Mindoro. 6However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant of the Court of Appeals.
of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original
land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed
and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on
July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of
dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one
entered confirming the registration and title of applicant,
Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased
and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their
aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land
covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the
corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the
issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found
that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the
Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally
acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want
of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of
1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under
Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first,
which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the
opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication
not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of
general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the
other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without
it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over
a particular land registration case. As to the second,
publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary
as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would
be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of
Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the
challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus
elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's
counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy
should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave
abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in
LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of
general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86
for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of
initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication
in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with
the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to
comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in
the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of
Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the
law also mandates with equal force that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded
the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus,
it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the
required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover,
the other requirements of: publication in the Official
Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site
and other conspicuous places, were complied with and
these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to
make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
 The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical
terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question
boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale
behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by
the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the
court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes
an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute. 15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute
rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon
its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the
term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial
hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of
which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of
the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to
or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or
whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has
been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the
land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive
evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same,
for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the whole world.
This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when
all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to
or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited
to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the
claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all
of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in
its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach
the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any
excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the
statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority
to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there
is room only for application. 19There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171631 November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA
PAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of
land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R.
dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose
R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for
registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529)
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application
covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters,
situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under
survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos.
3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together
with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the
respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2)
Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation
that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084;
(4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-
01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7)
Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay
dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not
covered by any land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9)
Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has
been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is
an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June
18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of
a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents
claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse
possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it
in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of
possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of
the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or
for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the
application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that
the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration
on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that
the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments
receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application,
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land
applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not
subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no
other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General
Default6 against the whole world except as against the Republic.
Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their
application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted
respondents' application for registration of the subject property. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio
R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No.
65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land
described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of
Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825)
Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and,
upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the
order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly
undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA,
in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were
able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents
acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who
have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA,
likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF
THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO
EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS
WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of
owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive
possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property
is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the
Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to
present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented
several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985,
1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-
interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by
the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to
date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain
that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land
serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert
that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the
Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support
by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by
the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by
no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is
misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient
and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public
domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the
subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance
Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to
do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court
held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the
land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a
certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and
that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by
the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the
kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within
the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to establish that the
subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.20 Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming
However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents’ the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino
19, 1939,21 testified that since he attained the age of reason he R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela
already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a
them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825)
the subject property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land.24 Manila, is DENIED.
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements SO ORDERED.
with no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-
interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While
Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their
parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from
their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show
Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in
possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the
application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.26
Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration
issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year
1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date.
What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a
bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that
their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in
the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in
1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same
for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact
that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a
clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR
DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements
for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to
nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment
of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses
for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad.
s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in
San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time
of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino
citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration
of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer
Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have
presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby
approves the said application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-
003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de
Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian
citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street,
San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta
T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree
of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued,
there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road
right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court
based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were
still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy
from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against
the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In
justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject
realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large
sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is
merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been
passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since
1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular
reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled
that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for
the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the
time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-
appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against
them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in
question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November
11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's
approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having
been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue
presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not
acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately
owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the
certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further
argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately
owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it
public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land
applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of
ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the
confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land
are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby
entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate
of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
(Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within
the alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of
Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals
that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants
"whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had
been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-
spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly
executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978
(Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors
in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But
what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the
subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such
that when they filed their application for registration in 1987,
ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them.
(Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of
possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses only
since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments
of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing
cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants
(respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing
of the application for registration." This is not, however, the
same as saying that respondents have been in possession "since
June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO.
141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in
respondents' possession. They fall short of the required
possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if
they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to
the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would
still be short of the required possession if the starting point is
1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was
declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of
petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of
title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor,
or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not,
however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141)
reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs
the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for
only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-
interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar,
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since
June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession
of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of
the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land
were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession
thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of
their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the
legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as
an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114
SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has
already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the
Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa,
declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by
law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation
is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by the statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum
of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . .
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that
open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of
alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property
(Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA
602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on
such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and
(National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the
land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA
78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for
the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA,
149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and
introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified
true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of
land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro
Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly,
the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's
thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but
were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed
acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The
applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under
the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court
decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate
court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us
on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a
Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19
of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not
present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest
derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo
real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial
grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment
title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the
"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which
could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director
of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis
of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been
in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts
could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of
Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that if had been a
private property even before the Spanish
conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil
935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come under the exception,
for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since
time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this
Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37
[1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals,
per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an
applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act must secure a certification from the Government that the
lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more
than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the
burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at
all to prove that the property subject of the application is an
alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire
property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under
the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish
their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation
of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. .
. . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial
possession," it means possession of which no man living has
seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned
from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was
never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding
that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that
(their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property
allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the
subject of both his last will and testament and the project of
partition of his estate among his heirs — in such manner as to
remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and
Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on
31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect
to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his
possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents
for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application
...
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American
citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had
acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over
the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not
merely because they were American citizens at the time of their
application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession
of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession
in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public
domain; such that at the time of their application, as American
citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by
virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of
time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.
In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact
that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar
to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him
as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the
relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to
enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee
of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square
meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total
area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee
of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes
which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject.
Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a
natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship
remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time
they applied for registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already private lands;
consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land,
were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of
transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens
at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private
land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate
of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP
185, must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it
refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other
laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall
be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit
to the register of deeds of the province or city where the
property is located a sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his
spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode
of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his
intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he
lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is
presently a citizen; and such other information as may be
required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do
not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is
to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less
implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land
registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the
judgment of the land registration court approving the application for
registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued.
And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the
application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet
to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen
of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject
to registration by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate
on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which
is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the
respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at the time they
acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer
citizens of the Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow
that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired
the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no
longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not
disputed that the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the
land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks
of a transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not
appear that the private respondents have observed "the limitations
provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the
land in the private respondents' name have been complied with. I do
not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully
submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act
and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted
to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If
we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we
should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2)
paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion, of the majority
opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took
effect on 16 March 1982, doesnot purport to cover the set of facts
before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were
natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have
been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as
I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who
were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-
born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg.
185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before
the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof,
imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the
quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes
transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously
acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg.
185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land
by the respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen
of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject
to registration by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate
on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which
is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the
respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at the time they
acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer
citizens of the Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow
that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired
the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are no
longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not
disputed that the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the
land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks
of a transfer of private land to a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not
appear that the private respondents have observed "the limitations
provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the
land in the private respondents' name have been complied with. I do
not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully
submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act
and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted
to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If
we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we
should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2)
paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion, of the majority
opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took
effect on 16 March 1982, doesnot purport to cover the set of facts
before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were
natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have
been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as
I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who
were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees
of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-
born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg.
185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before
the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof,
imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the
quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes
transferee and by such land taken together with other land previously
acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg.
185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land
by the respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether
prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land
registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that
would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the
assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes
Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein
that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14,
captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y
Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated
several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of
named oppositors who had established their title to their respective
lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial
and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon
the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan
Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to
Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental.3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A.
Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion
sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the
Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half
(1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by
the Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the
heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases
were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor
of the Spouses Abierra.4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed
of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and
the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous
possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of
registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the
rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of
the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of
registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why
the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands, though it does not
escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months
before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines
in December of 1941.
