Hans Delbruck The Warfare in Antiquity

HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, VOLUME I
By Hans Delbrilck
Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.
Warfare in Antiquity
HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR
VOLUME I
By Hans Delbrück
Translated from the German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.
University of Nebraska Press

Lincoln and London
English language edition copyright © 1975 by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Bison Book printing: 1990

Most recent printing indicated by the first digit below:
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Delbrück, Hans, 1848-1929.
[Geschichte der kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte.
Volume I—II. English]
History of the art of war / by Hans Delbrück: translated from the
German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.
p. cm.
Translation of: Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der
politischen Geschichte, v. I—II.
Contents: v. I. Warfare in antiquity—v. II. The barbarian invasions.
ISBN 0-8032-6584-0 (set).—ISBN 0-8032-9199-X (v. I).—
ISBN 0-8032-9200-7 (v. II)
1. Military art and science—History. 2. Naval art and science—
History. 3. War—History. I. Title.
U27.D34213 1990
355'.009—dc20
89-24980 CIP
Reprinted by arrangement with Greenwood Press, Inc.
Originally titled HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK

OF POLITICAL HISTORY, by Hans Delbrück, Volume I, ANTIQUITY. Translated
from the German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., and published as part of the Green-
wood Press Series, Contributions in Military History, Westport, CT. Maps drawn
by Edward J. Krasnoborski. Originally published in German under the title GES-
CHICHTE DER KRIEGSKUNST IN RAHMEN DER POLITISCHEN GES-
CHICHTE. Copyright © 1975 by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. All rights reserved.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations 8
Translator's Foreword 9
Preface to the First Edition 11
Preface to the Second Edition 19
Preface to t h e T h i r d Edition 23
Volume I
Point of D e p a r t u r e 27
BOOK I
T h e Persian W a r s
I. A r m y S t r e n g t h s : I n t r o d u c t o r y Material 33
II. G r e e k A r m s a n d Tactics 53
I I I . G r e e k A r m y S t r e n g t h s : Conclusion 63
IV. T h e Persian A r m y 67
V. Battle of M a r a t h o n 72
VI. Thermopylae 91
VII. Artemisium 98
V I I I . Battle of Salamis 103
IX. Battle of Plataea 111
B O O K II
T h e Greeks at T h e i r Height
I. G r e e k Tactics up to the P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r 123
II. Strategy: Pericles 135
III. Mercenaries 144
IV. R e f i n e m e n t of the Existing Tactical System in
the F o u r t h C e n t u r y 149
V. T h e o r y : X e n o p h o n 158
VI. E p a m i n o n d a s 165
5
6 Table of Contents
BOOK III
T h e Macedonians
I. T h e M a c e d o n i a n Military System 175
I I . A l e x a n d e r a n d Persia:
T h e Battle o n the G r a n i c u s 185
I I I . T h e Battle of Issus 191
I V . T h e Battle o f G a u g a m e l a 210
V . T h e Battle o n t h e H y d a s p e s 221
V I . A l e x a n d e r as a Military C o m m a n d e r 230
V I I . T h e Diadochi 235
BOOK IV
Ancient Rome
I . Knights a n d P h a l a n x 255
II. T h e Manipular Phalanx 272
I I I . R o m a n Drill, C a m p c r a f t , a n d Discipline 283
IV. P y r r h u s 297
V . T h e First Punic W a r 301
BOOK V
T h e Second Punic W a r
Introduction
I . T h e Battle o f C a n n a e 315
I I . T h e Basic Strategic P r o b l e m o f the
Second Punic W a r 337
I I I . T h e Strategic P r o l o g u e o f
t h e W a r in Retrospect 353
I V . R o m e Wins t h e U p p e r H a n d 365
V . T h e Battle o f Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a a n d
t h e Echelon Tactics 370
V I . H a n n i b a l a n d Scipio 380
BOOK VI
T h e Romans as World Conquerors
I. Romans and Macedonians 393
I I . T h e Professional A r m y : C o h o r t Tactics 412
III. T h e Centurions 429
I V . Mithridates 437
V. Romans and Parthians 441
Table of Contents 7
BOOK VII
Caesar
I. I n t r o d u c t i o n 453
I I . T h e Helvetian C a m p a i g n 459
I I I . Ariovistus 479
I V . T h e Subjection o f the Belgae 488
V. Vercingetorix 495
V I . T h e R o m a n A r t o f W a r Against the B a r b a r i a n s 508
V I I . T h e Civil W a r i n Italy a n d Spain 515
VIII. T h e Campaign in Greece 528
I X . T h e Battle o f Pharsalus 538
X. T h e Last C a m p a i g n s of t h e Civil W a r 556
XI. T h e Elephants 561
Conclusion 565
Index 573
List of Illustrations
Figure 1. Battle of M a r a t h o n 74
Figure 2. Battle of Issus 193
Figure 3. Battle of Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a 382
F i g u r e 4. Battle b e t w e e n C a e s a r a n d Ariovistus 484
Figure 5. Siege of Alesia 503
Figure 6. Siege of I l e r d a 521
8
Translator's Foreword
T h i s t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o E n g l i s h o f t h e first v o l u m e o f H a n s
Delbrück's Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen
Geschichte is based on the t h i r d edition of t h a t v o l u m e , which was
published in Berlin in 1920. I have e n d e a v o r e d to a d h e r e as closely
as possible to t h e original, b o t h in spirit a n d in style, a n d I have
a s s u m e d t h a t those u s i n g this b o o k will be familiar e n o u g h with
military history a n d the political history that Delbrück used as his
b a c k g r o u n d t o e l i m i n a t e a n y n e e d for s u p p l e m e n t a r y e x p l a n a -
tions on the p a r t of the translator. In those very r a r e cases w h e r e it
was felt necessary to point o u t an obvious e r r o r or oversight a p -
p e a r i n g in t h e G e r m a n version, this has b e e n d o n e within the b o d y
of t h e text. No notes have b e e n a d d e d by the translator.
Delbrück's f r e q u e n t use of G r e e k a n d Latin citations has c r e a t e d
a p r o b l e m in translating the text into English at this time, m o r e
t h a n f i f t y years after t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f his t h i r d edition a n d over
seventy y e a r s since t h e first e d i t i o n was p u b l i s h e d in 1900. Al-
t h o u g h i t c o u l d b e a s s u m e d t h a t t h e s c h o l a r o f D e l b r ü c k ' s day
would be familiar with b o t h G r e e k a n d Latin, such an a s s u m p t i o n
can no l o n g e r be m a d e , especially with respect to Greek. In a few
cases, w h e r e Delbrück has cited a G r e e k or Latin w o r d p a r e n t h e t i -
cally, without using it as a central p o i n t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of his
a r g u m e n t , I h a v e t a k e n t h e liberty of o m i t t i n g it completely. In
most cases, however, G r e e k expressions have b e e n t r a n s l a t e d into
English a n d a r e given in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s , followed by an asterisk.
In a few cases, w h e r e Delbrück e x p o u n d s at s o m e length on t h e
m e a n i n g of a G r e e k w o r d , an English transliteration of t h e w o r d is
shown. F o r obvious r e a s o n s o f e c o n o m y n o use has b e e n m a d e o f
t h e G r e e k a l p h a b e t . In the case of Latin, t h e cited passages a r e
shown in t h e original, followed in most cases by t h e English transla-
tion in p a r e n t h e s e s .
I am i n d e b t e d to Assistant Professor B r u c e T a g g a r t of t h e De-
p a r t m e n t of Classics, Boston University, for his translations of t h e
G r e e k a n d Latin citations.
In his s t a t e m e n t of distances Delbrück varied b e t w e e n the use of
G e r m a n miles a n d of kilometers. W h e r e he gives such figures in
kilometers, t h e same unit o f m e a s u r e has b e e n r e t a i n e d ; w h e r e h e
9
10 Translator's Foreword
uses G e r m a n miles, his figures have b e e n c o n v e r t e d into English

miles.
Finally, I wish to e x p r e s s my own a p p r e c i a t i o n a n d that of t h e
publisher, Greenwood Press, to Frau Helene Hobe-Delbrück,
d a u g h t e r of H a n s Delbrück, for kindly g r a n t i n g permission for this
translation.
But I say that we o u g h t to
j u d g e that the writer's
authority be taken not
necessarily as worth nothing,
but, again, not as final;
readers ought to make j u d g m e n t s
from the facts themselves.
Polybius 3.9
Preface
to the First Edition
T h e c o n s t a n t l y p r o g r e s s i n g specialization i n k n o w l e d g e i s d e -
v e l o p i n g in two ways in t h e field of history, by p e r i o d s a n d by
p h e n o m e n a . S o m e p e r s o n s s t u d y all p h a s e s of a specific t i m e ,
w h e r e a s o t h e r s seek to trace a special aspect t h r o u g h t h e various
— a n d w h e r e possible, t h r o u g h all—periods. O n e sees specialized
histories of art a n d literature, the history of religion, the history of
t h e constitutions a n d of the law, of economic life, of finances, a n d
even of individual institutions, such as m a r r i a g e , for e x a m p l e . All
i n d i v i d u a l b r a n c h e s of history flow t o g e t h e r in universal history
a n d cross-fertilize o n e a n o t h e r . No o n e b r a n c h is to be d i s p e n s e d
with without h a r m i n g t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e whole. A n d so univer-
sal history is also in n e e d of a history of the art of war. W a r s , which
form a n d destroy nations, occupy such a b r o a d p a r t of t h e total of
history t h a t o n e c a n n o t bypass the challenge, not simply to r e c o u n t
t h e m e v e n t by e v e n t as r e p o r t e d in the sources, b u t to e x a m i n e
t h e m critically a n d to d e v e l o p a technically correct p r e s e n t a t i o n .
T h e best m e a n s of d o i n g this, a c c o r d i n g to the law of the division
of labor, is t h r o u g h a specialized history.
F o r the historian, the difficulty of each such specialized history
lies in t h e mastery of sufficient technical k n o w l e d g e . If o n e is to
believe t h a t the literary h i s t o r i a n is capable of p l u n g i n g himself
completely into t h e process of literary p r o d u c t i o n , t h e n it is all the
m o r e difficult for t h e art historian to master completely the tech-
niques of p a i n t i n g a n d s c u l p t u r e , t h e economic historians those of
agriculture, h a n d w o r k i n g skills, a n d c o m m e r c e . Certainly o n e does
not d e m a n d o f t h e m t h a t they s h o u l d personally paint m a d o n n a s ,
build cathedrals, g u i d e the plow, or f o u n d colonies; b u t a l t h o u g h
o n e does not d e m a n d these things, nevertheless the p e r s o n s w h o
11
12 Preface to the First Edition
have these practical skills, w h o a r e familiar with these things or ac-

tually practice t h e m , do have a certain a d v a n t a g e over the historian
a n d t e n d to r e g a r d h i m with a certain mistrust. Achilles owes his
fame to H o m e r — b u t o n e w o n d e r s if he might not have cried out at
this or that verse: "It's easy to see that you a r e a p o e t a n d never
personally h u r l e d a spear, s t a n d i n g at the h e a d of the M y r m i d o n s ! "
T h e scholar w h o writes a history of strategy a n d tactics is in an
even worse position. It is already a considerable a d v a n t a g e if he has
h a d the good f o r t u n e to b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with the realities of
w a r t h r o u g h service in t h e lowest r a n k s . But he m u s t seek to m a k e
himself m a s t e r of e v e r y t h i n g at a h i g h e r level on a p u r e l y theoreti-
cal basis, a n d he may n o t later embellish his account with poetic
license. Technical accuracy is t h e prerequisite of success. J u s t as t h e
artist or the military m a n w h o wishes to describe the past d e e d s of
his p a r t i c u l a r field m u s t a d a p t himself to c a r r y i n g o u t methodical
s o u r c e studies, s o t o o m u s t t h e h i s t o r i a n w h o wishes t o r e c o u n t
wars, a n d especially the history of the art of war itself, study the
objective conditions, t h e technical possibilities of t h e events, as long
as is necessary to let h i m m a s t e r t h e m with c o m p l e t e certainty.
In principle, this r e q u i r e m e n t is in no way new, a n d from the
very start o n e s h o u l d eliminate the idea that, in the case of a w o r k
such as the p r e s e n t o n e , s o m e different scientific m e t h o d is to be
used than applies in o t h e r areas of historical research. T r u e
e n o u g h , o n e may speak of critical analysis based on objective con-
siderations in contrast to analysis based on t h e written w o r d , b u t
those are not opposites, only different tools of the s a m e unified,
scientific criticism. No philologist, no m a t t e r how s t r o n g the mastery
he m i g h t feel t h a t he possesses in strict, literal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , will
for that reason discard in principle t h e objective observation of t h e
subject; no e x p e r t , even if he is able to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e practical
context with e x p e r i m e n t a l certainty, will for t h a t r e a s o n d e n y that
the basis of all historical k n o w l e d g e is the passing d o w n of source-
based facts. T h e only difference is t h a t the o n e , by virtue of his
own studies a n d p e r s o n a l viewpoint, finds his s t r e n g t h principally
i n t h e philological m e t h o d , t h e o t h e r m o r e i n t h e objective o n e .
T h e o n e is subject to t h e d a n g e r of restating a false set of facts,
since he is not capable of perceiving their objective impossibility;
the o t h e r r u n s the d a n g e r of a t t r i b u t i n g to t h e past certain events
t a k e n from the reality of the p r e s e n t , without p a y i n g sufficient at-
tention to t h e difference in circumstances. In o r d e r , t h e r e f o r e , to
assure the accuracy of the research, the philological a n d t h e objec-
tive a p p r o a c h e s m u s t go h a n d in h a n d in every step a n d every o b -
servation, must constantly enlighten a n d control one another.

T h e r e is no t r u e objective analysis w i t h o u t a philologically accurate
base of s o u r c e m a t e r i a l , a n d t h e r e is no t r u e philological study
without objective analysis. O n l y in this way can o n e arrive at t h e
full rigor of t h e m e t h o d whose essence is the exclusion of all w h i m ,
both in the acceptance a n d in the d i s c a r d i n g of the i n h e r i t e d ac-
counts. Polybius has already e x p r e s s e d this idea pointedly in the ci-
tation that I have placed as my e p i g r a p h .
If this b o o k signifies a s t e p f o r w a r d in o u r k n o w l e d g e of t h e
past, which is such a p r o f o u n d n e e d of t h e h u m a n m i n d , this result
does not, t h e r e f o r e , rest on t h e application of a new m e t h o d , b u t
r a t h e r on the practical a n d systematic application of long k n o w n
a n d theoretically r e c o g n i z e d principles. It is t h e r e f o r e of the es-
sence of this b o o k — a n d I ask the r e a d e r ' s i n d u l g e n c e in allowing
me to speak a b o u t it—how I myself was led to realize t h a t in this
field scholarship was o n c e again faced with a task, a n d how u n u s u -
ally favorable circumstances c o m b i n e d to m a k e possible for me p r e -
cisely t h e study of the art of war.
Q u i t e soon after leaving t h e university I d i d s o m e study of t h e
history of the art of war, without really r e m e m b e r i n g how I first
b e c a m e i n t e r e s t e d in this. In t h e s p r i n g of 1874 I h a d a m a n e u v e r
to do in W i t t e n b e r g ; I obtained from the r e g i m e n t a l library
Rüstow's History of the Infantry (Geschichte der Infanterie), a n d from
that time on I n e v e r again lost sight of this subject.
In 1877, t h r o u g h the g o o d offices of C o u n t e s s H e d w i g B r ü h l , I
was c h a r g e d with c o m p l e t i n g t h e b i o g r a p h y o f G n e i s e n a u , t h e
Countess's g r a n d f a t h e r , which h a d b e e n left unfinished by G e o r g e
H e i n r i c h Pertz. As I p l u n g e d into t h e history of the wars of libera-
tion, I e x p e r i e n c e d in t h e strongest possible d e g r e e the n e e d to be
able to arrive at a realistic appraisal of the events, a n d my studies
t o w a r d this e n d h a d to be e x p a n d e d all the m o r e b r o a d l y in that, at
that time, two different basic strategic viewpoints—one r e p r e s e n t e d
b y A r c h d u k e Karl, S c h w a r z e n b e r g , a n d Wellington, a n d t h e o t h e r
by N a p o l e o n a n d G n e i s e n a u — w e r e in conflict with each o t h e r a n d
h a d to be tested historically.
G o e t h e spoke o n c e of the g r e a t step f o r w a r d that o n e can s o m e -
times e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h a single significant w o r d , a n d a n o t h e r
time he said that o n e learns best not from books, b u t t h r o u g h a
living e x c h a n g e o f ideas, t h r o u g h contact with wise p e o p l e . T h e
t r u t h of these p r o n o u n c e m e n t s I l e a r n e d for myself at t h a t time.
In those years I was t h e t u t o r of t h e y o u n g e s t son of Kaiser Fre-
derick, Prince W a l d e m a r , w h o d i e d in 1879 at the age of eleven. In
this position I h a d not only t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to gain a certain direct

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how the decisions of an a r m y c o m m a n d e r origi-
nate psychologically, t h r o u g h t h e stories of the t h e n C r o w n Prince
himself a n d of Field Marshal C o u n t B l u m e n t h a l , b u t I could also,
t h r o u g h a question at any m o m e n t , clarify a n d fill o u t my studies,
starting with Clausewitz, whose works the C r o w n Prince p r e s e n t e d
to m e . I can still r e m e m b e r today points w h e r e my u n d e r s t a n d i n g
h a d c o m e to a stop, so to speak, a n d w h e r e a lucky expression, an
a p p r o p r i a t e w o r d , c a r r i e d me over the obstacle, a n d I c a n n o t h e l p
t h i n k i n g in g r a t i t u d e , now, after almost twenty-five years, of t h e
n a m e s of those g e n t l e m e n to w h o m I am i n d e b t e d for this instruc-
tion. I n c l u d e d a r e t h e n a m e s of G e n e r a l von G o t t b e r g , w h o d i e d as
c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l of t h e I A r m y C o r p s ; G e n e r a l von W i n t e r -
feld, recently c o m m a n d i n g general o f the G u a r d C o r p s ; G e n e r a l
von Mischke; C o l o n e l von Dresky; t h e late G e n e r a l von U n r u h ,
whose last assignment was as c o m m a n d e r of the A l e x a n d e r Regi-
m e n t ; b u t , above all, t h e t h e n L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l ( a n d military
t u t o r of Prince F r e d e r i c k L e o p o l d ) von Geissler, w h o d i e d as a
l i e u t e n a n t g e n e r a l . H e r r von Geissler was pedagogically inclined
a n d , w h i l e o u r two y o u n g g e n t l e m e n w e r e p l a y i n g u n d e r o u r
s u p e r v i s i o n o n t h e e x e r c i s e a r e a o f t h e N e w Palace o r o n t h e
B ö t t c h e r b e r g n e a r Glienicke, he took p l e a s u r e in replying to my
e a g e r q u e s t i o n i n g with e n t i r e lectures on military subjects, which,
b e i n g of excellent, u n d e r s t a n d a b l e clarity, f u r t h e r e d my k n o w l e d g e
greatly. In t h e same c o n n e c t i o n I s h o u l d like also to m e n t i o n two
o t h e r h i g h - r a n k i n g officers: G e n e r a l von Fransecky, w h o in 1870
was c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l of t h e II A r m y C o r p s , later of the X I ,
a n d finally g o v e r n o r of Berlin; a n d the t h e n Major of t h e G e n e r a l
Staff, Boie, who d i e d as t h e g o v e r n o r of T h o r n . G e n e r a l von F r a n -
secky h a d o n c e , as a y o u n g G e n e r a l Staff officer, b e g u n a biog-
r a p h y of G n e i s e n a u ; t h r o u g h that I c a m e into contact with him a n d
often visited him a n d discussed that subject with h i m . Major Boie
t u r n e d over to me t h e n o t e b o o k for the c a m p a i g n of 1814 which
he himself h a d w o r k e d up from the original d o c u m e n t s for a lec-
t u r e at t h e W a r College, a n d we used to discuss in detail individual
p r o b l e m s of this c a m p a i g n .
W h e n , in J a n u a r y 1881, after I h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e G n e i s e n a u
b i o g r a p h y , I j o i n e d the faculty of the University of Berlin, my first
lecture was a b o u t the war of 1866. T h e n I gave (in the s u m m e r of
1881) "History of Military C o n c e p t s a n d of t h e A r t of W a r since
the I n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e F e u d a l System" ("Geschichte d e r Kriegsver-
fassungen u n d d e r Kriegskunst seit d e r E i n f ü h r u n g des L e h n s w e -
sens"). I did not yet v e n t u r e to i n t r o d u c e antiquity into this lecture.

I h a d n o t yet w o r k e d it o u t myself from t h e original sources, a n d I
felt, even t h o u g h I h a d already s t a r t e d to h a r b o r the idea t h a t t h e
p r e v a i l i n g belief a b o u t the d e v e l o p m e n t of R o m a n tactics
(Quincunx-Stellung) could not possibly be right, t h a t I was still n o t in
a position to offer s o m e o t h e r c o n c e p t as a substitute. N o t until two
years later, in t h e s u m m e r of 1883, did I d a r e to a n n o u n c e t h e lec-
t u r e " G e n e r a l History of Military C o n c e p t s a n d of the A r t of W a r
from t h e Persian W a r s up to t h e P r e s e n t . " I t h e n gave this lecture
m a n y t i m e s ; a n d I also s p o k e on t h e " W a r of 1 8 7 0 , " "Selected
C h a p t e r s f r o m Strategy a n d Tactics, for Historians," " T h e Principal
Battles of F r e d e r i c k a n d N a p o l e o n , " a n d finally (in the w i n t e r of
1897-1898) " C o n c e r n i n g t h e Economic Prosperity of N a t i o n s in its
I n t e r p l a y with t h e i r Military P o s t u r e a n d t h e i r Military D e e d s . " I
p u b l i s h e d w o r k s based o n original sources o n the Persian W a r s , t h e
strategy o f Pericles, o n T h u c y d i d e s a n d Cleon, the R o m a n m a n i p u -
lar tactics, t h e p r e - G e r m a n i c n a t i o n a n d district, the First C r u s a d e ,
t h e Swiss a n d B u r g u n d i a n battles, the bases of the strategy of F r e d -
erick a n d N a p o l e o n ; and at my u r g i n g , y o u n g e r scholars did
o t h e r works d e a l i n g with the most varied p e r i o d s of military his-
tory, from H a n n i b a l to N a p o l e o n .
I n a n d t h r o u g h t h e s e l e c t u r e s a n d special s t u d i e s t h e r e h a s
gradually b e e n c r e a t e d the book of which I am now b r i n g i n g o u t
the first v o l u m e , a n d in d o i n g so I ask t h e r e a d e r to b e a r in m i n d
t h a t this is only t h e first v o l u m e a n d that, from the p e r s o n a l view-
point of t h e a u t h o r , his point of d e p a r t u r e rests, not in this p e r i o d ,
b u t in the most r e c e n t p e r i o d of world history.
A n essential p r e r e q u i s i t e t h a t m a d e m y w o r k possible was t h e
p a i n s t a k i n g w o r k i n g out a n d o r d e r i n g of the source material in its
philological, a n t i q u a r i a n , a n d political science aspects, as p r o v i d e d
by the p r e s e n t state of o u r k n o w l e d g e . At this point I w o u l d have
to n a m e countless p r e c u r s o r s if I wished to list all those to w h o m
t h a n k s are d u e c o n c e r n i n g this work, a n d to say that M o m m s e n
stands at t h e i r h e a d is so obvious that respect p e r h a p s forbids m o r e
strongly t h a n it d e m a n d s that this point receive special m e n t i o n .
For this r e a s o n I shall c o n t e n t myself with the general s t a t e m e n t of
this i n d e b t e d n e s s . One b o o k I s h o u l d like to m e n t i o n expressly,
since it forms, so to speak, a spiritual parallel to my o w n . It is The
Population of the Greco-Roman World (Die Bevölkerung der
griechisch-römischen Welt), by J u l i u s Beloch (1886), which, j u s t as I
h a v e d o n e w i t h t h e a r t o f w a r , t r a c e s t h e p o p u l a t i o n statistics
t h r o u g h all antiquity, based not j u s t on the philological m e t h o d , b u t
principally on t h e objective m e t h o d as it has b e e n practiced a n d r e -

fined in r e c e n t times. T h e m o r e I consulted this book, the g r e a t e r I
l e a r n e d to prize it. If it t u r n s out that I myself seek at times to es-
tablish not only individual extensions b u t e v e n a few n o t insignific-
a n t variations from Beloch's figures, I s h o u l d like to m a k e it clear
from t h e start t h a t Beloch himself indicated t h a t such variations
a n d corrections w e r e very likely possible. T h e small differences in
carefully verified p o i n t s of individual detail only p r o v e c o n c u r r e n c e
a n d confirmation for t h e whole a n d t h e essential aspects.
W i t h o u t Beloch's p r e c e d i n g w o r k , m a n y p a r t s o f t h e p r e s e n t
book could h a r d l y have b e e n written; in fact, t h e s t r e n g t h s of the
a r m i e s will play such a n i m p o r t a n t role t h a t o n e c o u l d p e r h a p s
c o n c l u d e that my research was based squarely on t h e m . T h a t was
n o t the case, however, b u t I m u s t confess that, to my a s t o n i s h m e n t ,
in t h e course of each individual bit of r e s e a r c h I a r r i v e d again a n d
again at this s a m e point. P e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t conclusion of
the whole book for the following volumes, as for history, is the es-
tablishment of the n u m e r i c a l relationships in Caesar's Gallic W a r
a n d the logical d e d u c t i o n s t h e r e f r o m , a n d on t h a t p o i n t , as I m u s t
a c k n o w l e d g e , I myself did n o t arrive at a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g until
my last r e w o r k i n g of t h e m a t e r i a l . H e r e , it is t r u e , an historical
work m e a n s n o m o r e t h a n a n y w h e r e else t h e following-through t o
it's logical conclusions of an idea t h a t has o c c u r r e d to o n e in a
f o r t u n a t e m o m e n t of intuition, b u t it rests, r a t h e r , on empirical re-
search t h a t p r o g r e s s e s from point to point, a n d only slowly do t h e
t h o u g h t s struggle free f r o m the m a t r i x o f the d e e p l y r o o t e d ac-
c o u n t passed d o w n t o o n e .
T h e p u r p o s e of my book, like its guidelines, is indicated accu-
rately e n o u g h , I believe, by its title. I do not claim to have written a
c o m p l e t e a n d all-inclusive "History of the A r t of W a r " ; to such a
w o r k w o u l d b e l o n g also t h e study of ancient relics; t h e details of
drill, with its c o m m a n d s ; t h e t e c h n i q u e of w e a p o n s ; the t r a i n i n g
a n d h a n d l i n g of horses; fortifications; siegecraft; a n d finally also
t h e whole m a t t e r of seafaring—things a b o u t which I would have
n o t h i n g new to r e c o u n t or which I do not even have k n o w l e d g e of.
In this light, t h e r e still r e m a i n s the task of writing a "History of the
Art of W a r , " s o m e w h a t in t h e sense of a practical m a n u a l . O n e has
to believe that t h e r e is such a value i n h e r e n t in t h e history of war-
fare, for the g r e a t c a p t a i n s have often said so. N a p o l e o n , especially,
laid d o w n again a n d again t h e r e q u i r e m e n t that he w h o wished to
b e c o m e a strategist s h o u l d study t h e g r e a t d e e d s of the past, a n d
Clausewitz set up as an ideal t h e teaching of w a r purely by way of
historical e x a m p l e s . T h i s book, however, does not p r e t e n d to such

h i g h aims. W h a t e v e r practical c o n t r i b u t i o n history m i g h t m a k e lies
in t h e field of the military m a n ; t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of my o w n m i n d is
not in t h a t direction. I am only a historian a n d w a n t e d to write a
book for friends of history a n d a m a n u a l for historians in t h e spirit
of L e o p o l d R a n k e .
4 June 1900
HANS DELBRÜCK
Preface
to the Second Edition
of the First Two Volumes
T h e first two volumes of History of the Art of War have already
b e e n o u t of p r i n t for a n u m b e r of years now without my having
f o u n d the time to p r e p a r e t h e new edition, o c c u p i e d as I was with
my w o r k on t h e t h i r d v o l u m e . A n u m b e r of fine new d e t a i l e d
studies h a d a p p e a r e d i n the m e a n t i m e a n d h a d t o b e tested a n d
w o r k e d into t h e old text, a n d in addition small points h a d to be
c o r r e c t e d h e r e a n d t h e r e , a n d a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t , t h e oldest R o m a n
organization for war, h a d to be completely r e m o l d e d . B u t in the
final analysis, these corrections r e q u i r e d t h e least work a n d would
not have held up t h e new edition so long; t h e real effort a n d time-
c o n s u m i n g aspect of t h e new e d i t i o n w e r e necessitated by s o m e -
t h i n g else. In a review of the first v o l u m e , G e n e r a l of I n f a n t r y von
Schlichting, a u t h o r of Tactical and Strategic Principles of the Present
Day, (Taktische und strategische Grundsätze der Gegenwart), e x p r e s s e d
the h o p e that t h e p r e s e n t work w o u l d " b r i n g a n e n d t o the military
dilettantism that has h e r e t o f o r e r e i g n e d in t h e writing of history."
T h e s e w o r d s e x p r e s s i n t h e p r e c i s e s t possible way t h e goal o n
which I have b a s e d my work a n d t o w a r d which my h o p e s w e r e di-
rected. B u t this h o p e has not only not b e e n fulfilled, b u t the exact
opposite has t a k e n place. I v e n t u r e to say that h a r d l y ever in any
previous p e r i o d has so m u c h of a d i s t o r t e d a n d confusing n a t u r e
b e e n p u b l i s h e d in the field of military o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d the military
art t h r o u g h u n m e t h o d i c a l a n d dilettantish scholarship as precisely
in this last d e c a d e . T h e r e a r e not only historians a n d archaeologists
involved in this b u t also military m e n , w h o a r e inclined to believe
m u c h too quickly a n d with far too m u c h self-assurance that, with
the concepts they have g a i n e d in practice, often only in p e a c e t i m e
service, they can critically m a s t e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of earlier military
p e r i o d s . A n d s o not only have t h e r e b e e n d e v e l o p e d a n d published
false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the sources, c o n c e r n i n g which t h e r e can a n d
always will be different opinions, b u t also constructions that a r e ob-
jectively a n d physically impossible, a n d they have greatly o b s c u r e d
t h e clear historical events. T h e g r e a t e r p a r t of my work on this sec-
19
20 Preface to t h e Second Edition
o n d edition of these first two volumes has t h e r e f o r e consisted of

dispelling a n d r e b u t t i n g these impossibilities t h r o u g h b o t h critical
e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e s o u r c e s a n d objective analysis. T h a t is by no
m e a n s an easy a n d simple task, as we shall also see f u r t h e r on, for
in history the long p e r i o d t h a t separates us from t h e events t h e m -
selves allows even the most foolish ideas to take on a certain var-
nish of verisimilitude; it r e q u i r e s b r o a d - r a n g i n g a n d t h o r o u g h p r e -
sentations to destroy such false concepts a n d , since we c a n n o t re-
sort to e x p e r i m e n t s , to clarify verbally w h a t is physically possible
a n d w h a t is impossible. S o m e t i m e s this kind of discussion leads to
t h e a d v a n t a g e o f s h e d d i n g m o r e light o n t h e subject itself, a n d
t h e n o n e feels r e w a r d e d for his p a i n s . G e n e r a l l y , h o w e v e r , o n e
d o e s not r e a p such a h a r v e s t b u t finishes with t h e irritated feeling
of having wasted time a n d effort t h a t could b e t t e r have b e e n a p -
plied to s o m e t h i n g else.
H o w m u c h I would have p r e f e r r e d to have g o n e a h e a d with the
p r e p a r a t i o n of the f o u r t h v o l u m e !
As for the first v o l u m e , t h e reception t h a t it f o u n d a m o n g critical
scholars evoked in m a n y q u a r t e r s , even w h e r e it was otherwise wel-
c o m e d in friendly fashion, c o n c e r n as to w h e t h e r I h a d not ex-
c e e d e d t h e r i g h t of objective critical analysis a n d m o v e d f a r t h e r
away from t h e written sources t h a n could be justified. At no place
has my r e w o r k i n g of t h e material shown me t h a t t h e r e is a s o u n d
basis for this c o n c e r n . On t h e c o n t r a r y , I may say that the objec-
tively analytical c h a n g e s that I have now m a d e have s t e m m e d from
recognition of t h e fact t h a t in the first edition I h a d not yet m o v e d
sufficiently away from t h e viewpoints passed d o w n to us. It really is
true that not the Persians but the Greeks were numerically
s u p e r i o r ; t h a t A l e x a n d e r did n o t m a r c h o u t with a small b a n d to
c o n q u e r the Persian w o r l d e m p i r e b u t with a n a r m y p e r h a p s twice
as large as t h a t of X e r x e s h a d b e e n ; that in R o m e levies w e r e n e v e r
m a d e a c c o r d i n g to classes of wealth; that t h e b a r b a r i a n armies that
t h r e a t e n e d t h e civilized w o r l d w e r e always q u i t e small; t h a t the
R o m a n s w o n t h e i r victories over the Gauls a n d t h e G e r m a n i c tribes
chiefly by n u m e r i c a l superiority; that t h e knightly m a n n e r of war-
fare already existed b e f o r e the feudal system a n d d i d not grow o u t
of the latter.
T h e belief in t h e o p p o s i t e tradition on all these points is almost
as firm as it is ancient, a n d n o t only r e a s o n s b u t also time will be
r e q u i r e d to o v e r c o m e it a n d to establish a b e t t e r recognition in its
place. T h e best r e i n f o r c e m e n t s in this war, h o w e v e r , will be t h e
c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t work itself.
Preface to the Second Edition 21
T h e historian of antiquity w h o r e a d s only the first v o l u m e , the

legal historian w h o only c o m p a r e s the origin of the feudal system
with t h e attitudes that he has received from t h e sources, the his-
torian of the C r u s a d e s w h o only r e a d s how small the n u m b e r of
knights was a n d how little of an original n a t u r e this g r e a t military
p e r i o d is s u p p o s e d to have fostered—I can a p p r e c i a t e the caution
a n d t h e d o u b t t h a t they all feel. B u t I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e i r
d o u b t s will be dissolved a n d will d i s a p p e a r w h e n the historian of
antiquity also becomes familiar with t h e second a n d t h i r d volumes
of this work, w h e n the legal historian realizes the contrast between
t h e individual w a r r i o r a n d the tactical body from t h e i n t e r r e l a t e d
features of t h e e n t i r e work, a n d w h e n the historian of t h e C r u s a d e s
has b e c o m e fully aware of the difference between k n i g h t h o o d a n d
cavalry a n d t h e opposition of the concepts k n i g h t h o o d a n d tactics,
from a c o m p a r i s o n with the p r e c e d i n g a n d following periods.
J u s t as this work has g r o w n u p o n me from my overall observa-
tion of the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e art of war, in the same way only
those can derive from it the completely scholarly gain w h o use it
not simply as specialized historians of antiquity, the Middle Ages,
or m o d e r n times, but w h o accept it all t o g e t h e r as a study in world
history.
Berlin-Grunewald, 12 July 1908
HANS DELBRÜCK
Preface
to the Third Edition
Since t h e a p p e a r a n c e of t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n of this v o l u m e in
1908, two g r e a t p r o b l e m s of t h e military history of antiquity have
b e e n solved, the battles of Salamis a n d T h a p s u s , a n d I have b e e n
able to take t h e m into a c c o u n t in my r e w o r k i n g of this edition. F o r
Plataea a n d Issus, I have b e e n able to r e t a i n the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n -
ciples d e v e l o p e d in my earlier p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t on t h e basis of new
t o p o g r a p h i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t h e s e a c c o u n t s have b e e n r e w o r k e d
s o m e w h a t a s t o details. T h e old p o i n t o f d i s s e n s i o n c o n c e r n i n g
C a n n a e , as to w h e t h e r the battle took place on t h e left or the r i g h t
b a n k of the A u f i d u s , has b e e n definitely settled, b u t at the s a m e
time t h e u n d e r l y i n g bases for t h e Second Punic W a r , derived from
t h e s o u r c e materials, have b e e n strongly s h a k e n by a new a n d sol-
idly based hypothesis. T h e s e are the a r e a s in which, in a d d i t i o n to
n u m e r o u s d e t a i l e d c o r r e c t i o n s , this new e d i t i o n differs from t h e
previous o n e .
At the s a m e time I have also finally b r o u g h t the f o u r t h v o l u m e
t o completion a n d have t h u s c o n c l u d e d t h e entire work.
21 July 1920
HANS DELBRÜCK
23
Point of Departure
T h e history of the art of war is a single s t r a n d in the braid of
universal history a n d begins with the latter. It is best, however, n o t
to begin one's investigation at t h e point w h e r e the first m o r e or less
recognizable events begin to e m e r g e f r o m the twilight of t h e p r e -
historic era, but r a t h e r at the point w h e r e the source material be-
gins to p r o v i d e a full a n d valid glimpse into the events. T h a t is the
p e r i o d of t h e Persian W a r s , a n d not sooner; from t h a t time o n ,
however, r i g h t u p t o o u r o w n day, w e a r e able t o trace t h e d e -
v e l o p m e n t with u n b r o k e n testimony, a n d e a c h successive p e r i o d
helps to explain the p r e c e d i n g o n e . Even for t h e time before t h e
P e r s i a n W a r s t h e r e i s n o lack o f significant t e s t i m o n y ; for t h e
Greeks, H o m e r is particularly rich, a n d for the O r i e n t a l peoples,
such as the Egyptians, we have centuries, even t h o u s a n d s of years
of historical sources r e a c h i n g f a r t h e r back, b u t this evidence is still
not sufficient to allow directly t h e f o r m a t i o n of a completely certain
p i c t u r e . An historical objective analysis based on m u c h e x p e r i e n c e
in i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e events of w a r f a r e will facilitate the g r o u p i n g to-
g e t h e r into a unified p i c t u r e of the s e p a r a t e indications. T h i s objec-
tive j u d g m e n t in its highest d e g r e e , however, is only to be attained
t h r o u g h t h e study of military history itself, t h a t is, of t h e l a t e r
p e r i o d s . F o r o u r f i r s t steps w e m u s t t r y t o walk o n t h e f i r m e r
g r o u n d that t h e accounts o f c o n t e m p o r a r i e s offer us. O n a n d with
t h e m , t h e objective analysis can d e v e l o p to the point of r e a c h i n g
clear perspectives. T h e s e perspectives, won in this way, may
p e r h a p s later be valid to cast light on t h e earlier p e r i o d a n d to
b r i g h t e n the half-darkness in which it is e n v e l o p e d .
Even t h e events of t h e Persian W a r s h a v e b e e n passed d o w n to
us with such u n c e r t a i n t y , i n t e r t w i n e d with legends, n o t by a real
c o n t e m p o r a r y writer, b u t written d o w n only as they c a m e from the
m o u t h s of t h e following g e n e r a t i o n , so t h a t a N i e b u h r d e s p a i r e d of
recognizing t h e i r special s e q u e n c e , a n d w h e n e v e r , despite his w a r n -
i n g , h i s t o r i a n s t i m e a n d a g a i n p r e s e n t t o u s all t h e d e t a i l s o f
H e r o d o t u s ' a c c o u n t as history, a g r e a t deal of self-deception is in-
volved. No m a t t e r how skeptical a position o n e m i g h t wish to as-
s u m e , however, with respect to the colorful accounts of the f a t h e r
of written history, they do contain a n u c l e u s of accuracy that is suf-
27
28 History of t h e Art of W a r
ficient for the p u r p o s e s of a history of the art of war. We recognize

