Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2004
Repository Citation
Aliabadi, Sara A., "Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both
Supports and Opposes a Moratorium" (2004). W&M Law Student Publications. Paper 8.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/studentpubs/8
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/studentpubs
GENDER ASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR INTERSEXED INFANTS:
HOW THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRIVACY
BOTH SUPPORTS AND OPPOSES A MORATORIUM
Sara A. Aliabadi 1
I. INTRODUCTION
"Don't try to cut us up or change us or shame us or hide us,"
cautions intersexed individual Hida Viloria.2 Viloria is among those
Americans 3 who view the practice of performing gender assignment
surgery on intersexed infants as unnecessary, physically harmful, and
psychologically damaging to its "victims." 4 The procedure of gender
assignment surgery, which is traditionally performed on intersexed
individuals early in their infancy, is an effort to surgically alter the
genitalia of infants born with ambigious genitalia so that they conform to
that of a normal male or female. Many researchers and physicians
consider gender assignment surgery to be a valid and appropriate form
of treatment for intersexed individuals. 5 However, intersex
organizations analogize the surgeries to female circumcision and sexual
1 J.D. candidate, The William and Mary School of Law, 2005; A.B., Princeton
University, 2002. I would like to thank Professor Donald Tortorice, at The William and
Mary School of Law, for his teaching and support; Professor Donald Drakeman, at
Princeton University, for his guidance and inspiration; Drs. Hossein Aliabadi and Galen
M. Schauer, for their advice and assistance; and Ian Ralby, for his comments and
suggestions. This article was presented as part of the 2004 Benjamin Rush Symposium
at The William and Mary School of Law.
2 Intersex Babies: Controversy Over Operating to Change Ambiguous Genitalia,
(ABC News television broadcast, Apr. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Intersex Babies].
Some of these Americans belong to the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA),
an organization that opposes early surgery and contends that intervention should be
postponed for intersexed children until they are mature enough to make their own
choices about surgical sex assignments. The ISNA website can be found at:
http://www.isna.org.
4 Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First,Do No Harm" - The Fiction of Legal ParentalConsent
to Genital-NormalizingSurgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 469,
469, 488 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Peter Lee & Philip A. Gruppuso, Point/Counterpoint,Should Cosmetic
Surgery Be Performed on the Genitals of Children Born with Ambiguous Genitals?, 16
PHYSICIAN'S WEEKLY 31 (Aug. 16, 1999), at http://www.physiciansweekly.com/
archive/99/08_16_99/pc.html. See also Robert M. Blizzard, Intersex Issues: A Series of
Continuing Conundrums, 110 PEDIATRICS 616, 618 (2002).
2004] Gender Assignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 171
6 Julie Cole, Legal Issues on the Treatment of Children with Intersex Conditions (Apr.
6, 2003), available at http://home.vicnet.net.au/~aissg/legal-issues.htm.
7 Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants With Ambiguous
Genitalia?,7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2000).
8 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
9 Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, Pediatric Urologist, Pediatric Urology Associates,
in Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 10, 2004).
10 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 619. See also Intersex Babies, supra note 2.
11 See, e.g., Laura Hermer, ParadigmsRevised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & The
Law, 11 ANN. HEALTH L. 195,214-36 (2002).
12 However, in 1999, the Constitutional Court of Columbia, the country's highest
court, issued two rulings against gender assignment surgery for intersexed infants. The
Court held that the surgery should be postponed until the child is mature enough to
consent, and that intersexuals constitute a protected minority. Beh & Diamond, supra
note 7, 22 n.92.
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
13 Hermer, supra note 11, at 195. See also Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 17.
Common intersex conditions include clitoromegaly, micropenis, hypospadias, complete
androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS), partial androgen insensitivity syndrome (PALS)
and congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAM), the most common intersex condition.
Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, Pediatric Urologist, Pediatric Urology Associates, in
Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 25, 2003). To learn more about intersex conditions, see
http://www.isna.org.
2004] GenderAssignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 173
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 7-8.
28 Id. at 9.
29 Id. at 4.
30 Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 23, at 298-304.
31 Id. at 300; Hermer, supra note 11, at 197, 203.
Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
32 Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 10 (alterations in the original) (citations omitted).
33 id.
34 Id.at 11.
35 Id.
36 id.
37 id.
38 Mireya Navarro, When Gender Isn't a Given,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at Section
9,p. 1. David Jones, A Boy Called 'It,'SUNDAY MAIL (QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA), June
20, 2004, at 66.
39 Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 23.
40 JOHN COLAPINTO, As NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED As A GIRL
(2000).
4 See, e.g., Chanika Phomphutkul, et. al, Gender Self-Reassignment in an XY
Adolescent FemaleBorn With Ambiguous Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 135-37 (2000).
