Soviet Power Analysis: 1989

One of the biggest "what ifs" of history was a war between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO. This hypothetical war has been the subject of much analysis, debate and
simulation. But what were the real capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union?

The Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe envisioned a total of five fronts, using
Soviet forces stationed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany),
Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as reinforcing units from Byelorussia and the
Ukraine.

The war was to consist of four stages: At the outset of conflict, mobilization and
deployment; An initial Warsaw Pact breakthrough of prepared NATO defenses and
prevention of counterattack; Operations in depth and into the rear areas of the
defenders and; Final completion of first echelon force's operations.

The initial penetration of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) defenses was
itself divided into three sub-stages. Those included breaking through the defense
itself, overcoming the defensive sector and deploying the second echelon, and finally,
paratroop landings in conjunction with traditional ground operations. The Soviets
hoped to be at the French border by the 15th day of war, taking Belgium, Denmark,
the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the process and thus
forcing those countries out of the war. Two additional fronts would then be created to
smash any NATO strategic reserves in France reach Vizcaya and the Spanish border
by day 30 or 35.

That is what the Warsaw Pact high command expected. At least, so say some of the
more than 25,000 GDR military documents that came into possession of the Federal
German Ministry of Defense on 3 October 1990, as a result of the unification of the
Germanys. Those documents chronicle high-level Warsaw Pact staff exercises, and
what is fascinating about them is not merely the speed at which the Soviets intended
to conduct military operations (an advance so rapid Soviet category II and III units
could not have been mobilized and deployed). Rather, it is the fact that from 1988 and
beyond the Soviets seemed to believe such a victory was possible only by massive
initial use of tactical nuclear weapons. Indeed, some 840 warheads were to be used,
some 76 to devastate the border area of Schleswig-Holstein alone in the northeastern
FRG. Those same exercises prepared commanders for an initial or retaliatory NATO
nuclear strike involving 1,528 to 2,714 warheads-the exact number expected
depending on such factors as French participation in NATO operations. Final
authority for nuclear release, and the dangerous consequences of escalation, naturally
resided in the hands of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.

Such revelations came as a surprise to many Western analysts. While Soviet doctrine
had always stressed military operations in a chemical or nuclear environment, since
1981 Warsaw Pact staff exercises had frequently emphasized its massive conventional
arsenal for victory. Further, during the Gorbachev era of the mid-1980s, there actually
seemed to be an a resurgent interest in defensive operations, which to many not only
indicated the effects of perestroika, but also confidence in the conventional war
fighting option. Then in the later 80s, nuclear weapons suddenly reappeared as a
major, if not primary, consideration in Warsaw Pact staff training.

What had happened? The massive tip of the Soviet spear - GSFG, the Group of Soviet
Forces Germany still remained deployed in the GDR, ready for action, its motor pools
and training areas bristling with row upon row of the latest Soviet equipment. Massive
numbers of tanks and artillery pieces still gave the GSFG commander numerical
superiority over his NATO counterpart by margins of two- and often five-to-one.

This narrative postulates a controversial, and likely never to be proven or disproved,

answer as to why there was this shift in Warsaw Pact strategy. The change over to the
nuclear option confirmed Soviet recognition of the age-old struggle between quality
and quantity. Despite the vast numbers of soldiers, tanks and cannon it deployed,
GSFG as a conventional force had failed.

Strategy of Paranoia
To understand why GSFG and other Soviet forces fell behind those of the Western
powers in their ability to wage conventional warfare, it is necessary to understand the
complex factors that shaped the Red Army. Taken in the right context, one can
reasonably take the deployment of GSFG to the GDR as a purely defensive move. The
Soviets were students of history and history had demonstrated the Russian homeland
has long been a target for invasion, especially from the west. The point is well taken
when one considers the Mongols, the Poles (a Polish army actually took Moscow in
1610), Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, the British and French in the Crimea, and
especially the Germans in two World Wars. And though merely a footnote in Western
history books, the Allied intervention into the Russian Civil War was remembered as
an attempt to crush communism at its inception, proof positive of Western intentions
toward Moscow.

Establishing GSFG and the other groups of forces in Eastern Europe provided a strong
buffer zone that protected a Soviet border that lacked any significant natural barriers.
It also ensured the depth of the defensive zone was sufficient to allow the Soviet
Union enough time to mobilize for general war in the event of an invasion from the
west. GSFG and other Soviet forces also provided legitimacy and security for Soviet
satellite governments in eastern Europe.

