PAUL RICEUR Marquette Sruptes 1 Prntosopay AKEYTO Andrew Tallon, Seis Editor HUSSERL'S IDEAS I Volume 10 ‘TRANSLATED AND WITH A PREFACE, BY Bonp Harris & Jacquetine Boucuarp SpuRLOCK Eprrep, ‘TRANSLATION REVISED, AND WITH A INTRODUCTION BY Por VANDEVELDE MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESSHandelsho|skolens Bibliotek 2.0 JAN. 1997 Kabenhavn Library of Congress Cataloging: in-Pabliaton Data Ricoeu, Pal ‘key o Hussels Leas 1/ Pal Ricoeur tansated and with a prelice by Bond Haris & Jacqueline Bouchard Spurlock: edie, ‘tandtion revised, and with intodcton hy Pal Vanderclda by agaist ssn phisopy #10) sinttodution and running commentary was eviginally published 2 part of Ricoeur's French ranlation ofthe German wa spe he G ork Ideas by Include igi fens a ind Bu o-7acacoy.9 Huse mind 1859-1938, Algenie Finhangin dine Phinomenlogie. 2 Phenomenology “Lande Pr 1 Huse. Edmund, 1851938 Algemein nny ind in Phinomenologie. II. Title, IV. Series. : RBZ HDBALD 1956 Man 70 610139 ‘cru dna ei taney roby leis mecuil taoping mead esheets ea ‘eps © Marquete University ress, 1996 “Table of Contents Editors Introduction: Paul Riceue: Narative and Phenomenon ..7 “Translators Preface 33 Introduction to deat of E, Hsserl 35 used!’ Introduction i 6 Section : Essence and the Knowledge of Essences 6 (Chapter I: Fact and Essence 6 (Chapter 2: False Interpretations of Naturalism ” Section Il: Fundamental Phenomenological Considerations ..85 ‘Chapter 1: The Thesis ofthe Natural Attitude and its Place inthe Whole Matter 7 85 (Chapter 2: Consciousness and Natural Reality 93 (Chapter 3: The Region of Pure Consciousness. 105 (Chapter 4: Phenomenological Reductions i 13 Section II Methods & Problems of Pure Phenomenology... 117 ‘Chapter I: Preliminary Considerations of Method s..wsomow 117 ‘Chapter 2: General Seuccues of Pure Consciousnes 13 ‘Chapter 3: Noesis and Noema Z 133 ‘Chapter 4: Problems of Noetic-Noematc Structures Mi Section IV: Reason and Realty o 197 (Chapter 1: Noematic Meaning & the Relation to the Object.159 (Chapter 2: Phenomenology of Reason 163 (Chapter 3: The Levels of University Pertaining to the Problems of the Theory of Reason 167 Index se 7Paul Ricoour: ‘Narrative and Phenomenon Pol Vandevelde Marquette University In 1950 Ricoeur translated Husser’s famous and somewhat ab struse work, Idea, into French, This tanslation rapidly became a landmark, providing a powerful and consistent lexicon of French ‘equivalents for Hussels terminology. new vocabulary became avail- able and contributed tothe development of atypically French phe- ‘nomenology. Together with hie tandation, Ricceur also offered 2 masterful commentary to a work that really needed some interpre= tive support because ofits transitory character in Huse itinerary. Such an achievement propelled Ricaur to a postion of intelectual authority among Hussel scholas. His ambition, however, exceeded the philological task of phenomenological exegesis. The same year his translation and commentary were made available to a French publi, Ricoeur also published Philophy of the Will: The Volunaary ‘and the Involuntary (Ricceat 1950), which is an original “applica- tion” of the phenomenological method. Later came, among many ‘others, On Ineerpretation. Eaays on Freud (Riccear 1965) and The ‘Confles of Interpretations. Ezays on Hermeneuscs(Ricceur 1969), From 1983 on, Ricceur started a huge enterprise devoted to practical phi losophy with an emphasis on the rol of narrative in elation to time (Tine and Namsatve, Riceur 1983-1985), to action (Fiom Tet to Ae tion, Ricreur 1986) and 0 slide (Onselfax Another, Rieter 1990) “The tiles by themselves already indicate cha some shift has taken place in Ricasur’s interests. Yet, he has constantly maintained that three motives pervade and unify his whole work: che Cartesian con viction of the unifying rake ofthe Cogito, the phenomenological dis- covery of the role of intentionality, and the hermeneutic emphasis on a semiotic and interpretive mediation ‘Riceur’ itinerary not only appears mukiiceted, but alo represen an impressive living dialogue: he has unabatedly encompassed the fed ‘of contemporary philosophy ofthe lst five decades in its many tends land currents, In the numberof works he cites and quotes, and in the8 Paul Rieu: Kit ser Ides ‘ang of neal penptves he adops bee ctlly srtnizng them, Riccur peas a a wines of his ime ~a time occupied by polos of discourses and conse by conics of interpecaon. Sarreis often considered the lst intellectual of his time appears more and more that Ricaut, to use Berard Stevens expresion (Seevens 1991), willbe the refre of his era, Qualifying Rieu ov sefececeranly docs noc am at reducing hs wl to One of taking noes poring henge. His power hop acumen, as well a his inclination toward scrutiny and compromise, have kept him away fom the tempratons of intellectual fhion and smade him a contibutor in his wn right to some more sober sez counts of psychoanalysis, stuctutaism, deconstructionism, Postmodernism, et. With Rica, and thanks to him, it became Prose vo doconstucta text thus cing the almost sacred ulnar {tteton ofthe autho’ or speaker intention, while sil elimi that Someone" wrote his ext o hat “tomeone” spoke in tit uneree __Jea8 Grondin has characte large par of Rice work a an "apologetics," (Grondin 1990, 123) inthe sense that he presented his views by contradstinction to other trends and by engaging in lengthy discussions with them. Although pay accurate, such ackar, acterization might overlook the tremendous pedagoel advantage of such a method of expositions ic urns out to have opened de logue bersen the contemporary philosophical tends which have a tendency to force chemselves onto the tage fr thrown sake, Tact as ateferee and a wines, as Ricecur does, might move the hilo. sophical arena away fom the wil o power and restore some form oF dellecraat responsibility, Rieu might very well embody Hoses characterization of philosophers as “the functionaries of mankind.” This introduction to Rice commentary on Ides wll not ven: «ure ino a general presentation of Rcewursthoughe, nor wil ive tempe to offer a commentary on a commentary. Rather, we wll ‘nine how Rica noion of naratve extends he hounds of phenomenology by reformultng two crcl and techn! pins Jn Husels phenomenology: the passive synthesis and the flfimene 1. Hussers treatment of passive synthesis and fulfilment ‘The “pase phe sa concept Huse nodes in ccoune for she that the stv of eonstcon by onsen Pol Vandevelde, “Pal Ricoeur: Nareative and Phenomenon” 9 has passivity which itself already pervaded by some form of activ ig. In this sense, the synthesis by an Ego has iselF agenesis. Huser) thus speaks of “passive synthesis” and “passive genesis,” as opposed to an “active synthesis” and "active genesis.” ‘The problem of passive synthesis is closely linked to what Hussed ‘names a “genetic,” as opposed toa “static,” phenomenology and in trodes history a8 a phenomenological theme. Such a concern has been atthe center ofa long debate among commentators, since a historical dimension might jeopardize che ranscendencal character ‘of phenomenology. The debate has narrowed down to cwo options cicher a phenomenology in the strict sense, or its reformulation in terms of hermeneutics, Heidegger tok the second path followed by 1 host of philosophers. History, culture in short the others, what Heidegger in Being and Time calls the “The.” isa the origin of the ppsiviy of the Ego, The word ino which Dasein hasbeen thrown has ben articulated by the“ They” Iis precisely from the They” that Dasein will have to recover, beter or-conquer what willbe its authenticity” in the sense of what wll be propery ies own (Eigen). The second problem, the question of fulfilment, is inked to the first problem and represents the crucial test for a philosophy that puts intentionality tits center. [Fintentionality overcomes the mere divide of subject and object, it must absolutely be shown how my incentional act can be fulfilled by the givenness ofan object, so that Tava consciousness, wll not have to divese myself of my conscious owes in order to discover the world (naive realism), and chat the ‘world will not be merely what appears on the stage of my conscious- ‘ess (naive idealism). This problem offlflment challenges phenom- cenology to give a descriptive account of what is, independently of y practical concern or practical endeavor. Is it possible for our in- tentional acs to reach a fulilment without being caught in a rfer- Fing network where these acts ae relevant according co the goals they are pursuing? Again here, Heidegger's answer was negative and he ‘consequently engaged phenomenology in an “analytic of Daseins existence” which is characterized as “care: Dasein is primorially “concerned” by things which are ready-to-hand, “Although Ricceur draws insights liberally fom Heidegger, he stil wants eo maintain a central role for the Cogito. In order to under stand bis solution © these problems in terms of narrative, « more specific presentation of the probleme at stake is required.10 Pl Rieu: Ky er Ideas 1.1 Passive synthesis The notion of “passivity” has nor received a systematic treatment in Huser and has lf commencators wih the burden of elucidating it Franco Volpi (Volpi 1989, 161 Ff) ses the problem of ‘pasiviny 2 covering cree domains ot opening thie dictions of ivestign- tions 1) a theory of original temporal constitation in the “ving present” (ebendige Gegenwart) so chat temporal synthesis presents the basic structure of subjectivity. Klaus Held offers a powerfal re, onstruction of this original temporal constcution (Feld 1966) 2) A theory of association which represents the basic level forthe activity of constitution tothe extent that perception, for example, does no bear on mere sense data, but on "cluster" where an asecioe tion has taken place. Elmar Hiolenstein develops this line of invest sation (Holenstcin 1972). 3) An analysis of kinesthesis that shows that the most basic perception isalteady linked vo bodily movement, Maurice Merleau-Ponty has become the master of ths kind of re. search (Merleau-Poaty 1945), As already indicated by these different orientations of esearch, the problem of passivity is highly complex, For our purpose, we will not delve into the inctcacics of this problem nor into the variery of Husserian terminology. At the expense of nuances, ~ and for the sake of elucidating the filation between Ricceue and Hussel the following methodological device willbe put into place: 1) discussion is restricted to “passive synthesis” and “pase genesis" 2) the notion of “passivity” is understood as the fact that, the one hand an ‘objectisalready a whole before Intend it while, on the other." any already a unified field of consciousness before I can intend, 3) the problem of pasiviy is considered from the vantage point ofthe probs em of intersubjecciviy AA first glance, the very expression of “passive synthesis” seems to thecaten the heart of phenomenology in its transcendental endesvon how can a synthesis be passive and, fi is pasive, what performs the snthess? In the Cartaian Meditations, Huser uses the expresions “passive synthesis" and “active synthesis” for naming the fac ther the 88 as become what is, just asthe object in is gerne fs pies fented on the bass of a pasivity. Since, however, pasviy is not strictly speaking “given” as such, but can only be “reconstructed ‘once the enterprise of consttucon has taken place, one can ls speak neatan by pate generation The euyoma! ajo a tion marks caution us, at least in the Cartesian Mobos as the cia ei epee tp oe itt (318), Sek on satan aaa eee ee eet pouaaag CS2 Paul Ricca yt cet’ eas ‘here isa passivity hoth ofthe object (or of the world as an environ- ment of objects) and of my ego, “imperturbably | must hold fat to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for ime (is. sense in an arising fm my intencional life’ (CM 91), Thislase quoteisceneal for Huss understanding of pasivity as yillas for ssing the contrast with Rice's postion. Huser fry believes tha such a passviey can be recovered. A pos such a recovery could be the following, broken down in owo sep fies “rom che phenomenon world, fom che