War without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone

Author(s): Yekutiel Gershoni

Source: African Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Dec., 1997), pp. 55-76
Published by: African Studies Association
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War Without End and An End to A War:
The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra
Leone*

Yekutiel Gershoni

Introduction
An attack on Liberian government forces in Nimba County,
Liberia, on Christmas Eve, 1989, ignited a full-scale civil war. It was
carried out by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and
consisted of Libyan-trained dissidents, headed by Charles Taylor, a
former employee of President Samuel Doe's government. After six
months of fighting, the NPFL controlled 90 percent of Liberiaand was
ready to launch a final assault on the capital, Monrovia. Eight months
from the start of the war, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS)sent a Nigerian-led peace-keeping force, ECOWAS
MonitoringGroup (ECOMOG)to put an end to the civil war. ECOWAS'
military intervention failed to stop the war or to bring peace. Almost
half of the Liberian population of two-and-a-half million was
displaced, hundreds of thousands were killed or wounded, the economic
and administrative infrastructureswere destroyed, and law and order
ceased to exist.
After more than a year of fighting in Liberia, the war spilled
over into neighboring Sierra Leone. A force headed by Foday Saybana
Sankoh, consisting of Sierra Leone dissidents of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF),launched a military attack backed by NPFL units.
After gaining control over the resource-richarea of Kailahun, the RUF
fought its way to the capital, Freetown. The war in Sierra Leone
appeared to follow the Liberian experience: with many casualties,
displacement of population, destructionof economic and administrative
structures and anarchy replacing the rule of law and order. The
prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have similar features to
other wars which are taking place in various parts of Africa such as
Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and recently Zaire. One of their common
features is that prolonged wars signal a process of state collapse.
In Liberiaand SierraLeone, the prolonged wars both contributed
to and were a reflection of a process of state collapse. I. William
Zartman (1995) suggests that the collapse of a state is not a short-term
African Studies Review, Volume 40, Number 3 (December, 1997) pp. 55- 76.

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

phenomenon. Ratherit is a "long-termdegenerative disease" (Zartman

1995, 8). The process in Liberiadid not start with the 24 December 1989
NPFL attack. It could be traced back through the ten years of Samuel
Doe's dictatorial regime between 1980 and 1990 into the previous nine
years of William Tolbert'sgovernment, which was unable to cope with
the growing demand for political reforms. A similar depth of origins
applied to Sierra Leone. There the process could be traced both to
President Joseph Momoh's ambivalenceregarding the growing demand
for a multi-party regime, and to the economic and political
deteriorationwhich took place after SierraLeone joined ECOMOG.
The prolonged wars added their weight to the process of state
collapse. Nevertheless, Zartman suggests that the outcome of the
process is not inevitable;cure and remission are possible. He compared
it to a tumbling of an object down a staircase "landing and teetering on
each step it hits, then either regaining its balance and coming to rest or
losing its balance again and bouncing down to the next step, where the
exercise is repeated" (Zartman1995, 8).
Comparisonof SierraLeone and Liberiasupports Zartman'sview.
Sierra Leone was able in March 1996 to "regain balance." An elected
civilian government replaced the military regime, and the RUF agreed
to a cease-fire and to peace talks with the elected government. At the
same time in Liberiathe process of collapse continued, "bouncingdown
to the next step." Monrovia, the capital, which during the previous
seven years of war had remained an island of relative stability, turned
into a site of fighting, looting and killing in 1996.
This article will try to answer two related questions. First, what
caused the prolongationof the wars? And, secondly, why did the war in
Sierra Leone end while the war in Liberia continued? The second
question raises analytical problems. Can a war which has ended be
described as a prolonged war? What is the length of a prolonged war?
Did the five year duration of the war in Sierra Leone define it as a
prolonged war? Karl Magyar (1994) suggests that time is not the only
measurement for prolonged war. "Scholars in the field do not define
prolongation within a purely temporal context only. Rather,observers
should focus on the failure of the conflict to come to a head in an early
decisive battle-which would eliminate at least one of the major
protagonists"(Magyar 1994, 192). Donald Snow (1996, 1-2) in his study
about prolonged wars in the Third World in the post-Cold War era,
concentrates on the characteristics of the war, such as their being
internal, lacking political goals and being more vicious, rather than
concentratingon the war's duration. As will be shown later, the war in
Sierra Leone fits Snow's description.
The first part of the present analysis will claim that the factors
contributing to the prolongation of wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone
were both domestic and external. Among the domestic factors are

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military stalemate, the proliferation of antagonistic military factions

and the absence of clear political and military objectives on the part of
the insurgents. The external factor refers to the unwillingness or
inability of the United States, the United Nations and the
Organizationof African Unity (OAU) to force peace in Liberiaor Sierra
Leone by military intervention.
The second part of the analysis will deal with the contrasting
outcomes of the two wars. It will attempt to show that outcome
influencing variables were both external and domestic. Sierra Leone's
central authority, despite two coup d'etats, maintained a large degree
of control and stability, while Liberia lacked a stable and
authoritative government. The prolongation of the war in Liberiawas
in part due to the divisions within ECOWAS,and the inefficiency of
ECOMOG.These conditionswere not presentin SierraLeone.