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to
appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent
proceedings.5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and
received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently
presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and
ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the
1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in
main that the right of action to revive judgment had already
prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should
have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration
before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal
was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive
period for enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil
actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration
cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been
especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply
with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that
the original records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and
could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and
laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article
1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred
by statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not
challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition
of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish
that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the
State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of
Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in
that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the
Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null
and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become final
more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside,
the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive
prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the
double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent
action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of
registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had
become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that
laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a
right for nearly seven (7) years.
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a
more general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and
bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches
nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration
case."12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that
a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of
registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not
be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact;
in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which
the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the
judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to
issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been
filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered.14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render
inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated five
(5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De
Banuvar, et al.15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for
the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a
1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches.
In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in restating with
approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was
again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v.
Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v.
Ibanez, etc., and Poras17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v.
Llorente,18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent
purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land
never prescribes.19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of
the rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been
repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier,
the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases
later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of
Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare
decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent
any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent
strategy employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign
that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never
existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which
provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of
judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence,
the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should
apply to land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize
that the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of
the current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil
actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific
law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary
civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of
land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of
a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary
proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact.
Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no
further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial
duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No.
1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments;
hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the
sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason
being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of
execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first
place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the
judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final,
the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an
order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment
and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the
Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as
well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original
certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of
the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by
the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration
Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be
signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the
owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration
book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title.
No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing
applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the
title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land
court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of
registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the
judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the
decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of
Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged
with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of
amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their
part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the
prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such
applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of
our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the
imposition of an additional burden on the owner after the judgment in
the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate
such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration
Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From
another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there
would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar
circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of
judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds
from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription.
The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA,
with whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is
sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic
standing judgment or order from a land registration court that remains
unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance
of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical
value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years
has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented
decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not
be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial
evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of
the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of
causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the
issuance of the decree of registration.
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of
Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription
and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was
intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any
express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were
governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general
situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not
arise from an original action for land registration, but from a successful
motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously
adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such
motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the
pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the
order of cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an
argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the
portion ofShipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely
restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the
judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier.
However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with
good reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale provided by
the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the State
no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the
same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the
filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not
on the applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as
precedent on still another point, relating to its pronouncements
relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum
shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been
utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on
final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that
since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in
reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in
the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu
proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property
involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for
registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a
different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a
decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the
other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in
their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been
registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing the
issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of
prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action
to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the
competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year
prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court
did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing
the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus
denied the petition on that score.
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of
title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the
petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title
pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have
stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the
laches of the petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to
exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property,
marked by their inability to oppose the other application for
registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the
five (5) -year reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma
that negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to
detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution
of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of
Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final
judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded
by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those
circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the
part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor
of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their
right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was
indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the
same property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine
rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, with
which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal
design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or
superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless
that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the
continued application ofSta. Ana as precedent.25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal
viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopezconcerning the applicability of the
rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to
say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good
standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription
nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land
registration case, especially when the said judgment has not been
reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by
another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much as a newly-
carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating
the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that
the 1941 Decision constituted res judicatathat barred subsequent
attacks to the adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The
Republic submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only
after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in
this case. We doubt that a final decision’s status as res judicata is the
impelling ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is
more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different
case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s
arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that
the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard
decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or
her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then
Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In
this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly
acquired the rights of the original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-
interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still
in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her
predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the
Republic does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such
proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA,
AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A.
LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the
Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No.
18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January
29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November
10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor
of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the
same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio,
Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David,
Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the
opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s application by Branch
21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final
and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the
filing of petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on
the ground of res judicata. 31ªvvphi1.nét
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the
sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res
judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision
belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No.
1437-N;5and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by
respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the
cause of action in the dormant judgment passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the
basis of res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal
may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon
the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of
this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private
land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming
the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and
ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration
court’s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza’s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership,
and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No.
N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not
issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief
of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7,
Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral
extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in
court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special
work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim
of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land
registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the
decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the
sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must
be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no discretion in the
matter.However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer
the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of
the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to
execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not
lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6,
Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28,
1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision
of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce
the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar
to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by
virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,
DENIED.Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123346 March 31, 2009
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134385 March 31, 2009
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR
CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA
DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR,
AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MALABON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In the Court’s Resolution dated 14 December 2007,1 the Court
constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the
instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of three
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina
Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior
Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior
Member. We instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude
the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail,
the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations
based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as
may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their
claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and
Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the
evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat
the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge
Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and
valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior
right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT
as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject
of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of
OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those
proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government
and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the
title acquired by the Government through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining
which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance
with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.2
The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with
the Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty
Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok
Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs
of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were
directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-
page Report3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division
submitted the sealed Report to this Court.
Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary
matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion
beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that
they may submit their comments and objections thereon in accord
with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court."
We deny the motion.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the
Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance
with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of
the case to a commissioner "by written consent of both parties,"
whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the
consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of
Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains
proper even if the adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that
Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any
suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to
the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and
other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect.
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report
would not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the
promulgation of the Court’s action on the Sealed Report and the
adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present Resolution
quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other
substantive segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the
issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis
for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
 I.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by
the Special Division in its Report.
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
DIMSON v. ARANETA
CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
[SC-G.R. No. 134385]
On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First
Instance ["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his
complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-
plaintiff.
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute
owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro
Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan
Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had transferred the subject
property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on
14 November 1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ
discovered that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA
wherein an "agricultural school house" is erected and that despite
repeated demands, the latter refused to vacate the parcel of land and
remove the improvements thereon.
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is
the absolute owner of the land being claimed by DIMSON and that the
real properties in the Araneta Compound are "properly documented
and validly titled." It maintained that it had been in possession of the
subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims of
DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly barred by prescription.
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among
others, certifications from the Land Registration Commission attesting
that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed property, are
in the names of ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also
offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered
owner of the land described therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the
title of DIMSON over the disputed property xxx
Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with
CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two
cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the
title of ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No.
34819, the Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of
ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, which declared
null and void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994
registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA failed to
sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified was obtained
through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof.
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or
New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters
from different government agencies and Department order No. 137 of
the Department of Justice, among others.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the
Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain
status quo until the finality of the aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994 covering the
Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No.
36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and
added that there were subsequent certifications issued by the
government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report
and the Senate Committees’ Joint Report which attested that there is
only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on 3 May
1917.1avvphi1
CLT v. MANOTOK
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A
COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery
of Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry
of Deeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila)
["CALOOCAN RD"].
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a
basis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988,
it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I.
Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage. HIPOLITO’s title was , in turn, a direct transfer from
DIMSON, the registered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having
acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966
issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557.
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their
titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty
(20) parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo
Estate. In substance, it was contented that the title of CLT was an
offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of
Lot 26 by way of attorney’s fees to its predecessor-in- interest, Jose B.
Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this connection, further contended that
the portion of Lot 26, subject of the present controversy, had long
been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and
hence, there was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could
have been validly conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS
alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been
issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on Sept
ember 1918 by virtue of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas
Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210
allegedly covered an approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of
Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco
Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920
for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square meters
was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina
Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to
Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later replaced with the
names of Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided
and as a result of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six
(6),under the names of each of the children while the remaining title
was held by all of them as co-owners.
Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines. These properties
were then later subdivided by the National Housing Authority ["NHA"],
into seventy-seven (77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified vendees.