world appearing wih an objective sense, a substratum becomes separated, a the “Nave ‘included in my ownness” (CM 96); in a second step, this substravum ‘must be distinguished, even separated, from a nature that has been ‘obtained by abstracting from “everything psychic and fom those predicate of the Objective world thar have arisen from persons” (CM 96). This later starum sill belongs tothe objective word self and 's thus whata sciencst can each. Ie is what is obtained once we have stisinted intersubjective, everything purely psychological or putly Subjective” in the sense of “not shareable by others.” Huse. how. «ver, claims that such an objective nature, sripped of ll che prea dices we can find, isnot the end poine ofthe phenomenological vestigation. A second strategy must be put into play that adds one _more step tothe two already mentioned: The “objective” which is ‘incersubjeciv,” can again be reduced co the sphete of ownness in hich “the sense ‘Objective,’ which belong to everything worldly — 4 constituted intersubjectively, as experienceable by everyone, and 0 forth ~ nanishes completely" (CM 96), ‘This second strategy seals the fate of Huse enterprise and helps ‘explain Ricoeurs postion. For the eason for ths extra reduction ve Hussrls methodology. By and large, Hussedl considers that the pas. sivity of the world as well as ofthe Ego can be scen a8 ast of activi. ties that can be traced back and ce-discovered as they wete, so thar the passivity becomes a synchronic qualification. With the appropris ate method ~ a questioning-back ~ the dachrony of a series of syn chronies will appear. Ac any moment ~ such seems to be Hussei!s claim — the pasivity can be unveiled as it was in its living presen, ‘We will nly focus on this methodology as fara intersubjective ‘concerned, which is only one side of pasiviy, as mentioned above Hussers methodology for accounting far intersubjectivity and its ‘ole ina singular Ego capacities can be broken down ino four seeps ble strategy for Pol Vandevelde, “Pal Riser: Nareatie and Phenomenon” 3B cof the thee of hem counting as many assumptions. Firs sheimpac of theron iment on me mabe cone Sco, sich constitton soi pose though appssentaton, ssa sae epetece fhe et ely Thi he pc ‘durian i ony posible there unary ole “or whom thi rows kes place, the sphere of owes: Furth, the eerion of ri idenatywihin the pre of owns the harmony of exper foee Les bil flow thee ep “Thefts itgy anderson, ds or offer mach icy Phenomenology aims to describe what appear, thatthe appa nce must be or someon who rable conte To cli ha schacver wil be ale oconstaaDelonging 0 the other wl never eeed my consti and intentional bts, sl cong Cnr with he phenomenslogical hes However Hose undersands the cosituon of inesibjesieachioement seduce to de consituonf te other san anima body this thsecond cp By questioning bal neroubjcty appear be anchored nan Capac ofthe others body which sere poin of departure Seen apsning hectic neon ment The conecp a pperepion or apresentaion = ‘Hr them bees ynonynou= tha exis he genera on af mbt. Ju pr he es Fig ther own organisms aod paychophysis egos with mings hus Spring ten er an apr wa hy Fr ‘Feryerpetie dus apesenings co say fh hen pce objec: “Th expres phenomenon, Objective N Rare hs bess the primondaly const seatam fnmy phere neha sipetimposed scond, merely apreseted stam Stigaung Foy experiencing romeo che (CM 124), Tntrbjectie consaton hur covered by appreientaion Fom {sate pin of view Ie implicit the sna of my succes {pperecpon foster word the word belonging ht serrnce tems, must be experienced fartvth a the ame a ive ng my apnea isan ident fur apetnce ye ; pent capri ofan eget of perspec, Hus scone saving led the problem of psy ick Toner erga Now can dent a Narre onatated in me with a Nata const turd by someone ce (on ated with che neceary reo, Bow“ Paul Rice: Key to Huser Ideas can identify a Nature constcuted in me with one constituted in me ira Nature constituted by someone else)” (CM 126) “The concepe of appresentation offers the guarantee that any incersubjectve role ea, in principle, be brought back to the pres tence of two Egos: where one can constitute inthe presen the sense fof what isnot his or hers. Intesubjectve influence is whac [will be able co appresene in an experience of the other asa body, so that the potentialities of the other are thereby reduced ro what can be appresented chrough is body "The condition of posibily for appresentation isthe existence of a sphere of ownness, immune from the effec of the others while con- stating these very effect. This is the third step in Hussed’s account of incesubjectiviey and iis linked to the transcendental reduction, This eduction is supposed to reduce everything ~ che world as well asthe others, thus the radical passivity ofthe ego — tothe sphere of fownness. In such a framework, intersubjectvity as an Ego nity “becomes constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally)” (CM. 107), The sphere of owns thus represents the only ste for const- tution: "There is included in my ownness, as purified from every ‘sense, “mere Nature,” that sense pertaining to other subject has lost precisely that "by everyone” and therefore must not by any ‘means be raken foran abstract stratum ofthe world or ofthe worlds sense” (CM 96-97). Only sucha view Hussel believes, can acount for a passivity both of the subject and the object (or she world). “t, the reduced "human Ego’ (psychophysical’ Ego). am constituted accordingly, asa member of the ‘world’ with a multiplicity of objects ‘outside me,” But | myself constitute al this in my psyche’ and bear it intentionally within me” (CM 99). Such is supposed co be the ta scendental ego, reached by reduction to my sphere of ownness, To speak of “the transcendental intersubjectivity (that) has an Interubjective sphere of awnnes, in which it constitutes the Obj tive world” (CM 107) does not, therefore, mean anything more than this: I can recover in my sphere of ewes the sense of an object oF ‘world as “valid for everyone,” so that “the Objective world does rot, in che proper sense, ranscend that sphere [my own essence] that sphere’ own intersubjective essence, but rather inheres in i a an ‘immanent transcendency” (CM 107). Since my sphere of ownnestis che ste where my passive genesis 38 well asthe intersubjetive constitution can be recovered, ie “eons ol Vandevele, “Paul Riceur Narrative and Phenomenon” 5 tuted” as ming tis assumed that the pasvity of my ego as well as of ry world, can be broken dovn into elements that can be presented to-meand chus consticued. Hussrl seems to believe that recovering ‘ny pasviy is nor diffrent than plunging into my pase through my ‘memory and presentatng (vergegemusregen)pastexperiences. In the same way, recovering an intersubjective constitution means to start by apprescnting the orheras an animate body and, thus, appresenting what the other can see. could se it 00 if Took the others place. In both cases, however the very starting point has not been made ex- plicit, namely, cis very nation of “owness.” IFT can have the guat- antee of recuperating my past, it must be assumed that what T presendate has been, in its own present, merely presented. Similarly, T ean recover my genesis, aswell as the genesis of the world, because itis assumed thatthe processes of genesis or synthesis in chir time ‘were merely presented. The sphere of ownness which isthe stage of| {these orginal presentations and presentations seems to depend ison something else ~what Hise calls the harmony of exper ‘nce. This the fourth sep in the consttation of icersbjetviny. Hse! quaifes the transcendental redaction as an abstraction: “When we thus abstract min etary cobrnt rata af he phenomenon worl stratum ofthe phenomenon that is the core fae of continously harmonious, continuing wodd-xperince" (CM 96). The ‘continuously harmonious world experience” Huser men lon here nest function asthe kate eerion of wha i Yr se" which she oly thing hat canbe, At the same ine, armony of experince appears the citron of ownnes. “Harmony” how ver can ony be such fiom asa point of view that is oy, 8 long asthe subject for whom cher is harmony sil unified and vate ofisunity Although Huse speaks of "gens" of the go icappears thar such agenesis isso “or the ego i “constuted But itis the case the question of the synthesis ofthis ego “or ‘hom, gens of the objet cab “abscess pe. fice can be expesed a follows: hartony ison the one hhand, supposed to be the ultimate warrant that I'am successful in spenbeng an in ving my panty ox eine constitutions onthe other hand the concept of “harmony” has to ‘inh fxm mony ei laser ier to maintain two seemingly antagonistic cms: on ‘he one hand, the genesis can only be understood erospetively in6 Paul Riceur Key to Hse eas what he calls in the Crista Réchfige, a questioning;-backs but this {questioning back, on the other hand, once it has been performed, ddocs not unsetele the ego, which now sees ise as “generated,” and does not fundamentally put into question the world ~or the object — ‘which now appears being “passively” synthesized. The methodol- ‘ogy for retrieving my passivity or the passivity ofthe world has no ‘ontological impact: once my passivity has been recognized, not only am I not different from what I pasively” was, but what or who Lam is noc dependent on the account | give of who I am. Similarly, the ‘world thar has been recovered in its passivity is neither different fom wha ic was “passively” nor dependent ia is sense on the retrieval cnterprse. What allows the homogeneity to obtain isthe phere of ‘ownness which is supposed to be the guarante that a genetic — "hi torical” ~ dimension can be accounted for, but within che static ac- tivity of constitution, a fr as “harmony” reaches. Ricaar will refor :mulate ths criterion of "harmony" in terms of a narrative. Lee us ‘now turn to the second problem: the possibilty of fulfilment. 1.2. The question of fulfilment ‘The notion of intentionality or intentional at, only as relevance if chere isthe possibilty for the intentional ace tobe fulfilled. Inthe Logical inetgations, Huser puts into place a scheme for intentional acts that anticipate their fulfilment, He stares withthe signifying acts, ‘The “physical body” ofthe signs must be len a meaning by what Huser callsa meaning-conferring ac. Ths meaning-confering act, Jn urn, inorder to fulfils function, must be correlated with mea ing or sense. This meaning i the mere cortelate of che act and there- fore does not depend on anything outside the act. It is the content of the act and, as sch, an ideal content. Borrowing from Frege, Huser asserts: “meanings constitute [..] a class of concepts in the sense of ‘universal objec” (Husser! 