Factors Prolonging the Two Wars

Fourcommon factorscontributedto the prolongationof the wars in
both Liberia and Sierra Leone: the military stalemate on the field, the
proliferation of warlords, the personal capabilities of their main rebel
leaders and the ineffectiveness of the international community in
forcingor brokeringa peace.
The Evolving Military Stalemate
Military stalemates derive from the inability of one of the
protagonists to achieve a clear-cut military victory. That inability
prolongs wars, as the cases of Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan and
Chechnya exemplify. All the combatants, government forces and
insurgents in the cases of Sudan and Chechnya, or various military
factions in the cases of Somalia and Afghanistan, are roughly
balanced. All parties have access to sources of arms and ammunition.
No faction has a superior strategy, force or power. The supplies of arms
makes it possible for each side to continue fighting; symmetric force
makes it impossible for any side to vanquish the other. These
components have been present in Liberia'sand SierraLeone's prolonged
wars. In addition, in both countries the fighting forces suffered from
weak internal organization and lack of discipline.
During the Cold-War era arms virtually flooded Africa, as the
two superpowers and their allies provided a steady supply of weapons,
military technology and advisors to their respective Third World
allies and proxies. In the post-Cold War era, the weapons have been
provided by private and state-owned companies and from a range of
African governments including Libya, Nigeria and Uganda. At neither
time did demand ever much outstrip supply. "In the Horn of Africa,

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

such arms have on several occasions been more available than bread,"
wrote one analyst (Magyar1996,4).
Neither government armies nor insurgent forces in Africa ever
lacked military resources in recent decades, and both Liberia under
Samuel Doe and SierraLeone under Joseph Momoh had ample military
supplies. With a passion for power, Liberia's military ruler nearly
doubled his country'smilitarybudget between 1980and 1988,from $16.5
million to $28.07 million (InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies,
1980-1981:59; 1988-1989,133). Moreover, Samuel Doe's Liberiawas the
largest recipient of US aid per capita of all the sub-Saharan states.
Between 1980-1990 Liberia received $52 million in US military aid
alone (Thomasson, 14 July, 1990, 21). Shortly after the outbreak of the
rebellion by the NPFL on 24 December 1989, the US provided a large
quantity of military aid, including military advisers. In addition,
Liberia bought yet another one million dollars worth of arms from the
South Korean government (African ResearchBulletin, 15 May, 1990,
9664; African Confidential,20 April, 1990, 4-5). After the middle of
1990, when the US pared down its military aid as part of its post-Cold
War policy, the Interim Government of National Unity established in
Monrovia after Doe's assassination was propped up by the military
might of ECOMOG.That interventionary force consistently received
military and logistical support from the five nations which
established it (Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia)
and from the internationalcommunity.'
By contrast, the civilian president of Sierra Leone was more
modest in his arms' consumption. Fearing a military coup, President
Momoh disarmed most of the government army, leaving the country's
two infantry battalions with mostly defective Nigerian-made G3 rifles
(Anyadike 1996; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 May, 1991, 10112).
Nonetheless, when the RUF started its rebellion, Momoh was able to
get military supplies from Great Britainand combat units from Nigeria
and Guinea to back up the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (WestAfrica,13-
19 May, 1991, 754).
Just as the government armies enjoyed a steady flow of arms, so
also did the rebel forces. The NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra
Leone allegedly obtained military aid from Libya and Burkina Faso.
Before the NPFL launched its Operation Octopus against ECOMOG
forces in Monroviaon 20 October1992,it received large quantities of M-
16 and AK-47 rifles, 20 armored personnel carriers, tons of artillery
pieces with ammunition and a number of anti-aircraftmissiles (West
Africa,14-20September,1992, 1568).BurkinaFaso also sent hundreds of
soldiers from elite units to bolster up the two rebel organizations
(Richards 1995, 143). Moreover, both organizations were able to
purchase weapons from private sources with the proceeds of sales of
natural resources under their control to European and American

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businesses at below-market prices. NPFL leader Charles Taylor

obtained some eight to nine million dollars per month from the sale of
iron ore, rubber,timber, diamonds and gold. RUF leader Foday Sankoh
earned somewhat less from the sale of diamonds, bauxite and timber
(Lowenkopf 1995,94; McElroy,23 February,1996).
Added to ample and steady supply of weapons to both sides of
the conflict as a cause of prolonged war were limitations of military
strategy and capability. In both countries, insurgent forces waged war
against conventional government armies, made up of mechanized
infantry units, artillery batteries, engineering units and small navies,
trained to fight conventional wars. The insurgents, who avoided direct
confrontation and relied mostly on guerrilla tactics, managed to take
over large portions of their respective countries, even when they were
outnumberedby governmenttroops,because the latterwere ill-equipped
to handle insurgencies. In only six months, the NPFL's Charles Taylor
gained control of most of Liberia and reached the outskirts of the
capital, Monrovia (Africa Confidential,28 September, 1990, 2). It took
only one month for the RUF leader Sankoh to gain control of the fertile
Kailahun district, which had provided 62 percent of the country's
agricultural exports (WestAfrica,22-28 July, 1991, 1203).
Yet conversely, the insurgents' strength was limited to their
respective countrysides. Not trained in or equipped for conventional
warfare, they were unable to overcome the government forces guarding
capital cities. Taylor and his guerrillas were stopped outside Monrovia
three times: by the remainsof Doe's army in June 1990,by the ECOMOG
forces in September that same year and again by ECOMOGin October
1992. The advance of Sankoh and his fighters on Freetown was halted
by the SierraLeonean army fortified by units from Guinea, Nigeria and
South African mercenaries(Richards1995, 151).

Proliferation of Military Factions

The military stalemate in Liberia and Sierra Leone led the
opposing parties to try to undermine their adversaries' strengths by
supporting and establishing allied war factions. The NPFL-supported
RUF invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia in April 1991 had major
repercussions on the Liberian conflict. In retaliation to the NPFL
aggression, Sierra Leone's President Momoh, assisted by Guinea and
Nigeria, organized a group of Liberiandissidents of his own, made up of
former Doe supporters from the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups,
who formed an organizationcalled the United LiberationMovement for
Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO).Momoh dispatched them to attack the
NPFL in Liberia's hinterland (West Africa, 28 October-3 November,
1991, 1820).