Germany in particular was a problem that GSFG's stationing neatly solved. The Great
Patriotic War of World War II, with its millions of Soviet dead, had a tremendous
impact on Soviet military thinking. Dreary old Muscovite generals and politicians
could point to the Nazi Wehrmacht and proclaim that, for the sanctity of the Soviet
Union, if not the entire world, Germany must never again be a united country. Thus an
argument can be made and substantially supported that GSFG's positioning in
Germany was to prevent that country's reunification rather than to be the jump-off
point for an invasion that would result in the same unification. That the Soviet
military would ever seriously consider such action by the West is found in specific
instructions to the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact's joint armed forces,
which specified his initial wartime operational goals to be the liberation of both the
GOR and the Czech Peoples' Republic.

Conversations with former Warsaw Pact officers and defectors provide insight that
confirms Soviet mistrust and disdain for their Warsaw Pact allies, the GOR in
particular. One former Warsaw Pact general (known to the author) recalled a Soviet
colonel refusing to seat his commanding general at the head of a table because it was
directly under a rather large chandelier. The Warsaw Pact general noted the
chandelier, which was in one of his country's more luxurious old castles, had been
around for centuries, never fallen, and that his own country's president sat under it
regularly during high level meetings. The Soviet colonel replied while that may be
true, the president was not nearly as important as his general, who was reseated.
Likewise a former GOR pilot wrote:

The East German Air Force was entirely organized by Soviet standards,
which should have been very helpful when flying with the Russians in
exercises. The truth was that East German pilots never spoke to Russian
controllers, except for those very few occasions where we were scheduled
to land at one of their airports. We sometimes flew against each other in
exercises, blue against red. The Warsaw Pact wasn't even close to what
NATO is in the West. The average East German pilot didn't speak Russian
well enough to do that. The ones that spoke Russian had taken courses at
the Russian Air Force Academy in Moscow to become squadron or wing
commanders. They routinely did the communicating between the Russian
command and the German troops. The Soviet's security understanding
prohibited an effective way of working together.
Given these facts and perceptions, one must realistically conclude the Soviets would
likely never have gone to war with NATO unless significantly provoked. One must
also conclude Soviet perceptions of (and desires for) minimal Warsaw Pact support
also militated against starting a war unless no other options were available.
Nevertheless, while strategically GSFG was a defensive organization, its planned use
at the operational and tactical levels of war was decidedly offensive. Here again
Soviet commanders looked to history, particularly the Great Patriotic War, and those
lessons indicated Russian arms suffered most when on the defensive. History also
indicated offensive action, particularly in the pursuit phase, not only shortened the
time needed for victory, but drastically reduced friendly losses in men and materiel as
well. Thus an immediate counterattack after, or a preemptive strike before, initial
hostilities was deemed well within the parameters of Soviet defensive strategy.

To the Soviets, history also made one more immutable point: Russian arms had
always been qualitatively inferior to those of their opponents. In decisive battles such
as Narva (1704) and Tannenburg (1914), superior Western weapons, doctrine and
soldiery had overcome Russian numbers.

The vast lands of Russia and the country's large population, combined with a wealth
of natural resources and productive capacity, generally provided the strategic depth
that could be translated into victory. GSFG was the premier ground and tactical
aviation force of the Soviet military. It stood as the ultimate example of a carefully
conceived cost benefit analysis that balanced the need for the best equipment and
training available with Russia's historical strength in numbers. The concept was to
produce a fighting force that could most efficiently and quickly win the "next war."

When compared against NATO alliance military forces, the Soviets believed that
balance to be the perfect "correlation of forces." It meant a system that produced a
vast quantity of less sophisticated weapons that maximized firepower and speed. It
meant a system that produced soldiers to run them according to a strict and rigid set of
battlefield standards. And, most importantly, it meant a system that supported Lenin's
attributed dictum: "Quantity has a quality all its own." It was a system that matched
ideology, national personality and resources perfectly. And, in the shape of GSFG, it
meant a system that would ultimately fail.

