Poly Prep SF October Negative

We negate resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best

interest.
Poly Prep SF October Negative

Contention 1 is the economic brink

Fendos from the Diplomat describes in late 2016 that the South Korean economy is
poised for an economic disaster. He explains that the Sk economy is very linear with
46% of it relying on exports on electronics and cars. However, Chinese companies are
taking over that market with cheaper goods.
Justin Fendos, The Diplomat, 12-24-2016, "South Korea Is Poised for Economic Disaster," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-korea-is-poised-for-economic-disaster/

Let’s start with a simple analysis of what actually comprises the Korean economy. In 2015, about 46 percent of South Korea’s GDP was due to the export of goods and services. Let that
number sink in for a moment. That means about half of Korea’s entire economy relies on exports. Believe it or not, this figure is actually down from the peak of 56 percent experienced in 2012.
By comparison, only about 13 percent, 18 percent, and 22 percent of the U.S., Japanese, and Chinese economies depend on exports, respectively. All three of these latter countries have
stronger domestic consumption to balance exports.

The problem with a heavy dependence on exports is susceptibility to global competition. Although domestic markets can be protected in various ways, market shares in other countries are
vulnerable to changing tastes, new competitors, and undercutting imitations that offer a similar product at a lower price. Usually, the only types of products to enjoy true longevity in foreign
markets are regional specialties such as Italian art, civet coffee, or services like Swiss banking, things difficult to reproduce in another country. The unfortunate truth is that virtually all Korean
exports are not of this category.

The most prominent Korean exports in the last two decades have been electronics, automobiles, and boats. In the mid 2000s, Korea was a (if not the) global leader in each area. In recent
years, however, Korean prominence has been significantly diminished across the board, in large part due to the emergence of Chinese companies who have caught up in expertise, now
able to offer comparable products at a lower price in a growing number of markets. The effects of this competition have been most visible in maritime trade, where peer-reviewed research
recently published by my research team has documented the global emergence of Chinese ports and shipbuilding companies, resulting in significant and ongoing redistribution of Pacific
maritime trade in favor of Chinese infrastructure.

As a result, Lee from Bloomberg finds that South Koreans have a ridiculously high
unemployment rate at 14%.
Fendos from the Diplomat concludes that a 10 percent drop in exports would shrink
the economy by 5% and triggering a financial crisis. South Korea is on the brink now.
Justin Fendos, The Diplomat, 12-24-2016, "South Korea Is Poised for Economic Disaster," Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-korea-is-poised-for-economic-disaster/

One of the important aspects that gets missed about Korean exports is their overall lack of diversity. About 48 percent of all Korean exports consist of electronics and related components
while 31 percent are transportation goods (cars, boats, and related parts). A game-changing shift in the playing field for any product area could spell a slow but steady downward spiral for the
entire Korean economy. Even a 10 percent drop in exports would literally shrink the economy by 5 percent, costing tens of thousands of jobs that ultimately depend on export revenue,
exacerbating the already high underemployment rate of 14 percent (Lee from Bloomberg) and youth unemployment rate of 9 percent.

This is critical because China, a main trading partner of South Korea, despises THAAD.
Jethro Mullen, 3-3-2017, "China's 'unofficial' sanctions rattle South Korea," CNNMoney, http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/03/news/economy/china-south-korea-thaad-tourism-trade-
sanctions/index.html

China is also South Korea's biggest trading partner, accounting for about a quarter of its exports. "Korea is a lot more dependent on China than the other way around," said Krystal Tan of
Capital Economics. "China is a much larger economy." Investors are clearly worried about the escalation in tension and the potential fallout on tourism. Shares in South Korean companies
with big duty-free businesses plunged in Seoul on Friday. Hotel Shilla dropped 13% and Shinsegae fell 5%. Beijing has previously threatened Lotte, a South Korean retail group with a major
presence in China, for providing land for THAAD.

Lee from Sung University writes that by deploying THAAD, China in turn, unleashes
economic backlash because of severely damaged relationship.
Lee Hee Ok, Professor, Political Science and Director, Sungkyun Institute of China Studies, Sungkyunkwan University, “THAAD: A Critical Litmus Test for South Korea-China Relations,” 38
NORTH, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 3—2—17, www.38north.org/2017/03/hlee030217/, accessed 8-12-17.

