Columbia University Press hers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex jon copyright © F ight © 2007 Colum! reserved vier Roy and index. 978-0-231-51179-7 1, Islam—France. 2, Islam and sect France. 4, Laicism—France. 5. BP65.F8R6913 2007 322'-r0944—deaa 2007001748 LT 3o1gs ity Press books are printed on permanent and durable e C acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of An crest 76s432 120093065 CONTENTS Preface vii Introduction: Lai 1 French Laicité and Which Is the Except 3 2 Islam and Secularization 37 3 The Crisis of the Secular State of Religiosity 65 4 De Facto Secularization 91 Notes 103 Index 117suo pe ‘pany suo wo ‘wy eo 8 em Hop on Buspease») “ixojappiom asyfedoss9 ue uo sisar onsen si ‘a8un09 JO) ZTEIR qi tai syqHeduios we[s § :uoNsoNb op punose adtBatiog sep / ~SPPPIVT yp Ur sHoIYuOD ayp 20 ws}r0s391 01 parejar'saoTsaeT TPO” pur Sissi Ssurajqoad syw0uos90100¢ “sas pauUl) oy tr pumnoy ag. 02 204 st ey) depson0 we—voresSurur uoatsp-[10% pue wrejs] wooauog depiano ue st axay2 axayyn ‘odosng usois90 UE joodso ‘uado sufewas uopesSo1u sit jo uonsanb op s9Q\ 2 uy 2003 woyea djaataiuyop sey uonyindod unjsnyy e apiym 424 puy -(urejs] Jo woneN 2xp Jo aseD lp UF sv) oIsIaAuoD snorSHax jo pron snouadipur ue jo uaudojarsp ayn possouiis osye sey 389A, Du, “eISy aseayANOS pur ‘eouuFy ‘dara, SsusuAUODGNS WeIpUT ay ‘ase aIppryy atp ssoxe sona!s0s wjsnpy wos} SuTUTOD SUNNY, 4Jo suoyur jo sanais0s wasp UI aUaLHOPIS CrenEMIOA ‘aIsseUL aup :uouawousyd s2u A[panounstp © passunyas Aamaus0 yonuIMG ‘tp Jo seq puosss axp 394 *{Aq>1g ut) AsmUd9 yauianaye ay 02 Eq aaep uoHLeUIWOp UeRSTIYD ws2Ise24\ 19pun BuIAy soBOUTKE USMY ay a4, y]2801 WIEST SE PO SE St ISO OP YALA JarUMODUD 6,5] aDviadd }Preface ‘Western world, on the other hand. From that perspective, the West is allegedly defined by a set.of values. (freedom of expression, de- mocracy, separation of church and state, human rights, and, pecially, women’s rights). But a problem immediately arises: Are these Christian values? Is the opposition between Islam and the West derived from the fact that the West cr because the West is secularized and no longer locates rel the heart of its self-definition? Is it Christianity or secularism that makes the West so distinct? 3 The relation between secularism and Christianity is complex. Ei- ..” ther one defines the West in Christian terms, or one defines it in ref rence to the philosophy of the Enlightenmentyhuman rights, and J femocracy that developed against the Catholic Church, through. 7 first the Protestant Reformation, then the Enlightenment, and f- nally a secular and democratic ideal. If the Catholic Church has always fought secularism and the separation of church and state (at least until the be ism has played a more complex role by defending a sort of religious civil society in which the separation of church and state is seen as a necessary condition for a'génuiné therefore proceeds differently in Catholic and Protestant societies— against faith in the former, along with faith in the latter—to such an extent that itis difficult to talk about the West. Contemporary Western societies, however, are, in fact, secular- ized, either because the separation of church and state is a cons tional principle (the United States), because civil society no longer defines itself through faith and religious practice (the United King- dom, Germany, the Scandinavian countries), or because these two forms of secularism converge and reinforce each other, thus giving birth to what the French call laicité. And yet when one opposes the West and Islam, of Western culture or, on the contrary, by emphasi ism. In other words, when we question Islam's capacity fo become “Westernized,” we are referring to two different forms of Western Preface ization: Christianization and secularization. Of course, things are be easy to show that Western-secular- ism actually has a Christian origin—as I do in this baok,.But it is int to see that the critique of Islam is today a rallying point lectual families that have been opposed to each other .0se who think that the West is first and foremost Christian (and who, not that long ago, considered that the Jews could hardly be assimilated) and those who think that the West is primarily sec- ular and democratic, In other words, the Christian Right and the: secular Left are today united in their criticism of Islam. But if CI \ity has been able to recast itself as one rel among others in a secular space, why would this be impossible for are usually summoned to make this case: ical and says that the separation between religi -s is foreign to Isla it Islam is more than a rel I be addressed in this book. But this theoretical debate, which thrives on op-ed pieces and talk shows, is increasingly solved in the practice of Muslims themselves. The experience of everyday mises, and considerations meant to cope with a secu imposes itself on them, This does not mean that Islam has never iced secularism but only that, with the exception of a few jink about it. Today, both life conditions in the West and the domination of the Western model through the process of globalization compel many Muslims and under the pressure of political events. This reflection spans a very wide intellectual spectrum that goes from what I call neofun- damentalism to liberal positions, proceeding through all kinds of ‘more or less enlightened conservatism.' Unfortunately, the paradigms and models mol-Avydsip ayp ‘jooyps ut suakead anoge saxeqap ayy, “azayds a1qnd op ‘uy worStjau jo aaejd axp jo wonsonb aya sastes wistfeataaa snovyox éysunof 20 SuensinyD “imsnpy FoUpaY AA ,"UssIENTaUEEPUY Jo su1705 sMau 30} pur uopexBaru 105 20g UoLIpUOD aya st AaBUDp! jean Jo sso] slap pury “wis aytpads puosaq saypeas pue eqoys pue jessaatun st ey VOI Jeamyjno & se 200 Uads st UNEIs] ‘(sa1s0BSIeD asaya 03 BHO] 18 a4 TeIM OF UPA OYA UaUTOM HuNOK sMosaUIM) S139AU0D axp pur urese-wiog ap fuomy ,"paziusaisagy,, Apoazzod pooput aie sjeoipes SunoX ayp :Kamuapr jeana|n> Jo SSO] aq UO s9atrep ay -2ouaiaya3 jeany]n> ue wrosy sjasu1 Bur|dnosap Aq sdofasap—su40y ansypenauids 30 astyeuaurepuny sepun soyoya—jeataas storys s.cepor aeya st wajgosd ayp ang -seaddestp spunos8yoeq yesnayno I[e 2omis ‘ssorxeyaq pur sjaqjaq Jo uonEZtrE|Noes ayp-02 spray “uoR -ruyop Aq ‘uonesSaiur 3eip soydun uistuoneyunsse pue uN ISU Te Jo aouaisixe stp usod oq :suoseas sep st Jopour jeamajmonynu ayp Kqasoyas sornunoo asaya ur uoruido oygnd ui ay1ys e 01 pa] sey spuELaY.DN, ‘oy uF pue Wop8ury paruy amp wi yPNox unysnpY Jo UORDEAy eyo uonezeorper Suiseasour axp ‘aun aus ays ay “(sj18 axe ous 3 «9a. Sutseass