the c o m b a t m e t h o d s of the two armies, we can establish the terrain
o n w h i c h t h e f i g h t i n g t o o k p l a c e , a n d w e can u n d e r s t a n d t h e
strategic situation. With these things the basic features of t h e mili-
tary action a r e established, a n d these features, in t u r n , provide a
very reliable critical m e a s u r e for the details of the l e g e n d a r y ac-
c o u n t s . N o o l d e r military h a p p e n i n g s a r e laid o u t b e f o r e u s s o
clearly. T h e Persian Wars, t h e r e f o r e , form t h e n a t u r a l point of de-
p a r t u r e for a history of the art of war.
EXCURSUS
T h e basis for the scholarly k n o w l e d g e of the Greek military art is formed, e v e n

today, by two important works:
History of Greek Warfare from the Oldest Times to Pyrrhus (Geschichte des griechischen
Kriegswesens von der ältesten Zeit bis auf Pyrrhos). D e v e l o p e d from the original sources
by W. Rüstow, former Prussian e n g i n e e r officer, and Dr. H. Köchly, professor in
ordinary of Greek and R o m a n literature and language at the University of Zurich.
With 134 woodcuts printed in the body of the text and 6 lithographed tables. Aarau:
Verlags-Comptoir, 1852.
Greek Military Authors (Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller). In Greek and German with
critical and explanatory notations by H. Köchly and W. Rüstow. T w o parts, in three
volumes. Leipzig, 1853-1855.
N e w e r works include the following:
Army Organization and Conduct of War by the Greeks (Heerwesen und Kriegführung der
Griechen), by Dr. H. Droysen, g y m n a s i u m professor and d e a n at the Royal University
of Berlin. With o n e table and seven illustrations in the text (in K. F. Hermann's
Manual of Greek Antiquities (Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten). Freiburg im Breis-
g a u , 1 8 8 8 - 1 8 8 9 . A k a d e m i s c h e V e r l a g s b u c h h a n d l u n g v o n J . C . B . M o h r (Paul
Siebeck). (Discussed by me in the Literarisch.es Centralblatt 1888, N o . 16.)
Ancient Greek Military Periods (Die griechischen Kriegsaltertümer), by Dr. A d o l f Bauer,
professor of ancient history at Graz University (in Handbook of Classical Knowledge of
Antiquity [Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft]). Nördlingen ( n o w in
Munich): C. H. Beck, 1886; 2d ed. 1892. An excellent work, which contains a very
clear presentation of the source evidence. I should also like to point out here, o n c e
and for all, that Bauer's bibliography shows a very careful and t h o r o u g h treatment.
The Military Organization of the Ancients (Das Kriegswesen der Alten), with particular
consideration of strategy, by Dr. of Philosophy H u g o Liers, professor in the Gym-
nasium of Waldenburg, Breslau, 1895, is a stimulating and scholarly book based on
c o m p r e h e n s i v e and i n d e p e n d e n t readings of the old authors, which made me take
full notice of many a significant passage. As a whole, however, the work is unfortu-
nately faulty; the individual accounts are g r o u p e d systematically, but they are far
from having b e e n tested e n o u g h as to the d e g r e e of their credibility, and particu-
larly there is a lack of sufficient distinction between the individual periods of the
development.
In the Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 9 8 , 1907, Ben. Niese published an article entitled
"On the Organization for War, the Military Service Obligation, and the Military Sys-
tem of Greece" ("Ueber Wehrverfassung, Dienstpflicht u n d H e e r w e s e n Griechen-
lands") that d o e s not contain anything new on the subject.
I myself treated the military-historical problem of the Persian Wars in a m o n o -
g r a p h : The Persian Wars and the Burgundian Wars (Die Perserkriege und die
Point of Departure 29
Burgunderkriege). T w o c o m b i n e d military-historical studies with a s u p p l e m e n t on the

R o m a n manipular tactics. Berlin: Walther a n d Apolant (now H e r m a n n Walther,
Successor), 1887.
Of the general works on Greek history, the most meaningful o n e s for o u r consid-
eration are those of Busolt (2nd ed.), Beloch, and Duncker, and here and there also
the works of Grote.
T h r o u g h o u t all the volumes of the present work, right up to m o d e r n times, we
shall be accompanied by the following book, despite the shortcomings and superfi-
ciality in its e x e c u t i o n , w h i c h is i n g e n i o u s l y o r g a n i z e d : History of the Infantry
(Geschichte der Infanterie), by W. Rüstow. T w o volumes. Gotah, 1857 and 1858 (and
later reprints).
We shall also a d h e r e to the following work, particularly valuable in the later vol-
umes: History of Military Science, Principally in Germany (Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaf-
ten vornehmlich in Deutschland), by Max J ä h n s . ( F r o m the History of Learning in
Germany [Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland]). By special authority of His Maj-
esty the King of Bavaria, published by the Historical C o m m i s s i o n of the Royal
Academy of Sciences.) Munich and Leipzig, 1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 1 .
BOOK I
The Persian Wars
Chapter I
Army Strengths:
Introductory Material
W h e r e v e r t h e sources p e r m i t , a military-historical study does best
to start with the a r m y s t r e n g t h s . T h e y a r e of decisive i m p o r t a n c e ,
not simply because of the relative s t r e n g t h s , w h e r e b y t h e g r e a t e r
mass wins or is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by b r a v e r y or l e a d e r s h i p on the
p a r t of t h e w e a k e r force, b u t also on an absolute basis. A move-
m e n t that is m a d e by an organization of 1,000 m e n without compli-
cations b e c o m e s an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t for 10,000 m e n , a w o r k of art
for 50,000, a n d an impossibility for 100,000. In the case of a larger
a r m y , t h e task of p r o v i d i n g rations b e c o m e s a m o r e a n d m o r e im-
p o r t a n t p a r t of strategy. W i t h o u t a definite concept of the size of
t h e a r m i e s , t h e r e f o r e , a critical t r e a t m e n t of the historical accounts,
as of t h e events themselves, is impossible.
Since t h e r e still persist n u m e r o u s false ideas on this very point,
a n d r e p o r t e d n u m b e r s , without realization of the e x t e n t of t h e con-
clusions t h a t w o u l d have to be d r a w n from t h e m , a r e simply re-
p e a t e d , it a p p e a r s helpful, in o r d e r to s h a r p e n one's critical p e r c e p -
tion, so to speak, to indicate at o n c e in a few e x a m p l e s how easily
a n d to w h a t a g r e a t e x t e n t false s t r e n g t h s b e c o m e established in the
historical accounts.
In the o l d e r G e r m a n works on the wars of liberation, in Plotho,
w h o was senior a i d e - d e - c a m p o f F r e d e r i c k William I I I a n d d u r i n g
t h e w a r personally g a t h e r e d his i n f o r m a t i o n at the s u p r e m e head-
q u a r t e r s ; in t h e b i o g r a p h y of Radetzky by an A u s t r i a n v e t e r a n ; a n d
again in the o l d e r editions of t h e m u c h r e a d a n d d e s e r v i n g work of
B e i t z k e , German Wars of Liberation (Deutsche Freiheitskriege), t h e
F r e n c h A r m y , at the b e g i n n i n g of t h e fall c a m p a i g n of 1813, is
given as 300,000 to a m a x i m u m of 3 5 3 , 0 0 0 . T h e allies h a d at their
disposal a t t h a t time m o r e t h a n 4 9 2 , 0 0 0 m e n a n d w o u l d t h e r e f o r e
have h a d a c r u s h i n g superiority. In fact, aside from the garrisons
33
34 History of the A r t of W a r
of t h e fortifications in the t h e a t e r of war, N a p o l e o n h a d 440,000

1
m e n a n d was t h e r e f o r e numerically almost equal to the allies.
E. M. A r n d t e s t i m a t e d in 1814 t h e total casualties of all t h e
N a p o l e o n i c W a r s t o g e t h e r at 10,080,000 m e n ; a closer check brings
the n u m b e r considerably below 2 million, of which a f o u r t h would
2
be on the F r e n c h s i d e , a n d exact statistics w o u l d still lead to a con-
siderably smaller figure.
Even in n e w e r scholarly p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the wars of liberation
o n e finds that, in t h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t at H a g e l s b e r g , t h e h o m e
g u a r d s of the M a r k b a s h e d in the skulls of 4,000 F r e n c h m e n with
their rifle butts. In reality, it was a b o u t 30.
In the 1897 work of the Austrian G e n e r a l Staff C a p t a i n B e r n d t ,
Numbers in War {Die Zahl im Kriege), the s t r e n g t h of the F r e n c h at
the Battle of O r l e a n s (3 a n d 4 D e c e m b e r 1870) is given as 60,700,
w h e r e a s o t h e r r e s e a r c h e r s have estimated it at 174,500 a n d even
higher.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e same book, 75,000 A u s t r i a n s f o u g h t at A s p e r n
against 90,000 F r e n c h , a n d the latter are said to h a v e lost 44,380.
In reality, on the first day some 105,000 A u s t r i a n s fought against
3 5 , 0 0 0 F r e n c h , a n d on t h e second day the same A u s t r i a n s (with al-
lowance m a d e for casualties) fought against s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 F r e n c h
a n d t h e l a t t e r s u p p o s e d l y lost s o m e 1 6 , 0 0 0 t o a m a x i m u m o f
20,000 m e n .
T h e a r m y of Charles the Bold at G r a n s o n was e s t i m a t e d by Swiss
c o n t e m p o r a r i e s at 100,000 to 120,000 m e n ; later, at M u r t e n , he is
s u p p o s e d to have h a d a s t r e n g t h triple this n u m b e r . Actually, in
the first battle he h a d some 14,000 m e n , a n d in t h e second a few
t h o u s a n d m o r e . T h e Swiss, w h o claim to have f o u g h t against an
i m m e a s u r a b l e superiority, h a d a considerable n u m e r i c a l superiority
in b o t h battles.
Even at G r a n s o n they claim to have killed as m a n y as 7,000 of
the B u r g u n d i a n s , w h e r e a s in reality it was 7 knights a n d j u s t a few
3
private soldiers.
T h e Hussite armies, which cast t e r r o r over all of G e r m a n y a n d
w e r e p o r t r a y e d as endless masses, w e r e some 5,000 m e n s t r o n g .
It is probably n o t j u s t t h e g e n e r a l t e n d e n c y to hyperbolic con-
cepts, a lack of feel for n u m b e r s , boastfulness, fear, apology, or
o t h e r similar h u m a n weaknesses that lie at the base of the gigantic
e x a g g e r a t i o n s , b u t it m u s t probably also be c o n s i d e r e d that it is
very h a r d , even for a practiced eye, to estimate accurately r a t h e r
large masses, even on one's o w n side, w h e r e o n e has a free o p p o r -
tunity to observe t h e m ; in the case of t h e e n e m y , it is as g o o d as
Army Strengths: Introductory Material 35
impossible. An excellent e x a m p l e of this is p r o v i d e d by a recently

published account of Frederick William I I I c o n c e r n i n g the defeat
4
suffered u n d e r his own c o m m a n d a t A u e r s t a d t . T h e King says
that d u r i n g the battle o n e could no l o n g e r deceive himself as to the
fact t h a t he was facing a very s u p e r i o r force. T h e F r e n c h , he r e -
p o r t e d , as was possible with their g r e a t e r s t r e n g t h in infantry, h a d
quite often r e p l a c e d t h e i r fighting b a t t a l i o n s with fresh t r o o p s .
Since t h e P r u s s i a n s h a d a s t r e n g t h o f 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , the F r e n c h
would t h e r e f o r e have to be estimated at 70,000 to 80,000. Actually,
5
they w e r e only 27,000 s t r o n g , a n d that Frederick William really
h a d b e e n mistaken a n d was not p e r h a p s merely trying to excuse
the defeat is a p p a r e n t from a later a n n e x , which t h e King soon
t h e r e a f t e r a d d e d a n d i n w h i c h h e says t h a t , f r o m t h e F r e n c h
documents and other information, he has become convinced
" t h a t — b e it said to o u r s h a m e — t h e e n e m y o p p o s i n g us was no
s t r o n g e r t h a n 30,000 m e n . "
Let it be n o t e d t h a t it is not always a question simply of overesti-
mates a n d e x a g g e r a t i o n s ; the opposite occurs, too, a n d with full in-
tent I also i n t r o d u c e d a few e x a m p l e s of that kind above.
T h e a r m y that Xerxes led into G r e e c e is given by H e r o d o t u s as
n u m b e r i n g exactly 4,200,000 m e n , i n c l u d i n g the trains. A n a r m y
corps of 30,000 m e n covers, in t h e G e r m a n m a r c h o r d e r , s o m e 14
miles, without its supply train. T h e m a r c h c o l u m n of the Persians
would t h e r e f o r e have b e e n 2,000 miles long, a n d w h e n the h e a d of
the c o l u m n was arriving before T h e r m o p y l a e , the e n d of the col-
u m n m i g h t have b e e n j u s t m a r c h i n g o u t of Susa, on the far side of
the Tigris. A G e r m a n a r m y corps is a c c o m p a n i e d by artillery a n d
a m m u n i t i o n caissons, which take u p m u c h r o o m , a n d i n this r e g a r d
an ancient a r m y would r e q u i r e less space. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a
Persian a r m y certainly h a d only a very loose m a r c h discipline, that
quality which can only be attained t h r o u g h a very exact articulation
of the a r m y o r g a n i z a t i o n , with constant attention a n d effort. With-
out m a r c h discipline c o l u m n s very quickly stretch out to d o u b l e or
triple t h e n o r m a l length. Persian t r o o p s may t h e r e f o r e , even with-
o u t artillery, b e c o m p a r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y with m o d e r n t r o o p s i n
their m a r c h i n g space n e e d s .
After t h e d e p a r t u r e of X e r x e s with his large a r m y , M a r d o n i u s is
s u p p o s e d to have r e m a i n e d b e h i n d with 300,000 m e n , but even this
figure has no claim to credibility. A c c o r d i n g to H e r o d o t u s ' account,
M a r d o n i u s , w h e n h e h a d d e s t r o y e d A t h e n s for a s e c o n d t i m e ,
m a r c h e d back from t h e r e via Decelea to T a n a g r a , a n d on the fol-
lowing day, f a r t h e r . No a r m y of 300,000 m e n can m a r c h in this
36 History of t h e A r t of W a r
way. Even if a p a r t of t h e Persian a r m y h a d r e m a i n e d b e h i n d in

Boeotia a n d not only the pass of Decelea b u t all the passes over the
m o u n t a i n s were used a t t h e same time, t h e a r m y c a n n o t have n u m -
b e r e d m o r e t h a n some 75,000 warriors, including the allied Greeks.
B u t this w h o l e m e t h o d o f g r a d u a l l y r e d u c i n g t h e figures has
only a p r e p a r a t o r y value; it does not really lead us to o u r goal.
We m u s t convince ourselves a n d very definitely h o l d fast to the
idea t h a t we a r e deceiving ourselves if we place reliance on n u m -
bers like those of H e r o d o t u s . Even if o n e m i g h t , in any way what-
ever, p r o v e a specific n u m b e r that is no l o n g e r impossible, o n e that
even, in fact, a p p e a r s q u i t e possible—even in d o i n g this n o t h i n g is
really won. T h e t r u e a n d only reliable historical m e t h o d is not the
m e t h o d by which o n e , w h e n he has no reliable information, con-
tents himself with t h e unreliable a n d acts as if it w e r e acceptably
t r u s t w o r t h y , b u t r a t h e r , t h a t m e t h o d b y which o n e distinguishes
sharply a n d definitely b e t w e e n what can be r e g a r d e d as accurately
passed d o w n , a n d what is not. P e r h a p s we can still find some basic
point or o t h e r t h a t will allow us to express an a p p r o x i m a t e estimate
of the s t r e n g t h of the Persian a r m y . First of all, however, it m u s t be
established t h a t the Persian s t r e n g t h s claimed by t h e G r e e k s merit
no c r e d e n c e whatever, n o t even the slightest—that they are in no
way m o r e t r u s t w o r t h y t h a n the claims of t h e Swiss c o n c e r n i n g the
armies of Charles the Bold, so that we cannot d e t e r m i n e from
t h e m , t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r t h e n u m e r i c a l superiority lay on the side
of t h e G r e e k s or t h e Persians.
If we now t u r n t o w a r d the Greeks, we s e e m to be t r e a d i n g on
firmer g r o u n d . F o r t h e Battle of Plataea, H e r o d o t u s gives a specific
listing of the v a r i o u s c o n t i n g e n t s : 8,000 A t h e n i a n s , 5,000 Spar-
tiates, 5,000 Perioeci, etc., for a total of 3 8 , 7 0 0 hoplites. Since the
Greeks would no doubt have known their own strength, these
n u m b e r s could p e r h a p s be trusted, a n d most r e s e a r c h e r s have sim-
ply accepted t h e m . But t h a t is a methodological e r r o r . We do n o t
have t h e slightest g u a r a n t e e that some i n f o r m a n t o r the o t h e r o f
H e r o d o t u s did n o t d r a w up the list by a completely arbitrary esti-
m a t e , a n d t h e r e is at least o n e place in t h e list t h a t shows up the
feel of the o r i g i n a l w r i t e r for n u m b e r s in q u i t e an u n f a v o r a b l e
light. Every G r e e k hoplite was normally a c c o m p a n i e d by a serving
m a n ; t h e r e f o r e , in o r d e r to account for t h e full s t r e n g t h of the
a r m y , H e r o d o t u s d o u b l e s the n u m b e r . Every S p a r t i a t e , however,
a c c o r d i n g to him, h a d seven Helots with him; o n e must t h e r e f o r e
c o u n t an additional 3 5 , 0 0 0 m e n for this g r o u p . A ratio of 35,000
n o n c o m b a t a n t s to 5,000 c o m b a t a n t s , c o n s i d e r i n g b o t h m o v e m e n t of
the a r m y a n d its supply, is an absurdity. It probably h a d its origin

in the fact that the G r e e k t h o u g h t of t h e Spartiate as an e m i n e n t
m a n , w h o always went into the field with several servants. Seven
servants s e e m e d to be a very acceptable n u m b e r a n d was t h e r e f o r e
multiplied, without f u r t h e r reflection, by t h e s u p p o s e d n u m b e r of
Spartiates. T h e s a m e kind of t h i n g is sometimes d o n e by m o d e r n
historians. In Philippson's History of the Prussian State (Geschichte des
Preussischen Staatswesens), 2:176, o n e r e a d s that t h e Prussian a r m y
u n d e r F r e d e r i c k t h e G r e a t , in 1776, took precisely 32,705 wash-
w o m e n a l o n g into the field. T h e a u t h o r d o e s not even hesitate to
give his source, Busching's Reliable Contributions to the Governmental
History of King Frederick the Second of Prussia, (Zuverlässige Beyträge z.
d. Reg.-Gesch. König Friedrichs II. v. Preussen), a s o u r c e t h a t d o e s
i n d e e d , for the most p a r t , contain reliable material, a n d since in r e -
ality a n u m b e r of c a n t e e n w o m e n a n d soldiers' wives did accom-
pany Frederick's a r m y , it is still m o r e readily possible for an a r m y
of 200,000 m e n to have 32,705 w a s h w o m e n t h a n for 5,000 Spar-
tiates to have 35,000 Helots; a n d a m o d e r n , methodically t r a i n e d
historian deserves m o r e c r e d e n c e t h a n d o e s the naive H e r o d o t u s .
But in t h e final analysis we shall discard b o t h bits of information. A
brief analysis of the c h a r a c t e r of Frederick the G r e a t a n d of his
a r m y is e n o u g h to convince us that the a r m y was certainly not ac-
c o m p a n i e d into t h e f i e l d b y w a s h w o m e n , a n d that c o n s e q u e n t l y
B ü s c h i n g fell victim to some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g or o t h e r a n d ar-
rived at his n u m b e r by c o u n t i n g o n e w a s h w o m a n for every t e n t of
soldiers, a n d t h a t Philippson simply copied this interesting assertion
w i t h o u t critical analysis. T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e 3 5 , 0 0 0 H e l o t s o f
H e r o d o t u s p r o b a b l y c a m e a b o u t in the same way. In total,
H e r o d o t u s ' estimate of t h e G r e e k a r m y leads to a s t r e n g t h of s o m e
110,000 souls. T h e historians w h o copied this n u m b e r did not r e -
flect sufficiently on the question of what it m e a n s to feed 110,000
m e n in o n e spot for a r a t h e r long time. We shall have m u c h m o r e
to say a b o u t this in t h e later p e r i o d s , w h e r e we have at o u r disposal
6
m o r e c e r t a i n s t r e n g t h s f r o m t h e original s o u r c e s . T h e n u m b e r
passed d o w n to us is obviously u n t r u s t w o r t h y . We m u s t c o n t e n t
o u r s e l v e s with t h e fact t h a t we do n o t possess a figure for t h e
strength of the Greeks at Plataea on which we can base any
7
conclusions.
T h e figures of t h e later G r e e k sources, too—to the effect that the
A t h e n i a n s w e r e 10,000 m e n s t r o n g a t M a r a t h o n — a r e completely
unverified. T h e y can be characterized straight off as an arbitrary
estimate by the fact that t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e allied Plataeans, e i t h e r
included in that total or in addition to it, is given as 1,000 m e n .

Plataea was a very small spot a n d could not possibly have furnished
a t e n t h or a n i n t h of the n u m b e r of A t h e n i a n s . If historians, for
the most p a r t , have accepted the n u m b e r of 10,000 up to now, that
is because, from a practical viewpoint, it s e e m e d quite reasonable; it
has no validity, however, t h r o u g h any kind of evidence.
Despite the lack of reliable direct-source evidence, we can arrive
at an idea of the s t r e n g t h of the G r e e k armies in t h e Persian Wars.
We have at o u r disposal, in addition to the events themselves,
which we must first b e c o m e acquainted with, conclusions from later
G r e e k history a n d from the p o p u l a t i o n that was at h a n d ; the p o p u -
lation can be d e t e r m i n e d , in t u r n , to a certain d e g r e e from the size
a n d the fertility of the c o u n t r y .
T h e result for the richest city state, A t h e n s , is that t h e tiny c o u n -
try, the p e n i n s u l a of Attica, in the year 4 9 0 B.C. probably c o u n t e d
s o m e 100,000 free souls, a n d thus, since t h e slave p o p u l a t i o n at
that time was u n d o u b t e d l y still m o d e r a t e , at the most 120,000 to
140,000 p e r s o n s , or 115 to 140 p e r s q u a r e mile (about 50 to t h e
s q u a r e kilometer). T h a t is a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same as today.
H o w m a n y of these A t h e n i a n s actually b o r e a r m s in the battles of
the Persian W a r s we still do not know, a n d we must see if t h e se-
q u e n c e of events themselves offers us a lead for an estimate.
EXCURSUS
O N T H E P O P U L A T I O N O F ATTICA A N D O F T H E O T H E R GREEK STATES.

Greece has a n u m b e r of areas from which we can be very sure she drew no supply
whatever of foodstuffs or only a very small a m o u n t — B o e o t i a , Arcadia, L a c e d a e m o n ,
Messenia. We have no definite measure for the d e g r e e of fertility of the agriculture
in these areas at the time of the Persian Wars. But we shall be able to estimate a
certain m a x i m u m of self-support capability of these areas nevertheless, by analogy
with known relationships, a n d w h e n that is d o n e , we can further conclude that this
m a x i m u m was m o r e or less attained. T h e b e s cannot have been such a very small
city, and in addition to T h e b e s , Boeotia counted also quite a n u m b e r of other cities.
On the other hand, L a c e d a e m o n cannot have been, relatively, so very m u c h less
densely populated than the other Greek regions; otherwise it would not have been able
to play such an important role for such a long time.
On these basic principles, with help from the figures passed down historically, Be-
loch estimated, in his The Population of the Greco-Roman World (Die Bevölkerung der
8
griechisch-römischen Welt) for L a c o n i a and M e s s e n i a t o g e t h e r a p o p u l a t i o n of
2 3 0 , 0 0 0 souls, or 27 to the square kilometer; for the P e l o p o n n e s u s , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 to
9 0 0 , 0 0 0 souls, or 36 to 40 per square kilometer, because the commercial cities of
Corinth, Sicyon, T r o e z e n , Epidaurus had a comparatively larger population. It can-
not have been so very great, however, since the importation of grain to these cities
by sea was almost completely blocked during the Peloponnesian War. T h e y there-
fore had to live from the sparse supply of grain that could be brought to them by
land.
For Boeotia, Beloch estimates in the first half of the fourth century B . C . 60 per-
sons to a square kilometer, of w h o m about a third were slaves. T h i s n u m b e r of
slaves for a region with nothing but country towns s e e m s very high to me; from
what source would the Boeotians have drawn so many slaves, and with what would
they have paid for them? A slave population perpetuates itself only to a small de-
gree and requires constant reinforcement to maintain itself. For the fifth century
B . C . Beloch also accepts the fact that Boeotia was a country of free labor, and there-
fore with s o m e 40 souls to the square kilometer. T h i s n u m b e r stands in a correct
relationship with the Peloponnesus, since Boeotia was, it is true, much m o r e fertile;
in the P e l o p o n n e s i a n trading cities, h o w e v e r — C o r i n t h , Sicyon, e t c . — t h e r e were
9
many slaves, a fact that t e n d e d to balance off the situation.
In his estimates Beloch assumes that the adult m e n f o r m e d approximately a third
of the population; he felt that the Greek population was already stabilized as early as
the fifth century B . C . , somewhat similar to present-day France. I cannot agree with
1 0
this opinion.
Athens, Megara, Corinth, and many other cities actually grew greatly in the fifth
century B . C . through the immigration of metics, and if Laconia, Messenia, Arcadia did
not also grow, that was because of internal migrations. I also prefer to estimate the
number of children somewhat higher than Beloch and therefore count the adult
males as less than a third of the population. In Germany today (1898) the males
over eighteen years old account for 28 to 29 percent of the population. But the dif-
ference is not so great that Beloch's e n d results would be significantly affected by it.
T h e German Empire today (1898) has some 97 souls per square kilometer but is
not able to feed them all, being obliged to rely on imported grains for m o r e than a
quarter of its c o n s u m p t i o n and on the average to import almost exactly a quarter of
all agricultural and forest products. It therefore feeds, with the help of potatoes and
all m o d e r n means of agriculture, some 74 persons to the square kilometer or about
190 to the square m i l e . "
It is impossible to draw any conclusions as to the population of Attica from the
land and area relationships, since A t h e n s had already been importing m u c h grain
from abroad long before the Persian Wars. Nevertheless, we have a whole series of
reliable Figures from the second half of the century, which also permit a conclusion
as to the population at the time of the Persian Wars. Since I differ here from Beloch
quite significantly, we must go into a special analysis.
At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, in 431 B . C . , T h u c y d i d e s has Pericles
saying in a speech (2. 13) that Athens has 13,000 hoplites and also 16,000 garrison
troops from the oldest, the youngest, and the metics w h o were performing hoplite
service; also 1,200 m o u n t e d m e n , 1,600 archers, and 3 0 0 triremes. ("There were
13,000 hoplites, not c o u n t i n g the m e n w h o were stationed in the forts or w h o
manned the city walls. For this many m e n were e n g a g e d in d e f e n s e at the first w h e n the
e n e m y invaded, and they were made up of the oldest and youngest m e n as well as
such metics as were themselves heavily armed.")*
This report, definite as it may seem, unfortunately cannot be accepted at face
value. T h e oldest and youngest, with the metic-hoplites, cannot have a m o u n t e d to
16,000 m e n w h e n the field army was only 15,800 m e n strong. With the Athenians
the field service obligation lasted from the twentieth to the forty-fifth or even the
fiftieth year; the n u m b e r of service-qualified m e n u n d e r twenty and over forty-five
or fifty must therefore have been much smaller than the n u m b e r eligible for field
service. Furthermore, there is lacking any estimate of the crews of the 3 0 0 triremes;
with full crews the latter would have required no fewer than 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . Did there
exist in Athens, outside the field army, any such numbers of m e n as these? Why
then was the field army so small? Was it c o m p o s e d only of the u p p e r classes of citi-
zens? W h e r e was the dividing line? Why did they not reach d o w n lower?
People have sought to shed light on these uncertainties through the most diverse
hypotheses. Beloch had no solution for it but to c h a n g e the 16,000 garrison hoplites
40 History of the A r t of War
to 6 , 0 0 0 and to add, on the other hand, 12,000 citizens as ships' crews—a desperate
resort and only too characteristic of the condition of the accounts passed on to us:
that we are obliged to distort in this way, in order to make it understandable, the
only passage in all of Greek literature that to a certain extent claims to report com-
pletely and systematically on Greek levies. T h i s procedure is further complicated by
the fact that Ephorus already read this passage approximately as it stands in the
manuscripts today; Diodorus, w h o copied from him, sets the field army at 12,000,
the garrison troops at 17,000—a confirmation, but at the same time a variation
( 1 2 , 0 0 0 instead of 13,000; 17,000 instead of 16,000), which again underlines the u n -
certainty of o u r sources.
Recently, in Klio 5 (1905): 3 4 1 , Beloch expressed the supposition that the n u m b e r
16,000 was not to be c h a n g e d to 6 , 0 0 0 , but rather was to be completely disregarded
as the addition of an editor.
U n d e r these conditions of uncertainty of its own content, the T h u c y d i d e s citation
will be useful for us only on the condition that we find some other estimate that
provides us a key for the interpretation and at the same time a reliable control.
As a matter of fact, I find in T h u c y d i d e s a piece of information that has never
before been appreciated, not even by Beloch, and which, I believe, can help us.
T w i c e T h u c y d i d e s describes for us an unusual levy of the A t h e n i a n s , each of
which, in its way, appears to be the largest and is indicated as their m a x i m u m effort.
In the fall of the first year of the war, 431 B . C . , they m a d e an incursion into Megaris
with 13,000 hoplites, while 3 , 0 0 0 were in position before Potidaea. At the same time
they had a fleet of 100 ships at sea (and also possibly a few ships at Potidaea). A
h u n d r e d ships m e a n crews of 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ; that gives a total of 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , with the
hoplites. Since, however, T h u c y d i d e s adds that a not insignificant g r o u p of "light
troops"* was also on hand, n o t h i n g definite can be concluded from this point as to
the total strength of the Athenians.
It is different in the second citation (3. 17), where T h u c y d i d e s describes the ar-
m a m e n t of the Athenians after the revolt in Lesbos in 4 2 8 B . C . T h e y have at that
time 70 ships at sea (40 at Lesbos, 30 at the Peloponnesus) and 1,000 hoplites before
Mytilene. T h i s makes the Spartans believe that they have no further capabilities, and
so they plan an attack on A t h e n s by land and sea. In o r d e r to show them how mis-
taken they are, the Athenians then man 100 m o r e ships from the two lower tax
classes of their citizenry.
T h u c y d i d e s compares this accomplishment with that of the first year of the war;
he says it is similar and o n an e v e n larger scale. For in this year (431 B . C . ) , 100 ships
had g u a r d e d Attica and Euboea, 100 had blockaded the Peloponnesus, and some 50
m o r e were at Potidaea and other places, so that there was a total of 250. T h e 100
ships that g u a r d e d the h o m e l a n d were naturally not continuously at sea, for which
there was no immediate necessity, but they were fully outfitted reserve ships whose
crews were assigned and ready, so that they could put to sea at any m o m e n t , and
from a m o n g them, from time to time, the individual ships undoubtedly m a d e test
and practice cruises to check their readiness. For this reason, the accomplishment of
the year 4 2 8 B . C . , w h e n 170 ships actually were in action at the same time, was in a
certain respect greater than that of 431 B . C . , w h e n a total of 2 5 0 could be c o u n t e d ,
of which, however, only 150 were really fully active at the same time. According to
Pericles' account, the Athenians had 3 0 0 triremes. We shall have to understand this
as meaning, however, that at the outbreak of the war, the Athenians were capable of
actually m a n n i n g 2 5 0 ships, whereas 50 were left over as reserve replacements. T h e y
m a n n e d the 170 ships in 4 2 8 B . C . , as T h u c y d i d e s expressly adds, by calling up also
the citizens of the third tax class, w h o otherwise normally did hoplite duty.
A n d now we have a basis for an estimate of the Athenian citizenry in the year 4 2 8
B . C . O n e h u n d r e d seventy ships required crews o f 3 4 , 0 0 0 m e n ; and i n addition
there were 1,000 hoplites, t o g e t h e r with their serving m e n . In addition to these
3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n there remained in A t h e n s a garrison for the defense of the city and of a
few forts, which we may estimate at some 4 , 0 0 0 to 6 , 0 0 0 men. From this n u m b e r we

must make a reduction in that the m a n n i n g of the 100 suddenly outfitted ships was
probably not complete, and at the least the epibatae either were included in the row-
ers or were missing entirely, so that the crews a m o u n t e d to some 18,000 m e n in-
stead of 2 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e n , too, in the fleet before Lesbos and the fighting fleet there
12
was certainly a large n u m b e r of m e r c e n a r i e s , and finally there is doubt as to how
many slaves were possibly included a m o n g the o a r s m e n . Despite these n u m e r o u s
uncertain factors in o u r estimate, it still gives us a certain m a x i m u m and m i n i m u m
limit. It is certain that a considerable number of mercenaries and probably also of
slaves were in the fleet; it is also certain, however, that the predominant character of
13
the whole was that of an A t h e n i a n citizen l e v y . If everything had b e e n at full
strength, we would reach a figure of 4 2 , 0 0 0 men. It is probable, however, that there
were only 3 8 , 0 0 0 , a n d of these we can c o n s i d e r that at least 1 0 , 0 0 0 were m e r -
cenaries and slaves. T h i s n u m b e r could even have been as high as 18,000. T h e total
of militarily qualified Athenian citizens and metics in the year 427 B . C . must there-
fore be found s o m e w h e r e between 2 0 , 0 0 0 and 3 2 , 0 0 0 .
T h e writing of T h u c y d i d e s d o e s not allow us any greater leeway. To j u d g e from
the entire character of Athenian policy, however, 2 0 , 0 0 0 is considerably too small a
figure; we may with certainty set the m i n i m u m at 2 4 , 0 0 0 . On the other hand, if
Athens had had in the year 4 2 8 B . C . considerably m o r e than 3 2 , 0 0 0 militarily qual-
ified citizens and metics, it would be impossible to understand why the o t h e r Hel-
lenes should have considered that city as being almost exhausted as a result of the
expedition against Lesbos, which required only 10,000 m e n , and certainly a g o o d
half of them mercenaries; and again, the following outfitting of the 100 ships must
14
have required practically the rest of the m e n fit for s e r v i c e . T h e basic figures 30 +
4 0 + 1 0 0 = 1 7 0 s h i p s a n d 1 , 0 0 0 h o p l i t e s w e m a y t a k e a t face v a l u e f r o m
T h u c y d i d e s ; an error on his part is practically impossible, and the manuscript re-
port, too, is verified by comparison with the other figures from the year 431 B . C .
In 4 2 4 B . C . the A t h e n i a n s marched out "with the whole body of the city drawn up
as an army"* (battle of Delium) and had 3 0 0 m o u n t e d m e n , 7,000 hoplites, and
"many m o r e than 1 0 , 0 0 0 'light troops'*"; t h e r e w e r e , c o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t o g e t h e r
2 0 , 0 0 0 to 2 5 , 0 0 0 m e n . Furthermore, they had 70 to 80 ships at sea with 14,000 to
16,000 m e n . Grand total: 3 5 , 0 0 0 to 4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . T h a t is about the same as in 4 2 8
B . C . , only as a military effort m u c h lower, by virtue of the fact that almost a half
were "light troops,"* w h o a c c o m p a n i e d the army not to fight but to build hasty
15
e n t r e n c h m e n t s . We may accept, then, as completely verified, that Athens had in
4 2 8 B . C . between 2 4 , 0 0 0 and 3 2 , 0 0 0 citizens and metics qualified for military service.
A n d based on this we can specify the n u m b e r at the outbreak of the war. Up to that
point A t h e n s had had very light combat losses, but very many had died of the
plague, "from the ranks"*—4,400 hoplites and 3 0 0 m o u n t e d men. T h e 4 , 4 0 0 h o p -
lites do not give us any definite measure, since we do not know to which g r o u p we
should relate t h e m — w h e t h e r only to the field hoplites, or also to the metics and
garrison hoplites. T h e 3 0 0 m o u n t e d m e n , however, are undoubtedly in relationship
to the 1,200 m o u n t e d m e n in the speech of Pericles. Of the city inhabitants, it is
possible that a somewhat larger proportion of the lower classes died, but on the
other hand many of them were outside the city as farm cleruchs and less e x p o s e d to
the hazards of the plague. We may therefore establish for this g r o u p also an average
death rate of 25 percent. If A t h e n s therefore still had in 4 2 8 B . C . 2 4 , 0 0 0 to 3 2 , 0 0 0
service-qualified citizens and metics, then in 431 B . C . it had 3 0 , 0 0 0 to 4 0 , 0 0 0 of
them; and if we add 25 percent old m e n and disabled veterans, then Athens had at
that time a total of 3 7 , 5 0 0 to 5 0 , 0 0 0 citizens and metics, of w h o m we may list 3 0 , 0 0 0
to 4 0 , 0 0 0 as citizens, and of their n u m b e r 2 2 , 5 0 0 to 3 0 , 0 0 0 qualified for service.
T h e most e x t r e m e possible lower limit hardly c o m e s into consideration. If, on the
upper side, we add 1,000 to 2,000 m e n qualified for service, it is only to pacify the
strongest skeptic and forestall any objection.
42 History of the Art of W a r
N o w we have found a n u m b e r forming a standard against which the passage in