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

This started a chain reaction, in which Taylor, ULIMO and

ECOMOG all used ambitious warlords to attack one another. First,
Taylor spawned the Lofa Defense Force to attack ULIMO, to which
ULIMOresponded by forming another local faction, the Bong Defense
Front, to attack the NPFL.ECOMOGadded to the chaos by forming yet
another rogue group, the LiberianCouncil for Peace (Ankomah 1995,
11). ECOMOG was already supporting two other groups-the
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), which had
split off from the NPFL,and the remnantsof Doe's army, which became
known as the Armed Forcesof Liberia(AFL).
The warlords leading the various factions usually controlled
specific territories,whose agriculturaland mineral resources they could
exploit in order to retain their economic and political independence.
All in all, by 1996, eight new military factions had been created in the
hinterland, and Liberiabecame a mosaic of warring units, over whom
their makers had little control, contributingto prolongation of the war.
In SierraLeone a somewhat similar pattern developed. President
Momoh was ousted in April 1992 by a military coup-d'etat.From his
exile in Guinea he then established the National Front for the
Restoration of Democracy (NFRD), a military faction which operated
in the Sierra Leone hinterland. The RUF itself suffered a split when
Alimany Bakarr Sankoh, one-time RUF spokesman, defected and
formed the Sierra Leone People's Democratic League (SLPDL). The
three armed groups vied with one another and with the Sierra Leone
army for control of the country's hinterland (WestAfricanJournal,July
1995, 13; Africa Confidential, 1 April 1994, 6). The proliferation of
fighting factions deepened the military stalemate and prolonged the
war in Liberia and Sierra Leone. No faction was powerful enough to
force its will on all the others, yet each group could undermine any
political solution found unsatisfactory.

Insurgent Leaders'Politico-MilitaryAmbitions
In both Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the insurgent leaders fought
only for their own ambitions to hold power for its own sake. Such a
condition, in which the aim to control the government is accompanied
by any clear or consistent political rationale, is typical of prolonged
wars in the post-Cold War era. In the African prolonged wars in Sudan,
Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone, articulation of a coherent political
goal is either implicit or derivative, or missing altogether (Snow 1996,
106).
Bent on becoming head of their respective states, neither Charles
Taylor nor Foday Sankoh had any moral or ideological incentive to
compromise on a negotiated settlement that would give them anything
less than that. In an interview, Taylor condemned military rulers who

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gained power through military force, although he himself resorted to

the same means to attain the same end (Richards 1995, 165n5).
Although he publicly proclaimed that the NPFL was committed to
helping the African people get rid of "dictatorialand corrupt"regimes
and to restore democracy not only in Liberiabut in all of West Africa,
his evident aim was to rule. As one specialist on Liberianaffairs put it,
"Taylor will fight tooth and nail to make sure he's the head of any
interim government" (Noble, 27 September, 1990, A13). Foday Sankoh,
more careful than Taylor not to be caught contradicting himself,
declared in an interview that his intention was not to usurp the
presidency, but to lead Sierra Leoneans to multi-party elections
(Richards 1995, 165n5). Nonetheless, he was no less ambitious than
Taylor, and for five years he turned down every proposal for
negotiations.
The murder of Samuel Doe in September 1990 and the overthrow
of Joseph Momoh two years later put an end to Liberia's and Sierra
Leone's "dictatorialand corrupt"regimes. Yet although a major part of
the rebels' declared aims was thus realized, neither Taylor nor Sankoh
laid down their arms to seek a political solution, because the change in
regimes did not allow them to assume the presidency.Doe's government
was replaced by the ECOMOG-backedInterimGovernmentof National
Unity; Momoh's by a military government, neither of which was
willing to hand over authority to the insurgent leaders.
Uninterested in any resolution of the wars that would not bring
them to power, both Taylor and Sankoh acted to thwart elections in
their respective countries. Sankoh rejectedelections under the auspices
of any of the three governments that held power in Sierra Leone
between 1991 and 1996. He repeatedly declared that he would agree to
elections, but only after he was already head of state. Taylor's rejection
was more complicated. Between 1990 and 1993, when Liberia's
ECOMOG-backedInterim Government of National Unity was headed
by Amos Sawyer, Taylor too rejected the idea of elections. After the
1993 Cotonou Accord brought the NPFLand other military factions into
the interim government, in one peace accord after another Taylor
repeatedly committed himself to elections, but each time reneged on his
commitment when it became obvious that he would not be able to
manipulate the process.
The two insurgent leaders likewise impeded negotiations in each
country. Sankoh erected impossible preconditions. He ruled out
negotiations until all foreign troops were withdrawn from SierraLeone.
In September1995,he dropped this preconditiononly to raise a new one:
that he would not negotiate with any military government. At the time
Captain Valentine Strasser's military government was in office (Alpha
1995; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 September, 1995, 11993-94).
Taylor, more wily, participated in negotiations so long as they served