The decision to deploy THAAD has, in fact, severely damaged relations between China and South Korea, countries that have generally seen eye to eye on the North Korean nuclear issue.
When North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China issued a statement strongly condemning the North. Despite that, the ROK proceeded on February 7, 2016 to begin
official consultations with the United States on THAAD deployment. China fought the proposal from the start, contending that the potential step would violate its security interests and
disrupt the strategic balance. China regularly voiced its criticism of the prospective deployment in even stronger terms, expressing hope that it would be “relinquished,” warning that it would
“wreck” bilateral relations and linking it to a “sword dance by the US aiming at China.” When the ROK ultimately decided to deploy the system, China immediately said it had “expressed its
strong dissatisfaction with and resolute opposition to the decision.”[3] After the US-ROK announcement, China started to stress its own strategic security interests on the peninsula, calling
for peace and stability, denuclearization and resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiations. Furthermore, China could impose non-tariff barriers to pressure the ROK. Bilateral
exchanges, both public and private, are shrinking. Internet users in each country are fomenting sentiment against the other, and the ROK is developing measures to minimize any negative
trade impact. South Korean companies have also found business and investment deals in China going sour, with numerous reports of increased inspections, stalled construction projects and
difficulties clearing customs. Following the announcement of the recent land swap deal with Lotte International, exchanging Lotte’s golf course in the southeast for military land near Seoul,
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Gen Shuang warned again, of “consequences” for the decision, stating that China “will definitely take measures to safeguard its security interests,” with
“all the consequences entailed will be borne by the US and the Republic of Korea.”
Poly Prep SF October Negative

The impact is devastating as Ren from Barrons finds that China’s econ sanctions can
shave off up to 20% of SK GDP. That’s why she concludes that continued sanctions can
sink the economy.
Shuli Ren, 3-5-2017, "China’s Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink Korea’s Economy," No Publication, https://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-
1488773168

China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and
suspending conglomerate Lotte Group's supermarket operations in China. China's travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea's GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently
forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. Chinese tourists, who come as part of tour groups, contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea's economy, or 0.5% of its
total GDP. Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP.
Poly Prep SF October Negative

Contention 2 is the War Game

Beauchamp 17 writes that North Korea’s nuclear program was born out of fear of the
US. With US troops stationed in south korea, Pyongyang improves their military as a
deterrence to invasion. The nuclear program was to be the ultimate deterrant.
Beauchamp 17 Zack Beauchamp, 9-8-2017, "The case for letting North Korea keep its nukes," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16256880/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-test-
containment //DF

The most fundamentally important fact about North Korea’s nuclear program is that it is born out of fear — fear, specifically, of the United States. The Korean War began in 1950 when
North Korea invaded the South and nearly conquered all of it. The only reason it didn’t was intervention by a US led-coalition, which in turn nearly took the entire North, stopped only by a
Chinese counter intervention. After the war ended in an armistice in 1953, the US pledged to defend South Korea against future attack and left thousands of US troops deployed there — a
constant reminder to Pyongyang that the world’s strongest military power was its enemy. Put another way, North Korea’s entire foreign policy and national identity has evolved around the
threat of war with America. As a result, they’ve always been trying to improve their military capabilities in order to deter the US from invading. “They’re hyper-focused on our military and
what we can do,” explains Dave Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. The nuclear program, which began in the 1950s, was designed to be
the ultimate answer to this problem. The thinking among three generations of Kim’s was that if North Korea had nuclear weapons, they could inflict unacceptable costs on the US if it were
to invade the North. Nuclear weapons, in other words, would be the ultimate deterrent against regime change. This explains why North Korea has invested so many resources, and been
willing to accept crushing international sanctions, in order to develop a nuclear bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could hit the US mainland. “There’s pretty broad
agreement that Kim Jong Un wants a nuclear arsenal, including a nuclear-armed ICBM that could put cities and targets in the United States at risk, to deter an attack and to ensure survival and
prevent regime change,” says Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. What this brief history suggests is that North Korea’s
pursuit of nuclear missiles is fundamentally rational. North Korea is not a suicidal state; there is no evidence that it wants to blow up an American city and invite regime-ending retaliation. Its
goal, according to every piece of evidence we have, is the opposite: to avoid war at all costs.

