INTERNATIONAL HISTORY THE CRAFT OF RERARARRAAARARARARA ARATE RETORTEDThis page intentionally left blank RAPRAPRORAHAAAARARAAHHHHAAARADARHR AGATA TLAEEI00 1UUUCTTVU TTT T CVI TssT UUUCTUT TTT TU UT eee ses Chapter One THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY Tans s+ noo about method 2 about the tec iors et undead errata police: Buus of eho cannot be dale wth ins eset, Toe fow hrc work needs to Be done, you it have 1 Ive te sce for thar is exactly chat as shold be wing odo hss the sof hiercal anata? Whats the por of his ele branch UF nleeuol ats? These questions ar of fundamental prance, ever Shc terms Te undentand te goal of ioral woke know hae Fatal unmtaning sand what historia explanation team be o fet tu ode wotng bwonnn, Tha noe can seve aa hed of Fearon: econ help the orion se owt 0 oar te ulethy of hiery crane pode hina with hed sane hey seed! Ths uesion the foes ofthe fs evo sections fn ha ee—C—=é=ER phos have nothing much to oer he hierns? Again, the aswer mo There ateiporant ght abl, ut hey ste be oor in the hos Op fies ern That thee wings fal val he Pace ies Matra the po he agument nthe lection of is chapter Inthe actos [want to drew srs of the sgt oe fund in ha ie rte ced how how they app itor wr Tir Cassie Traprrion: Henst: versus Conuixcwoon In 1942 the philosopher Cael Hempel published a paper called “The Func: tion of General Laws in History” in which he laid out a theory of historical ‘explanation. In history a8 in science, Hempel said, explanation meant de- duction, An explanation would show that certain initial conditions existed tnd would lay out general laws that governed hat would happen if those conditions were met; the occurrence of the event in question would follow as "cat Heael, “The Function of Gener Lan i HitorJsonal of Php 39 (140) 35-48, septal in Parc Gardiner, ey Theres of Hitery (New Yer: Fee Pres, 1959), Fo M456 Ther frees othe et appear in the Gadi bok,2 CHAPTER ONE. matter of course from those laws and those initial conditions. Unless a his torical account had that form, Hempel wrote, that account gould not be con sidered veal explanatioa. It would at best be a mete “explanation sketch.” ‘This theory of explanation, the “covering law” theory as itis often called, was 1 focus of philosophical dicussion until about 1970. Indeed, as one leading fcholar noted, the Hempel paper was so fundamental that most participants in the debate on historical explanation “quickly found themselves clasified aseither pro-Hempelian or anti-Hempelian.”” “This theory was atzractive because it appealed to people sense for what an ‘explanation should be. IFan account does not explain why an event had to happen, if it siraply explains why it might have happened, thea, in-a certain sense itis nota teal explanation at all. As one leading philosopher of history put i "Ifwhat we give in explanation of an evens does not rule out the posi- hilicy of that event’ failing to cceur, then we can scarcely claim chat we know why in that paricular core it did occur: why in that cise, in other swords, the possibility of its nor eceurring was not realized instend. The only sway we can rule out such a possbilry is by arguing that the event had +0 Deut: that it necessarily occurred. Anal that is what the deductive equire- ‘ment of scientific explanation insures. ‘This point, however, canted liele weight with most historians. Their fel- ing was that the Hempel approach was abstract and formalstc and did not take actual historical practice as is point of deparvure. It didnot look at what fexplination meant to the histodan and then ty to build out fom thee. Hempel, with his emphasis on social scientific “ws” would force interpeta- tion into much too rigid a mold, He did noc seem to have any real fel for 2 See Willom Dray, Laws and Exenain in Hisary (Osorik Odors Univers Pros, 1957). Alon Demag chanted this view othe "PogoeeHempl” thea. Alan Desagsn, “The PopgenEgel Theory Reconsidered” Hero aud Try 1 C1964). 3-25 rept with Init ceonge in Phlooptcal Ancyse an Het e. Wilkr Dry (New Yorks Harper {Row 1966), 9. 