Consti New Cases

G.R. No.
L-33112 June 15, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO
TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, and
PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union, respondents.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent
Judge Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, 1 followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 2 deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law
doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. This is not the first time
petitioner raised that issue. It did so before in Philippine National Bank v. Court of industrial Relations, 3 decided only
last January. It did not meet with success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous cases of National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation 4 and Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company,5 that funds of
public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, 6 a similar
outcome is indicated. This petition must be dismissed.
It is undisputed that the judgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had reached the
stage of finality. A writ of execution was, therefore, in order. It was accordingly issued on December 17,
1970. 7There was a notice of garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of execution in the sum of
P12,724,66. 8 In view of the objection, however, by petitioner Philippine National Bank on the above ground, coupled
with an inquiry as to whether or not respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds deposited with
petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until January 25, 1971 that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari
proceeding was issued by respondent Judge.9 Its dispositive portion reads as follows: Conformably with the
foregoing, it is now ordered, in accordance with law, that sufficient funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration now deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch, shall be garnished and delivered
to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the Writ of Execution for one-half of the amount awarded in the decision of
November 16, 1970." 10 Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
As noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National Bank would invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be
admitted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional
law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 11 If the funds appertained
to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to
garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie. Only last January, as noted in the opening
paragraph of this decision, this Court, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely invoking such a doctrine,
left no doubt that the funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Accordingly, this petition must fail.
1. The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of this certiorari proceeding, was sought to be justified on the
failure of respondent Judge to set aside the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to respondent Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration. This excerpt from the aforecited decision of Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations makes manifest why such an argument is far from persuasive. "The premise that the funds
could be spoken as public character may be accepted in the sense that the People Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt. from garnishment.
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated
in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the
NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied
upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its
own. distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has — pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356,
dated October 23, 1950 ... , pursuant to which The NASSCO has been established — all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law ... ." Accordingly, it may be sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)" ... To repeat, the ruling was the
appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if
owned or controlled by the government." 12
2. The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the first of its kind. The ruling therein could be
inferred from the judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, decided as
far back as 1941. 13 In the language of its ponente Justice Ozaeta "On the other hand, it is well-settled that when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." 14 It is worth
mentioning that Justice Ozaeta could find support for such a pronouncement from the leading American Supreme
Court case of united States v. Planters' Bank, 15 with the opinion coming from the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall. It
was handed down more than one hundred fifty years ago, 1824 to be exact. It is apparent, therefore, that petitioner
Bank could it legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of non-suability.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Santos, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued
by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I,1 declaring a
decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very
least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of
law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to
the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of
execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On
July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co.,
Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the
arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent
Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9.
Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June
26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution";; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,
particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds
duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated
July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..."2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12.
Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the
properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment
issued pursuant thereto are null and void."3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde
and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in
the amount of P2,372,331.40.4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well
as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In
the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was
indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,6 with its
affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go
to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of
such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein
expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent."8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound
sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case
of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of
Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an
employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente
left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of
public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own
courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing
is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a
legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June
24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder.
The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J, took no part.