1970, 330). Husserl extends his cheory ‘of meaning to perception: every act of perception has a meaning or a sense and this intentional act can be fulfilled in intuition. This ex- tension, however, represents a challenge. As Dreyfus puts it, “He (Husser] must exhibic a percepeual sense as corelate of the percep tual act, co correspond to the conceptual sense we have seen to be correlated with each signifying act. And he must show why we speak of the sense as “what is perceived” in every act of perception ol Vandevele, "Paul Rizr: Naraive and Phenomenon” v (Dreyfus 1982, 102). Huser thus considers there ro be a parallel bberween a perceptual act as signifying actand the fulfilling sense or intuitive sense, much lke the parallel between acts of conferring smaning and conferred meaning, Following Dreyfus, we can reconstruc the problem as follows: the conferred meaning remains ideal, while the Fullling sense is sup- posed to give the objec in person.” Huss ries to avid the diff- culty by dividing the sense ofthe falling ace. A perceptual at, which is supposed eo be fulfilling, bas to full a certain signifying intention and it must be sensuowsy given: "asignitive intention merely points to its object, an intuitive intention gives ie “presence,” inthe pregnant sense ofthe word” (Husserl 1970, 728). Thus, in onder to be Fulfilling, a percepeual act has to articulate two components: “an act which intends a cerain objec as having certain characteristics, and an act which present the object, thereby Fulfling or failing to fulfil ehisincencion” (Dreyfus 1982, 103). The coincidence ofthese «wo will verify perception. However, if the ineuitive sense, which is supposed to provide the true fulfilment, is itself an abstact moment ‘and it scems that it can only be abstract ~ chen, one is eager to ask, what is supposed to deliver the “abject in person”? Do we not need another act tha wll eonnect che inuitive ace with the signifying act, and this ad infinitum? If ehe intuitive component of the perceptual act~ besides is signifying component — as, in turn, an intentional content or signifying component (since iis abstract), we are caught in an infinite regress where a sense i supposed to full a sense, de- laying indefinitely the sensuous fulfilling, Huser cificuly originates from his understanding of sense. Sens, the claims, can be separated from fulfilment, o that an "empty" in- tention can havea sense (Auffssungsin), but not be met by an in tuitve sense (Anichauungsinn), and therefore remains unfulfilled. ‘Although this mighe satisfy a common sense view, the question sill remains of how an “intuitive” sense (Anuchauungsinn) can be pos- sible she “incuitive” sense being supposed tobe che flflment of the sense ofthe empty intention, What supposedly is that moment where consciousness in its self givenness encounters an object as fly given in person and ould thus be satisfied by i? Dreyfus describes Hussers Aapora as follows: "For ifeven in perception one mus always separate the act of meaning ftom the at oF inition wich fills thar meaning, it follows that one can have an account of the interpretive sense8 Paul Rieu: Key aera (Aufissangsinn) bux no account ofthe correspondinginetive sense (nicanaguinn). One can have an account of what the mind takes the object tobe, but no account of our bodily ineration with the abject in perceiving i” (Dre 1982 108). used scems to have acknowledged the problem in the Lapa! Invesigavions:" cis cleat J hat che alflling sense carces no implication of flnss, that ie dos nor acorn include te tol content ofthe inuiive at" (Huss 1970, 744. Huse emphasis) Garwesch tried co remedy this problem by introducing the noion of an “incarnate meaning: something that would be both sensuous an of the order ofthe sense, parila, but already informed bya universal form (Guewitsch 1982) Huss’ ntrodvction ofthe oem in dear represents an advance cover the Logical Ineiatons with respect to the teamien of this «cial problem. The noema can covet atleast thre diferent ele ments i¢ can be the conelate ofan ac, a a puncte noematic ap- pearance: it ca ao be the sense (Sin or Bedeatung and a sich be the identical or ideal content; andthe naema can name the object, constituted in is unity and be, thus, the intentional abject (Beret 1995, 71). In the ease of perception, the noersa mus be, i seems, the perceptual sense. But here again: isi the interpretive sense ufisungsinn) ~s conrace ofthe signifying act~ oF the nitive sense (Amihaunesnn) ~ as correlate ofthe Fulfilling act? Hussrl does no relly clarify the problems: “perception (.] has is nocma, and at ehe base ofthis its peep meaning (Walrnhmungsinn, thae is the perceived as such” (Huser 1962, 238). Gurwitsch rook this “pecrved as uch” tbe che intuitive sense, what he ells per- cept. However, Huse alo considers che noema ata sens: “every noema has eontent namely, its ‘ean, and is lated shrough it to's’ object” (Huser! 1962, 333). This extension of meaning from the linguistic realm tothe sphere of petcepion acknowledges the gesture alteady made the Lagi Inveigation where the scheme proposed in the ist metiganion is applied in the fith and sth “Originally these words (Bedewang and bedewen) relate ony wo the sphere of speech, that of ‘expression. Bu iti almos inevitable, and ac the sme time an important step for knowledge, to extend the ‘meaning ofthese words [so that they may be applied [0 che whole noctio-noematc sphere, all as, therefore, whether these are interwoven with expression ats or aot” (Huse 1962, 319) Pal Vandevelde, “Pal Riseu: Naeativeand Phenomenon” » [Although che extension of sense ro perception might have opened a path toward making understandable how a fulimentcan tke place, Huser’ analysis sill remains too “stati,” as opposed ro “gen ‘The nocma i supposed to bea mediation, but 2 mediation that docs ‘not account for its own possibility hence the various interpretations ofits: an absract sense belonging toa tind realm ~ besides subject and object (Follesdal 1982), 28a linguistic meaning (Melneyre and Smith 1982), or just as whac the phenomenological analysis produces (Gokolowski 1984). Whar scems co be lacking is a dynamic-genetic explanation thac would account for the fact that, as Dreyfus pucs it in concluding his article, “there is only the embodied subject coming {o grips with embodied objects” (Dreyfus 1982, 123) In his lacer works, Hussed seems to anticipate the objection. He increasingly emphasizes the role of horizons: an object appears within ‘horizon and is, thus, situated among other objets and finds its place within this referring network, When consciousness intends an ‘object, tis therefore, within a horizon and the appearance of an ‘abject opens other horizons. Consciousness can follow the refering network ofthe appearance ofan object to another appearance ofthe same object. However, foran object to appeas, still means, for Huser, to become thematic tobe the focus of the atention of intentional ‘consciousness, As Klaus Held notes (Held 1995), che true experience ‘of falilmene for Husseel must be such thar in i the being in itself of| fn object is given non-thematically. In other words, because of the horizons in which an object is entangled, because ofthe horizonal character of consciousnes isl, it seems thar the givenness “in per- son” of an object to consciousness cannor happen: they ean never encounter each other, the ewo of them being caught in a refering network. ‘We mighe say that, in Husserl, no account of an articulation be ‘ween intention and flflment is given. Klaus Held sees in Heidegger the one who offer suck an articulation thar provides an account of how an intention can be fulfilled. Heidegger, however, changes the framework of investigation. He abandons the focus on perceptual intention or signifying intention and considers action or the world of daily concerns asthe true sit for phenomenological questioning. “A true fulfilling would be contained in living experience where we ‘would precisely encounter a tool im is discreet reliability, where the tool in other words would offer its determinate character without20 Paul Riccar Ky to Hise eas cobjectfjing thematzation” (Held 1995, 116), Experiencing some- thing in a world which is a “work-world” means thae the “some- thing” cannot be separated from ts potential use, The goal is always atcipated so that consciousness, which is “concerned! by things in a daily word, is always ahead of them, Becoming aware of one's own selfidentity does noe mean anything more than becoming aware of the one fr the sake of whom the referring neework iat play: Human ‘existence can thereby transcend the mundane way of existing, with- draw from the instrumental world of action, and find oneself as the ‘center of action, This is what Heidegger calls authenticity. By then coming back co things of daly se, human existence is able ro dsen- ‘angle them from instrumental action and, thus, to let the refering network appear. According ro Held, only in authenticity can 3 fulflmenc take place. What is then experienced is that the instra- ‘mental usages become focuses within which the word all ofa sud- dden shines. The fulfilment, consequently, is noe an object. Ie is not, and cannot be, thematized, but is indicated by affects it isan affec- Despite its incellecrually arracive and fascinating aspect, this Heideggerean path might escape the phenomenological cred alto gether, by overemphasizing the given and downplaying the Ego: sivenness becomes more and more al from afar and the subject is ‘more and more confined to afield of relationships or a mere device for the transmission ofa tradition. The phenomenon withdraws from the vsible~ human ~ realm, The emphasis on a "phenomenology of the unapparent,” which Heidegger mentions in bis later works, dan- sgerously folds back upon a speculation on a history of Being or on Eregnisse that, as paradigms, excape any phenomenological invest- gation. Although a close reader of Heidegger, Ricccur has always ‘manifested some uneasiness with this Heideggerian extension of phe- ‘nomenology that could just slits end. Riczur claims ro be able to lead phenomenology into the field of hermeneutics, while preserving the Cartesian faith ofthe former, 2. Narrative as articulation ofthe phenomenon, ‘The configuring task ofthe naratve, discourse, or language, that Riccur has forcefully manifested, seems to represent one of those ‘are points of encounter berween diferent “tends of thought” of our ol Vandevele, "Paul Rica Narrative and Phenomenon” a finishing century: Heidegger, Gadamer, deconstructionism, jpostmodermism, French and Amerian literary criticism, and abeand ‘of analytic philosophy (Searle 1995, Maclaryre 1988) came co grant zateaivesan ontological impact. Things as they are cannor be grasped as such other chan through 2 symbolic mediation, be ie linguistic, discursive, of naratve. Ricaur is no stranger to this philosophical ‘encountering berween several trends, even if for now, itisa minimal ‘encounter. He has indeed relentlesly pioneered such a dialogue ‘Although Ricaxur did nor specifically address the ewo problems of ‘passive synthesis and fllment as we presented them, and did not tren directly relate co Husserl when laying out his position, ie seems tha itis not unfair to view bis conception of narrative asa solution to these rwo problems. Regarding the frst one, Riceur decisively accepts that any intentional act is interpretive in character, so that ‘heres not even che option to discount history within the phenom «nological enterprise. The possibly ofa tanscendental philosophy becomes, cherefore, a subsidiary concer. Regarding the second prob- Jem, Ricerur has devoted more and mote of his time and energy to the question of action: ony inaction, it seems, can one's intentional acts find ther fulfilment. Fulfilment, in other words, does not cake plice in one’s own mind, when there is an encounter berween an ‘empey intention and the givenness of something: in order 0 be ful- filled, an intention has tobe, first, articulated in signs and, second made understandable, i., concrete and relevant, By how one is to act upon it Inentional acts ate, thus, no longer to be understood as purely mental ats representing the absolute starting point. They are already called for by the way they can be fullled in a pragmatic framework. However, Riceur does not merely tura to pragmatics, His genius isto introduce a pragmaric slant into phenomenology. Action isl s not merely submitted to pragmatic rules or pervaded by pragmatic motives. To ace means to at upon intentions, so that action i the embodiment of intentional ats. There is thus solidar ity beeween action as embodiment of intentions and intentional act as anticipating its pragmacc fulfilment. In such an interplay becween intention and action, action is pervaded and articulated by anarra- tive and is, chus, a quasi-text, just asa text—as a conglomerate of intentional acts is alteady pervaded by the potentialities for ation. Lec us ist cura tothe question of passivity,2 aol Rice Rey to Hier des 2.1, Passivty as a narrative achievement In order ro establish the link berween Ricaeu’s notion of narrative and Husserl’s questions of passivity and fulilment, le us sare with Riccar’ incerpretation ofthe diffcule Husserlian concepe of "Life- world,” considering forthe sake ofthe argument that the life-world is another Huseianslanc ofthe problem of passivity: In his article “Loriginaire ct a question-en-retour dans a Kriss de Huse” (Ricoeur 19861), Ricceur attempts to solve Huss’ paradoxical presentation ofthe life-world, The life-world is both originary asthe bass for all activities and originary in the sense of an operation