A note on translation

Even a hundred years ago Tönnies’s friend, Friedrich Paulsen, com-

plained of his ‘horrible sentences’, while to many modern Germans he is
‘the Great Unreadable’ because his constructions require a command of
German grammar that has largely fallen into disuse. Tönnies’s style
favours the traditional periodic German sentence, long, convoluted, with
many subordinate clauses branching off one another. This is possible in
German because the language has genders and inflections, so that it is
clear to which word a relative pronoun is referring. This feature of his
writing we have not attempted to retain, and the long sentences have been
broken up in accordance with English usage. Another of Tönnies’s pref-
erences was for constructions which balance two halves of an argument,
e.g. both . . . and; not only . . . but also; on the one hand . . . on the other
hand; x stands to a as y stands to b; and so on. In many cases this feature
has had to be greatly simplified in order to avoid confusion in English.
Tönnies used many archaic words and grammatical structures, influ-
enced no doubt by older authors from his wide reading and by his own
Schleswigian background. Although the  edition was published in
Roman print, the  edition was printed in the old Gothic style, as were
all subsequent editions before that of . Similarly, many Latinate
spellings of German words employed in  were ‘Germanised’ in the
 edition. At the same time Tönnies employed many technical terms
from mathematics, physics, and the biological sciences – sometimes with
direct reference to, but more often as analogues of, or metaphors for,
processes in the social and political spheres. He also made frequent use of
terms derived from financial markets or commercial law. These terms
often have both a specialist and a more general application, and it is some-

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 A note on translation

times difficult to determine whether the stricter or looser sense is implied.

Another feature of Tönnies’s prose is a certain rhetorical quality, which
draws upon both the arts of the Protestant preacher and the more formal
devices of classical rhetoric. This partly reflects the origins of the work,
in his Habilitationsschrift for the university of Kiel, which he would have
been required to defend orally before the assembled faculty.1 But it also
suggests that, like his master Thomas Hobbes, Tönnies was torn between
the view that correct scientific knowledge was self-evidently true, and the
sense that it needed support from the arts of exposition and persuasion.
One rhetorical device which we have not been able to preserve is his use
of alliteration. This occurs most conspicuously in Book Two where he
highlights his points by choosing key words that begin with the same
letter, or with the same unstressed syllables Be- or Ge-. It is impossible to
replicate this exactly in English, though we have attempted to convey
some echo of the technique being employed.
As our aim has been to make Tönnies’s thought available in compre-
hensible English, we have used the idiom of the present day, including
everyday and even occasional slang expressions. We have not, however,
tried to expunge all traces of Tönnies’s own style – rather, where possi-
ble, we have tried to retain it. Where it is excessively complicated we have
aimed (so far as is consistent with the meaning) to ‘improve’ upon his
style by making it simpler and more incisive; but where he writes with
great feeling and powerful imagery, we have attempted to preserve these
and not water them down into more prosaic terms. A further difficulty
has been that, because of the complexity and allusiveness of Tönnies’s
language, there are many points at which several (sometimes widely
varying) readings are possible. This has usually been soluble in terms of
context; but on occasion we have been forced to make an informed guess
about what Tönnies was trying to say, and to plump for the reading that
seemed most plausible. This has seemed preferable to the alternative of
glossing over the difficulty, and rendering opaque German into even more
opaque English. Another problem has been that very different emphases
can be squeezed out of Tönnies’s text in the many cases where the
German vocabulary is more limited than the English. To take an obvious
example, it makes a great deal of difference in a work of social and political
11
Though there seems to have been some doubt about whether he actually did this. Tönnies
as a young man was a very tongue-tied speaker, had failed his earlier thesis-examination
in Berlin on this account, and may have chosen Kiel because it was more relaxed about
oral presentation.

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 A note on translation

theory whether the word Volk is rendered as tribe, nation, common

people, lower classes or simply as ‘people in general’. And when Tönnies
maintains that men are klüger than women, a great deal turns on whether
this means that men are more intrinsically intelligent, more judicious and
prudent, or simply more worldly-wise and cunning. In all such cases, an
attempt has been made to capture the overall drift of the original text. One
of the most difficult phrases to unpack has been the second half of the
sub-heading to the first edition: Abhandlung des Communismus und des
Socialismus als empirischer Culturformen. The simple-sounding als
empirischer Culturformen is in fact only intelligible in the context of
Tönnies’s  introduction, where he sets out his objective of reconcil-
ing the cognitive methods of Kant and Hume. Tönnies used the word
empirisch interchangeably with historisch to mean ‘empirically observable
in concrete historical facts’, while he used the word Form in the Kantian
sense to mean something which is known a priori. He also used the word
Cultur to mean, not just ‘culture’, but a whole way of life, social system or
overall civilisation (cultural, social, economic and political). A translation
of the sub-title that captured all these resonances would therefore have to
read something like: ‘An Essay on Communism and Socialism as concrete
Historical Embodiments of Two Different Abstract Conceptions of
Civilisation’. Since this sounds impossibly pretentious we have settled for
the more limited phrase: ‘An Essay on Communism and Socialism as
Historical Social Systems’.
Unless a translator is an expert in the subject of the work being trans-
lated, he or she is dependent on collaboration to grasp refinements of
meaning, to decipher technical terminology, and to ensure that the trans-
lation makes good sense in terms of subject matter and context. In the
case of this partnership, Margaret Hollis has provided the linguistic
input, unravelling the complicated sentences, which Jose Harris has then
revised in order to draw out Tönnies’s philosophical interests and his
political, social and economic thought. Neither could have done the work
without the other, so we regard ourselves as joint translators of this fasci-
nating work and trust that our efforts will bring it before a new genera-
tion of readers.