G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P. ASPIRAS,
EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments. 1 They should bear in mind that the
primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort due from the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines).
The Case
On appeal by the University of the Philippines and its then incumbent officials (collectively, the UP) is the decision
promulgated on September 16, 2005,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 80, in Quezon City that directed the garnishment of public funds amounting to ₱ 16,370,191.74
belonging to the UP to satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce the already final and executory judgment
against the UP.
Antecedents
On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction
Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), represented by its President and General
Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of
Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).3
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding
to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing worth ₱ 273,729.47 was not paid
due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to
pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the
unpaid billing and to recover various damages. The suit, entitled Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano R. Dela
Cruz v. University of the Philippines Systems, Jose V. Abueva, Raul P. de Guzman, Ruben P. Aspiras, Emmanuel
P. Bello, Wilfredo P. David, Casiano S. Abrigo, and Josefina R. Licuanan, was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-
14971 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC).4
After trial, on November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs,5 viz:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following, to wit:
1. ₱ 503,462.74 amount of the third billing, additional accomplished work and retention money
2. ₱ 5,716,729.00 in actual damages
3. ₱ 10,000,000.00 in moral damages
4. ₱ 150,000.00 and ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance as attorney’s fees;; and
5. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Following the RTC’s denial of its motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2002,6 the UP filed a notice of appeal on June
3, 2002.7 Stern Builders and dela Cruz opposed the notice of appeal on the ground of its filing being belated, and
moved for the execution of the decision. The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed within the
reglementary period because the UP’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of
denial only on May 31, 2002. On September 26, 2002, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having
been filed out of time and granted the private respondents’ motion for execution.8
The RTC issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002,9 and the sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution
and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel, on October 9, 2002.10 The UP filed an urgent motion to
reconsider the order dated September 26, 2002, to quash the writ of execution dated October 4, 2002, and to
restrain the proceedings.11 However, the RTC denied the urgent motion on April 1, 2003.12
On June 24, 2003, the UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 77395.13
On February 24, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UP’s notice of appeal had
been filed late,14 stating:
Records clearly show that petitioners received a copy of the Decision dated November 28, 2001 and January 7,
2002, thus, they had until January 22, 2002 within which to file their appeal. On January 16, 2002 or after the lapse
of nine (9) days, petitioners through their counsel Atty. Nolasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision, hence, pursuant to the rules, petitioners still had six (6) remaining days to file their appeal. As admitted by
the petitioners in their petition (Rollo, p. 25), Atty. Nolasco received a copy of the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2002, thus, petitioners still has until May 23, 2002 (the remaining six (6) days) within
which to file their appeal. Obviously, petitioners were not able to file their Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2002 as it
was only filed on June 3, 2002.
In view of the said circumstances, We are of the belief and so holds that the Notice of Appeal filed by the petitioners
was really filed out of time, the same having been filed seventeen (17) days late of the reglementary period. By
reason of which, the decision dated November 28, 2001 had already become final and executory. "Settled is the rule
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and failure to perfect that appeal renders the challenged judgment final and executory. This is not an
empty procedural rule but is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice." (Ram’s
Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 691, 696). Indeed, Atty. Nolasco received
the order of denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 2002 but filed a Notice of Appeal only on June 3,
3003. As such, the decision of the lower court ipso facto became final when no appeal was perfected after the lapse
of the reglementary period. This procedural caveat cannot be trifled with, not even by the High Court.15
The UP sought a reconsideration, but the CA denied the UP’s motion for reconsideration on April 19, 2004.16
On May 11, 2004, the UP appealed to the Court by petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 163501).
On June 23, 2004, the Court denied the petition for review.17 The UP moved for the reconsideration of the denial of
its petition for review on August 29, 2004, 18 but the Court denied the motion on October 6, 2004.19 The denial
became final and executory on November 12, 2004.20
In the meanwhile that the UP was exhausting the available remedies to overturn the denial of due course to the
appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the RTC their motions for
execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having
already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).21
On June 23, 2003 and July 25, 2003, respectively, the sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository
banks, namely: Land Bank of the Philippines (Buendia Branch) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
Commonwealth Branch.22 The UP assailed the garnishment through an urgent motion to quash the notices of
garnishment;;23 and a motion to quash the writ of execution dated May 9, 2003.24
On their part, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed their ex parte motion for issuance of a release order.25
On October 14, 2003, the RTC denied the UP’s urgent motion to quash, and granted Stern Builders and dela Cruz’s
ex parte motion for issuance of a release order.26
The UP moved for the reconsideration of the order of October 14, 2003, but the RTC denied the motion on
November 7, 2003.27
On January 12, 2004, Stern Builders and dela Cruz again sought the release of the garnished funds.28 Despite the
UP’s opposition,29 the RTC granted the motion to release the garnished funds on March 16, 2004.30 On April 20,
2004, however, the RTC held in abeyance the enforcement of the writs of execution issued on October 4, 2002 and
June 3, 2003 and all the ensuing notices of garnishment, citing Section 4, Rule 52, Rules of Court, which provided
that the pendency of a timely motion for reconsideration stayed the execution of the judgment.31
On December 21, 2004, the RTC, through respondent Judge Agustin S. Dizon, authorized the release of the
garnished funds of the UP,32 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no more legal impediment for the release of the garnished amount
in satisfaction of the judgment award in the instant case, let the amount garnished be immediately released by the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Commonwealth Branch, Quezon City in favor of the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
The UP was served on January 3, 2005 with the order of December 21, 2004 directing DBP to release the
garnished funds.33
On January 6, 2005, Stern Builders and dela Cruz moved to cite DBP in direct contempt of court for its non-
compliance with the order of release.34
Thereupon, on January 10, 2005, the UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the
RTC in issuing the order of December 21, 2004 (CA-G.R. CV No. 88125).35 Aside from raising the denial of due
process, the UP averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that there was no longer any legal impediment to the release of the garnished funds. The UP
argued that government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment, as
held in Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission,36 and citing Section 84 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445 to the effect that "revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in
pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority;;" and that the order of garnishment clashed
with the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan37 to the effect that the funds belonging
to the UP were public funds.
On January 19, 2005, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) upon application by the UP.38
On March 22, 2005, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the RTC their amended motion for sheriff’s assistance to
implement the release order dated December 21, 2004, stating that the 60-day period of the TRO of the CA had
already lapsed.39 The UP opposed the amended motion and countered that the implementation of the release order
be suspended.40
On May 3, 2005, the RTC granted the amended motion for sheriff’s assistance and directed the sheriff to proceed to
the DBP to receive the check in satisfaction of the judgment.41
The UP sought the reconsideration of the order of May 3, 2005.42
On May 16, 2005, DBP filed a motion to consign the check representing the judgment award and to dismiss the
motion to cite its officials in contempt of court.43
On May 23, 2005, the UP presented a motion to withhold the release of the payment of the judgment award.44
On July 8, 2005, the RTC resolved all the pending matters,45 noting that the DBP had already delivered to the sheriff
Manager’s Check No. 811941 for ₱ 16,370,191.74 representing the garnished funds payable to the order of Stern
Builders and dela Cruz as its compliance with the RTC’s order dated December 21, 2004.46 However, the RTC
directed in the same order that Stern Builders and dela Cruz should not encash the check or withdraw its amount
pending the final resolution of the UP’s petition for certiorari, to wit:47
To enable the money represented in the check in question (No. 00008119411) to earn interest during the pendency
of the defendant University of the Philippines application for a writ of injunction with the Court of Appeals the same
may now be deposited by the plaintiff at the garnishee Bank (Development Bank of the Philippines), the disposition
of the amount represented therein being subject to the final outcome of the case of the University of the Philippines
et al., vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon et al., (CA G.R. 88125) before the Court of Appeals.
Let it be stated herein that the plaintiff is not authorized to encash and withdraw the amount represented in the
check in question and enjoy the same in the fashion of an owner during the pendency of the case between the
parties before the Court of Appeals which may or may not be resolved in plaintiff’s favor.
With the end in view of seeing to it that the check in question is deposited by the plaintiff at the Development Bank
of the Philippines (garnishee bank), Branch Sheriff Herlan Velasco is directed to accompany and/or escort the
plaintiff in making the deposit of the check in question.
SO ORDERED.
On September 16, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the UP’s petition for certiorari, ruling
that the UP had been given ample opportunity to contest the motion to direct the DBP to deposit the check in the
name of Stern Builders and dela Cruz;; and that the garnished funds could be the proper subject of garnishment
because they had been already earmarked for the project, with the UP holding the funds only in a fiduciary
capacity,48 viz:
Petitioners next argue that the UP funds may not be seized for execution or garnishment to satisfy the judgment
award. Citing Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Hon. Ligot-
Telan, petitioners contend that UP deposits at Land Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines, being
government funds, may not be released absent an appropriations bill from Congress.
The argument is specious. UP entered into a contract with private respondents for the expansion and renovation of
the Arts and Sciences Building of its campus in Los Baños, Laguna. Decidedly, there was already an appropriations
earmarked for the said project. The said funds are retained by UP, in a fiduciary capacity, pending completion of the
construction project.
We agree with the trial Court [sic] observation on this score:
"4. Executive Order No. 109 (Directing all National Government Agencies to Revert Certain Accounts Payable to the
Cumulative Result of Operations of the National Government and for Other Purposes) Section 9. Reversion of
Accounts Payable, provides that, all 1995 and prior years documented accounts payable and all undocumented
accounts regardless of the year they were incurred shall be reverted to the Cumulative Result of Operations of the
National Government (CROU). This shall apply to accounts payable of all funds, except fiduciary funds, as long as
the purpose for which the funds were created have not been accomplished and accounts payable under foreign
