-trial ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If the plaintiff fails to appear the action shall be dismissed
with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. (1st and 2nd sentences, Sec. 5, Rule 18,
ROC)
The failure of the defendant to appear at the pre-trial shall be cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. (3rd
sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 18, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Factors in deciding grant or denial of motion for postponment of pre-trial. The
court shall take into account:
1) The reason for the postponemt;
2) The merits of the case of the movant. (Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122346, prom. February
18, 2000)
b. Meritorious defense. The term “meritorious defense” may imply that the applicant
has the burden of proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases
usually do not require such a strong showing. The test employed appears to be essentially the
85
same as used in considering summary judgment, i.e. whether there is enough evidence to present
an issue for submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is clear the
judgment is warranted as a matter of law.
The defendant must show that she has a meriotrious defense otherwise the grant of her
otion will prove to be a useless exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement
of the evidence which she intends to present if the motion is granted and which is such as to
warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would probably be otherwise. (Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122346, prom. February
18, 2000)
TRIAL
149. Are there any instances where no trial is conducted in civil cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Where the case is:
a. Dismissed upon a motion to dismiss the complaint or pleading asserting a claim filed
by the defending party. (Rule 16, ROC)
b. Dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court. (Sec. 1, Rule 17, ROC)
c. Dismissed by the plaintiff upon order of the court at the plaintiff's instance. (Sec. 2,
Rule 17, ROC)
d. Dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion if the
plaintiff fails to appear at the trial, or prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with the Rules of Court, or any order of the court. (Sec. 3, Rule 17, ROC)
e. Decided after declaration of default for failure of the defending party to file an answer
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. (Sec. 3, Rule 9, ROC)
f. Decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Rule 34, ROC)
g. Decided for failure of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. (Sec. 5,
Rule 18, ROC)
h. Decided after the court finds during the pre-trial the propriety of rendering judgment
on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefore be found to exist. (Sec. 2 [g], Rule 18, ROC)
i. Decided on a motion to dismiss or judgment by default by wilful failure or refusal of a
party to have his deposition taken or to answer interrogatories. (Sec. 5, Rule 29, ROC)
j. Decided after the parties have agreed in writing, upon the facts involved in the
litigation and submit the case for judgment on the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of
evidence. (Sec. 6, Rule 30, ROC)
47013, Co v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60647, and The Associated Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 60958-59, prom. February 17, 2000)
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
***151. What is a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence and what are its
effects ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A motion to dismiss filed by the defending party after the
claimant has rested his case, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Effects of filing a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence:
a. The defending party does not thereby waive his right to offer evidence in the
event that his motion is denied. (Sec. 1, Rule 33, ROC)
b. If the motion is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
defendant waives his right to present evidence in his behalf. (Ibid.)
c. In case (b) above, the appellate court shall forthwith render judgment for the
claimant on the basis of his evidence alone. (Atun v. Nunez, 97 Phil. 762)
DISMISSALS
154. When may an action be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or motu proprio
by the court ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If for no justifiable cause the plaintiff fails:
a. To appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint; or
b. To prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
c. To comply with the Rules of Court, or
d. To comply with any order of the court.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
the counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.
The dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court. (Sec. 3, Rule 17, ROC numbeing and arrangement supplied))
c. If he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. (De Knecht, et
al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108015 and De Knecht, et al. v. Hon. Sayo, et al, G.R.
No. 109234, prom. May 20, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Effect of dismissal for failure to prosecute: Once a case is dismissed for failure to
prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided for in the order of dismissal.
(De Knecht, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108015 and De Knecht, et al. v. Hon.
Sayo, et al, G.R. No. 109234, prom. May 20, 1998)
In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without
prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with
prejudice. (Knecht)
b. Examples of disobedience of court orders which may result in dismissal:
1) An order directing the plaintiff to amend his complaint so as to indicate
the representative of the deceased defendant. (Sunico v. Villapando, 13 Phil. 352)
2) An order to file a bill of particulars. (Bautista v. Teodoro, 101 Phil.
7001)
(3) An order to present his witnesses anew in view of the fact that the
judge was not the one who originally tried the case. (Castillo v. Sebullina, 31
Phil. 518)
156. What are some of the valid grounds for refusal to comply with a sub[oena ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Where the witness resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from his residence
to the place where is to testify by the ordinary course of travel, or
b. Where the witness is a detention prisoner if no permission of the court in which his
case is pending was obtained. (Sec. 10, Rule 21, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
159. When may the court authorize amendment of the pleadings ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleadings,
b. the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality
c. if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby.
d. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (last two
sentences, Sec. 5, Rule 10, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
88
JUDGMENT
a. In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
b. In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title. ( 1st par., Sec. 48, Rule 39, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Grounds for repelling foreign judgments:
1) Evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
2) collusion, fraud, or
3) clear mistake of law or fact. (Sec. 48, Rule 39, ROC numbering and
arrangement supplied)
a. Motion
1) For reconsideration.
2) For new trial.
b. Petition for relief from judgment
***164. What are the various modes of attacking final and executory judgments ?
Explain each briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Direct action or proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in another case if, in the
latter case, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or to pronounce the judgment. It is not
incidental to, but is the main object of the proceeding.
b. Collateral attack, in which the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief,
other than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment and the attack is only incidental. (1
Freemen on Judgments, Sec. 306, pp. 607-608)
90
c. Petition for relief from judgment or order as authorized by statutes or by the rules, in
the same action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was entered. (Agustin v. Bocalan,
135 SCRA 346)
G.R. No. 133547; Destura v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133843, prom. February 10,
2000)
***166. What are the grounds for filing a petition for relief from judgment, order or
other proceedings ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is hereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (Sec. 1, Rule 38, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Nature of petition. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is
allowed only in exceptional cases when therre is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal
from an adverse decision of the trial court and he was not prevented by fraud accident, mistake
or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself
of this petition. (Mercury Drug Corporation v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 138571, prom. July 13, 2000;
Basco v. Court of Appeals, et al., prom. August 9, 2000 citing Samoso v. CA, 178 SCRA 654;
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110 SCRA 205; Ibabao v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76)
Relief of judgment; a unique remedy; allowed only in exceptional cases.- The issue of
jurisdiction aside, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a petition for relief from judgment is a
unique remedy in the sense that it is based on the principle of equity and constitutes the
petitioner’s final chance to prosecute or defend his cause. Being an act of grace, a petition for
relief from judgment is usually not regarded with favor and thus, is allowed only in exceptional
cases where there are no other adequate and available remedies. (Basco y Salao v. Court of
Appeals and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 125290, prom. August 9, 2000)
b. Grounds for filing a petition for relief from denial of appeal:
When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party
thereto, by
1) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
2) has been prevented from taking an appeal,
he may file a petition in such court, and in the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course. (Sec. 2, Rule 38, ROC numbering and arrangement supplied)
c. Where petition is to be filed. The petition for relief must be filed in the same court
and in the same case irrespective of whether the court is an MTC, RTC, the CA or even the
Supreme Court in case of a petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceeding. (Secs. 1
and 2, Rule 38, ROC)
d. When petition filed. The petition for relief from judgment,order of proceeding must
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order
was entered, or such proceeding was taken. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, ROC)
e. Effects of granting the petition for relief from judgment, order or proceeding:
1) The court shall set aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding
complained of upon such terms as may be just.
2) Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other
proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken.
3) The court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it. (1st par., Sec. 6, Rule
38, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
f. Effects of granting petition for relief from denial of appeal:
Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give
due course to the appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and
proper appeal had been made. (Sec. 7, Rule 38, ROC)
APPEALS
92
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
***167. Distinguish the grounds from appeal from the grounds for certiorari.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If the error is in the wisdom of the trial court's findings and
not of jurisdiction, the proper remedy would be appeal and not certiorari. (Philippine National
Bank v. Hon. Sayo, et al., G.R. No.129918, prom. July 9, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. There may be certiorari even if appeal available. Availability of an appeal does not
foreclose recourse to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari or prohibition where appeal is not
adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Philippine National Bank v. Hon. Sayo, et
al., G.R. No. 129918, prom. July 9, 1998 citing various cases), and will not promptly relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where the appeal is ineffective.
(Africa v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 124478, prom. March 11, 1998)
However, aside from the bare, stereotype allegation in the pleading of "no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," there must be showing that
the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, or ineffective. (Africa, supra)
b. Final order defined. one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else t be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an interlocutory
order is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon.
An interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or
rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown by any time before final judgment. This prescinds
from a court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justice. It is immaterial that the judge who exercises such powers is different from the
one who issued the rescinded or amended order since the former is not legally prevented from
revoking the interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subsequently assigned to
him for judicial action. The only limitation is that the judge can not act with grave abuse of
discretion, or that no injustice results thereby. (Ley Construction and Development Corporation,
Sps. Manuel T. Ley and Janet T. Ley v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133801, prom.
June 27, 2000)
c. Order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order. An order dismissing a
case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is
timely filed. In we stated thus, The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however
mean that said dismissal or der was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all
details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not
merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint. (Banares II, et al.,
v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000 citing Olympia International v. Court
of Appeals)
d. When order becomes final and executory. The law grants an aggrieved party a
period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action
or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is
beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A
final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for
the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same.
(Banares II, et al., v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000 citing Olympia
International v. Court of Appeals)
e. Remedy when order already final and executory. After the order of dismissal of a
case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court’s power to
amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new
complaint.
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set
aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court’s docket. Even
assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or
“revived” by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another
93
complaint sccompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by
law.
Since theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after
fifteen (15) days therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remain within
the control of the court, the plaintiff may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive
his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the
fiftee-day reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or
“revived” is by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and
the payemnt of fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of the
dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control
over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.
(Banares II, et al. v. Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, prom. March 13, 2000 citing Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco)
***f. Appellate court has discretion to consider errors not assigned. Generally, an
appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned. However, this rule is not without
exceptions. In the following instances, the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court is
accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors and consider
errors not assigned:
1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter;
2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law;
3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the
trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned;
6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.
There is no reason why this rule should not apply to administrative bodies as well.
(Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 108950, prom.
March 7, 2000)
upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be
confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. Such is not the intendment
of the Rules. (Marina, supra)
3) Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the
pleader to merely delay the proceedings, and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to
present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts
should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro
forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant's valuable right to appeal. It would
be in the interest of justice to accord the appellate court the opportunity to review the
decision of the trial court on the merits rather than to abort the appeal by declaring the
motion pro forma, such that the period to appeal was not interrupted and had
consequently lapsed. (Marina, supra citing 1 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 380 (6th ed., 1997).
4) Under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 dated 27 February 1991 and Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated 16 May 1995, which took effect on 1 June 1995,
an aggrieved party is allowed one motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or
final order before he may file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. (Marina,
supra)
the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees
regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. In Gegare v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of petitioner to pay
the docket fees within the reglementary period despite a notice from the Court of Appeals
informing him that such fees had to be paid within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such notice.