Since nuclear weapons allow Kim Jong-Un to feel protected from his greatest fear,
they reduce his need to act aggressively. Anderson from Yale in 2017 writes that after
nuclear acquisition, North korea has had less military provocations, dropping from 5.6
to 2.8 on average.
Anderson 17 Nicholas D. Anderson [Department of Political Science, Yale University], 4-20-2017, "Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula,"
Australian Journal of International Affairs, https://campuspress.yale.edu/nickanderson/files/2017/04/Anderson-2017-Explaining-North-Koreas-Nuclear-Ambitions-website-1dcnbpz.pdf //DF

However, a look at the data shows that this is not obviously the case. Figure 5 (below) tracks North Korea’s militarized provocations using new data from 1995 to 2016. 10 As is clear, there is
no obvious uptick in its militarized provocations after its initial acquisition in 2006, nor even a general trend upwards. Between 1995 and 2005, North Korea’s overall military provocations
(lighter line in Figure 5) averaged approximately 6.2 per year. Between 2006 and 2016, the annual average is 6.6. North Korea seems to have been just as militarily provocative before it
acquired its nuclear arsenal as after. Separating North Korea’s missile tests from its other forms of militarized provocation casts even further doubt on this hawk argument. If the North’s
nuclear and missile tests are seen as just that—tests to advance their technology and bolster deterrence—then it is worth examining its nonmissile, conventional provocations alone with
respect to its nuclear acquisition. A look at its nonmissile provocations (darker line in Figure 5) indicates, if anything, a negative relationship between nuclear acquisition and militarized
provocations. From 1995 to 2005, North Korea averaged 5.6 non-missile provocations per year. Yet after its nuclear acquisition, from 2006 to 2016, this number dropped to just 2.8. Thus,
considering the North’s non-missile provocations alone, it is difficult to escape the strong possibility that North Korea’s nuclear acquisition has made it less militarily provocative, rather than
more so.11 In short, revisionism does not seem to be a primary driver of its nuclear program

However, Missile defense systems destroy North Korea’s sense of security. Etzioni at
George Washington University in 2017 explains that having nukes as deterrent utilizes
MAD. However, having a potential ability to prevent a retaliatory strike erodes the
deterrence effect.
Etzioni 17 Amitai Etzioni [University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University], 8-10-2017 “THAAD: Best a Barganaing Chip,” The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/ //DF

Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big
powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if [a country] either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid
back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance),
the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks
down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by
the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.
Poly Prep SF October Negative

Missile defense takes away North Korea’s means to protect himself from the US. So, in
order to protect himself, Kim has been forced to posture in two ways.
First, by leveling the playing field.
The North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the
ISDP in 2016, North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy missile defense as a provocation
and an act of aggression. NK responded by developing tech that can bypass AMS.
ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf //DF

North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy [missile defense] THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and
invest in technologies that could bypass [missile defense] systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1
(KN-11) SLBM.41 This was followed by three short range missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.42 North
Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a “physical response.” 43 The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD’s abilities, as it is
possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.44 So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in
intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular
trajectory.45 Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.46 The
improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear
development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.47

Mcintyre at the Washington Examiner in 2017 reports that these weapons are
specifically designed to exploit the gaps and seems in the missile defense architecture.
Thus defeating the purpose of AMS.
Mcintyre 17 Jamie Mcintyre, 6-5-2017, "The hypersonic threat that keeps US commanders up at night," Washington Examiner, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-hypersonic-threat-
that-keeps-us-commanders-up-at-night/article/2624599 //DF

The U.S. is in fact developing not just hypersonic weapons but also systems to counter them. The Trump administration, in its fiscal 2018 budget submission to Congress last month, requested
$75 million for "hypersonic defense" as part of $7.9 billion overall funding plan for missile defenses. But critics in Congress complain that's a mere $379 million over last year's request from
former President Barack Obama and well below the annual $9 billion funding level planned by the Bush administration. "These weapons present an entirely new capability we must counter as
they are specifically designed to exploit the gaps and the seams in our existing missile defense architecture, thus defeating the systems we currently have in place," said Rep. Trent Franks, R-
Ariz, on the floor of the House in March. Franks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, is concerned the threat from high-speed maneuvering weapons is figuratively flying below
the radar. "The threat has outpaced us," Franks said. "These new weapons are capable of traveling more than a mile per second and fly at flat or nonballistic trajectories to prevent our missile
defense systems from tracking them."