assisted projects for the duration of the said project. In this regard, the Department of Budget and Management
issued Joint-Circular No. 99-6 4.0 (4.3) Procedural Guidelines which provides that all accounts payable that reverted
to the CROU may be considered for payment upon determination thru administrative process, of the existence,
validity and legality of the claim. Thus, the allegation of the defendants that considering no appropriation for the
payment of any amount awarded to plaintiffs appellee the funds of defendant-appellants may not be seized pursuant
to a writ of execution issued by the regular court is misplaced. Surely when the defendants and the plaintiff entered
into the General Construction of Agreement there is an amount already allocated by the latter for the said project
which is no longer subject of future appropriation."49
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration on December 23, 2005, the petitioners appealed by petition for
review.
Matters Arising During the Pendency of the Petition
On January 30, 2006, Judge Dizon of the RTC (Branch 80) denied Stern Builders and dela Cruz’s motion to
withdraw the deposit, in consideration of the UP’s intention to appeal to the CA,50 stating:
Since it appears that the defendants are intending to file a petition for review of the Court of Appeals resolution in
CA-G.R. No. 88125 within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of resolution, the Court agrees
with the defendants stand that the granting of plaintiffs’ subject motion is premature.
Let it be stated that what the Court meant by its Order dated July 8, 2005 which states in part that the "disposition of
the amount represented therein being subject to the final outcome of the case of the University of the Philippines, et.
al., vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon et al., (CA G.R. No. 88125 before the Court of Appeals) is that the judgment or
resolution of said court has to be final and executory, for if the same will still be elevated to the Supreme Court, it will
not attain finality yet until the highest court has rendered its own final judgment or resolution.51
However, on January 22, 2007, the UP filed an Urgent Application for A Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ
of Preliminary Injunction,52 averring that on January 3, 2007, Judge Maria Theresa dela Torre-Yadao (who had
meanwhile replaced Judge Dizon upon the latter’s appointment to the CA) had issued another order allowing Stern
Builders and dela Cruz to withdraw the deposit,53 to wit:
It bears stressing that defendants’ liability for the payment of the judgment obligation has become indubitable due to
the final and executory nature of the Decision dated November 28, 2001. Insofar as the payment of the [sic]
judgment obligation is concerned, the Court believes that there is nothing more the defendant can do to escape
liability. It is observed that there is nothing more the defendant can do to escape liability. It is observed that
defendant U.P. System had already exhausted all its legal remedies to overturn, set aside or modify the decision
(dated November 28, 2001( rendered against it. The way the Court sees it, defendant U.P. System’s petition before
the Supreme Court concerns only with the manner by which said judgment award should be satisfied. It has nothing
to do with the legality or propriety thereof, although it prays for the deletion of [sic] reduction of the award of moral
damages.
It must be emphasized that this Court’s finding, i.e., that there was sufficient appropriation earmarked for the project,
was upheld by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 16, 2005. Being a finding of fact, the Supreme
Court will, ordinarily, not disturb the same was said Court is not a trier of fact. Such being the case, defendants’
arguments that there was no sufficient appropriation for the payment of the judgment obligation must fail.
While it is true that the former Presiding Judge of this Court in its Order dated January 30, 2006 had stated that:
Let it be stated that what the Court meant by its Order dated July 8, 2005 which states in part that the "disposition of
the amount represented therein being subject to the final outcome of the case of the University of the Philippines, et.
al., vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon et al., (CA G.R. No. 88125 before the Court of Appeals) is that the judgment or
resolution of said court has to be final and executory, for if the same will still be elevated to the Supreme Court, it will
not attain finality yet until the highest court has rendered its own final judgment or resolution.
it should be noted that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining
the release or withdrawal of the garnished amount. In fact, in its present petition for review before the Supreme
Court, U.P. System has not prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the Court doubts
whether such writ is forthcoming.
The Court honestly believes that if defendants’ petition assailing the Order of this Court dated December 31, 2004
granting the motion for the release of the garnished amount was meritorious, the Court of Appeals would have
issued a writ of injunction enjoining the same. Instead, said appellate court not only refused to issue a wit of
preliminary injunction prayed for by U.P. System but denied the petition, as well.54
The UP contended that Judge Yadao thereby effectively reversed the January 30, 2006 order of Judge Dizon
disallowing the withdrawal of the garnished amount until after the decision in the case would have become final and
executory.
Although the Court issued a TRO on January 24, 2007 to enjoin Judge Yadao and all persons acting pursuant to her
authority from enforcing her order of January 3, 2007,55 it appears that on January 16, 2007, or prior to the issuance
of the TRO, she had already directed the DBP to forthwith release the garnished amount to Stern Builders and dela
Cruz;; 56 and that DBP had forthwith complied with the order on January 17, 2007 upon the sheriff’s service of the
order of Judge Yadao.57
These intervening developments impelled the UP to file in this Court a supplemental petition on January 26,
2007,58alleging that the RTC (Judge Yadao) gravely erred in ordering the immediate release of the garnished
amount despite the pendency of the petition for review in this Court.
The UP filed a second supplemental petition59 after the RTC (Judge Yadao) denied the UP’s motion for the
redeposit of the withdrawn amount on April 10, 2007,60 to wit:
This resolves defendant U.P. System’s Urgent Motion to Redeposit Judgment Award praying that plaintiffs be
directed to redeposit the judgment award to DBP pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Supreme Court. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and countered that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Supreme Court has become moot and academic considering that the act sought to be restrained by it has already
been performed. They also alleged that the redeposit of the judgment award was no longer feasible as they have
already spent the same.
It bears stressing, if only to set the record straight, that this Court did not – in its Order dated January 3, 2007 (the
implementation of which was restrained by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated January 24, 2002) – direct
that that garnished amount "be deposited with the garnishee bank (Development Bank of the Philippines)". In the
first place, there was no need to order DBP to make such deposit, as the garnished amount was already deposited
in the account of plaintiffs with the DBP as early as May 13, 2005. What the Court granted in its Order dated
January 3, 2007 was plaintiff’s motion to allow the release of said deposit. It must be recalled that the Court found
plaintiff’s motion meritorious and, at that time, there was no restraining order or preliminary injunction from either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court which could have enjoined the release of plaintiffs’ deposit. The Court also
took into account the following factors:
a) the Decision in this case had long been final and executory after it was rendered on November 28, 2001;;
b) the propriety of the dismissal of U.P. System’s appeal was upheld by the Supreme Court;;
c) a writ of execution had been issued;;
d) defendant U.P. System’s deposit with DBP was garnished pursuant to a lawful writ of execution issued by the
Court;; and
e) the garnished amount had already been turned over to the plaintiffs and deposited in their account with DBP.
The garnished amount, as discussed in the Order dated January 16, 2007, was already owned by the plaintiffs,
having been delivered to them by the Deputy Sheriff of this Court pursuant to par. (c), Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the judgment obligation has already been fully satisfied as per Report of the
Deputy Sheriff.
Anent the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court, the same has become functus oficio, having
been issued after the garnished amount had been released to the plaintiffs. The judgment debt was released to the
plaintiffs on January 17, 2007, while the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court was received
by this Court on February 2, 2007. At the time of the issuance of the Restraining Order, the act sought to be
restrained had already been done, thereby rendering the said Order ineffectual.
After a careful and thorough study of the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court is of the considered opinion
that there is no legal basis to grant defendant U.P. System’s motion to redeposit the judgment amount. Granting
said motion is not only contrary to law, but it will also render this Court’s final executory judgment nugatory.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. This
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. In
fact, nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding defendant U.P. System’s Urgent Motion to Redeposit Judgment Award
devoid of merit, the same is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The UP now submits that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION, ALLOWING IN
EFFECT THE GARNISHMENT OF UP FUNDS, WHEN IT RULED THAT FUNDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
EARMARKED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT;; AND THUS, THERE IS NO NEED FOR FURTHER
APPROPRIATIONS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ALLOWING GARNISHMENT OF A STATE
UNIVERSITY’S FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 5(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE UNIVERSITY INVOKES EQUITY AND THE REVIEW POWERS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT TO MODIFY, IF NOT TOTALLY DELETE THE AWARD OF ₱ 10 MILLION AS MORAL
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS.
IV
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE
JUDGMENT AWARD IN ITS ORDER DATED 3 JANUARY 2007 ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY AND JUDICIAL
COURTESY.
V
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE
JUDGMENT AWARD IN ITS ORDER DATED 16 JANUARY 2007 ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
UNIVERSITY STILL HAS A PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED 3 JANUARY
2007.
VI
THE RTC-BRANCH 80 COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ORDERING THE REDEPOSIT OF THE
GARNISHED AMOUNT TO THE DBP IN VIOLATION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
RESOLUTION DATED 24 JANUARY 2007.
The UP argues that the amount earmarked for the construction project had been purposely set aside only for the
aborted project and did not include incidental matters like the awards of actual damages, moral damages and
attorney’s fees. In support of its argument, the UP cited Article 12.2 of the General Construction Agreement, which
stipulated that no deductions would be allowed for the payment of claims, damages, losses and expenses, including
attorney’s fees, in case of any litigation arising out of the performance of the work. The UP insists that the CA
decision was inconsistent with the rulings in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego61 and Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC62 to the effect that government funds and properties could not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy judgment awards.
Furthermore, the UP contends that the CA contravened Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution by allowing the
garnishment of UP funds, because the garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction of the UP’s limited budget
allocated for the remuneration, job satisfaction and fulfillment of the best available teachers;; that Judge Yadao
should have exhibited judicial courtesy towards the Court due to the pendency of the UP’s petition for review;; and
that she should have also desisted from declaring that the TRO issued by this Court had become functus officio.
Lastly, the UP states that the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00 and moral damages of ₱ 10 million
should be reduced, if not entirely deleted, due to its being unconscionable, inequitable and detrimental to public
service.
In contrast, Stern Builders and dela Cruz aver that the petition for review was fatally defective for its failure to
mention the other cases upon the same issues pending between the parties (i.e., CA-G.R. No. 77395 and G.R No.
163501);; that the UP was evidently resorting to forum shopping, and to delaying the satisfaction of the final
judgment by the filing of its petition for review;; that the ruling in Commissioner of Public Works v. San Diego had no
application because there was an appropriation for the project;; that the UP retained the funds allotted for the project
only in a fiduciary capacity;; that the contract price had been meanwhile adjusted to ₱ 22,338,553.25, an amount
