RECEIVERSHIP

COMMODITIES SOTORAGE VS CA
274 SCRA 439
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Trinidad obtained a loan from respondent Far East Bank & Trust Company to
finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage. The loan was secured by a
mortgage over the ice plant and the land on which the ice plant stands. Petitioner spouses failed to
pay their loan. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the ice plant was sold by public
bidding where respondent was the highest bidder.
Petitioner spouses filed Civil Case. Petitioner filed a Civil case against respondent bank before the
RTC of Bulacan for reformation of the loan agreement, annulment of the foreclosure sale and
damages but was dismissed without prejudice for non-payment of docket fees.
Petitioners filed another case against respondent bank before the RTC, Manila for damages,
accounting and fixing of redemption period. As a provisional remedy, petitioners "Urgent Petition
for Receivership." They alleged, among others, that respondent bank took possession of the ice
plant forcibly and without notice to them.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue but the court granted the petition for
receivership which was reversed by the CA. Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of the provisional remedy of receivership is valid?
HELD:
No. In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a receiver.
A receiver of real or personal property, which is the subject of the action, may be appointed by the
court when it appears from the pleadings or such other proof as the judge may require, that the
party applying for such appointment has (1) an actual interest in it; and (2) that (a) such property is
in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured; or (b) whenever it appears to be the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving or administering the property in litigation.
A receiver is a person appointed by the court in behalf of all the parties to the action for the purpose
of preserving and conserving the property in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or
dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. The appointment of a receiver is
not a matter of absolute right. It depends upon the sound discretion of the court and is based on
facts and circumstances of each particular case.
A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property or fund which is
the subject of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or material injury which necessitates
protection or preservation. The guiding principle is the prevention of imminent danger to the
property. If an action by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedy
cannot be applied for and granted.
PACIFIC MERCHANDISING VS CONSOLACION INS.
73 SCRA 564
FACTS:
Petitioner Pacific merchandising filed an action to collect sum of money from Consolacion
Insurance who in turn filed a third-party complaint against Pajarillo. The court ruled in favor of
petitioner and ordered the respondent to pay the amount prayed for and condemning third-party
defendant to pay third-party plaintiff for whatever sums or amounts the latter paid the plaintiff on
account of this judgment
Third party complainant elevated the case to the CFI of Manila which affirmed the decision of the
City Court. Third party defendant Pajarillo was appointed receiver of all assets, properties and
equipment of Paris Theatre owned by Leo enterprise which was sold at public auction by way of
execution from a case filed by pacific merchandising against Leo Enterprise.
However, when plaintiff’s counsel demanded payment from Pajarillo, the latter did not pay claiming
he no longer was bound to pay because he had ceased to be the receiver of Paris Theater operated
by Leo Enterprise.
ISSUE:
Whether or not receivership was terminated making third part defendant no liable.
HELD:
No. The receivership was not extinguished.
A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an officer of the court
exercising his functions in the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common
benefit of all the parties in interest. He performs his duties "subject to the control of the Court", and
every question involved in the receivership may be determined by the court taking cognizance of the
receivership proceedings. Thus, "a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any
contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the
authority or approval of the court * * *". As explained by Justice Moran, speaking for the Court in a
1939 case, "* * * The custody of the receiver is the custody of the court. His acts and possession are
the acts and possession of the court, and his contracts and liabilities are, in contemplation of law, the
contracts and liabilities of the court. As a necessary consequence, a receiver is subject to the control
and supervision of the court at every step in his management of the property or funds placed in his
hands. * * *" He cannot operate independently of the court, and cannot enter into any contract
without its approval."

ARRANZA VS BF HOMES
333 SCRA 799
FACTS:
Respondent BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) , is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivision
and selling residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes
Paranaque Subdivision. With the withdrawal of substantial investments in BFHI , respondent filed
with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation. Atty Florencio Orendain was appointed as receiver. He
was later relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver. The new Board of Receivers revoked the
authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community
assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps ; recognized BF Paranaque Homeowners
Association (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners; took over the management of the
Clubhouse and deployed its own guards.
Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit “for and in behalf of the more than 7,000
homeowners” against respondent BFHI et al to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots in BF
Homes Paranaque 3. Respondents asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction arguing
that the SEC, being the appointing authority should be the one to take cognizance of controversies
arising from the performance of the receiver’s duties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HLURB is divested of jurisdiction since respondent is under receivership.
HELD:
NO. The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction.
A receiver is a person appointed by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi-judicial administrative
agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and
preventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the
parties. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets of the receivership estate; and in the
management and disposition of the property committed to his possession, he acts in a fiduciary
capacity and with impartiality towards all interested persons. The appointment of a receiver does not
dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. In this case
where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation
receivership, respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence, continues or should continue
to perform its contractual and statutory responsibilities to petitioners as homeowners.
Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights; it cannot be
used as an instrument for the destruction of those rights.
No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditors would result as far as petitioner’s
complaint before the HLURB is concerned.

ALCANTARA VS ABBAS
9 SCRA 54
FACTS:
Alcantara sued Bacaron Abbas partly to foreclose the chattel mortgage executed by the latter on a
tractor with its accessories. Pursuant to a clause in the mortgage contract, the court designated
Alcantara as receiver of the tractor. Thereafter, with the courts approval, he leased the machine to
Sablada. Upon the expiration of the lease, and after Sablada’s failure to return the machine, said
court, at the instance of Alcantara, declared Sablada to be in contempt of court and fined him in the
amount of Php100.
Meanwhile, alleging that Alcantara had neglected his duties as receiver because he did not get the
tractor, Bacaron petitioned the court to relieve such receiver and to appoint Bacaron as the receiver
instead.
Respondent Judge, in his order, relieved Alcantara and appointed Bacaron as receiver of the tractor,
without bond, with authority to receive the sum of Php2000.00 in Alcantaras hands as rentals of the
tractor, and to the end the same for repairs if necessary.
His motion was denied so Alcantara filed with this Court a special Civil action.
ISSUE: WON the removal for his receivership is valid.
HELD:
No. If it was error to remove Alcantara, a clearer error occurred when Bacaron – the defendant –
was appointed, as receiver without bond, over the objection of Alcantara – the plaintiff.
The general rule is that neither to a litigation should be appointed receiver without the others
consent because “a receiver ought to be an indifferent person between the parties” and “should be
impartial and disinterested”. Note that Bacaron was the defendant, and his personal interest would
conflict with his duties to the court and the plaintiff. Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, the
receiver must file a bond; and yet Bacaron was exempted from such obligation. The effect of the
whole proceeding was to discharge the receivership at the request of the defendant, without so
much a bond – contrary to sec 4, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court.

ABRIGO VS KAYANAN
121 SCRA 20
FACTS:
the plaintiffs sought the partition of seven (7) parcels of land under a claim of co-ownership with the
defendants. The plaintiffs claimed that except for one-half of the fifth parcel, two of the defendants,
were in possession of the lands. The defendants put up the defense of ownership; they claimed
ownership by hereditary title by virtue of an alleged duly approved Amended Project of Partition in
the Testate Estate of Nazario Abrigo.
the plaintiffs filed an Urgent Motion for the appointment of a receiver to administer parcel on the
ground that numerous squatters had invaded the property to the plaintiffs' great damage and
prejudice. The court appointed as Receiver Atty Nantes and another as assistant to the receiver.
Defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion for the appointment of a receiver but was denied.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the court.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Judge erred with his appointment of a receiver.
HELD:
Yes. The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in connection with the appointment
of a receiver.
The appointed receiver does not acquire any advantage from the owners and/or present possessors,
nor is he in a better position in order to protect the respective interest of the herein parties for he
has to apply as are the present possessors deprived of their possession, for the same remedies and
relief normally afforded to an aggrieved property owner, under our legal system. A receiver is not
endowed with extra-legal power to take the law in his hands with a view to quell and disband the
squatters short of taking legal action; nor is he conferred with a magic wand not possessed by herein
party-litigants as property owners. On the contrary, the receivership placed the parties at a
disadvantage. He stands between the squatters and owner. possessors, so much so that any action of
the owner-possessor against the squatters will have to pass through the receiver. Whereas, if the
status quo were left undisturbed, the owner-possessor, whose holding over the parcel of land under
litigation is actually occupied and entered by squatters can take direct legal action as he has the legal
right to proceed against the intruders.
The respondent judge should at least have accepted the bond offered by the petitioner. Rule 59, Sec.
4 stipulates that "the receiver (may be) discharged when the party opposing the appointment files a
bond executed to the applicant in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that such party
will pay the applicant all damages he may suffer by reason of the acts, omissions, or other matters
specified in the application as ground for such appointment."

RALLA VS ALCASID
116 PHIL 622, 625
FACTS:++
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to annul the orders of respondent judge appointing a
receiver and refusing a bond to dissolve the receivership.
Pedro Ralla filed a case against his father Rosendo Ralla and his brother Pablo Ralla, an action for
partition involving 212 parcels of land allegedly valued P270,000.00. The complaint after making
proper allegations, also prayed for the appointment of a receiver which the court granted. The
Municipal Treasurer of Ligao, Albay, Vicente Real, qualified as receiver with a bond of P10,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. While such motion was pending, above petitioners
presented an omnibus "Motion to be allowed to file a bond for the discharge of the receiver and/or
Motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration and motion to require accounting and increase of
bond, if discharge of the receiver is not allowed."
However, respondent court entered an order denying the motion to reconsider the appointment of a
receiver, and the motion to discharge the receivership upon the filing of a bond.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred when he decreed the receivership and appointed a receiver in a
partition proceeding.
HELD:
NO. We find no inclination to hold that the respondent court abused its discretion in the issuance
of its questioned orders.
A receiver of real or personal property, which is the subject of the action, may be appointed by the
court where it appears from the pleadings, and/or such other proof as the judge may require, that
the party applying for such appointment has an actual interest in it and that such property is in
danger of being lost, removed or materially injured. The appointment is also proper whenever it
appears to be the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, or administering the property
in litigation.
The appointment of a receiver depends principally upon the sound discretion of the court; it is not a
matter absolute right. The facts and circumstances, of each particular case determine the soundness
of the exercise such discretion. Among the consequences and effects considered by the courts
before appointing a receiver are: (a) whether or not the injury resulting from such an appointment
would probably be greater than the injury suing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (b) whether
or not the appointment will imperil the interests of other whose rights deserve as much a
consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.
ACUÑA VS CALUAG
101 PHIL 446
FACTS:
Petitioner Acuña and his wife, executed in favor of Mr. Santos a real estate mortgage over two
parcels of land with TCT and the improvements thereon, to secure the payment of a loan with the
undertaking that the properties mortgaged should be insured and that the insurance policy would be
kept in force.
Upon petitioners failure to pay, respondent Santos filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
with the CFI of Rizal. Respondent judge rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The decision
became final and executory and so the Court issued an alias writ of possession to enforce the
decision in the case.
Thereafter, respondent Judge appointed Romero as receiver of the properties over the opposition of
the petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred in appointing a receiver when such was opposed by the petitioners.
HELD:
NO. The orders of respondent Judge on petitioner's to deliver possession of the property to the
receiver are therefore valid and it was petitioners' duty to obey the same.
We agree with counsel for the respondents that, although the perfection of an appeal deprives the
trial court of jurisdiction over the case, nevertheless, under the law, said court retains jurisdiction as
regards the preservation of the property under litigation and involved in the appeal, including
necessarily the authority to appoint a receiver who has the power to take and keep possession of the
property in controversy. (Rule 61, Section 1 (d) and Section 7; Velasco & Co. vs. Go Chuico, 28
Phil., 39; Jocson vs. Presbitero et al., 97 Phil., 6). According to respondents' answer to the petition,
petitioners did not contest the legality and propriety of the appointment of the receiver; they did not
even file a motion for reconsideration of the appointment. Consequently, it is now rather late to
raise the question of the propriety and legality of the order of the court appointing said receiver.
According to the same answer, petitioners herein are insolvent: the building and improvements
involved in the appeal in danger of being destroyed or impaired; and petitioners have failed to pay
the rents at the rate of P500 a month from August, 1953, up to the date of the answer, June 26,
1956, amounting to about P15,000, for which the receiver was appointed on October 28, 1955.

SALIENTES VS IAC
246 SCRA 150
FACTS:
Salientes filed a complaint for annulment of the titles of private respondents in the CFI of Riza. He
instituted the action in his capacity as the receiver appointed by the same court in a previous civil
case. The complaint sought to enjoin private respondents from proceeding with the ejectment cases
filed against occupants of the lots as there was no portion of the Maysilo Estate has actually been
alienated to anybody.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action, res judicata
and lis pendens which the court granted. His motion for reconsideration was denied so he filed an
appeal with the CA. The CA upheld private respondents and reversed the oders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals held that there was no legal basis for the trial court to appoint petitioner as
receiver under Section 1, Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of Court because the land registered in the
names of private respondents are not the subject of litigation.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of petitioner as receiver is without legal basis.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a receiver is proper only during the pendency of the
cas
General powers of receiver.- Subject to the control of the court in which the action is pending, a
receiver shall have power to bring and defend, as such, actions in his own name; to take and keep
possession of the property in controversy; to receive rents; to collect debts due to himself as receiver
or to the fund, property, estate, person, or corporation of which he is receiver; to compound for and
compromise the same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and other
property that shall remain among the persons legally entitled to receive the same; and generally to do
such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize. But funds in the hands of a receiver
may be invested at interest only by order of the court made upon the written consent of all the
parties to the action."
A receiver is a representative of the court appointing him for the purpose of preserving and
conserving the property under receivership and preventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if
it goes to the possession of another person. In the case at bench, petitioner had to take action to
question the right of private respondents in transferring portions of the land covered by O.C.T. No.
994.

DOLAR vs SUNDIAM
38 scra 616
FACTS:
A petition for allowance of will and appointment of administrator for the deceased. estate was filed
by Generoso Tupas Jr. After the probate of the will and the appointment of the deceased’s widow as
judicial administrator, Generoso Tupas Jr. sold to respondent Lumampao, for the price of P40k, two
parcels of land bequeathed to him by his deceased father.
By virtue of this purchase, Lumampao asked the surrogate court to be allowed to intervene in the
proceedings. The court granted his motion. A project of partition of the testate estate was submitted
to the probate court for approval. The two parcels of land of the testate estate previously sold to
Lumampao were expressly assigned to Generoso Tupas Jr. Such project of partition was approved
by the probate court.
Thereafter, a complaint for the recovery of the said two parcels of land was filed by Lumampao
against Generoso Tupas, Jr. and Luis Tupas with the CFI of Iloilo on the ground that the
defendants therein, by use of force, threats, stealth, strategy and intimidation, deprived him of the
possession of the said properties and gathered all the products therefrom.
Pending the decision, Lumamapo filed with the probate court a petition for the appointment of
receiver which was granted.
ISSUE:
WON the relief of receivership is a valid remedy while the main case is pending.
HELD:
Yes. The principal object of the ancillary relief a receivership is to secure and preserve the property
or thing in controversy pending litigation in order that, as far as practicable, a judicial tribunal, in aid
of its jurisdiction, may be able to effectively bestow to the parties litigant the rights to which they are
entitled, or exact from them the obligations to which they are subject, under the law. Ordinarily,
therefore, this remedy will not lie where the property involved is already in custody of law, such as
that in the hands of an executor or administrator. In these cases, the practical and equitable
purposes to be accomplished under a receivership are then virtually available.
REPLEVIN
BASAYA VS MLITANTE
156 SCRA 299
FACTS:
Respondent TUNA is the charterer of a fishing vessel. TUNA, Inc. has been operating this Vessel in
its deep-sea fishing business since 1977 together with eight (8) other fishing boats. Sometime in
1985, TUNA, Inc. transferred the operation of the Vessel to a sister corporation, the Eastship.
Petitioners, twenty-four (24) in all, constitute the crew of the Vessel, with petitioner Dominador
Basaya, Jr., as its Captain.
TUNA, Inc. sought the remedy of Replevin against petitioners before the RTC presided over by
Respondent Judge, praying that petitioners (defendants in that case) be ordered to deliver to it the
possession of its Vessel, which petitioners were allegedly possessing in violation of its rights.
Judgement was rendered in the replevin case declaring Tuna to have a better right to the possession.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the Replevin case.
HELD:
Yes. The Court upheld its jurisdiction and ruled, as heretofore stated, that the charterer, TUNA,
Inc., has a better right to the possession of the Vessel and ordered petitioners to immediately deliver
possession.
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The
primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another
person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of
personal property (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Provisional Remedies, 1985, p. 386, citing
46 Am. Jur. 7). The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property
involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property
as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal; it is beyond
the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
The Trial Court, therefore, rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the Replevin Case and aptly held
that, as charterer of the Vessel, TUNA, Inc. has the better right of possession and that petitioners’
alleged right to possess the Vessel as the crew thereof is not in any way superior to the right of
TUNA, Inc. as such charterer or lessee.
BA FINANCE CORPORATION VS CA
258 SCRA 102
FACTS:
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed a promissory note binding themselves to
pay Carmasters, Inc. for an amount on to be paid on installment basis. To secure payment, spouses
executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle.
When the latter failed to pay, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands not having been heeded,
petitioner filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses praying the recovery of
the vehicle.
Upon motion and filing of a bond, the lower court issued the writ of replevin.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the writ of replevin was valid.
HELD:
Yes. Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It
may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the
plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is
primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam — in
rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to
damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to
obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a
special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession of the property sought to be
replevied is ordinary the proper and only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required
to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but not in possession
thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the immediate possession of the
property but the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for
seeking such interim possession.

YANG VS VALDEZ
177 SCRA 141
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Morante brought an action in the RTC of General Santos City against
petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo
trucks.
In their complaint, the Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and possession of the two
(2) cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period from 1982 to 1984. The trucks were,
however, registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante
spouses' business of buying and selling corn.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied for a writ of
replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560,000.00 executed by respondent Milagros Morante and
Atty. Bayani Calonzo (counsel for respondent spouses).
The Court approved the prayer for the issuance of the writ of replevin.
ISSUE:
WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it approved the replevin bond of
respondent spouses.
HELD:
No. A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or
undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. It is not indispensably necessary, however, that
the obligation of the bond be secured or supported by cash or personal property or real property or
the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. Most generally understood, a
"bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee
under specified conditions. At common law, a bond was merely a written obligation under seal. A
bond is often, as a commercial matter, secured by a mortgage on real property; the mortgagee may
be the obligee, although the mortgagee may also be a third-party surety whose personal credit is
added to that of the principal obligor under the bond.
PAGKALINAWAN VS GOMEZ
21 SCRA 102
FACTS:
Respondent Judge, the Hon. Amador E. Gomez acting on a complaint for replevin filed by the
other respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed petitioner, Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising
agent of the National Bureau of Investigation to turn over to the Sheriff of Cebu City an automobile
which was seized under a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon.
Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of the offense of theft or as stolen property.
The respondent judge issued an order directing the petitioner to immediately comply with the order
of the court and to turn over to the sheriff the car in question upon receipt of a copy of the order.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the replevin action.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction. Hence the mandatory preliminary injunction
issued be made permanent.
It is worth noting that while the then Justice Laurel dissented, his opinion being in effect that the
remedy should be granted, he admitted that "where property is seized under color of judicial process
and brought under the control of the court, [it was] placed beyond the reach of replevin or other
independ-ent or plenary remedy. Again, while the above ruling is not squarely on all fours, still the
governing principle does not seem to be in doubt. The remedy for questioning the validity of a
search warrant may be sought in the Court of First Instance that issued it, not in the sala of another
Judge, and as admitted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel, not through replevin.
The moment a court of first instance has been informed through the filing of an appropriate
pleading that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if
the literal language of the Rules of Court yield a contrary impression which in this case
demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for acting as he did, require a sheriff or any proper
officer of the Court to take the pro-perty subject of the replevin action if theretofore it came into
the custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance
that issued such a search warrant may order its release.

BAGALIHOG VS FERNADEZ
198 SCRA 614
FACTS: Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport.
Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the petitioner's house,
which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had sought refuge
there. The search proved fruitless.
Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the
petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant.
The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.
petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the motorcycle with an
application for a writ of replevin, plus damages. Complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON Replevin is proper to recover possession of said motorcycle.

HELD:
Yes. The proper remedy for this purpose is his complaint for recovery and the issuance of a writ of
replevin as authorized by the Rules of Court.
We do not find that the importance of the motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases
excused its seizure without a warrant. The authorities had enough time to comply with the required
procedure but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional shortcut.
Our finding is that the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate will
not constitute interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and that,
consequently, the complaint should not have been dismissed by the respondent judge.

CHUA VS CA
222 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Judge Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a search warrant directing the
immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction located and the seizure of an Isuzu dump
truck. Respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody thereof.
A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump
truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, presided by Judge Cañares alleging among other things, petitioner's lawful
ownership and possession of the subject vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone;
that he has not stolen nor carnapped it, and that he has never been charged of the crime of
carnapping or any other crime for that matter.
Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount
of one hundred thousand pesos. The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the
subject vehicle was seized
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the writ of replevin was valid.
HELD:
No. We find no merit in the main issue presented before Us.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is
in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.
The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the
possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the
property was taken.
Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an
officer under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession
will lie
LA TONDENA DISTILLERS VS CA
209 SCRA 553
FACTS: Petitioner La Tondena filed with the RTC of Manila an action of Replevin with Damages
against a person named Te Tien Ho, described in the complaint as a junk dealer or owner of a
second-hand store located in Manila.
In his complaint, he alleges that defendant is in possession of a quantity of bottles registered under
La Tondena.
Judge Santillan issued a writ of delivery upon posting of a bond by petitioner.
ISSUE: WON judge Santillan violated the rule on replevin.
HELD: Yes. A defendant or other party in a replevin proceeding against whom a writ of seizure has
the alternative remedies set forth in Section 5, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
The defendant may avail of these alternative options only within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer. This was made plain albeit impliedly by Section 6 of the same Rule.
Thus, if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to
him, he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of
said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof both requirements — as well as compliance
therewith within the five-day period mentioned — being mandatory.
Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a
counter-bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6
ONG VS IAC
201 SCRA 543
FACTS:
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. applied for and was granted a loan by Solidbank. To secure the loan,
both parties executed a document denominated as "Pledge Agreement" where Madrigal will give
additional securities or collaterals of a pledge in favor of the bank, its barge and tugboat.
Madrigal failed to pay. The creditor bank had to sell the pledged properties. Nevertheless, when the
pledgee bank was to sell the pledged properties, it found out that the tugboat and the barge had
surreptitiously been taken from the Tanque Bodega, Pasig River, Manila, where the vessels were
moored and towed to Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila, without the knowledge and consent of the
Solidbank .
Solidbank filed a complaint for Replevin with Damages before the CFI of Manila. The respondent
court (CFI) issued an order for the seizure of the above described personal property upon posting of
a bond
ISSUE: WON a counterbond is necessary to release the properties subject of the writ.
HELD:
Yes. Solidbank was required and has already posted a bond in favor of the Ongs should the suit for
replevin be declared improper. Conversely, petitioner Ong must post a bond if he seeks the
continued possession of the property, in favor of Solidbank should the suit for replevin prosper.
This Court has explained that a defendant in a replevin suit, (petitioners Ong in this case) may
demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to
the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff s affidavit, within the
periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. Under Section D, petitioner
may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff' require the return of the
property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the
officer." Both these periods are mandatory in character. Thus, a lower court which approves a
counterbond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of jurisdiction

ASIAN TERMINALS INC VS BAUTISTA

505 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Respondents are duly-licensed importers of vehicles. In 1998, they imported 72 secondhand right-
hand drive from Japan. When the shipment arrived in Manila, the Collector of Customs impounded
the vehicles.
The importers then filed a complaint with the RTC for replevin with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. The court granted the application for
the writ of replevin upon posting of a bond.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in the issuance of the writ of replevin.
HELD:
Yes. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents
herein, issue the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already
seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the
petition for replevin at the outset.
The initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are
void. While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and
the transfer thereof to the custody of the RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the
required taxes, duties and charges, he did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did
it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for
replevin.

SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

FRANCISCO VS ZANDUETA
61 PHIL 752
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez,
instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is
the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support.
Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not
present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenio’s birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order
granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence the writ for certiorari.
Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his
client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case.
ISSUE:
W/N Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status as petitioner’s son
HELD:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really agreed to have him pay the pension
during the case’s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case.
As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of
support can be derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his
guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of support can be given
because the very civil status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who
claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such
son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must
not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.”
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light
of herein private respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
SAN JUAN VS VALENZUELA
117 SCRA 926
FACTS:
On Sept 16, 1981, the marriage between Respondent Mejia and Petitioner San Juan was declared
null and void by the CFI of Rizal on ground and prior subsisting marriage between petitioner and
one Isable Bandin.
Respondent Mejia instituted the instance action against petitioner, seeking support for herself and
her two minor children.
The court granted the application for support pendent lite. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in granting the application for support pendent lite when it fixed the amount
to be paid by petitioner.
HELD:
No. The issue should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of the evidence to be presented at
the proper hearing. The order of December 24 fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not
final in character in the sense that it can be the subject of modification, depending on the changing
conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
It appears that pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a manifestation
proposing to settle his obligation of P15,000.00 which was approved by the court.
Unquestionably, the petitioner's willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the
mariner indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have
rendered this petition moot and academic.
REYES VS INES-LUCIANO
88 SCRA 803
FACTS:
Private respondent Ines-Luciano seeks to have the decision of the lower court be modified making
the payment of the support pendente lite of 4000 per month to retroact.
On the other hand, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the ground that
the trial court should be ordered to receive evidence on the issue of whether or not the private
respondent is entitled to support pendente lite. He claims further that the amount is not only
excessive for the needs of private respondent but beyond the means of the petitioner herein.
ISSUE:
WON the amount ordered by the court is excessive and beyond the means of herein petitioner.
HELD:
No. The support pendente lite in the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) is reasonable.
Hence, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner has no merit.
Obviously, during the period that she was not receiving any support she incurred debts. She must
also pay attorney's fees.
Considering that whatever support the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, might now be
receiving will be deducted from her share of the conjugal properties, the Court finds that under the
equities and circumstances of the case, the decision should be modified so as to make the support
pendente lite of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) a month retroact to November 1, 1977.

TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER

GO-TAN VS SPOUSES TAN
567 SCRA 231
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h)
(5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be
included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In
Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.

FRANCISCO OCAMPO VS ARCAYA-CHUA

AM OCA IPI NO 07-2630-RTJ
619 SRA 59
FACTS:
These consolidated cases stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua due to the acts of respondent Judge in a case pending before her sala where
complainant is one of the respondents.
In the said special proceedings, Milan, wife of Francisco filed a petition claiming the sole custody of
their minor daughter. Summons were served and hearing was set. During the hearing, respondent
Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the
country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights
over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Francisco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan
were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan and not in Makati.
Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied. Respondent Judge also issued a Temporary Protection Order requiring complainant
Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's
residence.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the Temporary Protection Order in the case is necessary and thus
valid.
HELD:
Yes.
According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to
stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the issuance of the TPO can be made
upon the filing of the application after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued.
This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:

SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the
reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court
shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who
may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice
of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before complainant
Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A
preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared
that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo,
having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or
ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo.
While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of support
apt and plausible, the same could be merely considered as an error of judgment or an abuse of
discretion, but respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively liable thereon.
Considering that the matter of support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not
be faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without further evaluating evidence with
respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that
respect was not gross, the same having been brought about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on
Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection
and support may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule specifically applies to petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal separation. In this case, the
matter of support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.

WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER

YANO VS SANCHEZ
612 SCRA 347
FACTS: Respondent Cleofas filed a petition for issuance of Writ of Amparo with Motion for
Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon.
The court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen Esperon to make a verified return of
the writ.
Cleofas amended her petition to include additional petitioner and implead other military officers as
additional respondents. They claim that their sons were gone missing after they heard gunshots and
saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by and upon thorough search including the Camp
Detachment of the Philippine Army, they were unable to locate their sons.
Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on
account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the
production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military
camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment
under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The petition was denied but nonetheless the Court granted the relief prayed for to inspect the
different camps of the AFP in the said area in the interest of human rights and justice.
Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred when it approved the issuance of the writ of Amparo despite failure of
respondent to prove their allegations.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds merit in the petition.
The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to have
the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo
petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that
standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the
appellate courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve
the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction
on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for
the court to grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the
courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and
preserve all relevant evidence, viz:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court,
justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may
order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of
keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of
praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a
party who did not appeal.

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES UNDER THE RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS:

CHILD CUSTODY: BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
HORACIO LUNA & LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA VS IAC
137 SCRA 1
FACTS: Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio
Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to
her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known
as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.
A the birth of the said Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple, who
brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and
"Papa." She calls her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy."
Her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley abroad but respondents refused to give their written
consent.
When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to another
school. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said
respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners.
In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal, against the
private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The
court rendered a decision declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody and forthwith
granted the writ prayed for.
The private respondents appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside and another entered,
ordering the petitioners, among other things, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The
herein petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision but their motion was denied.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review of the decision of the appellate court.
Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to the court of origin presided over by
respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo who, thereafter, issued an order directing the issuance of a writ
of execution to satisfy and enforce the resolution of the Supreme Court which affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The execution of the judgment was opposed by the petitioners who filed a motion for the
reconsideration. By reason thereof, the respondent judge called a conference among the parties and
their counsel, and conducted hearings on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and to set aside
the writ of execution. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the petitioners herein,
and forced to stay with the respondents.
However, respondent Judge denied the motion to set aside the motion for execution. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but was again denied. A petition for certiorari was filed to the CA
but was again denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON procedural rules, more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of
appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of
the child.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners custody of the child Shirley should be maintained.
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court,
the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The
lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose than
execution; nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with
it further than to settle so much as has been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that
a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the
ends of justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had ever been submitted to the
judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued;
or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgment debt has
been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education
and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of
the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their
children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an
age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and
give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive
to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley
has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding,
guidance and counselling, and moral and material security. But, what if the threat is for real?