(Barangay 24 of Legazpi City represented by Bgy, Chairman Ricardo Abunda v. Elias Imperial,
G.R. No. 140321, prom. August 24, 2000)
b. Litigants cannot raise issue for the first time on appeal, exception: Although
litigants cannor raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules
of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, the Supreme Court has relaxed observance of
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote substantive rights of litigants. Certain rules ought to be applied with severity and
rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case fro the operation of technicalities
should not be subject to cavil. (Sy v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127263, prom. April 12,
2000)
c. Material data rule. The rule to the effect that “the petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein,” should be taken to refer
more particularly to the date of receipt of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
from for the purpose of determining whether or not the appeal or petition was reasonably brought
up to the appellate body or tribunal. (Romero v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 139288,
prom., February 28, 2000)
d. Appeal in contempt does not require record on appeal. In the case of Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, multiple appeals are allowed “in special
proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in the special civil action of
eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage,” contempt proceedings is not one of those
instances where a record on appeal is required to perfect an appeal. (Cortes v. Judge Bangalan,
etc. A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129, prom. January 19, 2000)
e. Certified true copy of questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Under Rule
45, of the Rules of Court (governing Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court), only the
judgment or final order or resolution accompanying the petition must be a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy thereof certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo.
Even under Rule 65 governing certiorari and prohibition, petitions need be accompanied by
certified true copies of the questioned judgment, it being sufficient that copies of all other
relevant documents should accompany the petition. Numerous resolutions issued by this court
emphasize that in appeals by certiorari under Rules 45 and original civil actions for certiorari
under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the
copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. No plausible reason suggests itself
why a different treatment, i.e. a stricter requirement, should be given to petitions under Rule 43,
which governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals. None could have been intended by the framers of the Rules. A contrary ruling would
be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. It must be conceded that obtaining
certified true copies necessarily entails additional expenses that will make litigation more
onerous to the litigants. Moreover, certified true copies are not easily procurable and party
litigants must wait for a period of time before the certified true copies are released. At any rate,
the entire records of the case will eventually be elevated to the appellate court. (Cadayona v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 128772, prom. February 3, 2000)
f. After perfection of the appeal and the transmittal of the records, the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the case. Henceforth, it may no longer grant a motion for, or issue a writ
of immediate execution. To do so would be an abuse of discretion. (Sec. 2 and 3, Rule 39 cited
in Diesel Construction Co. Inc. v. Jollibee Foods Corp., G.R. No. 136805, prom. January 28,
2000)
Defendant countered with the allegation that reclassification of the land was not
approved by the proper authorities and that he was duly constituted as tenant thereof by the
previous owner.
The municipal trial court received evidence on the issue of right of possession and he
land's proper classification. Finding the land to be agricultural and the fact that tenancy was
in issue, the municipal trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court who heard the case and found that
the municipal trial court had jurisdiction because the land was duly reclassified from
agricultural to residential and that tenancy was not involved.
If you were the RTC judge how will you proceed ? Should you decide the issues on the
merits or should you remand the case to the municipal trial court for further proceedings ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The case should be decided on the merits and should not be
remanded to the municipal trial court. Where the parties have presented their respective
evidence before the MTC, a remand becomes a useless superfluity, an undue imposition on the
time and dockets of courts.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
A remand is necessary only when there has been no trial on the merits. A remand
would unnecessarily impose on the parties the concomitant difficulties and expenses of another
proceeding where they would have to present the same evidence again. This clearly runs
counter to Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, which mandates liberal construction of the
Rules to attain just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. (Spouses
Morales v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126196, prom. January 28, 1998)
171. How may decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction be appealed ?
S UGGESTED ANSWER: The decision of Regional Trial Courts on such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which Nay give it due course only
when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law
that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
(last sentence, Sec. 22, B.P. Blg. 129)
***172. What procedure should the RTC follow where it finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction in a case appealed to it from the said MTC ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. In case of affirmance of the decision or judgment appealed from and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has
jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it.
(2nd sentence, 1st par., Sec. 8, Rule 40, ROC words not in bold supplied)
b. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof but shall decide the case on the merits as of the case was originally filed with
it, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice. (2nd par., in relation to the 1st par., Sec. 8, Rule 40, ROC)
***173. Conchita sued Beltran et al., for unlawful detainer. The MTC rendered
judgment in her favor ordering Beltran et al., to vacate, pay reasonable rental and attorney’s
fees.
Beltran, et al., appealed to the RTC. The MTC judgment was executed pending appeal
because Beltran, et al. failed to file supersedeas bond. Beltran, et al., moved the RTC to admit
additional evidences consisting of a contract to sell between them and its Quezon City
government covering the lot in dispute, and some receipts of payment, which the RTC granted.
The RTC also conducted seven “clarificatory hearings” during which the parties presented
testimonial evidences, as well as conducted an ocular inspection of the disputed premises.
Thereafter, the RTC rendered judgment reversing the MTC decision, ruling that Conchita has
no interest to the disputed property. The RTC then dismissed her complaint. Conchita filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied the petition and restored
possession to Beltran, et al.
Was the RTC correct in reversing the MTC? What about the CA in restoring
possession to Beltran, et al.? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS: No, the RTC was in error. RTC in exercise of appellate
jurisdiction could not hear cases de novo. RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
cannot hear the case de novo in the guise of clarificatory hearings during which additional
evidence is to be presented by the parties and on ocular inspection conducted.
The Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents’ motion for execution pending
appeal. For, indeed, the case was not with said court on appeal but on a petition for certiorari.
Thus, the appellate court'’ jurisdiction was only to pass upon the validity of the orders of the RTC
in the conduct of clarificatory hearings and ocular inspection. Since the RTC has yet to act on
private respondent'’ motion for execution pending appeal, this matter should have been left for
resolution by the trial court, not by the Court of Appeals. (Abellera v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 127480, prom. February 28, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Although Regional Trial Courts should decide cases on
appeal on the basis solely of the record of the proceedings in Municipal Trial Courts and other
courts of equal rank, nonetheless, the principle of estoppel may bar a party from questioning the
reception of additional evidence, as in this case.
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, this court ruled: A party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean v. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R.
79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjustment, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated – obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court (Pease v. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. v. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659) And in Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.
98
Upon the principle stated in Sibonghanoy, we hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to
question at this stage the reception of additional evidence and ocular inspection of property after
she participated but eventually lost in what she now calls the irregular proceedings of the trial
court. (Abellera v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127480, prom. February 28, 2000)
Injunction should not issue to restrain the decision in unlawful detainer. In
Legaspi, the Supreme Court held: Where the action … is one of illegal detainer … and the right
of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding,
it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expense for the court in which the issue
of legal possession,, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition
for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. (Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
128102, prom., March 7, 2000)
***173-A. In Republic v. Garcellano, 103 Phil. 231, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the CFI of Zamboanga City expropriating 280,885 sq. m. of land that is now part
of the Zamboanga Intl. Airport. On February 17, 1996, acting on the basis of a reconstituted
title, the alleged heirs of Jun Ledesma, a defendant in expropriation case (Republic v.
Garcellano) forcibly entered the property and caused the building of a concrete wall
separating the property from the rest of the airport. Consequently, the government filed a
complaint for forcible entry, but the MTC dismissed the case. On appeal, RTC, Branch 17,
reversed the decision. Since the defendants did not appeal, the RTC decision became final. In
the meantime, the heirs-defendants filed a complaint for accion publiciana, alleged that the
government did not pay them just compensation, the property was not being used for the
purpose for which they were expropriated, they were in possession, titles to same were in their
names, no res judicata because there are other parties, etc. The case was raffled to RTC,
Branch 13. The government moved to dismiss the complaint. Instead of resolving that
motion, Branch 13 issued a TRO dated November 18, 1997 directing the MTC to cease and
desist from enforcing the forcible entry case decision. On December 16, 1997, the court
issued a writ of of preliminary injunction explaining that while the forcible entry case had
become final and executory, the claim of ownership of the land and actual occupation thereof
by the heirs (aside from the fact that they had not yet been compensated for the appropriated
land), demanded stay of execution.
Was RTC, Branch 13 correct in issuing the injunctive writ? If not, what should be the
remedy of the heirs-defendants?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Although the injunctive writs issued by RTC, Branc 13
were directed to the MTC, the same had the ultimate effect of preventing the execution of the
decision of the RTC, Branch 17, a court of equal rank and jurisdiction.
The remedy of the heirs-defendants should have been to oppose the issuance of a writ of
execution by the MTC on these grounds, instead of asking RTC, Branch 13 to issue a TRO or a
writ of preliminary injunction. (Actg. Solgen de la Cruz v. Judge Eisma, etc. A.M. No. RTJ-00-
1544, prom. March 15, 2000)
174. What is the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions of
Regional Trial Courts ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Court of Appeals shall exercise :
a. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and
b. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts. (Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129 paraphrasing supplied)
***176. How are appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Appeal in ordinary cases:
a) Filing of notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court that rendered
the judgment or order appealed from. (Sec. 2 [a], Rule 41, ROC)
b) Payment of the appellate docket fee and other lawful fees to the
Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 4, Rule 41, ROC)
c) Within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. (Sec. 3, Rule 41, ROC)
2) Appeals in special proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed:
a) Filing of a notice of appeal and record on appeal with the Regional
Trial Court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from. (Sec. 2 [a], Rule
42, ROC)
b) Payment of the appellate docket fee and other lawful fees. (Sec. 4,
Rule 41, ROC)
c) Within thirty (30) days after notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. (Sec. 3, Rule 41, ROC)
3) Appeals of judgments in exercise of appellate jurisdiction:
a) Filing of verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. (Sec.
1, Rule 42, ROC)
b) Payment of docket and other lawful fees and deposit of P500.00 for
costs. (Sec. 1, Rule 42, ROC)
100
177. How are appeals taken from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies like the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, national Electrification Administration, Entergy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, GSIS, Employees compensation commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission,
Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law to the Court of Appeals:
1) Appeal through verified petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals.
(Sec. 5, Rule 43, ROC)
2) Payment to clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other
lawful fees and P500.00 deposit for costs. (Sec. 5, Rule 43, ROC)
3) Within fifteen (15) days from notice of award, judgment, order or date of last
publication if required. (Sec. 4, Rule 43, ROC)
4) Additional time of fifteen (15) days only may be granted after motion for
extension, payment of docket and other lawful fees and deposit for costs and further
extension for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Sec. 4, Rule 43, ROC)
179. The general rule is that factual findings of the lower courts are final and
conclusive and not subject to review by the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. State the exceptions to this general rule:
101
EXECUTIONS, IN GENERAL
EXECUTIONS, IN GENERAL
180. In Civil Case No. D-8835, Pacita entered into a judicially approved compromise
agreement with the spouses Pinlac, whereby the spouses bound themselves to pay P160,000.00
in eighty (80) equal installments of P2,000.00 subject to the condition that failure to pay two
(2) installments would render the outstanding amount due and payable.
Subsequently, for failure of the Pinlac spouses to pay two installments as stipulated in
the compromise agreement, Pacita filed with the court a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution alleging that the spouses paid her only P2,500.00 and then failed to pay the
remaining amounts. She then demanded execution in the amount of P57,500.00 as unpaid
balance, which motion was granted. Subsequently, Pacita requested the Clerk of Court for the
amendment of the writ to execution to show the correct amount of P 157,500.00. The Clerk of
Court without prior order of from the court granted the request and issued an amended writ
increasing the amount fromP57,500.00 to P157,500.00.