that can be re- covered through a questioning-back (Réolfage), once the scientific level has been reached. In the first case, originary means a the origin ofall sciemtific activity and, inthe second case, whae only scientific activity can discover and recover. Riceeur notes that the lifeworld cannot be separated feom the method that posts or discovers it, a ‘method which itself has ies poine of departure in idealzations and objectfcatons that have been produced by culeural and scientific activity: In this sense the lfe-world is out of reach. Icis a presuppos ‘ion thar cannot be ractualizd in its presence. On the other hand, the perceptive world (Sinnemet), which seems to be the lfe-world, isitselfaleady interpretive in character so that weare always beyond the mere given, and can never go back to it, "because we left it for- ‘ever, not only to the benefic of mathematics and physics, bur also under the pressure ofa question which turns against its the question ‘ofan ultimate foundation. For this question does not itself belong co the lfe-world” (Riceeur 1986b, 292) In order to understand the paradox, Ricecur draws a distinction beeween two types of “originarys ontological and epixtemological ‘Thelife-world has a epistemological function in the sense thar, tart- ing from objective science, one can show its lack of foundation and refer it back to what precedes i absolutely, che lifeworld. In this re- spect, the lifeworld is not a world from which one wishes to with> raw, but rather 2 methodological step, a detour, 2 questioning in lorder to correct che concept of sciences we have and recover a a- ‘hentic science, an authentic rationality. However, the idea of sience 2 the source of al legitimation, does not derive from the lif- world, The life world, epistemologicaly, enters ino play only as a conerast On the ontological side, however, the lif- world isthe ulimaterefer- ol Vindevelde, “Pal Ricceu: Naat nd Phenomenon 23 ence of objective science. The real world has, thus, an ontological pririy, whereas the idea of science hasan epistemological priority as the ultimate source of validity: Idalivies might well be derived From the life-world, since iis the ultimate reference of all scientific enterprises; the validity of these idesities, however, depends on the scientific achievement. “We live in a world that precedes all ques tions of validity. Bur the question of validity precedes all our effores for giving sense to the stuaions in which we find ourselves” (Ricceur 1986b, 295). When we star to think, we are faced with a dimension of ‘always already” ~a world that was always already chere ~ and we recognize that we are ina world of symbols and rules chrough which the world in which we live has already been interpreted when we stare to think. Buc when we chink, we have the capacity to question ‘our scientific constructions by reference to this originary lifeworld, ‘Contrary to some of Husserls formulations, the lifeworld — we might say “passivity” ~ inthe ontological sense is dependent on the way it has been posited and, therefore, cannot escape che narative device of phenomenological investigation. Such a dependence docs ‘nor amount to relinguishing the life-world ro the realm of fiction, It ‘only means that a new dimension has been integrated in pheno- ‘nology: the mediation of narrative. The distinction Ricoeur draws bberween che wo senses of originary helps us understand that Husserl, by desperately clinging tothe “orignal presence” asthe ultimate site ‘of constitution, and thus by posting it almose dogmatically, cuened away from the demands of phenomenology: to provide an account of what appeats without filing into intellectual constructions. "The mediating role of narratives presents a response to the two alternatives that Gadamer proposes in Trush and Method (Gadamer 1986): che alienating distanciation, on the one hand, which permits the objectivity of human sciences, and belonging, on the othe, which isthe properly Gadamerian thesis aiming ar preserving the Funda- mental relationship between us and our historical concreteness. The firs alternative is an emphasis on the method which permits objec- tivgy through disanciaion. The second is euch, which is our tly belonging to our life-world, ac the expense of objectivity. ‘Ricceur has argued at length in his long debate with Gadamer against such an alternative. “My own method, Ricoeur writs, comes fom 2 refusal of these two alternatives and ftom an attempt to overcome them” (Ricceur 19862, 101). The problematic ofthe text offers Ricasur4 Prul Ricur Ky so Huse dea the posibilty of esaping from these wo alternatives of even recon ciling them, and thus offering an encompassing view which does ju tice tothe ontological concreteness of our belonging toa life-woe ‘on the one hand, and to the objective method ofa science, on the other. Despite the distanciation i requires theough the use of signs, a ‘text permits one co think of human experience as a communication berween humans, i. a ahistorical belonging through and within this distanciation. Ricceur mentions five criteria of what he calls ‘textualiy: 1) the realization of language as discourse; 2) the realza- tion of discourse as seuctured work; 3) the relationship between speech and writing in discourse and in discursive works; 4) the discursive work as projection of a world; 5) discourse and discursive work as mediation ofthe selF-understanding (Riceeur 1986a, 102) ‘These five criteria represent the levels of the genesis of intercom prehension, that is to say, of the historical human experience. We ‘might say, in Husserlian terms, tha chese are the five stages of the passive synthesis, Language isan anonymous system of combinations of signs. Only Jina discourse, when signs are brought together i a sentence utered by someone, can something happen. Language, then, becomes di course. As such, this linguistic event takes place in vime and di course becomes a work tinder someones responsibility: The work right well bea projection by a Cogito. However, unlike Athena, it has not arisen fly shaped ftom the head ofthe uteret. Ii rather through its discursive works thac a Cogito can come back co itself in what Ricoeur calls a narrative identity. For that ro happen, speech rnceds to be sedimented into writing and a projection of a world needs to be made from discourse toward 3 work, The Cogito lose itself in 4 production and deciphering of signs, loses itself and dies, dssemi- nated in the word, in order to construc itself and understand iseat the term ofa journey of life of reading, writing, and interpeeting. “There is no se-understanding which is not mediated through signs, symbols, and texts” (Riceur 1986a, 29). Only through this semiotic ‘mediation can the Cogito, construing isl, come back to itself and sediscover itself such 28 twas “always already.” "The question of elf understanding which, in comantic hermeneutics, occupied the fore- stage, is now postponed until che end, a5 final factor, and not as incroductory factor, and even lessas center of geavity"(Riceur 1986a, 103), Po Vandevelde, “Pal Rieu: Narativeand Phenomenon 2B “The Cogito belongs to the same category asthe author ofa work asa craftman ~the anctor~iis responsible forthe work. The author, however, sa category originating from the inceprecation of the work: itis what the interpretation discover as its source. Only from the interpretation ofthe work can a meaning arse and only in interpre- tation can this meaning be refered and ateibuted tots author. There is thus correlation as wel as precedence berween author and work or berween Cogito and though: like che author, and as an author, the Cogito is “a human being individualized by producing individual works” (Ricoeur 1986a, 110). Such a view radically calls into question the strong distinction be- tween explanation and understanding, in the sense chat understand ing could be direct ink co the authors intention: an empathy which ‘could recover the moment of production ofthe work, Distanciation, Ricaeur claims, is this detour which alone permits a coming back ro oneself and an understanding of oneself. Works allow authors to understand themulves, because, before the arising of works, there ras no author. To deal with the author's intention, is, on the one hand, o confuse che wo distinct moments of the genesis of a work and of ts interpretation. Iralso amounts, on the other hand, co claim that this work can be reduced tothe processes of ts production. In both cases, the proper selF-understanding of the authors has been ‘overlooked: for they had ro construe thei own se-understanding ‘through and in their works, and only there. In this respect, a work ‘can only become what isin conextualizingitslf—in being written in a neework of texts constituting a culture ~ and the work, con- versely, can be decontextualized aswell s re-contextualized, The a- thor authority does nor perain to their intention, bu is itself con- textual, Once writen works have fred themselves from the con- straints of a living dialogue, authors can survive their own present and become writers. Aginst romantic hermeneutics, and against, Dilthey, Ricoeur firmly sates that dstanciation *is not only what understanding can overcome, but also what conditions understand ing” (Ricaeur 19862, 112), 2.2 Narrative a the articulation of intention and action [As we have seen, Huser! introduces the notion of noema to re- solve the dificult of flflment, bu his attempt was nor really suc-26 Paul Ricaur Key t Hse es 1 ‘cesfl In the introduction to his translation of Ideas, Ricoeur recog- nizes the imporance of fulilment and its central role for phenom ‘nology: “Transcendental phenomenology aims to integrate into the ‘noema its relation co its object, chat is the fullness which completes the consticution ofthe fll noems (.] To consticute reality isto refuse Coleave the presence’ of realty ouside ofthe ‘meaning ofthe world” (Ricceur 1996, p. 46) However, Ricceu has to conclude, thisis some thing Zdeas 1 promises more chan it demonsteaes’(Riccear 1996, p, 46). Ultimately “realty always seems to escape transcendental con~ stitution (Rieceur, 1996, K:324:15). ‘The notion of narrative Ricaur relies on can be understood not ‘only asa reformulation ofthe passive genesis, but als as reform lation of the noema. Ricceur speaks ofthe “noematic structure of action’ (Riceeur 19862, 192) and understands icin analogy with speech acts“ the noema noc only has a propositional content, but also displays ilocutionary feacues fly similar to those ofthe com plete speech act” (Ricecur 1986, 192). A narrative has a function that exceeds the waditional orate, which isjuse supposed to convey a preexisting ratio. Narratives give shape and form to what, without them, would be unformed, handicapped, impoverished. “What would we know of love and hatred, of echical feelings and, in general, ofall thar we ell che Self fall this had nor been brought to language and articulated by lteracure?” (Ricceur 1986a, 116). Natetives config- ‘ure and mediate in a threefold schema that Ricerr calls mimesis, ‘The frst level of this schema, called Mime, isthe level ofa pre narrative world, requiring within is own articulation, to be told, “Life is more than experience. There is somthing inexperience that ddemands the assistance of narrative and expreses the need for it? (Ricceur 1991, 28). Ac this is level, Riceur mentions three points ‘of anchorage of narrative in lf. 1) The first point of anchorage is manifested by the very structure of action itself, Human accion is indeed structured around projects plans, goals, means, and cicum- stances which we implicily understand and which constitute acon- ceptual network with which we are natively fir, The experience is already structured semioccally, so that the amework of action is already predelineated within experience, Ta this extent there is in practical lfea semiotic dimension that peevades i, what Riccur calls 4 “semiotic of action.” 2) Human action itself, nserbed in astruc- tured experience, in eu finds its arculaion in signs, rules, norms ol Vindevelde, "Paul Rigeure Nara and Phenomen 2 shih determine or qualify capacies, modes, and means fo action, ‘This symbolic mediation “males ation a qusi-text fr which sym bos provide che ules of signification i tems of which a given con duct canbe interpreted” Riceur 1991, 29). 