Xq) aoeds qnd ays Uy ssanatjaq se poztuBo203 2q 01 puewap sunysnyy urefe-ti0q Sumnok ‘aouesy ut ose “AORN “puogoy adaooe pur uoneonpa pur a8enSury jo suuza2 ur pases8oquL axe AoWp ajiyss “wI9e1 JO SWHDIA axp HS aze Aowp ey pUE drys -uoznp sse[a-puooas e st siiaqp yp Upe|dusoo sunysnpy Sumo y|>AueAa ax] snl ‘sazN|N> Oy sistz9 UY a4v Wst enjoug amp se peosge paatsorad st wisquoneymutsse apy ‘wonezroxays Jo AUBWRNSU! UP se J0 AMUN [euOReU JO UORDANSap aIp se soup ws! -jemyjnopjnur woxes-offiuy s9prsuo> ypuary a1p :s|apour astuone| -Tuisse pue fesmyonynus ap uetp pasoddo axou aq pnoo SuIyION, -(aqumunuoo Jo asuas yp wy) ,uoneU e se SuPylou pue sjenpratpur se Hunppdzona pantres8 aq asm fay, 27621 uy smal youasy 03 drys ny parues8 veqp aia ayn Sump Ayquiossy peuoneN, Youszy ‘yp u! pasejsep sem sy “sroyds aveand amp o2 parouras uot are 1120 sTUNAI9 UO 30 9DEI MO Paseg 1942aq}%4) yunuuo> AzepowsaN [fe sox0Ust wy ‘UoREL aqp “faqumuno> jeonrod & Aq uapptssaso pue pasesa axe spunos8 ~3peq yemyyno penprarpur 2eyp suweaUH (dea Afanepaz aq 0230 summa ‘ypms) diysuaznp on ssasoe “(,uonexor, sf wz99 [eIOyJO oy) Jo -pour istuonejmsse atp Uy ‘BurSuojaq jo asus werseMUNUOD e Aq parepauy aq wea uoRU xp 2 woRe|A: §,497119 ayp “Sp40M JOUAO UY uo IueUTIHOP axp JOU S1eNP aIMyIND e yp AquEUNLT AyNNUApY aU ‘ures ayp ae pur uszpID poo8 & aq Wes auC “2xaU atp 03 LORLIuIS uo wioxy y[pst suTexureU! ey amajns oUNSIP ¥ UE PappaquiD st uosras & se urejs] aeIp sasoddns wsyjeanyjnonqnpy “aueLy 03 2g -ods pour sstuonejunisse ayp pur ‘adomg woypsou pue (epeur ‘somes peru 942 ‘wopBury pouup, op) sornumo> Suryeeds-ys1, Sug yun pareposse Aqjensn ‘tustemaMon]nur :sjapour O12 Surzt| -iqow Aq uonejndod unysnyy su paSeucur sey aso 242 “Ey Og -rafluens v jo uonisod ayp o1 uuvgp sixof yparep] axp 40 suenasizy ureBe-waog amp Jo 2eKp 02 29509 s12eqp uonrsod v ut saxjpsuroya puy 02 pur swysnpy seyp UoKp s9z1 -[e2x Appmb suo puy “2xai0s wiarseyy pazHE|nsas BMT USMY se Ye s,au0 aonsead 01 ajgyssod st ar moy purasiapun 03 39p10 ‘my sfapour auazano ayp wopueqe azojasoyp ast UC) °s auesfiunuy URpHA ureys] Jo sonsead oxp aziaiseseyD weyA Aaysorstyas Jo sui10j 2121009 ayp dses# 01 sured 2e s1 A#0J0ID0s YBnoy UaAa —aySios Aypreq st (soonoead umsnyy Jo sisAjeue arax9U09 ayp ae1p) ABojo10s Jo day aqp ,‘suonezttal9 Jo Ysepp,, ayp anoge aeq 9p yenado|faqur ayp Aq. pastdsu ssa] 20 axous st sunysnipy Aq poruosoz e20joigPreface of the Ten Commandments in courthouses, or the creation of an eruv following the request of Haredi Jews to “privatize” public space on Shabbat show that the recasting of the relation between the religious and the public sphere is not specific to Islam. ‘Why, then, pay so much attention to French laicité, which until now seemed to be an exception? There is today a convergence of the various debates taking place in Western countries: tellingly, they focus on the veil worn by some Muslim women (prohibi- tion of the headscarf in French high schools, increasingly vocal critique of the burka—that is, of the integral veil—in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands). The real issue here is indeed the articulation of religious identity within the public sphere and therefore the question of secularism. This debate started in France in 1989 and was continued in the United Kingdom in 2006, fol- lowing the declarations against the burka made by the leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw. Is France an exception, or does it represent a real alternative to multiculturalism? Here lies the interest of studying the French model. From a historical point of view, there is indeed a French exception: France may be the only democracy that has fought religion in order to impose a state-en- forced secularism. In France, laicité is an exacerbated, politicized, and ideological form of Western secularism that has developed on two level 1. A very strict separation of church and state, against the back- drop of a political conflict between the state and the Catholic Church that resulted in a law regulating very strictly the pres- ence of religion in the public sphere (1905). This is what I call legal lait. 2. An ideological and philosophical interpretation of laicité that claims to provide a value system common to all citizens by expel- ling religion into the private sphere. I call this ideological laicités today, it leads the majority of the secular Left to strike an all ance with the Christian Right against Islam. Preface Laicité therefore defines national cohesion by asserting a purely tical identity that confines to the private sphere any specific religious or cultural identities. Outside France, this very offensive and militant laicité is perceived as excessive, and even undemocrat- ic, since it violates individual freedom. Itis regularly denounced the annual report of the State Department on religious freedom in the world (not only because of the prohibition of the Muslim veil but also because of the restrictions placed on the activities of sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Scientologists). Yet, over a short period of time, the initial hostility of European. ‘multiculturalist countries toward the French model has turned into a renewed interest: What if the French were right? A sizable number ‘of countries that have embraced multiculturalism so far are about to restrict the wearing of the Islamic veil (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany). This interest in laicité is primarily negative: it stems from the crisis (from the death, I would even ar- gue) of multiculturalism. If the multicultural model has failed, then one should look at the alternative represented by the French model. But is French laicité a solution? How does it work? Isn’t it too spe- cific to the French context? How can one imagine both the national cohesion of Western societies and the development, beyond specific idual and voluntary which, however, put forward their specific agendas? Com- munitarianism and individualism go hand in hand in these faith ‘communities. The redefinition of the relations between religion and politics is a new challenge for the West, and not only because of Islam. Islam is a mirror in which the West projects its own identity crisis. We live in a postculturalist society, and this postculturalism. is the very foundation of the contemporary religious revival. ‘Managing these new forms of religiosity is a challenge for the West asa whole. Its also a task to which this book intends to con- tribute, by drawing the lessons from the French debate, but only to resituate it in the general context of the relations between Islam and the West. cultures, of “faith communities” based on in¢WV1SI SLNOYINOD WSINVINDASINTRODUCTION Laicité and the Identity of France ‘The question of laicité in France has recently given rise to violent polemics going well beyond intellectual debate into the realm of personalities.’ The law on the veil and the deportation of imams were accompanied by hundreds of editorials and op-ed pieces in the press and a significant number of best-selling books in which the denunciation of fundamentalism soon shifted into a system- atic attack on Muslims and Islam in general: the so-called Islamic threat was on the covers of all the magazines.* This polemical vio- lence, which has recently been given the name “Islamophobia” and ‘which comes from very diverse political contexts,’ clearly demon- strates that the problem of Islam in France today is practically an existential one: Islam seems to call into question the very identity of the country, or at least the nature of its institutions. People mo- bilize for the defense of “republican values” and “lait But why has the debate over French identity focused on Islam? Militant laicité is an old storys it has been at war against private Catholic education at least since 1905 (and there are still no real private Muslim schools). Christian sects and evangelical denomi-e a] anuo> wwouanoyy ayn kq pososuods souasoju0> agn posmas 3eyp Soregpp any, ‘paoptsd xp pu popnyax 2yp “POM PAN 1p PE sainumon padojenap “yanos pe HZON, ua2Aueq aUO se 2TFUOD aE Dos pur ayy awonxo ayp 02 woneyUsse fue afr Asorago doxp (avting sioSueagSys9I5 urepy)stoxyuon aozan o stoadsefeoj09 “oau pu sos stp Surzsey duo “possozddo amp pre plo PIL 2B 4o asuayap ayn o1 yep pourewou sey aor seam ap ue > NP jo ured v “tontsoddo uy -uonesfrur yo awauodwoo—qpess;-ue pure uenmsoqeg-ord Syqetansoid aouaq pue—aiqeay ays SPH! We] <5] yom 0s 0u st wojgoud op 2589 sip UL wSIDES Yo FEAST Pastose Smaey 305 root uF deqang] HY SUOREN pastun ayp Aq pIPY LSID asuyee souaraytog snovozou oq pue plore oF UEPEUIEY poxaLs Suiaey 20) wruog [woos pue sHwOUOsg ayp aouMONNp. SH, ANY “uo> jogo? v soogor wistuetzeranunoo pure SuRIURS/eq 9p YEN ‘gnuapy sonoyurg ayy “wy 305 (oueye uonong-u2919-pox ayy TED oqp 2eye) 2B uo aap pr ws A WY 9 Dur ftasor7-aue Stsip0,4 Par, 02 iysuoneay sy pra ang wst “Tewwausepury ips squo zou som woygord amp <(nexyngg meyy SjomBe, sxpuy-22352) PHOM PAUL ap WBE WoREUPSES st JO} pozonta Sao ae ong 3724p tps W039 9484 OU ‘SuEay ARIES |UUOs Joy INg_“(s|FeA jaNUEPY ‘SULYDOPY JoIpIG) sues stp pardope. Day yo" aap uo suetoayod Kuepy ypuang nan pe “2/98 “5394 99 pInom rey wep] ue “Fuiaq ore Bug woxD 20 ‘2}60} 0) UR Sazenuoo oxp wo Soy ‘sistumdo aga pe “urs 26798 ou st as ‘unos 205 ‘sisaussad ap :pouzoasip aq ueD soul] osu ya] 24 UO soan3y 4q Xjueunad poronpuos “uBredurea siya uy “{asa2n0g aurjoseD, Do sions uepetmey bine suede paypume sypENe jo 20423 a4 S153) aredio1unoo uenstayy sir ueyp Suuaneonyp a20ur wsauoRHE uty © se aslo Aoxp seq ang stuesSysun ou Bumequio> ‘7122 pur oygndar ayy auasasdar 01 Suruneja saps Jo aeya Aepos papper ‘uv0q Sey “fouonspen pojes oq Kear ryan “umeST pZEaor AOSOG sip on ng “bj009 s,2eyfe4 MEIZG eH IEEI|G 1 Y>IGM SUKI 3st “ea 894930 2fuy9 We HppE wnjO oR a) aR] DIANNA 30 pure ays uensizga 24p jo uonssod jeuorpen ap sts “(ATEA PL vvoysnpowy z arpuexory ‘uosuesog Urepy “pee PUEL) WO} se]NI—s w Ul U9AD 41 ozur pareafoiul oq 1owue> wejsy rep snip pue Aanuop! ueadommy pue youszy yo wed st afeuoy UeRSIAYD aKp IMP UR Oy 950K ai UlEjs{ Jo pue swesBuNUNT Jo YBoq souaseud axp 02 ajnsoy Az2A -Aysnolaqo “32172803 9uo8 ou 9Aey MOU FUN reEp sIUaLLA|a [e9A2s 4 uy puy 2% 205 ‘adeaspuey yenx>a|j2uu1 pur [eonNod youaxy axa jo ‘Sudeysas ays ur paajoaur st Aepor Surssounuss ase am wigoydoureysy jo uBiedurea ayy. 2eg) ueyP IaYpIJ Yonut seo8 UoRsaNb ay ang ures] jo aatisadsiad ayp wi03} anaxurg ay pur anayjurg 2xp jo axnoadsiod ayp way ureysy snoge Burqunp doas (03 2avy 20 Uap ‘ansst ae st aeqp UrE|s] A[UO St #1 PUY “UEOy aq oxy suoneionb jo weans ssaqpua ou doas we> ax pur ‘{yse9p> pres 2 03 sey aeya wayp “Aajnoyytp Jo 2amn0s aqp SI 3e4p 3SEg >IPPIAY 24 4o worerdrurunt st 4 J! ng “ar9]qoud aya Jo uondsoxad auosin9 ay aBueyp 02 2] op plow wHps] pis AoeIuOD pue soudsaxd ups, jo wonipen pjo ue s} ax012 aeyp BuBENsuOUING “sornuNoD uN|sNYY twoxy uonesSiuut a4isseus pue “AseaunJoA ‘U9DDx 50 3]Ns93 ayp Ay]E> -iydesSowop st asoqy 942 U Wes] aeyP UaDXD yp 02 “AyqeAEAaUT “39 -apo8o3 poxtur Asnotago $1 3eUp JO |IV SPA AIPPEN yp Ut sioryu0D Jo mopeys ays 2oursy ovo sivafosd Aqjeonewoane yoiyas ‘SwuesBiu ut Jo worSr]s 242 81 WE]s] IeUp I9ej ayp 09 “AqpeoteSOrd zou “x0 ASojoor unjsnyy Jo Jo.sexeyp aylsads ays on anp smIp st ‘ase rey uy gavoxp ayioods v jo soze9q ayp “uorSija1 yuosoyIp & Se Us0s Lep -03 wejs] s1 “aynupuoa quaredde ayp andsop ‘70 “fro1908 yousdg Ur ‘wotGij21 jo aoejd ayp yates pausouo9 wHe|s] mmoge aLeqap 2up S! ‘pur ay) Uf “yeas & 40 AaNURUOD v swuassadoa sr ZoyRDqPK St YORS=ND [eas a4p ang “wis1oyo4ReD Jo aoe|d axp uoxea MoU seq wHE|ST puE §(qiktuaua oga 52042 "wsqpouay2,) YPIMYD HOHE oMp Sea AusoUD ayp four aya ay “areas pur youny> jo uonesedas ayp uo ae] So6r amp ‘ur worssaxdxs asazva[9 01 punoy Yaa ‘32207 Youssy Jo Laorsty ay jo 3xa1u02 2qp U] porerass aq 63 Sey aDegap 94, {2 H]DYMIORO LED sroypeaid papavoq pue ssi2 poyiaa paspuny maj © reys auI0d s1s49 yons paqoras Aamuapy youagy sey 30 eamyp & Yon we}S] S| “SUID -aid a1joyre) puosoq s¥j paresayyjoud oxvy adins Aran2 jo suoner vwolpaposyyIntroduction racisme et pour Pamitié entre les peuples (Movement Against Rak ism and for Friendship Among Peoples) in December 2004 clearly illustrate the question: Should the struggle against Islamophobia be mentioned in the context of the struggle against racism? Is Islam an elemenc of ethnic and cultural identity, or is it only a religion? The denunciation of Muslim fundamentalism thus masks other targets and other stakes. The label of “fundamentalism,” which is very use- ful for polemics, is applied from the outside. When Muslims are called on to adopt a reformed and liberal Islam, they are expected to situate themselves in relation to an analytical framework that has been prepared for them without asking questions about the meaning of their practices and the nature of choices involving their identity. But very clearly, everything connected to an open (but not necessar- ily ostentatious) affirmation of Islam is considered the harbinger of a dangerous fundamentalism. : We are thus witnessing a blurring of traditional divisions and a holy secular the past. In the early twentieth century, those who saw Europe as a Christian land rejected the stateless Jews and also opposed repub- lican laicité.