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

his purposes but repeatedly left the negotiating table or torpedoed

agreements when he thought he could improve his position. He agreed
to negotiations after his own military setbacks, hoping to gain there
what he failed to obtain on the battlefield.
After the NPFL's initial abortive assault on the ECOMOGforces
in Monrovia in September 1990, Taylor participatedin three successive
rounds of negotiations: in Bamako (November 1990), Lome (February
1991), and Monrovia (April 1991). There, he tried to form a coalition
that would appoint him head of state (Noble, 20 January, 1991, 3;
Africa Confidential,3 May, 1991, 7). When these efforts broke down,
Taylor opened up a second front against ECOMOGby orchestratingthe
RUF assault into Sierra Leone (Africa ResearchBulletin, 1-30 April,
1991, 10072). Later in 1991, when he saw that his military actions
would not lead to the dismantling of ECOMOG, the NPFL leader
agreed to another round of talks, in Yamoussoukro,C6te d'Ivoire, from
June to October, 1991. He signed four agreements, each one giving him
better terms than the previous ones (West Africa, 11-17 November,
1991, 1886).When none of them brought Taylorwhat he wanted, in 1992
he launched Operation Octopus, another attack against the ECOMOG
forces in Monrovia. Only when that attack failed did he return to the
negotiating table. Once again he signed a series of agreements. The first
three (Cotonou,July 1993;Akosombo, September1994;Accra,December
1994)he subsequentlyhelped to torpedo. The fourth, signed in Abujain
August 1995, gave him the recognition as the country's main warlord,
and allowed him to bring his troops into Monrovia, which he had been
unable to do by fighting.
In contrast,Sankoh's stand throughout most of the war was rigid,
inflexible and uncompromising.Taylor was more sophisticated, mixing
negotiation with his basic policy of violence to achieve his political
end. Each peace conferencewas treatedby Taylor as a stepping stone to
becoming Liberia's head of state. He evaluated all acts according to
whether they brought him closer to his goal.
The lack of an ideological frameworkgiving purpose to power led
to outright, unrestrained competition for power. While prolonged war
prevented any constructive use of power, it was compatible with
competing for power for its sake.
Ineffectiveness of the InternationalCommunity
The United States, the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity were all involved in trying to resolve the conflicts in the
two countries. In Sierra Leone they supported the three successive
governments. In Liberia, they supported the ECOWAS peace
initiatives and the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG forces, the bodies
they believed had the best prospects of bringing an end to the fighting.

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Despite their unanimity, their peace efforts remained ineffective. The

OAU did not have sufficient influence to bring the warring parties to
agreement, the US and the UN did not have the will to do so.
Of the three, the US probably was in the best position to effect a
rapid end to the two civil wars. In Liberia, a decisive US military
action at the beginning of the war might have convinced Taylorand the
NPFL to put down their arms. Many Liberiansexpected the US to take
active measures against Taylor, both because of the special US-
Liberian relationship since the colony was established in 1822, and
because of the US global interest in containing Taylor's chief backer,
Libya. These hopes seemed about to be fulfilled when US warships,
with 2,000 marines, anchored off the Liberian coast in June 1990.
However, President George Bush, declaring that Liberiawas not worth
the life of a single US marine, limited use of the troops to evacuating
US and other foreign nationals (Ellis 1995, 168). Then the Iraqi
invasion of August 1990 diverted American attention to the Persian
Gulf. The same pattern of political support, humanitarian aid and
limited financial and military aid was repeated in Sierra Leone. The
US government strongly condemned the RUF invasion of the country,
allocated money, food and medical aid for refugees and supplied Sierra
Leone government forces with radio equipment, vehicles, other "non-
lethal" military equipment and military advisers (West Africa, 22-28
April, 1991,625;24-30June 1991,1034;9-15 September,1991, 1511).
Both the Bush administration and the succeeding Clinton
administration aimed to prevent direct US involvement in the two
conflicts. Although the US had a strong interest in keeping Libya out of
West Africa, the most it was prepared to do was to back peace
initiatives generated by ECOWAS with diplomatic and financial
assistance. The US determination to avoid military involvement in
Liberia and Sierra Leone began with the emergence of new global
priorities, and only intensified with the ignominious evacuation of the
US forces from Somalia in 1993, which made the American public and
Congress reluctantto shoulder any furtherfinancialor military burdens
in Africa. Meanwhile, events in Haiti, Cuba and Bosnia drew the
attention of policy-makers in Washington away from West Africa
(Rothchild 1995, 48; Oakley 1995, 72).
The US response to the Somali fiasco also impaired the UN's
ability to respond to the crisis in West Africa. Following the
withdrawal from Somalia, the US decided to review its commitment to
UN peacekeeping operations. Washington declined to offer US ground
troops as part of an international peacekeeping force and severely
reduced its budget for peacekeeping operations (Cleaver and May 1995,
485). In addition the US used its central position in the UN to limit
future UN peacekeeping operations. Speaking before the UN General
Assembly in September 1993, President Bill Clinton stated that "the

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

United Nations must know when to say no." He urged the UN, and
especially its Security Council, to be more selective in its approach to
conflict, particularly to the growing number of internal conflicts in
Africa (Cohen 1995, 77). Washington limited its participation to
operations in which there was a genuine threat to international peace,
and a predetermined financial commitment (Cleaver and May 1995,
485).
This US policy hampered the UN's ability to intervene in West
Africa. The civil war in Liberia was placed on the Security Council
agenda twice between 1990 and 1991 and each time the Council called
on the belligerent factions in Liberia to adhere to the cease-fire. The
Council also expressed its support for ECOWASefforts to restore peace
in Liberia and the US allocation of emergency humanitarian aid.
Thereafter, it confined itself to sponsoring the various negotiations
held over the next few years, along with the US, the OAU and
ECOWAS. The only UN direct intervention was in 1993, when the
intensive efforts of UN Special Envoy, Trevor Gordon-Somers, along
with OAU Eminent Person, Canaan Banana (former president of
Zimbabwe), brought together the belligerent parties of Liberia to sign
the Cotonou Accord. In addition to mediating, the UN established the
United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL) to supervise
the cease-fire and the disarming of the various military factions
(Copson 1994,57).
The UN's involvement in the Sierra Leone crisis was even
smaller. Two and a half months after the RUF invaded Sierra Leone,
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar held face-to-face talks with the
Freetown government. The SecretaryGeneral made no commitment to
take direct steps to end the fighting, offering and carrying out only the
distribution of humanitarianaid and the sponsorship of peace talks.
Unlike the US and the UN, the OAU regarded intervention in
conflicts as one of its majorduties. The OAU has both the mandate and
the administrative structures to mediate, and, if necessary, to intervene
in the internal conflicts of its member states. Moreover, it had a record
of mediating in some of its member states' internal conflicts, albeit
unsuccessfully, for instance in the civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia and
Chad. These prior failures did not deter it, but it was obvious that to
deal with the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the
continued eruptionsof violence in Rwanda and Burundi,a new approach
was needed. Commitment to the preservation of the status quo, and to
the principle of the territorial integrity of member states (guaranteed
under Article III of the OAU charter),had to be abolished.
African heads of state agreed at the 28th annual summit of the
OAU in Dakar, in June 1992, to establish a mechanism for preventing,
managing and resolving conflicts. Militarily, that mechanism was
supposed to rely on an African peacekeeping force, and financially on an