3) The third poin of anchorage of naraive in life is lle “the pre-nareatve quality of ihuman experience" (Riceur 1991, 29). Action takes place in an ex- pevence which i already stuctued and involves plans and goals that ca be achieved (ist poin of anchorage) action ive as to Follow some parers, obey some rues, and submit co some norms, so tha peforming an action is analogous to writing a tex (Second point of anchorage). Asa chain of ations life is thus a story in its ascent state, an activity and a passion in search oF narrative. Such is chefs evel of mimes “The second level, Mime 2, ithe propery marae level where the symbolic mediation of language and dscouse permits story 0 be tld. Since the story brings tothe fore symbolic seructates chat were already embodied in he practical life of action, the story does not merely ender ation of leas an imitation through a miroring ffece. The explicily semiotic aspect of the sory shows i a particu lar fashion the implice semiotic potentialities of action and of the lifeworld. Scores thus make us aware ofthe narrative articulation of cur world and by 3 doing, represen a reserve of narratives that can be, in recur, applied to the lifeworld and can be used vo coniigure sew types of actions Thee lies, according to Rica the possibility ofan iconic increase ofthe world, a posibility forthe word robe cntiched by sme new alternatives opened by naraives. Mimess3 is precisely this end results che impact of naeaves on the practical fe ‘The reader ean be affected by narratives and act accordingly. As a symbolic discutsive mediation, a txt opens to ation and confgutes Fictitious marae, ike iterate, may presenta dificult otis view, since they do not efer to anyehing real. Here again Ricorur ‘manifests his acumen. What allows che passage fom Miness 2 0 Miers 3, i the case of works of fiction, is, Riceur a ond degree refeenc.” In orl dscous, the reference i guaranteed bythe ostensive Function. Uimatey a discourse can be made un dertandabl by etoceding toa reality, a thing, ora sae of af that i common tothe speakers and, thus, canbe shown. When it cannot be shown test tan be situated within a necwork of el2s Paul Rica: Ket» Huse es sionships understandable by the interlocutors: what they can remem- ber, what they can check in official documents, ete. Ukimately, che parameters of reference ofall discourses ate the “here” and “now” of the speakers. In che cae of iction, this posibilry of retrocession toa here” and “now” that could be used for stuaing che objec of refer ‘ence, by definition, i foreclosed, Ie isa tion, a poem, a play, ora novel. However, Ricreur claims, what is abolished is the Fist degree reference; this abolition itself opens a new reference, ata second de ‘ge: if we read and enjoy fictions, it must be that we are somehow able to relate what is invented to what we live. What is eferced to in 2 fiction is “the being-i-the-world which is expounded before the text” (Riccrur 19862, 114), what Ricoeur also clls “propos fora world [..] which I could inhabie” (Ricerar 1986a, 115). The expres- sion “being-in-the-world” chat Ricocur uses directly alludes to “Heidegger. What fictitious nacratives ike literature, offer, i indeed a reariculation ofthe world: chey impinge on the world no longer at the level of manipulable objects alone, but ata level that Hussert designated as" Zebenswelrand Heidegger Beng-in-the-world (Ricaur 1986a, 114), ‘These three levels in their intertlationshipe show that “fiction is ‘nly compleced in life and that life can be understood only through the stories chat we tll about i,” so that “an examined life, in the sense of the word as we have borrowed it from Socrates, isa life recounted” (Ricoeur 1991, 30-31). This lst quote opens anew eti cal dimension: a narrative “turns out to be the first laboratory of ‘moral judgment” (Ricoeur 1990, 167) ‘Alchough this emphasis on natratives opens a new range of qucs- tions and eases a hos of difficulties, che mediation of narratives re- formulates the problem of intentional at and fulfilment. Since, now, inceaton itself is narrative in character, to che extent tha i must be articulated and therefore semiotically mediated, an intention cannot be separated from its potential fulfilment. The narrative, as the semiotie mediation, i precisely what articulates both intention and fulfilmene, and offers che guarantee that if there is intention, its pos- sible fulfilment was ateady anticipated for this intention to be ar- ‘culated, Similarly, Reseur has decisively moved the phenomenological de- bate away from Huser’ inticacis: the pasivity ofthe ego as well as of the world cannot be recovered in asatic phenomenology. Pasi ol Vandel, "Pol Rieu Narasive and Phenomenon” 2 reticle which andere reporsy ofan cer Note have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Kimberly (CASS, Kevin HERMBERG, Mark MUNNS, and Erik RICHARDSON, Tam particularly indebted to Andrew TALON for his constant sup- port and good advice.30 Pol Ricaue ey 19 Huser eas) References adolf Beene. "Husseels Begriff des Nocma.” In Samuel Isling (Ed), ‘Huser Ausgabe und Huser Forchang. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990 Hubere Devs. “Huse Perceptual Nocma.” In Hubert Dreyfus (Fa), Huse. Iemionaiy and Copetsve Scene, Cambridge: MIT Paes, 1982 Dagfinn Folesdal."Husseas Noion of Noema.” In Dreyfus 1982 Hans-Georg Gadames, Truth and Metbod. New Vor: The Crssrosd Pub- lishing Compaay, 1986. Jean Grondin. “Cherméseutque pose de Pal Ricaun du temps aussi,” In “Tempses rc" de Paul Rieuron debt. ats: Les Ed dis Ce, 199. ‘Aaron Gurwisch. "Muses Theory of Intentionality of Consciousness.” In Deeyfus 1982 Klaus Held. Lebondige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Stine der ‘ransendenslen Ich bei Edmund Heer, entwichle am Leiden der Zeiproblemaik. The Hague Niho, 1966. Intentionalité et emplistment de Vexstence.” te Dominique Janicaux (Ed), Linentonait ex question. Enve phnomdnelogie et recherches ogisver Pais: Vin, 1995, Elmar Holensein. Phinomenolope der Asazaton. Zu Satur und Funtion ‘ines Grundprinsp der pasven Gees bi Edmund Fused. The Hague Nijhoff, 1972, Edmund Hussel dear General Introduction to Pare Phenomenology. Te ‘Boyce Gibso. New York Caller MacMillan Publier, 1962, Anabsen zur pasion Syubeis (1918-1926), Musseliana 11. The iague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, Logical Investigation Te Joho Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970, Casesan Medication An Itredacin to Phenomenology. i Dati aims, The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 19 Alasdair Mactnyre. Whose Juice? Which Rationality? Notre-Dame, Ind ana: University of Notre-Dame Pres, 1988 Ronald Melngyre and David Wood Smih, “Huser densification of ‘Meaning and Noera.” In Dreyfus 1982, Maurice Medeau-Ponty. Phnoménolge del perception. Pts Galliman 1945. Ti, Phenomenolgy of Povepin by C- Smith, London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1982 Paul Ricoeur. Philoophi del volo Le vlonain et Vinvolonie, Pais ‘Adie, 1950,Te Fredom and Nate. The Valsad he Ivory by E, Kohak. Evanston: Northwestern Univerity Pres, 1966, ol Vandevelde, "Pal Riser Narative anid Phenomenon” 31 De Finerpriation, Esai sur Pred. Date Ed. da Seu, 1965. Te “Freud and Phileophy. say on Interpretation by D, Savage. New Haven Yale University Pes, 1970, Le confide nerpréations, asic Derméneutigu, vol. 1. Pais: EA du Seu, 1969. Te. The Conflier of Ieeprettions Engen Herme- seat. (Ed) Doa thde Evanston: Northwestern University Pres, 1974 Tempe et st. Nol. 1, Pari Ed. du Sea, 1983 Tempe e sit Nol. 2: La configuration dans eit de fision, 1984. ape rci Vl. 3: Le temps rconé 1985. Te Time and Narrative ‘by K McLaughlin and D. Pella. Chicago: Univerty Pes of Chi cage, 1984 a teste Faron Esai dherméncuiqu Il, Paris: Du Seuil 1586, Ti, From Tee Aci by K. Bamey and J. Thompson. Evanston NNorehwestemn Univesity Press 1991 “Lovignaire els quetionen-recou dans la Kriss de Hasse.” In Paul Ricci A Peale del phdnaménoope Pais Ven, 19866. __ Sot-mine comme an autre, Pats Ed da Seu, 1990. Te Oneself as “Another by K Blame, Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1992. “Life in Quest of Narative” In David Wood (El), On Pl Rice ‘Narrative and Ierpreaion. London!New York: Route, 1991. John Searle, The Contraction of Soil Reali. New Yok: Fre ress, 199. Robert Sokalowsk, “Intentional Analysis and ehe Noera.” Dialer, 38 (2984) Berman Sevens. Lgprontnag designe Lecture de aad Rice The Hague ‘wer Academic Publishers, 1991 Franco Volpi “Aux racines de malaise contemporain: Huser! et ‘esponsbéuphilosophe.” ln Eliane Escoubae and Mare Richie (Ed), Huser Grenoble: Millon, 1989,‘Translators’ Preface In 1950 Paul Ricoeur translated into French Husserls major work deen 2u ciner reinen Phinomenologie und phinomenologicehen Philosophie. Erster Buch: Allgemeine Einfubrung in die reine Phinomenolgi. The orginal German txt was fst published in 1913, a8 special issue of Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phanomenologische ‘Forschung, vo. 1. In this French translation Ricoeur provided both a Tengthy introductory chapter and a large running commentary in the orm of nots. These notes were keyed co the beginning of many ‘of Hussel’s sections and co important places within the body ofthe text The esule of Ricezu’s effort gives a chance to see a philosopher ‘of the first rank grapple with the obscurties ofthe German tex The present eransation brings at last this fimous commentary into En lish. In undertaking this work the tanslators have benefited from the encouragement of Professor Riceur himsel. Temust be emphasized tha the style of his commentary on Huss, though very authoritative, daes not have the smoothness found in Ricarurs essays, One should bear in mind that his comments were originally just notes to Riceeu's French tanslation of Hussedl. As such, they bear the blunt, chopped seyle of footnotes. While their value lies in thei content and not in thei tle, we have taken great pains to improve the later while preserving the former. ‘A word needs to be said about the prefaory references co each note. Four references ae given, The firs iso the English translation (of the Ideas by F. Kersten, So, K:I2:8 refers to line cight of page ‘twelve ofthe Kersten text ‘The second refers to the page inthe German text and to Riceeurs note on hac page So, 13:2 refers othe second note of Riceeur on page thirtcen of the German rext. In the body of his text Ricat himself rofers to che German text so that "CE p. 9, n, 5° means Ricoeur's fooxnote five of page nine inthe German ext. In our 50- mmenclarure it eads: “CE G95, ‘The third reference refers to the clothbound edition of che W. R, Boyce Gibson English translation. Ie is abbreviated, for example, 25. (G:5846, thar is line sx of page fifty-oehologche deli. 11 42! Levinas, La Théorie de Haron dane la Pivominooge de Huser, ‘ean 1930, p. 101-174. J Hésinghas suongly shown in his discussion ‘with L,Chestov that in Huser shee noe any aurcracy of resson and logicburthe rule intuition nll forms. Hering Su specie ate.” (Revue d isin de Philp Religie, 1927), i response Me mento mos (Rene Philsepigue del Prnce et del Eager, Jan. 1926). 49. Commensary, G5. 44, Fink, Op. cit, p. 321-6, 334-36 45. In another atl, E. Fink speak of “is of inerpretaton: “Das Problem der PhacnomenologieF. Hurterls” Rue Internationale de Philophi Jas. 13.1939, p.227. 46. Op. ct, particular case, p.336 97th 9.338. On Huser and Kant, cf G. Berger Le Cogito dane lt PBilaophie de Huser), Aubier, 1941, p. 12133.o Paul Ric: Kay used es psa. 49, Ii. p. 359s in favo ofthis interpretation: Médiarons Catennes 70.4 (Eng. p. 83-88. Editor. G. Berger op cits p. 43-6, gives are tmarkable exposé of phenomenological reduction with lit difficulties. 50. Additions Ceréiennes proposes this developed formula ofthe Cogite Ego-cogito-ogitacum,”p. 43 Eng, p. 50. Faltor St. Emchrintang, Enachintung, Op. it, . 389. 