As it turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these
lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the
Manotok Estate Corporation.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the
parties, approved the creation of a commission composed of three
commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles.
Accordingly, the created Commission convened on the matter in
dispute.
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura
submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report ["THE MAJORITY REPORT"]
finding that there were inherent technical infirmities or defects on the
face of TCT No. 4211, from which the MANOTOKS derived their titles
(also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro
Victoriano submitted his Individual Final Report ["THE MINORITY
REPORT"] dated 23 October 1993.
After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed their
respective comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the trial
court, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10
May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, among
others, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before
the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of
damages which was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for
reconsideration, but said motion was denied by said appellate court in
its Resolution dated 8 January 1996. After the denial of their Motion
for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before
the Supreme Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately filed
by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association,
Inc., ["STO. NIÑO"], were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the
report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which
concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed
and registered on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005
DECISION"], the Supreme Court, through its Third Division, affirmed
the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which
declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA,
the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and legal findings of
the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said
titles. Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the
same were accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally,
should not be disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme
Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within its function to review
factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties.
THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005 Decision.
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the
Solicitor General ["OSG"] intervening on behalf of the Republic, the
Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 ["THE
SUPREME CCOURT 2007 RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005
Decision and categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
1917, which was the basis of the propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON.
However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand the cases to this
Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding conclusions:
"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register
of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which
should be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may
also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994
resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on
(19)* April 1917, although such dated cannot be considered as
the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
(19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The
fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to
an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the validity
of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error
alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT
claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by
them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at
bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as
inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga
with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or
similar to that at bar.4
II.
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence
before the Special Division. The Report names the evidence submitted
to the Special Division for its evaluation:
CLT EVIDENCE
5
In its Offer of Evidence, CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and
testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the case filed by CLT
against STO. NIÑO in Civil Case No. C-15491, ["CLT-STO NIÑO CASE"].
These pieces of evidence include, among others, the Majority and
Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of
the evidence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIÑO CASE
consisting of various certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer,
tax declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of
correspondence.
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate
and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued to them and
their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the
Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola
and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax
declarations and real property tax receipts; the Formal Officer of
Evidence of Philville Development & Housing Corporation;
["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case No. 15045; this Court of Appeals’ Decision
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of
Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557
and the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted in
evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits of Rosa R.
Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio, Atty.
Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy of a
photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and
reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and
TCT No. 177013 of CLT.6
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,7 DIMSON submitted
the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to these cases,
various certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994,
subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer
Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative positions of properties within Lot
25-A; the Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15
January 1948 between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta
Institute of Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to
dispute some of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests
and official receipts.
ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title,
specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT No.
26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. 13574. It also
marked in evidence the certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the
DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land
Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Malabon City;
survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit
of Engineer Felino M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also
offered the certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of
Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications
issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of
Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge Palma’s Order
dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17 (which
pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947)
and its official receipt and; the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
994.89
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the
Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to
determine the following issues based on the evidence:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back
their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
dated 3 May 1917:
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the
Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court
2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence. Assuming they
are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said claims?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of
Judge Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are
true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish
a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of the Araneta
and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the
subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are
those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its title
acquired by the government through expropriation?
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining
which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of
Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were
entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they
claimed title thereto. One set of properties was disputed between CLT
and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta
and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an
order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to
register in his name properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge
Sayo’s order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge
(later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muñoz-Palma of the CFI
of Rizal. Dimson’s titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917.10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169,
which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by
TCT No. 13574 and 26538.11 Araneta was then and still is in possession
of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title, OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for
recovery of possession against Araneta.
Another property in Dimson’s name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold
the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-
177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917.12 Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property
covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced
their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both
reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917.1avvphi1
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied
on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their
claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held
that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings
before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike
the opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims to title
based on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April
1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division:
Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and
CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that their previous
postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the
supposed validity of their titles, that which emanated from OCT 994 of
19 April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT
994, the Supreme Court has yet again allowed them to substantiate
their claims on the basis of other evidentiary proofs:
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in
this special proceedings, by way of the evidence already presented
before and such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record,
that either there had only been an error in the course of the
transcription or registration of their derivative titles, or that other
factual and legal bases existed to validate or substantiate their titles
aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.13
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear
that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayo’s Order dated 18 October
dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates of title, i.e.,
TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the
Maysilo Estate. Pertinently, with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON,
which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were
inscribed on the face of the instrument.
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of April in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume NA pageNA , as Original Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No. ______
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No.
994/NA, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-
described land is concerned.14
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no.
15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now disputed
Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the
certificate of title issued to DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the
derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as
the OCT which they emanated had already been declared inexistent.15
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any
explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April
1917. At the same time, it rejected CLT’s explanation that the
transcription of the erroneous date was a "typographical error."
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their
successor-in-interest CLT, had failed to present evidence before this
Court to prove that there had been a mere typographical error in the
transcription of their respective titles with regard to the date of
registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion
that there had only been a typographical error in the transcription of
its title.16 On the other hand, while DIMSON had refused to
categorically assert that there had been such a typographical error
causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any reason or
argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19
April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they
simply had no basis to support their proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to
the erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT 994, DIMSON are
left without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis
of other evidence not presented during the proceedings below, which
would effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over
the disputed properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had
previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity
of their title.17
Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly
constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was
allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz Palma. On that
issue, the Special Division made the following determinations:
It should be recalled that in their appellee’s brief in CA-G.R.CV No.
41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied the falsity of
TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can
be determined by a controlling decision."18 Jose Dimson expounded on
his reliance as follows:
"In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS)
case, Jose B. Dimson’s (as private respondent) title TCT No. 15167
issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered
on April 19, 1917, is overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued
on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT 994, registered on May 3,
1917.
(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson’ (plaintiff-appellee) title
TCT No. R-15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978, is overlapping
with defendant-appellant’s title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not
derived from OCT No. 994."19
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or
annotation on their respective certificates of title, the present inquiry
then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then
Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Civil Case No. 4557 ["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayo’s Order dated
18 October 1977 ["SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be
validated and authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary
claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD
ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit:
"Whether the factual and legal bases of Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order
and Sayo’s 18 October 1977 Order are true and valid. Assuming they
are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject
properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims
of Araneta and the Manotoks?"
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly
traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point out that their
title was issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in
Case No. 4557 and entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of
OCT No. 994. DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538
were mere microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore,
inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities
which voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings
and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present evidence to defeat
their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis.
As we see it, Sayo’s 18 October 1977 Order, which apparently
confirmed Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to
the validity of the manner by which it was arrived at.
It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the
ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Clerk
of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No.
4557 for purposes of determining the genuineness and authenticity of
the signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order granting the
confirmation. A certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said
court, appeared and manifested in open court that the records
pertaining to the petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome
Rivera, et al. could no longer be located inasmuch as they had passed
hands from one court to another.
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire
records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that he had
not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of
Judge Palma on the Order duly proven because all that was presented
was an unsigned duplicate copy with a stamped notation of "original
signed." Equally perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557
on file, said file pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil
case.20 Thus:
"Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor
the Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to determine the
genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this
court order and which order was a basis of a petition in this court to
be confirmed. That is the reason why we want to see the genuineness
of the signature of Judge Palma.
COURT:
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a
duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original signed.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see the original.
Court:
I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was
brought here, I checked the records, there were so many pages
missing and the pages were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate
original and there is a certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty.
Molo.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are
surprised why it is missing.
Court:
We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muñoz Palma.
