Preston Lee 

HMW 16 
 
1) Assuming voter utility is equally increasing in the effort of the two candidates, in 
equilibrium both candidates will put forth effort an effort level of 10 units, voters will be 
indifferent between the candidates and candidates will be indifferent between running 
or not. To prove this, suppose by way of contradiction that e​a​ ≠ ​ ​e​b​. In this case it still 
cannot be that either is greater than 10, because both candidates would prefer ​not ​to 
run. So it must (without loss of generality) be e​a​<e​b​<=10. Then Burr would win and reap 
benefit 100-e​b​2​ while Adams gets nothing. Adams has incentive to deviate to some 
proposal in range (e​b​, 10] in order to win. Both candidates have this incentive to deviate 
as long as this interval has positive length. So the Nash equilibrium must be e​a​=e​b​=10.