Comment on the actuation of the Clerk of Court in issuing the amended writ.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: By amending the writ of execution the Clerk of Court clearly
usurped a judicial function.
No one but the court can amend what was granted, and its Clerk of Court has no other
duty but to issue the writ in accordance with the grant. It is settled principle that a writ of
execution should conform strictly with the very essential particulars of the promulgated
judgement (Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 250 SCRA 418) or, in the
present case, with the order granting execution of a judgment based on a compromise
agreement. Only the judge is vested with authority to amend such order. (Viray v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120760, prom. February 24, 1998)
There was no such amendment of the order in the case at bar which would provide a solid
basis for the alteration of the writ. (Viray, supra)
181. Does the court have authority to amend judgments which are not yet final ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. A court has the inherent power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice (Sec. 5 [g], Rule 135,
ROC), and when it finds that the ends of justice would be better served, the court may disregard
technicalities and amend its order or process that has not become final. Villanueva v. CFI of
Oriental Mindoro, 119 SCRA 288)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Instances where a court has authority to amend judgments that are already final:
Clerical errors or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be
corrected or supplied after the judgment has been entered. (Presbiterio v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 129 SCRA 450, 451)
Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion
of a decision the court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had
102
become final, and for this purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's
findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision. (Presbiterio v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 129 SCRA 450, 451)
b. Mode for elevating validity of execution of final and executory judgments: In
exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode
available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court.
That mode of elevation may either be by appeal, writ of error or certiorari, or by a special
civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. (Limpin, Jr., et al., v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 147 SCRA 522, 523)
***182. What is the remedy where an executed judgment was reversed but the funds
were already garnished ? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In case the executed judgment is reversed, the Supreme Court
instead of ordering the judgment creditor to return funds that have been improperly garnished
pursuant to an order of execution pending appeal, directed the judgment debtor to proceed
against the bond filed by the judgment creditor. (BF Corporation v. ESDA Shangri-La Hotel,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 132655, prom. August 11, 1998)
This is supported by Rule 39, Sec. 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that, where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of
damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
As garnishment is a specie of attachment, the procedure provided in Rule 57, Section 20
of the Rules of Court for the recovery of damages against a bond in case of irregular attachment
should be applied. This means that notice should be given to the surety and that there should be a
hearing before it is held liable on its bond. (BF Corporation, supra )
5) In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court in aid of its appellate jurisdiction against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court
that may be taken therefrom. (Sec. 21, Rule 70)
b. When interlocutory order may be enforced by execution: An order granting
support pendente lite, although interlocutory, may be enforced by execution. (Sec. 1, Rule 61,
ROC)
***184. Distinguish a final judgment from a judgment that has become final and
executory.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A "final judgment" becomes final upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected (Sec. 1, Rule 39, ROC), or
an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes
final and the records of the case are returned to the court of origin.
The "final judgment" is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in
respect to which, as the law explicitly provides, Execution shall issue as a matter of right (Sec.
1, Rule 39, ROC),. It bears stressing that only a final judgment or order, i.e. a judgment or
order that disposes of the action of proceeding can become final and executory. (Investments,
Inc. v, Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 341)
DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION
186. What should be done to stay the execution in unlawful detainer or forcible entry
cases during the pendency of an appeal before the Regional Trial Court ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: An appeal is perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed on favor
of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from. (Sec. 19, Rule 71, ROC)
b. He may cause examination of the debtor of the judgment-debtor as to any debt owed
by him to the judgment-debtor or as to any other property of the judgment-debtor in his
possession (Sec. 37, Ibid.);
c. If after examination the court finds that there is property of the judgment-debtor either
in his own hands or in that of any other person, the court may order the property applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment (Sec. 40, Ibid.);
d. If the court finds that the earnings of the judgment-debtor are more than sufficient for
his family's needs, it may order payment of the judgment in installments (Ibid.);
e. The court may appoint a receiver for property of the judgment-debtor not exempt from
execution, or forbid a transfer or other disposition of or interference with such property (Sec. 41,
Rule 39, ROC);
f. If the court finds that the judgment-debtor has an ascertainable interest in real property
either as mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise, and his interest can be ascertained without
controversy, the court may order the sale of such interest (Sec. 42, Ibid.(;
g. If the person alleged to have property of the judgment-debtor or to be indebted to him
claims an adverse interest in the property, or denies the debt, the court may authorize the
judgment-creditor to institute action to recover the property, forbid transfer of the property until
the action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment, and may punish disobedience of such
order as contempt (Sec. 43, Ibid.)
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
RECEIVERSHIP
REPLEVIN
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
***197. X sued Y for a sum of money. Y is leaving the Philippines with intent to
defraud creditors. Hence, X applied for and was granted ex-parte a writ of preliminary
attachment which was immediately implemented by the sheriff. Y now moves to discharge the
attachemtn because it was issued and implemented prior to service of summons. On the other
hand, X quotes Sec. 2, Rule 57, which provides that, “an order of attachment may be issued
either ex-parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is
pending xxx” He likewise adverts to Sec. 1 of the same Rule which provides that, “At the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper
party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment that may be recovered xxx” Finally, he contends that the subsequent service of
108
summons cured any infirmatiies that may have attended the issuance and implementation of
the writ.
Rule on the motion to discharge the attachment. Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The motion to discharge the attachment is granted. The
issuance of the writ of attachment prior to service of summons was valid, but the same must be
implemented together with or after service of the summons.
The subsequent service of summons does not cure the defect of failure to serve the
sumons at the time of the implementation of the writ.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action
or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered in the following cases:
a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money, other than moral
and exemplary, on a cause of action earising from law, contract, quas-contract, delict or
quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors;
b) COPY (Sec. 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court)
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
RECEIVERSHIP
REPLEVIN
It is sufficient to prove the plaintiff’s entitlement to the legal possession only and not
necessarily ownership. (National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
122195, prom. July 23, 1998)
To detain in replevin cases means, "To hold or keep in custody." There is tortious taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion
over it, without manual seizing of the property. (Paat v. Court of Appeals, et al., 266 SCRA 185)
***198. “A” owns an antique wood carving valued at P350,000.00 which he lent to
“B” for exhibition during the inauguration of the latter’s art gallery. After the inauguration,
“B” brought the painting to his house in Quezon City where he hung it in his sala. Despite
“A’s” numerous demands for the return of the painting “B” refused.
If you were “A’s” attorney, what legal steps would you take to protect the interest of
“A” and in what court should you bring the suit ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: I would bring a suit for the recoveru of the wood carving with
a prayer for an order for the delivery of the property to “A”. I would file the case before the RTC
since the action is one which not capacble of pecuniary estimation.
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Requirements to support an application for replevin. The applicant must show
by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
a) That the applicant is the owner of the property particularly describibg it,
or is entitled to the possession thereof;
b) That the property is wrongly detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief;
c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or
a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt
from such seizure or custody; and
d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double
the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of
109
the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to
the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. C
(Sec. 2, Rule 60, ROC)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
GENERAL CONCEPTS
TRUSTEES
HABEAS CORPUS
CHANGE OF NAME
ABSENTEES
INTERPLEADER
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
110
INTERPLEADER
CERTIORARI
***199. Distinguish certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 from certiorari
as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The following are the distinctions:
a. Certiorari as a special civil action is within the jurisdiction of the supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regioal Trial Courts WHILE certiorari as a mode of appeal is within
the jurisdiction only of the Supreme Court.
b. The grounds for certiorari under Rule 65 are lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion WHILE the grounds for certiorari under Rule 45 are errors of law.
c. Under Rule 65 the public respondents should be hjoined WHILE under Rule 45, they
need not be joined.
PROHIBITION
MANDAMUS
QUO WARRANTO
EXPROPRIATION
PARTITION
***201. In case of several demands in a suit for unlawful detainer when should the
jurisdictional date of one year be counted ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: From the last demand. (Labastida v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 110174, prom. March 20, 1998)
205. What are the requisites to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an
unlawful detainer case ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The defendant perfects his appeal;
b. He files a supersedeas bond;
c. He periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the
appeal. (Sec. 8, Rule 70
CONTEMPT
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure)
GENERAL CONCEPTS
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
a. When conducted
Penalty prescribed is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day without regard to fine
TRIAL
a. Order of trial
b. Consolidation
c. Discharge of accused for use as state witness
d. Exclusion of public
e. Actg. public prosecutor
AFTER TRIAL
a. Motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence
b. Judgment
c. Motion for new trial
d. Motion for reconsideration
APPEAL
PROBATION
113
SERVICE OF SENTENCE
WHO ARE THE PARTIES ? Who is the accused and who is the private offended
party, if any ? These questions must be resolved in order to know whom to call during the
preliminary investigation.
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, siad routine chekcs cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. (Ibid.)
c. Plain view doctrine. Objectss falling within the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant
and may be introduced in evidence. The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur:
1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an instrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
3) it is immediiaely appratent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contrabannd or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcemenrt officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 710-711
cited in People v. Elamparo, G.R. No. 121572, prom. March 31, 2000)
d. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commissionof the offense.
The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the permissible area or
surroundings within his immediate control.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search
under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and
place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the
person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from hom are limited to “dangerous
weapons” or “anything which may be used as proof off the commission of the offense.” With
respect to time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful
arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid the search must be conducted at about the time of the arrest
or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. (People v. Ting, etc., G.r. Nos. 130568-69, prom.
March 21, 2000)
e. Authority to issue search warrant inherent in all courts. A search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal
action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search
warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.
(Savage, etc. v. Taypin, et al., G.R. No. 134217 prom. May 11, 2000)
The Rules of Court as amended requires the certification of no forum shopping only from
initiatory pleadings, omitting any mention of “applications.” The old Supreme Court Circular
04-94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification even from “applications.” The
absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.
(Ibid.)
*** 2. What are the requisites to be complied with before a warrantless search be
considered as valid because consent was given ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that:
a. The right exists;
b. The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and
c. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (People v. Figueroa, et
al., G.R. No. 124056, prom. July 6, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: There was valid consented search where the accused
accmpanied police officers to his house in order to surrender his share of the ransom money. He
even brought them to his room upstairs. The consent of the owner of the house to the search
effectively removed any badge of illegality, (People v. Deang, et al, G.R. No. 128045, prom.
August 24, 2000)
115
3. A police patrol team, responding to a bomb threat received earlier, accosted a group
persons standing on a corner street. They were allegedly acting suspiciously with "their eyes
moving fast." As they were approached the group fled and were chased by the police.
Malacat was among these persons who was chased and when caught, was searched. During
the search the police reportedly found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside his front waist
line. Is the seizure an incident to a lawful arrest ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. There is a difference between the concepts of "stop and
frisk" search and of search incidental to a lawful arrest where a precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search. Here there could be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto nor a "hot pursuit" arrest preceding the search because of the lack of personal knowledge
on the part of the arresting office or an overt physical act on the part of the accused, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed, or was going to be committed.
(Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, prom. December 12, 1997)
*** 4. While Andan was in custody, he was visited by the mayor and in the presence of the
media confessed to having raped and killed the victim. Is the confession to the mayor and the
media admissible in evidence ? Reason out your answer briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. The confession to the mayor is not one made under
custodial investigation but a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The prohibition against self-incrimination are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
The media confessions were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview made by the reporters, neither were they
acting under the direction and control of the police.
Finally, the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It lays down limitations on governmental power to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of the government
and its agencies. (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, prom. March 3, 1997; People v. Ordono, et
al., G.R. No. 132154, prom. June 29, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being
purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The right proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to estort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as gthe accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People v. Gallarde, G.R.
No. 133025, prom. February 17, 2000)
b. Requirement for waiver of right to remain silent and to counsel. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannort afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Authoritative interpretations of the Miranda rule as embodied in the above Art. III, Sec.
12 (1) require, however, that the crucial question is whether the accused has effectively waived
the effectuation of these rights. Accused should be asked whether he was willing to testify even
without the assistance of counsel. If he was willing to testify only with the assistance of counsel,
he should be asked if he has one. If he said he wanted to have counsel but could not afford one,
he should be asked if he wanted one appointed for him. If these questions are not asked there is
no effective waiver of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. (People v. Naag, et al., G.R. No.
123860, prom. January 20, 2000)
b. Rationale behind Miranda warning. An uncounseled statement is preseumed to be
psycholigically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar enviroment and surrounded by intimidating
figures typical of the atmosphere of polic interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand
of counsel. (People v. Obrero, G.R. No. 122142, prom. May 17, 2000)
116
investigation and he must be accorded his Miranda rights. (People v. Gamer, G.R. No. 115984,
prom. February 29, 2000)
i. Purpose of right to counsel during custodial investigation. The protection covers
the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the offense although not yet in custody.
The exclusionary rule is premised on the pesumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
ootentiality for compulsion, physical or psycholigical is forcefully apparent.
However, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confession guilt if he
voluntarily ad intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is
coerced to admit although untrue. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused
from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution
to preclude the slughest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
(People v. Base, G.r. No. 109773, prom. March 30, 2000)
5. Gallarde was charged with the special compolex crime of rape with homicide
without any qualifying circumstance. During the arraignment he pleaded not guilty. After
trial he was convicted of the crime of murder only, not of the cokplex crime of rape with
homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. Was Gallarde properly
convicted ? REason out your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Although the term “homicide” as used in special complex
crom of rap[e with homicide is to be unbderstood in its generric sense, and includes murder and
slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, it is settled itat where a
cpmplex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
cirumstance must be sufficiently alleged and provided, Otherwise it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nautre of the offense with which he is chaged.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher thatn that which he is charged in the
complaint or information for which he is tried, or necessarily incluyded in that which is charged.
He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. to convict an accused of a higher ofofense than that charged in the complaint or
information under which he is ctried would be an unbauthorized denial of that right. (People v.
Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, prom. February 17, 2000)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
i. Presence of accused not a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary
investigation. The presence of the accused is not required for as long as efforts to reach him
were made, and an opoortunity to controvert the evidence for the complainant is accorded him.
The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thrwart the
prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics. (People v. Arlee,
etc., G.R. No. 113518, prom. January 25, 2000)
j. For election cases it is the COMELEC that conducts the preliminary
investigation. ‘If the complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with the
Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation.
Upon direction of the Chirman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be
delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the Regional Election Directors or
Provincial Election supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commssion.” (Sec. 5, Rule 34, COMELEC
Rules of Procedure)
5. On September 15, 1997, members of the PNP went to Quezon City to arrest
Larranaga, albeit without warrant for kidnapping with serious illegal detention. The charges
stemmed from an alleged kidnapping that was committed on July 16, 1997. Larranaga
resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and brother-in-law, who in turn sought
the aid of Atty. Arnovit. Over the phone, Atty. Arnovit was able to dissuade the police officers
from carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed to meet them at the PNP headquarters
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Larranaga, together with his sister and brother-in-law also
went to Camp Crame aboard their own vehicle. After some discussion, Larranaga was allowed
to go home on Atty. Arnovit's undertaking in writing that he and Laranaga would appear
before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 27, 1997 for preliminary investigation.
The prosecutors now contend that Larranaga is entitled only to an inquest
investigation under Section 7 of Rule 112 since he was lawfully arrested without a warrant
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The prosecutors likewise argue that
Larranaga was actually committing a crime at the time of his arrest since kidnapping with
serious illegal detention is a continuing crime.
Is Larranaga entitled to regular preliminary investigation ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. Inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court applies only to persons lawfully arrested without a warrant.
The facts show that Larranaga was not arrested as there was no restraint upon his person,
neither was deprived of his own will and liberty.
Granting that Larranaga was arrested such arrest would be illegal because of the absence
of a warrant. It does not appear that Larranaga has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15,
1997.
The case of Parulan v. Director of Prisons, 22 SCRA 638 which considered kidnapping
with illegal detention as a continuing crime does not find application. In Parulan, the deprivation
of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another. There is no showing in the facts
that the victim Jacqueline was being detained by Larranaga who was then residing in Quezon
City. (The minor Larranaga, etc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130644, prom. March 13,
1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Entitlement to inquest: Before the complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court on Preliminary Investigation, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. (2nd par., Sec. 7, Rule 112, ROC
words not in bold supplied)
b. Entitlement to regular preliminary investigation: Person not lawfully arrested
should be subject to the regular preliminary investigation. Thus, a person who has been arrested
without a warrant for a crime allegedly committed some two months before was not lawfully
arrested hence entitled to the regular preliminary investigation. REASON: Preliminary
investigation is not inquisitorial but quasi-judicial. Fairness dictates that the right should be
considered not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive right. (The minor Larranaga, et
al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130644, prom. March 13, 1998) Note the case of Raro v,
120
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 108431, prom. July 14, 2000 citing Cruz, Jr. v. People which
considered a preliminary investigation as merely inquisitorial. For Bar purposes, the author
suggests that the Larranaga doctrine is the better view because it adheres more to the libertarian
interpretation of criminal law and procedure.
10. "T" filed a complaint for libel against "L" which ripened into an information
filed by the prosecutor's office with the Regional Trial Court. "L" filed a petition for review
of the prosecutor's resolution with the Department of Justice, which gave due course to the
petition and directed the prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to
elevate the entire records of the case.
The court approved the motion and deferred the petitioner's arraignment until the
final termination of the petition for review.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor's findings, as a consequence of which
the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw information. The trial court denied the motion
using as authority Crespo v. Mogul. If you were to review the order of the trial court, how
would you decide ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: I would reverse the order of the trial court. Sole and bare
reliance on Crespo is not sufficient basis for the denial. The trial court should have conducted an
independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss because
grant or denial of the motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its
dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are required
to make their own assessment of whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting or denying the appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution's or
the secretary's evaluation that such evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the
accused for trial exists. They should embody such assessment in their written order disposing of
the motion. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, prom. September 5, 1997)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CRESPO v. MOGUL, 151 SCRA 462;
MARCELO v. COURT OF APPEALS, 235 SCRA 39; MARTINEZ v. COURT OF
APPEALS, 237 SCRA 575; ROBERTS, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 254 SCRA 307.
In Crespo the Secretary was advised to restrict such review to exceptionally meritorious
cases. Rule 112, Section 4, of the Rules of Court which recognizes such power, does not,
however, allow the trial court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Marcelo ruled that prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance
the proceedings and wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the
Secretary of Justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the
information. However, after the SOJ has the resolved the matter, the trial court should make its
own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the
secretary. (reiterated in Dimatulac v. Villon and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., et al., v. How,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 140863, prom. August 22, 2000)
In Martinez the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice was overruled because such grant was
based upon considerations other than the judge's own assessment of the matter. Relying solely
on the conclusion of the prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the
accused to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his function
of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
In Roberts the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of the
prosecutors upon petition by a proper party even while the criminal case is already pending with
the courts was sustained.
SUMMARY: While the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review and could
direct the exclusion of an accused from the information, such is not binding upon the court since
the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and
123
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. (Solar entertainment, Inc., et al., v. How, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 140863, prom. August 22, 2000) The final ruling on the exclusion of the accused rests
upon the trial court who has already obtained jurisdiction over the case.
b. Appellate authority of Secretary of Justice over preliminary investigations. The
Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or decisions of provincial or city
prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings as
he may deem fit. This same power is granted under Section 1 (d) of P.D. No. 911. (Jalandoni v.
Secretary of Justice, etc., et al., G.R. No. 115239-40, prom. March 2, 2000)
If upon petition by a proper party undr such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (last par., Sec. 4,
Rule 112, ROC)
*** 12. On October 21, 1985, Isagani contracted a first marriage with Dulce. Without
hsaid marriage having been annulled or terminated, Isagani contracted a second marriage
with Imeldla on January 25, 1996 and a subsequent third marriage with Julia. Upon
complaint of Dulce, Isagani was charged with bigamy. Isagani then initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage to Dulce on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pendency of the civil suit for nullity as a
prejudicial question. Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion denied. Assuming that the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by Isagani, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves it nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
124
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, prom. July 31, 2000 citing
Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731, 735)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Article 40 of the Family Code requires prior declaration of nullity of first
marriage before contracting second marriage. Not every defense raised in the civil action may
be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The burden of
proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted
rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case.
(Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, prom. July 31, 2000 citing Landicho v. Relova, 22
SCRA 731, 735)
b. Action for nullity of marriage not prejudicial question to concubinage. For a civil
case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal proseuction would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would be necessarily be determined. (Beltran v. People, et al., G.R. No. 137567, prom.
June 20, 2000)
13. Luna filed a criminal comlaint against Co for estafa and perjury. It appears that
Producers Bank authorized Co to purchase a proprietary share of Manila Polo Club to be
placed in his name being the Director of the Bank and to be held by him on behalf of the
corporation. After separation as Bank Director, Co, despite demand, refused to surrender to
the Bank the Manila Polo Club certificate. Instead, he executed a false affidavit of loss and
was able to secure a replacement certificate, despite the existence of the original certificate in
the Bank’s possession.
During the pendency of the criminal action, Co filed a civil action for damages against
Luna and claimed ownership over the questioned certificate. Co now moves for a suspension
of the criminal proceedings claiming that the civil action he filed raises a prejudicial question.
Is the motion meritorious ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The motion is bereft of merit. The trial court hearing the
criminal case can resolve the question of ownership. The civil action for recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. hence, Co may invoke all
defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. He is not prohibited from airing
exhaustively the question of ownership. After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the said
defense. (First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co., G.R. No. 139655, prom. July 27, 2000)
14. On 04 February 1992, Ching was charged before the Regional Trial Court-Makati
with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1 (b) of the R.P.C., in relation to
P.D. No. 115, the “Trust Receipts Law.” On 05 Maerch 1992, Ching, together with Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., filed a case before another branch of the RTC-Manila, for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. On 07 August 1992, Ching filed a
petition before the RTC-Makati, for the supsension of the criminal proceedings on the ground
of prejudicial question in a civil action. Rule on the petition.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for
declalration of nullity of documents and for damages does not juris et de jure dtermine the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court
hearing the civil asp[ect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the
parties was not a rtrust receipt agreement, noetheless the guilt of the accused could still be
established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it
differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto
follow that such declaration of nulllity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and
liability. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.r. N0. 110844, prom. Aoril 27, 2000)
KATARUNGGANG PAMBARANGAY
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes except:
a. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or fine exceeding Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
b. Offenses where there is no private offended party. (\sec. 408 [c] and [d], R.A. No.