Atty. Contreras:
May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our
original vault LRC application no. N-4557 but the applications were
certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leaño involving Navotas property
because I was wondering why they have the same number. There
should be only one.
Atty. Directo:
Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number?
Atty. Contreras:
No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a
petition after decree record.
Atty. Ignacio:
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case.
xxxxxx
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palma’s 13
June 1966 Order had been recalled by a subsequent Order dated 16
August 1966, ["RECALL ORDER"],21 wherein the trial court dismissed
the motion filed by DIMSON on the court’s findings that " x x
x whatever portion of the property covered by OCT 994 which has not
been disposed of by the previous registered owners have already been
assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his assignees, as a
result of which there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein
supposed assignee Jose Dimson."
However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due
execution of the Recall Order considering that its original or even a
certified true copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the
two parties relying on it despite having been given numerous
opportunities to do so.
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was
ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the DIMSON titles over
the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the
fact that the supposed "share" went beyond what was actually due to
Jose Dimson under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should
be recalled that Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order approved only the
conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of whatever share of Bartolome
Rivera has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject to
availability of undisposed portion of the said lots."22
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations
contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that, based on
the assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and
"(C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal was only
1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to
be the surviving heirs of Vidal will inherit only 197, 405.26 square
meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their
share.23 Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7
hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that Jose Dimson
would only be entitled to more or less five (5)hectares of the Maysilo
Estate. Obviously, basing only on TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which
covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters),24 it is
undisputable that the total properties eventually transferred to Jose
Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palma’s 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that "x
x x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose Dimson, the
same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land
Registration Commission as correct and in accordance with previous
orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this
court for final approval.
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not
submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268 which
allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove
that the same had been duly approved and certified correct by the
Land Registration Commission. What was submitted before the RTC
and this Court was only the Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which
notably does not bear the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even an
inspection of the exhibit for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which
could have, at the very least, proven the authenticity of the DIMSON
title.
Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in
proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of the allegation of
contending parties that since the survey plan upon which the land
titles were based contained the notation "SWO," meaning that the
subdivision plan was only a product of a "special work order," the
same could not have passed the LRC. Neither was it duly certified by
the said office.25
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities
attending Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169.
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was
originally surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911, October 4-21 and
November 17-18, 1911." Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the
original survey is reflected as "Sept. 8-27, 1911" and nothing
more.26 The variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSON’s
titles are all direct transfers from OCT No. 994 and, as such, would
have faithfully adopted the mother lot’s data. Unfortunately, no
explanation for the variance was ever offered.
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169
indicates that not only was the date of original registration inexistent,
but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been
presented prior to the issuance of the said transfer certificate. This
manifest from the notations "NA" on the face of DIMSON’s title
meaning, "not available." It bears emphasizing that the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title to the purchaser without the production of
the owner’s duplicate is illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and
does not confer any right to the purchaser (Philippine National Bank
vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds must,
therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary instrument if the
owner’s duplicate is not presented in connection therewith. (Director
of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of the
Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927].27
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title
emanating from one common original certificate of title were issued
on different dates to different persons or entities covering the same
land, it would be safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at
an earlier date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the
process of registration.28 Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive
registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim is derived
directly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. x x x"29
xxx
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No.
25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly confirming the
Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON
filed the Motion only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after
obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name.
Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then
Judge Palma was not a simple land registration case wherein the only
purpose of Jose Dimson was to establish his ownership over the
subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the
subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimson’s claim over
the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed properties. The case did
not partake of the nature of a registration proceeding and thus,
evidently did not observe the requirements in land registration cases.
Unlike in a land registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to
file an action before Judge Sayo to seek "confirmation" of Palma’s
Order dated 13 June 1966.
So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the
statute of limitations in land registration cases,30 as well as Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of
judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or
extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases, is clearly not
applicable in the present case. The legal consequences of laches as
committed by DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of
Rule 39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the
confirmation of DIMSON’s title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that
they derive the validity of their certificates of title from the decreased
Jose Dimson’s 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome
Rivera ["RIVERA"] as an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal
["VIDAL"]. However, the records of these cases would somehow
negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report
of the Land Registration
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old
on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429
and 4496).31 It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years
old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other
hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have
been born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained
anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Rivera’s alleged
grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson.
Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of
Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo
Estate.32
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice
Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007
Resolution. To wit:
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the
name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a
transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in
turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on
April 19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito
acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18, 1977
approving the compromise agreement which admitted the sale made
by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly
acquired ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the
CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his
attorney's fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and
29 that were undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the
properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the
CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated
October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994,
particularly the following entries, showed:
AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en
cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y
16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a
favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con
Deogracias Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el
certificado de Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 29, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion — September 9, 1918
10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: — Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el
cuanto a una extencion superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados,
descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano
P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el segundo con
Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina
164, Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion – September 9, 1918
10:50- AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918
pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the
order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot
No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently,
Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not
transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the
Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title was not
approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to
be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994
was therefore perplexing, to say the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial
and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need to
preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the
trial and appellate courts simply disregarded them.33
The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the
validity of Jose Dimson’s titles, which he obtained consequent to the
1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal
recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate
obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966
Order of Judge Muñoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
B.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS
and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of
DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and the
MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were issued
much earlier than the titles of the latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and
even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership
from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the
properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn
acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by
the Special Division as it evaluated CLT’s claims.
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it
maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where its claim
emanates. It argued that its case against the MANOTOKS, including
that of STO. NIÑO, was never decided based on the doctrines laid
down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals34 and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.35
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to
submit "new" competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling on the
alleged flaws of the MANOTOK’s titles, "the findings and conclusions
of the court-appointed commissioners as adopted by the trial court,
then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28
September 1995 and finally affirmed in the Supreme Court’s Decision
dated 29 November 2005, therefore stand, as there is no reason to
disturb them."
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge
Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of their finality. Lastly, CLT
asserts that the properties covered by the MANOTOKS’ titles and
those covered by the expropriation proceedings did not property
pertain to and were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it
maintains that the MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of
their titles the expropriation undertaken by the Government as a
means of staking their claims.
To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered
by TCT No. T-17701336located in Malabon, Caloocan City and
designated as "Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268." TCT No. T-
177013 shows that its mother titles is OCT No. 994 registered on 19
April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipoloto executed a Deed of
Sale with Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988.
By virtue of this transfer, Hipolito’s TCT No. R-1799437 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, CLT’s TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-17994.
Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the deceased Dimson
who was allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the
basis of TCT No. 15166.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of
DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as
the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLT’s propriety
claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the
strength of Hipolito’s title and that of DIMSON’s TCT No. 15166.
Remarkably and curiously though, TCT No. 15166 was never presented
in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this
basis alone, the present remand proceedings remain damning to CLT’s
claim of ownership.
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations
identical to those of DIMSON and consequently included the defects in
DIMSON’s title, the fact that whatever typographical errors were not
at anytime cured by subsequent compliance with the administrative
requirements or subjected to administrative correction bolsters the
invalidity of the CLT title due to its complete and sole dependence on
the void DIMSON title.38
IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims
of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special
Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled by the courts
below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as
their valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless,
particular issues were raised as to the validity of the Manotok and
Araneta titles independent of their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT
No. 994 vis-à-vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted
the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimson’s claim over
that of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538
and 26539, from which Araneta derived its titles, thus:
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of
Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have acquired TCT
13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the
other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record
No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that
it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First
Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429,
issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on
March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A
Bartolome Rivera et al.)
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in
Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna,
respectively.
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma.
Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994,
where they were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land
Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925
was only registered and was stamped received by the Office of
the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953
when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23,
1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract, Deed of
Sale and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0.