xl
 Glossary

Tönnies was very insistent on clear definition of terms, to such an extent

that his articles in Mind (–) defended the use of artificial,
‘invented’ language so as to rescue science from the snares of inherited
usage. This view co-existed awkwardly with his penchant for complex
and often archaic words and expressions that were richly enmeshed in
multiple layers of meaning. Moreover, having defined terms in a certain
way, he sometimes forgot that he had done so and slipped back into more
casual or traditional usage. Many of his key terms have to be translated in
different ways according to context. The most important of these are his
two antithetical pairs of concepts: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; and
Wesenwille and Willkür/Kürwille.
Neither Gemeinschaft nor Gesellschaft necessarily has the precise
meaning that Tönnies’s usage implies. In ordinary German Gemeinschaft
covers a range of possible meanings, from semi-mystical ‘communion’ to
simple sharing or partnership; while Gesellschaft often refers to a club,
association, social gathering or business firm. However, Tönnies’s own
use of the two words reflects his conception of an antithesis between
Gemeinschaft as small-scale, ‘organic’, close-knit Community, and
Gesellschaft as large-scale, impersonal, civil and commercial Society.
Except on occasions when Tönnies himself clearly uses the words to
imply something different, ‘Community’ and ‘Society’ are the terms
adopted here. The alternative sometimes suggested for Tönnies’s use of
Gesellschaft, i.e. ‘association’, seems (even though occasionally appropri-
ate) far too weak a word to convey his full meaning, which is that
Gesellschaft is (potentially at least) an all-embracing, global civilisation.
We have also at many points left the two terms untranslated, on the

xli
 Glossary

ground that both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft have evolved over the
course of the twentieth century into socio-political concepts whose reso-
nance transcends the boundaries of the German language.
Tönnies’s two ‘wills’ were linked to the distinction between der Wille
and die Willkür made by Kant. In Tönnies’s usage, as in Kant’s, although
the exercise of will may be relatively unreflective and spontaneous, it is
always conscious and in some sense ‘rational’: thus (despite Tönnies’s
interest in Schopenhauer) it never makes sense to talk of will as ‘blind’,
‘instinctive’ or ‘sub-conscious’. Der Wille is etymologically linked to Wahl

choice, and includes wish, desire, forethought, purpose, determina-
tion. Der Wesenwille was a term invented by Tönnies, and derives from
wesen
being (etymologically related to ‘was’ and ‘were’). The adjec-
tive/adverb wesentlich
esssential(ly) or basic(ally): so that Wesenwille
means the intelligence at the basis of all existence. In the  edition der
Wesenwille was contrasted with the already existing term, die Willkür,
which was replaced in the  edition by the ‘artificial’ term der Kürwille
(a change made by Tönnies partly to render his work more ‘scientific’, but
also to get away from the sense of Willkür as meaning nothing more than
‘arbitrary’). Both Willkür and Kürwille conveyed the sense of ‘free will’ or
‘free choice’, and corresponded to the Latin term, liberum arbitrium.
‘Arbitrary’ had traditionally meant something like ‘not subject to any
higher human power’ (e.g. in Tönnies’s text, the selection of a ruler
became arbitrary when it ceased to be determined by lot, fate or the gods,
and became dependent on the rational choice of electors, such as die
Kürfürsten, or prince-electors, who chose the Holy Roman Emperor).
There are many echoes in the text of the long and complex history by
which ‘arbitrariness’ as an attribute of freedom had become transformed
into an attribute of ‘absolute’ political authority. Previous editors have
translated these terms in a variety of ways. Loomis’s edition of
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft rendered Wesenwille as ‘natural will’ and
Kürwille as ‘rational will’; Werner Cahlman’s translation of Tönnies’s
‘Zur Einleitung in die Soziologie’ translated them as ‘essential will’ and
‘arbitrary will’; while Tönnies himself in an exposition of his work in
French referred to them as la volonté naturelle and la volonté factice (i.e.
natural and artificial will). In the present translation we have usually ren-
dered Wesenwille as ‘natural will’, but occasionally as ‘essential’ or ‘spon-
taneous’ or ‘intuitive’ will where these variants seemed appropriate. The
obvious difficulty with translating Kürwille as ‘arbitrary’ will is that in
ordinary speech ‘arbitrary’ has come to mean just the reverse of ‘rational’.