already more than sufficient to cover the judgment award;; that the UP’s prayer to reduce or delete the award of
damages had no factual basis, because they had been gravely wronged, had been deprived of their source of
income, and had suffered untold miseries, discomfort, humiliation and sleepless years;; that dela Cruz had even
been constrained to sell his house, his equipment and the implements of his trade, and together with his family had
been forced to live miserably because of the wrongful actuations of the UP;; and that the RTC correctly declared the
Court’s TRO to be already functus officio by reason of the withdrawal of the garnished amount from the DBP.
The decisive issues to be considered and passed upon are, therefore:
(a) whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment award;; and
(b) whether the UP’s prayer for the deletion of the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00, moral damages of
₱ 10,000,000.00 and attorney’s fees of ₱ 150,000.00 plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance could be granted despite the
finality of the judgment of the RTC.
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
I.
UP’s funds, being government funds,
are not subject to garnishment
The UP was founded on June 18, 1908 through Act 1870 to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy,
the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical training to deserving students.63 Despite its
establishment as a body corporate,64 the UP remains to be a "chartered institution"65 performing a legitimate
government function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any
dividends.66 In enacting Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has
declared the UP as the national university67 "dedicated to the search for truth and knowledge as well as the
development of future leaders."68
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality,69 performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting
quality and accessible education.70 As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714,71 and from the
yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
9500.72 All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose,73 and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.74
Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a "trust fund" as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of
the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some
obligation.75 A trust fund may be utilized only for the "specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received."76
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the
use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.77 Hence,
the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment.
The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately
enforceable by execution against the UP,78 because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.79
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme:80
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable;; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Also, in Republic v. Villasor,81 where the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment was nullified, the Court said:
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law.
The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment awards of actual and moral
damages (including attorney’s fees) was not validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover
the liability. It was, therefore, legally unwarranted for the CA to agree with the RTC’s holding in the order issued on
April 1, 2003 that no appropriation by Congress to allocate and set aside the payment of the judgment awards was
necessary because "there (were) already an appropriations (sic) earmarked for the said project."82 The CA and the
RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government and its
agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created or for
which the funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government
agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations.83
Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and
actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not
covered by the "appropriations earmarked for the said project." The Constitution strictly mandated that "(n)o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."84
II
COA must adjudicate private respondents’ claim
before execution should proceed
The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. This was
expressly provided in Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, to wit:
Section 26. General jurisdiction. - The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the
Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and
inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts;; and the audit and settlement of the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as
the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of
the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non governmental entities subsidized by the government,
those funded by donations through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for
which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP. The settlement
of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC
having already validated the claim.85 As such, Stern Builders and dela Cruz as the claimants had no alternative
except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
On its part, the RTC should have exercised utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the motions
for execution against the UP and the garnishment of the UP’s funds. The RTC had no authority to direct the
immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP. By eschewing
utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment, and by authorizing the
withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its orders and issuances
thereon were void and of no legal effect, specifically: (a) the order Judge Yadao issued on January 3, 2007 allowing
Stern Builders and dela Cruz to withdraw the deposited garnished amount;; (b) the order Judge Yadao issued on
January 16, 2007 directing DBP to forthwith release the garnish amount to Stern Builders and dela Cruz;; (c) the
sheriff’s report of January 17, 2007 manifesting the full satisfaction of the writ of execution;; and (d) the order of April
10, 2007 deying the UP’s motion for the redeposit of the withdrawn amount. Hence, such orders and issuances
should be struck down without exception.
Nothing extenuated Judge Yadao’s successive violations of Presidential Decree No. 1445. She was aware of
Presidential Decree No. 1445, considering that the Court circulated to all judges its Administrative Circular No. 10-
2000,86 issued on October 25, 2000, enjoining them "to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units"
precisely in order to prevent the circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 1445, as well as of the rules and
procedures of the COA, to wit:
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit, judges
are hereby enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of
execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units.
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 1970), this
Court explicitly stated:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’ and
that the power of the Court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement
or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D.
No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (Department of Agriculture
v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02 1993 citing Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 1973). All money claims
against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within
sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court
on certiorari and in effect, sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
However, notwithstanding the rule that government properties are not subject to levy and execution unless
otherwise provided for by statute (Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899 1968;; Commissioner of Public Highways v.
San Diego, supra) or municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206 1990), the
Court has, in various instances, distinguished between government funds and properties for public use and those
not held for public use. Thus, in Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52 1926, the Court ruled
that "where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy
judgments recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be
determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held." The following can be culled from Viuda de Tan Toco v.
Municipal Council of Iloilo:
1. Properties held for public uses – and generally everything held for governmental purposes – are not
subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The same rule applies to funds in the
hands of a public officer and taxes due to a municipal corporation.
2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its proprietary capacity, as distinguished from its public or government
capacity, property not used or used for a public purpose but for quasi-private purposes, it is the general rule that
such property may be seized and sold under execution against the corporation.
3. Property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used for private
purposes. If the public use is wholly abandoned, such property becomes subject to execution.
This Administrative Circular shall take effect immediately and the Court Administrator shall see to it that it is faithfully
implemented.
Although Judge Yadao pointed out that neither the CA nor the Court had issued as of then any writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the release or withdrawal of the garnished amount, she did not need any writ of injunction from a
superior court to compel her obedience to the law. The Court is disturbed that an experienced judge like her should
look at public laws like Presidential Decree No. 1445 dismissively instead of loyally following and unquestioningly
implementing them. That she did so turned her court into an oppressive bastion of mindless tyranny instead of
having it as a true haven for the seekers of justice like the UP.
III
Period of appeal did not start without effective
service of decision upon counsel of record;;
Fresh-period rule announced in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals
can be given retroactive application
The UP next pleads that the Court gives due course to its petition for review in the name of equity in order to reverse
or modify the adverse judgment against it despite its finality. At stake in the UP’s plea for equity was the return of the
amount of ₱ 16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment
based on the supposed tardiness of UP’s appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. The CA upheld
the declaration of finality on February 24, 2004, and the Court itself denied the UP’s petition for review on that issue
on May 11, 2004 (G.R. No. 163501). The denial became final on November 12, 2004.
It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any
respect,87 even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of the land.88 Public policy
dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be
deprived of the fruits of victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement
of such judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable controversies with
finality.89Indeed, all litigations must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors.
But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions,
among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors;; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to
any party;; (c) void judgments;; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render
its execution unjust and inequitable.90 Moreover, in Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca,91 we stated that despite the
absence of the preceding circumstances, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside procedural norms if only to
serve the higher interests of justice and equity. Also, in Gumaru v. Quirino State College,92 the Court nullified the
proceedings and the writ of execution issued by the RTC for the reason that respondent state college had not been
represented in the litigation by the Office of the Solicitor General.
We rule that the UP’s plea for equity warrants the Court’s exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the
declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UP’s right to due process.
Both the CA and the RTC found the filing on June 3, 2002 by the UP of the notice of appeal to be tardy. They based
their finding on the fact that only six days remained of the UP’s reglementary 15-day period within which to file the
notice of appeal because the UP had filed a motion for reconsideration on January 16, 2002 vis-à-vis the RTC’s
decision the UP received on January 7, 2002;; and that because the denial of the motion for reconsideration had
been served upon Atty. Felimon D. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002, the UP had only until May
23, 2002 within which to file the notice of appeal.
The UP counters that the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco was defective
considering that its counsel of record was not Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office but the OLS in Diliman,
Quezon City;; and that the period of appeal should be reckoned from May 31, 2002, the date when the OLS received
the order. The UP submits that the filing of the notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 was well within the reglementary
period to appeal.