* These Chri ity advocates reject Islam but, in their opposition to homosexual marriage and their criticisms of what they call the excesses of feminism, find themselves in agree- ment with Muslim fundamentalists against a liberal Left that defends sexual minorities but has now called into question its relationship to religious minorities. Today, a segment of the secular Left that in the 1980s defended the rights of immigrants against the Front Na- tional is indignant that the children of those immigrants display a Muslim identity and sometimes holds, despite itself, positions that were those of the Front National, but with the clear conscience of those who still see themselves as antiracist.‘ Religious practices as- sociated with an immigrant culture were tolerated (the slaughter of a sheep outside an apartment building for the end of Ramadan) but become unbearable when they take their place definitively on the stage of French society as the affirmation of a faith detached from iance between currents that opposed each other in ian-ider 4 Introduction any foreign culture (the hallal supermarket in Evry forced to close under pressure). The universalism of the Left has shattered against Islam, Conversely, another segment of the Left attacks Islamopho- bia and defends the right to wear the veil in school (the associa- tion Ecoles pour tous et toutes [Schools for All] and a minority of feminists such as Francoise Gaspard), a defense, by the way, much more tied to individual rights than to the praise of multiculturalism, which remains, whatever its detractors may claim, absent from the French scene. But it must be noted that more and more former as- similationists on the Left now find themselves adopting very right- ‘wing positions.” As for those who seein Islamo-progressivism a new convergence between extreme Left and extreme Right and consider anti-Zionism as an expression of anti-Semitism, they have difficulty defending hard-line laicité at a time when orthodox religious com- ‘munitarianism is growing in France and Israeli society is debating the relationship among citizenship, ethnicity, and religion. In every case, those for whom the underlying problem has always been im- migration—that is, the ethnic (if not racial) question—have now joined those for whom the central question is religion: the theme {and the denunciation) of communitarianization is what unites the ‘nwo currents. Immigration and the place of Islam are linked, even though the link will gradually be loosened in reality, as new genera- tions, the descendants of immigrants, no longer see themselves as the custodians of a native culture. Another element arises from the fact that in France Muslims have begun to speak as Muslims. The immigrant of the 1970s was silent: others spoke for him, The young beurs of the 1980s,” when they went outside their banliewes, laid claim to the prev: ing language of integration instead of defending a difference, ex- cept for skin color: they were above all antiracist, that is, a any insignia of otherness; they rejected any communitarianism and made no reference to Islam. This was the very nature of the march of the beurs in 1983, and it remains the line of the asso~ ation SOS-Racisme, which came out of the 1983 movement but f 5£ soajpswioyp saprsuoo []Ns ajdoad yBnogp uaa ‘ay weary 0 391020 yp ae aq 03 sase20 worBijar uoysA anogL souOD 3 toe UaWIO| du yeopyod ou sounbes seyn vouswuouayd pos © st wonezmeo2s yo}n] pur uoHZZe|NDds ‘snowW.AWOUAS 20U axe BYR 142909 OA skoda Yoog sm, “4321008 ut uorSty9a 0 aoeyd aya Jo SuryBOU sn 123 ‘suons1Auo> s,s0491f9q 24 3nq “PIsOM saRO ayp UI UaUTYsTENA se ua try jo uoRejoIA axp sus0M snorSyes ase axayp pur SsiutEs Jo Uuowuntuio> 10 “ysanyp ‘Puaun ‘o\doad uasoyp se AjsnoLEA UMOLY Sssoxoyjoq jo Avunuwo> e st arayp HayueUMY BACT YBNI v st 279y :uorStjax ansiatpouows poyvanay {4949 03 WoURUOD $1 IBY as 10} WEIS] ‘2z1pnuo 100 eu uo weYp IDB aya porters 105 283 | “uO!STS Aue UE ‘sanaduas pajeonaz yo uoneaydxa radoxd oy Suupraosd yata pousa> ou St 3] “eusSlop snor81jas la [wap 204 Sop Yoo STULL, eAayany ut astozaxa we gaiagey jeomypsts Mow v 2303821 9 aduione auazan> aya Slupjeur ‘s7su9 onuy pazewuo ({axpessoa1un sat suute;poad sep younyo © SuUossu0> az04ds jeoHOd xp sa1poquiD aeyp aves uBI219A0S ¥) 91220] I parpoquaa suondwnsse ayp 03 2sIz axe aeyp uonemsiguos arp sey ‘saypes 0 gpIOM ayp Jo e8u2s La9 -Ad Ul paieonsowop us9q sey Tey WEST ue ‘oBioUa isusauL s} ures] Seazya “poz1]eus aur udoq sey 49821 YuMyP ay YBNoy? asd apz0 [eonIjod pur srejnoos audio arp ysyyqeaso 01 djay AamwenstayD pip ‘spx0m 94H ‘uy cjesaua8 ul uorStpor 40 sejmonsed ay ureysy woyqosd ayp s] :3ui0d ‘uo punose saajoxos SurppAzang “azhjeue 02 ssoAvepud 00q SIA apip pur papeaa aq souure> reyp sura;qozd jesuaWepuny pastes sey ‘ayBij uewp aeay 210ur paonpoud sey pue uesnsed pur “isn{un ‘pasty -uoa s1 31 pur reas peg & 01 Jo uoMO8 sey s1wa}od ayp YBNOYRTY “aaisnjoxa 0 yemroryuoo se pasuatssdxo soazu 9Aey, Aoyp aeya dnos8 & uy diystoquiour says savey stomp ur waMORYp 2Avy ag uayas ‘asino9 jo ‘Kup amp [aun ‘areqap amp ur azedionaed s0u wowonpoauy 9 ‘op ‘faa1s0s yung Ut paystyqease jJam aze OYA pue g7747] youossad yp padojaaap aAvy oys sunsnpy ‘saxesopou Jo sseur aeasH ay :squEnnw ay2 238 aveqap auf W] stuedionzed aatase asou ays ‘sKeAayE se {{j]oUIg “Ure[s] JO UONSNb ayp uF UOIsUOWIP JeoRIod soBuONS {yon © s} a12qp ‘seg OIPPH ay} UI UOBEMIS ay pue LoREZSrur Url Jo asnesog “sossauntyy s,yeaoyal ayp 30 sitou9A0w feoy]aBuEA suvisoioug Yala wisiyearaay snorStja1 uN|snpy auedwu0> o3 a1enbape ou st a ‘own ures ayp ay “sanbry pue soqsro waasstoq ayy Aq punog [295 30 op oyAs ssosoq]9q Jo soRTUMUTWIOD mau Jo souRreadde 4 Aq parentuso.e ‘suorSyjox jo worsidsns yaya auarstsuo> axe wes] anoge sSurarSsryy “we]s] Jo ase> ays uy se Suous se st wow asurese ayp[si89] 07 uoreaduraa axp put *Ai2!208 youary 01 Suryqnon st 51398 Jo uouswouayd ayy, “(worker Jo soe omp sopun saAayjaq oy ) aarsnpoxa “(Aatmum0D snoj8ija0 sjamnd e jo ang) uerrexrunurios woyp Jo IIe ‘421S0¥81}93 30 suo} s89u Jo suorfiyas 2ystapouow uraisagy (fe Ur aouaBIOUID Lop -pns atp Jo 1eyp suonsanb o1seq & sastes 11194 puy “pooy ou pred si suonngynuos s,uepeurey st gory ‘asstioostp asyeTeS UO yZ0M stp ang oy UiB1I0 wT asyEeg ‘SINS aq 02s} eyD asINODSIP ¥ Jo UOREULIO} -suen pue woneioqea atp jo Jaeur & st 34a Suryr4so9A9 BurAuop ae pue asay aya Jo Surypvaad ayp ox ammiy puosas axp jo ypaads ay Sunepunsse ae paute djsnoraqo st pazionus AjuersuoD st wepeLr -ey bure], yoryas 20) aenSupy jenp Jo guDY> ayy, “ArorxUE asozvaL8 aya pareaio sey oy “urpeuey bury. Aq parpoquia ‘omay ze) aya