G.R. No.

74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by
the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering
the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

RULING:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives
when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the
law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards;
and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
law’s implementing rules.
ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional.

RULING:

YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to review the law’s IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries” is purely
speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of
negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid
classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are
sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the
original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.

However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
LICO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 205505 29 September 2015

FACTS:

Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop) is a multi-sectoral party list organization which was registered on
Nov. 16, 2009 under RA 7941, otherwse known as the Party List System Act. On Nov. 30, 2009, Ating Koop filed its
Manifestation of Intern to Participate in the Party List System of Representation for the May 10, 2010 elections with Lico
as its first nominee. Ating Koop was proclaimed as one of the winning party list groups thereby earning a seat in the
House of Representatives represented by petitioner Lico. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of te winning
parties, Ating Koop issued a Central Committee resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term sharng agreement
wherein petitioner Lico was to serve as its representative for the first year of the three year term. Almost one year after
petitioner Lico's assumption of office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty on the
basis of his refusal to honor the term sharing agreement and also of malversation and graft and corruption. Rimas Group
filed with COMELEC with a prayer that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the instant petition to expel Cong. Lico in the House of Representatives for
lack of jurisdiction but upheld is expulsion from Ating Koop Party List Group and recognized Amparo T. Rimas as the
representative of ating Koop.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC as jurisdiction to expel a member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization.

RULING:

No. The COMELEC has no jurisdction to expel a member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution endows the HRET wit jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the
case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the
winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of te House of Representatives. In
ths case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.

BANAT vs COMELEC

GR No 179271 21 April 2009

FACTS:

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the
Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6 Section 5 should
be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed
mandamus for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5 (2) of the Constitution
mandatory?

DECISION:

Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in Veterans. First, the twenty
percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent
threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system
are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
FUNA VS THE CHAIRMAN, CSC

G.R. No. 191672 25 November 2014

FACTS:

On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 designating te Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, Hon. Francisco T. Duque III, as a member of te Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of
the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF. Petitioner asserts that it violates te independence of the CSC which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the designation of Duque as member of te Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC,
and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutiional prohibition
against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the members of constitutional commissions.

RULING:

Yes. It impairs the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or
multiple offices for the members of the constitutional commissions. An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, without further warrant or appointment, and he has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. His designation as member of the governing Boards entitles
him to receive a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of
its clear contravention of the proscription set by Sec. 2 art. IX-A of the Constitution. Apart from violating the prohibition
against holding multiple offices, his designation as member of the governing Boards of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and
HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC since the President exercises control over all these government entities.

ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO

G.R. NO. 226679 AUGUST 15, 2017

FACTS:

Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. He wants to enter into a plea bargaining agreement but Judge
Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because Section 23 specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona
argues that Section 23 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?

HELD:

Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reason. First, it violates the equal protection clause since other
criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and
murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching
upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it
is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then Comelec
Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec
Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to
the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding
heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment
violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments
issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC,
subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by
the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision should be harmonized with
the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will
negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. NO. 202242 JULY 17, 2012

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress”
refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and
mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD:

Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution
only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be
said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

DE CASTRO V. JBC

G.R. No. 191342 April 2, 2010

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.

After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant.
Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy"
furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting
President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position from the most
senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the
President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the
Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in
the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.

RULING:

Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.

If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice, then they
should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).

Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.