2004] GenderAssignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 177
49 They further admit that certain influences, such as androgen imprinting of the brain,
have not always been given sufficient attention when assigning genders to intersexed
infants; this can result in disastrous consequences for the intersexed recipient of gender
assignment surgery, including rejection of the assigned sex when the individual reaches
adulthood. Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, supra note 13.
50 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
51 See, e.g., Claude J. Migeon, et al., Ambiguous Genitalia With Perineoscrotal
Hypospadias in 46,XY Individuals: Long-Term Medical, Surgical, and Psychosexual
Outcome, 110 PEDIATRICS 31 (2002).
52 American Academy of Pediatrics, Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of
Male Children With ParticularReference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological
Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590 (1996).
American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 17, at 141. The Board issued a
statement in July 2000 advocating the use of a "team" approach for the treatment of
intersexed infants that leaves open the possibility of early gender-assignment surgery.
The surgical model of care has received international support. The British Association of
Paediatric Surgeons Working Party on the Surgical Management of Children Born With
Ambiguous Genitalia recently stated that a blanket policy of delaying surgery until the
patient is old enough to consent for himself or herself would be overly restrictive,
although it acknowledged that parents of intersexed infants should be informed that
nonoperative management of intersex conditions is a viable alternative to surgery.
Blizzard, supra note 5, at 618.
54 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 619, (citing Jorge Daaboul and Joel Frader, Ethics and the
Management of the Patient with Intersex: a Middle Way, 14 J. PEDIATRIC
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM, 1575-83 (2001)).
2004] Gender Assignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 179
one physician has said, "My experience suggests that many, if not most,
of the people who had surgery as infants are pleased . . .-55
the medical community. That is, that education will decrease the pool of
60
medical professionals willing to perform or recommend such surgeries.
In contrast, other advocates focus on promoting public awareness of
61 62
intersex issues through the use of news broadcasts, journal articles,
websites 63 and other avenues of popular media. This form of education,
which is aimed at society rather than the medical community, endeavors
to bring an end to gender assignment surgery by promoting acceptance
of individuals who do not conform to society's gender and sexual norms.
Presumably, such an attitudinal shift will ensure that parents of
intersexed individuals don't feel societal pressure to surgically "fix"
their children, and intersexed children won't grow up feeling societal
pressure or stigma for failing to conform to traditional anatomical
appearances or gender roles.
B. TiptoeingInto the Legal Arena, and Into the Provinceof
FundamentalRights
As the dialogue over gender assignment surgery widens to include
the opinions and research of those outside the medical sphere, it is likely
that the issue of gender assignment will be increasingly framed in a legal
context. When legal scholars add their perspectives to those of
physicians, legislators and lay persons, those opposing gender
assignment surgeries will likely begin to demand legal remedies with
greater frequency.
One such remedy might be a state or federal statute that bans gender
assignment surgeries on intersexed infants, or a statute that creates a
presumption that such surgeries are improper and raise questions of civil
liability. 64 Additionally, amicus briefs submitted to cases involving
gender assignment surgeries might promote a federal ruling outlawing
gender assignment surgery on intersexed infants entirely. Moratorium
advocates also might try persuading courts to apply a "reasonable person
standard" rather than the currently-applied "reasonable professional"
standard to cases involving gender assignment surgery. 65 In determining
60 Interview with Galen M. Schauer, Pediatric Pathologist, Children's Hospitals and
Clinics in Minneapolis, Min. (Oct. 25, 2003).
61 See, e.g., Intersex Babies, supra note 2.
62 See, e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 7.
63 See, e.g., ISNA, supra note 3.
64 Interview with Galen M. Schauer, supra note 60.
65 Hermer, supra note 11, at 217-20. The author states, however, that while changing
the standard of care could lead to some positive changes, it would be inadequate to
resolve some of the more troubling aspects of treating intersexed children.
2004] Gender Assignment Surgeryfor IntersexedInfants 181
66 Id. at 215.
67 Id.
68 Blizzard, supra note 5, at 620.
69 See Beh & Diamond, supra note 7, at 47.
70 The following findings might bear significantly on whether gender assignment
surgery is an acceptable, reasonable, and ultimately, constitutional form of medical
treatment: whether the surgery is primarily cosmetic or health-related in nature; whether
the surgery can be performed with a minimal negative impact on the intersexed
Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
individual's sexual function and capacity for sexual pleasure; the likely sexual
identification of individuals with various intersex conditions; the role of external
anatomy, hormones, and "nurture" in influencing an infant's sexual identification; and
the extent to which an intersexed child who grows up "uncorrected" will experience
psychological difficulties in childhood and adulthood.
I See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the privacy
right encompasses the right to buy and use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (basing a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy on the due process
right of privacy); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that the state
of Washington's ban on assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
because of its relation to a legitimate government interest).