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African peace fund. Although the spirit was willing, the flesh was
weak. The OAU had neither the military might of the US nor the
resources of the UN. The Africanpeace fund was never established as a
result of the financial weakness of the OAU members, and the decision
to establish the African peacekeeping force was declined in the OAU
annual summit in Cairo,June 1993 (Copson 1994, 176;Cleaver and May,
1995, 487).
Thus the OAU was confined to much the same ancillary role that
the UN and the US had assumed, joining them in sponsoring peace
talks. While the US supported ECOMOG with funds and military
equipment, and the UN provided an observer force (UNOMIL) to
supervise the cease-fire and disarmament agreed to at the Cotonou
peace talks, the OAU called upon African states to contribute troops to
ECOMOG. Only Uganda and Tanzania heeded the call, and they
withdrew their soldiers within a short time (Africa Confidential,29
July, 1994).Without adequate resources there was little the OAU could
do independently of the US and the UN.
To sum up, in neither Liberianor Sierra Leone could either side
win the war decisively; in neither country were the rebel leaders ready
to commit themselves to a negotiated peace that would result in
anything short of their being head of state; and in neither war were the
OAU, the UN or the US effective in bringing about either a military or
negotiated settlement. In both countries, these factors led to the
prolongation of the civil wars.

Divergent Paths to War Termination

The fact that one war ended while the other continued, despite
the above mentioned similarities, can be attributed to both external
and domestic factors. The external variable was the role of ECOWAS.
The domestic variables were the level of central authority and the
personalities of the rebel leaders.
ECOWAS'Divided Intervention
In theory, the West African organization, ECOWAS,might have
been more effective in ending regional civil wars than the more remote
international bodies discussed above, since its member states had a
greater interest in ensuring peace in the region. But ECOWASwas a
divided organization, reflecting divided regional interests. COte
d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, backed by other Francophone ECOWAS
members,gave active support to the main insurgentforces in Liberiaand
Sierra Leone, the NPFL and the RUF, respectively.
In the 1980s, President Houphouet-Boigny in C8te d'Ivoire came
to regard Samuel Doe as an usurper-a "bandit" and "criminal." Doe

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had executed President Boigny's son-in-law, A. B. Tolbert, and his

father, the former Liberian President William Tolbert (JeuneAfrique,
26 September-2 October, 1990, 29). Meanwhile, President Blaise
Compaore of neighboring Burkina Faso supported the NPFL, because
Libyan-trained Liberian dissidents, who later became the nucleus of
the NPFL had helped him to overthrow the government of his own
country in 1987 (Richards1995, 138-39).
On the other hand, a Nigerian-led group, consisting of Ghana,
Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, feared that an NPFL victory
would expose the entire region to Libyan domination. Libya, Taylor's
major supporter and supplier, had a well-known history of intrusion
into other states' internal affairs, and Taylor had called for exporting
his "revolution" to Liberia's neighbors (West Africa,22-28 June, 1992,
1064). Thus the Nigerian-led group was active in forming and
supporting an interim government in Liberia, and stood behind the
civilian and military government in Sierra Leone. This division of
ECOWASnot only undermined its efforts to bring an end to the war in
Liberia, but also complicated the situation there and pushed any
resolution of the Liberianconflict ever further into the distance.
Burkina Faso and COte d'Ivoire, which served as conduits of
Libyan arms to the NPFL, were the first ECOWASstates involved in
the Liberian conflict. Looking for a political solution to the crisis, the
Nigerian-led group then established the ECOWAS Mediation
Committee. In June 1990 Taylor rejected the peace plan the Mediation
Committee had put forth, leading to the establishment of its military
arm, ECOMOG.On 24 August 1990, the Mediation Committee sent
ECOMOGsoldiers to Monrovia to shore up Samuel Doe's army just as
the NPFL was about to take the capital, and prevented Taylor from
completing his victory. After Doe's murder about three weeks later, the
Mediation Committee set up an InterimGovernmentof National Unity
in Monroviabacked by the ECOMOGforces (Vogt 1993,201-02).
For the next three and a half years, ECOMOGunits continued to
be the main source of support for the Interim Government of National
Unity. However, it soon became obvious that ECOMOGsuffered from
severe shortcomings. The force had no clearly defined goal. Its main
contributors, Nigeria and Ghana, differed over what type of
intervention was intended-a peacekeeping force or a peace
enforcement force. ECOMOG'soperational ability was limited by its
lack of a proper chain of command, and also by the impairment of its
operational ability by poor administrative and financial support
(Iweze 1993, 220, 225; Howe 1997, 166). The military ineffectiveness of
ECOMOG was coupled with low morale and lack of discipline among
its troops. ECOMOG soldiers, especially the Nigerians, were notorious
for looting, drug dealing and harassing citizens. The acronym ECOMOG

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was said to stand for 'Every Commodity Or Movable Object Gone'