We agree with the submission of the UP.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was
invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the
counsel and not the client that the service should be made.93
That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only on May 31, 2002. As
such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002,94 rendering the filing of the
UP’s notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UP’s period to appeal.
Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in
Diliman, and no other. The fact that Atty. Nolasco was in the employ of the UP at the UPLB Legal Office did not
render the service upon him effective. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be
made upon such counsel.95 Service on the party or the party’s employee is not effective because such notice is not
notice in law.96 This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly
states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he
shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." As such, the period to appeal
resumed only on June 1, 2002, the date following the service on May 31, 2002 upon the OLS in Diliman of the copy
of the decision of the RTC, not from the date when the UP was notified.97
Accordingly, the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC, being devoid of factual and legal bases, is set
aside.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining
period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the
judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June
3, 2002.
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in
the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal;; and that the period resumed upon notice of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for
strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UP’s favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first
announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,98 viz:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution,"99 is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.100 A law or regulation is procedural when it prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice.101 It does not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or is not subject of the general rule prohibiting the retroactive operation of statues,
but is given retroactive effect in actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage without violating any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
We have further said that a procedural rule that is amended for the benefit of litigants in furtherance of the
administration of justice shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in
equality.102 We may even relax stringent procedural rules in order to serve substantial justice and in the exercise of
this Court’s equity jurisdiction.103 Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or
legal jurisdiction.104
It is cogent to add in this regard that to deny the benefit of the fresh-period rule to the UP would amount to injustice
and absurdity – injustice, because the judgment in question was issued on November 28, 2001 as compared to the
judgment in Neypes that was rendered in 1998;; absurdity, because parties receiving notices of judgment and final
orders issued in the year 1998 would enjoy the benefit of the fresh-period rule but the later rulings of the lower
courts like that herein would not.105
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UP’s
filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP,
the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June
1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within
which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day."
IV
Awards of monetary damages,
being devoid of factual and legal bases,
did not attain finality and should be deleted
Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes that express findings of fact and of law should be made in the
decision rendered by any court, to wit:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
Implementing the constitutional provision in civil actions is Section 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (1a)
The Constitution and the Rules of Court apparently delineate two main essential parts of a judgment, namely: the
body and the decretal portion. Although the latter is the controlling part,106 the importance of the former is not to be
lightly regarded because it is there where the court clearly and distinctly states its findings of fact and of law on
which the decision is based. To state it differently, one without the other is ineffectual and useless. The omission of
either inevitably results in a judgment that violates the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
The term findings of fact that must be found in the body of the decision refers to statements of fact, not to
conclusions of law.107 Unlike in pleadings where ultimate facts alone need to be stated, the Constitution and the
Rules of Court require not only that a decision should state the ultimate facts but also that it should specify the
supporting evidentiary facts, for they are what are called the findings of fact.
The importance of the findings of fact and of law cannot be overstated. The reason and purpose of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court in that regard are obviously to inform the parties why they win or lose, and what their rights
and obligations are. Only thereby is the demand of due process met as to the parties. As Justice Isagani A. Cruz
explained in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals:108
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Here, the decision of the RTC justified the grant of actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees in the following
terse manner, viz:
xxx The Court is not unmindful that due to defendants’ unjustified refusal to pay their outstanding obligation to
plaintiff, the same suffered losses and incurred expenses as he was forced to re-mortgage his house and lot located
in Quezon City to Metrobank (Exh. "CC") and BPI Bank just to pay its monetary obligations in the form of interest
and penalties incurred in the course of the construction of the subject project.109
The statement that "due to defendants’ unjustified refusal to pay their outstanding obligation to plaintiff, the same
suffered losses and incurred expenses as he was forced to re-mortgage his house and lot located in Quezon City to
Metrobank (Exh. "CC") and BPI Bank just to pay its monetary obligations in the form of interest and penalties
incurred in the course of the construction of the subject project" was only a conclusion of fact and law that did not
comply with the constitutional and statutory prescription. The statement specified no detailed expenses or losses
constituting the ₱ 5,716,729.00 actual damages sustained by Stern Builders in relation to the construction project or
to other pecuniary hardships. The omission of such expenses or losses directly indicated that Stern Builders did not
prove them at all, which then contravened Article 2199, Civil Code, the statutory basis for the award of actual
damages, which entitled a person to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he
has duly proved. As such, the actual damages allowed by the RTC, being bereft of factual support, were speculative
and whimsical. Without the clear and distinct findings of fact and law, the award amounted only to an ipse dixit on
the part of the RTC,110 and did not attain finality.
There was also no clear and distinct statement of the factual and legal support for the award of moral damages in
the substantial amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00. The award was thus also speculative and whimsical. Like the actual
damages, the moral damages constituted another judicial ipse dixit, the inevitable consequence of which was to
render the award of moral damages incapable of attaining finality. In addition, the grant of moral damages in that
manner contravened the law that permitted the recovery of moral damages as the means to assuage "physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury."111 The contravention of the law was manifest considering that Stern Builders, as an
artificial person, was incapable of experiencing pain and moral sufferings.112 Assuming that in granting the
substantial amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00 as moral damages, the RTC might have had in mind that dela Cruz had
himself suffered mental anguish and anxiety. If that was the case, then the RTC obviously disregarded his separate
and distinct personality from that of Stern Builders. 113 Moreover, his moral and emotional sufferings as the President
of Stern Builders were not the sufferings of Stern Builders. Lastly, the RTC violated the basic principle that moral
damages were not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, but to restore the plaintiff to his
status quo ante as much as possible. Taken together, therefore, all these considerations exposed the substantial
amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00 allowed as moral damages not only to be factually baseless and legally indefensible, but
also to be unconscionable, inequitable and unreasonable.
Like the actual and moral damages, the ₱ 150,000.00, plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance, granted as attorney’s fees
were factually unwarranted and devoid of legal basis. The general rule is that a successful litigant cannot recover
attorney’s fees as part of the damages to be assessed against the losing party because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.114 Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, indeed, such
fees could be recovered only when there was a stipulation to that effect. It was only under the present Civil Code
that the right to collect attorney’s fees in the cases mentioned in Article 2208115 of the Civil Code came to be
recognized.116 Nonetheless, with attorney’s fees being allowed in the concept of actual damages,117 their amounts
must be factually and legally justified in the body of the decision and not stated for the first time in the decretal
portion.118 Stating the amounts only in the dispositive portion of the judgment is not enough;;119 a rendition of the
factual and legal justifications for them must also be laid out in the body of the decision.120
That the attorney’s fees granted to the private respondents did not satisfy the foregoing requirement suffices for the
Court to undo them.121 The grant was ineffectual for being contrary to law and public policy, it being clear that the
express findings of fact and law were intended to bring the case within the exception and thereby justify the award of
the attorney’s fees. Devoid of such express findings, the award was a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture.122
Nonetheless, the absence of findings of fact and of any statement of the law and jurisprudence on which the awards
of actual and moral damages, as well as of attorney’s fees, were based was a fatal flaw that invalidated the decision
of the RTC only as to such awards. As the Court declared in Velarde v. Social Justice Society,123 the failure to
comply with the constitutional requirement for a clear and distinct statement of the supporting facts and law "is a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" and that "(d)ecisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void." 124 The other
item granted by the RTC (i.e., ₱ 503,462.74) shall stand, subject to the action of the COA as stated herein.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals under review;; ANNULS the orders for the garnishment of the funds of the University of the
Philippines and for the release of the garnished amount to Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz;;
and DELETES from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 28, 2001 for being void only the
awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00, moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱
150,000.00, plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance, in favor of Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz.
The Court ORDERS Stem Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz to redeposit the amount of ₱
16,370,191.74 within 10 days from receipt of this decision.
Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, et al.
FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern
Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the
UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was
not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect
the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16,
2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was
served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of
appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the
writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence,
Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted
and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for
execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP
administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of
Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including
any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be
subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment
of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact
that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving
the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary
jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP.
HELD: The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record. (The
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time)
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its
trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal,