stat ‘suoneayqnd auasax Aq aSpn{ o2 ase am jt puy “saxajdusoa anoypias yjasu padeydsip veep yayjaq e ‘aouasaygip yeauourepury e jo asqead ul ajods ous “youazy io9piad Supjeads penarayjaiur passesp {Aiqrooadust axp pur ‘sauoz wappiquoy out pouroysuesa u22q pey IMP sonatyuog ayy wney 01 asey ay WO} BUIOD "uae AavDy v ‘pum pur eqe|jalp a1qss & ur Siaypeaad asyepes papzeaq aya ssaandy oma Aq parpoquis asmossip amurrys] pasmonas & sem ‘S061 ay uy ‘saie] poseadde wy “sanatuog ayn wos} parsatuoastp mou st uoyenposiuyInfroduetion believers; the everyday practices of people, like the meaning they give to the world, are no longer constructed under the aegis of ion. The final stage of secularization is the disappearance of religion, smoothly and gently accomplished (Eu- rope, for example, experienced a decline in religious observance throughout the nineteenth century). But secularization is not an- tireligious or anticlerical: people merely stop worshiping and stop talking about religion; itis a process, Laicité, on the contrary, is explicit: it is a political choice that defines the place of r. in an authoritarian, legal manner. Laicité is decreed by the state, which then organizes public space (but it does not necessarily cast religion into the private sphere, contrary to a persistent legen rather defines, and thus limits in every sense of the word, the vis- ibility of religion in the public space). ‘The problem of laicité is that of the separation between the re- ligious sphere and the political sphere at the level of society. A be- liever obviously does not need to separate the two: his conscience indicates to him the place of each order. Religion does not deter- mine what comes under its own aegis, but the law does with re- spect to laicité, as society does with respect to secularization. The problem is to determine how religion redefines itself in the face of this change in social and political space, how it adapts to it, op- poses it, or creates its own space. ‘The responses are, of course, complex. Indeed, it is possible to consider the problem in two ways. You may adopt the classic techniques of apologetics: dissect the arguments of adversaries by pointing out their internal con- tradictions and theie hidden preconceptions. You then take a se- ries of examples from history, dogma, or contemporary writers to demonstrate that, of course, Islam is compatible with modernity and laicité. But this looking-glass polemic, on whichever side of it you are located, has the paradoxical disadvantage of agreeing on a shared assumption, which is thus strengthened by the de- bate—that there is, in fact, a truth as to what Islam does or does transcendence and Introduction not say and that it is chat truth that defines the Muslim, The actor is replaced by a text. Alternatively, you can go outside the confines of the debate by raising a fundamental question: How does a religion function with- in the social and political realm? How can a religion determine the conduct of its believers, particularly if it lacks a clergy to establish and disseminate the standards? How do believers reconstruct their religion, with or without the help of theologians? However, and this has been a commonplace in the sociology of religion since Max Weber, there is no causal relation between dogma and conduct. The prohibition against coveting one’s neigh- bor’s wife never put an end to adultery in the Christian world, even though it certainly affected sexual morality. The link between Protestantism and the capitalist ethic asserted by Max Weber did not keep very good Catholics from being excellent heads of com- panics."' Hence what needs to be studied are the operators and mechanisms that enable religion to have an impact on social and political life. Two forms are sometimes confused. On the one hand, there is in the anthropological sense—the entirety of the ways of thinking and acting characteristic of a society. Re- ligion exists only through a culture, which may be perceived as ethnic (Arab culture). In this case, religion has to do with ethnicity, customs, traditions. But how does this culture manifest itself in the conduct of an individual, particularly in a context involving the loss of cultural identity, like that confronted by immigrants? It does not explain the specific conduct of social actors, unless it is understood as some kind of ethnic constant. On the other hand, there is fun- damentalism—that is, when religion separates itself from the sur- roundi jon in a system of explicit codes (in its political form, this is called Islamic ideology; in its strictly religious form, itis Salafism). Ics this form that appears to bea challenge to laicité, whereas it was unwillingly constructed con the basis of that laicité. It is this dimension that will be the fo- cus of my analysis, because it raises the most significant problem, leure—that 9u sAoexsourop ysatsg 405 wajqord v sasod 2eyp urejs] oures ayp You Aisnorago star ey sayaaes YSUOAY yp smoys ]]9A & Suuvam auoHe stoIsN YsHIUIG & Aq MOAyTEALY 3 poraou8 Suiag “Jppou aammuyap yst|qesse 01 poof ou op pIom 31 Pur ‘uonezisenoas Jo pue 927270] Jo wuauryst|qease axp Jo sazOIsTY areredas aroyazayp aze aay. “worsiyax dq panuney aze son1208 pazt -senoas 1g “Ayjeontjod fast sauyop Aio1I0s yoryaL ur AeaK ay ano sas a1 {uo#ijas pue 216 wo9a2q oRefar ofc 2qunyp 01 any st ay aeIp seaq> azoyazaqp st 3 “(WoNDaMIp sures ay. Ut aujod osje worssayoxd eS] ayp Aq me ayp jo uonezneatad-senb ay Ue spuog JeID0s Jo woRTUYSp ayp Ut AzE:>YpN{ ayp Jo afos HuMOIE up sareag panrup atp ut yBnowpye) tonesi8aj jo 4jodouow oxp 9412 -eBoroad say se 159, aq UY Ua9s sf 2eyAn Jo azed © Jo aaERS a4p asDAIP 01 Appstoaud spun wizeys Jo worysodust ayp ang ‘erzeys jo 2ey ang vypanyp aya Jo aorjd axp u29q z9Aou ax0yor0%p Sey PHHOM UTISHY ay. UU uonsanb ay, “wre[s] Aq parsayze Appunojosd usaq aaey susorsn> pur mep ang ‘asi ur srurE|sy sy suoNOUNY sonyod yA UL Ava aq ‘uy Sunpou suonwzzrensas Jo suI05 waRo srayp paonposd aney YIY A ‘sanatoos unjsnpy 105 ann axour wana St Sty. “92/2tr] noKpIN woReZ, -renoas paouatiadxa satsnumos asoup 194 pury “Bupyunya sir kpoqua ue A105 1onaIsUo> o1 UoISs|UI aq YAM PoIsoAuE 30U st Seo Te 28 20u ‘avers ayp azayye ‘saxsuMo9 me] uOUTHOD Sunyeads-yst] Sug ur asuas ou soxfeus a “pasoes pazopisuo> seat seat y>ryat “areas Suons & jo wolasse aqp [fF Jo 381g seas 3 sOFFDT WHOS, Ka ayp 505 Jepout agp 92240) youasy ayeur or auUBDOUYpA LuaA aq p]NoM 31 10g guoneonpa snorfxos A[ySnosomp v pey ‘saquio; apa ayy ‘N07 jo sopsode Kuew mopy gArroyine yesoduiar 03 ramod snor8rjaz jo ‘uopemprogns ay 40} pandire “ureyyDO Jo WENTEAN aH] ‘OYA asoy Supnyour ‘4819]9 