So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given
a special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him
in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said
Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly
registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of
Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in
Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of
defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit
5 defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of
defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That
was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in
Court.
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of
593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only
390,282 sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in
its name, when the registration of the document entitled
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was
suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by the
Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was
filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec.
53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title
shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any
certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any
deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owner’s
duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is
not reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT
26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists
and intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits
16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539
(Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T 6196
Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said
title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x) which could
have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47
(Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of
Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land
Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document,
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13,
1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear.
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the
value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land
Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents
presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of said
defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate
officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the
land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him
from all its documents marked in evidence which were obtained only
lately when they needed for presentation before this Court.3940
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual
contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title
was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings of the
Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has
established by direct evidence that its titles were validly derived from
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it
asseverates that these were unfounded and thus, labored to refute all
of them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and
Sayo Orders which was the basis of DIMSON’s titles.
The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to
OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the titles submitted, its
predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon ["RATO"], one of
the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994, who was allotted the share of nine
and five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share
of the Maysilo Estate.41 For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of
the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the title
of RATO need to be reassessed.
Verily, attesting to RATO’s share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O-
994 of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of OCT no. 994, records the
following:
"12343/O-994 – Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - - Queda cancelado el
presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension superficial de
1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No.
25-A-3, an virtud del auto dictado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia
de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had
expedido el Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35
del Libro de Certicadads de Transferencia.
Date of Instrument – Julio 28, 1924.
Date of Inscription – Agosto 1, 1024 – 10:19 a.m.
SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds
Agosto 19, 192442
In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924,
TCT No. 869243 which covers "Lote No. 25 A-3 del plano del
subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible), "Hacienda
de Maysilo," situado en el Munisipio de Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x
x x."44 The parcel of land covers an approximate area of "UN MILLION
CUATROCIENTOS CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros
cuadrados con NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o
menos." As reflected under Entry No. 14517….T-8692,45 the parcel of
land covered under this certificate of title was subdivided into five (5)
lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First
Instance of Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858
and 21859 were issued.
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of
title issued in RATO’s name,46 cancelled TCT No. 869247 with respect to
the property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857,48 was a derivative of
OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of
subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O
Record No. 4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No.
2653849 and TCT No. 2653950 which were both issued in the name of
Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it
covered a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of the subdivision
plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate
area of 581,872 square meters.51 Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was
cancelled by TCT No. 619652 whose registered owner appears to be a
certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872
square meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-
10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C.
As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the
name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title were traced from OCT No.
994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 13574 was issued in favor of Araneta Institute
of Agriculture on 20 May 1949.53 It covers a parcel of land designated
as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot
25-A-3-C. It has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters.
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of
TCT No. 6196 is the following:
"Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 – SALE in favor of the ARANETA
INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the property
described in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and
issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13574, page 74,
Book T-345 in the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II,
S. of 1949 of Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Biñas).
Date of Instrument – May 18, 1949
Date of the Inscription – May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m.54
TCT No. 2653855 in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of
land designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan Psd-10114 being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters.56
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784,
which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture. TCT No.
7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282
square meters.57It would appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No.
34819 consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was
eventually cancelled by TCT No. 21343.58 As per attachment of
ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 march 1980 filed in Civil Case No.
8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of
land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a
portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No.
4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square meters.59 However,
for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or
certified true copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court.
In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-
owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was assigned Lot No.
25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued
in his name. RATO held title to these parcels of land even after its
subdivision in the 1930’s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was
again issued TCT No. 21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still
covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those
that ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the
lot as either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained,
thereby proving identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all
of them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. For
purposes of tracing ARANETA’s titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear
that the evidence presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos.
7784 and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and
legitimacy of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well
substantiated by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles
deserve validation.
Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the
imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial court in
invalidating ARANETA’s titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETA’s predecessor-in-
interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in Rato’s name
refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their
issuance. This is being questioned inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers
to a decree issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was
issued for ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR
No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a
mere typographical error and did not have any effect on the validity of
their title. It further contended that the number "4429" was the case
number of Decree No. 36455 and was used interchangeably as the
record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree
and Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETA’s predecessor-
in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETA’s
predecessors-in-interest and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind
of this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the
effect of rendering the previous titles void sans any strong showing of
fraudulent or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person making
such entries. Fraud is never presumed but must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.60 The strongest suspicion cannot sway
judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass.61
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc.62 acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title,
specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and "it is
certainly believable that such variance in the copying of entries could
be merely a typographical or clerical error." In such cases, citing with
approval the decision of the appellate court, the technical description
in the title should prevail over the record number.63
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the
technical description of the land, as stated on the face of the title, had
not been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the
source of titles. In ARANETA’s case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No.
25 had been verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all
located in Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect
entries on the title, the properties, covered by the subject certificates
of title can still be determined with sufficient certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name
of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from which said
titles had supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what
partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject lot were
not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August
1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 are not even the immediate
predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No.
21857. Logically therefore, these two certificates of title could not
have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being the preceding
titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains
to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical condition of the copy
submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a
definite conclusion.64 On the other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994
found on the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically
recorded the issuance of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.65
The other flaws noted on ARANETA’s certificates of title pertained to
its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343. As we have
discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of
TCT No. 21857 and a certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as
Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a
copy of said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to
declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission,
especially so since TCT No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of
TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been
preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of said
title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETA’s failure to submit TCT No.
21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000
square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538, we find that
the trial court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of
TCT No. 26538 before they finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the
Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that
portions of this piece of land had been sold to various individuals
before the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 march 1948.
Naturally, since the subject land had been partially cancelled with
respect to the portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the
area of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer
to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by TCT No.
26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us to
conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the
area covered under the derivative title will be much more than its
predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this is not so in the case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA
should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering that the
registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was
suspended/denied and no title was received by the Register of Deeds
of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on
march 4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial
court, shows that the suspension or denial was merely conditional
considering that the person seeking registration had give days within
which to correct the defects before final denial thereof. As we see it,
the Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the
registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the
vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title to the land
was subsequently issued free from any notation of the alluded defect
creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to
comply with the condition imposed. This is especially true since the
notice itself contained a note, "Just Completed," written across the
face of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTC’s observation with regard to Araneta’s
failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the subject land
(Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps ½ portion of TCT
15159 and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other ½ portion of said TCT R-
15169. The trial court further noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson)
and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping
each other within Lot 25-A. That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson)
along bearing distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2
shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343
(Araneta)."66
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K," it becomes apparent that the said evidence
relied upon was only a private survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands and was based only on photocopies of relevant land
titles.67 What is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to adequately
explain his observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative
positions of the lots.68 From all indications, the conclusions reached by
said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETA’s title was the absence of any entry
on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the
alleged sale between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by
ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. 26538 submitted to the trial court
contained entries only up to the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1)
lack of entry with regard to the issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of
ARANETA considering that the same was issued a year later and; (2)
entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company
which was entered way back on 21 August 1929.
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together
with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a voluntary agreement with
the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property.
Moreover, no conclusion should have been reached regarding the
total cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784
cancelled the former certificate of title to the extent only of Three
Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square
meters.
Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of
ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos. 2653869 and 21857,70 which
are both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and
cover parcels of land located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these
certificates of title reflect different registered owners and designation
of the land covered.
Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating to TCT No. 26538, registered
on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de Alvarez as the
registered owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No.
19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan Psd-5254 being a portion of Lot
No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and
refers to a certain TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions.