which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule
that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of
finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office
was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other.
It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear
enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled
to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining
period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the
judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on
June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the
rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed
upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be
taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first
announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems
it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The
retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs
filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the
UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end
on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday,
within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day
of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day.
GRANTED
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic
principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a
government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the
best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been
permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities
quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers;;
with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders
from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their
unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the
serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of
this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine
relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and
a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was
made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned
them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need
not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was
made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted
certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for
Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of
a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the
writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty,
on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel
for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the
day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were
produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to
Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The
fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the
answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then
in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did
not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province
of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that
he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that
the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to
do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless
the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further
stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and
policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13,
1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by
their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in
the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women;; that eighty-one women were found in Davao
who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
statements;; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz,
fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final
decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society,
and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night
to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and
the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-
General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine
Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for
any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of
that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of
society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If
the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render
the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of
the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official
can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so.
And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country,
then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed;; nor will
we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29;; 1 eng.
stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and
to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882],
106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man
may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the
courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action;; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may
still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to
meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his
domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force
in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty
of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer
has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously
as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the
persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge
Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by
one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a
crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the
writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance
in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court
should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by
respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila
only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a
petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78;; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal
liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made
therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of
first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court
or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79;; Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior
court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance
it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by
which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila;; it was shown that the case involved
parties situated in different parts of the Islands;; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained
of their liberty;; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to
grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says
counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint;; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush,
this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first
principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were
prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries
of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We
believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not
be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange
as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ
of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into
the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another
State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief
justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue.
Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions,
and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition
which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been
expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment;; after its many
confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a
fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of
right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed
here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the
state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the
case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the
statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to
and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the
latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the
court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent
upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion
are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted
to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to
the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled
to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the
limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of
control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881],
57 Iowa, 193;; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000;; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by
the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the
mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a
certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ
had been handed over by him to another;; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible
for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the
defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice
immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a
command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown
to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted
with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce
the child, that might be an answer;; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many
efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the
purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the
question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a
contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews,
12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233;; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to
have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention.
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of
Washington;; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ
of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show
that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court
held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being
present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he
should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that
Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged
in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5
Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624;; Church on Habeas, 2nd
ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted
a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court
awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or
be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the
record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of
his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do
so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question
being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit
that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted;; they did not show impossibility of performance;; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended
with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return.
That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back
to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at
their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar
facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's
case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought
about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;; and we said that he was bound to
use every effort to get the child back;; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose;; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter;; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That
the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze
the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have
shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading
of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a
substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see
this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person
and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce
the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed
in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156;; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that
any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction
by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to
fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court,
his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into
this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who
was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the
penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties
aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him
as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that
since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of
the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to
lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and
embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such
an amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent
Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days