(Ankomah 1995, 11).
ECOMOG could neither rout Taylor out of the country or convince
him and his fighters to give up their arms and promote their aims as a
political party, and did not extend its authority beyond the capital
Monrovia. The Interim Government of National Unity, which was set
up to prepare the country for free and democratic elections, found itself
locked in the capital. Totally dependent on an inefficient force, it was
unable to accomplish its mission.
At the same time, the C~te d'Ivoire group within ECOWAS
continued to put its weight behind Taylor, now openly, rather than
clandestinely as they had done before the intervention by ECOMOG.
Burkina Faso provided Taylor with military and logistic support. C6te
d'Ivoire's President Houphouet-Boigny led a year-long diplomatic
campaign within ECOWAS against the intervention and allowed the
NPFL to use the country's commercial capital, Abidjan, to make the
transactions with foreign companies which funded the NPFL's
operations (Noble, 29 August 1990, Al; Reno 1995, 214). This
diplomatic, military and financial support gave Taylor and his NPFL
the wherewithal to attack ECOMOG forces in Monrovia in September
1990, October 1992, and to open a second front against ECOMOG in
Sierra Leone, in April 1991.
Up to this point the conflict in Liberia took the shape of a
conflict between two main contenders, the NPFL, on the one hand, and
ECOMOG and the interim government on the other. Each had its own
areas of control and each was dependent on its own backers in
ECOWAS. These dependencies gave the two ECOWAS factions a
certain amount of control over the situation. Had either faction been
determined to end the war, it needed only to stop supporting its client.
The invasion into Sierra Leone completely altered the Liberian
situation because antagonistic military groups multiplied, resulting in a
loss of control. As a result, the two major ECOWAS factions lost all
ability to bring the war to a conclusion. After 1993, the warlords had to
be included in all Liberian negotiations, and the civilian-controlled
interim government that the Nigerian group had installed in 1990 was
disbanded. The various peace accords that were signed in subsequent
years established a succession of new interim governments, in which the
weight of the warlords steadily increased.2
Sierra Leone faced a different political and military situation.
To start with, it was fortunate not to suffer from the intervention of the
divided regional body. Both factions in ECOWAS regarded the war in
Sierra Leone as an extension of the war in Liberia, and assumed that it
would end when Liberia's war ended. Moreover, seeing that their
intervention in Liberia lead to chaos, the two factions in ECOWAS
were duly wary of repeating their mistake. Sierra Leone did not become

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

a battleground for the two factions in ECOWAS, and was spared

ECOWAS'intervention, nor did it turn into the mosaic of conflicting
factions that prolonged the war and made reaching a workable peace
accord virtually impossible in Liberia.
To be sure, the three armed factions-the RUF, the Sierra Leone
People's Democratic League (SLPDL)and the National Front for the
Restorationof Democracy (NFRD),vied with one another and with the
Sierra Leone army for control of the country's hinterland. Nonetheless,
the SLPDL and the NFRD never became candidates for national
leadership and the main contest always remained between the Sierra
Leone governmentand the RUF.
Sierra Leone had the opportunity to draw lessons from the
ECOMOGintervention in Liberia.President Momoh's government, and
later Captain Valentine Strasser's military government, were selective
in choosing the foreign forces which would help them in their battle
against the insurgents. They willingly accepted army units from Guinea
and Nigeria, which did not break the stalemate. From February 1995,
the Sierra Leone government decided to rely on mercenary forces,
initially Gurkha units from Nepal, and later mercenaries from South
Africa (Reuters World Report,21 February, 1995). The South African
troops were sent by ExecutiveOutcomes-a company which specialized
in hiring mercenariesfor African states. The mercenaries sent to Sierra
Leone were Africanand white South Africanveterans of the commando
units who had been engaged in counter-insurgencycombat in Angola.
They were hired for a period of three years to fight the RUF, and to
train Sierra Leone government soldiers in counter-guerrilla warfare
(West AfricanJournal,July 1995, 7).
Executive Outcomes proved to be an efficient military force. It
launched a vigorous, anti-guerrillawarfare training program for Sierra
Leone army units. The mercenariesdrew on their formerexperience and
used helicopter gunships to launch successful attackson RUFbases. The
ExecutiveOutcomes fighterswere disciplined and were never accused of
looting, drug dealing or harassment of civilians (West Africa, 23-29
October, 1995). Although the employment of the Executive Outcomes
mercenaries did not lead to the immediate rout of the RUF, which
continued to attack vehicles traveling on the main roads from Freetown
to the hinterland, it did enable the government to regain control over
the main towns in the interior, Bo and Kenema, and to block Sankoh's
advance into the capital (Africa ResearchBulletin, 1-31 October, 1995:
12029; WestAfricanJournal,September-October,1995).

Level of Central Authority

In Liberia, Taylor's NPFL quickly conquered most of the rural
parts of the country. Taylor won support from the disaffected Mano and