Pericles' speech may be measured (Thucydides 2. 13). Pericles estimates: 13,000 field
hoplites, 16,000 garrison hoplites, 1,200 m o u n t e d m e n , 1,600 archers, for a total of
3 1 , 8 0 0 armed m e n . Included therein (according to 2.31) are 3 , 0 0 0 metic hoplites;
that leaves, therefore, 2 8 , 8 0 0 citizens.
Previously this n u m b e r was s o m e w h a t d o u b t f u l because of uncertainty as to
w h e t h e r it included the entire service-qualified Athenian citizenry or whether, since
it literally s e e m e d to be a question of land troops only, the entire g r o u p of ships'
crews had to be added. In addition to metics, mercenaries, and slaves, at least 15,000
Athenian citizens, then, had to be estimated for this service, possibly even 2 5 , 0 0 0 .
We w o u l d t h e r e f o r e arrive at c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s for the service-
qualified Athenian citizenry. All of their accomplishments would show up in another
light, and the analysis of their campaigns and operations becomes something quite
different if it is possible that we might be dealing with, instead of scarcely 3 0 , 0 0 0 ,
some 5 0 , 0 0 0 or more service-qualified citizens. All of this c o n f u s i o n is now elimi-
nated. T h e figures from the year 4 2 8 B . C . , which have led us to a m a x i m u m figure
of s o m e t h i n g over 3 0 , 0 0 0 service-qualified m e n , give us c o m p l e t e assurance that
Pericles, in his figure of 2 8 , 8 0 0 service-qualified m e n , did not omit from considera-
tion any such large figure as the Thêtes or the entire g r o u p of ships' crews—that is,
some 2 0 , 0 0 0 souls—but that, on the contrary, he meant the entire citizenry.
On mature reflection, this c o n c e p t is, too, the only logical o n e . We may expect
T h u c y d i d e s to tell us which financial resources, how many warships, and how many
service-qualified citizens the state of A t h e n s had all together, and these numbers, in
the last citation including also the metics w h o were obligated for hoplite service, he
did in fact give us in the speech of Pericles.
T h e n u m b e r of citizens o n e might wish to outfit with hoplite e q u i p m e n t , aside
from those w h o p r o v i d e d their o w n e q u i p m e n t , was a simple matter of m o n e y ,
which, in a rational survey of the available combat forces, must not be confused with
the personal capabilities of the people. Precisely for this reason, it is impossible that
Pericles would have included in his estimate any foreign mercenaries whatever.
T h e total strength of the levy in the fall of 431 B . C . is consistent with this total. We
estimated it above at 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n and in addition a considerable n u m b e r of "light
troops."* All in all, then, there may have b e e n 4 5 , 0 0 0 to an absolute m a x i m u m of
5 0 , 0 0 0 men u n d e r arms. Athens was fully capable of this, since, in addition to the
2 8 , 8 0 0 service-qualified citizens and 3 , 0 0 0 metic hoplites, there were also some 5,000
nonhoplite metics, and the remainder can be reckoned as mercenaries and slaves.
N o w that we have established a definite base through a determination of the total
n u m b e r of the Athenian citizenry, we may attempt to dispel the remaining haziness
e n v e l o p i n g the figures given in Pericles' speech.
We have already seen that T h u c y d i d e s ' report must contain s o m e kind of error,
for it estimates the field army at 1 5 , 8 0 0 and the garrison troops at 16,000, while
expressly saying of the latter, however, that they were c o m p o s e d of the oldest, the
youngest, and the metic hoplites. T h i s forms an impossible ratio. Since we are told
elsewhere that the metic hoplites n u m b e r e d 3 , 0 0 0 m e n , there would then have re-
mained 13,000 from the oldest—that is, the m e n from fifty or forty-five years of age
to sixty—and the eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds. It is impossible, however, that
these year-groups—17 at m o s t — w o u l d n u m b e r almost exactly as many m e n as the
25 or 30 year-groups of the field army.
But this is not the only questionable point. T h e 16,000 m e n over and above the
field army, T h u c y d i d e s says, would have garrisoned the long walls and the strong-
holds w h e n e v e r the e n e m i e s attacked. Just at this time, however, the largest part of
the field troops were also at h o m e , and the field hoplites were, in any event, called
up very seldom and for a short time or, in the case of distant expeditions, only in
small numbers. Is it conceivable that precisely this best part of the army p e r f o r m e d
no duty at all when the e n e m y invaded the country, and that the fifty- to sixty-
Army Strengths: Introductory Material
year-olds were o r d e r e d to the long walls while the twenty- to fifty-year-olds stayed at
home? Furthermore, it is striking that T h u c y d i d e s ' account seems to indicate that
the garrison of the Athenian walls was c o m p o s e d entirely of hoplites. For the possi-
ble defense of the walls the heavy armor with shield was superfluous and even an
impediment. Cover was provided by the battlements, from behind which o n e would
repel the e n e m y by shooting arrows, hurling javelins, and throwing stones. Hoplites
had to be held in reserve for the contingency of close combat against those w h o
broke through.
T h e r e is, consequently, no doubt that there is an error s o m e w h e r e in T h u c y d i d e s '
report. To assume that it is not a question of an error by T h u c y d i d e s himself, but
rather an error in the figures of a writer w h o copied him, is, as we have proved,
impossible. T h e figures are sufficiently specified and verified by the numbers given
elsewhere in T h u c y d i d e s . Beloch's most recent explanation, that T h u c y d i d e s himself
did not make the error but that the publisher of his work created the confusion by
adding the n u m b e r 16,000, can, of course, neither be proved nor disproved. As a
matter of general principle, however, o n e will always prefer, as long as it is possible,
the milder and less incisive means of correcting obvious errors in the historical ac-
counts. It therefore seems to me that my hypothesis—that the master himself, for
once, made an error here—still detracts m u c h less from the authority of the entire
work, as we know it, than would be the case if we imagined that the publisher irrev-
erently made corrections without even applying the proper care and reflection. We
shall see at once how small the slip actually is, in the final analysis, which we attri-
bute to T h u c y d i d e s , and no matter how gladly I normally count myself a m o n g the
admirers of T h u c y d i d e s , I cannot agree that this possible solution is completely out
of the question. T h a t even the most careful critical brain can, precisely in the matter
of establishing n u m b e r s , for once fall into an error which, o n c e it is clarified, hardly
seems possible—for this we have a very illustrious e x a m p l e from the most recent
time. No less a person than Moltke, in his history of the war of 1870, estimated the
number of Germans in the Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat at some 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n too
small, by forgetting all the officers, the cavalry, and the artillery, categories that are
counted in arriving at the enemy's total. O n e recognizes the origin of the error at
once by c o m p a r i n g the appropriate page in the General Staff Work (Generalstabswerk)
(2:234, A p p e n d i x ) , which he had in front of him as he wrote, with the passage in his
work (p. 63); and it is not a question of a cursorily given number, but rather, a
number that serves as the basis for a highly important conclusion. If this h a p p e n e d
with Moltke—who was, to be sure, at an advanced a g e — t h e n we are not being too
unfair to T h u c y d i d e s by attributing a similar error to him w h e n , for once, the fig-
ures given by him are absolutely impossible.
T h e error stems from characterizing the garrison troops as being c o m p o s e d of the
"oldest and youngest and the metic hoplites." Missing here is a category that, in
keeping with the overall context, cannot be d i s p e n s e d with, namely, the service-
qualified citizens w h o were not assigned to hoplite duty.
If we subtract the 3 , 0 0 0 metics from the 16,000 garrison troops, there remain
13,000 citizens, or exactly as many as the citizen field hoplites. T h a t is hardly pure
coincidence. Rather, we may be permitted to assume that it was specified that at any
given time half of the service-qualified citizenry was to be trained and e q u i p p e d for
hoplite duty. T h e two recruit year-groups ("guards"*) were assigned to the garrison
of the forts and were at the same time u n d e r g o i n g training. It was therefore said in
A t h e n s — a n d Pericles, too, in his speech, may have expressed himself in this way
—that even if the entire field army of 13,000 hoplites had marched out, there would
still remain just as many m e n for the d e f e n s e of the long walls and in the forts—and
3 , 0 0 0 metic hoplites in addition. In adding these figures, T h u c y d i d e s n a m e d only
the youngest and the oldest and the metics but forgot to mention the others.
T h e m o d e r n reader, then, in order to understand the passage correctly and c o m -
pletely, must be in the clear as to the following:
T h e 13,000 field hoplites are not only the citizens of the higher classes, w h o pro-
vide their o w n e q u i p m e n t (which w o u l d put the total citizenry of A t h e n s at m u c h
too high a figure), but in addition to them also those Thêtes w h o are outfitted by
the state for hoplite service.
T h e 16,000 garrison troops are not those w h o actually garrisoned the walls w h e n
the e n e m y came into the country, but those w h o would still have been available for
the d e f e n s e of the walls if the w h o l e field hoplite army had been e n g a g e d elsewhere.
T h e s e 16,000 m e n include 3 , 0 0 0 metics w h o were assigned to hoplite service; the
recruits; the older year-groups, from age forty-five or fifty up to sixty; the half-
invalided ones; and finally all those Thêtes w h o were not designated for field h o p -
lite service.
Furthermore, T h u c y d i d e s did not include in his estimate the metics w h o were not
h o p l i t e s . For us, this latter o m i s s i o n is a l m o s t the m o s t sensitive o n e , but f o r
T h u c y d i d e s , as we shall still see (2. 3), a completely logical omission.
In this n u m b e r that we have estimated as 3 6 , 0 0 0 Athenian citizens are included
the cleruchs. T h e s e colonists were and remained Athenian citizens, but they lived, in
part, quite far away, for e x a m p l e on the islands of L e m n o s , Imbros, Skyros. T h e y
f o r m e d their o w n communities there, and T h u c y d i d e s later always mentions their
contingents in the campaigns separately from the Athenians; moreover, T h u c y d i d e s
gives the strength for the campaign of 431 B . C . as 16,000 hoplites, consequently the
same n u m b e r as Pericles. It must be assumed, however, that the distant cleruchs
were not called in for this campaign.
O n e might conclude from this, as Beloch did (p. 82), that Pericles, too, omitted
them from his count. T h e following, however, contradicts this: We have seen that
Pericles claims to give the total n u m b e r of service-qualified Athenians. It would be
completely incomprehensible if, in d o i n g so, he had omitted such a large s e g m e n t as
the entire cleruch communities, which Beloch estimates probably too high at 10,000
citizens, and which were located partly quite far away, but in part also quite near, as
in Salamis and Oreos on Euboea. T h e account of T h u c y d i d e s from the year 4 2 8 B . C .
positively e x c l u d e s any leeway for such a high estimate of the A t h e n i a n a r m e d
forces. T h e estimate that 13,000 hoplites attacked Megara in 431 B . C . , while 3 , 0 0 0
were in position before Potidaea, can be explained without difficulty. It is true, of
course, that the m o r e distant cleruchs were certainly not called up for this campaign,
b u t t h e r e was, n e v e r t h e l e s s , s u r e l y a c o n t i n g e n t o f t h e m with t h e fleet, a n d
T h u c y d i d e s by no m e a n s gives a specific n u m b e r for this special case, but simply
repeats the number given in Pericles' speech without venturing further into a special
accounting as to how many, possibly by c h a n c e , prevented by whatever reasons,
might have been missing. It is highly probable, therefore, that not only m o r e distant
cleruchs, but also a rather large n u m b e r of Athenians, w h o were always away on
commercial undertakings, were missing without T h u c y d i d e s ' having m a d e allowance
for t h e m .
I should like finally also to explain on what points and for what reasons I have
now modified the estimates to which I had c o m e in my Persian and Burgundian Wars.
In that book, following an idea of Duncker, I sought to solve the contradiction in
T h u c y d i d e s , 2. 13, in such a way as to have all the field-service-qualified Thêtes
c o u n t e d in with the hoplites, and the m o r e distant cleruchs with the garrison troops.
Strictly speaking, this solution agrees best with the wording of T h u c y d i d e s , since the
distinction b e t w e e n field troops and garrison troops is rigorously o b s e r v e d and
maintained.
But it has now b e c o m e clear to me that the characterizing of the 16,000 m e n as
garrison troops cannot possibly have been meant literally; it now b e c o m e s entirely
impossible to s u p p o r t the o t h e r w i s e very desirable c o n c e p t of the cleruch c o m -
munities as garrisons. Moreover, it would be very illogical if Pericles, on the purely
theoretical possibility of making hoplites of all the field-service-qualified Thêtes, had
actually shown them as such while, on the o t h e r h a n d , omitting the cleruchs, w h o

performed real hoplite service.
I have therefore proposed, so to speak, an e x c h a n g e between cleruchs and Thêtes,
and in this way the final total has b e c o m e higher by 2 , 0 0 0 citizens. This is because at
that time, in o r d e r to be consistent, I had to o m i t f r o m the n u m b e r g i v e n by
T h u c y d i d e s a n u m b e r of metic garrison hoplites also, which I estimated at 1,500.
Now that is no longer necessary, since this whole concept has been discarded. The
number of service-qualified citizens is thereby increased by 1,500 and with a 25 per-
cent addition for the militarily unfit, the overall total is increased by 2,000.
Whereas I have g o n e up from 3 4 , 0 0 0 to 3 6 , 0 0 0 citizens, Beloch, in his Greek
History (Griechische Geschichte) (which appeared in 1893, 1:404, footnote), went d o w n
f r o m 4 5 , 0 0 0 t o 4 0 , 0 0 0 A t h e n i a n c i t i z e n s ( 3 0 , 0 0 0 living i n Attica a n d 1 0 , 0 0 0
cleruchs). Consequently, we have approached each other so closely that our differ-
ence now a m o u n t s to only 4 , 0 0 0 .
My list is now:
1,200 mounted men

1,600 archers
13,000 hoplites, including the cleruchs
13,000 service-qualified Athenian citizens (including cleruchs), nonhoplites
7,200 militarily unqualified
Total: 3 6 , 0 0 0 A t h e n i a n citizens.
In addition, s o m e 6,000 to 8,000 metics.
From these figures we can still draw no conclusion as to the total population of
Attica in 431 B . C . , since we have no basis for the n u m b e r of slaves. We can only say
that this n u m b e r was, in any case, quite high.
For the almost purely agricultural state of Sparta, Beloch correctly estimated that
it had a quite stable population; the increase was lost through emigration. T h a t did
not apply to Athens. Emigration, aside from the cleruchs, was certainly very small,
whereas on the other hand, in the period in which A t h e n s was flourishing, the me-
tics increased greatly in the course of the fifth century and in 4 9 0 B . C . were p r e s e n t
only in rather small numbers. As to the rate of the natural increase, we unfortu-
nately have no indication at all. Normally, u n d e r favorable circumstances, a popula-
tion can be e x p e c t e d to double in sixty years. We may not assume that rate for the
Athenians, w h o in the meantime also suffered very heavy war casualties (for e x a m -
ple, in the campaign in Egypt). T h e principal increase is no doubt to be attributed to
immigrating metics and slaves. Nevertheless, the citizenry probably did not remain
stable, so that, if there were 2 8 , 8 0 0 service-qualified citizens on h a n d in 431 B . C . , we
may be allowed to assume s o m e 18,000 to 2 6 , 0 0 0 for the year 4 9 0 B . C . ; and in addi-
tion possibly 2,000 metics.
F r o m t h e first edition of the s e c o n d volume ( p p . 1 ff.) I t r a n s -

p o s e t o this p o s i t i o n still a n o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n , w i t h
E d u a r d Meyer, o v e r the same subject.
Shortly before the printing of the first volume of this work, the second v o l u m e of
Studies in Ancient History (Forschungen zur alten Geschichte) by Eduard Meyer appeared,
but it did not c o m e to my attention s o o n e n o u g h to permit my using it. On the basic
questions of Greek history of the fifth century B . C . we are completely in agreement.
On two points, however, we c a m e to opposite conclusions.
T h e first is the interpretation of T h u c y d i d e s 2. 13 as to the population of Attica at

the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. On this point Meyer (11:149) proposed a
new solution that results in exactly the double of my estimate. W h e n o n e remembers
what importance the figures have in my research and how much o n e n u m b e r is al-
ways used to check the other, how o n e Figure is built up on the other, then o n e can
measure the range of our difference. I would, of course, like to think that the new
solution that I, for my part, have proposed, is so persuasive in itself that a special
refutation of Meyer's concept is no longer necessary; but since such an outstanding
Hellenic scholar as A d o l f Bauer, in the Historische Zeitschrift 8 6 : 2 8 6 , on the contrary,
accepted Meyer's solution as the right o n e , I cannot avoid a specific explanation. Ac-
cording to my concept, the worth of T h u c y d i d e s as an historian and of Pericles as a
statesman actually d e p e n d s on this statistical question. For I have not simply sug-
gested, as Bauer claims, but have stated very positively, and I stand solidly behind it:
"The authority of the greatest of all historians is irrevocably destroyed, a pillar of
Greek literature is thrown over, if somebody proves that A t h e n s had 6 0 , 0 0 0 citizens
in 431 B . C . For if T h u c y d i d e s has falsely j u d g e d Pericles and his statesmanship, then
we may in no way ever again trust his j u d g m e n t . " Since such a recognized scholar as
Meyer, who agrees with me on the basic points of the m e t h o d as well as of the con-
cept in general, has actually undertaken that proof, then o n e can see that there is
something at stake and that a reexamination is not unjustified.
M e y e r , t o o , p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n that t h e f i g u r e a s i t s t a n d s i n
T h u c y d i d e s — 1 3 , 0 0 0 hoplites in the field army, 13,000 citizen hoplites in the garri-
son troops, consisting of the oldest and the youngest—is logically impossible, since
the few year-groups of the m e n unqualified for field service but qualified for garri-
son duty could not possibly have been as strong as the approximately 30 year-groups
of those unqualified for field service [sic: "Nicht-Felddienstfähigen," obviously an
error—Translator's note]. W h e r e a s I a s s u m e ( d r o p p i n g an o l d e r hypothesis) that
T h u c y d i d e s neglected—expressly in this case—to m e n t i o n the Thêtes w h o had b e e n
called in for o t h e r than hoplite service a l o n g with the oldest and the youngest,
M e y e r claims that f r o m the field-service-qualified y e a r - g r o u p s a large n u m b e r
(5,400) of the weaker men were assigned to the h o m e guard (Landsturm) and were
not m e n t i o n e d by T h u c y d i d e s . A c c o r d i n g to Meyer, T h u c y d i d e s , t h e r e f o r e , left
completely out of consideration the n u m b e r of nonhoplite Thêtes, and we must try
to d e t e r m i n e their n u m b e r through other figures. In d o i n g so, Meyer arrives at
2 0 , 0 0 0 and for the metics at 14,000 at least, so that Athens had at her disposal m o r e
than 7 0 , 0 0 0 grown free m e n without the cleruchs. I, on the o t h e r h a n d , c a m e to a
figure of some 4 0 , 0 0 0 ( 3 6 , 0 0 0 of t h e m citizens), including the cleruchs, and conse-
quently almost exactly half of Meyer's figure.
T h e following considerations contradict Meyer's estimate:
1. He counts 3 3 , 0 0 0 zeugitae as c o m p a r e d to 2 0 , 0 0 0 Thêtes. T h a t is an impossible
ratio. Meyer did not take into consideration the fact that, insofar as hoplite service
t h r o u g h one's o w n m e a n s was c o n c e r n e d , not only the lowest stratum of the popula-
tion b e l o n g e d to the Thêtes class, but necessarily also very many sons of middle-class
landowners. It was absolutely impossible, w h e n a father w h o had several grown sons
was rated a m o n g the zeugitae, to b u r d e n the sons as well with the obligation of hop-
lite service, for, indeed, in most cases there was normally just o n e set of hoplite
e q u i p m e n t in a family. If A t h e n s had had 3 3 , 0 0 0 citizens w h o could provide their
o w n equipment, and in addition 2 , 5 0 0 m o u n t e d m e n , then she would have had to
have at least 4 0 , 0 0 0 to 5 0 , 0 0 0 Thêtes.
Meyer is also in error in his idea (p. 158) that "the Thêtes were prevented by their
trade from attaining the full military and physical training of the hoplites." T h a t
gives a completely false picture of the duties of a hoplite, w h o n e e d e d physical train-
ing as little as did a R o m a n legionary. T h e great majority of the hoplites, w h o were
very moderately fixed farmers and craftsmen, probably had no athletic training at
all, and their military training certainly required less drill than the training of a
thranite.
2. In T h u c y d i d e s 3. 17, we are told that the Spartans considered A t h e n s to be
exhausted w h e n , in 4 2 8 B . C . , she had 70 ships and 1,000 hoplites in action. T h e
Athenians, however, by straining their resources, still brought 100 more ships to sea.
T h i s account would be senseless if Meyer's estimate were correct. For, of the ap-
p r o x i m a t e l y 1 4 , 0 0 0 m e n m a n n i n g the 70 ships, t h e r e w e r e at the very h i g h e s t
—cleruchs e x c l u d e d — 5 , 0 0 0 to 7,000—with the hoplites, 8,000—Athenians. Even if
we a s s u m e that the p l a g u e had cost A t h e n s 1 5 , 0 0 0 service-qualified m e n
(Thucydides gives "4,400 hoplites 'from the ranks'* and 3 0 0 m o u n t e d men"), the
city would still have had some 4 0 , 0 0 0 . How then could the Spartans have possibly
believed that A t h e n s was e x h a u s t e d by the s e n d i n g forth of some 8,000 citizens?
And it w o u l d have been just as unlikely, with such a supply of citizens, for the out-
fitting of 100 ships to be an unusual accomplishment; 18,000 m e n were sufficient
for these ships, and at that, the larger half could have been slaves, or foreign sailors
who h a p p e n e d to be in Athens at the time.
On the other h a n d , there is close agreement between T h u c y d i d e s ' account and the
estimate that A t h e n s did not have m o r e than s o m e 4 0 , 0 0 0 adult citizens and metics
in 431 B . C . In this case we could arrive at the following accounting:
a. Citizens and metics in 431 B . C . about 4 4 , 0 0 0

b. Losses from the plague about 12,000
Remainder: 32,000
c. Nonservice-qualified and absent 8,000
Remainder: 24,000
d. Serving at sea on the 70 ships 7,000
Remainder: 17,000
e. A b o a r d the 100 ships (smaller half of
the c o m b i n e d crews) 8,000
Remainder: 9,000
T h e s e 9 , 0 0 0 m e n , with the addition of partially qualified m e n from category "c,"

were e n o u g h to man and guard the forts and city walls, although o n e must still de-
duct a certain figure to account for the m o r e distant cleruchs.
We may shift the individual figures in this accounting up or down by 1,000 or
2 , 0 0 0 m e n , but the two limiting factors, which are given in T h u c y d i d e s '
account—i.e., that Athens, on the o n e hand, was thought to be exhausted by the
dispatch of 70 ships and 1,000 hoplites, and that, on the other hand, 100 m o r e ships
could be m a n n e d and the necessary city garrison left b e h i n d — t h e s e two limiting fac-
tors may not be violated, and therefore Mever's accounting is not reconcilable with
that of T h u c y d i d e s .
For the defense of the city of Athens itself and the long walls, a few thousand
m e n were sufficient. On page 154 Meyer states the o p i n i o n that even 6 , 0 0 0 m e n
would not have been e n o u g h for this purpose, since the circumference of the walls
a m o u n t e d to 2 6 , 0 0 0 meters and therefore, with 1/6 of the total, or 1000 m e n , on
post at any o n e time, there would have been only o n e double sentry every 52 me-
ters. T h e assumption underlying this reckoning, however, is false. Not e n o u g h dis-
tinction is made b e t w e e n observation and defense. Only a large e n e m y army could ven-
ture to attack a city like Athens, and a large e n e m y army cannot approach u n -
noticed. Consequently, as l o n g as no e n e m y army was reported nearby, a few watch-
tower sentries sufficed. But if an e n e m y army actually did move toward the walls,
they were not evenly m a n n e d with double sentry posts, but on the contrary, were
principally put u n d e r g o o d observation, and an alert force was m o v e d to whatever
position might be t h r e a t e n e d . Certainly there was n e v e r a situation with evenly

spaced double sentries posted all the way a r o u n d , and with particular regard to the
year 4 2 8 B . C . , the fleet of 100 ships had naturally been back in the harbor quite a
long time before a Peloponnesian army could appear before the long wall. Only for
protection against a possible surprise attack by a highly mobile task force was it
necessary for a small garrison to remain at h o m e . In fact, u n d e r conditions like
those of 431 B . C . , w h e n the A t h e n i a n field army m o v e d out against Megara, e v e n
this was unnecessary, since the army, by its position, covered the city against any
attack by land. Furthermore, the Boeotians w o u l d not have risked an undertaking
against Attica, since they would have b e e n cut off.
3. Like me, Meyer recognizes that Pericles' war plan was the right o n e . If at that
time, however, Athens had c o u n t e d 8 0 , 0 0 0 free m e n , including the cleruchs, this
war plan w o u l d have b e e n wrong. Since the financial power and the trading centers
of her entire great sea alliance stood at the disposal of Athens, she would have been
able to turn on the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s not with a strategy of attrition, but with a
strategy aimed at victory. T h e invading army of the Peloponnesians can hardly have
b e e n stronger than 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . T h e Athenians would therefore have been able to
meet t h e m squarely in the o p e n field, and the isthmus offered the possibility of
splitting the e n e m i e s and defeating the Boeotians and Peloponnesians separately.
T h e possibility of raising the estimated population of the other Greek city-states in
comparison with that of Athens is ruled out, since they were blockaded for many
years and existed with practically no imports. Consequently, e v e n Corinth can have
been only a moderately sized city.
T h e statement of A d o l f Bauer (Historische Zeitschnft 86:288), "With a field army of
1 3 , 0 0 0 h o p l i t e s A t h e n s c o u l d not risk a great decisive battle against the vastly
superior armed forces of the Peloponnesian League, and her additional m a n p o w e r
was available only on a very limited scale," misses the mark. Why were not m o r e
than 13,000 m e n available, if A t h e n s had m o r e than 8 0 , 0 0 0 citizens, cleruchs, and
metics, and, in addition, the m o n e y to hire very many mercenaries? R o m e , in the
Second Punic War, made much greater efforts without help from her allies. N o t h i n g
would have been m o r e illogical than to hold troops and ships constantly at hand and
thereby k e e p them from e n g a g e m e n t in the main battle, as Bauer believes was the
case, because of the possibility of insubordination on the part of her allies. On that
point o n e should read again what Clausewitz says about the error of holding out a
strategic reserve in a strategy of all-out victory. T h e best way to reassert the author-
ity of the leading state was to c o n q u e r Sparta, Corinth, and T h e b e s . N o w , since
there is ample evidence at hand that Athens was not remiss in her efforts—for ex-
ample, that even the metics d o n n e d hoplite e q u i p m e n t and that Socrates, at the age
of forty-seven, still had to do field service as a hoplite, and on the other hand it is
specifically reported that, w h e n the force m o v e d out "with the w h o l e body of the
city drawn up as an army"* in 4 2 4 B . C . , it had a strength of only 7,000 hoplites—it is
impossible that there would have b e e n 7 0 , 0 0 0 free m e n on hand in Attica in 431
B.C.
4. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War Athens had 3 0 0 triremes; even if
o n e agrees with Meyer w h e n , for reasons not completely clear to m e , he raises this
n u m b e r to 4 0 0 , nevertheless A t h e n s never had m o r e than 170, or at the very most
2 5 0 , triremes in service at the same time (see p. 40 above). Corinth, however, sent
out 90 triremes in 4 3 3 B . C . ( T h u c y d i d e s 1. 46). A c c o r d i n g to Beloch's estimate,
Corinth did not have m o r e than s o m e 10,000 free adult m e n , and it is impossible to
increase this n u m b e r significantly, since we could not account for the possibility of
feeding any larger n u m b e r than this d u r i n g the long blockade of the Peloponnesian
War. If A t h e n s had had seven times as many inhabitants as Corinth, not only would
its sea s t r e n g t h a p p e a r very small but it w o u l d also be i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e how
Corinth could have e n t e r e d such a serious and protracted rivalry with such a hugely
superior neighbor.
T h i s becomes e v e n clearer if we go back to the period of the Persian Wars. Meyer

assumes that, e v e n t h e n , Attica had approximately the same population as in 431
B . C . T h a t is not really demonstrable; but e v e n if we c o m e close to this estimate, we
are faced with impossibilities. At Artemisium and Salamis, Corinth is supposed to
have had 40 ships, A t h e n s 123 and 180 respectively. T h e last figure is probably too
high. But e v e n if it were correct, it is clear that A t h e n s could not be anywhere near
seven times as large as Corinth, since, according to historical records and the situa-
tion, she had m o u n t e d not a relatively smaller fleet than her neighbor, but a rela-
tively larger one. Only a few years previously, however, A t h e n s had had to borrow
20 triremes from Corinth and was, consequently, still by no m e a n s a highly d e -
veloped commercial center, a situation that is inconceivable without warships. If,
then, she was not yet a highly d e v e l o p e d trading center and was consequently not
attracting a very important level of imports, it follows that she cannot yet have had
such a large population. T h e report that A t h e n s had n e e d e d to import grain ever
since the time of Solon d o e s not, of course, contradict o u r conclusion—insofar as the
size of the importation is c o n c e r n e d , m u c h d e p e n d s on whether not a tenth or a
twentieth of the population, but a third or even half lived on imported grain. At a
time w h e n Athens was only starting to b e c o m e a sea power, such can not yet have
been the case.
We may also be permitted to reach the following conclusion. If Athens at that
time had already been a very p o p u l o u s trading center, Corinth would have had a
strong sensitivity vis-a-vis this increasing c o m m e r c i a l rivalry a n d w o u l d not have
provided a benefit to her rival t h r o u g h the loan of ships. If Athens was at that time,
however, still so little d e v e l o p e d as a city that she incited no significant envy in
Corinth, she can by the same token not possibly have already had seven times as
many citizens fifty years later.
T h e size of Corinth, t h e n , establishes indirectly a certain limit for the size of
A t h e n s , and the size of Corinth can, in turn, be verified by that of Sparta. See
below, Chapter III, note 3.
5. Even t h o u g h I reject the results of Meyer's investigation, it still makes, like
every serious scholarly study, an important indirect contribution. T h e crux of the
controversy o v e r the account of T h u c y d i d e s 2. 13 is really whether the Thêtes are
included or not. Up to the present the advocates of the opinion that the Thêtes
were not c o u n t e d in this n u m b e r have n e v e r m a d e a clear and consistent estimate as
to how high a figure o n e could reach for the total population of Athens, and by
adhering to a somewhat vague middle line have m a d e the accounting appear to be
more or less possible from a practical viewpoint. N o t until Meyer showed indisputa-
bly that this interpretation w o u l d necessarily lead to a figure of some 7 0 , 0 0 0 free
adult m e n in Attica (consequently without the cleruchs)—and e v e n this n u m b e r
would still be too small—did he also make possible the equally inevitable counter-
proof that this n u m b e r is, from a practical viewpoint, absolutely impossible. We must
therefore look for another interpretation of T h u c y d i d e s 2. 13, and here the o n e
proposed by me can at any rate have the advantage of providing no contradiction
either with the figures passed d o w n in other accounts or with the actual accomplish-
ments of A t h e n s . Since the Athenians waged a not insignificant portion of their wars
with mercenaries, they were no doubt in a position, e v e n when they n u m b e r e d only
3 6 , 0 0 0 citizens and 6 , 0 0 0 to 8 , 0 0 0 metics, to fight simultaneously on the mainland
and in the A e g e a n Sea, on Cyprus and in Egypt.
T h e way to the correct interpretation and filling out of the numbers given by
T h u c y d i d e s has been obscured by considering them in combination with the break-
d o w n of the various classes of Athenians, a breakdown of which T h u c y d i d e s makes
no m e n t i o n here a n d which has n o t h i n g at all to do with his accounting. From
another point of view as well, it is most important to dissolve this connection that
has falsely b e e n injected into the interpretation. It has created confusion in many
places. T h e whole concept of R o m a n political history has been distorted by the er-
r o n e o u s idea of the significance of the division of the p e o p l e into classes. By

eliminating the classes in T h u c y d i d e s 2. 13, and interpreting the figures correctly,
we arrive simultaneously at a correct concept of the Athenian constitution and, indi-
rectly, of the Roman one.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I
1. Beitzke, History of the German Wars of Liberation (Geschichte der

deutschen Freiheitskriege), Vol. 1, A p p e n d i x . B e r n h a r d i , Memorable
Events in the Life of Toll (Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben Tolls), Vol. 3,
Appendix.
2. Pertz-Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau (Leben Gneisenaus), large ed.,
Vol. 4, A p p e n d i x ; small ed., 2d p r i n t i n g , 2:19.
3. Delbrück, Persian and Burgundian Wars (Perser- und
Burgunderkriege), p. 157.
4. P. Bailleu in the Deutsche Rundschau, D e c e m b e r 1899.
5. von Lettow. The War of 1806 and 1807 (Der Krieg von 1806 und
1807).
6. C o m p a r e "Mind a n d Mass in History" ("Geist u n d Masse in d e r
Geschichte"), Preussische Jahrbücher 147 (1912): 193.
7. R. A d a m , in his dissertation "De H e r o d o t i r a t i o n e historica
quaestiones selectae sive de p u g n a Salaminia a t q u e Plataeensi" (Ber-
lin, 1890), shows t h a t t h e a r m y s t r e n g t h s a n d n u m b e r o f ships
given by H e r o d o t u s a r e b a s e d on an estimate table t h a t removes
from t h e m any residual e l e m e n t of credibility.
8. In the Wochenschrift fur klassische Philologie 12 (1895): 877, Be-
loch d e f e n d e d himself well, in a review, against several u n f o u n d e d
attacks.
9. K r o m a y e r claimed, in t h e article "Studies on the Military Power
a n d Military Organization of t h e G r e e k States, particularly in the
F o u r t h C e n t u r y " ("Studien ü b e r W e h r k r a f t u n d W e h r v e r f a s s u n g
d e r griechischen Staaten, v o r n e h m l i c h im 4. J a h r h . " ) , Klio, Vol. 3,
1903, that the p o p u l a t i o n a n d the levies w e r e considerably h i g h e r ,
b u t he was c o n t r a d i c t e d by Beloch, Klio, Vols. 5 a n d 6, 1905, 1906,
in the essay "Greek Levies" ("Griechische Aufgebote").
10. In his Greek History (Griech. Gesch.), 1:403, Beloch d r o p p e d this
viewpoint a n d a s s u m e d t h a t even in the fifth c e n t u r y t h e p o p u l a -
tion was sharply increasing.
11. According to P. Voigt, " G e r m a n y and the World Market"
("Deutschland u n d d e r W e l t m a r k t " ) , Preussische Jahrbücher 9 1 : 260.
A c c o r d i n g to a m o r e r e c e n t estimate of Max Delbrück, " G e r m a n
A g r i c u l t u r e a t t h e T u r n o f t h e C e n t u r y " ("Die d e u t s c h e L a n d -
wirtschaft an d e r J a h r h u n d e r t w e n d e " ) , Preussische Jahrbücher, Feb-

ruary 1900), o n e m u s t consider o n t h e o t h e r h a n d the fact that o u r
population enjoys a large p r o p o r t i o n of m e a t foods, which makes
for very g r e a t p r o d u c t i o n costs. With a primarily vegetarian diet, a
country can s u p p o r t m o r e p e o p l e .
By way of c o m p a r i s o n I cite also t h e following figures:
STATE INHABITANTS PER