ays Jo sroquuaus aiom soBy aIppHAY 9p 30 S39ye -osoyyd sofew Aueur MoH =faquenstayy Jo siseq atp wo IINg az0m agp asnesaq ‘uenstayo em zaqp UF Tpog axe oNeZETEINIas sno pur az227] sng "yomyp pue ABojo.eyps9 uenstIyD AfyBNosOKp 30 sisoys ay) wayp ur Suaas mnowpim adomg wssasam ur siuaUIeAOUE asqumumog Jo ssa0ons pue tpSuans ayp puersiopun o2 afnoyyp Sta] 18 B SE 941240) Jo lwowpnpomuy ou -wisyfeauaureptmny jo s:yeazqano uy SAsentuoD ayp Uo ‘30 WHO pazise|N 998 B Ul soy suumyas 31 pue ‘Aaax>0s padeys Sey WorBp94 :k191908 S41 -qeyur worthy “Axoxsty snorSt[a1 & 0 ose pue Axoxsty v Jo 1onpord ays axe seeds asayy ‘worSijar sejnonsed yea 01 aouaroyax stat ‘ssaydosopryd 30 ‘sueiBojoomp ‘siya fq >p10M Jo siseq ayp uo ano paxize> wop)as st uonsnzsuODas sip ang “sty -snyy, Aq paronnsuosas ua9q Aepor sey wis] Moy puersi9pun Or se (PHOm un[snpy ayp Jo Azoasty aya) ased xp mnoge wsKA] o1 ajqys sod 51 31 2ey% ano puy 02 Your os rou azoyaz—qp SF UORSaNb ay, -soumy]no J0 sisp9 ayp Jo s2ouanbosto> ap Jo 2u0 st 2y seazayan ‘aangyno & Jo woneaz0dust aya YIM pareivosse Ayjesneur -sKs st wsifewourepuny ing “22:29e) pur ‘Kovs20wIop “we|s] Sou suons9uu09 stp 5uNPax we aK MOY PUEISIOPUN O1 (3S9,A\ ay JO adosuoo ayp 01 uaaiS Surteau ayp sane Aeur veg yt uaa “s9/Q ay on ajqeadepe aouay ‘asnajno aejnonaed Aue 02 uy] Ou YIM oH amd © augap on duane ue) wstfewaurepuny yates op 02 sey Ey pur (suomesauad yo asmnoo ayp ut awaddestp 30 auey> 02 paumsap ‘somyjno uSIex0} Jo uoNeuodwy aya ‘sf 2ey2) UonesSTUNEE yA Op 01 sey sey UaaMIaq HOROUNSIP v ayer Os aney az0Fox—Np a. “surajqoad pasneo sey rey uo paren -us2u09 Ajaresaqijap axvy [Ing “ssonseud snowStjax Ou aAey SUSY se Aqjeordojonos pauyap ajdoad Auwem pur ‘ssaaayjaq Jo AOU © 4Aquo soypnor wistje1uaurepuny :uonsorsip snotago ue Jo sta ayn 1e au vwowenposiuyIntroduction ‘The problem arises when globalization introduces a gap among concrete societies, cultural models, and political strictures, that is, when a model is detached from the historic conditions in which it ‘was produced: this is the case for the modern state, for the rights of ‘man, and for democracy, which are exportable, but probably not ‘The question then arises of the comp: Of those forms, now red universal, with religions and cultures perceived as par- ticularist, especially immigration. But what is less the historical, social, and cultural conditions that brought it into being and rooted it in relatively stable cultures. We therefore con- tinue to think about laicité and religion as the expression of p. cal cultures, not seeing that their universalization depends preci on their loss of cultural identity. But religion and laizité are both invoked today in the name of identity and set forth as opposing mirror images of each other. And yet they are being rebuilt by ig- noring their historical roots, which paradoxically makes them less incompatible than one might think, because they are fluctuating, are productive of diverse spaces, and embody principles that sit side by side rather than in opposition to each other. ‘The religious phenomenon is no longer the bearer of a politi- cal alternative; the conflict is not a conflict of legitimacy between religion and the state but the symptom of the appearance of new spaces that cannot be confined within a territory, a society, a na- and a state. Religion today is participating, in the same way as the construction of Europe is, in the disassembly of the spaces that created the modern nation-state, This may be cause for regret or rejoicing, or we may simply draw the necessary conclusions to think in a different way about the place of religion. But demoni- zation of the other is only a different, and more sinister, way of practicing religion. 12 I FRENCH LAICITE AND ISLAM Which Is the Exception? ‘Secularization)Is Not the Same Thing (and How is it possible to define the relationship between two terms as, vague and controversial as laicité and “Islam”? We know that la- ité is a characteristically French phenomenon, incomprehensible in Great Britain, where customs agents and police officers are per- mitted to wear Veilsas well as in the United States, where no presi- dent can be elected who does not speak of God. And yet both those countries are Western secular democracies. The question of laicité a society emancipates a sense of the sated that it does not necessarily deny, iD. whereby the state &xpels religious life beydind border that the State itself has defined by: In fact, situations differ considerably Wepending on oo two b parameters: the separat fand thesl ag st 2eysa Aqsvapp Avs 03 2avy 2; “auisoddo sir se aoeds axjqnd auy aya yor uF Gapppypue 91 Fursuap Apessaou mnoywa workyas Aur gees mooning uornefos0 10eisu6S 3 opssuonas 01 ay8n0 9H TEPOT TS Suyuvou st aya 01 JURAd|DIsT aze Ing ased ay UO IyBH] pays yt nt leyuado 2q asneoaq souorsstunuos weadomg se auoysiaing 0990 jo uonoolax ayn uy aes 26 Se “epuras w pu zeastp e suyewas Bur “Jp9j snorfrox 70 uorsso1dx9 ayp Aepon ajdond seynos Aueus 305 pure “prey ur Puy isa OAT ap SNpEUOITED Paiesypap Kou yp 205 resea2ou! 300 In "AME STOUHE aH SSUTEBE ying poopur Sem PDI] DUSTY se [eonjod e Ye Jo 31g st neds e wns Jo yuaunysrqeaso ayy, “2oeds rexp fos2U0D pus auyap 01 {ayapo 01 a0a49) ayp K30230) wros) soyosny ay) aesaec) own sopuay],) 20608 TEAST E SED TE PHATE TI “onews072s yons {ae parsajfou pue Ajusopour 03 paadepe sjsnowoqe] seq wsi>qoqn ep aeyrioBio} om 2]rym “uisaTrsaI0g a>] UOREULIO}ES smorfaX anrazadxo 01 Wes] ay a}dusEx9 10} “uipjs} yu UOREUOVUED qUaxIND SH pue wistepnf 50 soBeueun ayqndoy youssy amp Aem oy usaauag WEI U2YO $1 >] -qered Y gg1210] 1m0 Yat a]quedwoour a1 saxyeus wey WEIS] noge ayads Suryzauos azaqp st 10 open sea ezpjnoas sag axp 204 “TTBS [or SUT TY PUT MT SREY SEATE om "PHOM WITT sip OF [paT THE RT wSamaq dajsuortEyay tp Jo yeads am uy BSITO3 JO lwojs| pus 9v107 YouELy mn “sgyorp posr 443j © Jo Suuyseyas ayp anq apy] 2 spedy SHA ITV 2591 ny waa ‘S212!905 Wapout Jo soaz0 aapous HurK}sopuN 2qp Jo Surpurassapun Ue on wAdfox , Ws], UOUD]> ayp 1 Avan EY Ly gsunsnyy se uMoU [dood jo soonDeud aya:9u09 ayp pueassopun 01 sn ajqeus fyjeas uousmouayd Arexrun e se ure[sf Jo Bupjeads soop srasoaioyy 20ydosg 2tp Jo uoupeN ayp pur UeIOY yp Wo wEIIP 100s POA PAYAL, 30 wisiasey ueadomg wos} pemo110q, 30} suapysoad pur Aared uo) jopous siaqp ae1p pue (ad4ig ‘euodry ur Aue ay pur [auosy uones9qr7 jeuoneN] 2[euon “eu uonesaqyy ap 2uosy ayp “eLAg astppEe “ets J) SoU sE|NI9s Aq posod axe ase 2IpPIY ayp Ul AowIS0WUaP 02 so/>eIsqO [edE ayp aeip 10810) 03 you ayfin0 am ang ‘ue}s] pue Aoe:>0NIOp tH2dmI0q ysuonepss oq pue 3st a|PpHNY aXp UI UOReZTeDOWEP JopisuoD ‘sanoo