Dart Philippines, Inc. v Sps.

Francisco and Erlinda Calogcog

[G.R. No. 149241; Aug 24, 2009]
Nachura, J.

FACTS: Dart PH entered into a distributorship agreement with the respondent spouses for the direct
selling distribution of Tupperware product. Their contract was entered into on Mar. 3, 1986, it was to
expire in Mar. 31, 1987 (1 year) and was subject to an “automatic renewal clause” for 2 1-year terms.
Another distributorship agreement was entered into on Apr. 1, 1991 and was to expire 1 year later, and
also renewable on a yearly basis. After the expiration, Dart PH informed the respondent spouses that
they’re not willing to renew anymore because of the latter’s violation. The respondent spouses made a
handwritten promise to comply with the terms. Dart PH was convinced to enter again to renew (until
Sept. 30, 1992). Dart PH now subject the respondent spouses’ books for audit. A 2nd audit was made
and now the respondent spouses refused to have their books audited. The consequence of their refusal
meant that they can only order stocks on a “pre-paid basis”
Before the expiration on September 30, 1992 respondent spouses filed before the RTC a case
for damages plus injunction against Dart PH. The allegation was that Dart abused its right when they
subjected the respondents to audit and when they only accepted order on a “prepaid basis”. Damages
were allegedly P1.3million.
The RTC issued writ of Preliminary Injunction and ordered Dart PH to comply with terms of
contract. Dart PH filed for certiorari with Court of Appeals since the contract had long expired. The
Court of Appeals said that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because the Distributorship
agreement had long expired (nothing to enforce anymore). Respondents moved for the admission of
their supplemental complaint with the RTC. Respondents alleged that Dart PH refused to award
benefits to its sales force and there’s violation of the Distributorship agreement because the products
on hand and in their custody were not paid, Dart refused to transfer its goodwill, Dart’s action resulted
in loss of sales force and that Dart made “inutile respondents’ investment in their building”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dart PH abused its right when it conducted a 2nd audit, changed the terms to
a pre-paid basis, and ultimately when it denied to renew their agreement?

HELD: No. there were violations already pointed out in their very first agreement, which caused the
respondents to give a hand written promise. The correspondence prompted respondents to make a
handwritten promise that they would observe and comply with the terms and conditions of the
distributorship agreement. This promise notwithstanding, Dart PH was not barred from exercising its
right in the agreement to conduct an audit review of respondents’ account. Thus, an audit was made in
July 1992. In September 1992, petitioner informed respondents that it was causing the conduct of a
second audit review. And as explained in petitioner’s September 11, 1992 correspondence to
respondents, the second audit was intended to cover the period not subject of the initial audit (the
period prior to January 1 to June 30, 1992, and the period from July 1, 1992 to September 1992).
Because respondents objected to the second audit, petitioner exercised its option under the
agreement to vary the manner in which orders are processed—this time, instead of the usual credit
arrangement, petitioner only admitted respondents’ purchase orders on pre-paid basis. It may be noted
that petitioner still processed respondents’ orders and that the pre-paid basis was only implemented
during the last month of the agreement, in September 1992. With the expiry of the distributorship
agreement on September 30, 1992, petitioner no longer acceded to a renewal of the same. From these
facts, we find that bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of petitioner. Petitioner’s exercise of its
rights under the agreement to conduct an audit, to vary the manner of processing purchase orders, and
to refuse the renewal of the agreement was supported by legitimate reasons, principally, to protect its
own business.
The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and
capriciously, to injure or prejudice respondents. The rights exercised were all in accord with the terms
and conditions of the distributorship agreement, which has the force of law between them. Clearly,
petitioner could not be said to have committed an abuse of its rights. It may not be amiss to state at
this juncture that a complaint based on Article 19 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing
to support it but innuendos and conjectures.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUCMAN M. IBRAHIM et al.,

G.R. No. 175863, February 18, 2015
J. Perez

Facts: Lucman Ibrahim owns a parcel of land located in Lanao del Norte. In 1978, NAPOCOR took
possession of the sub-terrain area of the land and constructed underground tunnels on the said
property. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao
and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus projects.In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim)
requested Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct or install a motorized deep well on the
parcel of land but it was rejected on the grounds that the construction would cause danger to lives and
property by reason of the presence of the underground tunnels. Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to
pay damages and to vacate the sub-terrain portion of the land.