the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record
the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision
may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas
corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of
women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to
change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of
prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred and fifty
women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of
the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in
proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to the
laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order of the
mayor of the city;; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said
governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the community formed by
those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city
or in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao;; hence the said official is obliged to bring
back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in which they lived prior to their
becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent
disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we
take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting
them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together
in a given place. It was not because they were really detained, but because on the first days there were no houses
in which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof that they were free a number of
them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living
together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in
good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their
domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons
who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the
suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a few
transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand
(300,000) who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate
women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into
account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution
in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such
houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are
sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the
closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates
thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of
the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor
the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights, should the administrative authority order his
hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the
great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist
or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger
because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their will,
whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its
consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the
cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease
known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is
still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy,
pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor
humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient
remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman who is usually older than
she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this
shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent
women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the
community or society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable
conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and
sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public
health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the
just orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been
worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy
may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in
general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it;;
they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty
bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they
assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly
responsible for the conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken,
availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense
majority of the population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center for the propagation of
general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said
houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate
the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the
women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily
renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities similar
measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is
true that in the execution of such measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in
forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for
the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a certain place of women dedicated to
prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which
is better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take
back and restore the said women who are at present found in Davao, and who desire to return to their former
respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should
expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made
under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due
compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with
respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed, according to the same decision, by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano
Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated
November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the
writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the
Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents, for the
purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ;; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not
safely be brought before this court;; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their lawyers
waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;; did not show impossibility of performance;; and did not
present writings, that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of
the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time
they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own
expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have
been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they
obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this,
the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and
added "that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was
that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to
in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on
January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with
the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same decision has
the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary
and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila
was provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and
while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to
conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the
first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking the first step for compliance with the
mandate of the said order;; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to
the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in
that none of the women appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with,
and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the said women having returned to
Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court
room, which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for
the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present
them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the
day fixed for the protection of the women before this court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-
mentioned who had returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents
themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them
from Davao with their consent;; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to
return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the
respondents to this effect;; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but
notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of
them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have
been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will,
only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance with
the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the
respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from
Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to
these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we
have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their inability to
present any of the said women that the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to
Manila;; and, on the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who
acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could bring
before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the
compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of
them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count
upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose.
But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This fact can
not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent has
substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not
complied with the mandate of this court in its first and second orders;; that neither of the said orders has been
complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority
decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent
with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and
constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight (8)
of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his order and
transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao,
demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas
corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty,
the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order.
In other words, he has disobeyed the said two orders;; has despised the authority of this court;; has failed to give the
respect due to justice;; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the
said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said
proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court;; and he is
guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the
defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct
the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or
circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct means.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law
and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing justice, since true respect never
comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and
obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be
difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally
that where due respect for the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of
compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to remove an
unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times.
In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers,
the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the
executive department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative
department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the
judicial department. The power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary
incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not;; and the authority for issuing attachments in a
proper case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as
supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed;; the loss of the prestige of the
authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the
same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban;; the damages which might have been suffered by some of
the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be
presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to this city at their own
expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket
the transportation of the said women;; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition
interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and
duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the
respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according
to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken
into consideration the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the
city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an
example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as
well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that
justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the
respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against him.
Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the
Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem
necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of
Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and punishment of the
crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect
by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes
committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means
whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there
should exist a government of laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.

