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China’s Maritime Disputes

A CFR InfoGuide Presentation
China’s Maritime Disputes (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-
The East and South China Seas are the scene of escalating territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, including
pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/)
Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The tensions, shaped by China's growing assertiveness, have fueled concerns over
armed conflict and raised questions about Washington's security commitments in its strategic rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region.
“We are strongly committed to safeguarding the
country's sovereignty and security, and
defending our territorial integrity.”

~ CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING

Mapping the Claims

Six countries lay overlapping claims to  the East and South China Seas, an area that is rich in
hydrocarbons and natural gas and through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow. As it
seeks to expand its maritime presence, China has been met by growing assertiveness from
regional claimants like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The increasingly frequent standoffs
span from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, on China’s eastern flank, to the long stretch of
archipelagos in the South China Sea that comprise hundreds of islets. The U.S. pivot to Asia,
involving renewed diplomatic activity and military redeployment, could signal Washington’s
heightened role in the disputes, which, if not managed wisely, could turn part of Asia’s maritime
regions from thriving trade channels into arenas of conflict.

East and South China Sea Claims

China Taiwan Japan Vietnam Philippines Malaysia Brunei Disputed Regions

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“Provocations against Japan’s sovereign sea and

land are continuing, but they must not
be tolerated.”

~ JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER SHINZO ABE

Historical Context
China’s maritime disputes span  centuries. The tug-of-war over sovereignty of the
Diaoyu/Senkakus in the East China Sea can be traced to the Sino-Japanese War of  1894,
while Japan’s defeat in World War II and Cold War geopolitics added complexity to claims over
the islands. The fight over overlapping exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea has an
equally complex chronology of events steeped in the turmoil of Southeast Asian history.
Globalization—including extensive free trade pacts between claimants—and recent
developments like the U.S. “pivot” to Asia have further connected the two disputes. As China’s
economic ascent facilitates growing military capabilities and assertiveness in both seas, other
regional players are also experiencing their own rise in nationalism and military capability, and
have exhibited greater willingness to stake territorial claims.
Timeline: China’s Maritime Disputes
The territorial row over the Diaoyu/Senkakus in the East China Sea dates back to the end of the nineteenth
century, while disputes over overlapping exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea have intensified
in the last few decades.

1895
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“To be realistic about it, how does one push

around a superpower?”

~ PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT BENIGNO AQUINO

By the Numbers
Source: The White House (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/13/press-briefing-nsa-strategic-communications-ben-
rhodes-and-admiral-rober)
 Share
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6)
 Share
Source: World Energy Outlook 2012 prepared by the International Energy Agency (IEA)
(http://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2012/energyefficiencyfinance/1aBirol.pdf)
 Share
Source: SIPRI Trends in Military Expenditure (PDF), 2012 (http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf)
 Share
Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer (http://globalnation.inquirer.net/79707/coast-guard-to-acquire-10-patrol-ships-from-
japan#ixzz2aT4wcMF5)
 Share
Source: The Genron NPO (http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59:the-9th-japan-china-
public-opinion-poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4#1)
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“The South China Sea issue is not just about

competing claims; it’s about peace and stability
in the region.”

~ ASEAN SECRETARY GENERAL LE LUONG MINH

 Policy Options
Thousands of vessels ply the East and South China Sea waters, from fishing boats to coastal
patrols and naval ships. Increasingly frequent clashes between China and its neighbors heighten
the risk that miscalculations by sea captains or political leaders could trigger an armed conflict,
which the United States could be drawn into through military commitments to allies Japan and
the Philippines. Policy experts believe that a crisis management system for the region is crucial.

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PREVENTIVE MEASURES
A range of preventive measures could ease regional tensions and de-escalate the risk
of military conflict. Experts including Elizabeth Economy, Sheila Smith, Joshua
Kurlantzick, and Simon Tay weigh the options.
Resource Sharing
Claimants in both the South China Sea and East China Sea could cooperate on the development of
resources (http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springbuszynski.pdf) (PDF)
(http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springbuszynski.pdf), including fisheries, petroleum, and gas.
A resource-sharing agreement could include bilateral patrolling mechanisms, which would deter
potential sources of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes arising from oil and gas
exploration. More collaborations in the mold of joint fishery deals like those between China and
Vietnam and Japan and Taiwan (http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?
disp3_l205403553_text) could mitigate risk by sharing economic benefits.

Military-to-Military Communication
Increased dialogue between military forces has the potential to reduce the risk of conflict escalation
(http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883). Communication mechanisms
like military hotlines to manage maritime emergencies, similar to the one set up by China and Japan
and the one that China and Vietnam agreed to institute (http://bigstory.ap.org/article/china-vietnam-
agree-set-hotline) in June 2013, could be established among all claimants. These hotline systems
would connect leaders in the event of a crisis that could arise from such mishaps as naval maneuvers
misinterpreted by captains of merchant vessels or fishermen. Lastly, joint naval exercises could
support greater military transparency and help develop shared rules of the road.