Comrade Tank

The Soviet military industrial complex did not necessarily produce inferior weapons
and equipment compared to Western standards. Certainly the ZSU 23-4 self-propelled
antiaircraft gun with its quad 23mm guns and superb gundish radar stands as
testimony to a weapon system far superior to anything in Western arsenals when it
was first introduced. The ZSU can hold its own even today. Soviet military production
diverged in three critical ways from Western practice, however, often producing
qualitatively inferior equipment.

First, the Soviet Union favored production of equipment that put a bullet or missile
down range as opposed to those that did not. That is, the Soviet army greatly preferred
weapons systems over logistics. For example, in the mid 1980s, the Soviet Air Force
(including PVO Strany, the Soviet air defense organization) had some 770,000 men
fielding 7,260 combat aircraft. Compare those numbers to 594,500 and 3,925 for the
US Air Force, respectively. In effect that meant for every 106 Soviet airman, a Soviet
interceptor or strike fighter was available for action somewhere. For the US, only one
aircraft per 151 airmen was present, and that does not take into account Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard personnel manning many US fighters.

There was a price to be paid for the number of weapons fielded, however, and the
Soviets traditionally paid it in their support and sustainment services. So, while the
US Air Force deployed 639 aerial refueling tankers during the same period, the
Soviets could muster but 50. Similar ratios were present in the Soviet ground forces
where transport and service support equipment was concerned. While a Soviet
division might have a much higher "tooth to tail" ratio than an equivalent US unit, it
lacked the trucks and maintenance support to resupply and sustain itself in combat for
more than a few days. This situation did not support long-term Soviet power
projection operations or the ability to reinforce quickly over long distances, but given
that Soviet strategic thought emphasized a model of massive combat power up front,
the correlation was satisfied.

Second, the Soviets supported their large inventory by keeping older equipment in
service long past the time when other nations would have retired it. From the late
1970s to mid 80s; the Soviets had nearly 51,000 tanks for an army of 1,800,000 men.
During the same period, the US made do with 12,000 tanks in a ground force of
780,000. That is, the Soviets had over two times as many soldiers as their American
counterparts, but their tank force was over four times as large. This ratio may seem
impressive until the numbers are examined more closely. Some 23,000 Soviet tanks or
nearly 45% of the force were venerable T-54/55 series vehicles. The US also had
1,700 comparable and older M-48A5s lurking about, but these tanks represented only
some 14% of the force. Obviously, GSFG received the pick of equipment, normally
driving to war in the latest from Soviet production centers. Yet in the late 1970s there
were still over 2,600 T-54/55s (sometimes defined by Federal German Leopard tank
crews as "lunch") in the groups of forces, while follow-on forces would likely have
had an even higher proportion of ancient vehicles, at least by modem tanker standards.
But, given the numbers, the Soviets believed the correlation of forces remained
satisfied in their favor.

Interestingly enough, that same tank force illustrates the third way in which the Soviet
military shaped its armies to maximize the power of pure numbers, and that was by
compromising the quality of each individual piece of equipment. Soviet tanks were
lighter and cheaper to build than those of NATO. While unsophisticated, Soviet tanks
built reputations for being rugged, easy to operate, and easy to maintain. Soviet tanks
carried guns heavy for their size. Their hulls and turrets were designed with low
silhouettes that made them difficult for enemy gunners to hit, especially when in a
hull down position.

Given Soviet disdain for service support, the need to make durable equipment made
sense, particularly if it meant their hardware would not break down often under
wartime conditions and it could be fixed by its crew when it did. However, Soviet
industrial production methods (and, historically, Czarist methods as well) if the Tula
musket factory was any indication was known far more for meeting distribution dates
and production quotas than for either precision tooling or quality control. While in
some respects that situation was simply a matter of inferior design or technology, in
many other ways the culprit was official policy, and it especially reared its ugly head
as Soviet generals demanded greater sophistication to match Western weapons
systems.

That is why the vaunted T-64/72/80 series of tanks arrived in GSFG without benefit of
an adequate testing program to work out the bugs or discover their design flaws.
While many military analysts gave the vehicle good marks for its 125mm high
velocity gun, there were human engineering problems as its low silhouette made for a
cramped crew space. The Israelis noted the T-62s they had encountered in Arab
armies had such poor ventilation some of their tank crews actually suffocated while
operating the vehicle.