72 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
73 Indeed, some commentators argue that history and tradition are ineffective for use
in identifying fundamental due process rights because the fundamental rights in need of
constitutional protection are precisely those that history and tradition have not usually
protected. In his dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Brennan stated:
"By describing the decisive question as whether [plaintiffs'] interest is one that has been
traditionally protected by our society ...and by suggesting that our sole function is to
2004] Gender Assignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 183
most important role is to ensure that the political process runs smoothly
and that all views are appropriately represented. 74 These scholars would
identify non-textual rights as fundamental only if they strengthened
courts' commitment to "representation reinforcement. '75 Other
authorities suggest that courts should use natural law principles when
76
identifying fundamental rights.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court articulated the
basic legal framework for identifying which practices qualify as
substantive due process rights. The Court recognized two important
features of practices deserving protection under a substantive due
process analysis: (1) the practice is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed,"
and (2) there exists a "careful description" of the liberty interest being
claimed. 77 The Glucksberg standard arguably receives the most
attention in modem legal circles.
B. The FundamentalRight to Privacy
The substantive due process right most pertinent to the debate over
gender assignment surgery is the right to privacy. In American
jurisprudence, privacy is generally accepted as a liberty sufficiently
important to be regarded as fundamental even though it is not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 78 Although certain legal
authorities, including Justice Douglas, describe privacy as emanating
from the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth
amendments, 79 courts generally have treated the right of privacy as a
substantive due process right. The right is an important focus in 80
reproductive jurisprudence, and in particular in abortion jurisprudence;
discern the society's views, the plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a majority of the
States. Transforming the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause into a
redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (citations omitted)
emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEw, 73-104 (1980).
75 id.
76 See, e.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION, 13-54 (1994).
77 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
78 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
79 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
80 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
this paper will explore how the arguments made in those cases can be
applied to the gender assignment surgery debate.
"As an abstract principle, privacy's logical limits forbid State
interference into the 'most basic decisions about family and parenthood,
as well as bodily integrity.' 8 1 Numerous court decisions support the
general contention that on a fundamental level, the right to privacy
protects an individual's right to be free from unwanted invasion of his or
her person. 82 Particularly in the context of reproductive rights, the right
of privacy often has been used to protect individuals' bodies from
outside invasion. While the courts have historically protected the right
of privacy as a substantive due process right, the proper scope of the
83
right is still hotly debated in legal and judicial circles.
Although the privacy right is generally considered fundamental in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, what specific actions it protects is less
clear. When determining which actions fall under the umbrella of a
fundamental right, courts often struggle with questions concerning the
degree of abstraction at which the right should be stated.84 If a
substantive due process right is stated broadly, a wide variety of actions
fall within its protection. In contrast, if the right is stated narrowly, few
85
actions will be protected.
First explicitly relied upon in Meyer v. Nebraska, the right of
privacy has been interpreted to include the right of parents to "establish a
home and bring up children," 86 and "to control the education of their
own." 87 The right of privacy also has been extended to include a
multitude of other, more specific rights, many of which are implicated in
the controversy over early gender assignment surgery. Some of the most
prominent of these rights lie in the legal arena of procreation.
81 Elizabeth Reilly, The "Jurisprudenceof Doubt": How the Premises of the Supreme
Court's Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 757,
761 (1998) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)).
82 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
83 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-68 (2003).
84 For a judicial commentary on the ways that the level of abstraction at which a right
is defined can influence whether it is protected as "fundamental," see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
85 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1977) (in which the Court
ruled that defining family rights to only include the protection of the nuclear family
would be too narrow a construction).
86 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
87 Id. at 401.
2004] GenderAssignment Surgeryfor Intersexed Infants 185
C. Individual v. AssociationalRights
The Supreme Court has discussed the right of privacy, including the
right to control procreation, as both an individual right and an
associational right. The former describes a right that is separately vested
in each individual person, whereas the latter describes a shared right that
arises from a close relationship between individuals. The following cases
illustrate some of the primary differences between these two views of
the privacy right.
1. Skinner v. Oklahoma and Eisenstadt v. Baird:
Privacy as an Individual Right
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court struck down a state act
that allowed courts to order the involuntary sterilization of criminals
convicted on two or more counts of "felonies involving moral
turpitude. '88 Although Skinner is an equal protection case, the Court
spoke broadly about the right to procreate, characterizing it as a
fundamental due process right:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
89
whither and disappear.
Skinner describes reproductive rights as positive rights - the right to
reproduce 9° - and it strengthens the notion that the right of privacy
encompasses the right of an individual to exercise affirmative
procreative choice and to be free from procedures that improperly
infringe on a person's "basic civil right" to procreate. 91 Additionally,
Skinner illustrates that the privacy right of procreation is an individual
right that is held by every person under the law, as opposed to an
associational right that is created out of a marital relationship. The
Skinner Court says, "There is no redemption for the individual whom the
98 Id. at 479-86.
99 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
'00 Id. at 166.