Building a Multilateral Framework

The development of a multilateral, binding code of conduct between China and ASEAN countries is
often cited as a way of easing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The parties have already
agreed upon multilateral risk reduction and confidence-building measures in the 2002 Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (http://www.asean.org/asean/external-
relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea), but none have
adhered to its provisions or implemented its trust-building proposals. While China has historically
preferred to handle all disputes bilaterally, the resumption of negotiations between Beijing and
ASEAN still holds promise for reinvigorating a multilateral framework toward greater cooperation
and conflict resolution.

International Arbitration
Bringing territorial disputes to an international legal body presents another means of conflict
mitigation. The International Court of Justice (http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-
china-sea/p27883) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are two forums where
claimants can file submissions for settlement. In July 2013, a UN tribunal was convened in The Hague
to discuss an arbitration case filed by the Philippine government contesting the legality of China’s
territorial claims in the South China Sea. An outside organization or mediator could also to be called
upon to resolve the disagreement, although the prospect for success in these cases is slim given
China’s likely opposition to such options.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT
In the event military conflict erupts, policy experts including Elizabeth Economy, Sheila
Smith, and Shen Dingli outline a few immediate options facing the countries involved.

Diplomatic
Escalatory actions would likely trigger ramped up diplomacy. The United States could initially serve
in a mediation role in the event of crisis erupting in either sea. In the South China Sea, mediation
could also come from ASEAN or a trusted, neutral actor within the region like Singapore. Parties
could also call for an emergency session of the UN Security Council (http://www.un.org/en/sc/) to
negotiate a cease-fire, although China’s seat on the council could limit the effectiveness of this option.
In the East China Sea, bilateral management of the dispute is the likely first option, with Beijing and
Tokyo sitting down to negotiate a common guideline for handling the conflict and preventing its
escalation.
Economic
Despite extensive trade ties, the parties to the dispute could respond to a rise in tensions by imposing
economic sanctions. In response to a Chinese action, for instance, Washington could sanction
financial transactions, the movement of some goods and services, and even travel between China and
the United States. In retaliation, Beijing could bar U.S. exports and cut back on its extensive
purchases of U.S. Treasuries. Claimants could also manipulate exports and relaunch boycotts of
goods. Some signals of such a response have already been seen: in 2012 Chinese protesters launched
a wave of boycotts (http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-17/anti-japanese-protests-flare-
in-china-over-disputed-islands) of Japanese-branded products. Japan also accused China of halting
exports of rare earth minerals
(http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hc9KKTHMMgKRbYLIkxQJMMz8fqCQ)
after a territorial spat in 2010—a charge Beijing denied—causing a commodities crisis for resource-
dependent Japan.

Military
If confrontation were to involve Japan in the East China Sea or the Philippines in the South China
Sea, the United States would be obligated to consider military action under defense treaties
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html). Experts note that Washington’s
defense commitments to Tokyo are stronger than those to Manila. Under its treaty obligations, the
United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the U.S.-Philippine treaty
holds both nations accountable for mutual support in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area
on either of the Parties.” Military action would represent a last resort, and would depend on the scale
and circumstances of the escalation. In the event of armed conflict breaking out between China and
Japan, the United States could also use crisis communication mechanisms outlined in the U.S.-China
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (PDF) (http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-
china.pdf) to encourage a stand-down of forces and facilitate communication between Tokyo and
Beijing. Verbal declarations that communicate the seriousness of the dispute and convey support for
an ally, as well as offers of military assistance, can also serve as essential “coercive de-
escalation” measures during a crisis.
 “This is the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific—
security, prosperity and dignity for all ... let
there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the
twenty-first century, the United States of
America is all in.”

~ U.S. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

Resources
EXPERTS FURTHER READING GLOSSARY EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES

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Experts

Shen Dingli (http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/viewprofile.en.php?id=66) Professor of International Relations, Fudan

University
Elizabeth Economy (http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-china-environment-us-china-relations/elizabeth-c-
economy/b21) C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, CFR
Richard Haass (http://www.cfr.org/experts/afghanistan-iraq-middle-east-and-north-africa/richard-n-haass/b3350)
President, CFR
Joshua Kurlantzick (http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-southeast-asia-democracy-human-rights/joshua-
kurlantzick/b15522) Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia, CFR
Sheila A. Smith (http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-and-pacific-japan/sheila-a-smith/b12373) Senior Fellow for Japan
© COPYRIGHT 2013, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. ALL RIGHTS
Studies, CFR
RESERVED.
Simon Tay (http://siiaonline.org/page/Staff/) Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs
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