This creates a vicious cycle where both countries feel pressured to gun up. Chellaney
at the Japan Times in 2017 concludes that THAAD deployment threatens to make
Skoreans more insecure through an action-reaction cycle.
Chellaney 17 Brahma Chellaney [a longtime contributor to The Japan Times, is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including “Water, Peace, and War.”], 3-20-2017, “Averting an
accidental war on the Korean Peninsula,” The Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/20/commentary/world-commentary/averting-accidental-war-korean-
peninsula/#.Wbp2KtOGNE6 //DF

North Korea has a virtual artillery choke-hold on Seoul that THAAD cannot neutralize. This is why the U.S. lacks a realistic option to militarily degrade the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities
without provoking Pyongyang to unleash its artillery power against Seoul or triggering an all-out war. The absence of credible techno-military options against North Korea is also underscored
by the reported failure of the U.S. to undermine Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs through coordinated cyber and electronic strikes in recent years. In this light, THAAD’s political
symbolism is greater than its military utility. The system, in any case, has never been battle-tested. But rather than enhance South Korea’s security, including by reassuring its citizens, the
THAAD deployment threatens to make South Koreans more insecure through an action-reaction cycle. For example, the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang may now plan, in a combat scenario, to
fire many missiles simultaneously so as to defeat THAAD.

Second, placing a finger on the nuclear button. Etxioni from GW finds that North korea
will put its nuclear forces on hair trigger alert, ready to strike at any sign of
preparation by the opposition when deploying thaad.
Etzioni 17 Amitai Etzioni [University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University], 8-10-2017 “THAAD: Best a Barganaing Chip,” The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/ //DF

Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big
powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if [a country] either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid
back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the
other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down.
Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the
other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.
Poly Prep SF October Negative

Kim putting his missiles on high alert raises the chance that one goes off. Narang at
MIT in 2017 explains that miscalculation becomes a serious issue for 2 reasons. First, is
that units tasked with nuclear weapons are under major psychological stress,
increasing the chance for a mistake. Second, is communication disruption. With comm
networks getting jammed by US tech, the NK army would come under use-it-or-lose-it
pressure without any knowledge of what is happening.
Narang 17 Vipin Narang [associate professor of political science, MIT], 9-16-2017, "Thinking Through Nuclear Command and Control in North Korea," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2017/09/thinking-through-nuclear-command-and-control-in-north-korea/ //DF

Imagine that a crisis breaks out and Kim orders some nuclear weapons to be assembled and moved to assigned ballistic missile operating areas. First, units that may be inexperienced with
handling nuclear weapons are being tasked to do so in the midst of an intensifying crisis, under incredible psychological stress. Second, even if Kim has nominal authority to release nuclear
weapons, what physically prevents these units from simply doing so without his orders now that they are fully ready? Even if units do not consciously go rogue — a risk that exists during
peacetime, should weapons exist in a mated state with some predelegation — the United States and its allies would presumably apply a range of measures to disrupt North Korean
communications networks with electronic warfare assets. With communications disrupted, the Korean People’s Army units tasked with nuclear operation would come under intense use-
it-or-lose-it pressure without knowledge of whether Kim and the Supreme Headquarters remained intact or had been decapitated. This brings us to the third point: The Kim regime has
likely designed the wartime command and control system around fears of a decapitation strike by the United States and South Korea. How can the regime make sure the military is able to
respond with nuclear weapons if Kim is killed during the onset of hostilities? Given Kim’s overarching concerns about regime change attempts, one has to assume that the system is designed
to fail-deadly — making sure his units will launch nuclear weapons if the regime is believed to have been decapitated is the only logical deterrent posture. This means that the actual decision
to use nuclear weapons in a crisis or conflict may rest no longer with Kim but with the commander in physical possession of the system. Thus, although North Korea may have centralized and
assertive peacetime command and control, largely due to disassembled components and procedures that make it almost impossible for anyone to use nuclear weapons without Kim’s express
authorization, all that may shift sharply in a crisis or conflict. This facet of North Korea’s command and control structure has implications for how and when Kim might have to consider using
land-based nuclear weapons in a potential crisis. With the stresses and concerns about maintaining communication with the Strategic Rocket Forces command — surely one of the first things
an attack would try to sever — and the concerns about decapitation and preemption, when an attack starts, does one really think Kim will wait to see whether his conventional forces can repel
the United States and South Korea before considering using nuclear weapons? Almost certainly not. Given the time it takes to assemble, fuel (while North Korea relies primarily on liquid fuel
missiles, at least), and move nuclear forces out to their operating areas, and their possible vulnerability as this is being done, if Kim wants to truly retain assertive control over his nuclear
forces, weapons would have to be launched early in a crisis. Once the artillery shells start flying, Kim probably cannot be confident that he can retain control over, and communication with, his
Strategic Rocket Forces units — forcing him to worry about unauthorized use. And if he waits too long, he may lose the window of opportunity to launch nuclear weapons successfully at all if
they start getting destroyed. This was the concern with Pakistan in the early 2000s, and it is even more acute with North Korea today so long as it has a relatively primitive command and
control architecture.