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AFRICAN STUDIESREVIEW

Gio ethnic groups, who were discriminated against under the Doe
regime. As the NPFLgained ground, and victory attractednew recruits,
Doe's army responded with scorched earth tactics, looting, raping and
killing civilians, and burning whole villages. Refugees who fled
Liberia told of dead bodies littering the roadsides (Africa Research
Bulletin, 15 July, 1990, 9735). The atrocities committed by government
forces brought the NPFL an even greater stream of volunteers. In
December 1989, NPFL forces numbered only 250; within six months, as
Taylor reached the outskirts of Monrovia, they had grown to more than
10,000 (Lowenkopf 1995, 92-93).
Taylor's territorial sweep, stymied by the intervention of
ECOMOG,resulted in the establishment of two separate governments:
Taylor's "Greater Liberian" government, and the ECOMOG-backed
Interim National Unity Government. On 20 September 1990, the
ECOWAS Mediation Committee had gathered representatives of all
the various Liberian political parties and non-governmental
organizations in the capital of Gambia, Banjul, to elect an Interim
Government of National Unity (Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 October,
1990, 9873). Not to be outdone, on 10 October 1990, Taylor held elections
in the territories under his control, and, winning them, adopted all the
trappings of an official government, even though no state recognized it
(Ellis 1995, 171). Both governments claimed legitimacy. Taylor argued
that his election victory gave him the mandate of the Liberian people.
Amos Sawyer, head of the interim government, retorted that Taylor's
elections were rigged and argued that his election made his government
the legitimate one (West Africa, 3-9 December, 1990, 2954; Africa
ResearchBulletin, 1-30 June, 1991, 10176).
Whatever the value of the respective claims, neither government
functioned as a central authority. The interim government controlled no
more than the capital of Liberia and was backed up almost entirely by
ECOMOG forces controlled by their mother countries. Taylor's control,
though more encompassing, over time came to be limited by other
warlords.
In Sierra Leone, the central government maintained more
authority. The question of which was the legitimate government never
arose. Despite two coups, in April 1992 and January 1996, the Sierra
Leone government remained a power to be reckoned with beyond the
country's capital. Throughout the civil war, it continued to control the
western area and northern province, comprising about 60 percent of the
country's territory. Although bolstered by units from Nigeria, Guinea
and mercenaries from Nepal and South Africa, the government retained
an active national army and was not sustained only by foreign troops.
Unlike the Liberians, Sierra Leoneans did not join the rebel forces en
masse, largely because Momoh refrained from the brutal revenge and
scorched earth tactics that Doe had adopted (Richards 1995, 139, 150-

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

51). Continued legitimacy, territorialcontrol and control over its army

gave the Sierra Leone government room to maneuver on both the
military and diplomatic fronts unavailable to Liberia's interim
governments.
The Sierra Leone government's territorialcontrol and persisting
legitimacy enabled it to apply non-military pressure to the RUF. In
1991, President Momoh, who advocated the one party political system,
had to comply with opposition pressure and publicly declared his
commitment to convert SierraLeone into a multi-party state, with free,
democratic elections (Africa ResearchBulletin, 1-30 June, 1991, 10165-
6). This public commitment opened a second front against the RUF,
promising the democracy that the RUF claimed it was fighting for, but
without the bloodshed. Momoh's successor, Valentine Strasser,having
overthrown Momoh in a military coup, likewise declared his
commitment to the democraticprocess, seeing it as a means of winning
Europeanand Americanrecognitionfor his regime.
Internally Strasser used the military stick and the democratic
carrot to beat the RUF. While he began reshaping the country's
conventional army into a force able to handle counter-guerrilla
warfare, he also established in October 1992 a 15-member National
Advisory Council to work out the modalities for creating a multi-party
system of government. In January1994, in preparationfor presidential
and parliamentary elections, an Interim National Electoral
Commission was established to carry out voter registration and
boundary demarcation (West Africa, 26 October-1 November, 1992,
1835; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January, 1994, 11294). The new
electoral system enabled every major political group to participate in
the elections and to win legislative seats. The Sierra Leoneans reacted
enthusiastically. Seventeen political parties representing a variety of
social, cultural and ethnic interests were registered (West Africa,
December 1995-January1996).In the public eye these concrete measures
undermined the basis for Sankoh's vociferous rejection of government
sponsored elections (as opposed to elections held under RUF auspices).
Concurrently the NPR's advance on Freetown was blocked and
governmentunits regainedcontrolover key towns in the interior.
In January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his second-in-
command, BrigadierJulius Maada Bio. The new head of state brought
with him a different approach toward the RUF. While Strasser saw
the elections as an additional way to fight the insurgency, Bio saw
them as a means for conflict resolution. He adamantly wanted not only
the major loyalist political groups to participate in the electoral
process, but the RUF as well (Mozzafar 1996, 16). Helped by his sister
Agnes Deen-Jalloh, a senior RUF member, he started negotiations with
Sankoh. The two parties agreed on a two-month cease-fire and on

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unconditional negotiations which would take place in a third country

(Africa Confidential,2 February 1996, 2).
Bio's effort to come to terms with Sankoh stemmed from his
understanding that the RUF, despite its military setback, was still
able to undermine the elections unless the insurgentsjoined the process.
Sankoh, on his part, could see that his military campaign was bringing
him no closer to achieving his political aspirations and that a great
majority of the Sierra Leone public supported the election process.
However, the RUF leader's decision to start a political dialogue with
the government was not accepted by all the RUFcommanders. Some of
them continued their military struggle (Africa Confidential, 2
February,1996,3).
Presidential and primary elections took place on 26 February
1996.They were followed by a second round of presidentialelections on
15 March that put Ahmad Tejan Kabba of the Sierra Leone People's
Party in the presidential seat (Africa Confidential, 26 April, 1996).
The high voter turnout in the elections proved beyond doubt that Sierra
Leoneans were tired of war and wanted democracy, sending a clear
message to Sankoh.He and most of his commandersbegan to open up a
political dialogue with the elected government. On 24 March, five
days before the elected government was sworn in, Bio and
representativesof President Kabbamet in Yamoussoukrowith Sankoh.
One month later, the talks continued, this time between President
Kabba and Sankoh. The two agreed to extend the cease-fire and to set
up working groups on a comprehensive peace accord (Africa
Confidential,29 March, 1996, 2; Africa Confidential,26 April, 1996, 8).
Approachesand Personalities of the InsurgentLeaders
Sierra Leone's government was not only in better control of the
country than Liberia'sinterim governments, but it had the good fortune
of facing a less savvy, less politically skillful opponent. Sankoh's
approach was rigid and head-on to the point of bullishness. Once he set
out on the warpath, he never veered. He consistently blocked the
political resolution channel by preconditions to negotiations on the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Sierra Leone. Even when the
military balance shifted in the government's favor in 1995, Sankoh
refused to abandon the military track for the negotiating table. The
RUF manifesto published in 1995 is replete with slogans such as
"historical responsibility of every patriot.....We must be prepared to
struggle until the decadent, backwardand oppressive regime is thrown
into the dustbin of history...national democratic revolution...and,
organized challenge and resistance...." Sankoh switched course only
when it was obvious that most of the population supported elections,
and that the long-promised government elections will finally take