Exhibit "N-Dimson," on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857
was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I. Tuason de Perez
married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of
land described as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of the consolidation and
subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It ahs an area of
436 square meters and cancels TCT No. 21856.
Exhibit "Q-Dimson"71 consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of
land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No. 44 of the
consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372
square meters. It was issued to Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated on 7
May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 46118.
Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no
identity of the land could be found. The Supreme Court, in the case of
Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc.72 agreeing with the Court of
Appeals’ dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing
fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another
title to another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as
follows:
"On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same
number as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu
Country Club, Inc.’s reconstituted title bears the same number as the
title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General
Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19,
1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August
5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on
July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the inauguration of the
Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued
after the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with
No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration
were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the
Philippine Republic x x x."
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this
Court’s Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON objected to the
admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA
failed to submit the original copies of these certificates of title and
contended that the "originals" contain different "contents" from their
own Exhibits M, N and Q.73 The fact that the entries contained in
ARANETA’s pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSON’s do
not automatically make ARANETA’s exhibits inferior replications or a
confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding the
non-submission of the "original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON
in their Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of
Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).74 In any case, we
find the objections unwarranted considering that certified true copies
or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been
submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings.
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement
Company at the time the special power of attorney was executed by
Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of
conveyances, the same only proves that Philippine Land Improvement
Company was not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving
the existence or non-existence of the company at which time it was
executed. In effect, the company was not precluded to enter into
contracts and be bound by them but it will do so at the risk of the
adverse effects of non-registration under the law.
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title
constitute as clouds on ARANETA’s titles are not for this Court to rule
upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not
for the Heirs of Dimson to rely on the weakness of ARANETA’s titles
and profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of
their own titles since it is not within our office to decide in whose
hands the contested lands should go, our task being merely to trace
back the parties’ claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.75
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose Ma. Rato y
Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special
Division correctly assessed, among others, the reference to Decree No.
4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of
Araneta76 as mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said
titles, "4429" being the case number of Decree No. 36455, and the
designation and the technical description of the land on those titles
not having been shown to be erroneous or variant with the source
title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court
had failed to take into account the several conveyances of TCT No.
26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which
explain the difference in area between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No.
26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with
the titles held by Dimson was based on a private survey which had not
been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The alleged absence of
any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of
the sale of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according
to the Special Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta
entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring
the ownership of the subject property. Finally, the Special Division
noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had
submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to
properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the
Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we affirm the
same.
B.
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more
controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact that there
could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3
May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of the Manotoks.
However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings
undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At
least some of the titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced
from the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic.
The Special Division explained the milieu in full:
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of OCT
994 of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot No. 26 had been a
subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P.
Leuterio.77 The notations reads:
"Ap. 6655/O-994 – Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en
cuanto a una extension superficial de 3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y
16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y descrita en elLote No. 26 vendida a
favor de Alejandro Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con
Diogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido
el Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22.
Date of the Instrument – Aug. 29, 1918
Date of Inscription – Sept. 9, 1918 – 10:50 a.m.
(GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
"Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Cerficiado en
cuanto a una extension superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados,
descrita en el Lote No. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano
P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Deogracias Quinones y el Segundo
con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4211,
Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22.
Date of Instrument – Aug. 21, 1918
Date of Inscription – Sept. 9, 1918 – 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was
issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the
"Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described
in this Certificate" was the sale executed in favor of
Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No.
5261 was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales.78
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in
the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria P. Gutierrez,
Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla;
Juana Francisco Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon;
Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco
Felipe Gonzales y Narciso married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion
Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr.
Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111
which reads as follows:79
"A/2111 – Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo,
a Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia
esta en (not legible) los tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida
entre la misma y el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del
Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila
Sala II, dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el
Expidiente de intestado del nombrado Francisco J. Gonzales, No.
49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y se expide otre a
hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86,
Tomo T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de dicha
orden da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES,
Registrado de Titulos."
The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with
subdivision plan Psd-21154.80 Partitioning the lots among the co-
owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six
(6) certificates of titles were individually issued81 to Francisco
Gonzales’s six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT
No. 1374 was issued in favor of all the children.82
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-
1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were
eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots
were obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired
the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC
acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-
B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT
No. 232568 was issue don 9 May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2
of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an
area of 4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one
Basilio Caina who was issued TCT No. 7526 which cancelled TCT
Nos. 36657-62 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.83
2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from
one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an
approximate area of 2,876 square meters. Buenaventura’s
ownership was evidenced by TCT No. 7525,84 deriving the same
from TCT No. 36657-63.85
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having
an area of 20,000 square meters.86 This certificate of title was
traced from one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792.
Custodio was in turn a transferee of Guillermo Rivera, the latter
having been issued TCT No. 7760 by virtue of sale between him
and then People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation ["PHHC"].
The latter title eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the
Republic.87
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an
approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRI’s certificate of
title was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of
Filemon Custodio, a transferee of Jose Dionisio, who was issued
TCT No. 9853. Dionisio’s title in turn cancelled the Republic’s
TCT No. 36657-63.88
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an
approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the
same by virtue of sale between him and Francisco Custodio,
holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was a transferee of
Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale between Caina and the PHHC, the latter’s
certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.89
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it
and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No. 21484.
The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area
of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in turn a transferee of
Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the registered owner of TCT No.
21013 by reason of sale between him and PHHC.90 Under Entry
No. 6277/T-21485, it would appear that portions of the
property covered under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had
been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the
Manotok Estate Corporation, et al. interposed no objections
subject to the payment of just compensation.91
7) TCT Nos. 2640592 and 26406,93 both registered in the name
of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively. TCT
Nos. 9773 and 9774 were registered in the names of Romulo,
Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto,
[JACINTOS"], before the same were transferred to MRI by
reason of sale in favor of the latter. The JACINTOS’ certificates
of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015
issued in the name of Filemon Custodio94 Both TCT Nos. 8014
and 8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of
tracing TCT No. 7792/T-39 to the Republic’s certificate of titles,
this certificate of title was not submitted in evidence.
8) TCT No. 2640795 issued to MRI was traced back to the title of
Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the registered owner of TCT
No. 8404 by virtue of sale between the two, thereby
transferring ownership to MRI. On the fact of TCT No. 8404, it
would show that it cancelled TCT No. 8013/T41 but there is no
showing in whose name TCT No. 8013 was registered and what
certificate of title it cancelled.
9) TCT No. 3390496 of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon
Custodio by virtue of sale between the latter and MRI.97 We
note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there
is no showing whether the same could be traced back to the
Republic’s certificates of title.
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an
area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the registered
owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the
Republic.98
11) TCT No. 25487599 bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot
55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. This
certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55,
also registered in the name of MRI. It would appear that MRI
acquired the lot covered under TCT No. 41956 from one
Joaquin Caina who was the registered owner of TCT No. 25715
being a vendee of PHHC.100
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15,101 which was
purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta who held TCT
No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the same land from one
Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. 7827 was eventually
cancelled by Villacorta’s land title.102 It would appear that TCT
No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. 7826/T-40 but there is no trace to
whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title
it cancelled.
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3
of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the
Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square
meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 53122 in the
names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and one Silvestre
Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No. 53122 in turn
cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus
Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo (1,000
square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No.
21315/T-107 but there is no indication to whom TCT No. 21315
was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.103
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot
6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
MRI’s certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in
the names of MRI (27,750 square meters), Roberto S. David
(3,0000 square meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters).
It would appear that TCT No. C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124
registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio
Sebastian and Jose Madulid.104 MRI also submitted in evidence
a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid
thereby subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as
per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.105 Again, we note that
TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records
are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it cancelled
and to whom the same was registered.