7160)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Cases where the parties may go directly to court:
a. Where the accused is under detention;
b. Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. (Sec. 412 [b]
{1} and {4}, R.A. No. 7160)
SELECTION OF COURT
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
16. What law determines the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case. Is there any
exception to this rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires
jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final
determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another tribunal.
A recognized exception to this rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it isintended to operate upon actions pending before its enactment. However,
where such retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court
cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment. (Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,
etc., G.R. No. 136806, prom. August 22, 2000)
17. What is the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other inposable
accessory penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses; or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (Sec. 32, B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. MTCs do not have jurisdiction where the law specifically vests the jurisdiction in
other courts. By virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Sec. 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129 as amended by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7691, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the three
lower trial courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.
Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years (i.e.prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction
thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the exceptions provided for in the opening sentence of Sec. 32 are cases under (1)
Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and (3) the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. (Commission on Elections v. Hon. Noynay, et al.,
G.R. No. 132365, prom. July 9, 1998) Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception. (Ibid; Juan, et al., v. People, G.r.
No. 132378, prom. January 18, 2000)
126
VENUE
***20. Where should criminal cases be filed ? What is the venue of criminal cases ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried
a. in the court of the municipality or territory
b. where the offense was committed or
c. where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [Sec. 15 (a), Rule 110, ROC
arrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. Exceptions or instances where a case may be instituted at a place other than
where the offense was committed:
1) Continuing offenses at any place where the essential elements of the crime was
committed;
2) Libel where generally the venue is the place of publication or where any of the
offended parties actually reside at the time of the commission of the offense;
3) Where a change of venue was ordered by the Supreme Court;
4) Cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan where cases are always filed where
the Sandiganbayan is located;
5) Extraterritorial crimes or crimes committed outside of the Philippines.
Specific venue for criminal actions:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients took place;
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft, or other vehicle passed
during its trip, including the place of departure and arrival.
(c) When an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or
of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of
the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first
filed. (Sec. 15, Rule 110, ROC)
128
PLEADINGS
It is thus imperative that the information filed with the trial court be complete – to the end
that the accused may suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully
state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the
essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation aainst the accused.
(People v. Bayya, G.R. No. 127845, prom. March 10, 2000 citing Pecho v. People)
b. Sufficiency of allegations in complaint. The allegations in the complaint that the
accused had carnal knowledge with the offended woman “against her will” or “without her
consent” is insufficient to warrant conviction for rape, although the evidence proves the
commission of the crime. (People v. Mendez, G.R. No. 132546, prom. July 5, 2000 citing
People v. Oso)
c. In case of variance between the victim’s complaint and the information in crimes
against chastity, the complaint controls. The faiure of the information to state that the rape was
committed “through force or intimidation” is not a fatal omission where the compalint alleged
the ultimate fact that the accused raped the victim “by means of force.” So, at the outset, the
accused could have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through
force. . (People v. Mendez, G.R. No. 132546, prom. July 5, 2000 citing People v. Oso)
d. Special qualifying circumstances in rape must be alleged in the information
otherwise the death penalty may not be imposed. The seven additional attendant
circumstances intorduced by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 7659, (such as victim’s minority and her
filial relationship with the accused, among others) should be considered as special qualifying
circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape considering that they have changed the
natiure of simple rape by increasing the penalty one degree higher through the imposition of the
death penalty. These attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying
circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating
circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher
degree. These circumstances must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
information, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him
and, subsequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of
its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the
offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned. (People v. Villar, G.R. No. 127572, prom. January 19, 2000 citing People v. Dela
Custa, G.R. No. 126134, prom. March 2, 1999; People v. Bayona, G.R. Nos. 133343-44, prom.
March 2, 2000; People v. Ferolino, etc., G.R. Nos. 131730-31, prom. April 5, 2000; People v.
Traya, G.R. No. 129052, G.R. No. 129052, prom. May 31, 2000; People v. Baybado, G.R. No.
132136, prom. July 14, 2000 citing People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463; People v. Ramos, 296
SCRA 559)
e. Penalty for one crime only if information alleges only one such crime even if
prosecution proves two crimes. The accused could only be convicted of a crime committed as
shown in the information and not as proven by the prosecution. An accused cannot be convicted
of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he
has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him
of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this
constiturtional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven,
unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. (People v.
Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, prom. March 15, 2000)
e. Error in caption not controlling. Error in the caption is not fatal. What is
controlling are the actual recital of facts in the body of the information and not the caption or
preamble of the crime. (People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 1144261, prom. February 10, 2000)
27. Is it necessary to state the date and time of commission of the felony in the
complaint or information ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was commmitted except when it is a mterial ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. (Sec. 11, Rule 110, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Allegation of exact time and date of commission of rape not important. This is
because the precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it
has no substantial bearing on its commission. It is equally settled that a variance of fedw months
between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during the trial
has neen held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction volely on
that score. (People v. Alvero, etc., G.R. Nos. 134536-38, prom. April 5, 2000)
27. Tan, Jr., Urbi, Maza, Avendano and dela Cruz were charged with having violated
the Anti-Graft Law through conspiracy. Upon reinvestigation, all the accused were dropped
from the information except Tan, Jr
He now moves to quash the information arguing that there being no conspiracy as a
result of the discharge of his co-accused, the charge against him of "conspiring and
confederating" with others in committing the crime has no more basis. he further contends
that there can be no conspiracy if only one person remains charged under the same
information.
Rule on the motion.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion denied. Conspiracy is not an element of the crime.
The subsequent dismissal of the charges against Tan, Jr.'s co-accused premised on the non-
existence of conspiracy did not render the information defective. The allegation of conspiracy in
the information becomes a mere surplussage as a consequence of the outcome of the
reinvestigation.
In any case, an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged
except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the
information. (Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128764, prom. July 10, 1998)
***28. A passenger bus owned by San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (SILI) driven by Eduardo
collided with the Toyota Lite Ace Van driven by Annie, totally wrecking the van and injuring
Annie and her two passengers in the process.
A criminal case was filed with the Pasig RTC charging Eduardo with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
Four months later, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of
the van and subrogee filed a civil case for damages against SILI before the Manila RTC.
After joinder of issues, SILI filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil
Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against Eduardo in the Pasig
RTC and the failure of PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said
criminal action. Decide the motion ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Motion granted. Reservation is required in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse and prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. (San Ildefonso Lines, Inc.,et al., v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119771, prom. April 24, 1998)
Clearly PISC as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code is not exempt from the
reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the
same act or omission of Eduardo complained of in the criminal case. PISC merely stepped into
the shoes of Annie (as owner of the van), hence it is bound to observe the procedural
requirements which Annie ought to follow has she herself instituted the suit. (Ibid.)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: General rule: Prior reservation required for independent
civil actgions: There is no dispute that the so-called "independent civil actions" based in Articles
132
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines are the exceptions to the primacy of the
criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court.
This is deducible from the phrase in Section 3, "which has been reserved" that the
"independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement.
In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these
independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart
from or simultaneous with the criminal action. If no reservation is made then the civil actions
are impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the former are waived or filed ahead of
the criminal action. (San Ildefonso Lines, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
119771, prom. April 24, 1998)
29. Is civil liability based on quasi-delict extinguished with the acquittal of the accused
?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually also charged criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111, Sec. 2 (b), of the
Rules of Court refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has never been committed by the accused. (Heirs of Guaring, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108395, prom. March 7, 1997)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: General Rule: The death of the accused prior to conviction
extinguishes his civil liabiity arising from delict. Exception: Civil liability arising from quasi-
delict is not extinguished.
Thus, even if the separate civil action under Article 33, of the Civil Code had not been
expressly reserved it may still be enforced separately. REASON: The civil action was
terminated without final adjudication as a result of the death of the accused. (Villegas v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 82562 & G.R. No. 82592, prom. April 11, 1997)
32. Where an employer is found to be subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, what should be determined at a hearing prior to execution ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose:
a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship;
b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have comitted
theoffense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offensed he commits “while” in the
discharge of such duties; and
d) that said employee is insolvent. (Basilio v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113433,
prom. March 17, 2000)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Vicarious civil liability of employer for fault or negligence of employee. Under the
law, the vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law:
1) Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow
an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the
employer for tan act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
prepondrance of evidence to prevail. Here the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in
the selection of supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against
the emploer in such an action does not require the employee to be insolvent since the
nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee (the two being statutorily
considered joint tortfeasors), is solidary.
2) Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the subsidiary
liability of the employer for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his
duty. This liability attached when the employee is convicted of a crime doen in the
performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly
respond to the civil liability adjuged. (Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, et
al., G.R. No. 129029, prom. April 3, 2000)
b. Instances when existence of employer-employee relationship between accused
driver and alleged vehicle owner is determined.
1) During the criminal proceeding, and
2) During the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances,
the alleged vehicle owner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the
essence of due process. (Basilio v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113433, prom.
March 17, 2000)
33. On October 10, 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor filed with the RTC and amended
information charging a driver with reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and
damage to property.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plead of not guilty. The private offended
parties made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the
offense charged. On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the RTC a
complaint against the employer of the accused based on quasi-delict. The private offended
parties opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto
they filed against the employer. On December 15, 1989, the private offendned parties
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that
they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal case. However, they did not
withdraw the separate civil action based on equasi delicto against the employer arising from
the same act or omission of the accused driver.
ARREST
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (1) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Disposition of person arrested without warrant:. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation,
the complaint or iformation may be filed by a prosoecutor without need of such
investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In
the absence or unavailiability of an unquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit
of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary invesrtigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the compalint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask
for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence as provided in his
defense as provided in this Rule. (Sec. 7, Rule 112, ROC)
b. Kinds of warrantless arrest:
1) Arrest "in flagrante delito" under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113, ROC;
2) Arrest in "hot pursuit" under Sec. 5 (b), and (c), Rule 113, ROC.
c. Instance where there is no valid in flagrante delito or hot pursuit arrest: Where
there is lack of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act on
the part of the accused, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, prom. December
12, 1997)
For warrantless arrest to be valid there must be compliance with the element of
immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense and the time of the arrest.
Warrantless arrests made within shorter periods like ten (10) days from commission considered
as illegal. (People v. Salvariera, G.R. No. 104663, prom. July 24, 1997)
BAI L
39. When may the Court of Appeals deny bail on a case elevated for review ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: A person who appealed his conviction of homicide on a
murder charge to the Court of Appeals, may be denied bail by the Court of Appeals because he
could be convicted of a capital offense. (Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: General rule: No bail shall be allowed after a
judgment of conviction has become final. (1st sentence, Sec. 24, Rule 114, ROC) Exception
when bail may be granted even after final judgment: If after such finality, the accused
applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail
was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall
bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (Sec. 24, Rule 114,
ROC)
40. Accused Roger filed a petition for bail. The hearing of the petition was set for
May 31, 1998, but was not heard because the Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8,
1998, but on said date, the Judge reset it to June 22, 1998. The hearing did not materialize,
and a reset was made to July 17, 1998.