SQUARE KILOMETER
1890 Prussia 86
Mecklenburg- 33
Strelitz
1888 Switzerland 71
Graubünden 13
Schwyz 55
Uri 16
Wallis 19
1889 Greece 34
Laconia 30
Messenia 55
Euboea 24
Attica and Boeotia 41
12. As early as in t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ,

T h u c y d i d e s m e n t i o n s with decisive e m p h a s i s t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n s
fought t h e i r wars partly with m e r c e n a r i e s ( 1 . 1 2 1 ; 1. 143); after t h e
p l a g u e the r e m a i n i n g citizens in business, on t h e farm, a n d in in-
dustry were even m o r e indispensable than otherwise, and the
n u m b e r easily to be s p a r e d smaller, so t h a t t h e n u m b e r of m e r -
cenaries was certainly unusually large.
13. T h a t the A t h e n i a n fleet a n d a r m y at that time, despite a cer-
tain r e i n f o r c e m e n t by m e r c e n a r i e s a n d slaves, w e r e still m a n n e d
principally by A t h e n i a n citizens themselves, follows from the politi-
cal situation of t h e state. T h e ancient a u t h o r s are a g r e e d on this
point, a n d especially t h e o l d e r " C o n s t i t u t i o n o f the A t h e n i a n s , " *
which, in my o p i n i o n , comes d o w n to us from no less a p e r s o n t h a n
T h u c y d i d e s himself, b e a r s full witness to the fact that the d e m o c -
racy rested on naval service. If the fleet h a d b e e n m a n n e d com-
pletely or p r e d o m i n a n t l y by m e r c e n a r i e s a n d slaves, it would have
b e e n r a t h e r a n i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e rich m e r c h a n t s , w h o p a i d t h e
m e r c e n a r i e s or could buy slaves, as was t h e case with o t h e r great
t r a d i n g cities ( C a r t h a g e , Venice, A m s t e r d a m ) . Aristotle, too, in his
Politics 5. 5. 5, says: " A n d t h e n again the naval p e o p l e , having b e e n
the cause of the victory at Salamis, a n d t h e r e f o r e , of the h e g e m o n y
o f A t h e n s b e c a u s e o f h e r p o w e r a t sea, m a d e t h e d e m o c r a c y
52 History of t h e A r t of War
stronger."* T h e C o r c y r a e a n s ' fleet at Sybota was for t h e most p a r t

m a n n e d by slaves. T h u c y d i d e s 1. 55. C o m p a r e with Book II, C h a p -
t e r I I , Excursus, below.
14. T h e fact that, for short expeditions, a G r e e k c a n t o n o n c e sent
o u t w h a t a m o u n t e d to all its m e n fit for service follows from the
account of T h u c y d i d e s 1. 105, w h e r e M y r o n i d a s moves out against
t h e C o r i n t h i a n s with "the oldest a n d t h e youngest, because the r e g u -
lar a r m y was e n g a g e d elsewhere," a n d in 5. 56, w h e r e t h e Argives
(in 4 1 8 B.C.) believe they can take E p i d a u r u s by surprise, since t h e
m e n a r e off at war.
15. T h e m a r c h out to Delium took place "with the whole body of
t h e city d r a w n u p a s a n a r m y . " * I t m i g h t c o n s e q u e n t l y s e e m
s t r a n g e that A t h e n s b r o u g h t u p only 7,000 hoplites, w h e r e a s t h e
speech of Pericles gives 13,000 + 3,000 metics, or a total of 16,000.
If, however, we subtract the losses from the p l a g u e , consider that,
in the fleet, not only the epibatae but also a n u m b e r of citizens w e r e
serving, m e n whose n a m e s a p p e a r e d on the hoplite list at the same
time, a n d finally that the n u m b e r 16,000 gives the payroll roster,
from which, in reality, m a n y a r e absent—sick, traveling, or o t h e r -
wise indispensable e l s e w h e r e — t h e n the two n u m b e r s a r e quite con-
sistent with each other.
Chapter II
Greek Arms and Tactics

At the time of the Persian W a r s the g r e a t mass of a G r e e k a r m y
was c o m p o s e d of a r m o r e d foot soldiers with a t h r u s t i n g lance a b o u t
1
two m e t e r s l o n g , the hoplites. T h e protective e q u i p m e n t consisted
2
of helmet, h a r n e s s , greaves, a n d shield. A short sword was an a u x -
iliary w e a p o n .
T h e hoplites form a tight tactical unit, the p h a l a n x . T h e p h a l a n x
3
is a c o n t i n u o u s l i n e a r a r r a n g e m e n t c o m p o s e d of several r a n k s .
T h e d e p t h varies; very often we h e a r of an 8-man d e p t h , which
seems to be r e g a r d e d as a kind of n o r m a l formation; b u t we also
4
h e a r o f 12-man a n d even 2 5 - m a n d e p t h s .
In such a p h a l a n x two r a n k s at most can participate in the actual
combat, with the second r a n k s t e p p i n g into the holes of the first at
the m o m e n t of contact. T h e following r a n k s serve as i m m e d i a t e r e -
p l a c e m e n t s for t h e d e a d a n d w o u n d e d , b u t they exercise princi-
pally a physical a n d m o r a l p r e s s u r e . T h e d e e p e r p h a l a n x will d e -
feat the m o r e shallow o n e , even if on b o t h sides exactly the s a m e
n u m b e r of c o m b a t a n t s actually m a n a g e to use t h e i r w e a p o n s .
B u t for t h e a d v a n t a g e of this p r e s s u r e , it w o u l d be m u c h b e t t e r
to l e n g t h e n the line, o u t f l a n k i n g the e n e m y a n d e n v e l o p i n g his two
flanks at t h e m o m e n t of shock. B u t with e q u a l o p p o s i n g forces
such an e n v e l o p m e n t can only take place at t h e e x p e n s e of the
d e p t h of the formation, a n d a l t h o u g h it r e q u i r e s only a few min-
utes from t h e first contact of t h e two lines until t h e e n v e l o p m e n t
has b e e n c o m p l e t e d , nevertheless in this time t h e d e e p e r of the o p -
posing p h a l a n x e s w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y already have o v e r r u n the shal-
low c e n t e r o f the o p p o n e n t a n d would t h e r e b y have b r o k e n u p the
whole f o r m a t i o n .
T h e r e f o r e , in any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the p h a l a n x two principles
stand diametrically o p p o s e d : d e p t h , which gives weight, a n d length,
which facilitates e n v e l o p m e n t . It is up to t h e c o m m a n d e r to d e t e r -
mine the d e p t h a n d length of his p h a l a n x from the circumstances
53
o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e a r m i e s , t h e quality o f t h e
t r o o p s on both sides, a n d t h e f o r m of the t e r r a i n . A very large
a r m y is m o r e s t r e n g t h e n e d in the d i m e n s i o n of d e p t h t h a n in the
d i m e n s i o n of l e n g t h , b e c a u s e it is e x t r e m e l y difficult to m o v e a
long line forward in a fairly aligned a n d well-ordered way, w h e r e a s
the formation of a d e e p c o l u m n is not so easily d i s r u p t e d .
Since t h e r e a r m o s t r a n k s of the p h a l a n x almost n e v e r arrive at
t h e point of using t h e i r w e a p o n s , it might a p p e a r s u p e r f l u o u s to
s u p p l y c o m p l e t e p r o t e c t i v e a r m a m e n t t o all t h e w a r r i o r s f r o m
a b o u t the f o u r t h r a n k back. Nevertheless, we have no account from
the G r e e k s to the effect t h a t such a distinction was ever m a d e . An
u n a r m o r e d p e r s o n is not capable of really fighting against an ar-
m o r e d o n e . T h e f o r m i n g u p o f several r a n k s o f u n a r m o r e d m e n
b e h i n d t h e a r m o r e d r a n k s would t h e r e f o r e have b e e n not m u c h
m o r e t h a n a k i n d of p r e t e n s e . T h e realization that they could not
really e x p e c t t o receive any t r u e s u p p o r t f r o m t h e s e r e a r r a n k s
would have seriously w e a k e n e d the drive, the forward t h r u s t of the
f o r e m o s t r a n k s , in which, of c o u r s e , t h e value of t h e r e a r m o s t
r a n k s normally lies. If, at any section of the line, it really h a p p e n e d
that, by some possible c h a n c e splitting of t h e p h a l a n x , the a r m o r e d
e n e m y p e n e t r a t e d into t h e u n a r m o r e d r e a r m o s t r a n k s , t h e latter
would have h a d to give g r o u n d at once, a n d the flight in this o n e
a r e a would easily have pulled the e n t i r e a r m y back with it.
Least of all, t h e n , would it have b e e n desirable to p u t possibly
unreliable m e n , slaves, in t h e r e a r m o s t r a n k s of the p h a l a n x . T h e y
would d o n o g o o d t h e r e b u t would b e able, t h r o u g h p r e m a t u r e ,
p e r h a p s even malicious, flight, to create a panic quite easily, even
a m o n g t h e hoplites.
This explanation does not eliminate, of course, the opposite
proposition, that w h e n o n e has some m e n less well a r m e d , they are
placed in the r e a r m o s t r a n k s . Such lightly a r m e d or only partially
a r m e d m e n can also be useful by h e l p i n g friendly w o u n d e d soldiers
a n d by killing or taking p r i s o n e r those e n e m y w o u n d e d over a n d
a r o u n d w h o m the battle is being waged. T h o s e a r e only secondary
services, however, a n d the p h a l a n x as such p r e s u p p o s e s the most
completely a r m e d w a r r i o r s possible t h r o u g h o u t all the ranks.
Of the utmost i m p o r t a n c e in this kind of combat is the type of
m e n w h o stand in the first r a n k . Again a n d again, in his war songs,
T y r t a e u s praises the m e n of the forward battle, " a m o n g those fight-
ing in front."* T h e later theoreticians r e c o m m e n d to a r m y com-
m a n d e r s that the most reliable m e n be placed in the first a n d last
r a n k s , in o r d e r to hold the entire p h a l a n x t o g e t h e r . An accused
Greek Arms and Tactics 55
A t h e n i a n citizen b r o u g h t o u t in his defense in a trial the fact that

he h a d voluntarily h a d himself placed in the first r a n k in a d a n g e r -
5
ous battle.
In L a c e d a e m o n the Spartiates a n d the Perioeci took to the field
equally as h o p l i t e s , b u t t h e S p a r t i a t e s , as professional w a r r i o r s ,
were c o n s i d e r e d m u c h m o r e valuable t h a n t h e Perioeci, w h o w e r e
usually o c c u p i e d in t h e i r civilian p r o f e s s i o n . T h i s s u p e r i o r i t y is
probably most evident in t h e fact that the Spartiates p r e d o m i n a n t l y
6
formed the first ranks of the phalanx.
Missile-type w e a p o n s played only a very small role in connection
with the hoplite p h a l a n x . With the G r e e k s t h e bow was a tradition-
ally r e s p e c t e d w e a p o n ; t h e national h e r o , Hercules, was an a r c h e r .
In t h e case of t h e A t h e n i a n s , a special a r c h e r corps is m e n t i o n e d in
t h e c a m p a i g n o f P l a t a e a . B u t s i n c e t h e t i m e t h e p h a l a n x was
f o r m e d of spear-carriers, t h e bow was p u s h e d into t h e b a c k g r o u n d ,
since the two a r m s , even if not mutually exclusive, can be c o m b i n e d
only with g r e a t difficulty. O n e can p i c t u r e the archers, sling m e n ,
a n d j a v e l i n - t h r o w e r s in front of, beside, a n d b e h i n d the p h a l a n x .
W h e n e v e r they w e r e d e p l o y e d forward of t h e front line, they m u s t
have d i s a p p e a r e d before t h e clash of the two p h a l a n x e s , a n d t h e r e -
fore would necessarily h a v e w i t h d r a w n a r o u n d t h e flanks. If they
a t t e m p t e d to p u s h back t h r o u g h the p h a l a n x itself, the resulting
d i s o r d e r a n d delay w o u l d cause m u c h m o r e d a m a g e t h a n t h e ad-
v a n t a g e f r o m t h e losses t h a t t h e y m i g h t h a v e inflicted o n t h e
e n e m y . In o r d e r to be sure of passing a r o u n d the two flanks, the
s h a r p s h o o t e r s w o u l d h a v e t o b e g i n t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l while t h e
p h a l a n x e s w e r e still several h u n d r e d paces a p a r t . If the e n e m y h a d
no s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d we sent o u t m a r k s m e n against him, to fire on
h i m continuously d u r i n g the a p p r o a c h m a r c h , that could o f course
cause him serious d i s r u p t i o n . If b o t h sides h a d s h a r p s h o o t e r s , how-
ever, these two forces would, for the most p a r t , only shoot at each
o t h e r a n d would have no influence at all on the decisive p h a l a n x
battle. Firing obliquely o n t h e a p p r o a c h i n g e n e m y from t h e two
flanks of the hoplite p h a l a n x , a n u m b e r of m a r k s m e n could exer-
cise an influence on the p r o g r e s s of the battle. B u t we find no rec-
ognizable traces of this k i n d of action, even in the later G r e e k bat-
tles.
Finally, if s h a r p s h o o t e r s w e r e stationed b e h i n d the p h a l a n x , they
could shoot o u t t h e i r volley from t h a t position shortly before t h e
clash. Fired in an a r c h i n g trajectory, however, without real aiming,
this could not be very effective, especially w h e n , as is usually the
case, o u r o w n p h a l a n x was m o v i n g t o w a r d t h e e n e m y at t h e assault
pace. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h we find such an e m p l o y m e n t of p r o -

7
jectiles fairly often r e c o m m e n d e d in t h e o r y , nevertheless, from a
practical viewpoint, it was used only infrequently, as, for e x a m p l e ,
in the battle that T h r a s y b u l u s fought against the thirty T y r a n t s in
the streets of Piraeus. ( X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 2. 4). T h e r e , however,
the t r o o p s of T h r a s y b u l u s stood only ten m e n d e e p , on a rise of
g r o u n d , a n d waited for t h e e n e m y , w h o a d v a n c e d u p the street
with a fifty-man d e p t h . U n d e r these special conditions t h e projec-
tiles fired from above o n t o t h e thick mass w e r e able to do very
good service. Generally s p e a k i n g , however, the m a r k s m e n f o r m e d
only an auxiliary a r m . T h e real c o m b a t force of the G r e e k s in the
Persian W a r s consisted only of hoplites.
Nevertheless, H e r o d o t u s estimates for every hoplite in the Per-
sian W a r s o n e u n a r m o r e d m a n ("lightly a r m e d s o l d i e r " ) * a n d
c o u n t s t h e s e u n a r m o r e d p e r s o n s i n his e s t i m a t e o f t h e a r m y ' s
s t r e n g t h . T h e later G r e e k historians also m e n t i o n q u i t e often, it is
t r u e , g r e a t masses o f u n a r m o r e d m e n , b u t they d o not really c o u n t
t h e m as warriors, a n d as we have seen, rightly so, since they were
as g o o d as worthless for the battle itself. We a r e faced h e r e with a
difficulty that will confront us again quite often, especially in the
knightly armies o f the Middle Ages. T h e s h a r p distinction between
c o m b a t a n t s a n d n o n c o m b a t a n t s that today a p p e a r s quite n a t u r a l t o
us c a n n o t be traced t h r o u g h so strictly. T h e G r e e k hoplite h a d a
heavy load of e q u i p m e n t to carry a n d was responsible, for the short
time that the c a m p a i g n s usually lasted, for his own supplies. Most
o f t h e m were m e n o f p r o p e r t y , n o l o n g e r y o u t h s . C o n s e q u e n t l y
they could hardly get a l o n g without a h e l p e r to act as p o r t e r , for-
ager, cook, a n d in case of t h e i r b e i n g w o u n d e d , n u r s e . Each hoplite
h a d to have a second m a n with him, w h e t h e r it be a son, b r o t h e r ,
n e i g h b o r , or even only a t r u s t w o r t h y slave. T h i s c o m p a n i o n was
not completely u n a r m e d ; he h a d at least a d a g g e r in his belt or a
h a n d - a x e , a n d p e r h a p s also a light spear. If it c a m e to laving t h e
e n e m y ' s l a n d to waste, w h e n t h e e n e m y refused to j o i n battle, t h e
u n a r m o r e d m e n could d o t h a t task b e t t e r t h a n t h e heavily b u r -
d e n e d hoplites. In the battle a p a r t of t h e m could move a l o n g on
the flanks of the p h a l a n x , in o r d e r to harass the e n e m y with stones
a n d javelins a s h e m o v e d o u t . A n o t h e r p a r t o f t h e m m i g h t follow
the p h a l a n x , in o r d e r to pick up a n d care for the w o u n d e d at once
a n d to c a p t u r e or kill e n e m y soldiers w h o fell into t h e i r h a n d s .
T h e s e u n a r m o r e d m e n w e r e t h e r e f o r e n o t simply s u p p l y t r a i n
w a g o n e r s ; they also h a d certain battle functions. B u t we n e v e r t h e -
less get a false p i c t u r e if we simply c o u n t t h e m t o g e t h e r with the
hoplites in o r d e r to arrive at the s t r e n g t h of t h e a r m y . T h e correct

p r o c e d u r e , r a t h e r , is to c o u n t only the hoplites a n d t h e possibly
p r e s e n t m o u n t e d m e n a n d m a r k s m e n w h o a r e especially n a m e d a s
such, as t h e G r e e k s themselves generally did. In d o i n g so, however,
one must k e e p in m i n d that a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same n u m b e r of fol-
lowers w e r e p r e s e n t , w h o also c a r r i e d o u t certain battlefield func-
tions.
As for cavalry, it was not used by the G r e e k s against t h e Persians.
T h e w e a k p o i n t of a h o p l i t e p h a l a n x lay in its flanks. If t h e
e n e m y s h o u l d succeed in striking the flank of a p h a l a n x while the
front was occupied, all would be lost. T h e relatively few w a r r i o r s of
the outside c o l u m n s could hardly h o l d off an attack, a n d while they
h a d to stop a n d wheel against t h e e n e m y , they would e i t h e r force
the entire p h a l a n x to stop in like m a n n e r , so t h a t all the r e a r w a r d
r a n k s would be u n a b l e to carry o u t t h e i r special mission of pressing
forward, o r the p h a l a n x would b r e a k a p a r t a n d b e rolled u p from
the flank.
8
T h i s is described very clearly in a battle at Corcyra in 373 B . C .
T h e S p a r t a n s w e r e laying siege to the city a n d d r o v e back an at-
t e m p t e d sortie. At t h a t point o t h e r C o r c y r a e a n s fell on their flanks
from t h e gates, "lined u p eight m e n d e e p . " X e n o p h o n c o n t i n u e s t o
r e c o u n t , " T h e L a c e d a e m o n i a n s believed t h e flank ("the peak,"*
t h e r e f o r e literally t h e "point") too weak a n d s o u g h t to face a r o u n d
("they a t t e m p t e d to t u r n back").* T h e r e f o r e t h e last files tried to
f o r m in t h e r e a r a n e w f r o n t c o n s i s t i n g of a line with r e f u s e d
flanks. T h e e n e m i e s , r e g a r d i n g that as t h e b e g i n n i n g of a flight,
d r o v e i n all t h e m o r e s t r o n g l y , s o t h a t t h e w h e e l i n g m o v e m e n t
could not be c a r r i e d o u t , a n d o n e c o l u m n after the o t h e r took to
flight. ,
Of p a r t i c u l a r d a n g e r to t h e p h a l a n x is cavalry, w h e n , even in
small n u m b e r s , i t attacks t h e flanks. T h e n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e
p h a l a n x is immediately b r o k e n , since it can no l o n g e r move for-
ward without falling into d i s o r d e r .
T h e scope of this work does not include the origin of the
p h a l a n x formation as a tactical b o d y — t h a t is, the way the concept
of fighting in a tactical body d e v e l o p e d from the multiple single
combat concept. We have b e g u n o u r p r e s e n t a t i o n at a point w h e r e
the f o r m a t i o n of the hoplite p h a l a n x exists b e y o n d any d o u b t in
the G r e e k states a n d shows a high d e g r e e of effectiveness. I do not
wish to d e n y myself, however, a few r e m a r k s on t h e f o r e g o i n g sub-
ject.
T h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s indications t h a t t h e D o r i a n s , w h o subju-
58 History of the Art of War
g a t e d p a r t of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n a r e a , w e r e t h e first not only to

recognize the value of the closely knit g r o u p i n g of the fighters b u t
also to b r i n g this f o r m a t i o n into logical a n d effective practice. T h e
l e g e n d a r y account of the Messenian wars, as it has b e e n h a n d e d
d o w n to us in Pausanias, states (4. 8. 11) that the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s
h a d not p u r s u e d , because it was m o r e i m p o r t a n t to t h e m to h o l d
t h e i r o r d e r l y f o r m a t i o n t h a n to kill o n e or a n o t h e r of the fleeing
9
e n e m y . ("It was also a n a n c i e n t c u s t o m with t h e m t o p u r s u e
s o m e w h a t slowly, k e e p i n g it in m i n d to p r e s e r v e t h e i r formation
r a t h e r t h a n killing those w h o fled b e f o r e t h e m . " ) * Almost identical
is an account by E m p e r o r F r a n z I for his b r o t h e r Karl of L o r r a i n e ,
in t h e y e a r 1757, c o n c e r n i n g the military m e t h o d s of the Prussians
( A r n e t h , Maria Theresia, 5: 171). " T h e y u n d e r s t o o d only rarely how
t o d e r i v e i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a g e s f r o m a h a r d - w o n victory. T h e
r e a s o n is that they d r e a d e d n o t h i n g else q u i t e as m u c h as having
t h e i r r a n k s fall into d i s o r d e r , a n d so they usually avoided p r o m p t
pursuit."
T h e oldest r e c o r d o n t h e origin o f t h e p h a l a n x seems t o s u p p o r t
a legend that we find in Polyaenus ( 1 . 10). W h e n t h e Heraclidae
w e r e fighting against S p a r t a , they were s u r p r i s e d in t h e m i d d l e of
their sacrifices by their e n e m i e s . T h e y did not allow themselves to
panic, however, b u t o r d e r e d their p i p e r s t o m a r c h forward. T h e
p i p e r s blew a n d a d v a n c e d , b u t t h e hoplites, s t r i d i n g f o r w a r d i n
time with t h e melody a n d t h e r h y t h m , f o r m e d t h e i r battle r a n k s
a n d held t h e f o r m a t i o n solidly, a n d were victorious. ( " T h e hoplites
marched on accompanied by melody and r h y t h m and did not
b r e a k t h e i r r a n k s ; this was how they c o n q u e r e d t h e i r enemies.")*
T h i s e x p e r i e n c e t a u g h t t h e L a c e d a e m o n i a n s always t o h a v e t h e
p i p e r s lead t h e m into b a t t l e , a n d t h e i r g o d p r o m i s e d t h e m t h a t
they w o u l d always c o n q u e r as long as they fought a c c o m p a n i e d by
pipers a n d not against p i p e r s .
In this context t h e p i p e r is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e tactical forma-
tion; a g r o u p of h e r o e s e n g a g i n g in individual c o m b a t does not
m a r c h in step a n d would, by the i r r e g u l a r noise of t h e i r advance,
even d r o w n o u t the p i p e r s .
EXCURSUS
1. Also Plutarch, Lycurgus, Chapter 22, and T h u c y d i d e s (5. 70) recount that the
Lacedaemonians m o v e d into battle slowly, to the beat and the music of n u m e r o u s
pipers.
It has erroneously b e e n c o n c l u d e d from this, however (Liers, p. 177), that the
Spartans held this pace until the actual clash and that they m a d e no assault run as
the Athenians did. An approach march with music and in step can be reconciled
completely with the fact that the actual attack was finally made on the double, as the
nature—one might e v e n say the psychology—of the situation demands.
Polybius, too, reports (4. 20. 6) that the ancient Cretes and Lacedaemonians had
introduced in war, instead of the trumpet, "pipe and rhythm,"* that is, a measured
piping or flute-playing.
2. On closer examination, o n e finds in the fragments of the Songs of Tyrtaeus, as
Adolf Bauer has already correctly noted {Ancient Greek Military Periods, p. 2 4 2 ; 2d
ed., p. 304), indications that the singer had a close formation in mind, especially in
10. 15 (Bergk ed.): "They fight while remaining at each other's side."* O t h e r cita-
tions point, it is true, m o r e toward individual combat, as in the Iliad, for e x a m p l e
(the harangue to the Gymnetae at the end of Book 11), but the existence of tactical
formations d o e s not e x c l u d e single and multiple individual combats.
3. In the citizen's oath of the Athenians there was specifically expressed: "I will
not leave a c o m r a d e b e h i n d with w h o m I stand in battle."*
To these citations Olsen, in his Battle of Plataea (Schlacht bei Platää) (Greifswald
Program, 1903), p. 15, a d d e d the two following fine quotations: Sophocles' Antigone,
verse 6 7 0 , "would stand his g r o u n d in the storm of battle";* and T h u c y d i d e s 2. 11.
9, speech of Archidamus, "Follow wherever any [of your officers] might lead you,
reckoning g o o d o r d e r and vigilance above everything else . . ."*
4. On the basis of a very careful a s s e m b l i n g a n d c o m p a r i s o n of the literary
sources with the vase illustrations which have survived, Helbig tried very recently to
prove that there existed in Greece (with the e x c e p t i o n of Thessaly), until after the
Persian wars, no cavalry at all, but that the "Knights,"* which were n a m e d and illus-
10
trated, were to be considered as m o u n t e d h o p l i t e s . T h i s question deals principally
with a period previous to the start of my o w n study, but I can nevertheless not fail
to remark that Helbig's evidence d o e s not s e e m compelling to me and that there are
n u m e r o u s important points that can be used to counter his conclusion. Foremost of
all, in principle, the concepts of cavalry and infantry are much too m o d e r n , that is,
m u c h too sharply drawn. In the third v o l u m e of this work we shall see that there
were warriors on foot and m o u n t e d warriors to w h o m neither the word infantry nor
cavalry applies. Furthermore, Helbig's concept of m o u n t e d infantry is for this reason
disputable from the very start, and this is not perhaps just a simple contention over
words; rather, these basic concepts govern the entire study. Helbig's interpretation
of the scenes on the vase paintings, in particular, is repeatedly determined by the
idea that, wherever horses and a r m e d m e n are to be seen, o n e has only to choose as
to whether it is a matter of infantrymen or cavalrymen. W h o e v e r has studied suffi-
ciently the nature of medieval knightly combat will find that the Greek vase illustra-
tions often allow a n o t h e r interpretation than that which Helbig gives them; for ex-
ample, w h e n he interprets the battle scene in Figure 37, page 2 5 5 , as showing that
two m o u n t e d hoplites were a m b u s h e d and did not have e n o u g h time to dismount in
order to fight, I w o u l d prefer to believe that they are surprised before they have
time to m o u n t u p , w h e t h e r it be for the p u r p o s e of fighting on horseback or of
fleeing. Also the interpretation on page 188 d o e s not s e e m acceptable to m e , and
likewise for several others.
Helbig's idea is that citizens on horseback, e v e n with two horses, were levied for
war in o r d e r to play the role of hoplites in the phalanx in case of battle, but after
the battle they were to m o u n t up and carry out the pursuit. T h a t seems unaccepta-
ble to me. It might well have been that a man of means w h o was called out for ser-
vice rode his horse in o r d e r to avoid marching, and then fought as a hoplite. A n d it
may also have been true that the horse owners, after the decision in the phalanx
c o m b a t , quickly ran t o their h o r s e s , m o u n t e d u p , a n d p u r s u e d the d e f e a t e d
e n e m y — a l t h o u g h the concept of such a pursuit is n e v e r clearly shown in earlier
Greek history and is hardly compatible with it. It is quite certain, however, that
there was not a body of m o u n t e d hoplites organized by the state for this purpose.
60 History of t h e Art of War
On most occasions it is clear that the m o u n t e d warriors could contribute m u c h m o r e

to the decision by not d i s m o u n t i n g but attacking on horseback the e n e m y phalanx
on its flank.
From the application of the m o d e r n concept of cavalry Helbig also arrives at the
necessity (p. 169) for the riders to form up for c o m m o n drills, and he is doubtful of
the practicability of such drills. Very rightly so. But the pair of riders that each Attic
naucrary had to provide definitely did not form a 9 6 - m a n squadron; rather they
were 96 individual riders, or, if o n e will, knights, w h o carried out c o m m o n drills just
as little as did the medieval knights.
It is entirely natural that these knights went into the phalanx as hoplites u n d e r
certain circumstances. Medieval knights, too, often fought on foot, not only w h e n
conditions were not suitable for m o u n t e d combat, but also to give the other fighters
on foot a greater morale boost. Just as such action is credited to the special fame of
an Athenian r i d e r , " we also find it in praise of knights of the fifteenth century (Vol.
III, B o o k I V , C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 6). In the Persian Wars, w h e r e the few G r e e k
m o u n t e d m e n would have b e e n absolutely useless against the superior numbers of
the Persians, it is obvious that the prominent Athenians fought in the ranks of the
hoplites, and Helbig's conclusion (p. 160) that, since the Greeks at Marathon and
Plataea used no cavalry, they did not have any, is not convincing.
To go into the details of Helbig's study is hardly necessary for us, since, t h o u g h
they also fall into our period, they belong m o r e in the area of ancient relics. In this
area the last word still awaits a new study. For, if I have not been able to accept
Helbig's basic ideas and his positive solution, nevertheless he is right beyond doubt
in saying that contradictions exist in the historical accounts, which have up to now
remained unnoticed and unchallenged. His raising of the questions, his assembling
of the widely spread material, and his perspicacious combining of these sources were
in themselves a great service. T h e final solution, however, is still missing, and the
puzzles have remained.
Particularly remarkable for o u r sensibilities is the statement of Pausanias 1. 18
(Helbig, p. 180) that there were statues of the Dioscuri in an A t h e n i a n temple with
the masters on foot, their servants on horseback. T o d a y that w o u l d be a topsy-turvy
world.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I I
1. Adolf B a u e r , Section 4 0 , says t h r e e m e t e r s . On this point, see

also below, the study on the sarissae.
2. H. Droysen, Army Organization (Heerwesen), p. 24, cites several
passages in which t h e h a r n e s s is not n a m e d as a piece of e q u i p m e n t
for t h e S p a r t a n s a n d considers it possible t h a t they, in contrast to
t h e o t h e r Greeks, d i d n o t w e a r any. T h a t w o u l d be a far-reaching
difference. Nevertheless, this o p i n i o n is certainly incorrect. Droysen
himself cites a passage f r o m T y r t a e u s in which a r m o r is expressly
n a m e d , a n d if o n e w e r e inclined to c o n c l u d e from t h e passage in
X e n o p h o n ' s Anabasis 1 . 2 . 1 6 t h a t C y r u s ' m e r c e n a r i e s w o r e n o
a r m o r , t h a t w o u l d also have to apply to all t h e G r e e k s r e p r e s e n t e d
among them.
3. H. Droysen, Heerwesen, p. 171, footnote, r e c o m m e n d s using the
w o r d phalanx only with r e s p e c t to foot soldiers a r m e d with t h e
sarissa, whose p a r t i c u l a r combat position consisted in the "closeness

of their f o r m a t i o n in c o m p a r i s o n with those in the rear."* I believe
in h o l d i n g fast, however, to the expression that has b e c o m e quite
c o m m o n , w h i c h I t h i n k I can best establish with t h e d e f i n i t i o n
given above. T h e basis t h e r e f o r e will gradually e m e r g e as o u r study
progresses. D r o y s e n himself shows that t h e G r e e k usage is very in-
definite a n d has varied.
4. T h e a c c o u n t of Isocrates (Archidamus, p. 99), which says the
S p a r t a n s h a d c o n q u e r e d t h e A r c a d i a n s a t D i p a e a i n one r a n k ,
which D u n c k e r , 8:134, a c c e p t e d , has b e e n justifiably rejected by
Droysen, p. 4 5 , a n d Adolf B a u e r , p. 243 (2d ed., p. 305), as r h e t o r -
ical e x a g g e r a t i o n . Droysen, with e q u a l justification, also rejects the
two r a n k s of Polyaenus 2. 1. 24.
5. Lysias, Mantitheus 16. 15. T h e s p e a k e r , M a n t i t h e u s , b o a s t s :
" T h e r e was an e x p e d i t i o n to C o r i n t h , a n d e v e r y o n e knew a h e a d of
time t h a t it w o u l d be a d a n g e r o u s u n d e r t a k i n g . A l t h o u g h s o m e
were shirking back, I a r r a n g e d it so that I m i g h t fight o u r e n e m i e s
in the front line. A n d o u r phyle h a d t h e worst luck a n d suffered
the worst losses a m o n g its own m e n . I quit t h e field later t h a n that
excellent m a n f r o m Steiria w h o h a s b e e n a c c u s i n g e v e r y o n e o f
c o w a r d i c e . " * F o r this fine q u o t a t i o n I am i n d e b t e d to the b o o k
Warfare of Antiquity (Das Kriegswesen des Altertums), by H u g o Liers, p.
46.
6. C o n c e r n i n g t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of Spartiates a n d Perioeci in the
same military f o r m a t i o n , see B a u e r , p a r a s . 18, 19, a n d 2 3 , a n d ,
now at the c e n t e r of a lively controversy, K r o m a y e r , Klio 3 (1903):
177 ff, a n d B e l o c h , Klio 6 : 6 3 . On this o c c a s i o n t h e following
splendid evidence of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of the first r a n k has c o m e to
light. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 180. 2 7 1 , writes: " F o r in t h e c a m -
paign that t h e king led, they a r r a n g e d t h e m m a n by m a n in r a n k
with t h e m s e l v e s , a n d they also s t a t i o n e d s o m e m e n i n t h e f i r s t
rank."*
7. X e n o p h o n , Cyropaedia 6. 3. 2 5 . F o r f u r t h e r information on
this point, see below, Book I I , C h a p t e r V.
8. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 6. 2. 2 1 .
9. T h u c y d i d e s , too, r e p o r t s that the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s , specifically,
d i d n o t n o r m a l l y c a r r y t h e p u r s u i t far (5. 73). Helbig, " O n t h e
Original Period of the Closed P h a l a n x " ( U b e r die Einführungszeit
d e r geschlossenen Phalanx") Sitzungs-Bericht der Bayerischen Akademie
1911, believes, based on insufficient sources, that the Chalcidians
f o r m e d the f i r s t p h a l a n x .
10. " T h e A t h e n i a n Hippeis" ("Les Hippeis A t h é n i e n s " ) , by M. W.
Helbig, Mémoires de I'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1902, p.