15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters,
was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name
of MRI, after the same was subdivided into two lots, namely,
Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145
registered in the name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in
favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557)
12836 to (36563) 12842.106
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot
No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which has an
approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously
registered in the names of MRI (4,650 square meters), Ricardo
Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square
meters) under TCT No. 53123 by order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per
agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123
in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were
Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square
meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square meters).107 Like some
of the other titles, TCT No. 21346 cancelled TCT No. 21316 but
there is no trace of this latter certificate of title.
17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot
No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354 square meters
and a by-product of TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI,
after the same was subdivided under subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45
registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership
thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary
sale.108 TCT No. 8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this
latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for
purposes of tracing back to the Republic’s title.
18) TCT No. 165119109 was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of
Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan Ignacio
[SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-
36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was cancelled.110 It would
appear that TCT No. C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173
but TCT No. 35266/T-173 was not submitted in evidence.
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation,
covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an
area of 23,206 square meters, was derived from the certificate
of title held by PhiVille Development and Housing Corporation
under TCT No. 197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land
by virtue of Deed of Exchange between it and PHILVILLE DATED
9 May 1991.111 TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-
974 but there is no trace what certificate of title the latter title
cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS,
including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered
by such titles for taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had
successfully traced back some of their certificates of title to the valid
OCT No. 994, they having acquired the lots from some of the vendees
of the PHHC after the same were expropriated by the Republic from
the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster
this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven
properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by
the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster
this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven
properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation which were later
consolidated and subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign
of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point.112
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by
the State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever
previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug
explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals,113 and then Associate Justice
(now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA:114 "In an rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed
title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance."115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of then
Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in
Cadorette v. U.S.,116 which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack117 that "[b]y giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may
be obtained by voluntary conveyance."118
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects
of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211
was issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any
and all defects that may have attended that particular title would have
been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently
acquired by the State through eminent domain. The Special Division
noted as much:
As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should be
upheld because they were derived from the Republic’s valid
certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’ titles can be
traced back to the Government’s titles as a result of the expropriation
in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of
the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition
resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain
that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the
alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the
exercise of the State of its inherent power did not affect or render
invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when
land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the
former owner.119
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the
Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial
court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority
Report
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which
the Manotok titles were derived.120 The Special Division, however,
concluded that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it was
determined "outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon
by the parties." To wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with
regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as the majority
report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of
the tasks which the trial court confined them to perform. The
MANOTOKS also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT
failed to introduce evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned
geodetic engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the
MANOTOKS further maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or
legal bases to prove the authenticity and validity of the Palma and
Sayo Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for
being conditional and having resulted to the issuance of "duplicate
certificates of land title."
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS’ titles which
were based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases of the
alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the
veracity of the said report.
The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that
the parties approved the creation of a commission to resolve only
these two issues, to wit:
"x x x
These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer
Certificates of Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot
No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of
the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the
plaintiff and the property covered by the titles of the
defendants overlap.121
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial court’s
conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings therein
were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the
parties. Specifically, the deductions with regard to the technical
infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not
involve the question of whether or not the subject properties were
identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or whether there was
overlapping of titles. Records bear out that the MANOTOKS took
exception to the procedure taken citing therein the "ultra vires" acts
of the two Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and
inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging
from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision
plan, lot number and survey plan. Evidently, these defects go only as
far as the certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic.
Remarkably, no specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS’ titles
indicating any irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners
who signed the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos.
4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic)122 were irregularly and
questionably issued without any reference to the MANOTOKS’
certificates of title.123 Otherwise stated, the imputed flaws affect only
those certificates of title issued prior to those registered in the name
of the Republic. No flaw had been specifically identified or established
in the proceedings below, which would taint the titles held by the
MANOTOKS in so far as the regularity of their issuance is concerned.124
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the
validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular
titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the
Republic of the Philippines by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of
PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title which could not
be traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically,
MRI’s TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-
17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MEC’s TCT No. T-232568. As to
these certificates of title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific
reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled
and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and
registered. Thus, we find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to
their origins.125
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise
summary of its conclusions:
In précis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the
evidence on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON and CLT to
substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said
titles are derivatives of OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19
April 1917, as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which had consistently anchored
their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917,
have, in this remand proceeding, been able to support their claims of
ownership over the respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except
in the case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the
validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the
origin of their titles.
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the
tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to
defeat said claims, this Court finds that, as discussed above, such flaws
are inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein
contending parties are contradictory to each other and stand to refute
the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said
certificates of title have correspondingly been subjected to dispute on
the basis of separate and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial
difference between the imputed flaws allegedly tainting said
contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA, on the other, is that the imputed flaws purportedly
beleaguering the respective certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA relate to the mechanical and technical aspect of the
transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to the
import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the
fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA
had been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed
portions of the Maysilo Estate.
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT
primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise affecting the
very crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from
RIVERA, whose title is questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON
and CLT cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws
are hard to overcome as they delve into the substance of their
proprietary claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to
overcome their onus and instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws
of the adverse parties. For these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT
should be declared a nullity.
xxx
From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme
Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the following conclusions
as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances:
1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only
one OCT 994, the registration date of which had already been
decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917. OCT 994
which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date
is null and void.
2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have
already discussed, the certificates of title of the deceased Jose
Dimson and his successor-in-interest, CLT, having been traced
back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917, are NULL and VOID and
thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON and CLT.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo
Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the validity of their
respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary claims.
While the existence of said Orders are admitted, the legal
import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of
legality on the titles of DIMSON and consequently, of CLT, more
so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA, respectively.
4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy,
particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT,
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime
in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to
tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the
Republic, were able to establish that some of their certificates
of title had indeed originated or were derived from said
expropriated parcels of land.
 5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title
covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were derived
from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately
showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said
mother title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or
portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned by RATO, had been
well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of
DIMSON.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established
rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over
the contested properties, we find that the imputed flaws on
their titles cannot defeat the valid claims of the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the Maysilo
Estate.126
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the
Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As we
earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to
establish their claim to title for reasons other than the fact that OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be
noted that the instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose
Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment
of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of
evidence was on Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their
respective claims of ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever
weaknesses in the claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their
causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions
for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.127 In
an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim.128
We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the
Special Division. They are as follows:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby respectfully makes the
following recommendations regarding the validity of the conflicting
proprietary claims as interposed by the herein contending parties:
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of
DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their
successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus
invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land.
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims the
MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following
certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot
No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate
area of 2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of
20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an
approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate
area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate
area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797
with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of
approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters.
With regard to the following certificates of title,
namely:
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC.
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of
1,0000 square meters.
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of
1,000 square meters.
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of
1,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of
1,802 square meters.
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI
from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area
of 3,163 square meters.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate
covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters.
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an
approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision
plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area
of 4,650 square meters.
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of
more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product
of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No.
8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-
36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of
Sale between said Spouses and MRI.
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision
plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square
meters.
The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to
make specific references to the particular certificates of
title which they cancelled and in whose name they were
registered, may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the
alternative, subject the same to further technical
verification.
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA respecting
parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as
Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of
581,872 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.129
The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they
logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the
Special Division, which this Court adopts.