52, Ibid, p. 373. Bue asic hasbeen said shove, eis “retin” is not 9 ‘mich “making” in the mundane sense, bus ater a seeing.” here agree with G, Berger 9p cits p. 97-100: "One has oleae to unite two concepts that we usally contrast phenomenology is a philosophy of ‘retive intuition... The evidence, his completed form of intentional, is thac which is constituting” (p. 10). Ths creation, “beyond ztion tnd pasion” (P 103) i "ration by inion.” (p. 107). 53. Op cits p. 386,367. 54, Marvin Faber, who stdies so carefully and ffl he Legica nes tigations The Foundation of Phenomenology, cricies Huselian esl {sm too summarily, p. 543-59. 55. However, Meenas. 14649. 56: Cla good esumé of Experinceand Judgment, by Marvin Faber i the “Jeurnal of Philotophy, v0.36, 1.9, Ap 27, 1939, p. 247-49. 7. F, Levinas, La Thre de Tintin dam le phonomcnaloge de Hane, p. 143-174. Commentary on the lies, G95, 58. Die walle Iee der Formaien Legit . 42 59. Bycologiomus and transzendonzle Gramalegung de Lisp. 133-56 60. Unpublished text of Sep. 1907. under signature B I 1 ofthe Fase “Archives a Loran. (61. Texs and information taken From te intoduction by De. Biemel to the sill unpublished ranscription of Te de of Phenomenology (Now avail thle in Hixerdina: Die Ide der Phanomenclegie, Fn Verkengen. El 'W. Bice, 1950. Te Te Idea of Phenomenology by WP Alston and G. Nakhnikian. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, Edo. 62. The fis allusion ro reduction is aucam, 1905: SefelderBlietern A Vu. 63, Summer semester, 1907, F143, 64. M.UIL9 Il, Dar Problem der Erkennenisthore, die Anforang des “Empirichen “Sens” it Zasammenhinge der Abelaten Beanasscins (The lssoluton of empirical being in the inerconnectons of absolute con- “ciousnes). “All objectives te 'sppearance® in aspecifc sense, names nities of thought, unis of varies, which (as consciousness) form ‘he absoce in which al objectvces are constituted.” M, ILI speaks of the “enigma (Rite) of knowledge: “In thought elf everything Invroduction wo dew of E Huse a ‘ought co be “Teiimized (a Lote aleady remaed, but in an inad “equate way) DoT nr see that [cannot posca being ove agains thought, bur only ground tin thought and onthe foundation as most In the same sense M.IIL9 IV. Tamszendensprableme, of the Summer se- reser, 1909. 65, Text prepared by Landgrehe: some pages ae fom the beginning of (October, 1910; the esensial prt comes rm the fs pat of che Winter semester 1910-11. M.IUL9IVaand FL 666. On the translation of Eifuhlng by imropatie. cf. Vocabulaire Philsphique et Crtigue of Lalande on the word invparhi. 67. On Gagenssrigang and Vrgegentsignng, cf. Commentary Gt: an Ideas, pt. 9. (68. M, Merleau-Poney, on the contrary, has put himself atthe other ex- ‘remeo which phenomenology seems ro extend in is ast phase: iconly “reflects” inorder wo let arise, beyond complete aivery, the assurance thar he world i aways “already there's phenomenology ony “reduces” ‘ur participation in the pretence of the world to break momentarily out famlarty with the world and estore *wonde tous befor the sang res and the paradox of a word in which we live Ie sees ewences Only to ll back and reacquire the "fatty" of our eingin-the-woeld. a- troduction of he Phinoménelgie del perception Pats: Calimatd, 194. ‘One should als consult the lctre of A. de Waelhens in the Colle Pliloxophigue, Dela Phénoménolgie [Psisentiliome. This wtimate inflecon inthe direction of Heidegger's philosophy cannot be perceived yeti the Ido, where the negative aspect of teduction is noe yet ab Sorbed ino the postive aspect of constitution. But tis incontesably 3 sign that Huse going i this direction when contig and eng tue conflated in the theme ofan original ing conciousnes (69. No one more than Huse! ha the eling of being on the way and eve ting atthe beginning. He re-cuime for himsel “the seriousness of 2 beginning.” He aspires co deserve the name of a“eal beginner," onthe pth ofthis phenomenology which is itself a the “begining of the be inning” “Nachwoet au meiner Iden "p21HUSSERLS INTRODUCTION KAT; G:3:1; GC44:3; GP.39:39. On che translation of Reali, real, untea, cf G: 7:4 SECTION ONE: ESSENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF ESSENCES CHAPTER ONE: FACT AND ESSENCE, K:32; G71; GC49; GP43. Bsence and Knowledge of Esences, « ‘Thisfirst section ofthe dca constitutes sort of general prefce tothe work: the question of phenomenology isnot yet deals with, but, like the whole group oF sciences to which it pertains, phenom cenology presppous that extences and a science of essences exist (cf par 8 first lines) This science gathers not only formal truths ‘which can be ascribed roall essences but also material tuths which govern their a prov distribution into specific “regions.” In phe- rnomenology the intuition of esences is also involved, and phe- ‘nomenology bears~at least in its elementary way—on a “egion’ of being. The frst chapter exablishes in a direct and systematic way thee pr- _suppostins. The recond chapter covobonte them, indirectly hrough 4 polemic, with empircim, idealion, platonic reali, ee K5:2; G:7.2; GC51:2; GP45:2. Chapter One. Thi chapter which 4s very dogmatic in syle and very dense in its movement, works t0- ward two goals: A) It etablches the movions of exence and intuition ofesencs, Pat. 1-8. B) It examines thea priori conditions ofregional properties of exences, pat. 9-17 K:5:3; G73; GC51:3: GP:45:3 A) The fist group of analyses is subdivided as follows: 1) The mosion of exence, pats. 1-2; 2) The intuition ofesences, pas, 3-8. 1) The notion of essence, a) s introduced starcng with its contrary and correlate: fats or brute existence ofa particular hie er mune, par. 1. A whole sequence of ideas, gravitating around the notion of a act, is quickly established: experience, natural acitude, the world (ce. ro be true = to be teal = 10 be in the world), percep tion, The author outlines the general theory of intuition at thiso Paul Riccar Key to Masel des time, since perception is only one kind of inition, along with ination ofthat whichis experienced, incuition of the oer (em pathy) and ination of sence. 1) Pu. 2 shows the pase from fact esenee K:512; G74; GCI5T12: GPA5:4, “Reale” which we eansateas natural or worldly reality always refers, in the Zea, 0 what i posted ar real in the natural tind and which 1 longer has a place afte phenomenological reduction, pars. 334. In conest Wirkihkee eli) sil has meaning within reduction, on the cone hand, as modal of belie ceri par 103), and, on the ‘other hand, and more fundamentally, as elation ofthe nema to the object, pars. 89-90 and especially pas 128.33. (Huser more ‘over ineraduces the word “ell which we wil comment on in pars. 41,85, 88), Unfortunatly, French does not have there sources to translate these words, of both German and Latin coos, nor an unlimited capaciy for verbal invention 20; G75; GC'51:20; GPS:12. “Original geen or “given in srignal” is opposed to “simply thought.” oF “empty intention (pars. 136-138) his notion eas its meaning inthe context of a theory of evidence and is understood by the distinction berween acts of empry intention and acts of fulilmene through the full presence ‘in person (ist /nvesigaton and sith vesigatin, 2nd edion). Ase shal ee (G5), theres alo an orginal givenness of forms, reltions,“ategories ete. (The theoty af evidence and “fullling” will be taken over in the Ideas, 4th pat). The expres sion “orga” isintrodced inthe 2nd edition ofthe Pologemen to Pure Logic(1913)p. 190 and 229. K:5:20; G76; GCSI21; GP:AS3. Giving sneiton: Tis active form of the verb “o give” applied ro intuition wll be corzobo rated by the transition ro ranacendental constitution which isa giving of meaning pu 5 (Se G:106:1). We wll cure later to thesdealis sense ofthis expresion, though thisstil does nor li tate the inciive character of petcepion and evidence in general CEG: 44: KG; G81; GC51:20: GP:A6:2, Empathy isthe subject of some remaths in Hea es I devotes a lengthy intentional analysis to ie CE. below G:316:1. On ehe translation of this word Einfahlung) as “empathy.” ef, the Glossary. (Ricaue warslates Section One, Chapter One 6 by “intropathie” and refers to Vocabulaire Technique ¢ Critique de a Philosophie, by Lalande Translators.) ‘The fifth Cartesian Meditation eases this notion of phenomeno- logical psychology tothe level of phenomenological constitution. K:7:23; G:9:1: GC33:10s GP.AT1 Idea does not clarify the die- tinction berween essence and empirical hw any Further (except in pat. 6,p. 16), nor the manner of transition to essence. Only the role of imagination is made clear ~ it tests the resistance of the eidetic constant 10 real and invented variations ofits realizations, pat. 4. The author goes ditecly to the esential ching: any fact includes an essence which i self subordinated to a hierarchy of essences (par. 12), and any essence includes 2 range of contingent individuals (this hie e¢ mone. This contingency alone instieutes the distinction between essence and fact, which the duality of in- tuitions will confiem (par. 3)- Neat the end of pat. 2, 2 second consequence is indicated which will be taken up again in pat. 9 namely, that che hierarchy of essences projects onto the field of the individuasa dseibution in regions and categories, Phenomenol- ‘ogy for example, is concerned bythe “region” of consciousness. K.7-26; G:9:2: GC53:13: GP-47-15. On the tansation of Betand, ‘see the Glsary. (The Glossary cites two meanings for this wor: 1) component (especially in the plural), 2) (eideric) standing re- serve (fonds (eidécque)) Translators K:7.28; G:9:3; GC53:15; GP:47E18. Necesity and generalicy ae dlistingushed in pa. 6 K.7:35; G:9e4; GC53:23; GP-47:26. Dies da tode tof. pat. 14 Ke8:1; 69:5; GC:53:26; GP47:29. This snwence offers a very ac: curate definition of essence, free of any Platonism. In the Prolegomena to Pare Legi, chap. XI, par. 65, the notion of esence isintroduced through the notion of «prior: itis asked what "the ideal conditions fr the possibilty of Science, or of theory in gen- cel,” ate (ue, a closed deductive system). “I is evident.” tis answered, "that truths themselves and especially laws, grounds, And principles, are what they are, whether or nat we have of chem an intellectual view or any evidence.” (bi, p. 238). These truths are in themselves the ideal condition forthe possibility oF thie knowledge. Ie isin this way that one speaks about “the esence of these ideal unites” as an prior law belonging to truth as such, ro deduction, oF 10 cheory 35 such. The ultimate question of the6 Paul Ries: Ky herd Ideas Prolegomena is, thus, the following: “In what does the essence of theory as such, consis2” (Jbid p.241), Pare logics the theory of theories, thats, “systematic theory based on cheessence of theory, forthe nomological theoretical « prior science which deals with the ideal essence of science proper.” (Ibid, p. 242), All primitive concepts, such as object, unity, plurality, et. ae justified by an “Eins im das Weie,” ise an “inuitive Vergegemesrrigung des Wess in adiquaterIdeation” (bid. p- 244-45). The sixth Inve _gation 2nd section) gives more amplification co this analysis of| ‘essence and introduces it from another angle, namely, that inta- inion isstrictly defined by the fulfilling” of certain act of thought which, in an empry intend {er bucrather toward the “form” ofthe proposition (copula, func: ‘ion, connection, subordination, exc) and which can be called categorial form,” These meanings cannot be flfiled by a per ception or a “sensory” intuition but only by a “categorial incu ition.” In a broad sense of the word “to see” (or evidence), (p 38-39), cere isa “seeing” which has che same function in rela- tion to non-sensory moments of meaning as does perception in relation to sensory moments (p. 142 ff). Thete is a “categotal perception” in which formal elements ae orginally given in pet son, The idea of essence requires nothing ese. (Ubi, p. 128.55) In the introduction to the 2nd edition of Logical Investigations, Hiusserl declares that if one had read and understood this sich Investigation, 30 many misinterpretations ofthe Ideas would have been avoided. One cannot insist too much on the non-metaphysical character of the notion of estence; i is introduced here dialecti- tally a6 correlate of fact, a thar which provides a fact with the recessary determination so chacit has his parcculr meaning rather shan another K:8:13; G:10e1; GC54:3; GP-48E1. 