Similarly, while the automatic loader for the weapon was theoretically an exceptional
idea, Soviet production technology was unable to make the device with the precision
fit needed for it to work correctly, or rugged enough to withstand the rigors of combat.
Indeed, in 1979 the GSFG commander forbade the use of the autoloader on the T-64
because of its disturbing habit of becoming misaligned and reaching back to grab the
baggy trousers of the gunner and attempt to stuff him into the breach instead of the
selected shell. And though the problem was known on the T-62, the newer tanks still
had problems with their automatic ejection system. Instead of tossing a spent shell
casing out a small turret hatch in the rear, the ejector sometimes bounced the hot piece
of metal around inside the vehicle, much to the terror of its crew. Manual loading of
the gun, conversely, dropped the rate of fire from seven to two rounds per minute,
given that there was no loader assigned to the vehicle.

Other flaws were the result of design trade-offs or simply an inability of Soviet arms
industry to match Western technology. The automatic loader allowed for three-man
crew, but that also increased the proportional maintenance burden on each tanker.
Likewise, the inability to match US thermal targeting system technology proved to be
a huge vulnerability. In the 1991 Gulf War, US M-1 Abrams thermal imagers saw
straight through burning oil smoke to aim at and destroy Iraqi T-72s whose crews
were blinded by that same smoke.

Still, the Soviets produced some capable weapons. The ZSU 23-4 has already been
mentioned, and the D-30 122mm howitzer is notable as well. Yet technical
deficiencies that would have been unacceptable to Western armies were not
uncommon. No Soviet fighter aircraft during the mid-1980s had an aerial refueling
capability (outside a few modified MiG 25s). Such a design lowered costs on a per
unit basis and had the additional advantage of removing the need for aerial tankers
noted above. Similarly, though a T-72 was expensive to produce, it was still cheaper
than the price tag of a US M-1 or West German Leopard II tank. And its three-man
crew cut tank manpower requirements by 25%. To the Soviet high command, the
correlation of forces seemed to favor them, and having 51,000 tanks to push around as
a result of their policies was considered sufficient justification for the technical trade-
offs.

Comrade Soldier
Keeping things simple and less technically sophisticated supported Soviet theories
regarding the men who would handle the weapons on the battlefield.

Enlisted Soviet soldiers were drafted at age 18 under universal conscription and
served two years in the ground forces, or three years in the air forces. All training,
including basic training, was accomplished in-house at the soldier's permanent unit of
assignment. This training was rigorous, realistic and primarily focused on repetitive
drill. That latter factor was the logical choice given the short time the soldier spent on
active duty. Discipline was harsh in the ranks, and amenities almost nonexistent. A
typical day for a Soviet soldier looked like this:

0600-0605 hours Reveille.

0610-0630 hours Physical Training and Cleaning Quarters.
0630-0650 hours Washing and Bed Making.
0650-0720 hours Political Interpretation of the News and Inspection.
0725-0755 hours Breakfast.
0800-1350 hours Training.
1400-1440 hours Lunch.
1440-1510 hours After Lunch Rest.
1510-1530 hours Care of Weapons and Equipment.
1530-1830 hours Political Education (Monday and Thursday).
1530-1830 hours Maintenance of Technical Equipment (Tuesday and Friday).
1530-1830 hours Team Sports (Wednesday and Saturday).
1830-1940 hours Individual Study or Training.
1940-2010 hours Dinner.
2010-2140 hours Free Time.
2140-2155 hours Evening Walk and Roll Call.

That regimen was strictly followed six days a week with a half-day schedule followed
on Sunday to allow supervised visits to museums and patriotic sites.

There was no leave or weekend passes throughout the entirety of the soldier's
conscription. Food was simple, but hearty, consisting of oatmeal-like kasha, with
strong tea at all three meals, perhaps beef barley soup at lunch and fruit compote at
dinner.

As noted above, training was geared toward repetitive crew drill as befitted the
collective nature of the society the soldier defended. Individual expertise suffered for
both philosophical and budget reasons. While tank crew might be expert in the
procedures it needed to engage a target, hitting the target was something else; as their
drill was commonly on a simulator. One report, for example, indicated tank gunners in
some units fired only three full size rounds per year, compared with 120 rounds for
US tankers.

In the air, the same situation occurred. Experienced pilots received perhaps 60 hours
of flight time per year, or about a fourth of what US pilots flew. (For the record,
Russian pilots today are lucky to receive 14 hours of flight time per year.)