101 Id.
102 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972).
Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
opponents might argue that the medical decisions affecting the rights to
procreation (such as the decision concerning gender assignment surgery)
should be properly left to the parents, who play such an "importan[t]
role" in "child rearing."
C. Additional Considerations
In addition to the concerns addressed above, the debate over gender
assignment surgery often involves heated discussion about whether such
115
surgery is performed for cosmetic reasons or health reasons.
Ordinarily, those supporting early gender assignment surgeries portray it
as solving health concerns, while those opposing the surgeries portray it
as unnecessary and cosmetic. 116 However, even if gender assignment
surgery is portrayed as being performed for health reasons, moratorium
advocates can make arguments to support their position. In Roe v.
Wade, perhaps the most celebrated and reviled privacy decision of the
20th century, the Court held that the right of privacy "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy," 117 but was careful to add that this right must be balanced
against the important state interests in the potential life of the fetus and
the mother's health.11 8 Moratorium advocates might emphasize that Roe
lends support to the argument that the state may regulate or outlaw
medical procedures in order to protect an individual's health. Thus, the
state can regulate gender assignment surgery in order to protect the
infant's future health.1 19 Such regulation could include a moratorium on
0
performing gender assignment surgeries on infants.12
Against the backdrop of the Roe decision, then, it appears that the more
that early gender-assignment surgery is framed as a medical, "health"
procedure, the more control and discretion physicians and family
members might have over the decision.
Another concern that moratorium opponents could point out is that a
moratorium on such surgery may not actually help the individuals it
aims to protect. While gender assignment surgery has the potential to
trample on the privacy rights of intersexed infants and modem privacy
jurisprudence helps moratorium advocates by construing the privacy
right as an individual right, those supporting the practice of gender
assignment surgery could argue that the imposition of a blanket
moratorium would undoubtedly be both overinclusive and
underinclusive. Moratorium advocates often rely on the following logic:
since physicians cannot always accurately predict the gender with which
an intersexed infant will identify, and since gender assignment surgery
often carries with it undesirable side effects and risks, surgeons should
always refrain from performing gender assignment surgery until the
individuals are old enough to provide their own consent to it. In
unwanted child." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. This attention to the mental health of the
individual exhibits a broad judicial view that takes into account the emotional distress
and future happiness of an individual. Since some moratorium opponents assert that
delaying gender assignment surgery may result in psychosocial harm to intersexed
individuals, they may argue that the surgery promotes the state's interest in protecting
the health of intersexed individuals.
121 Reilly, supra note 8 1, at 773.
Virginia Journalof SocialPolicy & the Law [Vol. 12.1
VI. CONCLUSION
A "natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children is an interest far more
VirginiaJournalof Social Policy & the Law (Vol. 12.1
precious than any property right." 124 As much as the right to privacy can
bolster the arguments of moratorium advocates, it also supports the
arguments that favor gender assignment surgery.
The historic utilization of the surgical model of care, a binary
conception of gender, and the legitimate concerns that individuals raised
with "uncorrected" ambiguous genitalia might have growing up all seem
to oppose a moratorium on gender assignment surgery. In addition, the
medical literature and the Supreme Court's substantive due process and
privacy decisions appear to oppose a legal imposition of a moratorium
on gender assignment surgery. Given the numerous anecdotes that have
been gathered from intersexed adults who have experienced positive
outcomes from their gender assignment surgery, it would be premature
for a court or legislature to decide, in the absence of conclusive findings,
that gender assignment surgery is detrimental to intersexed infants and
that a moratorium on early gender assignment surgery is warranted. It is
simply too extreme to declare, at this point in time, that the privacy
rights of intersexed infants require that their parents raise them with
ambiguous genitalia, no matter how the infants' families or surgeons feel
about that decision and no matter what the sexual norms are of society.
However, the predominant surgical model of treatment might require
revision, as it fails to meet the needs of many intersexed individuals.
Only by exploring and examining privacy arguments will society be able
to develop a strong and effective treatment model for infants born with
intersex conditions - a model that fully integrates both the medical and
legal aspects of gender assignment surgery, and is consistent with
America's substantive due process jurisprudence concerning the right of
privacy.
Regardless of whether the arguments of moratorium opponents or
proponents appear the most legitimate at this juncture, both should
incorporate substantive due process arguments and privacy rights
jurisprudence into their dialogue. As the debate over early gender
assignment surgery moves into the legal arena, both sides must work to
understand the substantive due process and privacy considerations that
surround the surgery. Only then will they be equipped to fully
comprehend the legal implications of the surgery and devise a model of
care that adequately addresses the concerns of intersexed infants and
their families.
124 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).