2) The Intition of Exences, pat 3-8, This is the prineipal notion ofthe chapzer and one of the foundations ofthe entire Husserian edifice, although the key €0 Phenomenology is ranscendental reduction (on the relations be tween intuition and reduction, ef troduction). The rita chap ter will male explicit the theory of eidetic intuition, particularly in relation tothe reproach of being a form of Plaronism, par 40. (Husses even speaks of existence pertaining ro essences, ina P 280: this existences a character atached toa mere fulfilled mea Section One, Chapter One o ingand does not imply any duplication ofthe world o cosmos of| essences. a) Par 3 begins with the distinction between the two sen- soryand eidetic intuitions and concludes with her interdependence. TThe intuition ofthe individual involves the possibilty of turning the perspective on a face into an essence. The Fact remains as an illustration (this function willbe elaborated further on), but when [grasp the essence, I no longer posi the individual a existing in the world. Ashe goes along, Huse complicates this ental analy- sis with some side remarks. He anticipates the analysis of essences of things which are never known instantaneously, but in “adum- bration,” in sketches. AS a result, knowledge of them is inad: ‘equate: pa. 41 ff. This foreshadows a posible confusion berween ‘adequate 2nd orginal: what matters to ineition isnot completion ‘or exhausting its object (adequacy), ut giving ein person (originl- ity). The orignal character ofthe ewoincuicons is their only analogy No analogy inthe existence oftheir object can be concluded from it Ke8:31; G:1022: GC-54:22; GP:48:21. Representation in the very broad sense includes all the “simple” ats (perception, imagina- sion, remembrance, et), as opposed to “grounded!” ets (ynthe- sis of predicative judgmene and of relations, et.) inf p. 213 ad finem and 214, This notion has an unaberusve role inthe Ide, By contrast a great part of the fifth Investigation (p. 345, 426-75) is devoted tothe meaning of chs notion and seeks eo give an ac- ceptable meaning ro Brentano's formula: Every act isa epresenta- tion or depends on representations. This formula amourits to, a8 here, distinguishing berween acts “ofa single ray” and acts “of several 298 or intentions.” Judgment is an example of che later. (Ubi, p. 459-62) K:9:3; G:103; GC:54:27; GP.48:26. Natural realities other than, things are living beings and the psychological Ego. (CT. par. 53 and especially Idea I. K:9:14; G:10:4; GC'55:3; GP-48:40. The inadequacy of perception, which is essentially never completed, wil play a decisive role in subsequent analysis, By contraistintion twill lead us from that region called “thing” 10 the region called “consciousness,” the lt ter escaping this defecr. Par. 42 explicates the words “various sketch,” “adurnbration,” et. K:10:13 Gast; GC'35"32: GP:49:29, Preentiation original int ition is not only distinguished from empty meaning as given, asa6a Paul Riccur Key 29 Hel es 1 presence; itis morcover “original” presence as opposed to pres fence as “likenes” or “remembrance,” par. 99. (Logical Invetga- rons VI, 2nd part, par. 45, p. 144, uanslates Gegemuirtigain: das sozusagen in Perna Encheinen). Perception presents the thing, ‘whereas likeness and remembrance presentiate (Vergegen swinigang) it K:10:22; G:12l GC:S6:10; GP.50.9. In this sens, edetic int idion is a “grounded” act and nor a “simple” ac such as sensory perception; sixth fnveigaron, 2nd part, par. 48: “charaterza- tion of caegorial acts 2s grounded act.” Ks11:7; G:12:2; GC57:2s GP:50:32, b) The Mlrrative Function of “Imagination must not be overlooked fiction sche tre reveaer of essence. The function of serving as an example can thus be ac complished by something other than experience. Fiction allows for experimenting with unlimited variations which yield the ei detie constant. Hussel says further on: "Fetion isthe vital ele ‘ment of Phenomenology as well as ofl eideic science,” par. 70. In fac, fiction breaks the citcle of factcity which culminates in ‘empirical law and which gives ise domain over co the freedom of ideation. On the method of imaginative variations, cf. the Journal of Philosophy, vol. 36, no. 9,27 April 1929, p. 233-34. Kil e14 Gi12:5; GCIS7:95 GP:51:4. Blass always connected with the non-posiional. Enbilden is, thus, opposed to Dasrnseten. K:12:6; G:13:1; GC:58e4s GP:51:37.) The distinction, which s ini- tilly subsle Berween judgments directly related 0 esences taken as objets and judgment related to individual bur ander a certain point of view which gives to these judgments an eieve univeratty, gives all its scope to the cidetic Feld: cidesic knowledge is large than udgments which expressed take an essence as their object and txtends to judgments which eake them, so to speak, indirectly. “The Sixth Inetigation develops the analysis ofthese rational "mit gated” ats, p. 183-85. K:12s8 G:13:2s GC:58:6; GP-51:39. Verbalr, in the compound ‘Sachoerbah fers to “what is judged” a a correlate ofthe act of judging.” Sachverbale is the cortelate of theoretical judgement. Thissamejudgmentas related to an ede situation called eideticher| Schwert of more briefly Wesenverbl, See ina, p. 247 K:13:16; Geld:l; GC:49:6; GP: 52:34. Sicbrig isa weaker term than “Anschauung, in the sense of “insutiv beans,” “eras at the be Secion One, Chapter One © inning of par. 5: ic refers to that indirect implication of essences Which isnocan incuition of essence as object, though i belongs to the eidetc plane K:1333; G:142; GO5924 pat. 12, K:143; G:15:1; GC:5933; GP-53:21.d) The connection beneen the notions of generalization, neces, apodicty. This new analyse as- sumes that syntheses of judgment are capable of intuition, a the sixth Legical investigation establishes. This extension of intuition to the Sechoerbal of judgment extends to che rules of deduction itself, whose connections can be originally presen. This last ex- tension of intuition gives i alls meaning, The notion of gener alization governs the notion of necesiys i fits with the tre e etic state of affairs. Necessity is a continuation of universaliey when one “applies” eideric truth co 2 particular object. The Apodictc fits the judgment in which one becomes aware of the necessary connections between cidetic generality and the partic larstate of affairs,” The continuation of this paragraph cats these notions over to the distinction made in par. 5. The end of the paragraph emphasizes the difference berween cidetie generaliza- tion and empirical generalization of the laws of nature and there fore defines the opposition, which is only sketched in pat 2, be- tseeen essence and the empirical types resulting from induction. Ke14:1 1 Gr15:2s GC:60:6; GP53:30. One can outline the matter 4s Follows: Fidetc judging (symbolized or expressed by eideic judgment or proposition) has for 2 correlate “what is judged as such" (or the eidetic stave ofafirs in 2 modified sense.) Fidetic truth (or the true proposition) has fora corzelate the content of teuth or the cieti stae of affairs (ina proper sense). “Thus from the sandpoin ofthe subject, ruth sasorofjudging and cidetc judgment. The distinction beswoen judging and the judge ‘ment of proposition does noc come ino ply ere (cE LogialInvet- gations, ff bmeigaions pat. 28). Prom the standpoint ofthe ob ject, the content of tuth is one kind of “what i judged as such,” Generalization i atached tothe content o state of edeic eth, ‘What is judged, as such, which can be either cru o false, should not be called the eidetc state of affairs except in a modified sense snd in relation to cetie truth, The notion of tuth wil be stud ied inthe fourth section ofthis book. 53:1. On the notion of genus, cf70 Pal Rica Kyte Hise es Ks15:6; G:16:1; GC:60:33; GP.54:19. The application of eideric truths to existing individuals, and thereby t0 the order of nature, comes under the category of eidetic neces Tis remark com pletes the distinction beeween eidetic generalization and the gen- eralization of inductive laws, We will need these distinctions later inorder to recognize the type of necessity which fits with the pos: ited existence of the Cogito (P 86-87.) K:15:31; G62; GC6122: GP.55:4. Conclsion pat. 7-8. We have only to summarize che distinction (par. 7) and the relation of de- pendence (par. 8) which can be established between the sciences oF essences and the sciences ofc K:16:4; G:16:3; GC61:31; GP-55:14. This enumeration of pute ei- det sciences is very rough: the end of par. 8 will supply some ‘more precise observations. K:17:10; G:17s15 GC:63:4; GP:57-5. The concluding Chapter X1 of the Prolegomena to Logic allot a tripe task to pure logic in rela- ‘ion tothe general gol of establishing a prion the possibilty of « pure sequence, the possiblity ofa unity ofa systematically com- pleted theory” (p. 232). (1) Pure logic establishes “primitive con ‘cepts’ which secure the connection of knowledge, chat is, com- ‘cepss of elementary forms of relation (disjunction, conjunction, subject, predicate, plural ment ofthe phenomenological reduction (par. 59), these distine- tions wil become meaning toall che cidetic sciences K:189; G:18:2; GC:64:2; GP:57:15. The cheory of multiplicity is given as an illustration and partial realization ofthe third tsk of pure logic. (CE supra, G:17:1). A muleplicity, such s cha of whole rhurbers, fall within a theory of se form, governed by axioms of | sex form. Ths, this theory isa good example of the “theory of posible forms of theories.” The generalization of addition, be- yond whole numbers tall real numbers and to complex numbers ten the elaboration of spatial muleplctis to m dimensions), the theories of groups of transformation et. are given asexamples ofthis theory of maliplicey atthe time of the Prolegomena 10 Pure Logi, Chap. Xl, pat. 70, Formal and Transcendental Logic also deals ina lengthy way with this study: Ist. part, par. 28-36 K:18:14: G:1951; GC.647; GP.57-21. B) The Principles ofthe Re- ional Eidetic par. 9-17: we deat with the second requirement of a theory of essences which phenomenology thus presupposes as an cidetic science (, G7:1; G72, 1) The Nasue of Regional Ontolgy, pr. 9-10. In par. 2 we encoun- tered the problem of the hierarchy of essences, Material essences which rule empirical objects are subordinated co highest «ypes which are che object ofa science, ie, regional ontology. There fore, ontology of nacure deals with properties which belong uni versally co objects inthe region of nature. Par 10 specifies the ‘bearing of regional ontology on formal oncology, which rules from above the ontologies ofa particular tegion. Formal ontology eases {questions such as: Whae is an object, a property, a relation, etc? Since the very notion of region, which each regional ontology inisates, pertains to formal ontology one can say that all consid- «rations about the notion of region ate henceforth within the prov- ince of formal oncology (par. 17, ar the beginning) K:18:54; G:19:25 GC:6429; GP-58:2. This pure form of objectivity in general depends on formal ontology, which wil be deale withn Paul Ricrue iy 10 Hise eas in pa, 10, Actually all science implies formal logi, Formal ontol- ‘oy and material oncology ofthe region under consideration the first two constivuting the formal mathesscited on p. 8 and p. 20. 19:13: G:20:1; GC:65:10; GP:58:19. CF, G:18:1. 