jo ‘uo 99h “Uastse Sey 2nDz ypunay 02 diystone sit jo UoR -sonb aip Aus st aeap pure “Ise =ypPIpY aUp oT Mou sey WEIS] “98j JO saneur v sv ang zpos trpsnpy gexy ayp Jo A103s1y puw aunayo a4p fon Suuasojou am aay avynoos uaa Tesoqq] sijequaurepuny -Futs004> 5.940 jo wejs] ,2nN,, 2Ip AqfEarujod Ayuapy o» a[qyssod sAeaspe sma -sona] ayp jo aureu axp ut autds aup sippy 2eyp wustpemuourepuny & ‘01 uUp ¥ umop wma 20U P]nom pue [19x axp stoolar EYP WIHTEIOQY ¥ woyy 3u(8ues ‘siskfeue jeuosiad two sty sey Yee ang “UE}s] 20 {quo st asoyp eqs auosse [je Aoyp:soappsuisip suaysnpy BuourE ston -eyaadsaaun jo £2a1zva v pu areqap jo saMEW e sey Ing geUBOP aq, 203 Surssojau 2m azv 304 “uses Jo aeads aM UY “SLMOHET ‘yyreumuog ut ssoxsed are se ‘ssa40|duro 3uatus9908 ase surest asne2aq ‘aves pue ypsny> Jo uoReredas ou 5ey ut St azoKp ‘oy aouauayau gu sureiugy se oyp azoyon “hoysn 241 ambinj Geis Put {(sjodyss oqnd wi aoueroqyy 30 a€lpaig amp Pop s9pun,, Jo uoReNoa7 ayp playdn Ajauavaa aNo> aurosdng aap azoqyss “Sozeig partuy ayp) asoyds oyqnd ays us wort jo aJor aap Suraiufo20s Aysnooueaymuns apy (STEN PUE Tpanyp Jo UonTEse das oq BUTTIOSE 5) ¢byppog wana Kew at (Peg ‘weg RIES GBI] Jou yng sesFrench Loicité and Islam problem for our laicité: Some particular religion or all religion? ‘And to do that, we have to reconsider the very matrix of the rela- tionship between the republic and French Laicité: A Legal and Political Principle ‘Why is laicité such a burning subject in France? The first reason is probably that the debate touches on what is considered the heart of French identity, at a moment when that identity has been challenged from above by European integration. Consequently, we cling to a pseudoconsensus on republican and national values, which seem to be dissolving from below, in the banlieues and the schools. At bot- tom, Islam is not the cause of the crisis of the French model but the xt in which society now sees itself. France is experiencing the of its identity through Islam. The second reason is that differ- ent meanings are attached to the concept of laicité. But the prob- té as to Jem here is not so much to define the true meaning of in our society. The supporters of -éare far from sharing a single views there is a large distance be- tween advocates of an open and modest laicité, like Jean Baubérot, and defenders of laicité defined as a comprehensive project (Henri Pefia-Ruiz).' I see three registers in which the word is used. determine how it creates meat Laicité as a Philosophy This goes far beyond the separ a conception of values, of society, of the na based on the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the idea of progress, and finally advocacy of an ethics not rooted in religion but pro- claimed as rationalist. This philosophy has, of course, imbued the teaching profession and school textbooks since Jules Ferry and has become the consensus view of the Left A good contemporary ex- pression of the view can be found in the works of Henri Pefia-Ruiz 16 French Loicité and Islam and the writings of Didier Motchane (who was an adviser to Jean- Pierre Chevénement when he was interior minister).’ It will not be discussed here, because it is in fact an opinion, a perfectly respect- able one, but one that it would be groundless to set up asa standard or an official truth. Ideologies are like appear more amiable, more open, more tolerant or that are more familiar to us because they are rooted in our upbringing, but they are conceptually closed systems, because they define themselves as hegemonic (since reli ‘able in this instance only integrated into this Pik oben, the limit of the hegemony is tolerance, but tolerance presupposes hierarchy—you tolerate by by making the other’s thinking a subset of the whole. By definition, there can be no consensus on laicité as a philosophy, because many believers—whatever theit themselves in it. If we want to leave the religious realm, we must not * make laicité into a rel see no reason to combat one ideologi- cal discourse with another, when my intention is to determine under ‘what conditions it is possible to refrain from ideological discourse. Many advocates of have developed philosophi- cal thinking on the subject, but a study of the secular coalition that finally imposed the separation of church and state in(f905 shows that it was never driven by a consensus on a philoso, or an ideological conception of laicité and that its members had very varied allegiances and motivations. Secular thinking is an af- terthought that does, of course, have a philosophical history, but it is not the origin of the politics of a before being a system of thought. paren Laicité as an Effect of the La ons: there are those that including igion—cannot recognize ical laicit The notion of laicité as a legal principle is open to question, be- cause itis never defined as such by the text of a law. The 1905. law establishing separation did not use the word laicité. It was not ‘until the Constitution of x946 that the word appeared exp! 7ou suonezme8i0 worm ‘Aayiqetsos 40} Sfromau Jo spury oma 2x0 auayp ooups ayqnd ays Jo Aarunueun asyey ax punyog “(5270p oy 40 apis ayp Uo asom syuesoiOZg puE sof asneraq ‘soyOyReD 4pUO pur) sogip9 pue soxey w22a9q papiarp Ajdaap sem—A191908 |1A19 1 ‘st aeMP—s[ooyPs pue ‘suoMEROsse a1A19 ‘SuOHUN Saf UF ‘SoUEIy Aamuao-ipomuoan :papnppuoo Ayprerpauruut 104 sem Avan aovad ay ang “4#ojoatp uonesaqi| se umouy s1 rey BupdOpanap Aq “ya7] OH -ompeE ayp 103 “uaAa pu (uonMpsUoS Ueadoang oy Jo ajquieasd 24p osu parezodzoout ag aumyno werysizy> 03 aouaz9FOs v eI PIySe 24 uaya Foor Ur pip TT [Meg UYof adog se) adomng Jo ammyyno weR -siay aup jo 284 07 soumawos ‘axe] emMIEU Jo LOOM ayp Or SoU -omos #ui8ur]> ‘susznp Suppsexduou Yat sanpea jexoW jo UOT yap ay2 10} punox8 wourtuos saAossipas 03 parduianse yosnyD dy oygndas ay 01 sooyreD jo Uorsaype—onstunssoddo 10u—jeax oxp payeuiiis Aoes90wrag uensiz45 Jo aguaBrawe awanbosqns ay, [UeMTT FMW] FO UoHsNb yy, ‘pHOM ap Jo woIsTA, uisodurt ayp 20) ywaUMASHT UE JOU, UE feIMIU aq [Om I vip os Ajasizaad zopso Jearjod sow ayp adasoe 02 48.9]9 ayp 30 431 -zofew aip pue Aovded aip popensiod ‘saindsip uesned ow ysany> atp Sui@iesp ‘hazed syoypey & Jo uonronnsuod ays axeuzapun pinom Aowp erp 20 paztpeutfrews 2q pynom soyjousec wey say ay ang pouurapuo> asiy re sadod aya :asino> jo anew e JOU sem WOREII0s -sip stip anq ‘ajqeadaaoe auresaq wonezedas ays ze1p feorBojoaKp ay pur yeonyjod agp usom29q uoneIDossip aqp YBnostp sea 3p “uOIS|DIp Jeonyjod v osje ses—uonezuesso uessoorp ayn ysnomp saystsed 3ag0 Joos s,doysig aqp ‘st 2eyP—xINYD aq one’) ayp Jo asmaNsIs eonppzesory