Ultimately, Lerner at the Washington Post in 2017 explains that the real danger of the
NK situation is miscalculation. Lerner concludes that North Korea is ripe for
unintended conflict because communication between the two sides are practically
non-existent.
Lerner 17 Mitchell Lerner, 8-24-2017, “We won’t go to war with North Korea on purpose. But we might by accident,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-
history/wp/2017/08/24/we-wont-go-to-war-with-north-korea-on-purpose-but-we-might-by-accident/?utm_term=.84763b824825 //DF

The great danger of the current crisis is thus not that decision-makers in Washington and Pyongyang will deliberately weigh the costs and benefits of another Korean War and decide it is
worth pursuing. It is instead that a sudden and unexpected moment triggers a hasty and emotional decision that leads both sides down a tragic path from which there is no return. The
1962 Cuban missile crisis demonstrates how easily foreign policy crises can spin out of control despite the best intentions of those at the top of the decision-making process. Most Americans
celebrate the wisdom demonstrated by President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who acted with restraint while working to avoid what surely would have been a devastating
clash. Few Americans, however, understand how close to war we actually came despite their efforts, as the actions of less well-known figures and the inevitable chaos of unanticipated
circumstances threatened to undermine their best intentions. On Oct. 27, 1962, Soviet forces shot down an American U-2 over Cuba, killing the pilot, Maj. Rudolf Anderson. Khrushchev had
given specific orders not to fire on American targets unless war had started, but the Soviet commander on the ground, Gen. Stepan Naumovich Grechko, decided to shoot it down on his own
authority. American officials had earlier agreed that such an action would probably evoke an American military response against Cuba, but Kennedy wisely chose to delay such a response.
That same day, American ships were harassing a Soviet submarine in the Caribbean. With no contact from Moscow and unsure of the current status of events on land, the captain, Valentin
Grigorievitch Savitsky, ordered the launch of a nuclear torpedo. Only the opposition of his second-in-command prevented an act that surely would have sparked massive retaliation. In the end,
the Cuban crisis was resolved peacefully. But the fact that the world came perilously close to nuclear conflict because of actions taken by individuals outside of the world’s capitals and based
on erroneous assumptions should be a sobering warning for those who minimize the current dangers. The path to other recent conflicts also demonstrates that the road to war seldom runs
through an informed assessment of facts on the ground. In June 1950, North Korean forces swept over the 38th parallel, sparking the Korean War. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had earlier
rejected Kim Il Sung’s request to launch an attack against the South. But he soon changed his mind, in no small part because of a mistaken belief that the United States would probably not
intervene, and because of Kim’s unmerited assurances that massive indigenous backing from the South would ensure a quick victory before President Harry Truman could react if he chose to
do so. Likewise, the American role in the Vietnam War exploded after the alleged second Gulf of Tonkin attack on Aug. 4, 1964. We know now that this attack never occurred, but
American military and political leaders believed that it had, and President Lyndon Johnson used it as an excuse to obtain the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. In neither of these
cases were the critical decisions for war made as part of a sober and thorough assessment of accurate evidence. And yet, war came nonetheless. The current standoff in Korea seems
particularly ripe for such an unintended conflict. A long history of rivalry has predisposed each side to read the worst possible motives into the other’s actions. Official lines of
communication between the two are virtually nonexistent; at the moment, the United States doesn’t even have an ambassador in South Korea. The two leaders are inexperienced and
emotional, with a tendency to personalize strategic matters and unleash bellicose rhetoric that just heightens tensions throughout the region. North Korean defectors warn of Kim Jong Un’s
desperate and unyielding commitment to his nuclear program, which he sees as critical to the preservation of his regime, and of the growing doubts about his government at home. And the
North has launched a number of limited but deadly military operations against the United States and South Korea over the past decades, ranging from the attack on the USS Pueblo in 1968 to
the attack on the Cheonan in 2010, but has never faced serious retribution for them, probably encouraging Kim to trust in the safety of a limited strike that could be a critical first step. Recent
history thus suggests that the greatest danger we now face is not that Donald Trump and Kim will decide to go to war, but that isolated individuals who most have never heard of, operating
within the inevitable chain of mistakes and miscalculations that are the by-product of human weakness and exigent circumstances, will decide for them. This concern seems particularly acute
this week, as the United States and South Korea hold their annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills, which for the first time might include a nuclear war game and which the North has
condemned for “adding fuel to the fire.” “No one can guarantee that the exercise won’t evolve into actual fighting,” they noted ominously.
Poly Prep SF October Negative