While woefully inadequate by Western military standards, from a Soviet perspective

their system seemed the most efficient way to train large numbers of soldiers in a
short time. The system also had the bonus of saving precious rubles for the purchase
of extra hardware.

Regarding morale, the US Army Forces Command Opposing Forces Training

Detachment (Red Thrust) normally maintained the "Soviet soldier was not authorized
to have morale," and that statement was not far from the truth. The 1976 Soviet study
lnitsiativa itvorchestvo v voennom dele asked the question: "What keeps the soldier in
his front line position under conditions of maximum physical stress and psychological
strain?" The answer was discipline, with an emphasis on absolute, unquestioning
obedience to orders. While the Soviets were not at all above appealing to such
soldierly qualities as patriotism, the fact several Soviet officers summarily executed
some of their own errant soldiers during the 1968 Czech invasion indicates the
primary leadership technique was a brutal kind of discipline that would have warmed
the heart of Frederick the Great. Indeed, even at Tilsit in 1807 [the conference
between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I of Russia, ed.], Napoleon noted the Russian
soldier could have been the greatest in the world if only his inherent discipline were
united with "the electric enthusiasm of the French."

In retrospect, the system worked and enabled the Soviets, in a vague imitation of the
old Prussian Kruemper system [the Prussian reserve mobilization system, which
trained the military age male population of the state, ed.], to move thousands of
conscripts through their two years of training, thus providing a huge reserve of
recently trained manpower. Discharged soldiers would fill out the many category II
and III divisions that existed in the Soviet order of battle. Those divisions were
maintained at reduced levels of manning during peacetime. Again, the issue was
providing the quantity needed to provide the correct correlation of forces.

Yet there were problems with the system. Suicide was 18 times the rate in the Soviet
army as in the US. Though the troops were forbidden alcohol, ingenious methods,
such as draining the de-icing fluid from combat aircraft to drink its alcohol content,
provided many with the only escape available over two dreary years of service (with
an a further impact on equipment readiness). The biggest problem, however, was an
abysmally low retention rate among soldiers. Only the lowest categories of the
conscript pool, often miscreants who were aware they would never be successful in
civilian society, remained for another tour of duty and became non-commissioned
officers (NCOs). And often the most promising conscript was made a permanent
junior sergeant simply because there was no one else available. Thus, the Soviet NCO
corps was both much younger and much less experienced than its Western
counterpart, an issue partially solved by restricting NCO duties to largely ensuring
whatever the officers ordered was carried out. The kind of lower-level leadership
considered vital among Western NCOs was never envisioned among the Soviets.
Instead, it remained for Soviet junior officers to perform those tasks normally
associated with NCO supervision, as well as the usual leadership functions. Though
the Soviet junior officer might be well trained, educated and disciplined, such duties
left him little time for developing his own expertise or advancing himself
professionally. And that is exactly the way the Soviet-and historically, Czarist- system
wanted it.
Here one must remember the Soviets defined doctrine as an "accepted system of
scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed
forces in them... Military doctrine is a unified system of views and guide to action that
is not open to controversy."

Such a notion fit well with Marxist theory that postulated all human activity as the
product of proven scientific law. It also supported Soviet concepts of command and
initiative. From the 1978 edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Principle 8 was
Strict and Uninterrupted Leadership.

One US Army analyst commented that: "Mission type orders that allow subordinate
commanders wide latitude in conduct of operations are not compatible with Soviet
combat operations. Soviet commanders are expected to exercise detailed supervision
over subordinates to insure plans are properly executed in a timely manner."

Historically such strict obedience to centralized control was critical in governing a

nation as large as Russia-and so it only made sense such policy should make its way
into the military. As such recalling Grand Duke Constantine's Napoleonic era
admonition that officers obey all orders "even if an atrocity"-the practice must be
considered more Russian than Soviet, and its impact in the area of military initiative
proved pronounced. While it is true that originally the Russian language did not even
have its own word for initiative, is equally untrue Soviet military did not appreciate its
value. Rather, initiative was simply defined differently, especially for junior officers.
Given history and the fact the normal Soviet captain was up to his epaulettes
performing NCO business to begin with, allowing junior officers the same decision
making authority as in Western armies was a chance not worth the risk. Instead,
initiative for the junior officer was defined as picking the right solution from an
accepted set of norms, or in rare, "no other choice cases," choosing the same solution
his commander would have. Punishment was common, and sometimes severe, if the
officer were wrong.