Issue: Whether or not Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the land?
If yes, are they entitled to the payment of just compensation?

Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim. The Supreme Court cited Article
437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and
of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations
which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances.
Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Therefore,
Ibrahim owns the property as well as the sub-terrain area of the land where the underground tunnels
were constructed.

On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be paid a just
compensation. Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep wells but was
prevented from doing so by the authorities because of the construction of the tunnels underneath the
surface of the land.

Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the
same for the construction of the deep wells. It has been shown that the underground tunnels have
deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value.

It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to
public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the
event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the
principle that persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and for
public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, VS. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent

GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
FACTS: Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in
Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete
mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination. In the 2nd semester,
his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in
the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he
attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class
in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class
and was not able to take the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not
having to take the bar exam.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING: In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot
be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the
Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to
ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages
in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his
favor. The decision was affirmed with modification.
Barons Marketing Corp vs Court of Appeals and Phelp Dodge Phils Inc
[G. R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998]

Facts: On August 31, 1973. Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of its dealers of electrical wires
and cables effective Sept. 1, 1973. Defendant was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelps Dodge’s
electrical products. Barons Marketing purchased, on credit, from Phelps Dodge’s electrical wires and cable in
the total amount of P4,102,483.30. This was then sold to MERALCO, Baron Mktg being the accredited supplier
of the electrical requirements of MERALCO. Under the sales invoices issued by Phelps Dodge to Barons Mktg
for the subject purchases, it is stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount of atty’s fees and collection. Baron’s
Mktg paid P300,000 out of its total purchases leaving an unpaid account of P3,802,478.20. Phelps Dodge wrote
Barons Mktg demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due Phelps Dodge. Baron Mktg responded by
requesting if it could pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1%interest per month
until full payment, this request was rejected and Phelps Dodge demanded full payment.
Phelps Dodge then filed a complaint before the Pasig Trial Court for the recovery of P3,802,478.20 and
it also prayed to be awarded with attorney’s fee at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded, exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000, the expenses of litigation and the costs of suit. The court ruled in favor of Phelps
Dodge with the exemplary damages of P10,000 and recovery of P3,108,000. Both parties appealed. Phelps
Dodge claimed that court should have awarded the sum of P3,802,478.20. It also said that the amount awarded
was a result of a typographical error. Barons Mktg claimed that Phelps Dodge’s claim for damages is a result of
“creditor’s abuse” and it also claimed that Phelps Dodge failed to prove its cause of action against it.
· Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the correct amount but only with the 5% for the
Atty’s fee. No costs. Barons Mktg then alleged that the appellate court erred its decision.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of right?
Held: No. a creditor cannot be considered in delay if he refuses to accept partial performance because, unless
otherwise provided by law or stipulated by the parties, a creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial
performance; stated in Article 1248.
“Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the
prestation in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor
may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.”
However, if good faith necessitates acceptance or if the creditor abuses his right in not accepting, the creditor
will incur in delay if he does not accept such partial performance.
Carmen Quimiguing vs Felix Icao
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the
orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment
of complaint. Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations
with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by
Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees. The
defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had
been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to
the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of
action.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint?

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an
independent cause of action for damages. This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre
de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through
persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil
Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts. Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the
decision; with costs against Icao.
G.R. No. L-19671 July 26, 1966
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants and
appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: In February 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño secretly married each other and of course
without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated
by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but
Escaño withdrew from having a re-celebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with
another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she
acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not
result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier
(because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-
appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez
and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left
without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable
to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño
and not her parents.

On the part of Escaño’s parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the
Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of
the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC
reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and Michelle S. Ybanez, petitioners v. QUINONES, respondent

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
Peralta, J.

FACTS: Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store in Cebu City and
decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098. While she was walking, she was confronted by a Guess
employee and told her that she failed to pay for the item she got to which respondent replied that she did and
showed the receipt. Respondent then suggested they talk about it in the Cebu Pacific office in the mall. While
in there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the Guess employees in front of their clients. The
next day, Guess employees event sent a demand letter to respondents employers. While the RTC ruled for
them, Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good faith.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the Court of Appeals awarding moral
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones?

RULING: Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent
was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The principle of abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in the case. Respondent complained when petitioners embarrassed her
and insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance of an official receipt in her favor.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of rights were
enumerated. “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements stated are complete
in the present case. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made when respondent
already presented the black jeans with the original receipt. Second, they accused the respondent that not only
did she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent
to the respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for assistance in collection of the payment but also
to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance with the purpose of its
establishment and not abused. Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.