137
In the meantime, a June 29, 1998 Order was issued granting bail based on a marginal
note dated June 22, 1998, at the bottom of the bail petition which stated: "No
objection:P80,000.00," signed and approved by the public prosecutor and the Judge.
The Judge averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail,
he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. Did the Judge act properly ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. It is mandatory for a judge to require a hearing in a
petition for bail even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is a
matter of judicial discretion and not reposed upon the prosecutor. It is thus, mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, as well as the adequacy of the amount of bail. (Basco v. Judge
Rapatalo, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, prom. March 5, 1997)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Duties of the trial judge where an application for bail is
filed:
a. give reasonable notice to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (Sec. 18, Rule 114, ROC paraphrasing supplied)
b. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Secs. 7 and 8, supra)
c. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution.
d. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Sec. 19, supra) (Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, prom. March
5, 1997)
MOTION TO QUASH
***42. The general rule is that failure to move to quash or to allege any ground in a
motion to quash is considered as a waiver of the ground not alleged. (Sec. 9, Rule 117, ROC)
Are there exceptions to this general rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the exceptions are the following:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
138
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. (Sec. 9, Rule 118, ROC)
43. May a denial of a motion to quash be the subject of a special civil action of
certiorari ? If not may it be appealed ? If it could neither be the subject of a certirorari nor
appeal, what then is the remedy available to the movant ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Certiorari is not the remedy where a motion to dismiss
(quash) an information is denied. (Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 128764, prom. July 10, 1998)
REASON: An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. (Tan, Jr., supra)
However, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of if the denial of the
motion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. . (Tan, Jr.supra)
An order denying a motion to quash may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law
by appeal from the judgment after trial.
The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial, and if
the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. (Tan, Jr., supra)
***45. When are the instances where the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charge;
139
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered onlu
after a plead was entered in the former complaint or informationl or
(c) the plead of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except when more than one offense is charged unless a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law, as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule
116. (last par., Sec. 7, rule 117, words not in bold supplied)
47. What is the rule for arraignment under Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The arraignment of the accused shall be held within thirty
(30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before he
justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. (1st par., R.A.
No. 8493)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the
accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within
thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interpose a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may
140
modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove s uch defense by clear and convincing
evidence. (last sentence of the 1st par., and the 2nd par., Sec. 7, R.A. No. 8493)
PRE-TRIAL
TRIAL
49. Give some examples of violation of the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. It is incumbent upon the prosecution during the trial, to prove that prior to questioning,
the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of
regularity of official acts does not apply during in-custody investigation. (People v. Camat, et
al., G.R. No. 1122262, prom. April 2, 1996)
b. The signatures of the accused on the boxes and on the plastic bags are tantamount to
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights and are,
therefore inadmissible as evidence.
The fact that all of the accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the
"exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantee embodied in the Bill of Rights are given
and extends to all persons, both aliens and citizens. (People v. Wong Chuen Ming, et al., G.r.
Nos. 112801-11, prom. April 12, 1996)
50. What is the right to speedy trial guaranteed under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If the accused is not brought to trial within the time lmit
required by Section 1 (g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the
information may be dismissed on mnotion of the accused on the ground of denial of his
right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the
prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the
exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be siject to the rules on
double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of
the right to dismiss under this section. (Sec. 9, Rule 119, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Period for arraignment under Sec. 1 (g), Rule 116. Unless a shorter period is
provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within
thirty (30) days from the day the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The time of the pendency of a motion ot quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes
justifying the suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
141
b. Commencement of trial under Section 1, Rule 119. After a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall
commence within thrity (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
c. Extended time under Sec. 6, Rule 119. The time limit from arraignment to trial is as
follows:
First twelve-calendar month period after September 15, 1998 or until September
16, 1999 = 180 days;
Second twelve-calendar month period after September 15, 1998 or until
September 16, 2000 = 120 days; and
Third twelve-calendar month period after September 15, 1998 or starting
September 16, 2000 = 80 days. (Sec. 6, Rule 119, ROC)
d. Time limit for trial: In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except
those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the
public prosecutor and the co unsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly
or other short-term trial calendar at the earlies possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. (Sec. 6,
R.A. No. 8493)
In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from
the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (last sentence,
2nd par., Sec. 2, Rule 119, ROC)
51. Give some examples where the right to counsel was violated.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion, or
even it had been voluntarily given. (People v. Camat, et al,. G.R. No. 112262, prom. April 2,
1996) This refers to custodial investigation only.
b. Accused who was a foreign national was effectively denied his right to counsel, as he
was provided with one he could not understand and communicate with concerning his defense.
He was likewise denied his right to compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witness
and the production of evidence on his own behalf, including the services of a qualified and
competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony. (People v. Cuison, et al., G.R. No.
109287, prom. April 18, 1996)
52. Lanie was charged by Elenita, Imelda and Rosamar with large scale illegal
recruitment in the Regional Trial Court. Only Elenita testified in court as Imelda and
Rosamar were then abroad. In lieu of the testimonies of the absent complainants the
prosecution presented as witnesses, Imelda's mother, Lilia and Rosamar's sister, Victoria.
Lanie was convicted by the RTC of large scale illegal recruitment by adopting a
previous decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court where Lanie was convicted of estafa
involving the same circumstances upon complaint of Imelda and Rosamar.
Was the conviction proper ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Lanie was deprived of her constitutional right to confront
witnesses against her.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an
accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is
guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the
commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay.
Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to
its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings
of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision without the
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is
based. (People v. Ortiz-Miyake, G.R. No. 115338-39, prom. September 16, 1997)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Purpose of the right to confront witnesses:
a. To secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and
b. To allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (People v. Ortiz-Miyake, G.R. No. 115338-39, prom. September 16, 1997)
142
CONSOLIDATION
*** 54. What are the requisites for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court
may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statements of each proposed state witness at a hearing insupport of the discharge,
the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be sibstantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time ben convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. (1st par., Sec. 9, Rule 119, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Treatment of evidence adduced in support of discharge. Evidence adduced in
support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. (1st sentence, 2nd par.,
Sec. 17, Rule 119, ROC)
b. Effect of court denial of motion for discharge. If the court denies the motion for
discharge of the accused as state witness, his sowrn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (2nd sentence, 2nd par., Sec. 17, Rule 119, ROC)
*** c. Effect of order discharging an accused to be a state witness. The order discharging
an accused to a state witness
1) shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and
2) shall be a bar to future prosection for the same offense,
3) unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in
accordoance with is sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. (Sec.
18, Rule 119, ROC numbering and arrangement supplied)
EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.,(2nd par., Sec. 23, Rule 119, ROC)
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be revieable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (last par.,
Sec. 23, Rule 119, ROC)
*** b. Instance where the rules on waiver of right to present evidence suspended : The
accused were convicted of murder without presenting evidence because their lawyer filed leave
to file a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence, but at the same time expressly waiving
the right to present evidence. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case
to the lower court for its proper disposition.
The Court ruled that the court should have been put on guard that the counsel may not
entirely comprehend the consequences of the waiver and should have exercised prudence by
warning him about the prejudicial effects of the waiver. There is thus, doubt as to the
voluntariness of the waiver and full comprehension of the effects of the waiver. (People v. Flores,
et al., G.R. No. 106581, prom. March 3, 1997)
JUDGMENT
56. May an accused be convicted upon a duplicitous information (one which chargeds
more than one crime) ? Explain briefly,
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
b. but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
c. the accused may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and
law in each offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 120, ROC numbering and arrangement supplied)
57. How should a court render judgment in a criminal case where there is a variance
between the allegations in the complaint or information and the evidence ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Where there is a a variance between the offense charged
and that proved, and
a. the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
b. the accused shall be convicted of
1) the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
2) the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. (Sec. 4, rule
120, ROC numbering and arrangement supplied)
59. May a court reopen a judgment of conviction ? If not why not ? If so, how may
the judgment be reopened ? Explain your answers briefly,
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, a court may reopen a judgment of conviction.
a. At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction,
b. the judge may, motu proprio, or upon motion,
c. with hearing in either case,
d. reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceeding shall be
terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it. (Sec. 24, Rule 119, ROC
numbering and arrangement supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Do not confuse reopening of a judgment of conviction
with modification of a judgment of conviction. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. (1st sentence, Sec. 7, Rule 120, ROC)
144
60. May the convicted accused file a motion for new trial ? If so upon what grounds ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. At any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused, or on its own instance, but with the
consent of the accusd, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (Sec. 1, Rule 121, ROC)
The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been comitted during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment. (Sec. 2, Rule 121, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground
of errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings. (Sec. 3,
Rule 121, ROC)
61. Discuss briefly but comprehensively the effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are
the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of erros of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set
aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of
additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as
the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and
considered together with the evidence already in the record.
(c) In all cases,, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (Sec. 6,
Rule 121, ROC)
APPEAL
63. An accused escaped from detention, tried in absentia, was deemed to have waived
his right to appeal (Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79) while another who was absent during the
promulgation was considered as not having lost his right to appeal. (Moslares, prom. June 26,
1998). Distinguish between the two.
SUGGESED ANSWER: In Mapalao, the accused escaped from detention and trial in
absentia continued against him. He remained at large even at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, and thus, was to have waived his right to appeal.
In Moslares, the accused was not a fugitive from justice. He has been seeking redress
under the law as he has filed various pleadings and motions with the courts. Therefore, he
cannot be considered as one who has lost his standing in court and thus, cannot be deprived of
his right to seek judicial relief. (Moslares v. Third Diivisions, Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
129744, prom. June 26, 1998)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Mere absence of the accused, despite due notice to him
and his bondsman or counsel, during the promulgation of the sentence is not considered a
waiver of right to appeal.
145
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of hjudgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. he shall stae the reasons for his abosence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a judtifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (last par., Sec. 6, Rule
120, ROC)
The Supreme Court must still review the death penalty despite the convict’s escape.
Reason: Life is too valuable to be given away just because the convict escaped. (People v.
Espargas, 260 SCRA 539)
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE IN GENERAL
JUDICIAL NOTICE
***4. Is evidence obtained from illegal search and seizure admissible ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Any evidence in violation fo Section 2, Article III, shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [Sec. 3 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, abnd no search warrant or warant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and he pesons or things to be seized. (Sec. 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution)
OBJECT EVIDENCE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
***7. What is the best evidence rule and how is it applied to documents ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: If, possible, the best evidence which the nature of the case is
susceptible shall always be required, if not available, then the best evidence that can be had shall
be allowed. (Kneedler v. Paterno, 85 Phil. 183; 20 Am. Jur. 364)
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original itself. (Sec. 3, Rule 130, ROC arrangement and numbering
supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Reason for rule: The reason for the best evidence rule is to prevent fraud. (Anglo-
American, etc., v. Cannon, 31 Fed. 314).