Otherwise, guidance from above was the method preferred to solve unexpected
battlefield problems and to that end senior commanders in GSFG and elsewhere were
fond of the practice of "skip echeloning." Using it, Soviet division commander might
use his FM radio to bypass the chain of command and give instructions directly to a
company commander engaged with an uncooperative foe. Initiative was the province
of senior commanders, usually of general officer rank. Problems with the technique
were obvious, such as senior commanders micro-managing battles. But given the
experience of lower level officers, it was not unexpected, and that system also had the
advantage of making the actions of those same junior officers predictable. That in turn
made decision-making much easier for those generals who had the authority to be
creative when moving large numbers of troops and tanks.
From a Western perspective the system was fraught with exploitable holes, but from a
Soviet point of view it was worth the trade-off for masses of easily mobilized and
trained soldiers, supported by masses of battlefield weaponry. It did not guarantee
victory over NATO, but it made victory a reasonable possibility, and it almost
certainly guaranteed the West would never force its way into the Soviet buffer zone of
eastern Europe. As flawed as it seemed to many observers, the Soviet system
constituted a reasonable balance between quality and quantity, the perfect correlation
of forces. And in Soviet eyes, it worked until 9 May 1984.

Collapse

On 9 May 1984, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai
Vasilyevich Ogarkov released an article in Red Star, the Red Army's equivalent of the
Stars & Stripes, that directly challenged the much revered correlations. We now call
that challenge the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (or RMA-a term coined by
Ogarkov in 1982 when he began to study the issue). He predicted a much different
kind of war than Soviet planners had ever envisioned. Ogarkov believed future wars
would be characterized by a battle area in which precision guided munitions (PGMs)
would replace nuclear warheads as the dominant weapons system. Because of their
long range, near invisibility to detection, and growing accuracy, Ogarkov reasoned
PGMs aimed at command nodes and theater missiles would have precisely the same
effect as a nuclear strike, but without the military and political fallout.

Wars would no longer be fought in multiple stages. Instead, there would be a single
initial deployment stage wherein the attacker would immediately and simultaneously
attack the entire depth of the battle area. As a result, warfare would move at a much
more rapid pace than previous conflicts.

Therefore, war would no longer be linear, with two solid lines of divisions colliding
head-on or maneuvering for a flank. Instead, operations would be so fluid combat
units would often find themselves fighting without the security of friendly units to the
flanks and rear. Combat units would find themselves cut off from their higher
command structure and completely surrounded by the enemy, who would also be in
similar straits. Therefore, control of the information spectrum, including not only the
ability to secure and rapidly process large amounts of data but also to deny that ability
to the enemy, would become as important as control of the ground or the sky above it.

To say Ogarkov' s theory came as a shock to conventional Red Army wisdom is an

understatement, and the brilliant military thinker would eventually be sacked because
of those same pronouncements. To the Soviet military hierarchy, the problem was
that, if Ogarkov were correct, the entire Soviet way of war-and the forces that were to
fight in a future war-had become obsolete. Soviet conventional superiority in numbers
was negated by the probable destruction of the centralized command structure needed
to manage those formations, as well as by Western control of the information
infrastructure. That put a premium on the ability of Soviet commanders at all levels to
act quickly, decisively and independently of higher command authority. And these
abilities were something both communist collective-based ideology and Russian
history were uncomfortable with as well as being woefully out of the realm of
doctrine and training.

To make things worse, the Soviet military industrial complex simply could not
produce the technology to create the weapons and communications to compete with
Western armed forces. Only the belief such delicate technology could not possibly
survive on a nuclear battlefield provided some solace.

Meanwhile, the new US Army Air-Land Battle doctrine contained concepts similar to
Ogarkov' s thinking' calling for agility, initiative, depth and synchronicity. But the US
and its NATO allies deployed the arms and equipment to support the doctrine. That
included the channel hopping SINGARS radio, which not only made Soviet jamming
and eavesdropping a virtual impossibility, but also opened the way to control of the
information spectrum. It was, however, the US deployment of its GLCM (Ground
Launched Cruise Missile) and the Pershing II SSM (Surface to Surface Missile)
systems to Europe in 1983 that overturned Soviet complacency.