ap ozuBoD93 03 posse pey a11qndas ay aou0 “(Fz6r m1) ate] So6r axp yo aouesdaase parejag s,ueaHeA ayy “suonesaprs -uoo yeonyod q paeannow ‘uoystoap Jeoptjod Ayamnd v sem at to -yjnoods yeorSojoayp mau pin op 01 Bunpou pey (o6gr saquia -oN wy auafiaey jeuprey Aq uonesnsur sadod xp ae pozoarfop Su213}y JO 28v02,, 292) YoANYD aoyPLD ap 4q yqndas yp Jo oR “yuBo0a1 ayy “je2!8oj0>qp r0U ‘[eonayod sea e340] Jo pue ongndas ay jo aoueadaaoe s,yoanyp ayp ‘9292407 Jo aUaUNYSH|GEASS |: wops} pus 242107 ypuesy al «pus pqrered uy ye" up go sonzed ayp ype yo soreusow>p wounmo> quo axp useq Ajgeqoxd sey zu0m yo asuajap ayp “>ey Ut “yo! >yorpe ayp Jo uoRsod jeoutjod ay yo wonsonb ay uo 49 asowe pa8ury (s[ooyss areauad Jo JoAey ut uoReRsuOWap afny ay gum *hg6r ‘ioqpes 0) 1861 07 0621 wi03p panuatradxa aoUe3y eR eM [nD PeorBoyoapr Jo asoydsouNe ay, “uoReaNpo Jo 219yds ay ur patsssed sey 31 "ase] $061 oyp pardaaoe younyo ayp uogan 3098 aip the6r 01 “81919 atp Jo wonnaRsuOD jLAID 2qp Jo woR'odun aip yo 389K aqp ‘061 Woy parse] Iyuod siyp ‘Buryeads Aypeoag “ure[s uo sonusjod ayp ut epos posunoaa sey yptqa “ewaypeU pUE sousjous fequaa Kq poxseus i210) aanequioa v sya 819] "wSyEOHO -fiue uo papunoy “ping SjoweD yp pus aes UETGNAS a ising sindgp yo sane F Apes SGre¥e Guang) YoaMy syjouzeD arf 1 uonrsoddo w parsnzisuo> Sriqndas ayy, “yorous8 ur wosijar wory ueyp axous ‘yan aHJoynED ays Jo 20Ua -nygo xp wos Anjos pure aes ap a8 Huastp oF conse ‘xatuoo jeonyjod pur [eoiz03sty asi2oud v 03 pon st 2oue2 Ul fon apdroutig ponmod Y SP PUI] say saanaepseB9] 242 0 J jo areas © r2ysiau s1Gyp2¢) ave] ayp yo sao axp uy “areas puE YDuNY> yo wonesedas ayp jo 1d ayp Jo wousasse ays aous azenbs oy, “qnd ypuasg aya ur uordyoy jo aouyd ay pareysion ancy req sme] 2qp ye jo aout wousoo ayp se poppy 24 Seu eyo 821177 -souapnadstan! Aq parasdiouy ‘uoSija1 jo me] ypuasy axp dn Sunyeur seumaeas jo 4poq aya 4g pauyap st 27290) 1e4p apnypuoD 230;2101p Kou ayy MEPS YsHON UNO G21) jazi Jo paxinbas st ey suyop aouapradsunt ysnoxp pue Se] axp Burdydde Aq s13n09 aap pure sme] Suissed Aq auaureysed ‘saxeqap axp ype saye “osneI0q “peBo] Ayvayo “senomoy ‘st gzz40y Jo Aayeos ayy, “paytoads aayumy Buiaq mnoystm ang ‘si29yo [ea] Boyperua apdpund jeuonmnsuo> v wops] pu 24107 y>us.yFrench Loicité and Islam and even leisure activities (sports clubs, holiday celebrations, sum- mer camps, scouting, youth groups, informal universities, lecture series, and so on): the secular and the church-sponsored, with greater or lesser antagonism depending on the region. Of course, there were sometimes mixed marriages, as there are today, but people lived in two different worlds. The French Communist Party had, in its way, sectarianized the banlieues (and hardly shared cee- tain republican values, such as parliamentary democracy). Even though the political choices made by each group grew less dis- tinct (with the Resistance and the development of a Catholicism of the Left), the split affected ways of thinking (we know how little the “second Left,” often led by men from Christian backgrounds, was ever able to make itself acceptable to the Socialist Party). This conflict focused on the question of education, which faded only between 1984 (the year when the Left accepted private schools) and 1994 (the year when the Right stopped seeking the revenge of the private school). One might wonder, moreover, whether the end of the conflict over education is connected with the rise, if not of Islam, at least of violence in the banliewes, with leftist members of the middle classes finding in private schools a means of get- ting around the rigidities of the residential assignment of schools, which they had always supported. In any event, at the very mo- ‘ment when a split that was two centuries old was fading, a new ‘one appeared: laicité against Islam (or vice versa). It was as though the old pattern of conflict were inherent in French identity and only the religious agent had changed, Laicité thus refers back first of all to the structuring of French po- litical space, which was carried out in conflict and polemics but helped to forge and stabilize French identities, which went well beyond the ballot (from the Communist to the Catholic, including the Radical Socialist along the way). French laicité is inseparable from the construction of the republican state from the Revolution on. It also no doubt served to create a “class alliance” to sidestep 20 French Laicté and Islam the troublesome social question." Ie certainly still plays the same role of blurring social divisions to the extent thatthe criticism of Is lam cuts across class lines and touches very varied politic: and religious circles but also to the extent that it adopts a primarily cultural perspective on the complex realities of the banlieues, This very close bond between republic and laicité is a product of French history, but it has been so far internalized that we have invented the myth of a consensus on republican values. Political choice has logically been expressed by a body of laws, but it has also been sur- rounded by a philosophical (others would say ideological) elabo- ration of laicité, which there is even less reason to make into a normative system because it is, in fact, very complex (many laics, especially in the nineteenth century, thought of themselves as the defenders ofa certain religious idea against Catholic clerical). Oddly enough, then, today’s laicité is based on th f ya ith of consensus, particularly the consensus on republican’ Wallies. This is doubly a myth because one wonders, first of all, about what there was a consensus about (between a Stalinist of the 1950s and a Catholic opposed to Vatican I, for example) and, second, since it is obvious that there are citizens who do not seem to join in the consensus, whether the latter should be considered excluded from the political order (or excluding themselves, which amounts to the same thin war is not far off because, while the republic is founded on a consensus, which remains to be demonstrated, who- ever does not adopt itis not inside the republic. 5 But Jules Ferry’s consensus was negative: the efementary-school teacher was to say nothing that might shock a father lacité was also patriarchal; today we would add the mother).* Gate) aimed po If there is a consensus, iti not on values but on respect for a rule of the game, insofar as it is ratified by the popular will. The consensus concerns the political and constitutional principle of laizité, not philosophy. We see, among other things, how the Catholic Church defends fun- damental values against legislative choices, for example, in opposing 21