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

place. Before the elections Sankoh set the RUF on a course of violent
intimidation, which did not impede the process, but which lost him
whatever popular support he might have had (Africa Research
Bulletin, 1-29 February,1996, 12144).
Taylor , however, was far more wily, cunning and flexible than
Sankoh. He moved easily and unencumbered from arms to diplomacy
and back again to arms as suited him. It has already been pointed out
that when warfare was not getting him what he wanted, he would try
to obtain his ends at the negotiating table, where he invariably knew
how to extractas much as he could from his opponents. In the Cotonou
pact of July 1993, Taylor succeeded in diminishing ECOMOG'smilitary
role by endorsing UNOMILand in getting the Nigerian-backedInterim
Government of National Unity replaced by the Liberian National
TransitionalGovernment, in which his NPFL,along with ULIMO,held
the major posts. In the Abuja accord signed on 19 August 1995, he
improved his position even further.Along with two other warlords, he
himself became a member of the collective presidency, formally titled
the Transitional Council of State, that had been established. Although
officially designated only vice president, he was recognized as the
major figure in the collective presidency, more important than even the
civilian president. His advances are all the more impressive in light of
the fact that after 1993, his NPFL was no longer an effective military
force. But Taylor had no reason to stop, because according to his
understanding, the political-military turmoil created by the active
intervention of both ECOWASfactions would enable him to go from
accord to accord with impunity until he reached his goal.

Conclusion
The factors which contributed to the prolongation of wars in
Liberia and Sierra Leone-military stalemate, proliferation of
antagonist military factions, the absence of clear political and
military objectives on the part of the insurgents and the unwillingness
or inability of the US, the UN and the OAU to force peace-are factors
which are present, in full or in part, in other post-Cold War conflicts in
Africa and elsewhere. Donald Snow (1996, 1-2) referred to this type of
conflict as the "new internal war." He counsels that "warfare in its
most traditional sense has virtually disappeared from the scene...these
wars are all internal:fought primarilybetween groups within countries
rather than between states." These new types of wars inflicted
administrative, economic and social devastation.
Liberiaand Sierra Leone, affected by prolonged war, were listed
among countries whose conflicts resulted in breaking down the state
machinery (Smock 1995, 2; Rothchild 1995, 48). Nevertheless, Sierra
Leone managed to detach itself from the ring of collapsed states and

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create a fresh start. The civil war in Liberia had ignited the one in
Sierra Leone. However, at the same time, it provided lessons which
helped Sierra Leone to embark on a different channel. The country was
not affected by the division among ECOWASmember states, and the
Sierra Leone government, unlike the Liberian Interim Government of
National Unity, was free to choose which foreign military force would
be employed in the country. Its decision to engage ExecutiveOutcomes'
mercenariesproved to be correct.In a broadersense, the cases of Angola
and Sierra Leone show that using a disciplined mercenary corps has
proved to be an efficient and successful way to fight insurgent forces
(Herbst 1996, 124).
The Sierra Leone government was quick to understand that the
capture of territories by the NPFL meant that an imminent threat of
extensive destruction existed. The government, which retained control
of the administrative and military machinery and a large area of the
country, implemented a policy typical of what Donald Rothchild
(1991, 213) has called a "responsive state." Its commitment to carry on
free and democratic elections opened an opportunity for inclusive state
coalitions and proportionaldistribution of resources among the various
ethnic and social groups in the country (Rothchild 1991, 215). The two
military governments continued the scenario of the "responsive state."
Although committed to democracy, they implemented the electoral
system differently. Strasser used it as a means to isolate the RUF. Bio
saw it as a means to manage the conflict and insisted on integrating the
RUF. Bio took advantage of the steps initiated by his predecessor-
military advancement and completing the electoral process-to create
the "timing of ripeness" (Rubin 1991, 237). He was the first head of
state who established direct contact with the RUF leader.
At the same time, Foday Sankoh realized that his rigid and
inflexible policy led him nowhere. The military tide turned against
him and the political initiative was taken by the military regime,
which suggested an alternative system of government. When Bio
offered Sankoh an opportunity to participate in the alternative
system, the latter agreed. Sankoh's agreement to embark on a political,
non-military approach was essential in ending the war in Sierra Leone.
In Liberia, all of the combatants, government and insurgents, were
mostly balanced. Nobody had a superior strategy, force or power.
Neither the battleground nor the political arena shifted in favor of one
of the combatants. The participation of the various warlords in the
succession of interim governments only helped preserve the status quo
and contributed to the prolongation of the war. The continuous lack of a
stable central authority created political and military chaos, in which
the various warlords were able to function and preserve their
relatively autonomous existence. Moreover, the various warring
factions contributed to the deterioration of the state due to their

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 The ProlongedWars in Liberiaand Sierra Leone

inability to agree on a set of rules regarding the organization and the

functioning of a central authority, and its composition. Thus, a political
solution, the only way out of the prolonged war, was not available in
Liberia.
Notes
*The author wishes to thank Karl Magyar and Shaheen Mozzafar for their helpful
comments on this article.
1. ECOMOG was founded in August 1990 by Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and
the Gambia. Nigeria shouldered the largest share of support by far.
2. Each of the four peace agreements signed between 1993 and 1995 called for
establishing an interim governing body. The Liberian National Transitional
Government established by the Cotonou Accord allotted only two portfolios to
representatives of NPFL and ULIMO. The short-lived Akosombo agreement provided
for a joint presidency of only warlords. The five-member Transitional Ruling Council
created in Accra allocated three seats to warlords and two to civilians. The Interim
Council of State created by the Abuja agreement included eight warlords and three
civilians.

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