37.
See also " M o u n t e d I n f a n t r y in Antiquity" ("Berittene Infanterie
im A l t e r t u m " ) , by G e o r g Friederici, Neue Militärische Blatter, Vol.
6 7 , N o . 11/12, 1905.
11. Lysias, Mantitheus 16. 13. Helbig, p. 239.
Chapter III
The Greek Army Strengths:
Conclusion
Establishing t h e tactical n a t u r e of the G r e e k a r m i e s gives us new
points of d e p a r t u r e for estimating t h e i r s t r e n g t h s . A p a n o p l y is a
very expensive set of e q u i p m e n t ; n o t every service-qualified citizen,
by far, is in a position to provide himself with o n e . Each hoplite
has, m o r e o v e r , a n u n a r m o r e d m a n with h i m . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e
p h a l a n x was very m u c h smaller t h a n the n u m b e r of citizens.
In A t h e n s t h e r e h a d existed for a l o n g time f o u r classes
c a t e g o r i z e d b y wealth, o f which t h e two h i g h e r o n e s s e r v e d o n
horseback a n d the t h i r d — t h e zeugitae (small farmers), w h o h a d an in-
c o m e b e t w e e n 2 0 0 a n d 3 0 0 b u s h e l s (metretes) o f g r a i n , w i n e , o r
oil—served as hoplites. Before A t h e n s h a d a fleet, t h e very signifi-
cant lowest p o r t i o n of t h e citizenry, t h e Thêtes, t h e r e f o r e , w e r e
c o m p l e t e l y free o f a n y o b l i g a t i o n for military service. W e m a y
nevertheless a s s u m e with certainty that t h e u n a r m o r e d m a n w h o
a c c o m p a n i e d t h e hoplite was normally at t h a t time also a citizen;
most of t h e zeugitae probably d i d n o t o w n any slaves. W h e n the
A t h e n i a n s later c r e a t e d a fleet a n d simultaneously their wealth in
slaves increased, the Thêtes served on s h i p b o a r d a n d t h e hoplites
w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d by a t r u s t w o r t h y slave. S p a r t a , with Messenia,
h a d a l m o s t twice a s m a n y i n h a b i t a n t s , b u t since only t h e r u l i n g
w a r r i o r caste p e r f o r m e d military service—with t h e addition of the
citizens, t h e Perioeci, in u r g e n t situations, b u t e x c l u d i n g the serfs,
the Helots—it d i d n o t field any m o r e hoplites t h a n A t h e n s , that is,
some 2,000 Spartiates a n d 3,000 Perioeci. C o r i n t h a n d T h e b e s may
have b e e n able to p u t 1,500 to 2,000 in t h e field. T h o s e a r e consid-
erably smaller n u m b e r s t h a n h a d b e e n previously estimated, b u t a
careful check of t h e historical account, t a k i n g into consideration all
the prevailing c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d c o n d i t i o n s , w a r r a n t s o u r accep-
t a n c e o f t h e fact t h a t t h o s e n u m b e r s c a n n o t differ significantly
from reality.
63
EXCURSUS
1. In view of the n u m b e r s that we arrived at in the first chapter, it seems remark-

able that the naval service n e e d e d and levied so many more m e n than the army.
T o d a y it is just the opposite. T h e Athenians at o n e time had a fleet of 170 ships in
service, requiring a normal force of 3 4 , 0 0 0 crew m e m b e r s to man t h e m . T h e i r
greatest land levy (in the year 431 B . C . ) n u m b e r e d only 16,000 hoplites—in fact,
quite certainly considerably fewer, since T h u c y d i d e s gives the n u m b e r on the levy
list, without any deductions for those falling out or even for the distant cleruchs. We
have seen, however, that a levy of 16,000 hoplites really means that s o m e 3 2 , 0 0 0
m e n w e r e m o v e d o u t . B o t h levies, t h e r e f o r e , w e r e o f almost exactly the same
strength.
Of the 2 8 , 8 0 0 service-qualified Athenian citizens in the year 431 B . C . , 1,200 served
on horseback, 1,600 as archers, 1 3 , 0 0 0 as field hoplites, a n d 1 3 , 0 0 0 r e m a i n e d ,
a m o n g them two year-groups of recruits.
At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, therefore, the field army was made up
of over half of the adult service-qualified citizens. At that time Athens was at the
height of her power and o p u l e n c e . O n e cannot assume that, at the time of the battle
of M a r a t h o n , her military p o w e r was already d e v e l o p e d to s u c h an e x t e n t . A
panoply was so expensive that e v e n in 431 B . C . perhaps not e v e n half of the citizens
were able to equip themselves in such a way with their o w n means, but this equip-
m e n t was, as we shall see later, provided for a portion of the hoplites by the state. It
is not likely that this was already the case in the Persian Wars. We may therefore
assume that at that time only those citizens served as hoplites w h o were in a position
to provide their o w n panoply. For this point we have evidence in the class divisions
of the Athenians—the 5 0 0 - b u s h e l - m e n , the m o u n t e d m e n , the farmers (zeugitae)
and the day workers (Thêtes). T h e names indicate that, w h e n these classes were
created the inhabitants of Attica still lived principally from agriculture; we must
nevertheless assume that in the fifth century there were simply four property class-
es, in which the city population, too, was included according to each man's means.
T h e c l a s s e s n o l o n g e r h a d any p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e — i f t h e y e v e r h a d any
otherwise—and they were hardly useful for the paying of taxes; it was in the mili-
tary organization that they probably had their significance. In our sources no specific
obligation is shown for the highest class as such, but there w e r e certain contribu-
tions, especially the outfitting of triremes (the state provided the hull), which were
directly charged to the richest. Since somebody w h o was not included on the list of
the highest class could certainly not take over such contributions, we will therefore
be permitted to regard this as the special characteristic of this class. In addition to
these contributions, those w h o were placed in the first class had the obligation, along
with those of the second class, of serving on horseback. T h e zeugitae had the obliga-
tion of maintaining their o w n hoplite e q u i p m e n t and serving with it. My assumption
that, in the earlier period, the Thêtes went along into the field u n a r m o r e d is based
on the fact that A t h e n s was already a democracy before she possessed a fleet, and
universal suffrage without universal military obligation is not conceivable. If a h o p -
lite did not bring along his o w n attendant, be it son, brother, neighbor, or slave, his
precinct probably provided him a citizen as c o m p a n i o n . We are to understand clas-
sification in the zeugitae class as m e a n i n g that the family was to furnish one m a n ,
1
e q u i p p e d . It is impossible that the father of a farm family with several grown sons
would have been obligated to provide a panoply for each o n e . Providing o n e fully
e q u i p p e d man meant s e n d i n g not o n e , but two m e n .
If this concept is correct, then an Athenian hoplite army in 4 9 0 B . C . cannot have

included a half of the service-qualified Athenian citizenry, as in the year 431 B . C . ,
but hardly a third, and probably only a fourth or fifth. Including the metics, there-
fore, the Athenians at Marathon had at the very most 8 , 0 0 0 hoplites, and probably
only s o m e 5,000, accompanied by the same n u m b e r of u n a r m o r e d m e n .
The Greek Army Strengths: Conclusion 65
T h e extent of the service obligation of the metics is uncertain. For o u r purposes

that does not matter, since they were in any event called out in case of e m e r g e n c y
and for h o m e d e f e n s e , and o u r estimate is concerned only with the possible max-
imum achievement.
Schenkl, in his "On the Attic Metics" ("De Metoecis Atticis"), Wiener Studien 1
(1879): 196, expressly rejects the opinion of H e r m a n n , that citizens and metics had
the same military service obligation. T h u m s e r , too, in Wiener Studien 7 (1885): 6 2 ,
claims that the metic hoplites before the time of D e m o s t h e n e s , except in very un-
usual cases, were e m p l o y e d only in defense of the Attic h o m e l a n d . A n d likewise
Busolt, 111:53.
2. T h e p o p u l a t i o n of Laconia a n d Messenia has b e e n estimated by B e l o c h at
2 3 0 , 0 0 0 persons—to wit, 9,000 Spartiates, 4 5 , 0 0 0 Perioeci, 176,000 Helots. I prefer
to estimate the n u m b e r of individuals somewhat higher, since I assume the relative
number of adult m e n to be somewhat smaller than does Beloch. Furthermore, there
always exist a greater n u m b e r of m e n of an age for military service than actually
move out into the field or are capable of m o v i n g out. In other respects, however, I
agree completely with Beloch's estimate and can refer the reader to him for the de-
tails. Sparta was, according to him, capable of sending into the field a hoplite army
2
of s o m e 2,000 Spartiates and 3,000 Perioeci; the u n a r m o r e d m e n for this army
came from the Helots.
T h e s e calculations fully validate a n u m b e r from the sources h a n d e d d o w n to
us—a n u m b e r that up to now has always b e e n treated very cursorily. In the year 4 9 0
B . C . , according to H e r o d o t u s 6. 120, the Spartans sent 2,000 m e n to the aid of the
Athenians. That would, however, have b e e n remarkably few if they had really had
at Plataea, in addition to the ships' crews, 5,000 Spartiates and 5,000 Perioeci as h o p -
lites. N o w we realize that it was really the entire Spartiate levy that came to the aid
of the Athenians and that Spartans,, consequently, took the war very seriously. Of
course, since Herodotus' strength estimates have no credibility in themselves, it may
be that it is simply a question of coincidence here. It is also possible, however, that
precisely the n u m b e r 2,000, which was probably reported officially to the Athenians,
was m a i n t a i n e d in the oral tradition, w h e r e a s the n u m b e r of A t h e n i a n s a n d of
Plataeans w h o marched out "with the whole body of the city drawn up as an army"*
found no place in the legend. Later, perhaps in reply to a question by H e r o d o t u s ,
the total n u m b e r may have been estimated so inaccurately by somebody or other
having no knowledge of the situation, that a relatively m u c h higher accomplishment
is attributed to the village of Plataea than to A t h e n s itself.
3. T h e r e s u l t i n g total for Sparta is m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t e d by o u r e s t i m a t e for
A t h e n s . At that t i m e Sparta was c o n s i d e r e d a m o n g the G r e e k s as clearly the
3
strongest state militarily. T h e Spartiates were warriors by profession and therefore
qualitatively certainly superior to the citizen levies of the other areas. If at the time
of the Persian Wars, however, A t h e n s had already b e e n capable of sending into the
field 10,000 hoplites, exactly double the strength of the Spartan army, Sparta w o u l d
not have been able to claim such unquestioned superiority. T h e assumption that the
numbers were about equal and that the superiority of the Spartans lay in the excel-
lence of the reigning warrior caste removes every difficulty. If A t h e n s and Sparta
were unable to raise more than 5,000, or at most 6,000, hoplites, then Corinth or
T h e b e s , which controlled only very small land areas, certainly had no m o r e than
1,500, or at most 2,000.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R III
1. T h a t seems to be p r o v e d by Plato in Menexenus, w h e r e it is in-

dicated t h a t t h e family decides which o n e shall go to war.
2. Adolf B a u e r d o e s not d r a w up any total figure, b u t does esti-

m a t e ( a l t h o u g h h e , too, considers the figures of H e r o d o t u s to be
too high) t h a t at M a n t i n e a in 4 1 8 B.C. t h e r e w e r e 3,584 Spartiates
a l o n e , for a total of a b o u t 4,300 field-service-qualified m e n (para.
2 3 ; 2d ed., p. 312). I c a n n o t a g r e e . It is t r u e that T h u c y d i d e s ' fig-
u r e s a r e contestable, especially the pentecostys of 128 m e n ; if o n e ac-
cepts t h e m , h o w e v e r , it seems to me that t h e r e is no d o u b t that
T h u c y d i d e s i n t e n d s to give the total s t r e n g t h of t h e L a c e d a e m o -
nians a n d not j u s t that of the Spartiates. But he does not indicate
this limitation in any way; n o r is t h e r e any conceivable reason why
the e p h o r s s h o u l d have left all the Perioeci, except t h e Scyrites, at
h o m e at a time of such grave d a n g e r .
3. T h u c y d i d e s 1. 18, " T h e L a c e d a e m o n i a n s were the leaders of
t h e i r Hellenic allies, because their s t r e n g t h was superior."*
Chapter IV
The Persian Army
T h e Persian a r m y was of a type completely opposite that of the

G r e e k a r m y ; it was c o m p o s e d of m o u n t e d m e n a n d a r c h e r s . Aes-
chylus, the only c o n t e m p o r a r y whose r e p o r t on the Persian W a r s is
directly available to us, sings a n d speaks again a n d again (in his
1
d r a m a The Persians) of t h e c o m b a t of the spear against the b o w .
Even the Persian m o u n t e d m e n w e r e a r m e d with t h e bow.
T h e swords o r short spears that a r e m e n t i o n e d served only a s
auxiliary w e a p o n s .
Since the bow f o r m e d the principal w e a p o n , t h e protective a r m o r
was only light—for t h e d i s m o u n t e d t r o o p s , probably only a shield
of woven straw that the a r c h e r could place in front of himself while
firing. "With p a n t s a n d hats they go into battle," Aristagoras said of
the Persian w a r r i o r s in describing t h e m to the S p a r t a n s . In a n o t h e r
2
passage scale a r m o r is m e n t i o n e d , b u t it was p r o b a b l y w o r n by
only a p o r t i o n of the m o u n t e d m e n .
It is not only t h e difference in a r m s , however, that distinguishes
the Persians from the G r e e k s . T h e p o w e r of t h e p h a l a n x rests, in
addition t o t h e c o u r a g e a n d e q u i p m e n t o f t h e individual soldier, o n
the steadfastness of t h e whole of t h e tactical formation. We have
seen that, even w h e n o n e side has a m u c h l a r g e r n u m b e r of war-
riors, they influence the decision not by their w e a p o n s , b u t t h r o u g h
the fact that in t h e r e a r r a n k s of the p h a l a n x they exercise a physi-
cal a n d m o r a l p r e s s u r e . T h e Persians do not form a tactical body;
m a r k s m e n lend themselves b u t little to it. By their very n a t u r e they
t e n d to s p r e a d o u t r a t h e r t h a n to form a unit. Only a particularly
highly d e v e l o p e d skill can, consequently, m a k e an intrinsic unit of
t h e m . P r i m a r i l y , h o w e v e r , e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d s o n t h e skill, t h e
vigor, a n d t h e c o u r a g e of the individual.
M a r k s m e n c a n n o t be e m p l o y e d in large masses against hoplites,
If they a r e d r a w n up in a d e e p formation, t h e r e a r w a r d r a n k s no
l o n g e r h a v e the capability of s h o o t i n g effectively. If they s p r e a d
67
o u t , before long their a r r o w s will no l o n g e r be able to reach the

enemy.
T h e Persian E m p i r e was c o m p o s e d of t h e Persian national nu-
cleus a n d the n u m e r o u s subject peoples. T h e Persian kings d r e w n o
w a r r i o r s from t h e s e latter g r o u p s . T h e M e s o p o t a m i a n s , Syrians,
Egyptians, a n d i n h a b i t a n t s of Asia M i n o r were, for t h e m , t h e u n -
warlike, t r i b u t e - p a y i n g masses, with t h e exception of the Phoenician
a n d G r e e k sailors, w h o n a t u r a l l y m a n n e d t h e fleet. W h e n
H e r o d o t u s e n u m e r a t e s t h e h u g e mass o f p e o p l e s w h o a p p e a r e d i n
t h e Persian a r m y , we c o n s i d e r that as p u r e fantasy. Persia itself,
e m b r a c i n g p r e s e n t - d a y Persia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, a n d large
p o r t i o n s of T u r k e s t a n , was a n d still is today, for t h e most p a r t ,
steppes a n d desert, with n u m e r o u s small or fairly large oases a n d a
few very large o n e s . Persians, Medes, a n d P a r t h i a n s a r e b r a n c h e s of
the same p e o p l e , s o m e w h a t as Saxons, F r a n k s , Swabians, Bavarians
in medieval G e r m a n y . W h a t h e l d t h e m t o g e t h e r was not j u s t their
n a t i o n a l i t y b u t also t h e i r c o m m o n r e l i g i o n , t h e r e v e l a t i o n o f
Z a r a t h u s t r a . T h e truly warlike e l e m e n t was naturally t h e n o m a d i c
b r a n c h e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e agricultural ones. It was probably with t h e
n o m a d s that the e m p i r e was originally established. As the Persians
b e c a m e m a s t e r s o f d i s t a n t a n d r i c h civilized l a n d s , t h e y w e r e
gradually t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m warlike s h e p h e r d s to warlike rulers, or
k n i g h t s . We shall h a v e to i m a g i n e t h a t all t h e s a t r a p s from t h e
Black Sea to the R e d Sea w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d by large r e t i n u e s of
warlike, national Persian b o d y g u a r d s , with w h o m they s u r r o u n d e d
themselves a n d o c c u p i e d i m p o r t a n t s t r o n g h o l d s . With t h e h e l p o f
t r i b u t e a n d g o o d s which they received, they n o t only r e t a i n e d these
g r o u p s , b u t they also a d d e d t o t h e m , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c i r c u m -
stances, with m e r c e n a r i e s from warlike tribes t h a t in m a n y instances
h a d r e m a i n e d in the limits of the realm b u t w e r e still half or even
entirely i n d e p e n d e n t . F r o m Persia itself, however, m o r e from the
n o m a d s t h a n f r o m t h e f a r m e r s , it was always possible to levy, re-
cruit, a n d send o u t r e p l a c e m e n t s a n d r e i n f o r c e m e n t s .
T h e Persian E m p i r e , in its f o u n d a t i o n as in its s t r u c t u r e , has its
parallel 1,200 years later in the world e m p i r e that s p r a n g up from
a n o t h e r oasis land, t h a t of the A r a b i a n B e d o u i n s , w h o , like t h e Per-
sians, w e r e held t o g e t h e r by a new religion. T h e Persians in t h e i r
time h a d as little t e n d e n c y to form mass a r m i e s as did t h e A r a b s
later, for large masses c a n n o t be m o v e d over such g r e a t distances
as are to be f o u n d in e m p i r e s of such b r e a d t h . T h e Arabs, like t h e
Persians, f o r m e d quality a r m i e s . To form an idea of the c h a r a c t e r
of the Persian a r m y , o n e would do well to s u p p l e m e n t the r e p o r t s
The Persian Army 69
of the G r e e k sources by c o n s i d e r i n g the analogy of the G e r m a n i c

a n d knightly military system: the F r a n k s u n d e r the Merovingians,
who occupied t h e rich R o m a n areas of G a u l with small units, while
the m a i n p a r t of t h e i r p e o p l e r e m a i n e d in place in t h e areas they
h a d i n h e r i t e d , a n d t h e G e r m a n k n i g h t s , with w h o m the S a x o n ,
Salic, a n d H o h e n s t a u f e n kings took Italy a n d held it u n d e r their
r u l e . A n y o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t m a y h a v e existed b e t w e e n t h e
oriental a n d occidental political systems do n o t c o m e into consider-
ation h e r e ; what we have to c o n s i d e r is t h e c h a r a c t e r of the military
profession, which with very small n u m b e r s is nevertheless able to
3
maintain very extensive d o m i n i o n .
T h e w o r k o f each a n d the differences b e t w e e n the two armies
are meaningfully described in the conversation that t h e G r e e k s re-
port taking place b e t w e e n Xerxes a n d the b a n i s h e d S p a r t a n King,
D e m a r a t u s . T h e king of kings boasts that he has m e n in his body-
g u a r d w h o can take on t h r e e G r e e k s at the s a m e time. D e m a r a t u s ,
however, replies that the individual S p a r t a n s a r e j u s t as c o u r a g e o u s
as o t h e r m e n b u t t h a t their real s t r e n g t h lies in t h e i r j o i n t stead-
fastness a n d that t h e law c o m m a n d s t h e m to c o n q u e r or die stand-
ing t o g e t h e r in r a n k a n d c o l u m n . We stress this point specifically:
the G r e e k hoplites form a closed tactical body, t h e Persian w a r r i o r s
d o not.
T h e historical a c c o u n t s o f t h e G r e e k s c o n c e r n i n g the Persians
contain a basic contradiction. On t h e o n e h a n d the Persians a r e pic-
t u r e d as gigantic b u t very u n w a r l i k e masses that m u s t be d r i v e n
into battle with whiplashes. T h e n again, they a p p e a r as e x t r e m e l y
4
brave a n d skillful w a r r i o r s . If b o t h of these p o i n t s — t h e mass as
well as t h e warlike skill—are correct, t h e r e p e a t e d victories of t h e
Greeks w o u l d be inexplicable. Only o n e of t h e two can be right,
a n d h e r e it is clear t h a t t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of t h e P e r s i a n s is to be
f o u n d n o t in n u m b e r s , b u t in quality.
T h e victory of the citizen a r m i e s over t h e professional a r m y has
b e e n distorted in t h e G r e e k legend, which is o u r only source, into
the victory of a small minority over a gigantic majority. T h i s is a
national psychological a b e r r a t i o n t h a t o n e f i n d s again a n d again.
T h e criterion of quality is too fine for t h e mass, which t r a n s f o r m s it
into t h e criterion of quantity. T h a t is l e g e n d b u t n o t falsehood. F o r
everybody w h o u n d e r s t a n d s the difference between a professional
a r m y a n d a citizen a r m y , t h e victory of t h e G r e e k citizens over t h e
Persian knights is no less praiseworthy t h a n is the victory of the few
over t h e m a n y i n the legend. F o r t h e p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g from
the viewpoint of military history, however, e v e r y t h i n g in this pas-
sage d e p e n d s o n the difference between l e g e n d a n d history. T h e

c o n c e p t of a P e r s i a n m a s s a r m y is to be r e j e c t e d c o m p l e t e l y .
N o t h i n g forces us to a s s u m e that t h e Persians h a d n u m e r i c a l superior-
ity at all at M a r a t h o n a n d Plataea; it is completely possible, in fact
even probable—in my opinion, certain—that the Greeks were
stronger.
T h e Persians were professional warriors. Even the men who
p e r h a p s , for such a l a r g e w a r as this o n e against the Greeks, were
levied from the s h e p h e r d s a n d peasants of Persia to fill o u t t h e es-
sentially knightly a r m y w e r e , after all, no p o p u l a r levy, but r a t h e r
the m o r e warlike o n e s f r o m t h e mass o f t h e p e o p l e . T h e Greeks,
with the exception of the Spartiates, r e p r e s e n t e d citizen levies that
d i d n o t even have a s t r o n g military tradition. T h e heroic p e r i o d
was already long past, a n d the last g e n e r a t i o n s h a d , it is t r u e , seen
m a n y a q u a r r e l between n e i g h b o r s b u t h a d nevertheless b r o u g h t
up t h e mass of t h e p e o p l e for peaceful o c c u p a t i o n s , as f a r m e r s ,
sailors, m e r c h a n t s , a n d artisans.
W h e n I stated this o p i n i o n for the first time in my Persian and
Burgundian Wars, it was rejected by m a n y a scholar with a simple
"impossible," without any f u r t h e r r e a s o n given, a n d it is of course
only n a t u r a l that a concept so deeply r o o t e d as t h a t c o n c e r n i n g t h e
s t r e n g t h of X e r x e s ' a r m y is n o t given up easily. Because I foresaw
this, I linked my study of t h e Persian W a r s with t h a t on the B u r -
g u n d i a n W a r s b e t w e e n C h a r l e s the Bold a n d t h e Swiss. H e r e we
have exactly t h e s a m e s e q u e n c e of events. In r e p e a t e d battles the
a r m y of citizens a n d f a r m e r s c o n q u e r e d the a r m y of professional
w a r r i o r s (knights a n d m e r c e n a r i e s ) , b u t the p o p u l a r accounts trans-
f o r m e d that into a victory of the small minority over t h e g r e a t ma-
j o r i t y . F r o m G r a n s o n a n d M u t t e r , h o w e v e r , a few a r m y m u s t e r
rolls for both sides have b e e n h a n d e d d o w n to us, a n d so we can
prove from original sources that the s u p p o s e d many h u n d r e d
t h o u s a n d s o f C h a r l e s t h e Bold w e r e actually c o n s i d e r a b l y fewer
t h a n t h e Swiss. By no m e a n s , t h e r e f o r e , can o n e banish such a
c h a n g e d concept with an "impossible." T h e r e is no reason for as-
s u m i n g that H e r o d o t u s a n d the G r e e k s s h o u l d b e given any m o r e
c r e d e n c e t h a n t h e solid Swiss chroniclers, w h o h a v e also b e e n be-
lieved for centuries. W h o e v e r d o u b t s my evidence I request to re-
serve j u d g m e n t until he has tested the p r o o f of t h e Swiss legend.
We h a v e a Swiss account, that of Bullinger, which was written j u s t
a b o u t as long after the events as was t h a t of H e r o d o t u s after the
Persian W a r s a n d t h e r e f o r e h a d r e m a i n e d u n p r i n t e d . I copied t h e
passage in question in my Persian and Burgundian Wars from the
The Persian Army 71
m a n u s c r i p t , so t h a t o n e can study from it the c h a r a c t e r a n d t h e r e -

liability of such an account. J u s t as I myself, by this methodological
preliminary work, first came to c o m p l e t e certainty in dealing with
t h e G r e e k a c c o u n t s , I advise every s c h o l a r w h o wishes to plow
f u r t h e r in this field to a d o p t this i n s t r u m e n t before he e n t r u s t s his
seeds to rocky soil. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , I h a v e not yet noticed, as I will
a d d in this new edition, that any scholar has followed this advice.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R IV
1 . Verse 2 5 : " T h o s e w h o s u b d u e with the bow, a n d t h e

horsemen"*
Verse 82: " H e leads s p e a r - s u b d u i n g A r e s against m e n famed
for the spear."*
Verse 133: " W h e t h e r it is the d r a w i n g of the bow or the
strength of the s p e a r - h e a d e d lance that has
prevailed."*
Verse 226: " I s it t h e b o w - s t r e t c h i n g a r r o w t h a t is s t r o n g in
t h e i r h a n d s ? N o t at all: they have lances for close
fights a n d shields to use as a r m o r . " *
Verse 8 6 4 : " T h o s e w h o s u b d u e with the bow."*
H e r o d o t u s says the same thing in 9. 18 a n d 9. 49. Also a conse-
cration f o r m u l a of Simonides (fragment 143, Bergk) states: " T h e s e
bows which a r e now finished with tearful w a r f a r e lie u n d e r t h e
roof of A t h e n a ' s t e m p l e ; often, mournfully, in the melee, they w e r e
b a t h e d in the blood of the m a n - d e s t r o y i n g h o r s e m e n of Persia."*
Likewise, f r a g m e n t 97, Bergk, p. 4 5 2 . Colonel Billerbeck in his
study " S u s a " calls a t t e n t i o n to the fact t h a t t h e reliefs show t h e
principal w e a p o n of the I r a n i a n s to have b e e n not the bow, b u t the
lance. N o t only t h e specific s t a t e m e n t s of t h e Greeks, b u t also, as
we shall see, the c o u r s e of events, point indisputably to the bow.
We must leave it to t h e specialists to clarify the reliefs.
2. H e r o d o t u s 7. 61 a n d 9. 22.
3. T h e n a t u r e of the Persian E m p i r e as a feudal nation has re-
cently b e e n studied a n d described still f u r t h e r by G e o r g H u s i n g in
a n essay " P o r u s a t i s a n d t h e A c h a m a n d i s h F e u d a l S y s t e m "
("Porusatis u n d d a s a c h a m a n i d i s c h e L e h e n s w e s e n " ) , Berichte des
Forschungs-Instituts für Osten und Orient in Wien, Vol. 2, 1918.
4 . " T h e P e r s i a n s w e r e not i n f e r i o r i n e i t h e r c o u r a g e o r bodily
s t r e n g t h , b u t b e i n g u n a r m e d a n d u n t r a i n e d , they w e r e n o t t h e
equals of their e n e m i e s in respect to skill"* ( H e r o d o t u s 9. 62, on
the battle of Plataea).
Chapter V
The Battle of Marathon

On t h e basis of the previously discussed relationships, we esti-
m a t e the Persian a r m y in 4 9 0 B.C. at a b o u t the same s t r e n g t h as the
A t h e n i a n s or p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t smaller—that is, at a b o u t 4,000 to
6,000 warriors, i n c l u d i n g 500 to 800 m o u n t e d m e n . A n d in addi-
tion, as with t h e Greeks, t h e r e was a large n u m b e r of u n a r m o r e d
m e n . T h i s estimate may at first seem arbitrary, b u t o n e must realize
that t h e s t r e n g t h of o n e a r m y always p e r m i t s a certain conclusion
as to t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e o t h e r , as soon as o n e has an idea of the
quality of the w a r r i o r s on the two sides, a n d the m a r c h of events
will soon give us still m o r e evidence. T h e Persian a r m y c a m e across
t h e A e g e a n Sea on a large fleet, first took a n d d e s t r o y e d t h e small
city o f E r e t r i a o n E u b o e a , a n d t h e n crossed o v e r t o Attica. T h e
A t h e n i a n s still h a d no fleet that could have stood up to the Persian
o n e , a n d so they could m e e t the Persian attack only on land.
T h e mission o f the Persian c o m m a n d e r s Datis a n d A r t a p h e r n e s
was, first, to d e b a r k t h e a r m y at some p o i n t on the A t h e n i a n coast,
a n d t h e n t o attack a n d c o n q u e r t h e city o f A t h e n s itself. I f a n
Athenian army should appear in the open countryside, then it
would first have to be d e f e a t e d a n d driven back.
U n d e r the g u i d a n c e o f H i p p i a s , t h e f o r m e r r u l e r o f A t h e n s , w h o
h a d b e e n b a n i s h e d t w e n t y y e a r s earlier, t h e P e r s i a n s c h o s e t h e
plain of M a r a t h o n for t h e i r d e b a r k a t i o n a r e a . It is at a distance of
a b o u t n i n e t e e n miles from A t h e n s a n d was u n g u a r d e d , since the
A t h e n i a n s could not know w h e r e t h e Persians w o u l d land. If the
A t h e n i a n a r m y was a l r e a d y assembled, it was in a n y event in or
n e a r A t h e n s . Even t h o u g h the A t h e n i a n s h a d a very careful look-
o u t organization a n d t h e start of the d e b a r k a t i o n was immediately
r e p o r t e d to the city, it still necessarily took at least eight h o u r s be-
fore t h e a r m y h a d a r r i v e d a t M a r a t h o n , d r a w n u p for battle, a n d
p r e p a r e d for t h e attack. In this time t h e Persian a r m y , too, was
able to ready itself for battle. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e M a r a t h o n plain was
72
The Battle of Marathon 73
s u r r o u n d e d by m o u n t a i n s a n d h a d only a few a p p r o a c h e s , which

the Persians w e r e able to occupy easily with t h e first a r c h e r s to be
d e b a r k e d , in o r d e r thereby to delay still l o n g e r the e n t r y of the
A t h e n i a n s o n t o t h e plain.
In A t h e n s t h e r e is said to have b e e n d o u b t as to w h e t h e r they
should give battle against the e n e m y o u t s i d e the city or else allow
the situation to lead to a siege. T h e majority opinion, that a battle
should be risked, won o u t . W o r d was sent to Sparta, asking for a
reinforcing e x p e d i t i o n .
T h e h i g h c o m m a n d was e n t r u s t e d to Miltiades, a m a n from a
rich patrician family, w h o , like the V e n e t i a n n o b l e m e n in t h e four-
teenth a n d fifteenth centuries, as an A t h e n i a n citizen possessed a
principality in the land of t h e foreigners, on t h e T h r a c i a n C h e r -
sonese, a n d h a d g o t t e n t o know the Persians t h e r e . H e h a d even
b e e n a subject of t h e Persian King a n d h a d h a d to flee before h i m
to A t h e n s .
We know w h a t t h e superiority of t h e Persians consisted of. If it
came to a battle in the o p e n c o u n t r y , t h e n t h e r e was no d o u b t t h a t
the Persian m o u n t e d m e n , placed on the wings, would attack t h e
A t h e n i a n p h a l a n x on its two flanks, while t h e a r c h e r s s h o w e r e d ar-
rows on t h e m in t h e front. U n a b l e to m a k e a well-ordered attack
o n t h e a r c h e r s b e c a u s e o f t h e flank attack, t h e p h a l a n x , h a r d l y
coming to a real battle, would have h a d to s u c c u m b to the com-
bined a r m s o f the e n e m y . T h e mission o f t h e A t h e n i a n l e a d e r s h i p
was to offset this tactical w e a k n e s s of t h e s i n g l e - a r m A t h e n i a n
army. I f o n e studies the terrain o f M a r a t h o n a n d c o m p a r e s the r e -
ports of t h e battle with it, o n e can recognize with certainty j u s t how
Miltiades succeeded in c a r r y i n g o u t his mission.
C o r n e l i u s N e p o s , who d r e w his i n f o r m a t i o n from E p h o r u s ,
tells us in his Life of Miltiades that t h e A t h e n i a n s h a d d r a w n up in a
n a r r o w a r e a at t h e foot of the m o u n t a i n s , w h e r e they h a d felled
trees so that they would be p r o t e c t e d , b o t h by the m o u n t a i n s a n d
by the trees, from being s u r r o u n d e d by the enemy m o u n t e d
1
troops.
T h i s description c o r r e s p o n d s so closely to the circumstances t h a t
we w o u l d have to i m a g i n e s o m e t h i n g similar, even if it h a d n o t
come d o w n to us in such a positive way. Even the place in the small
plain of M a r a t h o n that c o r r e s p o n d s best to the N e p o s / E p h o r u s ac-
c o u n t can be d e t e c t e d without difficulty on a special m a p by an eye
practiced in m a t t e r s of military history; it is the e n t r a n c e to a small
side valley t h a t is today called V r a n a . T h i s valley is a b o u t 1,000
m e t e r s wide at a distance of 150 m e t e r s f r o m its e n t r a n c e . F o r a
74 History o f t h e A r t o f W a r
Fig I BATTLE OF M A R A T H O N
hoplite p h a l a n x of s o m e 6,000 m e n , t h a t is too wide; however, the

space was n a r r o w e d d o w n f u r t h e r by t h e cuttings. A trail passable
for infantry leads from A t h e n s over t h e m o u n t a i n s directly into this
valley. T h e V r a n a valley f o r m s a flanking position for the highway,
the only o n e t h a t leads i n t o t h e plain of M a r a t h o n , so that t h e
e n e m y a r m y could not m a r c h against A t h e n s without first having
d r i v e n the A t h e n i a n a r m y o u t o f t h e V r a n a valley.
H e r o d o t u s tells u s that t h e A t h e n i a n s d r o v e d o w n o n the e n e m y
with a c h a r g e of 8 stadia (4,800 feet, or 1,500 meters). Such a r u n is
a physical impossibility: a heavily e q u i p p e d u n i t can cover at the
most 4 0 0 to 500 feet (120 to 150 meters) at a r u n without com-
pletely e x h a u s t i n g its s t r e n g t h a n d falling into d i s o r d e r . Individual
t r a i n e d r u n n e r s a n d p r i m i t i v e p e o p l e s a r e , o f c o u r s e , capable o f
covering very g r e a t distances at a r u n , even w h e n b u r d e n e d , b u t
the A t h e n i a n s at M a r a t h o n w e r e no l o n g e r a primitive p e o p l e b u t a
b o u r g e o i s - f a r m e r g e n e r a l levy. A c c o r d i n g to the Prussian regula-
tions, r u n n i n g with full field e q u i p m e n t is not p e r m i t t e d for m o r e
t h a n two m i n u t e s , o r 330 t o 3 5 0 m e t e r s . T h e A t h e n i a n a r m y , how-
ever, did not e v e n consist of t r o o p s w h o w e r e in t r a i n i n g or of
youths w h o exercised in t h e g y m n a s i u m , b u t of t h e mass levy of
citizens, farmers, charcoal b u r n e r s , a n d f i s h e r m e n , u p t o t h e age o f
forty-five or fifty; a n d a closed mass r u n s with m u c h m o r e diffi-
culty t h a n an individual p e r s o n . W h e n a m o d e r n historian uses t h e
expression, the A t h e n i a n s "supposedly" r a n 8 stadia, that is j u s t t h e
same as if he r e p e a t e d a source r e p o r t to the effect that, in o n e
day, they "supposedly" m a r c h e d 60 miles. W h e n a n o t h e r o n e states
t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e i m m e n s e e x c i t e m e n t of the battle allows a
completely d i f f e r e n t effort o f t h e n e r v e s a n d muscles t h a n t h e
n o r m a l practice on the drill field, that is very t r u e , but it still does
not m a k e it possible for a p h a l a n x to r u n almost a mile.
A battle from m o r e m o d e r n military history may provide us an
e x a m p l e of this. In the Danish w a r of 1864 a Prussian d e t a c h m e n t
that h a d b e e n p u s h e d far forward, u n d e r Captain von Schlutter-
bach n e a r L u n d b y in J u t l a n d , was attacked by a s u p e r i o r force of
Danish infantry (3 July). T h e Prussians took up a defensive posi-
tion. At a distance of 4 0 0 paces the Danes, with a loud " h u r r a h , "
2
took up a r u n . "But," t h e account of t h e battle states, "a b o d y of
troops c a n n o t c o n t i n u e for 4 0 0 paces at a forced speed that spon-
taneously develops into a full r u n , in a situation leading to h a n d -
t o - h a n d combat with the e n e m y . T h e individual r u n s o u t o f b r e a t h ,
a n d after 100 paces the c o m p a n y is forced to halt. T h e e n s u i n g
m i n u t e s , until they can again m o v e forward, a r e most painful."
" T h e fabulous r u n s h o u l d not b o t h e r anybody; Artemis has given
t h e m the s t r e n g t h for the ' r u n n i n g with a shout'* a n d as a token of
their g r a t i t u d e receives the sacrifice of a live goat," a philologist has
explained, a n d he warns against rejecting, t h r o u g h lack of u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g a n d of goodwill, the fact that simple trust in God a n d in
one's own virtue has given the victory, contrary to all predictions
s t e m m i n g from little faith. T h i s viewpoint, too, is correct in its way;
particularly in the Middle Ages, in the lives of the saints a n d the
accounts of the C r u s a d e s , the world, a n d consequently war also, a r e
full of miracles, a n d o n e would be very loath, too, to cast aside the
r o m a n t i c style of r e c o u n t i n g history. B u t w h o e v e r wishes to e x p l o r e
the history of t h e art of w a r in a critical fashion may implore for
himself t h e assistance of Saint G e o r g e , or even, if he prefers, that
o f t h e divine A r t e m i s a n d o f A p o l l o — b u t h e m u s t b a n i s h t h e m
from his research. T h i s r u n n i n g pace is the decisive point for the
historical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e battle on which G r e e k f r e e d o m , a n d
with it all of m o d e r n c u l t u r e , rests. T h r o u g h the "8 stadia" the loca-
tion of the battle a n d with it also t h e tactical d e v e l o p m e n t a n d the
bases for victory a n d defeat must, first of all, necessarily be estab-
lished. We m u s t t h e r e f o r e consider ourselves lucky to have h e r e a
point on which a simple objective test can give us c o m p l e t e cer-
tainty, i n d e p e n d e n t l y of all doubtful witnesses a n d u n t r u s t w o r t h y

