4.CHAVEZ VS. CA
The two Chinese could not
FACTS:
 Petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking
jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify
against himself.
 On or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused
conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the
owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
 Petitioners are charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, (1) Thunderbird car,
Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its
accessories worth P22,200.00.
 Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual, Pedro
Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory"
Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.
 Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been
identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1äwphï1.ñët
 During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be the first
witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused
answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the
fiscal on the grounds that (1) the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness stand including the accused (2) If there should be any
question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his
objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer
of this witness to the question would incriminate him. (3) Counsel has all the
assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which
would incriminate him.
Version of the prosecution:
 Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for sale. Lee
answered yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and informed about the car.
The two went to Asistio and made a plan to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez'
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was
selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the
car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known
to be a car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee
who was selling his Thunderbird.
 Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on the price
and went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the registered owner of the
car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man
approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the
Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be
brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed
of sale of the car to the note bearer.
 The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant.
locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the Thunderbird
was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the
police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There,
Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the
latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the
car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in
the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
Version of Romeo Sumilang:
 In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a
price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him
with a down payment of P10,000.00.
 On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the
car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already
bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
 At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.
There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual who warned that Chavez was a
"smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A
certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans,
Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by Pascual and
Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the
prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee turned over to Sumilang the deed of
sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car.
 Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to
a film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio
offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang consented to the sale.
Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the
next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could
be paid, the car was impounded.
Ruling of the trial court and CA:
 The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus cleared. So was
Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the
court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was
not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
 As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
 establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-
confessed culprit"
 Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez Atty. Marquez was ordered to file
brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed information and also
stating that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous. CA dismissed said appeal. On June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals,
directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of
the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused against self-incrimination
was violated.
 Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the accused
HELD:
 Petitioner claims that there was a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the
constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself, fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all
criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from
being a witness against himself.
 The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it
secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Therefore, the court
may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency
of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is
understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will,
disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending
to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
 In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that
case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner
objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by
the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were
met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to
ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and
that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take
the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself.
For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would
be to incriminate him.
 With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the
contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury
or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His
testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission.
He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the
power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on
direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
 There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a
witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and
uncertain evidence
 The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.
This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of
by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the
Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final.
 Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
 The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... "

SC:
Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent Warden of the City
Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner
to discharge him from custody.
5. CABAL VS. KAPUNAN JR.
FACTS:
 On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with
the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel
Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft,
corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and
gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets and
liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts".
 On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five
(5) members, consisting of former Justice Marceliana R. Montemayor, as Chairman,
former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals Basilio J.
Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as
soon as possible.
 At the beginning of the investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee,
upon request of complainant Col. Maristela, or considered petitioner herein to
take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth.
 Petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col.
Maristela and to the aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
 The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,
subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory.
This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to
take the witness stand.
 It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down
to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or
criminal in character.
 In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no
question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer
holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge
against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State
of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held,
however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness
stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
HELD:
YES.
 It has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the various State
Constitution, that a witness or party called as witness cannot be made to testify
against himself as to matters which would subject his property to forfeiture.
 At early common law no person could be compelled to testify against himself or to
answer any question which would have had a tendency to expose his property to
a forfeiture or to form a link in a chain of evidence for that purpose, as well as to
incriminate him.
 Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of
proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings
in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is
applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are
of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his
breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his
property is sought to be forfeited.
 The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which
would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution
and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a ...
forfeiture..
 the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person
to take the stand as a witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-
criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of
property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature,
 In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against
compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any
question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty orforfeiture,
or testify in action against him for a penalty.
6. PASCUAL JR. VS BME  The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the
truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished
according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
FACTS:
human personality.
 More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an
 Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight.
Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
that he would present as his first witness the petitioner.
 Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on
the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to
respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
 The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could
call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
 Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party
proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice.
 Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

ISSUE:

 Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants

violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.

HELD:

 The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical

practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
 The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle
that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled
to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
 The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has
a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise
of his own free genuine will."