1:19:18; G:20:2; GC:65:16; GP:58:25. On Puke. ifa par. 117 and especially pa. 147, K:19:18; G:20:3; GC.65:18; GP.58:27. On the meaning of “exact,” ch inf pas. 725, K:19:32; G:20e4 GC:65:33; GP'59:1, On the different meanings of the French word chote (Ding and Sache), cf Glossar: (Inthe Glos- sary Ding means thing, as opposed to: (1) what is experienced in general, (2) animated beings and men. Sache means thing, a8 op- posed to Wer (value), sometimes opposed to presupposition: “te- ‘urn to things themselves" —Transators.) K.20:7; G:20%5; GC:66:10; GP:59:16. The eelation of regional on- ‘ologes to formal ontology introduces a particular difficulty: the notion of region. This notion — not a particular region, but the form of region in general — belongs to formal oncology as the determination of objectivity in general. Ie isan empry form which ‘can be applied to all regions. Therefore, we shall speak about for- mal region with caution as dsignacing the empry form of region in general and about material region (which isa pleonasm) as indicating a particular region (nature, et.). The notion of region is no broader in the hicrarchy of material essences. Ie elation to regions i no longer that of genus to species bur of formal to ma- terial Thus the Findamental determinations (or categories) of the formal idea of region are analytical, as are all propositions of a formal nature, whereas determinations of a particular region are synthetic, a8 are all propositions ofa material nature. Par. 16 will return to this opposition of analytic and synthetic: K.20:16; G:21:1; GC66:18; GP'59:25. This enumeration gives some idea of the questions deale with by the science of objectivity in eel which ushers in formal ontology. CE G18: and p. 22ad K:21339; G:22s1; GC:68:6, GP.61:8. The third Logical Investigation is devoted eo the theory ofthe whole and parts. Ie isan important chapter on formal ontology, along with reflections on subject and property, the individual, species and genus, relation and collec- tion, unity and number This chapter corresponds ro che Fist part Section One, Chapter One B ‘of the program which the Prolegomena allocates to pe logic (in pat. 67). The notions of analytic and synthetic are introduced through notions of dependent (xmelbdndig) and independent (elbstindi) objects. Te later objects can be “represented sepa- rately because of their nature” (onstigations Il, p. 230), while the others cannot (such as color and extension). However, differ- entkinds of dependences thacis, different ways by which a whole completes 2 pare— are not reained in the general law of depen- ‘dence which isa formal lav. Is therefore necessary that che type of dependence for example, besween color and extension) be gov- «ened by the supreme genus of the material sphere being consid ‘ered, which determines a prior how 2 moment “can be added” to another moment: these are precisely a priori synthede laws. In this sense ‘extension isnot based analytically on the concept of color (Ibid. p. 253). We ae able co see here how much Hussers approach difers from Kant’, It isthe distinction berween formal ‘ontology and material ontologies chat governs the distinction be- tween analytic and synthetic. K:22:8; G:22:2; GC68:13; GP.61:15. 1) The Prolegomena to Pure “Logic, par 67, p.243-45, makes distinction berween two areas in ‘establishing ‘primitive concepts” (Fst ask of logic): a) We can dwell in the area of meanings as elementary forms of the relation either berween propositions (conjunction, disjunction, hypoth- ‘6s, etc), or within a proposition (subject, predicates, plural et). ure grammar’, which isthe object ofthe fourth /mvestigation, develops chs undertaking, Ic applies to meanings the inquiry into the modes of dependence (along the lines of the notion estab- lished in che shied Jmvetgarion) between the components of mean- ing: "Pure grammar" thus excludes Unsinn (for example: a man and is, around of), but i does not exclude Wadersinn, formal absurdity (wooden iron). These enlogisch grammatisc laws are therefore distinguished from purely logical laws and permit the building of a "pure morphology of meanings” (fourth /nveiga- tion, 284-85 and 317-4). 'b) The formal categories of the object (object, unity, relation, ee), constitute the propedly logical plan of formal ontology Par. 14 ofthe Ideas states thatthe level of a proposition or apophantic statement isthe level of expression” in che broad sense. This dis tinction is necessary to understand par. 1: certain valuable dis”“ Paul Riceur: Ky» Maser Ideas sinetions that hold true on the level of objctivigy in general are suggested by pure grammar understood asa morphology of mean ings. This ie the case ofthe distinction examined in par. 11. Allof| ‘hese problems are developed at length in the fise part of Formal and Transcendental Lagic (definition of apophantic isin par. 12 13,22; expansion of formal logic, beyond the apophantic, co the dimensions ofa maths wniversalisin par. 23-27, Pat. 27 sums up the tute raved from 1901 to 1929, K.23:3; G:23:1; GC69:13; GP.62:13, 2) Preliminary distinctions to ian analyic definition of region, Pat. 11-15. Iis, henceforth, within formal ontology that we are going to pursue our reflection about objectivity in general and the empty form of region, The author introduces a series of ive distinctions which all actempr co define the fundamental relation of essence to region. K.23:95 G:23:2; GC69:20; GP:62:21. a) The ditinction between simpleterms and syntactical derived nctionisitroduced by ‘pure grammar” in te ene indicated bythe fourth Logical Investigation. (CE supra, G: 22:2) Pat. 7 of this study (p. 308) distinguishes cven within a single word a syntactic element (root, prefix, sufix, and complex of words). Transposed into the theory of objectivity in general this grammatical distinction allows us to designate as “syntactic” all developments derived from an object which wil have a syntactic construction for expresion: For example, the number in the plural. All categories such as propery, relation, plurliy (implied in syntactic acts such as attebuting, put inco relation, mulkplying) are derived by comparison with the simple posting of a substratum of these various acts, The prob- lem of the ulkimate substrata leads to the dificule question of the individual which will be the object of discussion in par. 14. The {question cannot be treated without introducing new distinctions. Onall these points, cf Appendie 1 to Formal and Trancendental Logi, p. 259-75. On the concept of “terminus,” ef, in particular p.273. 1:24:18; G:25:1s GOT Isl; GP63:28, b) The elation between species “aed genus is not peculiar to material oncology but also aban in formal ontology This thought is intended to define the last spe cific differences and to pose the problem of eideti singularity correctly. eis clearly understood thatthe eidetic individual (num- ber one regarding che supreme category of number, blue regard Section One, Chapter One 6 ing the category of sensory quality) is not the existing individual (this ted ie er mune). As it will be sid later on, the empirical individuals subordinated to the esence which can itself be indi- vidual oF generic, Individual exsence is subordinated 10 species and 0 gens K25:1; G:25:2; GC71-4s GP.6332, Sachhalhg is opposed toler as ‘material ro formal K:26:1; G:26:1; GC:723; GP:64:37. e) The relation of pecies to ge- ‘us is diingushed from the relation of material wo formal. This, seflecting about the notion of essence does not amount ra ata ing the genus of genera ofthis particular essence and this partieu- lar supreme genus or region. It is rather co pas fom material «o formal K:26:37: G:27e1s GC73e4s GP65:34, The example given here is borrowed fiom the theory of meanings, more precisely from the logic of propesitions or apophantics. We have seen in par. 10-11 that we pass easily from the latter tothe theory of object as sch, K:27:19; G:27:2; GC-73:26; GP-66:13. CE. G:25:1 IFthe hierarchy of material essences (Ginenlsierug), which isthe central cheme het, isubjectasa whole othe essence of formal ontology (which has just been defined in par 13), this hierarchy, in tar, overall ‘dominates the empirical realm of individuals, ofthis exsten here and now. The individual is subsumed under a unique essence, which is subordinated co species and eidetic genera which are material and consequently formal K:27:23; G:27:3; GC73:30; GP-66:18. The three meanings ofthe ‘word “extension” follow from the two pats of distinctions that have just been drawn, The eideti genus, whether formal or mate- ral, has an eideic extension regarding its species and eideic pe- calarties. The evo other meanings follow fom this fundamental ‘meaning: The relation of formal to material introduces the notion ‘of formal or “mathematical” extension over and against the realm ‘of material esences ~ mathematical here has the sense employed abovein mazhess universal. The relation ofthe edetc tele (or- ‘mal and matril) tothe empirical realm (ef. G:27:2) inuwoduces the third meaning of the word extension, K:27:32; G:27-4;GC:74:3; GP-66:28, This nuance is not very subtle the field of the individuals corresponding co an essence is nat rower than the field of posibleindvidvale realizing this essence. Ie6 ‘Paul Riccur Key to Hivels eas iscnough to remember the role of imagination beyond actual ex perience in order to encounter the resistance of essence, par. 4 K227:33; G75: GC74 GP:G6:30. CE G:27s1. K.27:34; G:28:1; GC:74:6; GP:66:32. d) A comparison of ede sin- _gularity and the nonsynactc rubreate. The distinction berween the levels of formal ontology, material ontology and individual exist- «ence (par, 14) allows us to reconsider the distinction berween the Substrate and the syntactical forms which have been introduced by “pure grammar” (par. 11). Thus we speak abou material and formal substrares: the formal substate isthe pure “something,” whose forms derived by syntactical means, are, 2s we have seen (par. 1), all forms elaborated in ats of judging (corrlae: “stare of affairs), concluding (corelate: “forms of inference"), counting (correlate: “nutnber"), analyzing, constituting a multpliciy, ec In che “material” order the interesting question co be raised here concerns bifurcation between the level of material essences and the empirical level of existences: 1 the first belong the wlrimate _material essences and tothe second the existing téde ri. Singular ‘essences and individual existences constitute, in the logic-gram- matical sense, substrates which ae itteducible ro new syntactical Forms, We conclude as follows the singular essence of ths” nec- essarly has the Funetion of a substrate. In the language of pure grammar: the individuals prior to syntactical acts which have as ther correlate the categories of sate of aft, elation, property, number, ee K:28:28; G:28:2s GC:75:3; GP.67:26. Formles does not her refer to the material a opposed (0 the formal but co the subscrare as op- posed to syntactic form, K:28:29; G:28:3; GC-75:5; GP-67:28. e) Singular enences of the com rete type and the aberact type. The definition of concrete is deci- sive forthe rigorous definition ofthe concept of region (Pat. 16) that isthe purpose of this article, The author accomplishes his goal in starting by drawing a distinction berween dependene and Independent abject. This distinction is studied at length in the thied Logical Invesigaion (co which we alluded while introducing, the notions of analytic and synthetic, G:22:1, and then that of logically pure grammar, G:22:2). Dependence or independence is the principal analytical determination (purely formal) ofthe rla- tionship of part co whole (Logical Investgarions I, p. 228): “The Section One, Chapter One independent contents ae found where the elements ofa represen tative complex can be represented separately according to their nature.” (Ibid, p. 230). Pat. 17 of his Investigation defines part in the narrow sense, berter called Stick “the independent part rela- tive roa whole G,” and defines the “moment” or abstract par: “every dependent part relative to this same whole G” (Ibid. . 255); for example, quality and extension. We thus ative at the definition of the abstract: “an abstract isan objec for which there is a whole in relation to which this object is 2 dependent pa (Ubid.,p. 256). An object and even a part (Stick in relation o its abscract moments is a “relative concrete” concrete which is ab- stract in no way i an “absolute concrete” (Ibid. p. 268). We see, then, that iT species and genera are necessarily dependent and thereby absrac,eidetic singularities can only be concrete. How ever they can also be abstract, ii is only in composition that a singular este partakes in the concrete. The word “individual” is saved fora “this” whose material esence is concrete. The con- crete therefore refers to a sort of singular esence which also

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