The deployment of missile defense systems has greatly increased the chance of a war.
Just last week, Stavridis, the former head of NATO, predicted that there is a 30%
chance of a conventional conflict and a 10% chance of a nuclear one. A conventional
war can kill 2 million people in 24 hours.
Dreazen 17 Yochi Dreazen, 9-28-2017, "Former NATO military chief: there’s a 10% chance of nuclear war with North Korea," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2017/9/28/16375158/north-korea-
nuclear-war-trump-kim-jong-un //DF

Retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis spent 37 years in the military, including four years as the supreme allied commander of NATO. Hillary Clinton vetted him as a possible running mate.
President-elect Donald Trump considered naming him secretary of state. He is a serious man, and about as far from an armchair pundit as it’s possible to be. And that’s precisely what makes
his assessment of the escalating standoff with North Korea so jarring. Stavridis believes there’s at least a 10 percent chance of a nuclear war between the US and North Korea, and a 20 to 30
percent chance of a conventional, but still bloody, conflict. “I think we are closer to a significant exchange of ordnance than we have been since the end of the Cold War on the Korean
peninsula,” he said during a panel I moderated Tuesday at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. His estimate of the potential death toll from even a nonnuclear war with North
Korea is just as striking. North Korea has at least 11,000 artillery pieces trained on Seoul, South Korea’s capital of 25 million people, and would be certain to use them during any conflict. The
US would be just as certain to mount a sustained bombing campaign to destroy those artillery pieces as quickly as possible. The result? “It’s hard for me to see less than 500,000 to 1 million
people, and I think that’s a conservative estimate,” he said.

Overall, a war with North Korea would be devastating for South Korea. Beauchamp at
Vox in 2017 estimates that South Korea alone would suffer up to 2 million casualties in
the first day.
Beauchamp 17 Zach Beauchamp, 8-1-2017, "Lindsey Graham: Trump "told me" he will bomb North Korea if it keeps testing missiles," Vox,
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/1/16075198/trump-lindsey-graham-north-korea-war //DF

The North Koreans are not stupid: They know they’re militarily outclassed by the United States and South Korea. So their strategy in the event of an out-and-out war, as far as outside
analysts can tell, is to inflict overwhelming pain as quickly as possible: to bombard South Korea, US allies in Japan, and any American forces they can find with missiles and artillery to the
point where their stronger enemies lose their appetite for a protracted conflict. The estimates of a conflict involving the North’s nonnuclear arsenal alone are hard to fathom. My colleague
Alex Ward spells some out: South Korea’s capital city, Seoul, is a so-called “megacity” with a whopping 25.6 million residents living in the greater metropolitan area. It also happens to be
within direct firing range of thousands of pieces of North Korean artillery already lined up along the border, also known as the demilitarized zone. Around 70 percent of North Korea’s ground
forces are within 90 miles of the DMZ, presumably ready to move south at a moment’s notice. Simulations of a large-scale artillery fight between the North and South produce pretty bleak
results. One war game convened by the Atlantic back in 2005 predicted that a North Korean attack would kill 100,000 people in Seoul in the first few days alone. Others put the estimate even
higher. A war game mentioned by the National Interest predicted Seoul could “be hit by over half-a-million shells in under an hour.” Here’s an even grimmer statistic: A South Korean
simulation conducted in 2004, before the North had developed nuclear weapons, estimated that there could be up to 2 million casualties in the first 24 hours of a conflict. Obviously, the
death toll would be exponentially higher if North Korea used any of its nuclear weapons. Those could potentially destroy Tokyo (population 9.3 million), Seoul (population 10 million), or
other cities in the two countries. It’s not clear how many working nuclear weapons the North has, though estimates suggest around 10 to 16. We do know that its missiles have enough range
to reach Tokyo, and that the country has tested a nuclear weapon designed to fit on precisely such a missile.