Case Summary
Villavicencio vs. Lukban (1919)
G.R. No. L-14639 | 1919-03-25
Subject:
Mayor and Chief of Police Had No Authority to Deport People by Duress; Remedies of the Aggrieved
Citizens; Habeas Corpus Remedy to Inquire Manner of Involuntary Restraint
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women beyond the latter’s consent and knowledge. Thereafter, they were
shipped to Mindanao, specifically in Davao, where they were signed as laborers. The women were
apparently inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street in Sampaloc. They were
under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station. The haciendero
from Davao, where the women were placed, had no idea that the people sent to him were
prostitutes.
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus. The respondent moved to dismiss the case and
argued that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that it should be filed in the City
of Davao instead.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect,
Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing
Lukban's deportation of the prostitutes.
Held:
Mayor and Chief of Police Had No Authority to Deport People by Duress
1. One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
— and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change
their domicile from Manila to another locality.
2. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
3. The law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which
it gives.
Remedies of the Aggrieved Citizens
4. The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
5. The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before the Supreme Court.
6. The Supreme Court held that if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that
any public officer has violated the provision of law prohibiting public officials to banish unlawfully
citizens, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action.
Habeas Corpus Remedy to Inquire Manner of Involuntary Restraint
7. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
8. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.

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G.R. No.

L-­33112 June 15, 1978

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Santos, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J, took no part.

2. ₱ 5,716,729.00 in actual damages

3. ₱ 10,000,000.00 in moral damages

4. ₱ 150,000.00 and ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance as attorney’s fees;; and

5. Costs of suit.

Matters Arising During the Pendency of the Petition

c) a writ of execution had been issued;;

The UP now submits that:

The petition for review is meritorious.

We agree with the submission of the UP.

I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

TORRES, J., dissenting:

ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:

In the said decision, it is said:

I do not agree to this conclusion.

Mayor and Chief of Police Had No Authority to Deport People by Duress

Remedies of the Aggrieved Citizens

Habeas Corpus Remedy to Inquire Manner of Involuntary Restraint

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L-33112 June 15, 1978