Ogarkov's assertions were ratified by their deployment. The GLCM could fly
undetected beneath radar and hit with "second window from the left" accuracy. The
Pershing II could fly 1,800 kilometers and hit within "somewhat less than 100 feet" of
its target by using a hard-to-counter guidance system that compared radar images of
the ground to digital maps carried in an onboard database. The missiles' short flight
time also meant they could strike before Soviet commanders could react. And as
Desert Storm and the 2001- 2 war in Afghanistan would demonstrate, the United
States and the West in general actually seemed to be able to make those complex
devices work on the battlefield. To suspicious Soviet generals, those developments
also meant the United States had achieved de facto first strike superiority. And so the
favorable correlation of forces was shattered.

We will never know if Western adoption of many aspects of Ogarkov's RMA

produced anew willingness GSFG to be prepared to go nuclear from the beginning of
any conflict, but if current Russian Federation strategic doctrine is any indication, it is
likely the case. Key provisions of Russia's 1993 document on its military doctrine
indicate Moscow would not use nuclear weapons against an adversary unless it was
attacked first by an enemy using the same devices. The 1999 revision, however,
contained these important changes:
 The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction against itself or its allies and also in response to large-scale
aggression involving conventional weapons in situations that are critical
for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

Evidently Ogarkov' s concept of PGMs as the nukes of the future had taken hold, and
it is probable within GSFG and the Warsaw Pact such realization was already well
entrenched. Lacking the means to counter Western military technology, and with a
military system that underemphasized initiative in combat, the Soviets saw nuclear
weapons and the re-adoption of a preemptive strike as a viable alternative. The
Soviets also declared GSFG a failure through obsolescence. The poor performance of
Soviet doctrine and equipment against Western client states in the Middle East, as
well as the Soviet Union's own abysmal 10 year experience in the Afghan War, a
GSFG victory in Europe was problematic at best and doubtful after 1983. Quantity
had associated costs as well, and in the end those costs proved fatal. As Colonel
General and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev admitted in a speech on 9 February,
1989:

It appears that we should also revise our attitudes toward work on long-
term problems.. .But responsibility for the end results (of the General Staff)
has been understated. The situation is different now...Many difficult
problems that the troops are encountering today can be traced back, with
careful analysis, to our lack of foresight, our short sightedness...The new
nature of the tasks now being solved requires the development of creative
activeness on the part of all directorates and every official; it requires
initiative and inquisitiveness in work.

Epitaph

Perhaps one day someone will build a memorial to GSFG, its tanks, cannon and the
hundreds of thousands of soldiers who served within its ranks. If so, perhaps it would
be proper to take one of the old motor pools and place a memorial plaque in its center,
dated of course, but with appropriate remarks that say something about this
juggernaut' s demise. In that case it might be well to discard Lenin's concept of quality
and quantity. Instead the words of France's tough old Marshal Saxe would seem more
in line with reality. Centuries ago he wrote, Wars are not won by big armies, but by
good ones."
*Life of a Soviet Soldier
-6am: wake up, given 5 minutes to ready yourself for morning drills
-6:05 – 6:40am: Run to drill site
-6:40-7:05am: Running/physical exercises
-7:05-7:20am: Run back to barracks
-7:20-7:40am: Shower/Make bed
-7:40-8:10am – Breakfast of 2 slices of break, bowl of kasha (wheat)
-8:10am -9am: Morning parade/inspection
-9am – 10am: Political Training
-10am – 11am: Tactical Training
-11am – 12pm: Weapons training
-12pm – 1pm: technical training
-1pm – 2pm: WMD defense training
-2pm – 3pm: Combat drill
-3pm – 3:30pm: Return to barracks to wash
-3:30pm - 4pm: Lunch. Potato soup, 10 grams of fish, 3 slices of bread
-4pm – 6pm: Clean weapons/equipment/base
-6pm – 8pm: “Self-Tuition”. Physical exercises/torture devised by sergeants
depending on your behavior during the day
-8pm – 8:30 pm: Dinner. Kasha (wheat), 2 slices of bread, potato
-8:30pm – 9pm: Free time to self-reflect on communism
-9pm – 9:30pm – Evening parade/inspection
-9:30 – 9:45pm: Return to barracks/prepare for bed
-9:45pm: Lights out