xlii
 Glossary

The parallel difficulty with translating Kürwille as ‘rational will’ is that,

as mentioned above, Tönnies viewed all will as in some sense rational (in
that ‘rationality’ took many forms and was just as much present in
Gemeinschaft as in Gesellschaft). The rationality of Kürwille, in the sense
of ‘calculation of rational self-interest’, was something quite distinct from
the vernünftige Wille which Tönnies saw as constituting the spirit of a
well-ordered commonwealth. In this translation, ‘rational will’ has been
used in contexts where Kürwille referred to calculation of means in rela-
tion to ends. But we have also translated it as ‘artificial will’, ‘arbitrary
will’, ‘free choice’, or ‘rational choice’ where these alternatives seemed
more appropriate.
Animal Tönnies’s term for the conscious, pain/pleasure registering
sphere of the human constitution, but below reflection/rationality.
An und für sich used by Tönnies in a rather casual way to mean ‘basi-
cally’, ‘intrinsically’, ‘in the abstract’ (there is little sign of his using the
term in the more portentous way that scholars detect in the writings of
Marx).
Begriff idea, concept, term, understanding (e.g. according to my under-
standing). (Begrifflichkeit
terminology).
Bestrebung used by Tönnies to indicate the selfish ambition that charar-
acterises ‘rational economic man’. It is linked to Streber, the pushy, self-
seeking type, and contrasts with Ehrgeiz, meaning ambition in the
sense of a noble ‘desire for honour’.
Bewußtheit a term borrowed from Schopenhauer to denote the height-
ened self-consciousness that Tönnies associated with ‘rational will’.
Bewußtsein ordinary human consciousness, in the sense of awake or
alert.
Einheit normally used to mean unity or a ‘unit’; also used by Tönnies to
mean a self-contained ‘system’.
Form used by Tönnies to indicate an a priori category, but also in a more
practical sense to mean something like ‘process’.
Geist intellect, spirit, ghost.
geistig spiritual, intellectual; relating to the life of the mind.
Gemeinwesen commonwealth, public affairs; sometimes translated as
‘community’ in the sense of a ‘political community’.
Gemüt no exact equivalent in English, since it refers both to the activity
of the mind, and to feelings or emotions. Translated here as either
‘heart and mind’ or ‘mind and soul’.
Herrschaft used by Tönnies sometimes to mean legitimate lordship or

xliii
 Glossary

authority, sometimes mere physical domination (as opposed to Würde,

which has overtones of ‘hallowed’ authority).
Idealbild used by Tönnies interchangeably with Normalbegriff and typ-
isches Exemplar to mean an abstract model or ‘ideal type’.
Ideell hypothetical, imaginary, related to the world of ‘forms’.
Leistung achievement, service. In compounds often means ‘efficiency’.
Mental mental, relating to the mind. Comes above ‘animal’ and ‘vege-
tative’ in Tönnies’s threefold construction of organic life.
Natur covers all the meanings of ‘nature’ in English, from the natural
world to the nature of a person or thing.
Naturell basic disposition or temperament.
psychisch: no exact English equivalent (not psychic, psychical, or psycho-
logical!). Translated here as ‘relating to the human psyche’.
Stadt town or city. Tönnies’s usage covers the Greek polis, the free city
of the mediaeval German empire, and any urban community that has
a composite organic life (as opposed to the atomistic ‘big city’ or
Grossstadt).
vegetativ Tönnies’s term for the reflex physiological activities of the
human constitution, below the level of awareness of pleasure/pain.
Vernunft reason in the philosophical sense, as in Kant’s Kritik der reinen
Vernunft. But ‘vernünftig’
reasonable, showing common sense.
Verstand reason in the sense of intellectual understanding, common
sense. verständig
(a) sensible; (b) showing understanding, sympa-
thetic.
Wissenschaft in a broad sense, knowledge; in a narrower sense, science
(including in German such disciplines as economics and history as well
as physics, chemistry, etc.).

A note on the text

In the translation that follows all footnotes are added by the editor,
Tönnies’s own references to sources being incorporated in the text. In the
main body of the text all italics (other than those used for non-English
words) indicate an emphasis in the German original. Double quotation
marks and round brackets were included by Tönnies himself. Single
quotation marks and square brackets have been added by the editor in
order to emphasise a point or to clarify meaning.

xliv