chroniclers. T h e objective test shows, however, that n e i t h e r a G r e e k
p h a l a n x n o r any o t h e r close-order battle line ever ran 1½ kilome-
3
ters or was able to r u n t h a t d i s t a n c e . H e r o d o t u s ' account rests on
s o m e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d this m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g will not even
r e m a i n a puzzle for us but will soon be e x p l a i n e d .
In t h e middle of the plain of M a r a t h o n rises an artificial hill, t h e
"Soros," which has b e e n established, t h r o u g h m o d e r n excavations,
as b e i n g the grave of the A t h e n i a n s killed at M a r a t h o n . T h u c y d i d e s
(2. 32) tells us explicitly that, on o t h e r occasions, the A t h e n i a n s h a d
b u r i e d their fallen warriors at h o m e b u t that, because of the special
h o n o r involved, the d e a d o f M a r a t h o n w e r e b u r i e d o n t h e bat-
tlefield. T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t H e r o d o t u s himself stood beside or
a t o p this burial m o u n d , a b o u t 12 m e t e r s h i g h , a n d observed t h e
battlefield from that position. Exactly 8 stadia from this m o u n t , in
t h e r i n g of m o u n t a i n s enclosing the M a r a t h o n plain, is the m o u t h
of the V r a n a valley.
It is h a r d to consider as a simple coincidence the fact that on t h e
t e r r a i n h e r e we actually find exactly the 8 stadia that a r e also m e n -
t i o n e d i n H e r o d o t u s ' account. T h e A t h e n i a n s stood i n t h e V r a n a
valley; 8 stadia b e y o n d t h e valley lies the m o u n d with the r e m a i n s
of t h e i r d e a d ; a c c o r d i n g to t h e battle of H e r o d o t u s , they s t o r m e d
f o r w a r d 8 stadia. T h e battle, t h e n , e x t e n d e d up to this point. T h e
A t h e n i a n s did not carry t h e i r d e a d back to t h e position w h e r e t h e
first clash o c c u r r e d , but b r o u g h t t h e m forward to the point w h e r e
t h e last o n e of t h e d e a d lay, to the point to which t h e p u r s u i t h a d
g o n e , w h e r e t h e victory was c o m p l e t e d . H e r e , in t h e m i d d l e of t h e
plain, visible from all sides, they e r e c t e d the high burial m o u n d .
H e r e , too, H e r o d o t u s looked over the f i e l d a n d h a d t h e account o f
t h e battle given to h i m : Up to this point, 8 stadia from that valley,
the A t h e n i a n s s t o r m e d f o r w a r d — a s he u n d e r s t o o d it, in the attack;
as it was really m e a n t , t h r o u g h the battle a n d in the p u r s u i t .
H e r o d o t u s goes on to tell us how the A t h e n i a n s a n d Persians h a d
stood o p p o s i n g each o t h e r for t h r e e days b e f o r e the actual battle
s t a r t e d . T h e A t h e n i a n s w h o gave h i m t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n h a d n o t
b e e n able to give h i m a r e a s o n for it, or r a t h e r , they h a d only too
good a r e a s o n : Miltiades did not b e a r the real high c o m m a n d ; it
was b o r n e in c o m m o n by t h e t h e n strategoi, who, a c c o r d i n g to t h e
law, c o m m a n d e d in t u r n , e a c h for a day. T h e y w e r e a g r e e d , how-
ever, to t u r n the high c o m m a n d over voluntarily to Miltiades;
nevertheless, he waited, in o r d e r to receive t h e full h o n o r of t h e
victory, for t h e day on which the c o m m a n d fell to him by t h e law.
We have h e r e a g a i n a psychological trait t h a t we shall e n c o u n t e r

again a n d again in t h e process of o u r research into military history.
T h e factual motives a r e too fine, too h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d , too u n i n -
teresting for t h e legend, which replaces t h e m by p e r s o n a l motives.
For us, however, t h e factual relationships a r e not difficult to recog-
nize. W h a t w e m a y a c c e p t f r o m t h e l e g e n d w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n
— s o m e t h i n g which d i d n o t n e e d to be invented—is the fact that the
e n e m y a r m i e s stood facing each o t h e r for several days before join-
ing battle. In d o i n g so the A t h e n i a n s lost n o t h i n g ; they were able to
supply themselves in their own c o u n t r y without difficulty, they in-
creased t h e i r c o u n t r y m e n ' s c o u r a g e w h e n t h e s e soldiers saw t h a t
the Persians d i d n o t d a r e to attack t h e m , a n d they w e r e e x p e c t i n g
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m the S p a r t a n s . It was completely impossible
that Miltiades s h o u l d o r d e r the start of the battle of his own free
will without awaiting the arrival of t h e S p a r t a n s . It is t h e r e f o r e o u t
of the question t h a t t h e attack s h o u l d have b e e n l a u n c h e d by the
A t h e n i a n s ; it m u s t have b e e n initiated by the Persians.
Now, I think, t h e overall picture of the battle becomes recogniza-
ble. As soon as t h e news h a d arrived that the Persians h a d l a n d e d
o n t h e p l a i n o f M a r a t h o n , Miltiades p u t t h e A t h e n i a n a r m y i n
m a r c h a n d led it into t h e V r a n a valley, which has a direct c o n n e c -
tion over t h e m o u n t a i n s with the capital. H e r e in the V r a n a valley,
a short distance b e h i n d t h e m o u t h of the valley, in such a m a n n e r
that the m o u n t a i n s still covered t h e two flanks a n d with t h e a d d i -
tional protection p r o v i d e d by abatis, he d r e w up his army, or h a d
it pitch c a m p in such a way that it could take up position at the
first r e p o r t of an e n e m y a p p r o a c h m a r c h . Since the valley was still
4
too wide for the small A t h e n i a n a r m y , despite the abatis, Miltiades
was not able to give t h e p h a l a n x the d e s i r e d d e p t h t h r o u g h o u t , b u t
m a d e the c e n t e r w e a k e r a n d the two wings s t r o n g e r , so that, even
w h e n they m o v e d o u t from their covered position, they would be
able to o p p o s e possible flank attacks from t h e Persian cavalry. T h e
, best a n d most c o u r a g e o u s of t h e u n a r m o r e d m e n w e r e p r e s u m a b l y
sent o u t o n t o t h e h e i g h t s o n the r i g h t a n d left, i n o r d e r t o p u t
p r e s s u r e on the Persian cavalry with a r r o w s , stones, a n d javelins.
T h e high g r o u n d covering the left flank rises only very slightly, as
I was able to see for myself d u r i n g a visit in 1911, b u t it is so cov-
e r e d with scattered b o u l d e r s as to be completely impassable for
m o u n t e d m e n . T h e actual r o a d from the plain o f M a r a t h o n t o w a r d
A t h e n s g o e s s o u t h w a r d r a t h e r close t o t h e b e a c h a n d a l o n g a
s w a m p , paralleling t h e front of t h e A t h e n i a n formation at a s h o r t
distance. T h e Persians could not move out of the plain of
M a r a t h o n w i t h o u t first h a v i n g d r i v e n off t h e A t h e n i a n s . T h e y
could not m a r c h a l o n g t h e actual highway, w h e r e t h e A t h e n i a n s
would have driven into t h e i r c o l u m n s from the flank. T h e y were
also u n a b l e to use o n e of t h e p a t h s leading o u t t o w a r d the n o r t h ,
a n d not even the lateral valley of M a r a t h o n a , since they would al-
ways be r u n n i n g t h e risk that, w h e n a p a r t of t h e i r a r m y was en-
g a g e d in the m o u n t a i n s , t h e o t h e r p a r t would be attacked by the
5
A t h e n i a n s while i n m a r c h . T h e M a r a t h o n a valley was, f u r t h e r -
m o r e , s u p p o s e d to be blocked by t h e A t h e n i a n s at a n a r r o w spot in
o r d e r to p r e v e n t the Persians from b e i n g able by this r o u t e to fall
u p o n their r e a r i n the V r a n a valley. T h e Persians t h e r e f o r e h a d
only the choice of e i t h e r giving battle to t h e A t h e n i a n s on terrain
chosen by the A t h e n i a n s or of e m b a r k i n g again a n d a t t e m p t i n g a
l a n d i n g at a n o t h e r place. T h i s too, however, would have b e e n very
d a n g e r o u s . Being as close as they w e r e , t h e A t h e n i a n s w e r e in a
position to fall on the Persian a r m y d u r i n g the e m b a r k m e n t ; a n d if
they did p e r h a p s successfully accomplish a l a n d i n g once again in
a n o t h e r place, could not t h e A t h e n i a n s o n c e m o r e find a position
in t h e i r so highly c o m p a r t m e n t e d t e r r a i n t h a t w o u l d offer t h e m
similar advantages for the battle as did the V r a n a valley? T h e Per-
sian generals must have fallen into s t r o n g d o u b t a n d p e r h a p s q u a r -
reled with o n e a n o t h e r as to w h a t they s h o u l d d o , since it d o e s
seem to be t r u e that they d e l i b e r a t e d for several days. T h e decision
that finally prevailed was to attack the A t h e n i a n s w h e r e they stood,
at least before the S p a r t a n s , too, s h o u l d have arrived.
T h i s decision would have b e e n e x t r e m e l y a b s u r d if, as is usually
accepted, the Persians h a d b e e n numerically very s u p e r i o r to the
Greeks. In this case the t h i n g for t h e m to do would have b e e n to
divide their a r m y in o r d e r to fix the A t h e n i a n s in t h e V r a n a valley
with half of it, while with the o t h e r half, covered by the first, they
e n v e l o p e d the A t h e n i a n s either by land or, with the help of the
fleet, by sea, t h e r e b y m a n e u v e r i n g t h e m o u t of their position. T h i s
e x p e d i e n t for use in the face of too s t r o n g an o p p o s i n g position is
so obvious that o n e is forced to conclude, by t h e s a m e token, that
the Persians' failure to do so m e a n s they w e r e too weak. W h a t we
f o r m e r l y d e c i d e d i n a n o v e r a l l way f r o m t h e g e n e r a l
circumstances—namely, that t h e Persians could n o t possibly have
b e e n significantly s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e A t h e n i a n s n u m e r i c a l l y — i s
b o r n e o u t h e r e by the positive train of events. Against a s u p e r i o r
a r m y the position of the A t h e n i a n s in the V r a n a valley would have
b e e n useless; n u m b e r s a n d position always have a m u t u a l effect on
each o t h e r . T h e Persians took the bull by the h o r n s , because t h e r e
was n o t h i n g else for t h e m to d o . Up to t h a t time the G r e e k s h a d

never yet b e e n able to stand up against the Persian warriors. C o n -
sequently, o n e c o u l d risk it. Miltiades allowed the e n e m y to a p -
p r o a c h his defensive position, a n d at the m o m e n t w h e n the s t o r m
o f a r r o w s w a s b e c o m i n g e f f e c t i v e — t h a t is, a t 100 t o 150
6
p a c e s — t h e e n t i r e hoplite p h a l a n x s u r g e d forward a n d h u r l e d itself
on the e n e m y at the d o u b l e .
T h e r u n n i n g pace h a d the d o u b l e p u r p o s e o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g the
weight of t h e impact, both physically a n d from the m o r a l e p o i n t of
view, a n d of o u t r u n n i n g the rain of a r r o w s . T h e weak c e n t e r , it is
t r u e , w h e r e t h e r e a r r a n k s d i d not exercise sufficient p r e s s u r e , wa-
vered u n d e r the hail of Persian a r r o w s a n d fell back, but the two
d e e p e r flank c o l u m n s stayed at the r u n a n d were face to face with
the e n e m y even before the Persian cavalry was able to hold t h e m
up by a flanking attack. Presumably the protective terrain obstacles
stretched out so far on the right a n d the left of the A t h e n i a n s that
only a very short space r e m a i n e d to be covered on the o p e n plain.
T h e speed o f the a p p r o a c h a n d the d e p t h o f the formation sup-
planted what may have b e e n lacking in t h e way of n a t u r a l flank
protection, a n d as soon as the A t h e n i a n hoplites were in h a n d - t o -
h a n d contact with the Persian a r c h e r s , t h e latter, with their m u c h
less effective protective a r m o r , w e r e lost. A l t h o u g h as brave m e n
they may have fought on for a certain time, they were not able to
withstand the weight of this attack for long. Even the a r c h e r s in the
center, victorious initially, could do n o t h i n g m o r e when they w e r e
pressed from b o t h sides, a n d once they h a d t u r n e d tail, as the r u s h
o f t h e g e n e r a l flight p o u r e d o u t o n t o t h e o p e n plain, t h e n t h e
cavalry no l o n g e r possessed the capability, even in the o p e n field,
o f r e d r e s s i n g t h e battle. O n e m i g h t i m a g i n e that well-organized,
disciplined s q u a d r o n s u n d e r skillful leaders might still have b e e n
able to b r i n g the battle to a standstill by a resolute c h a r g e , b u t t h e
c o n t i n u a t i o n of this study will s h o w — t h e battles of C h a r l e s t h e
B o l d a g a i n s t t h e Swiss a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t i v e i n t h i s
c o n n e c t i o n — t h a t knightly m o u n t e d m e n , as the Persians w e r e , a r e
not c a p a b l e of this. He w h o h e s i t a t e d too long was surely lost.
Everybody r u s h e d t o w a r d t h e ships. Since the n o r t h e r n c o r n e r of
the bay, w h e r e t h e P e r s i a n ships u n d o u b t e d l y lay at a n c h o r , is
about two miles from the battlefield, t h e mass of the Persians did,
in fact, succeed in r e e m b a r k i n g . T h e p u r s u i t , as we may c o n c l u d e
from H e r o d o t u s , e x t e n d e d 8 stadia from the V r a n a valley, almost a
mile, as far as the Soros. T h e n Miltiades assembled his a r m y again
a n d led it forward against the ships. We a r e told of a battle beside
the ships. Between the two c o m b a t actions t h e r e m u s t have b e e n a

considerable p a u s e , d u r i n g which the Persians w e r e able to l a u n c h
a n d b o a r d t h e i r ships, for t h e G r e e k s w e r e able to seize a n d hold
only seven t r i r e m e s . W e h e a r n o t h i n g o f n u m e r o u s p r i s o n e r s o r
h o r s e s that m i g h t have fallen into t h e i r h a n d s . If t h e A t h e n i a n s
h a d p u r s u e d t h e P e r s i a n s u p t o t h e ships w i t h o u t a b r e a k , t h e
spoils would have h a d to be m u c h g r e a t e r . B u t it is e x t r e m e l y dif-
ficult after a victory to assemble t r o o p s again a n d m o v e t h e m o u t in
such an i m m e d i a t e p u r s u i t . It is a brilliant p r o o f of the p e r s o n a l
s t r e n g t h a n d effectiveness of Miltiades that t h e r e was a second bat-
tle, at t h e ships, at all. T h e losses of the A t h e n i a n s a m o u n t e d to
192 killed, to which n u m b e r we shall have to a d d several h u n d r e d
w o u n d e d , since m e n w h o w e r e so well a r m o r e d as the A t h e n i a n
hoplites were no d o u b t s e l d o m killed o u t r i g h t by t h e Persian ar-
rows. T h e casualties of t h e A t h e n i a n s in killed a n d w o u n d e d , by
o u r p r e s e n t - d a y estimates, may t h e r e f o r e h a v e still a m o u n t e d to
s o m e t h i n g like 1,000 m e n , a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t M a r a t h o n was n o
m e r e skirmish b u t a very h a r d - f o u g h t battle.
C o n c e r n i n g the losses of t h e Persians we have no reliable figure.
T h e figure of Miltiades as a field c o m m a n d e r stands giant-like in
t h e early annals of world military history. T h e most c o m p l e t e a n d
rarest form of battle l e a d e r s h i p that the art of w a r has evoked up
to t h e p r e s e n t day, t h e defensive-offensive c o m b i n a t i o n , is f o u n d
h e r e , in t h e simple lines of t h e classical w o r k of a r t of t h e first
g r e a t military event in o u r study. W h a t perspicacity in his choice of
t h e battlefield, what self-control in awaiting t h e e n e m y attack, what
a u t h o r i t y over the masses, o v e r a p r o u d , d e m o c r a t i c citizens' levy,
to be able to h o l d t h e m fast in the chosen position a n d t h e n to lead
t h e m forward to the attack at t h e d o u b l e at the decisive m o m e n t ! It
will not be too rash for us to imagine how Miltiades a d d r e s s e d his
fellow citizens before the battle, showing t h e m that they w e r e p r o -
tected by the m o u n t a i n s against the e n e m y cavalry, o r d e r i n g t h e m
t o s t a n d fast u n d e r t h e Persian a r r o w s until h e s h o u l d give t h e
signal, a n d how he t h e n placed himself on horseback in the m i d d l e
of t h e p h a l a n x , with every eye directed t o w a r d h i m , to choose the
m o m e n t t o raise his a r m h o l d i n g the s p e a r a n d t o call o u t the
c o m m a n d that was t h e n e c h o e d a n d s p r e a d by t h e t r u m p e t call.
E v e r y t h i n g was g e a r e d to this m o m e n t — n o t a m i n u t e too early, for
t h e n the A t h e n i a n s would have r e a c h e d the e n e m y breathless a n d
d i s o r d e r e d ; not a m i n u t e too late, for t h e n too m a n y of t h e e n e m y
a r r o w s would already have struck a n d the large n u m b e r of falling
a n d hesitating m e n w o u l d have slowed u p a n d f i n a l l y b r o k e n the
power of t h e assault, which h a d to fall on t h e e n e m y line like an

avalanche if it was to give victory.
We shall have f u r t h e r occasion to discuss m a n y a similar situa-
tion, b u t n e v e r a g r e a t e r o n e .
EXCURSUS
1. T h e detailed basis for my concept of Marathon is contained in my Persian and

Burgundian Wars. Since the appearance of that book, however, o u r information on
two important points has either been corrected or enlarged. Only now has it been
7
established that the Soros is actually the grave of the A t h e n i a n s , s o m e t h i n g that at
that time was still so doubtful that I did not risk referring to it. Furthermore, a
8
newer topographical m a p has shown that the maps I used were inaccurate. T h a t is,
on the earlier maps the m o u t h of the Vrana valley was shown to be so wide that it
did not seem to offer the p r e s u m e d flank protection for a small army, and I had
therefore had to place the position of the Athenians farther back in the valley,
where a lateral valley (Aulona) branches off. N o w that it is established that the
Vrana valley, 150 meters from its m o u t h , is only about 1,000 meters wide, it appears
well suited for the position of the Athenians, and it has supporting documentary
evidence in the fact that the mouth of the valley is exactly 8 stadia distant from the
Soros. I made this correction in the Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 6 5 , 1890. In a few de-
tails the overall picture of the battle has b e c o m e even clearer to me since then. T h e
basic features, however, have remained the same.
2. H e r o d o t u s expressly states that the Persians had built for the expedition special
ships for the horses a n d had landed on the plain of Marathon because they t h o u g h t
they could make g o o d use of their cavalry there. T h a t can hardly have b e e n fabri-
cated of whole cloth, and so the Persians did have m o u n t e d m e n . On the o t h e r
hand, H e r o d o t u s makes no mention at all of cavalry in the battle itself, and neither
from him nor from later writers do we hear anything at all of captured horses,
which, as a prized possession, would certainly have b e e n worthy of mention and
would necessarily have been long r e m e m b e r e d by the Athenian people by virtue of
their offspring.
But since it is very complicated to embark horses aboard ships, it does not appear
entirely credible that the Persians should have completely finished doing so before
the Athenians arrived at the ships. O n e might therefore conclude that the Persians,
recognizing that they would not be able to use their cavalry against the position of
the Athenians, had left t h e m back near the ships and had perhaps embarked t h e m
in advance, just in case the o u t c o m e of the battle should be unfavorable. Against this
concept, however, stands the idea that the Persian leaders cannot have considered
an attack by the Athenians from their position as entirely impossible and might well
have estimated that the feared cavalry, e v e n if it was kept toward the rear of the
plain, behind the archers, would still have a certain morale effect on the Athenians
and would serve as a reserve. T h e surprising and o v e r w h e l m i n g weight of the Athe-
nian drive brought this estimate to naught, so that the m o u n t e d m e n had, in fact, no
effect on the battle. T h e fact that the Athenians did not capture any horses is,
nevertheless, not inexplicable. Several hours may have passed b e f o r e they w e r e
again f o r m e d up and m o v e d out for the attack on the ships, and the Persians may
themselves have killed the horses that they could not carry away.
3. Pausanias, 1. 3 2 . 3, reports that there were also burial m o u n d s at Marathon for
the Plataeans and slaves: "The slaves fought for the first time."*
This report is probably not very reliable. Nevertheless, it is possible that in many
cases the hoplites took with them into the field as helpers not another citizen, but a
trusted and skillful house slave, and that also many of these were posted on the
mountains and were killed there by Persian arrows.
4. Of great importance in the reconstruction of the battle is the rather long pause
between the e n g a g e m e n t in the Vrana valley and the fight at the ships, for that is
the only explanation for the escape of the rest of the Persians and of most of the
ships. O n e might perhaps c o n t e n d that only a short time w o u l d have been necessary
in o r d e r to assemble the phalanx, set it in march again, and m o v e three kilometers.
Basically this requires only a short time—certainly; but it was not so quickly carried
out. After the climax of the encounter, the full flight of the Persians across the
plain, and with the first stopping for breath, the condition and m o o d of the Athe-
nians was probably s o m e t h i n g like the way Frederick described his soldiers, when,
after the victory at Soor, he tried for the first time to set a direct pursuit in motion.
"My cavalry," he recounted later to Landgrave Charles of Hesse, "halted not far
from the e n e m y rear guard. I hastened forward and shouted: 'March on, forward,
at them!' I was greeted with 'Vivat Viktoria' and endless shouts. I continued to shout
'March on,' and nobody wanted to march. I became angry, I beat, I struck, I bawled
t h e m o u t — a n d I think I know s o m e t h i n g about bawling m e n out when I'm angry;
but I was unable to move this cavalry a single step forward. T h e y were drunk with
joy and simply did not hear me." Miltiades, too, no doubt had great difficulty reas-
sembling the Athenian citizens who, first of all, were c o n c e r n e d either with their
dead and w o u n d e d , or with the loot from the fallen Persians, or w h o were com-
pletely wrapped up in their jubilation; and without the h o p e of gaining still more
booty at the ships, there would probably have been no chance at all of a second
combat. In any event, it is only natural to assume that a rather long pause occurred
between the two phases of the battle.
5. A new hypothesis about Marathon has recently been published by W. Schilling
in Philologus 54 ( 1 8 9 5 ) : 2 5 3 . Schilling bases his theory on the r e p o r t e d massive
superiority of the Persians in numbers. Despite their size they did not dare attack
the Athenians. But their numerical advantage, according to Schilling, allowed them
to reembark by posting in the middle of the plain, for the protection of the e m -
barkment, a corps which was still twice as strong as the Greeks, i.e., 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , but
without cavalry. T h i s covering force was the formation that the Athenians attacked
at the place where the Soros was later erected, defeating t h e m and killing 6 , 5 0 0 of
their number.
Even if this assumption were correct, it still would not explain why the Persians
left their covering force in the plain without cavalry. If o n e has cavalry, o n e places it
where it can best be used, and n o w h e r e could it have been of such g o o d use to the
Persians as precisely here.
T h e only objectively reliable conclusion is the opposite o n e : since it is expressly
reported that the Persians chose the plain of Marathon for their landing because of
their cavalry, and since this report seems credible in relation to what is known of the
Persians' tactics elsewhere, the presence of a cavalry force must form o n e of the
basic assumptions for the reconstruction of the battle. If the Persians had cavalry,
however, then the battle cannot have taken place in the plain, since the Athenian
phalanx would have had great difficulty in winning it and there would necessarily be
s o m e mention of the cavalry action. Consequently, the battle took place on terrain
that was not passable for the m o u n t e d m e n .
A further weakness in the Schilling hypothesis is the fact that o n e cannot under-
stand why the Persians reembarked a portion of their army. If they drew up a cov-
ering force at the Soros, n o t h i n g would then have been simpler than to have the
force that was disengaged m o v e directly forward on the road through the Mesogaea
toward Athens. T h e n the Athenians would have had to m o v e out immediately from
their flanking position in the Vrana valley.
6. A certain relationship with the Schilling hypothesis is shown in another, which
was published at the same time by N. W. Macan in his Herodotus (London, 1895) and
with which E. B. Bury agreed in the Classical Review, Vol. 10, 1896. Macan agrees
with the o p i n i o n of Duncker and Busolt (the latter has, however, in the meantime,
in the s e c o n d edition of his Greek History [Griechische Geschichte], published in 1895,

changed his concept and accepted mine), but he modifies it in o n e important re-
spect.
Macan claims that the Persians, recognizing that the Athenians could not be at-
tacked in the A u l o n a valley, i n t e n d e d to march o f f toward A t h e n s t h r o u g h the
southerly pass and that they were attacked on the plain by the Athenians d u r i n g this
movement. T h e Soros was then erected at approximately the place where the Athe-
nian center gave way. He thinks that the Persians were not attacked on the flank,
however, or not e v e n really struck by surprise, but that they had prepared them-
selves for the possibility of an attack and had also had e n o u g h time to establish an
orderly formation. According to him, this southerly part of the plain was not suita-
ble for cavalry, a n d the Persians h a d also p e r h a p s r e e m b a r k e d most of their
m o u n t e d m e n , since they w o u l d have b e e n o f n o u s e t o t h e m o n the o v e r l a n d
march. A n d it was for this reason that the cavalry played no role in the battle.
T h e following points can be argued against this theory:
(a) If the Persians were prepared for the possibility of a battle, why did they e m -
bark a portion of their troops? If they considered them superfluous for a victory,
why had they brought them along?
(b) It would be doubly incomprehensible that the Persians would have embarked
their cavalry, of all things. T h e i r strength lay in their cavalry; they had to make a
flank march over an o p e n plain across the enemy front. If ever cavalry was n e e d e d ,
it was precisely h e r e .
(c) Why the terrain here is s u p p o s e d to have b e e n unfavorable for cavalry is com-
pletely inconceivable and it is, moreover, neither substantiated nor explained with a
single word by the author. T h e fact that there is a brook on the right flank, and a
swamp on the left, d o e s not c o m e into consideration, since the space between the
two obstacles still a m o u n t s to m o r e than three kilometers.
(d) If the Persians had risked a flank march along the front of the Athenian posi-
tion, the Athenians w o u l d certainly have attacked t h e m and would probably have
conquered them, e v e n if they s o u g h t to have their cavalry cover them. T h e A t h e -
nians would naturally have delayed the attack until the main body of the Persians
was already e n g a g e d in the pass, since this portion of the army was certainly a sure
prey to them after they had first o v e r c o m e and destroyed the last third, with the
cavalry. For this very reason it is completely unthinkable that the Persians should
have m a d e such a m o v e m e n t and, what is m o r e , have m o v e d away their cavalry in
advance. T h e y were no longer in a position to reembark without danger, since the
Athenians were so close, and u n d e r no circumstances could they leave the plain by
land without first having driven the Athenians out of their position. Consequently,
after s o m e hesitation, they d e c i d e d on the direct attack.
7. Later I learned of the book Herodotus, Historian of the Median Wars (Hérodote,
Historien des guerres médiques), by A m é d é e Hauvette (Paris, 1894), which forces us to a
renewed investigation of the run of 8 stadia. My explanation rests on the assertion
that such a run is a physical impossibility, a n d in arriving at that conclusion I based
my case on the provisions of the Prussian regulations. Hauvette (p. 261) counters my
argument in the following manner:
"These provisions, which are no doubt very useful w h e n it is a question of train-
ing y o u n g soldiers, also exist in our army; but they are far from corresponding to
what o n e can ask of m e n w h o are strong and well trained, as the Athenians were.
T h e p r o o f of this lies in the fact that Captain of Artillery de Raoul—adopting, it is
true, a new m e t h o d of marching and of d o u b l e time—recently obtained extraordi-
nary results: the platoon that he c o m m a n d e d in the large-scale maneuvers of the XI
Army Corps in 1 8 9 0 m a n a g e d to cover as m u c h as 15 kilometers at double time,
with arms and equipment. See an article by Dr. Felix Regnault in the periodical La
Nature, N o . 1052, 29 July 1893."
If o n e compares these two statements, the contradiction appears irreconcilable. I

assert: Such a large, closely o r d e r e d mass of hoplites as the o n e that fought at
Marathon cannot run any farther than 100 to 150 paces (double-time paces—i.e.,
150 t o 2 0 0 m a r c h i n g p a c e s ) w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g e x h a u s t e d a n d d i s o r g a n i z e d .
Hauvette replies: "Captain Raoul, with his platoon, covered 15 kilometers (that is,
2 4 , 0 0 0 marching paces) at a run with w e a p o n s and equipment." T h a t is not the only
thing, h o w e v e r , that separates us. Basically, H a u v e t t e rejects t h e objective-type
analysis with the help of which I have sought to check the historical account of the
Persian Wars. A considerable portion of his book is directed against my Persian and
Burgundian Wars. Hauvette d o e s not recognize the p r o o f that I claimed to adduce
from an analogy with the Swiss popular account, particularly the Bullinger report on
Granson and Murten, to the effect that an account like that of H e r o d o t u s is worthy
of only very little credence. On the contrary, Hauvette considers Herodotus both
subjectively and objectively as generally trustworthy and sees the task of the scholar
as consisting only of correcting possible individual errors, mistakes, and contradic-
tions that have crept into the account. He applies these principles with c o n s u m m a t e
erudition and great perspicacity, a n d although he by no m e a n s completely rejects
objective considerations, nevertheless he puts less trust in t h e m than in the written
word of the historical account.
In this respect, it is correct that objective-type analysis easily leads o n e into error.
It is a very difficult procedure, e v e n in simple questions, since even the expert is
s e l d o m familiar with all the circumstances that, in other periods and a m o n g other
peoples, exerted or could have e x e r t e d an influence on events, to say n o t h i n g of the
fact that experts are very often prejudiced in their various theories and consequently
arrive at different, even opposite, conclusions.
T h e basis for all historical k n o w l e d g e always remains the positive statements of
contemporary sources or of sources close to the contemporary ones. But the farther
the art of historical interpretation has progressed, the m o r e it has b e c o m e convinced
that e v e n contemporary reports are often falsified and clouded by fantasies of every
type, a n d that in cases where the available material is not sufficient to permit check-
ing o n e source against the other, objective-type interpretation remains the last re-
sort. It is only a matter of following t h r o u g h thoroughly and of acquiring so m u c h
special k n o w l e d g e of the subject that o n e can be certain of not being led astray by a
simple false analogy. Even Hauvette, in fact, exercises objective interpretation by cit-
ing Raoul/Regnault against the Prussian regulations, but in d o i n g so he falls into a
basic paradox. He rejects the objective-type interpretation carried out as a matter of
basic principle, while a p p l y i n g it h i m s e l f with respect to the facts that he has
a d o p t e d so casually and coincidentally. T h i s kind of half-objective interpretation
naturally serves no useful purpose, but only leads o n e into error. In this case it
would be better simply to repeat the sources naively. In Hauvette's case particularly,
this point can be m a d e clearly. Consequently, I shall take u p , below, several m o r e of
his statements. First of all, the question of the 8-stadia run.
Hauvette refers to an article by Regnault in the popular journal La Nature of 29
July 1 8 9 3 . Since t h e n a b o o k on this subject, Methods of Marching (Comment on
marche), by Regnault and de Raoul, with an introduction by M. Marey (Paris: Henri
Charles-Lavauzelle, 188 pp.) has a p p e a r e d , thoroughly treating the whole subject.
In this book Major Raoul claims that, in the winter of 1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 0 , he trained a
platoon of the 16th Infantry Regiment so thoroughly in three m o n t h s that it cov-
e r e d 20½ k i l o m e t e r s in 1 h o u r a n d 46 m i n u t e s a n d , after a rest of 2 h o u r s ,
returned over the same route in 3 hours and 5 minutes. Each m a n was carrying
his rifle, his saber, 100 rounds of a m m u n i t i o n , a n d rations. T h e route was not level.
General Fay inspected the platoon; it showed no fatigue.
T w o days later the same platoon covered 11 kilometers cross-country with field
e q u i p m e n t u n d e r the eyes of General Colonieu in 80 minutes. Immediately after
their arrival the soldiers carried out target practice and beat all their rivals.
In other units this training was imitated, and a Captain Fay wrote to Raoul that on
the ninth day he had already covered with his c o m p a n y 7 kilometers in 45 minutes.
Raoul is of the opinion that an army that g o e s about its marching flexibly and
gradually can attain on a g o o d road the rate of 5 minutes to the kilometer from the
third kilometer on and can maintain this pace for several hours.
T h e Prussian double-time, which I used as a point of departure, is based on 165
to 175 meters per m i n u t e , and c o n s e q u e n t l y s o m e 6 m i n u t e s to the kilometer.
Raoul's running pace is still a sixth faster and equals the speed of a horse at a brisk
trot.
If it is possible for m o d e r n soldiers to run at this pace for several hours, why
should the Athenians not have been able to do so for 9 minutes?
Why, however, does the Prussian physical exercise regulation prescribe that troops
may not run m o r e than 2 minutes u n d e r full pack?
First of all, the results attained by Captain Raoul are to be accepted with a certain
degree of skepticism.
He himself points out of what immeasurable importance it would be for the con-
duct of war in the future if troops were capable of the r u n n i n g and marching ac-
complishments promised by him. It has often been said, and with g o o d reason, that
wars are w o n with the legs. T h e invention of m o d e r n rifles would be less significant
for the revolution of the art of war than soldiers who could cover more than 4½
miles in three-quarters of an h o u r and could c o n t i n u e at such a pace for many
hours and days. All the g o v e r n i n g concepts of the present concerning strategic o p -
erations would have to be completely revised if Raoul's idea is correct. Why then,
does the French army not introduce the Raoul march m e t h o d ? It would m e a n cer-
tain victory over every e n e m y . T h e tests were made as far back as 1890 and are
supposed to have proved themselves before the eyes of generals. T h e suspicion
arises that, after all, certain self-delusions are at play in Major Raoul's case, illusions
that can so often be observed with inventors. His results are not verified for us by
neutral third parties, but only by himself and his colleagues.
Captain Raoul's unit was no regiment, not e v e n a c o m p a n y , but a single platoon of
thirty-four m e n , presumably selected m e n from the entire regiment. T h e training
period was three m o n t h s .
T h e possible performance of such an elite unit establishes absolutely no standard
for the capabilities of a large mass. It is not, however, simply a matter of r u n n i n g
but also of the necessity for the phalanx to reach the e n e m y in perfect order, with
the fighting strength of the men u n d i m i n i s h e d — a n d therefore not out of breath.
T h e performance of the g r o u p is not d e p e n d e n t on the best runners, but on the
worst ones. If the r u n n i n g pace were carried so far that e v e n a few individuals lost
their strength and fell back, even that would not only create disorder but would also
be extremely d a n g e r o u s from the morale point of view.
Aristophanes tells very graphically in his Peace, 1. 78n. 1171 ff., of the warrior
who marched out to battle and was found without arms in the nearest bush, or of
the general w h o passed off his purple garment as fine Sardis dye, which he had,
however, himself dyed w h e n he urinated in it and took to his heels, a deserter. In
every army there are such m e n of little courage, and o n c e breathlessness gives an
excuse for falling back a n d a few m e n do so, that quickly has an infectious effect. In
that respect the Athenians were no different from other people, and if Hauvette
believes they were in better condition than m o d e r n soldiers, it is easy to show that it
was the opposite situation that prevailed. T h e Athenian army at Marathon was made
up of the popular levy, m e n from twenty to about forty-five years old, of w h o m cer-
tainly only a very small fraction had ever exercised on an athletic field. Most of
them did not live in the city of Athens but at a distance of o n e to two days' march,
and outside the city there was hardly any type of gymnastic exercise. Men w h o have
to work t h r o u g h o u t the day to earn their daily bread, like the Attican farmers,
fishermen, charcoal burners, potters, sculptors, normally have neither the time nor
the strength to spare to k e e p themselves in running condition, and least of all into a
m o r e advanced age. Even the outstanding youths, w h o were e x p o s e d to athletic edu-
cation in the schools, are hardly to be c o m p a r e d in the strenuousness of their physi-
cal training with m o d e r n soldiers, w h o are subject, through strict discipline for sev-
eral years, to living exclusively a life of physical and military training and must de-
vote their whole way of life to that regime, w h o do not carouse at night and may in
no way allow themselves to let up. Even if o n e wishes, however, to think of the phy-
sical training in the Hellenic gymnasium as being at a very high level, that really had
little significance for the mass levy of the militia; in o r d e r to j u d g e the capabilities of
the militia, o n e may in no way count on special training.
T h e true objective interpretation of the run at Marathon can, consequently, lead
to no other conclusion than I reached in my Persian and Burgundian Wars (p. 56).
T h e Prussian regulations, "Rules for the Conditioning of Infantry" ("Vorschriften
über das T u r n e n der Infanterie") prescribes (p. 21):
"The following running times may not be e x c e e d e d in training at the double-time:
"Without equipment: 4 minutes at a run, 5 minutes at a walk, 4 minutes at a run.
"With field equipment: 2 minutes at a run, 5 minutes at a walk, 2 minutes at a
run.
9
"The s p e e d a m o u n t s to 165 to 175 paces per m i n u t e s . That gives as a m a x i m u m
of distance that may be covered at a run with equipment 3 5 0 paces, and the director
of the Military Central Physical Training School was kind e n o u g h to tell me person-
ally that he c o n s i d e r e d 2 m i n u t e s , or 3 0 0 to 3 5 0 paces, as the m a x i m u m that a
march c o l u m n with field e q u i p m e n t might run and still arrive before the e n e m y
with undiminished combat strength. A n d in that connection, the total burden of a
Greek hoplite was very considerably heavier than that of a Prussian infantryman (for
1 0
the latter, 58 pounds; for the former, 7 2 ) , and in a single mass of perhaps 10,000
m e n , running is m u c h more difficult than for a smaller detachment."
As positive proof that even the best-trained soldiers of antiquity were not capable
of a greater accomplishment, let us consider Caesar's account of Pharsalus (Bell. Civ.
3. 92-93). Pompey had c o m m a n d e d his soldiers to stand fast in the face of the attack
by Caesar's troops, so that the latter, by virtue of their doubly l o n g assault—that is,
6 0 0 to 7 0 0 feet, according to Bell. Civ. 1. 8 2 — w o u l d b e c o m e tired and breathless.
Caesar's battle-tested soldiers noticed this intention, however, m a d e a short halt at
the halfway point to catch their breath, and then r e s u m e d the attack. C o m p a r e
History of Julius Caesar, the Civil War (Histoire de Jules Cesar, guerre civile), by Colonel
Stoffel, 11:339.
8. T h e d e e p e r formation of the two wings and the m o r e shallow o n e of the
center, which, according to H e r o d o t u s , was ordered by Miltiades, is of course not to
be regarded as a special stratagem, but rather as an e x p e d i e n t necessitated by the
width of the Vrana valley, which was somewhat too large for the Athenian strength.
In and of itself, it would naturally have been better to make the center just as strong
as the flanks. Perhaps it should also be especially pointed out that the d e e p e r forma-
tion of the flanks would possibly not have sufficed to repel the Persian cavalry in a
battle on the o p e n plain. To be sure, a d e e p e r column cannot be rolled back so sim-
ply by a flanking attack as can a shallow phalanx, but it can be brought to a stand-
still, and that is e n o u g h to ruin it w h e n , as at Marathon, it is faced in the front by
archers. For it is defenseless against their fire if it d o e s not close with them. T h e
d e e p e r formation of the flanks, therefore, is only to be considered as an adjunct of
the real flank protection, which was sought in the terrain; and no matter how clev-
erly it was conceived, we can never determine whether it served the Athenians at
Marathon more as an advantage or a disadvantage, from a practical viewpoint, since
we do not know if it really contributed to the defense against the Persian cavalry,
whereas it is certain, on the other hand, that the highly d a n g e r o u s weakening and
penetration of the center was a result of it.
9. Eduard Meyer, in the third v o l u m e of his History of Antiquity (Geschichte des
Altertums), which was completed so soon after the appearance of the first edition of
this volume that my work could only be m e n t i o n e d in its foreword, took in general,
with respect to the Persian Wars, a position that was formulated in my Persian and
Burgundian Wars, published in 1887. As to details, however, certain important points
of difference are to be noted from case to case. I call attention to the following in
Meyer's presentation of Marathon (transposed here from the second volume of my
first edition).
Meyer states, "A national army, which could have contested the Persians' landing
in Attica, was not available." No army can contest a landing—only a fleet can. T h e
coast of Attica is so long that an e n e m y fleet can always appear with surprise effect
at a given point and, with the simple construction of ancient ships, debark its sol-
diers before the d e f e n d e r can be in position. For this reason Miltiades rightly did
not consider this kind of operation at all, but only a battle u n d e r favorable condi-
tions with the disembarked e n e m y .
It appears to Meyer "completely inconceivable" that the Athenians should have
taken up a position before the battle from which they could not see the enemy. T h i s
is not at all inconceivable. It is not necessary that the e n c a m p e d army be able to see
the e n e m y — b u t only that reliable lookouts w h o are in quick and sure communica-
tion with the army c o m m a n d see him.
T h e principal difference between Meyer and me insofar as the battle itself is con-
cerned has to do with the terrain. I assume that the Athenians had a position at the
mouth of a valley, where the mountains covered their two flanks. Meyer has t h e m
encamped on the slope of the southerly mountain (Agrieliki) and moving out from
there for the counterattack against the approaching Persians on the o p e n plain. Why
the Persians, in this case, did not attack the Athenian phalanx from o n e or both
flanks with their cavalry is not explored. It is only stated that the Persians, w h o on
their side forced the j o i n i n g of the battle and m o v e d forward, d e p l o y e d , against the
Athenians, had, to be sure, fought bravely with their infantry, but their cavalry,
"surprised and uncertain, was not able to enter the battle." Why they were sur-
prised, why uncertain, and why unable to intervene in the battle, is not stated.
We can pass up the question whether this presentation is false, for it suffers from
a much m o r e serious error; it gives the appearance of a logical interrelationship
where actually there is n o n e . W h e n a phalanx fights with hand w e a p o n s on a plain
against an army of archers and m o u n t e d m e n , the decision d e p e n d s on whether the
cavalry attacks the phalanx in its flank. T h e question whether or why that did not
occur must necessarily form the central issue of every historically and militarily
sound description of this battle. It is possible for the question to remain u n a n -
swered, for our sources to be insufficient, or for the explanations that are given not
to enlighten the author. If Meyer, therefore, had a d d e d to his account of Marathon
the sentence, "The tactical events and overall picture of the battle have not been
passed down to us and cannot be surmised," that would be a concept that o n e would
have to accept as valid. But Meyer does not do that at all; rather, he completely fails
to pose the question why the Persian m o u n t e d m e n accomplished nothing. He even
explains (p. 333) that the battle offers no points of difficulty at all, that it is com-
pletely understandable in the light of the Persian m a n n e r of fighting—that is, the
problem that the battle presents is not only not solved, either rightly or wrongly, but
it is not even recognized and not pointed up at all.
Even worse, it is a veritable mockery of the laws of strategy that Meyer repeats the
marketplace rumors of the Athenians to the effect that the Persians, even after their
defeat, sailed around S u n i u m , still intending to capture the capital.
10. I. A. Munro, in "Some Observations on the Persian Wars", Journal of Hellenic
Studies, 1899, p. 185, formulated a new Marathon hypothesis, related to that of Schil-
ling (see N o . 5 above), based on the points that, first of all, the Persians had a
marked superiority, and second, that they had a strong faction in A t h e n s itself. Both
of these points appear, it is true, in H e r o d o t u s ' report, but they cannot, for that
reason, be regarded as verified, and the conclusions M u n r o draws from them are in
general so artificial and forced that I believe I can dismiss the idea of a refutation in
detail.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R V
1. T h e passage r e a d s : " S u b montis radicibus acie r e g i o n e instructa