The best evidence rule is a misnomer because it merely requires the best evidence that is
available, and if not available, secondary evidence shall be allowed.
b. Application of best evidence rule: The best evidence rule applies only to contents of
a writing, when those contents are the facts in issue, and not to its execution which may be
proved by parol testimony or extrinsic papers. (Hernaez v. Mcgarth, 90 Phil. 565)
c. Documents defined. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material
containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression
offered as proof of their contents. (Sec. 2, Rule 130, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
d. The different rules on admissibility of documentary evidence are the:
1) Best evidence rule;
2) Rules for admission of secondary evidence;
3) Parol evidence rule; and
4) Rules on interpretation of documents.
***8. What are the exceptions to the best evidence rule or instances where the
original need not be presented or instances where secondary evidence is admissible ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and he fact sought to be established from them is
only the general results of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office. (Sec. 3, Rule 130, ROC rearrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
***a. Procedure for order of proof using secondary evidence:
1) Proof of execution;
2) Proof of loss or unavailability;
148
***9. What is meant by parol evidence and what is the rule regarding this concept ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Parol evidence is oral or verbal testimony of a witness. It is
also known as extrinsic evidence or evidence aliunde.
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be between the parties and their successors in
interest no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. (1st par.,
Sec. 9, Rule 130, ROC rearrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
149
a. Nature of parol evidence rule: It is not a rule of evidence but of substantive law. It
is part of the law of contracts, the law of negotiable instruments, and the law of wills. It is
founded upon the substantive rights of the parties. It was made part of the rules of evidence in
order that it may be considered in all its phases in one place. (70 A.L.R. Anno. 752; Tracy's
Handbook, 62 Ed., p. 97; 20 Am. Jur. 963)
b. Reasons for the parol evidence rule:
1) When the parties have reduced their agreement in writing,
2) it is presumed that they have made the writing
3) the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
4) whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived
or abandoned. (Van Sychel v. Dalrymple, 32 N. J., EQ. 233)
c. Best evidence rule distinguished from parol evidence rule:
1) Under the best evidence rule, the issue is contents of a writing (Sec. 3, Rule
130, ROC) WHILE under the parol evidence rule, there is no issue as to contents of a
writing (Sec. 9, Rule 130, ROC);
2) Under the best evidence rule, secondary evidence is offered to prove the
contents of a writing, which is not allowed unless the case falls under any of the
exceptions (Sec. 3, Rule 130, ROC) WHILE under the parol evidence rule, the purpose of
the offer of parol evidence is to change, vary, modify, qualify, or contradict the terms of a
complete written agreement, which is not allowed unless the case falls under any of the
exceptions. (Sec. 9, Rule 130, ROC)
Only the parties and their successors in interest, and not strangers may invoke the
protection of the parol evidence rule. (Sec. 9, Rule 130, ROC)
***10. What are the exceptions to the parol evidence rule or when are the instances
when testimonial evidence may be used to prove the terms of a written agreement ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts into issue in his pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement.
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto.
c. The validity of the written agreement.
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement. (Sec. 1, Rule 130, ROC rearrangement and
numbering supplied)
***11. What is the coverage of the parol evidence rule and what are the exceptions to
the parol evidence rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Covered. Only prior and contemporaneous agreements which are deemed to have
been merged in the writing conformably to the "integration of the agreement rule." (Woodhouse
v. Halili, 93 Phil. 526)
b. Not covered.
1) Subsequent agreements, notwithstanding that such agreements may have the
effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the
parties as evidenced by the writing.
2) Collateral agreements which although oral and contemporaneous with the
writing are separate and distinct agreements. (PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Contemporaneous agreement. A contemporaneous agreement is one entered into at
the same time as the agreement which has been redued to writing.
b. Tests to determine whether a contemporaneous oral agreement is separate and
distinct from the written agreement and therefore provable by parol evidence:
1) The first test is the subject-matter of the two agreements. If the subject-matter
of the written agreement is different from that of the contemporaneous oral agreement,
then the latter is a separate and distinct agreement and, therefore, provable by parol
evidence.
150
2) If the two agreements refer to the same subject-matter, the test is to determine
whether or not the contemporaneous oral agreement is separable, then the
contemporaneous oral agreement is separate and distinct and, therefore, probable by parol
evidence. (Lese v. Lamprecht, 196 N.Y. 32)
c. Example of agreement which CANNOT be proven by parol evidence : Express
trusts concerning real property cannot be proven by parol evidence because title and possession
cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted. (Sinaon, et
al., v. Sorongon, et al., 136 SCRA 410)
d. Examples of collateral agreements which CAN be proved by parol evidence:
1) An agreement of reconveyance is a distinct agreement, separate from the sale
itself, although the two agreements are usually contained in one and the same document.
(Laureano v. Kilayco, 34 Phil. 148; Yacapin v. Neri, 40 Phil. 61)
2) Inducements and representations which led to the execution of an agreement
may be proven by parol evidence because they do not vary the terms of the agreement.
(Woodhouse v. Halili, 93 Phil. 526; Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)
3) Parol evidence is admissible to prove an independent and collateral agreement
which constitutes an inducement to the making of the sale or part of the consideration
thereof. (Robles v. Lizarraga Hnos., 50 Phil. 387)
4) A condition precedent not stipulated in writing is provable by oral evidence.
REASON: Before the happening of the condition, there is no written agreement yet to
which the parol evidence may apply.
5) Verbal assurances given by the indorser of an out-of-town check to the
employees of the bank where it was presented for encashment that he would refund the
amount if the check should be dishonored by the drawee bank is a collateral agreement
separate and distinct from the indorsement, by virtue of which the first bank was induced
to cash the same, and therefore, provable by parol evidence. (PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756)
6) Any prior or contemporaneous conversaion in connection with a note or its
indorsement may be proved by parol evidence. (PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756; Philips v.
Preston, 5 How. [U.S.] 278)
7) An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be
embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit may be proved by parol evidence.
(PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756; 9 Wigmore 148)
h. The fact that parties who appear to have signed as principals did so as merely
sureties is provable by parol evidence. (Tan Machan v. De la Trinidad, 3 Phil. 684)
INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS
13. As a general rule there is need to prove the authemticity of private documents. Are
there exceptions to this general rule ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. There may be no need to prove the a uthenticity of
private documents:
a. When the document is ancient. (Sec. 21, Rule 132, ROC)
b. When the execution and enuineness of the document is admitted by the adverse party.
(Tria v. Cruz, 14 Phil. 551); and
c. When the enuineness and due execution of the document is immaterial. (Hicks v.
Coleman, 25 Cal., 122)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
151
a. The ancient document rule: Where a private document is more than thirty years old,
is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished
by any alterations or circumsmtances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be
given. (Sec. 21, Rule 132, ROC)
b. How genuineness of handwriting proved: The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of s uch person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen handwriting purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison made by the
witness in court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuinbe to the satisfaction of the judge. (Sec. 22, Rule 132,
ROC)
c. Not much weight is given to handwriting experts. Unless, therefore, there is, in a
given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, or direct or circumstantial competent evidence
of the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic
similarities, or dissimilarities, between the questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
(Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 126669; Meneses v. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 127900; Punzalan v. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 12880;
and Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132435 prom. April 27, 1998 citing Lorenzo
v. Diaz, 53 O.G. 4110-4111, cited in Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, Part I, 1997 Edition, p.
674)
Questions involving the mere similarity or dissimilarity of handwritings could be
determined by the court itself as authorized under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
making a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge." (Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, supra)
***14. When is evidence admissible ? What is meant by relevancy and are there
instances when evidence that is not relevant is admissible ? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. (Sec. 3, Rule 128, ROC arrangement and numbering
supplied)
Relevant evidence is that evidence that has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. (1st sentence, Sec. 4, Rule 128, ROC arrangement and
numbering supplied)
Only relevant evidence is admissible and evidence on collateral matter is not allowed.
However, it may be allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the facts in issue. (2nd sentence, Sec. 4, Rule 128, ROC
arrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: To determine whether evidence is admissible look for the
purpose.
The reason behind the above statement is that evidence may be admissible for one
purpose and not for another purpose.
ILLUSTRATION: While Leon was sitting in front of his house, he saw Miguel running
and heard him shouting, "Juan stabbed Pedro."
If Leon is presented as a witness, during the trial of Juan for having stabbed Pedro, and
his testimony is offered to prove that Juan stabbed Pedro, his (Leon's) testimony would not be
admissible because it is excluded by the rules for being hearsay. (Sec. 3, Rule 128 in relation to
Sec. 36, Rule 130, both of the ROC) Leon did not have personal knowledge of the fact that Juan
stabbed Pedro. His knowledge that Juan stabbed Pedro was not derived from his own perception
but from that of Miguel.
On the other hand, if Leon's testimony is offered to prove that he heard that Miguel
shouted, "Juan stabbed Pedro," then this would be admissible. It could not be excluded under the
hearsay rule because his testimony is derived from his own perception of what Miguel said.
Leon's testimony is likewise admissible because it is relevant under the concept of independent
relevant statement, a statement that tends in a reasonable degree to establish the probability
152
or improbability of the fact in issue. (Sec. 4, Rule 128, ROC) His testimony would tend in a
reasonable degree to establish the probability that Juan stabbed Pedro.
QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The husband or the wife,
b. during or after the marriage,
c. cannot be examined
d. without the consent of the other
e. as to any communication
1) received in confidence
2) by one from the other
3) during the marriage
f. except
1) in a civil case by one against the other, or
2) in a criminal case committed by one
a) against the other or
b) the latter's direct descendants or descendants. (Sec. 24[a]. Rule
130, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. The requisites for the marital privileged communication rule are the following:
1) The parties are or were legally married.
2) The communication, oral or written, was made during the marriage;
3) The communication was received in confidence;
4) The examination is done during the marriage.
5) The consent of the other spouse was not given.
6) The case is not a civil case filed by one against the other or a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct ascendants or
descendants.
b. The rational behind the marital privileged communication rule is to preserve the
peace of families and maintain the sacred institution of marriage.
c. Applications of the marital privileged communciation rule:
1) Every communication between spouses is presumed to be confidential.
(Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Ia. 487; Wigmore, Sec. 2336)
2) Communications made in the presence of third parties are not confidential,
unless the third person may be considered as an agent of the spouses. (Floyd v. Miller, 61
Ind. 224)
3) Communications overheard by third persons remain confidential as between
the spouses, but the third person who overheard may be called upon to testify. (People v.
Carlos, 47 Phil. 626)
4) Communications coming into the hands of third persons, whether legally or
illegally, remain confidential as between the spouses, but the third person may be called
upon to testify. (People, and Hammons, supra)
But if the third person acquired knowledge of the communication by collusion
and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, he thereby becomes an agent
of such spouses so that the privilege is claimable against him. (Ibid.)