The third recommendation – that eleven (11) of the titles held by the
Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical
verification – warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third
recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently
indicate that they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the
Republic when it expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the
1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed by
the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus
have benefited, as they should, from the cleansing effect the
expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous
titles. However, although the Special Division did not concede the
same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third
recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude that such titles
were false or fraudulently acquired. Absent such a finding, we are
disinclined to take the ultimate step of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a
valid mother title – OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark
contrast with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which
all advert to an inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok
titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and certainly the Special
Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the
face of the titles gives cause for the Court to annul the same.
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the
Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks
and CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in
the antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks derived their claim.
The Special Division concluded that such findings had been reached by
the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra
vires. Assuming that such flaws were extant, they existed on the titles
and anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the
Government. As stated earlier, such expropriation would have
cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles
enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from
the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the
rejection of the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to
therein could not form the basis for the annulment of the titles
involved. Indeed, the Special Division’s rejection of the Majority
Report further diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles
referred to in the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles
specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the
Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow.
In addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special
Division in rejecting the Majority Report – that the determinations
were made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by
the parties -- does not categorically refute the technical findings made
therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the
Manotoks’ titles listed in the third recommendation, should be
sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Division’s
third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the
Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles
so as to sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more
particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without
any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be
any cause for the annulment of those titles from a proper party’s end,
then let the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special
Division and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including
other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest,
if any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their
legal claims over the subject parcels of land;
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the
parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title
are declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2
of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an
area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of
2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000
square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate
area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of
2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of
25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an
area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of
approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters.
3) The following certificates of titles in the name of
ARANETA are hereby declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as
Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of
Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 390,383 square
meters.
4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty,
Inc. or Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit:
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an
area of 1,0000 square meters;
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an
area of 1,000 square meters;
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an
area of 1,000 square meters;
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802
square meters;
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from
one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163
square meters;
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision
plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of
more or less 20,531 square meters;
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate
area of 27,850 square meters;
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan
(LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650
square meters;
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more
or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No.
9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in
the name of Filemon S. Custodio;
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of
the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said
spouses and MRI;
k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan
Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as
determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the
said titles "failed to make any specific reference to the preceding
certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they
were subsequently transferred and registered," thereby leading the
Supreme Court "to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to
their origins."130
Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142549 March 9, 2010
FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred
Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described
by this Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over
three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of
Monaco and the Vatican."1 What we have before us now is touted as
"one of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in
recent history."2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing
with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular
petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at
the outset, applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such
applicability must be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to
come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy
that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking
respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to comply with the Order3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424,
entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC
Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of
them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional
share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal,
commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the
property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994,
allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this
Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals,4 reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of
Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and
not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration
rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya
granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that
case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the
co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred
Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered
that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the
Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion
to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated October 21,
1997 and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated December 30,
1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be
issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-
owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in
proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby
directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners for the following lots, namely:
xxxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by
this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan
City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because
they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before
proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA
Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the
Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for
petitioner a letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments:
1) the 1st Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st
Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular
No. 97-119 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in
part:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view
of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement
dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry
conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under
DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No.
994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917
(and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land
Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this
Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy
attached, stating the following:
xxxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st
Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the
Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading
relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in
its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x
x.10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on
Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the
following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It
was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.,
former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true
and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
government findings showed the physical and genetic
impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of
Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and
in bad faith, by issuing "certifications" and/or written
statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or
registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was
issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad
faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration
of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had
previously issued certificates of title in the names of other
individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated
May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the falsity of
April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT
No. 994.11(Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was
being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." We
quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former
Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear
that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong
impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the
double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering
the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of
land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our
Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is
mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a
stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens
system of land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the
issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No.
994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long
been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in
the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of
the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the
proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of
Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will
result to duplication of certificates of title covering land previously
registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the
Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title
which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely
invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B.
Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer
certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there
must be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of
certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94
SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it
behooves every official of the government whose functions concern
the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a
mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their
loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country
and people at large."12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st
Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by
this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of
Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established
ruling made by the highest Court of the land." According to petitioner,
respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there
is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a
reversal of the decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No.
994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a
decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify,
much less set aside the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped
judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of
no effect.14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused
the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated
October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases
similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest,
and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for
"condemnation and reproof of the highest degree."15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely
ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424
cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that
she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, other than this action."
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds
for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent
Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of
Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September
22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997
made by the committee created by Department Order No.
137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent
fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or
modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if
any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet
in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce
claims of damages.17
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of
Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties
being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of
mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and
could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he
wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the
Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in
this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ
Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee
due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of
Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the
investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and
personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo
Estate. According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of
initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon,
Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of
Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event
of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to
determine the involvement of and to recommend the actions to be
taken against person(s) and/or officials and employees of this
Department or its agencies who may appear to have participated
therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial
actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority,
and other units and attached agencies of this Department, with
respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking
into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo
Estate."18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the
purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding
investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend
policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the
Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt
with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles,
including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based
on this committee’s report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the
subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures,
and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must
follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles
covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer
certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was
merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said
that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated
September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January
18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due
process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that time.
Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was
accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an
opportunity to petitioner’s counsel to present petitioner’s case to the
LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to
be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues
that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course
of a trial where petitioner’s claim for damages can be fully litigated.
This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the
case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for
mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even
specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court.
There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees
for her claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be
outrightly dismissed.20
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary
Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he was the
cause of public respondents’ failure to comply with their ministerial
duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf
of the public respondents affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not
charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant
of relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondent’s
active participation. 22
Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did
not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court,
petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of
private respondent x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a
judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation
be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate
were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles
derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court
had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is
entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses
incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the
respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of
Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A
certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last
preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in
such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall
be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or
costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order
that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to
be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function
that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had
caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a
court order that had already become final and executory. Petitioner
likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions
within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed
their Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim
that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the
property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the
complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land
described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the
proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land
described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue
statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings
embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the
DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department
proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the
conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the
issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names.25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On
May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and
her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been
partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo
Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion
Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad
Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel
Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la
Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana
Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de
la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason
y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y Patiño, German
Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y
Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa
Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to
their respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled
PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION
PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which
is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation into English
consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both
made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the
same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of
above-enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the
undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration
of the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases
pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await
the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo
Estate.26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue
the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-
plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded
petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as
would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public
respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related
to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not
unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC
Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial
duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be
dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or
at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial
doubt exists.27 It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action,
when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either.28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if
compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in
the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public
respondents’ refusal to comply with said Order. Did public
respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s
request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration
Authority29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in
the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which
is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted
by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the
case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will
be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue.30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA
officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in
cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of
the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case,
which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register
of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC
Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering
the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights
of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could
respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require
the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in
the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply
that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA
Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons
for his refusal to grant petitioner’s request.31 There was, therefore,
sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the
RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that
OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-
plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case
resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as
well as the succeeding resolution33 in the same case dated March 31,
2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No.
994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate
and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings
and conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases
decided by this Court34 which have held that there are two existing
OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her
co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated
earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no
longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this
Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles
invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from
the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are
void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the
true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that
there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case"
doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.35
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994
allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the
following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on
3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as
the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of
the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date
cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title
took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted
Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier
dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.
they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, the petition for lack of merit.
especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. SO ORDERED.
994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the
factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.36 (Emphases
supplied.)1avvphi1
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate
reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court
constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases
on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt
the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider
whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may
be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the
parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as
evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted
by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the
Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them
without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports
must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the
courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that
could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x
x.
xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude
the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.37
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence
engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter’s
conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent
conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only
one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been
decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and
categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of
19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil
Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear
several attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a
matter that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential
access to a vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision
from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting