Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies

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The politics of citizenship in divided nations: Policies and

trends in Germany and China
Choo Chin Low
History Department, School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Malaysia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Looking at how divided states competed against each other in the arena of citizenship
Available online 6 May 2016 since 1949, this research observes a number of common trends. The German and Chinese
case studies manifested a shared trend in large part because they faced comparable
Keywords: challenges and responded with similar citizenship strategies in their quest for national
Comparative citizenship legitimacy and diplomatic recognition. The policy effectiveness depended on the intensity
Divided nations
of inter-state rivalry, the Cold War diplomacy, and the global nationality trends. The tight
Policies and trends
bipolar system and the strong international cooperation on nationality in Europe (among
Socialist nationality
Treaty system
the socialist and non-socialist blocs) explain why both German states were in more
National identity favourable circumstances in asserting their citizenship claim. These two aspects are
missing in the Asian context, which explain the absence of the role of the international
community in legitimising or supporting the Chinese citizenship rivalry. This paper con-
cludes that citizenship policies in the two German states were shaped in response to one
another. As compared to the German case, the Chinese and Taiwanese policies exhibited a
more pragmatic and independent character.
© 2016 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

1. Introduction

“Conflict” is the defining characteristic of relations between states within divided nations (Gu, 1995). Interstate rivalry
takes place when the rival states compete for diplomatic recognition and for representation in international organizations. In
their quest for international legitimacy, they form alliances with the superpowers, and engage in domestic reforms to
improve their international image (Lebow and Henderson, 2006; Metzler, 2001; Yung, 2000; Gu, 1995; Chiu, 1981).
Competition between divided states has presented peculiar problems for the international community and it affected the
rights of the population in the divided states with regard to diplomatic protection in a third state, the right to return and
resettlement, dual citizenship, political rights and travel restrictions to communist or non-Communist countries (Hilf, 2004;
Hofmann, 1998; Simma, 1985; Tseng and Wu, 2011; Wang, 2004). While interstate conflicts within divided nations have been
subject to a considerable research effort, the examination of citizenship conflicts has not been given the same attention in a
comparative perspective. Nationality in divided nations has been neglected in international law since international law
provides no legal framework for divided nations to deal with their nationality problems. Chang (1990, p. 267) asserts that
nationality in a divided nation presents “peculiar legal problems which have as yet been largely neglected and thus still
remain unexplored”. In his words, the phenomenon “possibly gives rise, in the field of nationality, to some sort of de facto dual
nationality” (p. 258).
Citizenship in divided nations, thus, should be treated differently from citizenship in non-divided nations. The citi-
zenship issue is a question of national existence. In terms of functionality, citizenship in divided nations has been

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2016.04.006
0967-067X/© 2016 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
124 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

“instrumentalised” to achieve goals of national unification. Citizenship is one of the important arenas of competition to
control the national population, including those in their rival state. Gaining the allegiance of the population is vital since the
interstate rivalry over the control of population is closely related to the issues of state's legitimacy and sovereignty. In fact,
the battle for influence and control over nationals abroad is one of the areas of rivalry in the quest for national and in-
ternational legitimacy. Effective control over population and territory is one of the criteria used by the international
community to assess a government's international legitimacy, which in turn decides its acceptability by the international
community (Gu, 1995).
Scholars have sought to interpret the citizenship dynamism in divided nations by referring to the ideological framework
(Nathans, 2004; Von Koppenfels, 2002; Zieger, 1971; Riege, 1982; Damm, 2007; Chiu, 1990; Suryadinata, 1997), the state
understanding of nationhood (Brubaker, 1992; Preuß, 2003), and the pragmatic considerations (Choe, 2006; McKay, 1998;
Palmowski, 2008; Eley, 2008). Single country study approach e based on individual German, Chinese, and Korean case
studies e have provided excellent empirical works and theoretical grounds for a comparative undertaking. Comparative case
studies are important to trace the variation across the countries while single case-study approach allows us to dwell into the
dynamic of individual citizenship policy (Howard, 2005: 705). Empirical comparison of citizenship policies in divided nations
has been undertaken by Choe (2006), using the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea as two case studies.
Challenging Brubaker's hypothesis (on the German case) that citizenship is a “politics of national identity”, Choe (2006)
suggests that citizenship is a “politics of national interests”. Political and economic interests have shaped the legal defini-
tion of citizenship in divided nations. In his words, “My research challenges the culturalist argument which takes ‘national
identity’ as the central determining factor in nation states' decisions about citizenship. I argue that citizenship, as a political
institution, is determined more by political and economic factors than by cultural factors such as national identity in the cases
of China and Korea” (p. 86).
A literature gap identified is the lack of a systematic cross-national analysis of the common trends. What explains the
common reaction, response, and policy formulation? There are some systematic factors explaining the similar developments
(though with some degrees of variation) of each regime. The special “intra-national” relationships between divided states
(Gu, 1995), and the Cold War diplomacy of “divided dynamism” (Metzler, 2001) do affect the citizenship conflicts. Further-
more, the developments were responsive the broader regional and global citizenship trends, taking place in the socialist and
non-socialist blocs (Sipkov, 1962; Koslowski, 1998). Taking into consideration of these three factors, this paper examines five
converging trends in the divided the German and Chinese states since 1949:

 When the divided states experienced high hostility in their inter-state relations at the beginning of the Cold War, their
nationality competition was intense (1949e1954).
 As the global nationality trend moved towards the prevention of dual nationality, the divided states followed the trend by
implementing the single nationality principle (1955e1970).

tente between capitalist and socialist blocs, the divided states strengthened their citizenship rivalry by
 As a result of the de
competing for international recognition (1971e1989).
 The changed diplomatic atmosphere complicated the question of identity construction in East Germany and Taiwan. The
GDR attempted to create a separate statehood by ‘de-Germanising’ the East German population and developing a socialist
identity. The ROC legitimised Taiwanese statehood by cultivating a local Taiwanese consciousness distinct from Chinese
identity and by engaging in democratization (1971e1989).
 When most countries reformed their nationality laws to facilitate the inclusion of immigrants, the divided states also
undertook a similar reform (after 1990).

This paper is interested in how divided nations define their citizenship. There are two main research objectives. First, the
research aims to identify the decisive factors determining the direction of the nationality policy of divided states. Second, to
what extent, if at all, can one identify similar stages of nationality rivalry in the German and Chinese cases?

2. Conceptualising citizenship in divided nations

There are three main definitions of citizenship based on three different citizenship theories. Liberalism sees citizenship
as a matter of rights; republicanism views citizenship as practice; and communitarianism regards citizenship as identity.
Liberal theories of citizenship place emphasis on individual rights and they are based on the objective of maximising in-
dividual liberty (Schuck, 2002). Republicanism strongly emphasizes citizenship duties. Citizens are required to cultivate
civic virtue and a commitment to participate in public affairs (Dagger, 2002). For communitarianism, the importance of
citizenship as a shared identity is highly valued. Citizenship functions to preserve the cultural identity of a community
(Delanty, 2002). In this paper, I focus on the function of citizenship as a political instrument to gain national and inter-
national legitimacy. The objective of national unification determines how the states define their political membership.
The German and Chinese citizenship regimes are also comparable within the wider context of Cold War diplomacy. First,
they provide an ideal opportunity to analyse the influence of ideological rivalry on their nationality laws. Both German states
 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135 125

were integrated into the bipolar Cold War system. Hence, the relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were significantly affected by the policy of their counterparts. In contrast, the Chinese
states were more independent of the tight bipolar structure (Gu, 1995; Lee, 2007). The ideological factors spill over into the
diplomacy of citizenship in terms of regional cooperation on nationality. West Germany concluded a multilateral convention,
initiated by the Council of Europe, while East Germany concluded a series of dual nationality treaties with countries in the
socialist bloc. Prohibition of dual nationality was enshrined in the new 1967 East Germany nationality law. By the 1960s the
socialist bloc and the capitalist bloc had developed their respective treaty systems which rejected the principle of dual na-
tionality. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was confronted with various obstacles in implementing its
nationality treaty system, due to the loose bipolar system.
Second, both regimes are using the similar strategies in striving to gain political legitimacy: by preventing the third state
from recognising the citizenship of its rival state. In the early stages of political division, constitutions were utilised to support
the claim to sole representation. Each government strove to influence third states in support of its claim of a single German or
Chinese nationality to the exclusion of the nationality law of their rival states. Both West and East Germany in their 1949
Constitutions claimed that there was only one German nationality (though the GDR had never claimed to be the sole
representative). Similarly, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the PRC also claim all Chinese, including those in their rival
states, as their citizens (Fulbrook, 1996; Bernhardt, 1995a,b; Fitzgerald, 1972; Damm, 2007). During the de
tente period, the
focus of citizenship competition shifted to the form of consular or bilateral treaties. The GDR sought to have its citizenship
recognised through consular treaties with third states, while the FRG prevented third states from recognising a separate East
German citizenship. Similarly, the PRC also sought to isolate the ROC through the conclusion of joint communique
s (Plock,
1986; Shen, 1981). There is a trend of similarities in terms of the strategies used despite differences in the resulting
outcome. The outcome proves to be more favourable to the German case while the Chinese were facing tougher geopolitical
conditions to effectuate their policies.
Third, the inter-state rivalry has a contrasting impact on the German and Chinese citizenship policies. For the PRC, it
resulted in the de-ethnicisation of its 1980 citizenship law, thus limiting its extra-territorial claim over the overseas Chinese.
Generations born abroad do not have PRC nationality if they had acquired foreign nationality by birth. Chinese living abroad
lost their Chinese nationality automatically if they voluntarily acquired foreign nationality (Chen, 1984). Among the divided
states, West Germany and Taiwan showed an uncompromising attitude regarding the question of nationality throughout the
division. Neither of them enacted a new citizenship law until the end of 1990s. Ethnicisation of their citizenship law allowed
them to claim ethnic Germans and overseas Chinese constitutionally, but it resulted in the exclusion of long-term residents
from the German and Taiwanese citizenries. Thus, the political division left a long lasting legacy regarding the immigrant
community's access to political membership and to dual nationality benefits (Green, 2004; Howard, 2008; Wang and
Be
langer, 2008; Chun, 2002).
The way Germany and China responded to these challenges showed the importance of the issue of nationality in
their policy considerations. The significance of the citizenship dispute is not merely an academic question. In the
German case, the relevant citizenship legislation had practical significance for the Germans in East Germany. It affected
travel between the two German states, the relocation of Germans from the GDR to West Germany or vice versa. More
importantly, the citizenship legislation determined West Germany's legal and political position concerning a possible
reunification of the Germans by free self-determination (FriedricheEberteStiftung, 1984). The issues raise real world
questions involving the fate of some citizens and outcomes in diplomatic rivalry. In countries which did not recognise
the Taiwanese government, ROC citizens were treated as stateless and the ROC was unable to exercise diplomatic
protection on their behalf (Hsieh, 2006). The unsettled nature of Taiwan's international status caused practical difficulties
for the Taiwanese people when they used a Taiwanese passport to travel. Taiwanese passports were not recognised as a
valid travel document as the ‘state’ had been derecognised by most countries since 1972. The de-recognition had real
implications when the holders of Taiwanese passports faced difficulties in terms of getting a foreign country visa (Wang,
2004).
This research draws upon archival material, legislative debates, citizenship legislation, dual nationality treaties, consular
treaties, gazettes, court cases, judicial decisions, official publications, and secondary literature. For archival material, German
records are available the Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde (Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, BAB) and the Political
Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswa €rtigen Amts, PAAA). Legislative material is available from the
official websites: the German Parliament (Deutsche Bundestag e Dokumentations - und Informationssystem, DIP), Bundesge-
setzblatt (Federal Gazette), the State Council (of the PRC), and the Mainland Affairs Council (of the ROC). Based on detailed
analysis of the official publications, the author categorises the variations and trends in the development of citizenship pol-
icies. The author suggests that interstate rivalry was more decisive for the two German states, as their citizenship policies
were shaped in response to one another. In contrast, the policies of both Chinese states exhibited a more independent and
pragmatic character. In the following section, the development of the citizenship conflicts is reviewed in a periodization
framework (Table 1).

3. Competitive interstate nationality policies, 1949e1954

The first stage (1949e1954) was characterised by intense nationality competition. At the national level, the competition
took the form of claiming the allegiance of all ethnic Germans and Chinese based on the pre-war German and Chinese
126 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

Table 1
The stages of development of citizenship policies in Germany and China.

Germany
Phase 1: The Stage of Intense Nationality Competition, 1949e1954
Both German stated in their 1949 Constitutions claimed that there was
only one German nationality. The Nationality Law of the German
Empire and States (RuStAG) of 22 July 1913 remained in force in both
states.
The FRG's claim to sole representation was supported by its Hallstein
Doctrine. The GDR suffered diplomatic isolation
The capitalist bloc recognised the FRG claim to diplomatic
representation for ethnic Germans and the Communist bloc
recognised the GDR claim.
Phase 2: The Stage of Nationality Competition through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaty System 1955e1970
West Germany concluded the 1963 European Convention on Reduction
of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of
Multiple Nationality.
The GDR enacted its first citizenship law (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz,
StBG) in 1967. East Germany concluded a dual nationality treaty with
the Soviet Union in 1969 and later with other socialist countries.
Phase 3: The Stage of Consolidation of Nationality Competition Following De
Diplomatic isolation of East Germany ended. The two German states
normalised their relationship with the conclusion of the Basic Treaty
(1972). The FRG abandoned its Hallstein Doctrine.
The GDR sought to have its citizenship recognised through consular
treaties with third states. Consular treaties with a special nationality
clause endorsed the GDR's position on German nationality and
denied West Germany, the right to provide consular assistance for
East Germans.
West Germany prevented such efforts and maintained the existence of a
common German nationality.
Phase 4: The Stage of Identity Construction, 1971e1989
The GDR governing regime created a separate statehood by de-
Germanising (Entdeutschung) the East German population by
eliminating the terms ‘German’ and ‘Germany’ from all its official
references.
The SED wanted to create a socialist state which was not German. The
SED regime developed a new citizenship formula in 1974:
“citizenship: GDR; nationality: German” after the failure of its de-
Germanization policy.
Phase 5: The Stage of Post-Cold War Nationality Reforms, after 1990
GDR nationality ceased to exist on 3 October 1990 when the GDR state
ceased to exist as a subject of international law. After reunification, all formulated the Anti-Succession Law (2005) which proclaimed that
former GDR citizens automatically became FRG nationals according
to the Basic Law.
Germany enacted its first nationality law in 1999 with the objective of
facilitating the acquisition of citizenship for foreigners. Integration,
multiculturalism, and dual nationality debates have dominated the
citizenship discourse in Germany since unification.
China
Both Chinese states adhered to the 1929 Nationality Law. Neither the
PRC nor the ROC formulated a new citizenship law.
Both Chinese states claimed the allegiance of all Chinese based on the
one-China policy. The PRC suffered diplomatic isolation.
Most states recognised the ROC, thus its nationality and diplomatic
representation for overseas Chinese were also recognised
The signing of Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, 1955 following
the Bandung Conference (which was later abolished in 1969).
The ROC reinforced its citizenship claim to overseas Chinese

tente, 1971e1989
The USA-PRC de
tente resulted in the recognition of the PRC. The ROC
lost its UN seat. Both Chinese states still adhered to the one-China
policy.
The PRC sought to isolate Taiwan through the conclusion of joint
communique
s with the inclusion of a Taiwan clause. A prerequisite for
the establishment of relationships was the recognition of Beijing as the
‘sole legal government of China’ and an acceptance of the PRC position
that Taiwan was a part of China.
The PRC enacted its first nationality law in 1980 (limiting its extra-
territorial citizenship claim and recognising a single nationality
principle)
The ROC government legitimised the Taiwanese statehood through de-
sinicisation (qu Zhongguo hua). The government abandoned its former
Chinese identity by rejecting the term China or Chinese and replacing it
with Taiwan.
The ROC sought to develop a Taiwanese political identity and ethnic
identity. Apart from restricting its sovereignty to the area of its effective
rule, the ROC also restricted electoral rights to the Taiwanese people,
rather than to ethnic Chinese
The Taiwanese independence movement gained momentum. The PRC
Taiwan is part of China.
The ROC amended its nationality law in 2000 with the same objective.
Policy makers have been pressured to liberalise the nationality law and
to recognise dual nationality for the immigrant community, especially
foreign spouses. Ethnicisation of the nationality law has been
challenged by transnational migration.

Source: Author's own compilation

nationality laws, which adopted the bloodline principle in defining membership in the political association (Shao, 2009;
Green, 2004). Similarities can be found with respect to the inheritance of citizenship. Jus sanguinis had been an integral
part of the German and Chinese citizenship regimes since the Imperial era. Citizenship is attributed at birth based on the
citizenship of the child's parents. Accordingly, ethnic Germans and overseas Chinese had a special status according to the
descent-based nationality laws which placed them in a more advantageous position in terms of acquisition of citizenship and
recognition of a dual nationality status. At the international level, the extra-territorial citizenship claim was supported by
several strategies e the claim to sole representation (with the exception of East Germany), the Hallstein Doctrine, and the
one-China policy e which became the citizenship features of this phase. Through these strategies, the divided states strove to
have their citizenship recognised internationally while preventing the international community from recognising those of
their rival states (Metzler, 2001; Gu, 1995).
Besides the inter-state rivalry, ethnic-based citizenship legislations also function as a constitutional protection to ethnic
Germans by both the West and East German governments. In East Germany, the Soviet Military Administration for Germany
(SMAD) was also confronted with the problem of integrating a huge number of expellees. In the Soviet Zone, there were over
four million refugees and expellees. Integration of the expellees was achieved through the granting of legal and social equality
with other Germans in the Soviet Zone. In September 1945 Saxony was the first state to recognise these German refugees as
Saxons (provided that they registered). Brandenburg and the other eastern states followed. SMAD then issued similar
 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135 127

citizenship legislation throughout the Soviet Zone in 1948, guaranteeing the legal and social equality of these stateless ethnic
Germans (Ther, 2002).
According to West Germany's Constitution (the Basic Law), every German was entitled to German citizenship. Article 116
(1) of the Basic Law, defined a German based on ethnic criteria, thus provided constitutional protection to refugees or ex-
pellees of German origin. According to Neuman (1998), Article 116 (I) legitimised the creation of an ethnic nation rather than a
political nation. Since the German expellees and refugees suffered discrimination based on their common ethnicity, the FRG
reacted to ethnic-based deportation and expulsion by formulating the law based on ethnicity. It was this definition of German
nationality that enabled these Germans to enjoy the same constitutional and legal rights as other Germans (Von Koppenfels,
2002). The broad definition of German nationality embraced nationals beyond West Germany's territorial boundaries, people
such as East Germans or ethnic Germans in Poland and the USSR (Randelzhofer, 1990). The Nationality Law of the German
Empire and States (RuStAG) of 22 July 1913 remained in force in both German states. Neither the FRG nor the GDR formulated
a new citizenship law. Both states in their 1949 Constitutions claimed that there was only one German nationality. With the
establishment of FRG on 23 May 1949 and the GDR on 7 October 1949, the inhabitants retained their German nationality
(Piotrowicz, 1989a,b).
The granting of automatic citizenship as a right to all Germans greatly undermined the legitimacy of the GDR. GDR citizens
were granted West German passports as soon as they crossed the border into the FRG or entered an FRG embassy. They were
exempted from the normal procedure of applying for asylum or naturalization. Since the coming into effect of the Basic Law,
numerous East Germans escaped to the West and the citizenship issue had remained a thorny issue on the inter-German
relations. To support the claim of the FRG as sole legitimate successor state, the Hallstein Doctrine was implemented in
West Germany in 1955. In accordance with the principles of foreign policy, diplomatic relations were to be severed with
countries recognising East Germany. GDR nationality was considered invalid in the non-recognising states (Frey, 1987). The
GDR, on the other hand, advocated that a socialist state was created as a result of GDR succession from Germany (Pletsch,
1979).
In the Chinese case, both Chinese governments claimed to be the only legitimate government of the Chinese nation, and
their territorial claims extended to the rival state. The PRC, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
insisted that only one China could be recognised. The international community would have to choose between recognising
the ROC or the new Chinese government. Under the one-China policy, the PRC would not establish diplomatic relations with
any states that still recognised the ROC. During the early period of the Cold War, the ROC enjoyed international recognition
and membership in the United Nations thanks to recognition by the USA. Recognition of the ROC meant that the PRC was
considered illegitimate (Hughes, 1997). When the Cold War was intense, the PRC was faced with diplomatic isolation and
economic blockade. In order to compete with the ROC, the newly established communist regime found it necessary to win the
loyalty of overseas Chinese and make them identify with their government rather than with that of the ROC. Hence, a more
competitive nationality law which recognised dual nationality and the principle of jus sanguinis was adopted (Liu, 2008). By
adopting the principle of the 1929 Kuomintang (KMT) Law, which was based on the concept of jus sanguinis, the PRC made the
similar claim as the KMT that all Chinese, including those residing abroad, were its nationals regardless of their foreign
nationality (Fitzgerald, 1972).
Claiming the title of the sole representative of the Chinese people, the ROC government granted citizenship rights to all the
overseas Chinese. A Chinese with dual nationality enjoyed the same rights as a Chinese with a single nationality in the ROC
with the exception of the right to hold public office (Chiu, 1990). Representation of the overseas Chinese in the political
system served to legitimise the Taiwanese parliament as a legislative body that represented the Chinese nation. In the quest
for legitimacy, the Chinese population became the most important diplomatic battlefield for both governments. The
contestation for the loyalty of the ethnic Chinese took place on the mainland, Taiwan, in Hong Kong and in other countries
with a large number of overseas Chinese, especially Southeast Asia and the USA (Damm, 2007; Gu, 1995). During the decisive
period at the beginning of the Cold War, maintaining ties with the overseas Chinese through dual nationality served as a
legitimization device in the rival states (Damm, 2007).
Dual nationality was seen as an asset for ethnic Germans for it offered them the right to return to the FRG and to the GDR.
However, dual nationality was seen as a liability for overseas Chinese. Southeast Asian countries, which hosted the largest
number of overseas Chinese were highly suspicious of their divided loyalty. Facing the same problem of a huge number of
overseas nationals, the FRG and the PRC adopted different solutions. The FRG enshrined the right to a German nationality
(allowing dual nationality) to German expellees and refugees suffering discrimination, while the PRC (since 1954) reacted by
severing citizenship ties with its overseas Chinese, thus banning dual nationality.

4. Nationality competition through bilateral and multilateral treaty system, 1955e1970

The 1950s represented a significant era in the development of citizenship competition. During the second stage, both the
socialist bloc and the capitalist bloc developed their own treaty systems to prevent dual nationality. All divided states (except
the ROC) reviewed their nationality policies in favour of dual nationality prevention. The nationality policies of divided
nations conformed to the global trend of preventing dual nationality. Western European countries and Eastern European
socialist states rejected dual nationality. The GDR was influenced by the socialist nationality system, whereas the FRG was
influenced by the European nationality norm in endorsing a single nationality principle. In Southeast Asia, the PRC
encouraged its dual nationals to choose the nationality of their countries of domicile after the failure of its treaty system.
128 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

In Spiro's words, “The advent of the Cold War magnified the potential explosiveness of the tinderbox in which dual na-
tionals always posed the danger of a spark; and the tenor of the times evoked the additional perception of dual nationality as a
more direct national security threat, raising the spectre of transferred attachments, of saboteurs and fifth columnists” (1997,
p. 1420). At the regional level, the divided states used the treaty system to gain recognition for their citizenship law. In fact, the
GDR concluded treaties with the communist states in order to prevent its citizens from claiming the benefits of German
nationality (Hofmann, 1998). Citizenship treaties with Eastern Bloc countries served to legitimise its newly created citizenship
law called “Gesetz über die Staatsbürgerschaft der GDR” of 1967. From the viewpoint of the GDR, nationals of the GDR were
“citizens of the GDR” and nationals from West Germany were treated as foreigners (Krajewski and Rittstieg, 1996).
Due to the common desire to solve the problem of dual nationality, a series of bilateral treaties were concluded among the
socialist states. The treaty between the GDR and the USSR served as a framework for the conclusion of further treaties with
other socialist countries. In the period between 1969 and 1979, the GDR signed treaties regulating questions of dual citi-
zenship with the USSR, Hungary, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the People's Republic of Mongolia
and the Socialist Republic of Romania.1 In terms of interstate rivalry, the nationality treaties had far-reaching political effects.
They signified the mutual recognition among the signatory states of their state sovereignty. A nationality treaty had the
character of a state treaty. It signified the full sovereignty of both countries in the area of citizenship legislation. First, the
treaty served to remind the FRG that East Germany had the sovereign right to decide on the citizenship of its own citizens,
including the right to determine the procedures under which cases of dual citizenship could be prevented. The treaty thus
served to challenge West German jurisdiction.2
In all socialist countries applications for discharge from the citizenship of the GDR were registered. Proper registration of
citizenship effectively prevented the unauthorised acquisition of the nationality of the FRG.3 Second, East Germany also
concluded citizenship treaties with Eastern Bloc countries to legitimize its newly created citizenship law. Since the formu-
lation of “Gesetz über die Staatsbürgerschaft der GDR” in 1967, two Germans nationalities had evolved. From the viewpoint of
the GDR, nationals of the GDR were “citizens of the GDR” and nationals from West Germany were treated as foreigners. While
the GDR claimed that there were two German citizenships after 1967, the FRG believed that there was only one German
citizenship (Krajewski and Rittstieg, 1996).
The Chinese situation was different. While both German states were anxious to claim the loyalty of East Germans, the PRC
was ready to give up its nationality claim on overseas Chinese. The regime had come to realise that its dual nationality policy
hindered it from establishing diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries. While PRC foreign policy after 1949 had
been guided by its anti-capitalist position, and the overseas Chinese were utilised to spread the communist revolution to the
Third World countries, by the 1950s the PRC was more interested in establishing good relations with them (Choe, 2006). The
PRC realised that it would result in the discriminatory treatment of their overseas nationals in their host countries. Theo-
retically, such a strong claim would be a source of tension in the relationship between China and other countries and lead to
complications in foreign relations. Gaining diplomatic recognition and establishing good relations with neighbouring
countries were key priorities of the CCP's foreign policy. Therefore, beginning in 1954 the PRC developed a two-pronged
strategy which served to eliminate discrimination and persecution among overseas Chinese and at the same time improve
relations with foreign states (Suryadinata, 1997).
During the Bandung Conference, Zhou En-lai, the Chinese premier, declared its willingness to abandon the dual nationality
claim, provided that the country involved concluded a formal treaty recognising the PRC as the sole Chinese government.
Among the Southeast Asian countries, only Burma and Indonesia had diplomatic relations with communist China, and only
Indonesia responded to the suggestion, which led to the signing of the Sino-Indonesia Dual Nationality Treaty in April 1955
(Fitzgerald, 1972). The treaty effectively ignored the KMT claim on the Chinese in Indonesia. The Indonesian Chinese could not
claim ROC nationality in Indonesia since the Indonesian government only recognised PRC nationality. If the ROC nationals did
not opt for either PRC nationality or Indonesian nationality in two years' time, they were to be considered by the Indonesian
Government as PRC citizens on the basis of paternal nationality (Suryadinata, 1976).
While Beijing had singled out a clear policy for its dual nationality issue - the overseas Chinese were encouraged either to
take up the local citizenship or retain their PRC citizenship e Taipei was still reluctant to sever its ties with its overseas
nationals (Damm, 2007). The ROC confirmed its nationality position in 1963. The Chairman of the ROC's overseas Chinese
Affairs Committee, Kao Shin, announced that the ROC, as an advocate of the principle of free choice, nevertheless respected
the decision of its overseas nationals should they voluntarily acquire local citizenship. It should be pointed out that the
acquisition of a new foreign nationality did not entail the automatic loss of Chinese citizenship. One had to obtain permission
for denationalization from the ROC (Chiu, 1990). The ROC objected to the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty and accused
the communist regime of using the overseas Chinese nationality as a bargaining chip to establish diplomatic relations with

1
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BAB) DO 1/14172 Ministerium des Innern, Information über die Durchsetzung der Vertra €ge der DDR mit
sozialistischen Staaten zur Regelung von Fragen der doppelten Staatsbürgerschaft sowie über die Verminderung der Staatenlosigkeit, 24 September 1979, 1.
2
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 24 September 1969, Stenographische Niderschrifft, (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik, 1969) 544.
3
BAB, DO 1/14239 Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des MfAA (Ministerium für Auswa €rtige Angelegenheit), Betr: der Berichte einiger Auslandsver-
tretungen der DDR zur praktischen Abwicklung des Staatsbürgerschaftswechsels, 19 November 1979, 5.
 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135 129

Southeast Asia. After the failure of its treaty system, the PRC encouraged its dual nationals to choose the nationality of their
countries of domicile without any-bilateral treaty (Fitzgerald, 1972).
The communist regime, without any official relationships with most of the Southeast Asian states, could not officially
resolve the dual nationality status of the overseas Chinese. The non-recognition of the nationality of the PRC (and the GDR)
was reversed when the communist bloc and the capitalist bloc moved towards rapprochement in the 1970s. The estab-
lishments of diplomatic relationships between the two Germanies in 1972, between the USA and China in 1972, and between
North Korea and the Western states in 1973 were part of a de
tente between the communist and non-communist blocs.
German de
tente involved the recognition of the GDR by the FRG and subsequently by the other capitalist states. The GDR
suffered from international isolation for twelve years from the introduction of the FRG's Hallstein Doctrine in line with its
one-Germany policy in December 1955. Under the pressure asserted by the FRG, the GDR faced a diplomatic setback as its
existence was only recognised by the Soviet Union and its satellite states (Metzler, 2001). With the newly gained recognition,
the citizenship competition entered a new phase.

tente, 1971e1989
5. The consolidation of nationality competition following De

The third stage (1970e1989) is the stage of consolidation of nationality competition following the easing of the Cold War
tensions. This was a period when the newly recognised communist regimes of the GDR and the PRC moved to pressure the
international community to recognise the existence of their statehood and nationality as a prerequisite for the establishment
of diplomatic relations. The GDR attempted to have its nationality recognised by third states through a citizenship definition
in its consular treaties. While East Germany attempted to secure diplomatic representation of East Germans in third states
through the conclusion of consular treaties and mutual assistance schemes, West German consular representatives abroad
sought to prevent third countries from including a citizenship clause in the GDR treaties. The PRC insisted on including a
“Taiwan clause” in its consular treaties and a ‘nationality clause’ in its joint communique
s.
The GDR was finally able to establish diplomatic relations with the western bloc when the West German government
abandoned its Hallstein Doctrine in 1967. GDR legitimacy was further enhanced following its formal recognition by the FRG,
through the signing of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations of 21 December 1972 (the Basic Treaty). Besides recognising the
GDR's sovereignty, the FRG also agreed to abandon its claim to sole representation of the German nation. Even though the FRG
recognised the GDR state, it did not recognise GDR citizenship. The citizenship controversy between the two German states
was not resolved by the treaty because there was a legal loophole in the treaty provision which provided the right for both
German states to disagree over national questions including those pertaining to citizenship (Frey, 1987). The FRG maintained
that questions of nationality were not regulated by the treaty, whereas the GDR declared that the treaty would facilitate the
regulation of the questions of nationality (Randelzhofer, 1990).
After the establishment of diplomatic relations, the GDR attempted though the means of consular treaties to 1) ensure the
sole right of their own consular missions abroad in support of “the citizenship of the GDR” and 2) to prevent diplomatic
assistance by West German consular representatives to East Germans.4 Consular treaties were also used as a means to gain
worldwide recognition of East German citizenship. In a series of state negotiations of consular treaties, the GDR insisted on
the inclusion of a special nationality definition which referred to the citizenship law of the GDR. Consular treaties with such a
clause were concluded with Austria, Finland, India, Guinea, UK, Guinea-Bissau, Cyprus, Mozambique, Yemen and Mexico.5
Treaties with a nationality clause endorsed the GDR's position on German nationality and therefore denied West Germany
the right to provide consular assistance for Germans from the GDR.6
The GDR signed a series of consular treaties with a citizenship provision in order to gain international recognition of its
nationality. In January 1975, the GDR concluded a consular treaty with Austria, which required the Austrian government to
recognize East German nationality. The FRG challenged the citizenship provision of the treaty and demanded to have the
provision removed. Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian Chancellor disregarded the FRG protest and affirmed that Germans could seek
consular assistance either in the East or West German embassy. Three months later, the GDR concluded a consular treaty with
Finland, which included a similar citizenship provision. When the British concluded a consular treaty with East Germany in
May 1976, they acknowledged that the treaty would not affect West Germany's right to represent East Germans in Britain
according to the existing British-West German consular treaty of 30 July 1956 (Plock, 1986). France, though having established
diplomatic relationships with the GDR, did not conclude a consular treaty with a special nationality provision with East
Germany. France was not bound by the treaty to recognise East German nationality. It respected the right of East Germans to
claim GDR nationality and at the same time, provided an option for Germans in a third country to choose between GDR
citizenship or German citizenship (Donner, 1994).
While the East German governing party, SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) strove to have its nationality
recognised through the conclusion of consular treaties, the FRG maintained its single German nationality concept by gaining

4 €rtigen Amts (hereafter PAAA), B82/1300 vom Auswa

Politisches Archiv des Auswa €rtige Amt an alle diplomatischen und berufskonsularischen Ver-
tretungen der BRD, 3.
5
PAAA, B82/1300 Entwurf der einführenden Erkl€arung für die Sitzung des Ausschusses für innerdeutsche Beziehungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 9
November 1977, 3e4.
6 €r. Betr: Vertragspraxis der DDR, 20 July 1979, 3.
PAAA, B82/1568 Abteilung 5 über Herrn Staatssekreta
130 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

third states' validation of its All-German consular activity. In violation of Article 4 of the Basic Treaty, the FRG continued its
practice of providing consular assistance and granting German citizenship to East Germans despite continuous objection from
the GDR. As long as third states allowed the FRG to represent GDR citizens in their states, gaining international recognition of
GDR nationality was an impossible task. The GDR consular treaties did not produce the desired result if GDR citizens chose the
West German consular assistance (Plock, 1986).
West Germany largely succeeded in implementing its nationality claims except in the countries directly associated with
the Soviet sphere of influence, which disallowed West German consular services to East Germans.7 All West German foreign
missions were informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the FRG's position that the question of nationality had not been
settled by the Basic Treaty. As a result, the conduct of the foreign missions of the FRG towards Germans remained unchanged.
All Germans in the meaning of the Basic Law were entitled to the protection of the West German diplomatic and consular
missions abroad, regardless of their places of residence in Germany.8 In practical terms, this meant that the FRG would
continue to grant German citizenship to East Germans and the GDR would also continue to raise its objections (Griffith, 1978).
These practices - the granting of German citizenship to East Germans in the FRG, the extension of diplomatic protection for
East Germans in third states, and the issuance of West German papers to GDR inhabitants visiting the FRG e were all logical
consequences of a single German nationality principle upheld by the FRG (Plock, 1986).
As long as the FRG failed to recognise a GDR nationality, a complete normalization in inter-German relations was
impossible. In a speech in Gera on 13 October 1980, Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the SED, demanded that the FRG
discontinued its previous practice, insisting that “an end must be put to the issuing of temporary passports for the GDR
citizens when staying in the Federal Republic, as well as to the issuing of FRG passports for GDR citizens by FRG embassies in
third countries” (Schweitzer et al., 1984, p. 389). Realising that the non-recognition of GDR citizenship was caused by West
Germany's reunification goal, Neues Deutschland, the official newspaper of the SED, in January 1985 demanded the abolition of
the reunification aim from the FRG's constitution. This was rejected by the West Germany (Plock, 1986).
While both German states accepted dual recognition following their de
tente, each of the Chinese states persistently clung
to its one-China policy, even though it resulted in Taiwan suffering international isolation. When the PRC won the battle for
international legitimacy, the ROC suffered great diplomatic setbacks (Weng, 1994). Existing diplomatic relations with the ROC
ended, as the international community switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The ROC's fate was sealed when the
United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979 and severed diplomatic relations with the ROC. Following
recognition by the United States, more states started to recognise the PRC, which controlled a larger size of the Chinese
population and territory. The switch of recognition was a logical outcome of the ROC's one-China policy (Gu, 1995). The PRC
opposed the continuation of any bilateral relationships, including informal relationships, between the ROC and the countries
which recognised mainland China. Contacts with the ROC had been tolerated in the past when the PRC was left behind in the
battle for international recognition. When the situation changed at the beginning of the 1970s, the PRC insisted that contacts
with the ROC should be minimised (Peterson, 1997).
In joint communique
s signed by the PRC a Taiwan clause was usually included. A prerequisite for the establishment of
relationships was the recognition of Beijing as the “sole legal government of China” and an acceptance of the PRC position that
Taiwan was a part of China. Any official ties between the contracting states and the ROC would not be tolerated by the PRC
(Shen, 1981). All communique
s concluded with the United States and its major allies and some Southeast Asian states
contained a “Taiwan clause”. These countries included the United States, Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Iceland, Brazil, Japan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands. These
countries used ambiguous terms such as “acknowledge,” “take note of,” or “understand and respect” Peking's claim over
Taiwan. However, not all communique
s contained a Taiwan clause. Some contracting states only recognised Beijing as the sole
legal government without stating their positions on the status of Taiwan, such as Austria, Barbados, Cameroon, Cyprus, Iran,
Ireland, Nigeria and Turkey. Some communique
s declared the establishment of diplomatic relations without even mentioning
the recognition of Peking as the sole legal government. Examples were Bangladesh, Gambia, Ghana, Libya, Mexico, and West
Germany (Shen, 1981, pp.78e79).
Communique
s concluded between the PRC and three Asian states in the 1970s, resolved the remaining issue concerning
the dual nationality problem of the local Chinese. In the Joint Communique
s concluded with Malaysia in 1974, the govern-
ment of Malaysia recognised the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and
acknowledged that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The Malaysian government agreed to close
down its consulate in Taipei.9 Article 5 affirmed the principle of non-recognition of dual nationality. The Chinese Government
considered any Chinese, who had acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality.10 The
Philippines and Thailand signed a similar communique
in June and July 1975.

7
PAAA, B82/1300 Entwurf der einführenden Erkla €rung für die Sitzung des Ausschusses für innerdeutsche Beziehungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 9
November 1977, 2e3.
8
PAAA, B82/1300 vom Ausw€ artige Amt an alle diplomatischen und berufskonsularischen Vertretungen der BRD. Betr: Konsularische Betreuung der
Deutschen im Ausland nach Inkrafttreten des Grundvertrags, 11 January 1973, 1e2.
9
Article 3 of the Joint Communique
of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia of 31 May 1974 as reproduced
in Leo Suryadinata, 2005.
10
Article 5 of the Joint Communique
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia of 31 May 1974.
 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135 131

tente, however, did not change the ROC's one-China policy. It was only when the new president, Lee Teng-hui took
The de
office in 1988, that Taiwan modified the one-China policy of President Chiang Ching-kuo. Following the lead of Korea and
Germany's simultaneous recognition by the international community, Lee Teng-hui devised a new policy called “flexible
diplomacy.” Under the new policy, Taiwan was prepared to establish relations with countries which had recognised Beijing.
These countries were not obliged to sever their relations with Beijing. From the PRC viewpoint, the establishment of relations
with the ROC by any country would have the consequences of severing their relationships with the PRC. Even if the ROC
tolerated dual recognition, the international community was compelled by the PRC's pressure not to respond to the ROC's call
(Hughes, 1997). While the ROC leadership was eager to apply the German formula of dual recognition (respecting the sov-
ereignty of the rival state and accepting simultaneous admission into the UN in 1973), the PRC leadership had bluntly rejected
the German model which they claimed would lead to dual recognition and create a “two Chinas” policy (Copper, 1997).
The author suggests that the citizenship rivalry between the divided states had not fundamentally changed despite the
attempted de
tente. Taiwan and West Germany did not relinquish their nationality claims. GDR citizenship had not been
accepted by West Germany. ROC citizenship was denied internationally. The remaining problem was solved following the end
of the Cold War as far as Germany was concerned.

6. Contesting and constructing national identity, 1971e1989

Following the period of de
tente, the newly recognised states moved into the fourth stage of consolidating their national
identity (1971e1989). During this period, divided states utilised citizenship as a means of identity construction. One common
feature shared by divided nations is their tendency to develop a distinct national identity as a response to non-recognition by
most other states. The efforts to create a new identity with a new citizenry were, however, difficult as long as the rival states
did not relinquish their claims on ethnic Germans and Chinese. The formerly unrecognised regime of the GDR and the now
unrecognised state of the ROC had been through such a period. In the GDR case, the governing regime created a separate
statehood by “de-Germanising” the East German population and by developing a socialist identity. The ROC legitimised
Taiwanese statehood by “de-Sinicising” its population and by developing a local Taiwanese consciousness, separate from
Chinese identity.
The international recognition enjoyed by the GDR after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty served as an official endorsement
of its existence as a separate socialist state. The admission of both German states to the United Nations in 1973 signified the
existence of two sovereign German states by the international community (Metzler, 2001). In 1974, the SED amended the GDR
constitution to delete all references to the word “Germany” in pursuit of even closer ties with the Soviet Union. The GDR state
was now declared as a ‘socialist state of workers and farmers’ (McKay, 1998, p. 98). In line with the newly formulated national
identity, “a GDR socialist nation which was not German”, the SED initiated a policy of demarcation (Abgrenzung) accompanied
by a policy of de-Germanization (Entdeutschung). The SED sought to de-Germanise its population by eliminating the terms
“German” and “Germany” from all its official references (except the party's name and its publication), and even rejected the
term “East German” (Frey, 1987, p. 50). Instead of the word German, the word “GDR” began to be used in all official forms and
documents, such as passports. It appeared that the regime was rejecting everything connected with the term German,
including culture, literature and music (McKay, 1998).
More importantly, the SED wanted to create a socialist state which was not German. The efforts to create a non-German
socialist nation through the de-Germanization policy seemed to confuse the public. Not only did the policy engender negative
responses from the public, it also strengthened the FRG's claim as the sole representative of the German nation (McKay, 1998).
To dispel the confusion, distinctions were drawn between nation, nationality and citizenship. Honecker finally recognised
that the citizens of the two German states were of the same German nationality in his speech to the Central Committee of the
SED on 12 December 1974. He coined the formula of “citizenship: GDR; nationality: German” (McKay, 1998, p. 109).
According to Fulbrook (1996), the GDR's effort to develop a separate nationality did not produce the intended result
because of the West German claim to a common citizenship and East Germans still identified themselves as ethnic Germans
rather than as GDR citizens. Honecker's 1974 clarification was designed to deal with the negative responses to the SED's de-
Germanization policy. By admitting that East Germans shared a common German “nationality”, the SED implied that its
population shared a common ethnic identity with West Germans. However, East Germans were GDR citizens since they were
the political members of the GDR nation-state in which they were granted legal-political rights and subject to certain duties.
In Soviet usage “nationality” refers to an ethnic group. Thus, GDR citizens could have a German nationality just as Soviet
citizens could have a Russian or Ukrainian nationality (McKay, 1998, p. 109).
Similar to East Germany, the ROC was also confronted with the problem of naming its nation and population. Since 1949
the Kuomintang (KMT) regime had inculcated a sense of Chinese identity into the island population. Consistent with the claim
that the ROC was the legal government of China, the population was considered as belonging to the Chinese race and ethnic
Han, sharing the Han culture and ancestry (Brown, 2004). To develop a sense of Chineseness among the population on Taiwan,
the KMT administration implemented a series of Sinicization policies. During the Sinicisation process, the word China
(Zhongguo) was widely used as the official name for national organizations, and government-owned or governmenterelated
enterprises. The term “Taiwan” was prohibited in the names of people's associations. The KMT promoted Mandarin Chinese as
the national language in 1953 and prohibited public usage of Taiwanese local dialects in schools, government, the military,
mass media and public places (Chang and Holt, 2007). Education in the ROC was based on Chinese language, culture and
history, aiming to instil a sense of Chinese consciousness. Chinese culture was regarded as national culture, and Taiwanese
132 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

culture was treated as folk culture. In the long run, Sinicisation policies strengthened Chinese identity among local population
and weakened Taiwanese identity (Yang, 2009).
As a result, the political identity of Taiwan had been associated with reunification with China. After Lee Teng-hui became
the new president of Taiwan in 1988, the political leadership was no longer preoccupied with the goal of reunification, but
instead concentrated on local developments. The KMT under the new president initiated the process of localization or Tai-
wanisation (1988e2000s) to replace Sinicisation (1945e1988) (Wong, 2001). The de-Sinicisation programme under new
President took the form of constitutional and civic reforms. In 1991, Lee Teng-hui announced that two Chinese states existed
within the Chinese nation (Rigger, 2002).
Apart from restricting its sovereignty to the area of its effective rule, the ROC also restricted electoral rights to the
Taiwanese people, rather than to ethnic Chinese. Through constitutional amendments in the 1990s, only Taiwanese have the
right to elect the governing regime: members of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, the president and the vice
president. As the ROC relinquished its claim over China, it also abandoned its former Chinese identity. As part of the emer-
gence of a separate statehood in the ROC, the regime has sought to create a sense of Taiwanese identity, based on a com-
bination of Han, Aborigine, and Japanese culture (Brown, 2004). The local population is no longer considered as Chinese. They
are Taiwanese. In the official usage, the term ‘Chinese’ is now referred exclusively to people from the PRC (Chao and Liu, 2007).
The development of a new political identity as a result of the democratization process, coupled with the extension of
citizenship rights and the limitation of the ROC territorial sovereignty to its actual jurisdiction, enabled the nurturing of a local
national identity. On the basis of this new political identity, the ROC was able to claim an independent international identity.
Democratization also enabled Taiwan to create an international identity, independent of the Chinese identity of the PRC
regime. The creation of this identity was much needed, especially when Taiwan was facing international isolation after it had
lost its UN seat. The quest for a Taiwanese identity was difficult as long as the KMT governing regime still fought for the goal of
Chinese unification. However, the introduction of democratic values by the government made international acceptance
possible (Wong, 2001). It is interesting to note that the GDR and ROC took a very different path to legitimise their states and
citizenries. In the GDR, the objective was achieved by the suppression of democratic movements, while the ROC responded by
democratising its political system and claiming independence (not officially). The one-party system was abolished and
elections were introduced.

7. Reforming the citizenship law after the end of the Cold War, after 1990

The post-Cold War nationality development is represented in the fifth stage (1990e2000). The FRG and the ROC had not
formulated any new nationality laws since their division. The adherence of West Germany and Taiwan to the pre-war na-
tionality laws and the jus sanguinis principle resulted in the exclusion of long-term residents. Under the pressure of migration
both states found it necessary to enact new nationality laws. The nationality reforms of Germany and Taiwan shared the
similar objective of facilitating the acquisition of citizenship for foreigners in an era of international migration.
The existence of a common German nationality, persistently held by the FRG throughout the years of division, had
facilitated the process of German reunification. There was no nationality problem regarding GDR citizens as they already
possessed German nationality even before the unification took place. GDR bilateral treaties on dual nationality with the
socialist countries of Eastern Europe also expired on the same date (The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, 1996).
Likewise, the GDR consular treaties and conventions on nationality that had been concluded in the 1970s, whereby the
contracting parties recognised the existence of a separate East German nationality, were also terminated (Papenfub, 1998).
GDR nationality ceased to exist on 3 October 1990 when the GDR state ceased to exist as a subject of international law. After
reunification, all former GDR citizens automatically became FRG nationals since all ethnic Germans in the GDR had always
been regarded by the FRG as German nationals according to the Basic Law (Zimmermann, 2000).
In contrast to Germany, the PRC treated all ROC citizens as Chinese nationals. This was evident from two regulations passed
in early 1990s. In 1991, the “Regulations of the Travel of Chinese Citizens to and from the Taiwan Area” defined “Taiwan
residents” as PRC citizens residing in Taiwan. The regulation had in fact regulated the citizenship status of ROC residents (Chi,
2009). Article 2 of the “Measures for the Control of Chinese Citizens Travelling to or from the Region of Taiwan” (1992) stated
that “These measures are applicable to Chinese citizens residing in the Mainland travelling to or from the Region of Taiwan
and Chinese citizens residing in Taiwan [emphasis added] entering or leaving the Mainland” (People's Republic of China,
1992).
The status of ROC citizens was further reiterated in the Anti-Secession Law, which defined ROC citizens as “Taiwan
compatriots”. Reiterating the principle of the one-China policy and denying the division of Chinese sovereignty, the PRC in
Article 2 of the Act stated that “safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all
Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included”. This Article implied that Taiwan compatriots were Chinese (Chi, 2009).
The mainland Chinese position on Taiwan was reiterated in the Anti-Succession Law on 14 March 2005, which proclaimed in
Article 2 that, “Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make
Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means” (People's Republic of China, 2005). Taiwanese independence was
unacceptable for the PRC as it would nullify the PRC's sovereignty claims over Taiwan (Wong, 2001).
Before unification, the descent-based nationality law of 1913 prevented the regulation of the status of long-term resident
foreigners. If the German division had made it impossible to amend the jus sanguinis principle of citizenship, reunification of
Germany and the absorption of East Germans as German nationals in 1990 removed the need to maintain the principle. In
 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135 133

contrast, the increasing numbers of foreign residents and their descendants who had been living in Germany for generations
without German citizenship called for the introduction of the jus soli principle. The aftermath of reunification has shifted the
focus of policy makers to the problems of the large numbers of legal foreign residents in Germany who had been neglected
previously. As a result of demographic changes in German society, there were pressures on German policymakers to
reconsider the appropriateness of continuing to deny the jus soli principle. There were 7.3 million foreigners before the
citizenship reform; they constituted 9 per cent of the German population (Howard, 2008).
A lively debate between various political parties finally led to the introduction of the new citizenship law (Staatsan-
geho€rigkeitsgesetz e StAG) of 15 July 1999 with two major breakthroughs: the introduction of the jus soli principle for the first
time in history and a more tolerant dual nationality practice (Hailbronner, 2002). Under the jus soli principle, second-
generation foreign children born in Germany acquired German nationality if one parent had resided in Germany for eight
years or had a residence entitlement or unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Children born before the law came
into force were also given the opportunity to apply for German citizenship through naturalization. The residential period for
permanent foreigners to claim naturalization was significantly reduced from fifteen years to eight years (Deutscher Bundestag,
Drucksache 14/533, 16 March 1999).
Similarly, the ROC also reformed its 1929 Nationality Law to facilitate the integration of foreigners. Since ROC nationality
was based on ethnicity, understandably it was very difficult for non-Chinese nationals to become citizens of Taiwan. There
was no provision in the law that provided for naturalization of foreigners except for spouses and children of citizens (Cheng,
2003). Marriage was the only means available for foreign workers to obtain Taiwanese citizenship and subsequently the right
to stay in Taiwan. The influx of foreign workers and spouses challenged the regime's concept of a homogenous nation and
necessitated a change in the nationality principle (Wang and Be
langer, 2008).
In light of the increasing numbers of immigrants, the 1929 Nationality Law was revised for the first time. Effective from 2
February 2000, the revised law provided for the inclusion of foreigners into the Taiwanese citizenry though naturalization.
While only foreign spouses were eligible for naturalization under the 1929 law, the revised law extended the right of
naturalization to other foreigners as well (Article 3 of the Law of Nationality revised and promulgated on 9 February 2000 as
printed in Chiu and Wu, 1999). The principle of jus sanguinis still governs the attribution of citizenship by birth in the 2000
revised law, but this principle was supplemented by jus domicili (citizenship based on residence) (Chun, 2002).
The recent developments after the end of the Cold War, have been affected by the influx of immigrants, which challenges
the restrictive policies and subsequently, charts a much needed impetus for citizenship reforms. Limited changes have
occurred due to the interplay of various domestic factors, party politics, public opinions, and multiculturalism debates.
Howard (2006: 449) argued that structural, cultural and institutional factors “explain very little” about the resistance to
further liberalization. He suggested the politics of citizenship or “political dynamism” within the countries as the main reason
behind the continuity of jus sanguinis and the opposition to dual nationality.

8. Conclusion

Continuity and change in the citizenship policies in Germany and China (1949e1990) have been characterised by the
“intra-national” relations between the divided states, the divided dynamism, and global citizenship trends. The instru-
mentalisation of citizenship for achieving national unification goals aims works at best with favourable allies. Both German
states were more successful in enforcing their citizenship claims due to stronger international cooperation on nationality in
Europe. The emergence of the international nationality regime in Europe (Koslowski, 1998: 746) among the EU states and
Soviet satellite states, enabled the smooth implementation of the treaty system on nationality. This aspect was missing in the
Asian context, which explained the less favourable geopolitical circumstances of the PRC's treaty system.
In reviewing the effectiveness of the different strategies employed by the governments in the two divided nations, a
careful framework of periodisation is needed. During the first stage (1949e1954) their nationality competition took the form
of adherence to the pre-war nationality laws. The claim to sole representation (with the exception of East Germany), the
Hallstein Doctrine, and the one-China policy resulted in the diplomatic isolation of East Germany and China. During the
second stage (1955e1970), bilateral and multilateral dual nationality treaties were used by the divided states to gain
recognition for their citizenship. Both German states were more successful compared to China in the implementation of the
nationality treaty. This was due to the strong international cooperation on nationality in Europe. When the communist bloc
and the capitalist bloc moved towards rapprochement (1971e1989), consular treaties and joint communique
s became the
instruments of competition. The non-recognition of the nationality (of the PRC and the GDR) was reversed when the in-
ternational community gradually recognized their sovereignty. In the area of consular representation, third states (with
which East Germany concluded a consular treaty) recognised the East German right to provide consular assistance to East
Germans. During the fourth stage (1971e1989), the GDR's policy of de-Germanisation received negative responses from its
population, whereas the ROC's policy of de-Sinicisation has legitimised new political and ethnic identities for its population.
Citizenship developments after 1990, witnessed the increasing relevance of integration, multiculturalism and dual citizenship
debates.
This paper attempts to find out which factors were more dominant in influencing the policy and trend of nationality in
each divided state. East Germany's citizenship policies were influenced considerably by inter-German rivalry and socialist
nationality principles. The formulation of the 1967 citizenship law was a reaction against the West German Hallstein Doctrine,
the single nationality principle was adopted after careful examination of the socialist nationality system, its dual nationality
134 C.C. Low / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016) 123e135

treaties with the socialist states were modelled upon the Soviet treaty, and the recognition of GDR citizenship by non-socialist
states was only possible after the 1972 inter-German de
tente. The paper shows that inter-German rivalry played a decisive
role in the German case. Both German states paid close attention to the citizenship developments in the other state and
devised new policies to counteract their rival's policies. In other words, their policies were mutually responsive.
In contrast to the German case, the citizenship policies of the PRC and the ROC were more independent of each other. This
is not to deny completely the role of interstate rivalry; without doubt the rivalry had strengthened the competition for the
allegiance of overseas Chinese at the beginning of the Cold War. But the Chinese states later reframed their policies based
primarily on pragmatic grounds (based on national interests and domestic developments) due to the changing geopolitical
circumstances. In the Chinese case, the international community determined their citizenship rivalry by deciding which state
and consequently which nationality enjoyed worldwide recognition. Once recognised, the legitimate Chinese regime would
then challenge the validity of its rival's nationality law by demanding complete de-recognition of its rival.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the editorial board of Communist and Post-Communist Studies and the anonymous reviewer for
their invaluable suggestions and constructive critiques, without which this article would not be in its present form. Their
repeated queries and valuable insights have helped to strengthen the article. I am grateful to Dr. Steven Welch, Prof. Antonia
Finnane, and Dr. Gideon Reuveni for their invaluable guidance on an earlier version of the paper.

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