n o n a p e r t i s s i m a p r o e l i u m c o m m i s e r u n t , n a m q u e a r b o r e s multis
locis e r a n t r a r a e , hoc consilio, ut et m o n t i u m a l t i t u d i n e t e g e r e n t u r
e t a r b o r u m tractu e q u i t a t u s hostium i m p e d i r e t u r , n e m u l t i t u d i n e
c l a u d e r e n t u r . " ( " T h e line was d r a w n up at t h e base of a m o u n t a i n ,
w h e r e the plain was not totally o p e n — f o r t h e r e w e r e trees h e r e a n d
t h e r e in m a n y p l a c e s — a n a they j o i n e d battle. T h e i r plan was to
protect themselves by the h e i g h t of the m o u n t a i n s , a n d to k e e p t h e
e n e m y ' s cavalry back, i m p e d e d by t h e scattered trees, so that they
themselves would not be o v e r c o m e by the e n e m y ' s s u p e r i o r n u m -
bers.") Instead of " a r b o r e s r a r a e , " A. B u c h n e r (Corn. Hepotis vitae
cum Augusti Buchneri commentario. Francof. a. Lipsiae, 1721) has
p r o p o s e d that o n e s h o u l d r e a d "stratae," which is actually m o r e a p -
p r o p r i a t e , but is no l o n g e r necessary, since o n e r e a d s , instead of
"nova arte, vi s u m m a , " " n o n apertissima."
2. L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l von Q u i s t o r p , Supplements to the Military
Weekly (Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt) 1897, p. 186.
3. E v e n a p h a l a n x of p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s , s u c h as t h e m e r -
cenaries of Cyrus, is incapable of moving f o r w a r d in o r d e r l y fash-
ion for a considerable distance at a r u n . " T h e y s h o u t e d to o n e a n o t h e r
not to r u n h e a d l o n g , but to p u r s u e the e n e m y in o r d e r , " * X e n o p h o n
tells us in Anabasis 1. 8. 19.
Caesar, in Bell Gall. 2. 18 ff., r e c o u n t s how the Nervii, s u d d e n l y
a t t a c k i n g his soldiers, r u s h e d 200 paces d o w n a hill, across t h e
3 - f e e t - d e e p S a m b r e , a n d t h e n s t o r m e d up a hill. T h a t is a very
great a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , b u t it d o e s not p e r m i t a c o m p a r i s o n with
M a r a t h o n , since (1) the Gauls w e r e not, u n d e r any circumstances,
as heavily a r m o r e d as the A t h e n i a n hoplites, (2) the r u n was b r o k e n
up by the fording of the river, (3) t h e e n t i r e distance is not m e n -
tioned at all, a n d (4) t h e Gauls, falling on t h e R o m a n s as they were
digging in, did not need to rely on their own tactical a l i g n m e n t .
In Bell Gall. 3. 19, the Gauls s u d d e n l y attack a R o m a n c a m p a n d
cover 1,000 p a c e s — 8 stadia—with a g r e a t r u n ( " m a g n o c u r s u " ) .
T h e y arrive so e x h a u s t e d a n d breathless that they c a n n o t c o p e with
the R o m a n s , w h o m a k e a sally, a n d they immediately take flight. Of
itself, h o w e v e r , this incident is not conclusive, since t h e r u n was
uphill a n d the Gauls were carrying fascines. O n e m i g h t also well

q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e 1,000 p a c e s w e r e c o v e r e d a t a n u n i n t e r -
r u p t e d , a c t u a l r u n , since i t was n o t a q u e s t i o n o f a n o r d e r e d
phalanx, in which all must move at t h e s a m e t e m p o if no d i s o r d e r
is to occur, b u t r a t h e r of an u n a l i g n e d mass, in which a m a n w h o
r u n s short of b r e a t h can slow d o w n for a while.
4. A b r o o k divides t h e V r a n a valley into two parts. A l t h o u g h it is
not really d e e p even today, it nevertheless necessarily h a d a consid-
erably disruptive effect on t h e a d v a n c e of a closed a n d well-ordered
phalanx. Possibly Miltiades did not have t h e valley n a r r o w e d on
both sides by abatis, b u t blocked off o n e side completely, from t h e
m o u n t a i n to the b r o o k .
5. Cyrus speaks as follows in the Cyropaedia 5. 4. 44. " T o m o v e
forward a n d to m o v e laterally a r e not the s a m e . For t h e m a n moves
forward w h o is of such a m i n d as to believe that he is best able to
fight—on t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e has to move by laterally with an ex-
t e n d e d c o l u m n of w a g o n s a n d a l o n g - d r a w n - o u t pack train. T h e
whole formation, however, must be covered by a r m e d m e n a n d t h e
pack t r a i n m u s t n e v e r a p p e a r t o t h e e n e m y t o b e u n p r o t e c t e d .
Necessarily, t h e n , in such a m o v e m e n t the a r m e d p a r t of t h e for-
mation is disposed thinly a n d weakly."
6. In Polyaenus 2. 2. 3, t h e r e is a description of how Clearch led
the Greeks into t h e attack at C u n a x a : " H e led the p h a l a n x at t h e
m a r c h to a point opposite the t r o o p s , astonishing the b a r b a r i a n s
with t h e i r g o o d o r d e r . A n d w h e n he was almost within r a n g e of t h e
missiles, he gave o r d e r s for t h e m e n to r u n , so that they would not
be hit by t h e missiles."* A n d similarly D i o d o r u s . T h e fact that this
d e s c r i p t i o n is n o t at o d d s with t h a t of X e n o p h o n , a c c o r d i n g to
which t h e p h a l a n x s p o n t a n e o u s l y b r o k e into a r u n , is effectively
p r e s e n t e d by G. F r i e d r i c h , Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 151:26.
Paul Reichard, writing in Deutsche Rundschau 12 ( S e p t e m b e r 1890):
4 2 6 , r e p o r t s t h a t Stanley c l a i m e d i n his b o o k t o h a v e s h o t far
.beyond 200 m e t e r s with an African bow. R e i c h a r d goes on to say
that that was, at t h e least, an e x a g g e r a t i o n . He himself h a d o n c e
e n g a g e d in a contest with Watusis, t h e best b o w m e n of East Africa,
in which the strongest o n e h a d shot only 120 m e t e r s , or 160 paces,
while h e , Reichard, h a d shot seven paces f a r t h e r . In like m a n n e r ,
L i e u t e n a n t M o r g e n o n c e r e p o r t e d , in a lecture a b o u t C a m e r o o n s ,
that t h e a r r o w shot from a bow r e a c h e d in certain conditions a dis-
tance of 150 to 180 paces. Nevertheless, t h e Asiatic bows, a c c o r d i n g
to the research of L u s c h a n ("On the ancient bow" [Uber d e n an-
t i k e n B o g e n , " ] Festschrift f ü r Benndorf, 1 8 9 8 , a n d i n t h e
Verhandlungen der Berliner anthropologischen Gesellschaft, Session of 18

F e b r u a r y 1899), were m u c h b e t t e r t h a n the African ones, a n d the
very best ones, t h e m a k i n g of which r e q u i r e d m a n y years, shot an
unbelievably long distance. Strabo, 14. 1. 2 3 , r e p o r t s that Mithri-
dates shot an a r r o w from t h e roof of the t e m p l e of E p h e s u s a n d
d e c r e e d that the free a r e a of the t e m p l e , which up to that point
e x t e n d e d a stadium, would e x t e n d t h e n c e f o r t h to the r a n g e of this
shot, which, as Strabo says, went a little farther. At any rate, Mith-
ridates h a d t h e best bow a n d was an excellent m a r k s m a n , a n d if
he d i d n o t c o n s i d e r a b l y e x c e e d a stadium in d i s t a n t — t h a t is,
high-angle—shooting, t h e n a low-trajectory shot certainly did not
exceed 200 to 240 paces. A recently published e p i g r a m from Olbin
praises the a r c h e r A n a x a g o r a s for having b e e n able to shoot 280
Master, or 5 2 1 . 6 m e t e r s {Literarisches Centralblatt [1901], C o l u m n
887). Naturally, for a large a r m y only a p e r f o r m a n c e of lesser qual-
ity c o m e s into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Vegetius estimates 6 0 0 feet; Jähns,
History of the Development of Ancient Offensive Weapons
(Entwicklungsgeschichte der alten Trutzwaffen), p. 2 8 1 , " u p to 2 5 0
paces for low-trajectory s h o o t i n g , 4 0 0 for h i g h - a n g l e s h o o t i n g . "
More m o d e r n investigation by Paul Reimer, " T h e Bow" ("Der
Pfeilbogen"), Prometheus, N o . 944, 20 N o v e m b e r 1907.
7. Mitteilungen der archäologischen Institut in Athen, 1890.
8. Maps of Attica. E d i t e d by officers a n d officials of t h e Royal
Prussian S u p e r i o r G e n e r a l Staff. With e x p l a n a t o r y text by E. C u r -
tius a n d I. A. K a u p e r t . 1889. {Karten von Attika. A u f g e n . d. Of-
fiziere u n d B e a m t e d. K. p r e u s s . Gr. Gen.-Stabes. Mit erl. T e x t v.
E. C u r t i u s u. I. A. K a u p e r t . 1889.)
9. T h e r e f e r e n c e is to r u n n i n g paces—1 m e t e r ; t h e F r e n c h r u n -
n i n g pace is only 80 c e n t i m e t e r s long.
10. Droysen, Military Organization (Heerwesen), p. 3, footnote, now
rejects—perhaps justifiably—the special figures of Rüstow/Köchly,
which I have accepted h e r e , as b e i n g arbitrary; the fact of b e i n g
heavily b u r d e n e d , however, can, in general, not be q u e s t i o n e d .
Chapter VI
Thermopylae
T h e battle o f M a r a t h o n h a d t a u g h t the Persians that they w o u l d
have to m u s t e r s t r o n g e r forces in o r d e r to o v e r c o m e the Hellenes.
For t h e new c a m p a i g n , t h e n , a m u c h l a r g e r a r m y was
outfitted—so large that it could h a r d l y be t r a n s p o r t e d on a fleet,
a n d since, at any r a t e , t h e c a m p a i g n was to be d e s i g n e d for the
conquest of all of Greece, it a p p e a r e d desirable to choose t h e land
route a n d , as t h e a r m y m o v e d forward, to force all of the i n d e p e n -
dent peoples along the route to acknowledge the Persian
h e g e m o n y . A l a r g e fleet a c c o m p a n i e d t h e l a n d a r m y in o r d e r to
furnish provisions, to o v e r p o w e r t h e G r e e k s at sea also, a n d to
facilitate d e t o u r s by sea for t h e l a n d a r m y in cases w h e r e such
m o v e m e n t by land was p e r h a p s not feasible.
We are able to d r a w for ourselves a m u c h less certain picture of
the course of this w a r t h a n that of t h e first c a m p a i g n . At M a r a t h o n
the e v e n t s a r e s o simple t h a t , o n c e t h e l e g e n d a r y e x a g g e r a t i o n s
such as the gigantic mass of the Persian a r m y a n d the one-mile r u n
of the G r e e k s a r e p u t aside, the indications of this historical ac-
count suffice to m a k e the overall p i c t u r e recognizable. T h e second
war is m o r e complicated. T h e political considerations a n d relation-
ships, n o t only of A t h e n s a n d Sparta, b u t also of the m i d d l e states,
come into i n t e r p l a y with the strategy; a n d t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e
, land a r m y a n d that of t h e fleet interact with o n e a n o t h e r . T h e s e
various forces a n d c o u n t e r f o r c e s a r e , by t h e i r n a t u r e , continuously
crossing back a n d forth a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . U n d e r such c i r c u m -
stances, it is impossible to work o u t again from a p u r e l y l e g e n d a r y
account t h e real historical base of the whole. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t for
us, h o w e v e r — t o recognize the status of the art of w a r in this deci-
sive m o m e n t of w o r l d history—will still be possible, even if t h e m o -
tives for the individual strategic moves can, for the most p a r t , only
be conjectured.
T h e logical idea of the G r e e k s was, first of all, to block from the
91
a p p r o a c h i n g e n e m y land a r m y the passes that, in only a few places,

lead from the n o r t h over the m o u n t a i n s into G r e e c e p r o p e r . T h e
first, m o r e n o r t h e r l y o n e , t h e T e m p e pass, was given u p , however,
since it was recognized t h a t t h e r e w e r e o t h e r passes f a r t h e r inland
a n d since, f u r t h e r m o r e , a few of the peoples on this side of the
pass h a d allied themselves with the Persians. T h e second o n e is the
pass of T h e r m o p y l a e , between M o u n t O e t a a n d t h e sea, which was
o c c u p i e d b y a n a r m y u n d e r the c o m m a n d o f L e o n i d a s .
At this point t h e r e arises the g e n e r a l question w h e t h e r this is, in
fact, the best way to utilize a m o u n t a i n chain for the defense of the
c o u n t r y , a n d w h e t h e r t h e Greeks already possessed a n insight into
certain laws g o v e r n i n g t h e strategic use of m o u n t a i n s a n d stem-
m i n g from the n a t u r e o f w a r f a r e .
M o d e r n , carefully conceived strategy does not use m o u n t a i n s in
the same way as L e o n i d a s did for t h e defense of a c o u n t r y . O v e r a
m o u n t a i n r a n g e — a n d t h e r e f o r e also over M o u n t O e t a — t h e r e is al-
ways m o r e t h a n o n e r o u t e , w h e t h e r it be n e a r e r or farther, easier
or m o r e difficult. It is h a r d to occupy all of t h e m , a n d o n e can
1
n e v e r succeed in d e f e n d i n g t h e m all. T h e e n e m y will always find a
place w h e r e he e i t h e r b r e a k s t h r o u g h , t h a n k s to his g r e a t superior-
ity, o r w h e r e h e h a p p e n s t o c o m e u p o n a n u n g u a r d e d p l a c e ,
w h e r e , t h r o u g h some ravine or o t h e r , e v e n t h o u g h it be pathless,
he takes a defensive position from the r e a r . O n c e t h e line is p e n e -
t r a t e d at o n e place, t h e n t h e garrisons of all the o t h e r passes a r e
e n d a n g e r e d t o a n e x t r e m e d e g r e e . I f they a r e n o t p r o m p t l y in-
f o r m e d a n d do not w i t h d r a w as quickly as possible, they can lose
t h e i r line of r e t r e a t , a n d even if they succeed in escaping without
losses, they are still, initially, s e p a r a t e d from o n e a n o t h e r a n d can
p e r h a p s reestablish contact only with difficulty.
T h e villainy of a traitor, Ephialtes, impossible to imagine in ad-
v a n c e , was t h e r e f o r e n o t n e c e s s a r y t o o p e n t h e pass o f T h e r -
mopylae to the Persians. Even in e n e m y t e r r i t o r y a g u i d e can al-
ways be f o u n d , w h e t h e r by m e a n s of kindness or force, r e w a r d or
p u n i s h m e n t , a n d t h e idea of a d e t o u r is in no way j u s t a p r o d u c t of
m o d e r n military t h e o r y , b u t i t h a s b e e n c o m m o n with military
c o m m a n d e r s from the most ancient times. As early as in t h e i r saga
of t h e battles of Astyages a n d Cyrus, the Persians have an e x a m p l e
of the o v e r c o m i n g of a courageously d e f e n d e d pass by m e a n s of an
e n v e l o p m e n t . In close p r o x i m i t y to T h e r m o p y l a e , t h e r e leads over
the m o u n t a i n r a n g e t h a t same footpath on which the Persians, ac-
c o r d i n g to H e r o d o t u s , o u t f l a n k e d the d e f e n d e r s of t h e pass in 480
B.C., a n d w h e r e t h e Gauls in 2 7 8 B.C. a n d t h e R o m a n s in 191 B.C.
Thermopylae 93
also c a r r i e d o u t successful o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t s . L e a d i n g o u t
from T r a c h i s , w h e r e this f o o t p a t h b e g i n s , t h e r e is still a n o t h e r
r o u t e directly o v e r t h e m o u n t a i n t o w a r d Doris, a n d it was e v e n
used by a d e t a c h m e n t of the Persian a r m y . A few miles farther on,
in the year 191 B . C . , the consul M. Acilius Glabrio m o v e d over t h e
m o u n t a i n with his a r m y , a l o n g M o u n t C o r a x ; a l t h o u g h it is t r u e
2
that t h e m a r c h was very difficult a n d costly, it still s u c c e e d e d .
Xerxes was s t r o n g e n o u g h to have all of these crossings a t t e m p t e d
at the s a m e time; his a r m y was at any rate already divided up into
t h r e e forces m a r c h i n g a b r e a s t o n p a r a l l e l r o a d s a n d t h e r e f o r e
would h a v e t a k e n t h e d e f e n d e r s o f T h e r m o p y l a e f r o m t h e r e a r
sooner or later u n d e r any circumstances, if it was n o t able to over-
come t h e m by frontal attack.
T h e defense of m o u n t a i n passes is effective only w h e n o n e does
not i n t e n d to stop the e n e m y completely, b u t only to cause h i m to
lose time a n d to force h i m into costly skirmishes. If you wish to
utilize the m o u n t a i n chain really to r e p e l a s u p e r i o r i n v a d i n g force,
t h e n the tactical t h e o r y r e q u i r e s you to take a position with y o u r
c o n c e n t r a t e d forces opposite the defile, or o n e of the defiles, from
which the e n e m y is a b o u t to d e b o u c h . T h e n you attack h i m at t h e
m o m e n t w h e n he has j u s t t a k e n t h e defile with a p o r t i o n of his
troops. If you succeed in d e f e a t i n g these t r o o p s while they a r e still
relatively weak numerically a n d not d e p l o y e d , they c a n n o t avoid
suffering heavy losses. T h e y a r e forced to m o v e back into t h e n a r -
row pass, a n d s o m e d e t a c h m e n t s a r e p e r h a p s d r i v e n off separately,
getting completely lost. If the e n e m y has u n d e r t a k e n t h e crossing
simultaneously at several places, you can now strike with y o u r en-
tire force at a n o t h e r c o l u m n , t h u s always d e f e a t i n g t h e e n e m y in
detail with y o u r c o n c e n t r a t e d p o w e r . T h i s s t r a t a g e m is so simple
that we find it used in a similar m a n n e r even in t h e oldest legen-
dary a c c o u n t o f battle. T h e f i r s t g r e a t c o n q u e r i n g p e o p l e i n t h e
legendary accounts were the Assyrians u n d e r King Ninus, and
when h e , a c c o r d i n g to the saga, m o v e d o u t against t h e Bactrians,
the king of the Bactrians allowed a p a r t of t h e Assyrians to move
d o w n into his c o u n t r y t h r o u g h the passes a n d t h e n attacked a n d
d e f e a t e d t h e m . N i n u s was s o s t r o n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h o s e o f his
t r o o p s w h o h a d a d v a n c e d t h r o u g h o t h e r passes were still sufficient
3
to c o n q u e r the Bactrians in the e n d .
W e m a y t h e r e f o r e say t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o t h e
strategic exploitation of a m o u n t a i n r a n g e was already k n o w n in
the oldest times b u t t h a t t h e Greeks, in t h e y e a r 4 8 0 B . C . , w e r e not
in a position to apply this k n o w l e d g e . T h e y would have h a d to con-
c e n t r a t e all t h e i r forces beside M o u n t O e t a a n d wage an offensive

battle at that point. First of all, that was impossible from a political
viewpoint; o n e m u s t n o t e x p e c t a c o n g l o m e r a t e of small republics
to send their e n t i r e forces so far from h o m e a n d to e x p o s e t h e m to
the d a n g e r of an offensive battle before t h e i r own territory is di-
rectly t h r e a t e n e d , a n d m o r e o v e r a large fraction of t h e whole, par-
ticularly t h e A t h e n i a n s , was o c c u p i e d with t h e fleet. Principally,
however, they w e r e tactically not in a position to wage an offensive
b a t t l e , i n view o f t h e P e r s i a n c a v a l r y . V i c t o r y h a d c o m e a t
M a r a t h o n only by virtue of t h e i n g e n i o u s defensive position with its
covered flanks. If o n e s h o u l d once again seek such a position, the
Persians w o u l d certainly n o t attack it again b u t w o u l d bypass it,
with t h e h e l p of t h e i r fleet if necessary, a n d would seek battle in
open terrain.
A later account has it t h a t T h e m i s t o c l e s , w h o m t h e A t h e n i a n s
4
chose as g e n e r a l , w a n t e d from the very start to r e n o u n c e any kind
of d e f e n s e by l a n d a n d as far as possible o p p o s e the Persians with
the fleet. T h a t would, in fact, have b e e n the best p l a n at that time.
U n d e r any circumstances, s o o n e r or later t h e r e h a d to be a sea bat-
tle; if they s u c c e e d e d in d e f e a t i n g t h e Persian fleet, they would
t h e r e b y h a v e c r e a t e d m o r e favorable chances for t h e decision by
l a n d . A l a r g e r n u m b e r o f m e n f r o m t h e s h i p s ' crews c o u l d g o
a s h o r e , d o n hoplite e q u i p m e n t , a n d reinforce the l a n d army, a n d
t h e Persians, in t h e i r strategic m a n e u v e r s , w o u l d no longer have
the alternative of a d e t o u r by water.
M a n y an obstacle, h o w e v e r , may have arisen to i n t e r f e r e with
such a plan. T h e various c o n t i n g e n t s of the G r e e k fleet would only
w i t h g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y h a v e all b e e n r e a d y a n d a s s e m b l e d s o o n
e n o u g h t o m a k e t h e long voyage t o the a r e a o f the Hellespont. T h e
risk was very great, a n d t h e Persian ships held back cautiously until
the land a r m y h a d a r r i v e d at the b o r d e r s of G r e e c e .
T h i s p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s w h y t h e G r e e k s finally c h o s e a c o m -
promise solution: they decided on blocking the pass at T h e r -
m o p y l a e , while t h e fleet awaited t h e e n e m y ships n e a r b y , at t h e
n o r t h e n d o f E u b o e a n e a r t h e foothills o f A r t e m i s i u m . T h e A t h e -
nians, w h o h a d already strongly participated in the occupation of
T e m p e p a s s , h a d n o w c h a n g e d t h e i r m i n d s , d e v o t e d all t h e i r
s t r e n g t h exclusively to t h e fleet, a n d h a d sent no c o n t i n g e n t to the
a r m y o f L e o n i d a s . T h e o c c u p a t i o n o f T h e r m o p y l a e was t h e r e f o r e
only a secondary, auxiliary move for the real strategic plan, that is,
to wage a sea battle in t h e o p e n w a t e r n o r t h of E u b o e a . To assem-
ble the various fleet c o n t i n g e n t s still f a r t h e r n o r t h w a r d was impos-
Thermopylae 95
sible; they w e r e , in fact, n o t completely assembled even n e a r Ar-
t e m i s i u m . F a r t h e r s o u t h w a r d , o n e w o u l d h a v e given u p m i d d l e
Greece to the Persian a r m y , since T h e r m o p y l a e was the only p o i n t
where o n e could h o p e to stop that a r m y , if a n d as long as the fleet
protected t h e sea flank.
It has often b e e n asked why the G r e e k s d i d not m a k e the a r m y
of L e o n i d a s s t r o n g e r . E v e n if we m a y n o t rely on t h e r e p o r t e d
n u m b e r s , o n e t h i n g is still s u r e : a l t h o u g h t h e total c o n t i n g e n t of
Spartiates a m o u n t e d t o some 2,000 m e n , L e o n i d a s nevertheless h a d
only 300 of t h e m with h i m . F r o m this it follows that most of t h e
o t h e r states, too, h a d probably sent only a few or even no t r o o p s at
all. T h a t can p r o b a b l y be e x p l a i n e d very easily, however. T h e d a n -
gers i n h e r e n t i n a m o u n t a i n d e f e n s e w e r e n o t u n k n o w n t o t h e
Greeks. If t h e blocking action s h o u l d fail, t h e n n o t only the posi-
tion itself b u t also a large p a r t of the a r m y would be lost, a p a r t
that w o u l d be all the larger, the l a r g e r t h e a r m y itself was a n d the
m o r e it h i n d e r e d itself in any withdrawal. T h e Persian cavalry a n d
archers w e r e particularly d a n g e r o u s p u r s u e r s for a r e t r e a t i n g a r m y .
Even a small a r m y was e n o u g h for the actual defense of the pass; it
was not because of too weak a g a r r i s o n b u t because of a lack of
alertness t h a t t h e G r e e k s actually lost the battle in the e n d . T h e r -
mopylae, h o w e v e r , e v e n t h o u g h I h a v e t r e a t e d it first h e r e , was
only the s e c o n d a r y action, t h e auxiliary o p e r a t i o n in t h e strategic
concept o f t h e G r e e k defense. T h e definite h o p e they h a d i n oc-
cupying the position was that t h e G r e e k fleet m i g h t succeed in beat-
ing t h e P e r s i a n fleet a t A r t e m i s i u m , w h e r e u p o n t h e l a n d a r m y
would give up its o p e r a t i o n a n d w i t h d r a w . Of itself, the defense of
T h e r m o p y l a e was as g o o d as hopeless; o b s e r v e d without r e g a r d to
o t h e r events, it was an heroic a t t e m p t b u t o n e in which they w e r e
not willing to stake e v e r y t h i n g simultaneously. As a m a t t e r of form,
it could also be said t h a t it was a mistake from t h e physical-military
point of view, b u t it was of m o r a l e significance a n d of inestimable
value in its fulfillment, in t h a t t h e e n t r a n c e into G r e e c e p r o p e r was
not to be h a n d e d to t h e b a r b a r i a n s without a fight.
Leonidas was a m a n w h o u n d e r s t o o d a n d knew how to carry o u t
this aspect of his mission. W h e n the bypassing by the Persians was
r e p o r t e d , he h a d t h e m a i n body of his a r m y start the withdrawal;
he himself, however, stood fast with t h e Spartiates, in o r d e r at t h e
same time to cover the withdrawal a n d to b r i n g to full fruition t h e
concept of the battle that was e n t r u s t e d to h i m . T h e defeat of the
Spartiates r e p r e s e n t s not j u s t a sacrificial d e a t h a n d not simply a
covering action, b u t both at the same time.
T h e critics say that L e o n i d a s s h o u l d have w i t h d r a w n . O n e thing

is c e r t a i n — t h e critics w o u l d h a v e w i t h d r a w n . T h i s s t a t e m e n t by
H e i n r i c h Leo may also well be r e p e a t e d in this military-historical
study as the best characterization of the e n c o u n t e r at T h e r m o p y l a e .
J u s t as Miltiades s h o w e d us in his defensive-offensive action at
M a r a t h o n that the Hellenes h a d already m a s t e r e d the basic con-
c e p t s o f all g e n e r a l s h i p , s o d o e s L e o n i d a s e m b o d y for u s t h e
m o r a l e e l e m e n t in war, its i m p o r t a n c e a n d its value; not only the
knightlike, p e r s o n a l c o u r a g e , t h e heroic d e a t h , b u t h e r o i s m in the
o r g a n i c context of warfare as a conscious military action.
T e s t i m o n y to t h e fact that the G r e e k s w e r e conscious of this idea
is given us by t h e p o e t w h o , in w o r d s as classical as the event itself,
set forth its m e a n i n g for all ages:
" T r a v e l e r , if you c o m e to S p a r t a , tell t h e m t h e r e t h a t you have seen
us lying h e r e , as t h e law has c o m m a n d e d . "
EXCURSUS
1. T h e more clearly o n e realizes that the Greeks were not able to accept a land
battle with the Persians b e f o r e they h a d d e f e a t e d the Persian fleet, the m o r e
noteworthy it is that the Athenians first sent a large land army to T e m p e pass, and
u n d e r the c o m m a n d o f T h e m i s t o c l e s a t that, w h o , a m o n g all the G r e e k s , was
thought to have the fullest insight into the strategic situation.
T h e following explanation appears to be a possibility. W h e n the Greeks were mov-
ing toward T e m p e , they still had at their sides not only the Boeotians but also the
Thessalians, both of w h o m , a n d especially the Thessalians, had excellent cavalry.
T h e r e f o r e Themistocles may have had the plan—not to d e f e n d T e m p e , s o m e t h i n g
which was completely hopeless, since the Persians could bypass it, not only by land,
but also by sea—but, with the help of the Thessalian cavalry, to give battle against
the Persians as they were d e b o u c h i n g from T e m p e . T h a t proved to be impractica-
ble, particularly since o n e c o u l d not d e p e n d on the T h e s s a l i a n s , a n d the o t h e r
Greeks did not a p p e a r to be n u m e r o u s e n o u g h . Only then did Themistocles lead the
Athenians over to the other route, to fight first against the Persian fleet, sending no
more troops to T h e r m o p y l a e .
A n d so T h e r m o p y l a e was from the very outset (unless the Persians should first
lose a sea battle and t h e r e u p o n turn about) a position that was as g o o d as lost, and
Leonidas was given the mission of dying with h o n o r in o r d e r to provide an e x a m p l e
for the Greeks.
2. In D i o d o r u s 1 1 . 4 there is (according to Ephorus) an account that n o b o d y has
been willing to believe up to now, but o n e that, nevertheless, in keeping with the
foregoing, might very well c o m e close to the truth. A c c o r d i n g to this story, Leonidas
wished to take along only 1,000 m e n from L a c e d a e m o n , and w h e n the e p h o r s of-
fered h i m m o r e , he is reported to have said that that was a small number to block
the passes, but that in reality he was not blocking the passes with them but was lead-
ing t h e m to their death. A n d if he were to march there with the entire population,
then L a c e d a e m o n would g o d o w n completely. W e n e e d not belabor the n u m b e r
1,000 in this a c c o u n t , nor the report that the e p h o r s o f f e r e d the king a larger
number. T h e y undoubtedly knew just as well as Leonidas himself what was at stake.
T h e important thing is that here, in popular form, the correct strategic concept is
Thermopylae 97
actually preserved for us. For Marathon, too, we f o u n d the popular legend of the
correct military concept in Ephorus.
3. According to H e r o d o t u s ' account, Leonidas also kept with him 700 T h e s p i a n s
who volunteered for that duty, and the T h e b a n s . T h e T h e b a n s surrendered to the
Persians, and the T h e s p i a n s fell with the Spartiates.
If the sacrifice of the Spartiates, w h o form a warrior class, is a d e e d of eternally
memorable heroism, then the voluntary participation of the citizen militia of a small
city seems to surpass h u m a n capabilities. T h a t an entire city could be inhabited by
such heroes—a small city like T h e s p i a could not possibly have had more than 7 0 0
hoplites—cannot be accepted on the strength of a legendary account. T h e logical
explanation could be that the Persians caught up with the T h e s p i a n s in their with-
drawal and annihilated t h e m there, since they offered resistance, whereas the T h e -
bans offered to surrender and were taken prisoner.
4. In opposition to my concept of Leonidas' d e e d , it has b e e n objected (Busolt, p.
686, footnote) that Leonidas, if he wanted to cover the withdrawal of the others,
could always have g o n e back so far as to have the Persian e n v e l o p i n g column again
in front of him, since still farther back on the route there were narrow passes that
lent themselves to a defense. T h i s objection d o e s not hold u p . T h e Persians had,
after all, established outposts and would have b e g u n immediately to press on as s o o n
as they noticed the evacuation of the pass. T h e n the Greeks would first of all have
suffered considerable casualties f r o m the p u r s u e r s ' arrows, only to be b y p a s s e d
again at their new position, possibly still saving in the e n d a small n u m b e r of the
Spartiates while sacrificing, h o w e v e r , the entire morale value of the battle. B o t h
points are closely b o u n d together and may not be separated: the sacrificial death
with its morale significance, and the military p u r p o s e .
5. (Second Edition.) In my presentation of T h e r m o p y l a e as it a p p e a r e d in the
first edition I have c h a n g e d n o t h i n g of importance, a l t h o u g h Grundy, in his excel-
lent topographical studies (The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries; a study of the
evidence, literary and topographical, L o n d o n , 1901), questions the passability of the
mountains near the pass at T h e r m o p y l a e and d e n i e s especially the existence of the
road from Trachis to Doris in ancient times. Even if it were not a road, however, it
definitely was a path, according to Munro, Journal of Hellenic Studies 22 (1902): 3 1 4 ,
who has so generally limited and corrected the statements of Grundy that my theory
can still hold true. W h i c h path the e n v e l o p i n g Persians took in the e n d is a simple
topographical question that, for us, can be left out of consideration.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R V I
1. Because of t h e most r e c e n t e n l a r g e m e n t of armies, this thesis