G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013

JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, vs. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN
DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding its judgment
sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The decision being contested
sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested
by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to
Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente
which was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the
water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed ownership of property to
Pastorfide?

Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention violated
Art. 19. New Ciivil Code of the Philippines which states that “Every person must, in the exercise of his right,
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was
invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During the
party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive
Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was
invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted
him out of her party.

Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances
painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the
party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no
other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had
turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party. Respondent
filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon
Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes
to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer
of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the
part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story
was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs
from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article
21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

BRICCIO A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID.

G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.

FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her aware
that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all
the files of the computers found therein. David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that
are related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David inferred
that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued regularly.

Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC conducted a
fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was anonymous. The
CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA
wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA ruled that the search was legal
because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly conduct search and seizure in
the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and
seizure.

ISSUE: Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without
his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy – lawful?

RULING: The Supreme Court said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of
an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

The Court also found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not have a
separate office space nor did he use a password for his computer. He would have visitors which he let them use
his computer. The CSC also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything on their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-
spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business
purposes.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA'S
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook
several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject
data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. The Cebu
RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the STC violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject
digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large. Without any
evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without
their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show
that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,
and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited
the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy. In US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to
the Web page or the photograph itself.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the
content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the
post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested,
that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to
be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me
Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through
the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to
the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes
more manifest and palpable.

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises
Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public
life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in
some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s
half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his life and
demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. After some bargaining as to the
amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as
LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises
Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales
the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country. Because
petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of
P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the
picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his
Answer that the episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and
occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent
has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration
and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he
paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him.
As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Vda. De Gonzales.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to
privacy notwithstanding that he was a public figure?
2. Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla
considering that the latter was a public figure?
3. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and of the press?

HELD: 1. YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.
The right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while
it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2. YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to
portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held
in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory,
but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own
rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
3. NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in
film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. One
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in
a given situation or type of situation." In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted
by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
Respondents.
ABAD, J.:

Facts: Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when the latter learned afterwards that Rustan
had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Prior to the marriage
of Rustan, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him. Irish rejected the proposal and
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages,
using the following numbers: 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to
ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The
sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers Rustan used.
Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures and threatened to spread
the picture through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish was: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum
ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.”
Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under the police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the picture and his text
messages. Irish asked Rustan if he could meet her at Lorentess Resort. Rustan came with a motorcycle and
was arrested by the police upon walking towards Irish. The police searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.

Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC found Irish’s testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. Thus the RTC found Rustan guilty of the said crime.
Rustan appealed but denied, then raised the case to the higher court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture pasted with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation
of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262.
RULING: Yes. RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women. This means
that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to
protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an
obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That
must have given her a nightmare. In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every
element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. NO. 146322, DECEMBER 06, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING AND RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ERNESTO
QUIAMCO, RESPONDENT .
CORONA, J.:

FACTS: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.
They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent's business establishment, Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero
could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's
collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent's men."

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in
charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced
back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in
his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle.
Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's
instruction and over the clerk's objection, took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Respondent moved
for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the
motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint and denied petitioner Uypitching's
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental,
Branch 37.He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2)
utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and
malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and
integrity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the corporation abuses their right of recovery?

HELD: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as
seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.

True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, which
the petitioner fails to do, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. Petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court
order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement.

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as
well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. The basic principle of human
relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that
a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability.It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners' instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners' exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious
to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus,
the totality of petitioners' actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law,
petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

Villanueva vs. Rosqueta

G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010

Facts: Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group
of the Bureau of Customs, tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001. But five months later on
June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against
her will on orders of her superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera to respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such
appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva
then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a TRO,
enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial
court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals.
The CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days
and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

While the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs
Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

Respondent filed an action for damages against the petitioner Villanueva alleging that he prevented her from performing
her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. The RTC dismissed
respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner.

The CA reversed the RTCs decision, citing the abuse of rights principle, it held that Villanueva acted maliciously when he
prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as
Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring
the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case?

Held: Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal
right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 f the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he
suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of
the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest
mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As
the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, a party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act,
otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the
defendant’s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.