127-5; frher eeences ane ths ater Fein ofthe rl, Ie should enetd, however, hat by dh te hale ere ot, Poppers very criti of what he ‘led “hisoricun? ch he dered eran egprach w Ue socal sets which” among ‘ther thine, wan coreemed with dhewerng dhe laws hat ude evlisin of istry” ge Poppe, The Dowty of Kuzma (Londor: Routledge, 1961), p. 3. He ber went out 1 his wy to praie Donagan or fing tha danger lof hors 0 fae” Paul ‘A Schl, el, Th Psy of Ka Popper, 2 vos, (Ls Sal: Open Court, 197, 2211 ‘The wea “locan.” of couse, has Been vsed in ey diferent ways. See Geen lage, ‘The Gannon Conon of Hits (Midleton, Cone Wesleyan Univesity Prey 1968), tp. 287-90 (or pp. 295.98 in the rev edition pablhed 1s 1983), ere he references hed thee ila Dy, On Hisar a Paes of Mao (Leder: Bl 1589), 13. Se also onsen, “Popper Hagel Theor "p 27 “Wilkin Det Pow of Hit) (Englond Cli, NJ: Prensice Hall, 1962, pp. 6-7 (enphacs nani Dey wa ese porphraing nother plow argent> ‘The THEORY OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY 3 history as « discipline with an intellectual personality of its own’ And a ‘pumber of philosophers sympathized with the view that standards were not ro bbe arbitrarily imposed on che discipline from the outse.® They rejected the idea that what could not be “euc down to analytic size” in terms of those stan- dards was ro be "stripped of the epaulets of cogaitive honor” and agreed that a field like history was to be taken essentially on its own terms.” Theie feeling, "was, as one of them put it, chat the social seiences in general and history in particular were not to be remodeled into “deformed likenesses of physics. And they sympathized with the historians’ view that the covering-law ap proach was unacceptable because it failed to allow for human agency—for the role that individaal human beings play in shaping the course of events? "Those philosophers, moreover, were able to show that che Hempel cheory was not particularly impressive, even on its own terms. Alan Danagan, for example, in one section of his well-known article on the "Popper-Hempel theory” effectively demolished Hempel’s assumption that covering laws were readily available. Among other things, he showed char one example Hempel Ihad given in his original artcle—an explanation drawing on three explicit ‘covering laws—did not hold up because “all chree were obviously false"! 'A tore basic problem was thar Hempel, by his own admission, did noc even purport to chow what an explanation was. All he did was to point to one of the things thar an explanation of an event in his view had to be. It needed, he ssid, to provide a agfcienr basis for expecting that that event had oc- ‘curred. The problem here, as he himself pointed out, was that “certain kinds of information" —the “tesules of a scientific test,” for example—aight pro- vide a sufficient bass for belioving chat some event hal occurred “without in the least explaining why." A certain barometric reading might predict @ ‘worsening of the weather, but it could scarcely be sid co cause the change in stmespherie conditions, Predictive power wa just not enough for something to qualify asa teal explanation. Somerhing more was needed, but whac? This vas «fundamental problem, bue Hempel essentially walked away from it Soe especially JH. Hester, "The One That Go Ay 98,6 * Se, for example, Pray Las ol Egan i His, (2, ad Ale Doon, "Can Philoopher Lear Geen Hiarans™ én Mind, Scene, ond His, ad. Howard Kifer and ‘Milzgo Manie (Albury Sete Unive of New Yor Pes, 1970) p24 * Marsin Levi, Feet sn Hitory” Hi nd Thaory 24 (1985) 61, "Damage, "Popes Hempel Theory” p57 villa Drage“ The Hitorical Eeplenaio of Actions Reams" in Phospy and Hie tary A Svosia, el Sine Haak New Yrs New Yk: University Pres, 196,133 "SDemapt, "Popper Henge Theo” p42 "Goal Heel "Resione and Covering Lawn Hiatal Baplenatin," in Hook, Pibuphy snd Hisiry pi, See alto N-R. Herzen, Obes ad Esplraon: A Oude w Foy of ‘Since (New Yor: Homer, 1971, 9 3B. F424, Naw York Hei of Bas, February