5) Communications intended for transmission to third persons are not
confidential. (U.S. v. Antipolo, 37 Phil. 726)
NOTE: The above rules may apply by analogy to other privileged communications.
d. Waiver of the marital privileged communication rule: The privilege is claimable
by the spouse not called as witness, so that it its waivable only by him or her; and it is waivable
by any act of such spouse which might be considered as an express or implied consent to the
disclosure of the communication. (People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484)
18. What is meant by the survivor’s disqualification rule or the dead man’s statute ?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
b. persons on whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
c. against an executor or administrator or other representative
d. of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
e. cannot testify as to any matter of fact
f. occurring before the death of such person or
154
g. before such person became of unsound mind. Sec. 23, Rule 130, ROC arrangement
and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Rationale, object and purpose of Dead Man’s Statute.
1) To discourage false testimony or perjury on the part of the survivor; and
2) To protect the deceased against false and unjust claims. (Goni, et al., v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 231)
***The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to
put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard o the opportunity to giving
testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity,
or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. (Tan, et al,. v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 125861, prom. September 9, 1998)
***b. Exceptions to the survivor’s disqualification rule:
1) Ordinary witnesses, who are not the plaintiff, assignor of plaintiff, or person in
whose behalf the case is prosecuted may testify. (Francia v. Hipolito, 93 Phil. 968)
2) When the plaintiff is a corporation, the officers or stockholders thereof are not
disqualified. (Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, et c., 84 Phil. 330)
3) When there is an imputation of fraud against the deceased, the plaintiff is not
barred from testifying to such fraud. (Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622)
4) When the plaintiff is the executor, administrator or legal representative of the
deceased, or the person of unsound mind, the defendant or defendants are free to testify
against the plaintiff. (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698)
5) When the defendant or defendants, though heirs of the deceased, are sued in
their personal and individual capacities, the plaintiff may testify against them. (Go Chi
Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622)
6) When the survivor's testimony refers to a negative fact. (Mendezona v. vda. de
Goitia, 54 Phil. 557)
7) When the survivor's testimony is favorable to the deceased. (Icard v.
Marasigan, 71 Phil. 419)
8) The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications
with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person
in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the
adverse party must be confined o those transactions or communications which were had
with the agent. (Goni, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 231)
c. How protection of the dead man’s statute is waived:
1) By not objecting to plaintiff's testimony on prohibited matters. (Marella v.
Reyes, 12 Phil. 1)
2) By cross-examining the plaintiff on prohibited matters. (Tongco v. Vianzon,
50 Phil. 698)
3) By calling witnesses to testify on prohibited matters. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil.
493)
4) When the plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring
during the deceased's lifetime. (Goni, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 231)
19. Explain what is meant by the parental and filial testimonial privilege rule.
SUGGESTED ANSWER No person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (Sec. 25, Rule 130, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Who may not be compelled to testify against certain parties under the parental
and filial testimonial privilege rule:
1) Person against his parents..
2) Person against his other direct ascendants like grandparents, great
grandparents, great great grandparents.
3) Person against his children.
4) Person against his other direct descendants like grandchildren, great great
grandchildren.
155
26. When is an offer to compromise admissible in evidence ? Are there any exceptions
? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. In criminal cases, except
1) those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or
2) those allowed by law to be compromised,
b. an offer of compromise by the accused
c. may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (2nd par., Sec. 27, Rule
130, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
***27. What is meant by res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet or res inter alios
acta ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Statements made or matters accomplished between two
parties cannot prejudice a third party. (Blanza v. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 4)
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided. (Sec. 28, Rule 130, ROC)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Rational for res inter alios acta: This evidentiary rule guards against the practical
inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other
mischief prejudicial to litigants. (Cruz, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126713, prom.
July 27, 1998 citing Francisco)
b. Exceptions to res inter alios acta:
1) When there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions
giving rise to he fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be
proved. (Cruz, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126713, prom. July 27, 1998)
2) In actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind
or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it
uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake. (Cruz, supra)
3) The rights of a party may be prejudiced by the act, declaration or omission of
another when between the party making the admission and against whom it is offered
there exists a relation of:
a) partnership;
b) agency;
c) joint interest;
d) conspiracy; or
e) privity.
158
Conviction for murder proper even if victim’s body is not produced : In all
crimes against persons in which the death of the victim is an essential element of the
offense, there must be satisfactory evidence of the fact of death and the identity of the
victim that a crime has been committed which is what corpus delicti really means.
The failure of the prosecution to produce the body of the victim does not imply
the absence of corpus delicti for the term does not refer to the body of the murdered
person. (People v. Centeno, et al., 130 SCRA 209)
HEARSAY RULE
***34. Explain the concept of dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The declaration of a dying person,
b. made under consciousness of an impending death,
162
c. may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
d. as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (Sec. 37, Rule
130, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Rationale behind admitting dying declaration or why dying declaration is an
exception to the hearsay rule:
1) Necessity, because the declarant's death makes it impossible to obtain
testimony in court and, usually, in crimes against persons, the victim's testimony is the
best evidence of the crime. (U.S. v. Virrey, 37 Phil. 618)
2) Trustworthiness, because it is made at the point of death, a situation so solemn
and awful as creating an obligation equal to that created by a positive oath administered
in a court of justice. (U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530)
b. Requisites of ante-mortem statement:
a. It must concern any case involved in and the circumstances surrounding the
declarant's death;
b. At the time of the declaration, the declarant must be conscious of impending
death;
c. The declarant must be competent as a witness;
d. The declaration must be offered in any case wherein the death of the declarant
is the subject of inquiry; and
e. The declarant actually died, otherwise, the declaration may be admitted as part
of the res gestae and not as a dying declaration
c. Victim need not state that he has lost all hope of recovery. It is sufficient that
circumstances are such as to inevitably lead to the conclusion that at the time the declaration was
made, the declarant would not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died.
The degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death supervened thereafter
constitute substantial evidence of the victim's consciousness of his impending death. (People v.
Tanaman, et al., G.R. No. 71768, July 28, 1987)
d. Dying declaration has weight even if declarant did not die immediately after his
declaration: The fact that the declarant died four (4) hours after his statement does not diminish
the probative value of the dying declaration since it is not indispensable that the a declarant
expires immediately thereafter.
It is the belief of impending death and not the rapid succession of death that renders the
dying declaration admissible. (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 111149, prom. September 5, 1997)
Mere gesture of dying victim inconclusive: The gesture of a dying woman in pointing to
a direction, when asked for the identity of her assailant, is too vague to be given such probative
value in determining the culpability of the accused.
REASON: Unlike an oral or a written declaration, a simple gesture of the hand
unaccompanied by words, is open to various interpretations by the witness who testifies To its
existence. Thus, the evidence comes to the court couched in the witness' second hand perception
and possibly, imbued with his personal meanings and biases. This is what makes hearsay
evidence objectionable. The second hand evidence is placed before the court without the benefit
of cross-examination by the party against whom it is brought, nor of any other means of
assessing the competence and credibility of the source. (People v. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, July
3, 1987)
35. What are the requisites for admissibility of declaration against interest ?
Distinguish declaraltion against interest from admission.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The declaration is made by
1) a person deceased, or
2) unable to testify,
b. against the interest of the declarant,
c. if the fact asserted in the declaration
1) was at the time it was made
2) so far contrary to declarant's own interest,
3) that a reasonable man in his position
a) would not have made the declaration
163
***37. What are the requisites for spontaneous exclamations as part of the res gestae ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The res gestae is an equivocal act.
b. The equivocal act must be material to the issue.
c. The statement or question must be necessary for the understanding of the
equivocal act.
d. The statement must accompany the equivocal act. (Tracy's Handbook, 62 Ed.,
p. 222)
G.R. No. 12880; and Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132435 prom. April 27,
1998 citing Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 662)
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Testimony of handwriting expert not indispensable to
COMELEC. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. It was ruled by the Supreme
Court that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the
ballot itself being sufficient. ((Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 126669;
Meneses v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 127900; Punzalan v. Commission on
Elections et al., G.R. No. 12880; and Punzalan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132435
prom. April 27, 1998 citing Bocobo v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 576 in turn citing Penson v.
Parungao, 52 Phil. 718)
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PRESUMPTIONS
40. What are the requisites for adverse presumption from suppression of evidence ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. The suppression is wilful. (Sec. 3-e, Rule 131, ROC) continue
b. The suppression is not in the exercise of a privilege.
c. The evidence suppressed is not merely corroborative.
d. The evidence is at the disposal only of the suppressing party.
NOTES AND COMMENTS: Instances where adverse presumption from suppression of
evidence does not apply:
a. If the evidence is at the disposal of both parties. (People v. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1)
b. The suppression was not willful.
c. The suppressed evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative.
d. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege. (People v. Navaja, 220 SCRA 624)
g. Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision,
unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda, or any
further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses
appear by different counsel, the court shall determine he relative order of presentation of their
evidence. (Sec. 5, Rule 30, ROC arrangement and numbering supplied)
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
a. Scope of judge’s participation at trial : A judge who presides at a trial is not a mere
referee. He must actively participate therein by directing counsel to the facts in dispute, by
asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest in a fast a fair trial. (Clarin v. Yatco, 56
O.G. 7042, Nov. 14, 1960)
He can interrogate witnesses to elicit the truth, to obtain clarification, or to test their
credibility. (People v Moreno, 83 Phil. 286)
However, this power must be exercised by the court sparingly and judiciously. (People v.
Ferrer, 44 O.G. 112). Of course, the judge cannot curtail counsel's right to interrogate witnesses.
(People v. Bedia, 83 Phil. 909)
b. Power of court to stop further evidence:
1) The court may stop
2) the introduction of further testimony
3) upon any particular point
4) when the evidence upon it is already so full
5) that more witnesses to the same point
6) cannot be reasonably expected
7) to be additionally persuasive.
But this power should be exercised with caution. (Sec. 6, Rule 133, ROC arrangement
and numbering supplied)
When the evidence already presented on one point is sufficient and the party merely
seeks to present cumulative evidence which cannot produce additional persuasive effect or that
he is not sure of what the other witnesses would testify, the court may in its sound discretion stop
the introduction of such further evidence. (People v. Reyes, et al., 133 SCRA 51)
c. Role of attorney during presentation of evidence: An attorney has a dual role to
perform relative to proving the truth respecting a matter of fact.
He must ensure that all evidence supporting the material allegations, whether raised in
the pleadings or not are admitted by the court. His other role is to block the admission of
evidence supporting his opponents' material allegations whether raised in the pleadings or not.
In order to perform this dual role the attorney should ensure that the evidence he offers
are admissible in accordance with the Rules of Court and those of his opponent are properly
objected to for being inadmissible
NOTES AND COMMENTS: The concept of past recollection recorded. A witness may
testify from such writing or record though he retains no recollection of the particular facts, if he
is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made, but such
evidence must be received with caution. (Sec. 16, Rule 132, ROC)
46. What is the effect of inadmissible evidence that has not been properly objected to ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: It is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has
the right to object.
A protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The proper time to make
a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer
thereto, or from the presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be inferred.
(British Airways v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121824, January 29, 1998 citing Abrenica
v. Gonda, 34 Phil. 739)
Cross-examination conducted to the inadmissble evidence may constitute waiver.
(British Airways, supra)
GOOD LUCK
ADVANCE CONGRATULATIONS