must be modified. With t h e gigantic masses of the s t a n d i n g a r m i e s
that are now available, even long m o u n t a i n r a n g e s can be so closely
occupied that they c a n n o t easily be p e n e t r a t e d . In this way we suc-
ceeded for a l o n g time in t h e w i n t e r of 1914-1915 in h o l d i n g t h e
C a r p a t h i a n s against the Russians.
2. Livy 36. 30.
3. D i o d o r u s , 2. 6, from Ctesias.
4. Plutarch, Themistocles, C h a p t e r 7.
Chapter VII
Artemisium
At a b o u t t h e same time as the e n g a g e m e n t s at T h e r m o p y l a e , the
1
two fleets w e r e fighting for t h r e e days r u n n i n g at A r t e m i s i u m . In
the later p o p u l a r accounts A r t e m i s i u m is t r e a t e d as a victory. Ac-
c o r d i n g to the account of H e r o d o t u s , t h e battle was a b o u t e v e n , but
the Greeks, because of the d a m a g e to so m a n y of t h e i r ships, h a d
decided to start a w i t h d r a w a l a n d h a d no s o o n e r b e g u n it t h a n the
news of the c a t a s t r o p h e of L e o n i d a s arrived.
It seems basically t h a t this account has to be accepted as t h e ad-
mission of a defeat. For t h e withdrawal of the fleet from the n o r t h -
e r n point of E u b o e a m e a n t sacrificing T h e r m o p y l a e , a n d that sac-
rifice m e a n t the evacuation of all of m i d d l e G r e e c e a n d Attica. T h e
p e o p l e may have i m a g i n e d , a s H e r o d o t u s r e c o u n t s , t h a t o n e would
move back only as far as t h e E u r i p u s a n d that a G r e e k l a n d a r m y
would o n c e again face X e r x e s farther s o u t h w a r d . T h e c o m m a n d -
ers, h o w e v e r , m u s t h a v e k n o w n that, if they h a d n o t even been
able to h o l d T h e r m o p y l a e , t h e r e was no position f a r t h e r s o u t h w a r d
that the Persians could n o t have bypassed, a n d consequently the
S p a r t a n s w o u l d not t a k e u p t h e d e f e n s e until they w e r e o n the
isthmus. It was no m i n o r decision, especially for t h e A t h e n i a n s , to
w i t h d r a w f r o m A r t e m i s i u m ; t h e i r c o u n t r y a n d t h e i r city w e r e
t h e r e b y lost. O n l y a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y — c o n s e q u e n t l y , a d e f e a t
— s e e m s to explain such a decision.
On the o t h e r h a n d , it is very r e m a r k a b l e t h a t t h e Persians al-
lowed t h e m t o w i t h d r a w u n p u r s u e d . T h e Persian a d m i r a l s knew
that t h e i r l a n d a r m y was fighting before a n a r r o w pass; they knew
what g r e a t merit they w o u l d e a r n if they d r o v e off t h e G r e e k ships
a n d t h e r e b y facilitated the e n v e l o p m e n t of T h e r m o p y l a e by water.
Nevertheless, they r e p o r t e d l y did not sail o u t again to c o m b a t on
the f o u r t h day, after t h e t h r e e - d a y battle; instead, only after receiv-
ing the r e p o r t that the G r e e k s h a d sailed away did they move o u t
98
Artemisium 99
from their a n c h o r a g e at t h e e n t r a n c e of t h e Gulf of Pagasae. After

a complete victory t h e Persians w o u l d certainly not have b e e n so
hesitant.
It a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e G r e e k s gave a g o o d a c c o u n t of
themselves in the t h r e e - d a y battle. It is p e r h a p s a false account that
the withdrawal was already d e c i d e d b e f o r e t h e arrival of t h e r e p o r t
of T h e r m o p y l a e . At any rate, t h e circumstances would a p p e a r to be
m u c h m o r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e if o n e a s s u m e s t h a t it was only this
news that s w u n g t h e balance (Plutarch h a d already conceived it in
this way) a n d b r o u g h t the final decision to w i t h d r a w , w h e r e a s at
first possibly only a few voices h a d d e m a n d e d that action.
H o w e v e r that m a y be, it a p p e a r s certain t h a t t h e G r e e k fleet
showed itself the e q u a l of the Persian fleet on the o p e n sea a n d
that it could not be d e f e a t e d in a t h r e e - d a y fight.
F r o m this we may c o n c l u d e that t h e two fleets were quite e q u a l
in strength. W h e n t h e G r e e k s try to explain away the contradiction
(that on the o n e side the Persians w e r e s u p p o s e d l y t h r e e times as
n u m e r o u s a n d still could not win) by the fact t h a t t h e e n e m y ships,
because o f t h e i r size a n d n u m b e r , h a d b e c o m e m i x e d u p a n d d a m -
aged each o t h e r , t h a t is p a t e n t fable. T h e principal p a r t of the Per-
sian navy consisted of Phoenicians a n d I o n i a n Greeks, b o t h excel-
lent sailors, w h o also knew how to c o n t r o l the ships they built. T h e
crews p r e s u m a b l y w e r e c o m p o s e d e x c l u s i v e l y o f p r o f e s s i o n a l
sailors, w h e r e a s the G r e e k ships m u s t have b e e n m a n n e d partly, it
is t r u e , by excellent sailors, but also partly by citizens with little sea-
going experience. H e r o d o t u s himself points out repeatedly the
technical superiority of the o p p o n e n t s (7. 179; 8. 10) a n d also has
Themistocles say expressly (8. 60) that t h e ships of t h e G r e e k s w e r e
less m a n e u v e r a b l e . L a t e r naval history—for e x a m p l e , the s u p e r i o r -
ity of t h e A t h e n i a n s in t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r — t e a c h e s us how
m u c h difference it m a k e s for a fleet w h e n its crews a r e profession-
ally t r a i n e d . T h e crews of the A t h e n i a n fleet in 480 B . C . , however,
.were c o m p o s e d in very large p a r t of Attic f a r m e r s , charcoal b u r -
ners, a n d artisans, w h o could only have h a d e m e r g e n c y training in
the fleet, which itself h a d b e e n d e v e l o p e d in only the two p r e c e d -
2
ing y e a r s . T h e G r e e k s t h e r e f o r e w o u l d not possibly have b e e n able
to hold o u t in t h e t h r e e - d a y battle on the o p e n sea if the e n e m y ,
professionally s u p e r i o r a n d well led, h a d in a d d i t i o n enjoyed a
great n u m e r i c a l superiority. T h e G r e e k s themselves claim to have
had 271 t r i r e m e s on the first day of battle; t h e Persians, t h e r e f o r e ,
certainly did not h a v e m o r e t h a n 200 to 300. S u p p o s e d l y they h a d
lost very m a n y ships in a heavy s t o r m a few days earlier. Even if

these losses w e r e e x a g g e r a t e d a n d they h a d n o t h a d m o r e t h a n 200
to 300 t r i r e m e s from the very start, it is nevertheless p r o b a b l e that
X e r x e s believed he could sweep all t h e G r e e k s f r o m t h e sea with
such a fleet. Of t h e total of G r e e k ships, 127 w e r e A t h e n i a n . Only a
few years earlier the A t h e n i a n s h a d b o r r o w e d 20 ships from the
C o r i n t h i a n s in o r d e r to wage a w a r against Aegina. O n l y t h e n , on
the p r o p o s a l of T h e m i s t o c l e s , was the g r e a t fleet of 483-482 B.C.
built, a n d a t the Persian c o u r t they certainly h a d n o c o n c e p t o f
what an e x t r a o r d i n a r y effort the small state h a d m a d e at the last
m o m e n t . T h e r e a p p e a r s , t h e r e f o r e , n o t only t o b e n o i n t e r n a l
reason for a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e Persian fleet was m o r e n u m e r o u s t h a n
t h e G r e e k o n e , b u t also i n fact t h e c o u r s e o f t h e battle o f Ar-
t e m i s i u m , a t least after t h e losses t h r o u g h s h i p w r e c k , definitely
3
eliminates this possibility. T h a t t h e Persians may h a v e m o v e d up to
attack before all of t h e i r fleet was p r e s e n t is naturally also o u t of
the question.
If all of this is correct, t h e n t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e G r e e k s be-
c o m e s quite u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . A c c o r d i n g t o H e r o d o t u s , the A t h e -
nians were further reinforced at Artemisium by 53 additional
A t h e n i a n t r i r e m e s . T h i s r e i n f o r c e m e n t has, with g o o d reason, b e e n
q u e s t i o n e d by Beloch; A t h e n s certainly d i d n o t have the p e r s o n n e l
to m a n 200 t r i r e m e s . T h e r e can be no d o u b t , however, that it was
n o t until Salamis t h a t a considerable p o r t i o n of t h e smaller con-
t i n g e n t s j o i n e d t h e fleet. H e r o d o t u s takes p a i n s t o point o u t ex-
pressly that t h e r e i n f o r c i n g of the G r e e k s was m a t c h e d by rein-
forcements o n t h e p a r t o f t h e Persians. F o r t h e Persians, however,
they consisted of a few ships of t h e island G r e e k s , while for the
G r e e k s H e r o d o t u s gives t h e figure 55 t r i r e m e s (in addition to the
53 A t h e n i a n ones). By w i t h d r a w i n g from A r t e m i s i u m , t h e n , they
w e r e g o i n g back for r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , a n d they could also again r e -
p a i r t h e m a n y d a m a g e d s h i p s v e r y quickly i n t h e h o m e p o r t s ,
s o m e t h i n g t h a t was m u c h m o r e difficult for t h e Persians. If the
G r e e k s h a d already a c q u i t t e d themselves with h o n o r a t A r t e m i s i u m ,
t h e n they could also look f o r w a r d with g o o d p r o s p e c t s to a second
battle in the Saronic Gulf. T h e price to be paid was admittedly very
high, since t h e A t h e n i a n s h a d to leave t h e i r c o u n t r y a n d their city
to t h e mercy of t h e e n e m y , b u t since they h a d n o t initially suc-
c e e d e d in d e f e a t i n g t h e e n e m y fleet at A r t e m i s i u m , they h a d no al-
ternative.
Artemisium 101
EXCURSUS
1. Herodotus recounts that the Greeks had already m o v e d back o n c e , before the
battle, from their position at Artemisium to the Euripus and had not m o v e d up
again to Artemisium until they received news of the Persians' heavy losses in the
shipwreck. T h i s report deserves no credence, since, in that event, Leonidas would
also have had to evacuate T h e r m o p y l a e . It is simply an expression of the fear in
which the Greeks lived over the arrival of the Persians and of the help which the
gods sent them in wind and weather. T h e greater the losses of the Persians in the
shipwreck, the larger the fleet had been originally.
2. With the establishing of the strength of the fleet, there disappears o n c e and for
all the fable that the Persians had sent 2 0 0 ships a r o u n d Euboea in order to cut off
the withdrawal of the Greeks, and that they had all f o u n d e r e d in a storm. In o r d e r
to cut off the Greek fleet—if indeed the Persians could get along without these ships
in the battle—they did not n e e d to send t h e m a r o u n d Euboea but simply across the
water into the left flank of the Greeks, while the main fleet was rowing up for the
battle. T h i s account, too, is an auxiliary t h e m e of the legend, aimed at explaining
the contradiction b e t w e e n the gigantic true size of the Persian fleet and its actual
appearance in the battle.
3. I sought earlier to explain the paradox that the Persian fleet was s u p p o s e d to
be many times larger than the Greek and yet the latter supposedly held its o w n in a
three-day battle on the o p e n sea; my explanation was that there was really no battle
at all at Artemisium. T h i s solution, however, is untenable, not so much because of
the Greeks' a c c o u n t — l e g e n d often invented entire battles—but because of the com-
bat a n i o n s at T h e r m o p y l a e . T h e Persian fleet cannot possibly have remained u n e n -
gaged while the king was fighting here, but it must have m o v e d in with all its power
to drive off the Greek fleet and take the position of Leonidas from the rear. Since
the decision at T h e r m o p y l a e did not take place until the seventh day after the king's
arrival in front of the pass, it is clear that the land army simply awaited the action of
the fleet. T h e fleet was reportedly held up for three days by bad weather. T h e s e
accounts of H e r o d o t u s may be r e g a r d e d as correct, e v e n t h o u g h the details of
chronological reports in a narrative after such a l o n g time are always subject to
strong suspicion and H e r o d o t u s also contradicts himself.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R V I I
1. Plato, Menexenus 11. A r i s t o p h a n e s , Lysistrata, verse 1250. L a t e r

they also placed on t h e foothill a victory m o n u m e n t whose inscrip-
t i o n has c o m e d o w n t o u s t h r o u g h P l u t a r c h .
2. C o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the t r i r e m e s , see H a u c k
Zeitschrift des Vereins deutscher Ingenieure, 1895; A. T e n n e (engineer),
Warships in the Days of the Ancient Greeks and Romans (Kriegschiffe zu
den Zeiten der alten Griechen und Römer), 1916. Review by Voigt, Die
Literarische Zeitung, 29 (1917): 932.
3. It is p e r h a p s well to recall that not only large l a n d armies b u t
also large fleets a r e h a r d to m a n e u v e r . T h e c o m p l e t e fleet with
which the A t h e n i a n s m o v e d to Sicily in 4 1 5 B.C. was 134 t r i r e m e s
a n d 2 p e n t e r e m e s strong, a n d h a d in addition 131 c a r g o ships a n d

a n u m b e r of v o l u n t e e r t r a d i n g vessels. T h i s fleet did not sail as a
single s q u a d r o n , b u t was divided into t h r e e divisions, "so that they
m i g h t not, b y sailing t o g e t h e r , b e w a n t i n g w a t e r a n d p o r t s a n d
provisions w h e n they l a n d e d , a n d so that they m i g h t , in o t h e r mat-
t e r s , be m o r e o r d e r l y a n d easy to c o n t r o l , b e i n g a s s i g n e d to a
c o m m a n d e r a c c o r d i n g to set divisions"* ( T h u c y d i d e s 6. 42).
Chapter VIII
Battle of Salamis
W h e n the w o r d r e a c h e d A t h e n s that t h e citizens w e r e to leave
the city a n d give it up to t h e e n e m y , they refused in dull d e s p a i r to
follow this advice, a n d even the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the oracle con-
cerning t h e w o o d e n walls was of no avail. Finally it t u r n e d o u t that
the Holy Snake of the Citadel h a d not e a t e n its m o n t h l y sacrificial
cake. O n e was t h e r e f o r e forced to c o n c l u d e t h a t even it h a d m o v e d
out. Now at last even the A t h e n i a n citizens no l o n g e r hesitated to
follow such a godly e x a m p l e .
T h e p o p u l a t i o n was m o v e d partially t o t h e P e l o p o n n e s u s , b u t
partly also only o v e r to Salamis. P r e s u m a b l y the m e a n s at h a n d
were not sufficient to t r a n s p o r t the large n u m b e r of p e o p l e with
their movable possessions all t o g e t h e r to t h e P e l o p o n n e s u s . T h e
farming p o p u l a t i o n probably fled to t h e m o u n t a i n s . T h e island of
Salamis, by p r o v i d i n g a refuge for t h e citizens of the city, tied the
fleet to this place. N e v e r t h e l e s s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e l e g e n d a r y ac-
count, a g r e a t q u a r r e l is s u p p o s e d to have o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n the
field c o m m a n d e r s as to w h e t h e r o n e s h o u l d accept battle against
the Persian fleet n e a r Salamis. We a r e n o t in a position to know
with certainty t h e n a t u r e of this q u a r r e l , a n d it is completely u n -
methodical to pass on as history an a c c o u n t like that of H e r o d o t u s ,
even w h e n it is possible to eliminate obvious impossibilities a n d con-
tradictions. P e r h a p s this whole story of a q u a r r e l between the lead-
ers is a fable with only a small n u c l e u s of t r u t h in the fact that the
reasons for d e c i d i n g to fight at Salamis or elsewhere were carefully
weighed in a council of war. Precisely this distortion, as s t r o n g as it
might seem, is to be f o u n d quite often in military history, even in
m o r e m o d e r n times. I w o u l d simply r e f e r h e r e to t h e Bullinger
chronicle of the battle of M u r t e n a n d of the similar alleged d i s p u t e
between F r e d e r i c k a n d Schwerin b e f o r e t h e battle of P r a g u e . Cer-
tain p o r t i o n s of H e r o d o t u s ' account c o r r e s p o n d so closely, it is t r u e ,
t o the n a t u r e o f t h e m a t t e r , t h a t w e c a n well a c c e p t t h e m ; b u t
103
w h e t h e r o r n o t o t h e r motives, u n k n o w n t o u s a n d p e r h a p s o f a
m u c h s t r o n g e r n a t u r e , played a role in t h e situation, we do not
know.
First of all, it m u s t be r e c o r d e d that it was only a question of
where, a n d n o t whether, the sea battle was to be fought. If they h a d
n o t h a d t h e c o u r a g e to risk the sea battle, t h e n G r e e c e would have
h a d to bow to the Persians. W i t h o u t the o p p o s i t i o n of the fleet, the
Persians would h a v e e n v e l o p e d the i s t h m u s , which was b a r r e d by a
wall, a n d we know a l r e a d y that t h e l a n d a r m y d i d not have the
self-confidence t o give b a t t l e t o t h e P e r s i a n s i n t h e o p e n c o u n -
tryside. If, t h e n , t h e battle was f o u g h t b e t w e e n Salamis a n d the
m a i n l a n d a n d was lost, t h e losers w e r e , for all practical p u r p o s e s ,
cut off, a n d only a few ships would have b e e n able to save t h e m -
selves t h r o u g h the S o u n d of M e g a r a , a s s u m i n g that the Persians
d i d not block this o n e , too. A battle in o p e n w a t e r t h e r e f o r e h a d
the a d v a n t a g e of not p u s h i n g the d a n g e r to its highest point. But
for the o u t c o m e of t h e war, that point did not c o m e into considera-
tion; a defeat of the fleet, even if s o m e w h a t less c o m p l e t e , w o u l d
have b e e n decisive u n d e r a n y circumstances, since after all, without
the fleet, t h e l a n d a r m y , too, was incapable of resistance. F u r t h e r -
m o r e , by w i t h d r a w i n g to t h e isthmus they would be giving up to
the e n e m y not only Salamis a n d the A t h e n i a n s w h o h a d t a k e n re-
fuge t h e r e , b u t also A e g i n a a n d M e g a r a . T h a t seems completely
convincing, a n d o n e is at first at a loss for any passably rational
r e a s o n t h a t t h e advocates of a f u r t h e r r e t r e a t m u s t nevertheless
have p r o p o s e d . I n d e e d , the l e g e n d is c o n t e n t with an e x p l a n a t i o n
of simple stupidity a n d cowardice. In reality, things did not come
a b o u t that way, a n d it is completely certain t h a t t h e S p a r t a n King
E u r y b i a d e s a n d t h e l e a d e r o f the C o r i n t h i a n s , A d e i m a n t u s , w h o m
his c o m p a t r i o t s c e l e b r a t e d as a h e r o a n d hailed as t h e real con-
q u e r o r of Salamis, b r o u g h t forth still o t h e r reasons for t h e i r plan
t h a n H e r o d o t u s passed o n . In fact, we now find in H e r o d o t u s ' ac-
c o u n t a n o t h e r fact t h a t has r e m a i n e d completely u n n o t i c e d until
now b u t that could give us t h e sought-after solution, if t h e r e is any
reality at all u n d e r l y i n g t h e account.
We are told t h a t a fleet of 60 C o r c y r a e a n t r i r e m e s h a d already
arrived at the southern point of the Peloponnesus. T h e Greeks
later e x p r e s s e d the suspicion t h a t t h e C o r c y r a e a n s , w h o r e p o r t e d l y
w e r e held up by u n f a v o r a b l e winds, h a d intentionally held back in
o r d e r to await t h e o u t c o m e a n d to j o i n the victors. It does n o t seem
impossible, however, t h a t in the council of t h e G r e e k c o m m a n d e r s
Battle of Salamis 105
their arrival was e x p e c t e d from o n e m o m e n t to the next a n d t h e r e -
fore o n e was willing, even u n d e r the h a r d e s t sacrifices, to w i t h d r a w
a n o t h e r step f a r t h e r a n d t h u s m a k e the victory still m o r e certain by
virtue of their h e l p .
Themistocles is s u p p o s e d to have forced t h e decision with the e n -
tire weight of his personality by feigning t r e a s o n a n d i n f o r m i n g
King Xerxes himself of t h e split a m o n g t h e Greeks, thereby inveigl-
ing him into an i m m e d i a t e attack. As to t h e c o n t e n t s of the mes-
sage that T h e m i s t o c l e s sent to t h e King, t h e G r e e k s were n o t in a-
g r e e m e n t . In Aeschylus (Persians, verse 336) it is said that a m a n r e -
ported to X e r x e s t h a t the Greeks w o u l d flee d u r i n g the night a n d
scatter, in o r d e r to save t h e i r lives. To this H e r o d o t u s a d d s t h a t the
Greeks w o u l d fight a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s if t h e P e r s i a n s sailed u p .
Diodorus (probably q u o t i n g E p h o r u s ) has t h e m e s s e n g e r say t h a t
the G r e e k s i n t e n d e d to sail to the i s t h m u s in o r d e r to j o i n t h e l a n d
army t h e r e . Similarly, a n d probably from the same source,
Plutarch. T h e r e a s o n for the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is clear: t h e r e w e r e
some p e o p l e to w h o m it d i d not o c c u r t h a t the King s h o u l d h a v e
had a n interest i n p r e v e n t i n g t h e G r e e k s from splitting u p t h e i r
forces. F o r if t h i n g s h a d r e a c h e d t h a t point, t h e n the Persian fleet
would not only easily have o v e r w h e l m e d e a c h G r e e k fleet division,
to the e x t e n t that it d a r e d at all to stay at sea, but w o u l d also have
d e t e r m i n e d t h e l a n d victory by l a n d i n g a p a r t of the Persian a r m y
at some place on the P e l o p o n n e s u s , t h e r e b y m a n e u v e r i n g the
Greeks o u t of t h e i r last u n e n v e l o p a b l e position b e h i n d the i s t h m u s
wall. On this basis, t h e n , we find in H e r o d o t u s the addition t h a t t h e
Greeks would fight a m o n g themselves a n d consequently a p a r t of
t h e m w o u l d go o v e r to the Persians—which makes the Persian at-
tack u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , at least to a certain e x t e n t . B u t E p h o r u s rec-
o g n i z e d t h a t e v e n this d i d n o t suffice, a n d since t h e r e was n o t
a n o t h e r positive account on h a n d , i n t r o d u c e d , instead of the dis-
b a n d m e n t of t h e fleet, a simple withdrawal to the i s t h m u s a n d con-
, tact with t h e l a n d a r m y . L a t e r writers, like N e p o s , J u s t i n , F r o n -
tinus, t u r n e d back to the original l e g e n d a n d would have the K i n g
i n f o r m e d : " T h e G r e e k s a r e a b o u t t o d i s b a n d ; you s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e
act quickly in o r d e r to catch t h e m all t o g e t h e r . " No fairy tale could
have a h a u g h t y k i n g d u p e d m o r e splendidly. A real soldier like
Themistocles, however, w o u l d probably h a v e said to himself that
Xerxes w o u l d a n s w e r h i m as follows: " T h a t is a very c h e e r i n g bit of
news; t h e n I can do away with t h e m o n e at a time w i t h o u t a n y
d a n g e r . " T h e message w o u l d probably a p p e a r most credible if it
r a n somewhat like this: " T h e r e a r e still sixty C o r c y r a e a n t r i r e m e s

on t h e way, so t h e P e r s i a n s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e seek battle b e f o r e
t h e i r arrival."
Up to this point I have b e e n able to let my p r e s e n t a t i o n in the
two first editions stand as it was. T h e following, however, is new.
Surprisingly e n o u g h , careful philological r e s e a r c h has succeeded in
discovering a completely new fact that places t h e events of Salamis,
b o t h from a tactical a n d a strategic viewpoint, on a completely dif-
f e r e n t basis f r o m t h e o n e f o r m e r l y t a k e n for g r a n t e d . All t h e
studies on Salamis p r o c e e d e d from t h e a s s u m p t i o n that the island
of Psyttalea, which was o c c u p i e d d u r i n g t h e battle by Persian war-
riors w h o , after t h e victory, w e r e cut off a n d d e s t r o y e d , was identi-
cal with the p r e s e n t - d a y island of Leipsokutali, which still lies in
front of the entrance into the sound. Endless pains have been
t a k e n t o reconcile Aeschylus' a n d H e r o d o t u s ' battle r e p o r t s with
each o t h e r a n d with this t o p o g r a p h y . Now J u l i u s Beloch has estab-
lished t h e fact t h a t p e o p l e have b e e n led astray by t h e superficial
resemblance of Psyttalea a n d Leipsokutali, t h a t t h e two n a m e s have
n o t h i n g at all to do with each o t h e r , a n d t h a t t h e island of Psyt-
talea, n e a r which the battle m u s t h a v e t a k e n place, is r a t h e r t h e is-
land Hagios Georgios, which lies considerably f a r t h e r to t h e n o r t h
in t h e s o u n d . T h i s is an o c c u r r e n c e similar to t h a t in the battle of
M u r t e n , w h e r e t h e t o p o g r a p h y a n d , a s a c o n s e q u e n c e , also t h e
tactical-strategic context of the battle w e r e d i s t o r t e d by virtue of an
u n f o u n d e d tradition, which indicated as "Battle C h a p e l " a c h a p e l
which was q u i t e d i s t a n t f r o m t h e r e a l battlefield. W i t h Beloch's
work in h a n d , I walked a l o n g the b e a c h of t h e s o u n d in 1911 a n d
at t h a t point the scales fell from my eyes as I realized that the bat-
tle could not have t a k e n place in this s o u n d at all, because t h e r e is
far too little space in it. O n l y on the far side of t h e n a r r o w s , in t h e
Bay of Eleusis, could t h e battle h a v e t a k e n place.
O n this basis t h e source accounts w e r e o n c e again w o r k e d over
by one of my students, Gottfried Zinn, a n d resulted in an irre-
1
p r o a c h a b l e p i c t u r e of the battle, b o t h tactically a n d strategically. All
the r e p o r t s from t h e original sources, which s e e m e d to be so m u c h
at o d d s t h a t o n e was c o n v i n c e d t h e situation c o u l d be r e m e d i e d
only t h r o u g h t e x t u a l c h a n g e s , s o m e h e r e a n d s o m e t h e r e , n o w
stand in perfect h a r m o n y .
T h e Persians allowed a g o o d f o u r t e e n days to slip by after they
h a d occupied A t h e n s b e f o r e they forced a decision (occupation of
the city, a b o u t 10 S e p t e m b e r ; b a t t l e , 28 S e p t e m b e r ) . Despite all
t h e i r previous successes, t h e situation was difficult for t h e m , a n d it
was not easy to decide how they could best go at it. T h e G r e e k fleet
lay on the n o r t h coast of the island of Salamis, w h e r e the necessary
sand beach was p r e s e n t (almost the entire east coast is rocky). Since
the island h a d too little water to p r o v i d e for the whole fleet (some
300 ships, with c o m b i n e d crews of 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ) , it is
probable that a p o r t i o n of the ships lay off the M e g a r a n coast. O n e
can easily imagine that Xerxes m u s t have p o n d e r e d the question
w h e t h e r he s h o u l d p e r h a p s , at the same time he attacked with the
fleet, move f o r w a r d by land on t h e r o a d leading from A t h e n s to
Megara. Since, however, n o i n f o r m a t i o n has been h a n d e d d o w n o n
this subject, let us j u s t establish the fact that the Persians did not at
2
any rate go as far as M e g a r a a n d t h e r e f o r e probably did not feel
themselves s t r o n g e n o u g h to do so, so that they limited themselves
to a fleet attack, which r e q u i r e d a careful, r a t h e r long reconnais-
sance. In o r d e r to come up with t h e G r e e k s , the Persian fleet h a d
to move either t h r o u g h the r a t h e r w i n d i n g S o u n d of Salamis, dot-
ted with islands a n d rocks, or t h r o u g h t h e still n a r r o w e r passage on
the o t h e r — t h e Megara—side of t h e island, T r u p i c a Bay. It was fi-
nally d e c i d e d to attack the G r e e k s simultaneously from b o t h sides;
victory would m e a n the loss a n d c o m p l e t e destruction of t h e G r e e k
fleet. B o t h p a r t s of the fleet started o u t d u r i n g the night, in o r d e r
to move into the Bay of Eleusis on b o t h sides at the same time the
next m o r n i n g .
As soon as their a p p r o a c h was r e p o r t e d , the G r e e k s also m a d e
t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n s , d i v i d e d t h e i r fleet likewise, a n d m o v e d o u t
against the e n e m y . Themistocles allowed himself the time to give
a n o t h e r stirring a d d r e s s before t h e e n g a g e m e n t . His intention was
not to p r e v e n t t h e e n e m y from sailing into the m o r e o p e n bay, but
to attack him while he was still involved in d e p l o y i n g o u t of t h e
narrow passage. T h e foremost G r e e k ships, probably the same o n e s
that h a d o b s e r v e d a n d c o v e r e d t h e e n t r a n c e t o t h e s o u n d , f i r s t
rowed a certain distance t o w a r d t h e r e a r . T h e n the attack started,
with the G r e e k s trying, as H e r o d o t u s quite correctly r e p o r t s , to en-
velop the right wing of t h e Persians, that is, the o n e that was mov-
ing i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Eleusis. T h e P e r s i a n s f o u g h t back m o s t
courageously, b u t the strait allowed t h e i r ships to move o u t only
slowly, w h e r e a s t h e G r e e k s could immediately e x e r t their p o w e r ,
s u p e r i o r u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h u s t h e P h o e n i c i a n - I o n i a n
ships, in spite of their s u p e r i o r maneuverability, h a d to yield, a n d
they w e r e p u s h e d back a g a i n into t h e s o u n d . Since the r e t i r i n g
ships c a m e up against those that w e r e still striving to move for-
ward, t h e greatest confusion resulted, a n d heavy losses e n s u e d .
N o t h i n g has b e e n told us of t h e combat in t h e opposite strait,

n e a r M e g a r a . We can n e v e r t h e l e s s a s s u m e with certainty t h a t it
took place in a very similar way, since the A t h e n i a n s r e p o r t e d to
H e r o d o t u s t h a t t h e C o r i n t h i a n ships h a d m o v e d off t o w a r d that
side (as they believed, in flight), a n d t h e C o r i n t h i a n s celebrated
their leader, A d e i m a n t u s , as victor.
All the distortions t h a t m a d e t h e account so i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e up
to this point have now d i s a p p e a r e d .
I t could not b e u n d e r s t o o d u p t o t h e p r e s e n t why t h e n a r r o w n e s s
of t h e water passage s h o u l d have b e e n d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s precisely
for the Persians, as Aeschylus particularly emphasizes, since, after
all, t h e P h o e n i c i a n s a n d I o n i a n s w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y b e t t e r sailors
t h a n the A t h e n i a n militia crews. Now, however, it becomes clear
how the strategic genius of Themistocles was able to a r r a n g e the
battle in such a way t h a t the strait h e l p e d the Hellenes, while the
e n e m y , with all his nautical ability, could not be effective. F o r the
pass is n o t directly r e l a t e d to t h e battle itself, b u t to the a p p r o a c h
into t h e battle.
T h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t t h e G r e e k s f o u g h t successfully i n o p e n
w a t e r a t A r t e m i s i u m a n d h e r e supposedly s o u g h t o u t , intentionally,
a n a r r o w battle a r e a with t h e i r increased n u m b e r of ships, is now
dispelled, since it was n o t t h e battle a r e a itself b u t only the a p -
p r o a c h to the battle a r e a t h a t f o r m e d t h e n a r r o w strait.
Parallel to the p o p u l a r account that X e r x e s o b s e r v e d the battle
from a hill beside the S o u n d of Salamis is a n o t h e r r e p o r t , from
P l u t a r c h , t h a t he e r e c t e d his t h r o n e on a hill at t h e b o r d e r of
Megaris. H o w could such an account d e v e l o p , w h e n t h e battle took
place at the southerly e n t r a n c e of the S o u n d of Salamis, 10 to 12
kilometers distant from t h a t point? Now it is, to be s u r e , probably
not accurate, b u t q u i t e r e a s o n a b l e .
Finally, too, t h e necessary space for t h e battle has b e e n f o u n d .
T h e orienting of t h e Persian right flank on Eleusis, as r e p o r t e d by
H e r o d o t u s , a n d t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e C o r i n t h i a n s a r e clarified.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e i s p r e s e n t i n t h e overall s o u r c e ac-
c o u n t s n o t a single p o i n t t h a t m i g h t contradict Zinn's r e c o n s t r u c -
tion of t h e battle.
T h e Greeks h a d won, b u t t h e i r victory was n o t so g r e a t that they
m i g h t have p u r s u e d t h e foe far o u t into t h e sea. In fact, they ex-
p e c t e d t h e attack to be r e n e w e d . B u t X e r x e s h a d b e c o m e convinced
that he was not capable of c o n q u e r i n g the G r e e k s at sea, especially
if t h e C o r c y r a e a n s now c a m e up also. He t h e r e f o r e sent the fleet
h o m e w a r d , feeling that, if it could not o v e r c o m e the Greeks, it h a d

no f u r t h e r role to play.
T h i s fact d i d n o t at all m e a n , h o w e v e r , t h a t the w a r was lost.
T r u e e n o u g h , t h e r e was now n o t h i n g m o r e t o b e a t t e m p t e d against
the isthmus position, b u t the Persians w e r e , nevertheless, h o l d i n g
central G r e e c e a n d Attica, a n d the G r e e k s d i d n o t d a r e risk m e e t -
ing t h e m h e a d - o n b y l a n d . T h u s , i f t h e l a n d a r m y r e m a i n e d i n
Greece a n d lived off t h e s u b j u g a t e d c o u n t r y s i d e , it could be as-
s u m e d that t h e G r e e k s , especially the A t h e n i a n s , w o u l d not be cap-
able o f d e f e n d i n g t h e i r c o u n t r y against r e p e a t e d i n c u r s i o n s a n d
would in time b e c o m e w e a r y of it all. A f t e r all, t h e y c o u l d n o t
evacuate t h e i r city a n d flee across t h e w a t e r each year.
T h e war, t h e r e f o r e , h a d to be p l a n n e d now on a l o n g - t e r m basis.
For the G r e a t K i n g t h e r e was now n o t h i n g m o r e to be d o n e in Hel-
las; his p r e s e n c e w o u l d h a v e called for great, brilliant d e e d s , which,
for the time being, w e r e n o l o n g e r t o b e e x p e c t e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y ,
it was even correct, from t h e political a n d military points of view,
that X e r x e s himself s h o u l d r e t u r n to Asia. T h e weak point in t h e
Persians' situation was t h e b u t slight d e g r e e of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of
the I o n i a n G r e e k s . If they s h o u l d by c h a n c e defect, t h e Persian
army in Hellas w o u l d be s e p a r a t e d from t h e m o t h e r c o u n t r y in a
d a n g e r o u s m a n n e r . Since he d i d not have at his disposal m a n y ad-
ditional t r o o p s , t h e best way to retain t h e o b e d i e n c e of t h e I o n i a n
G r e e k s was t h r o u g h t h e p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y o f t h e King. X e r x e s
therefore t u r n e d the high c o m m a n d over to Mardonius and re-
3
t u r n e d to Sardis, w h e r e he r e m a i n e d for a w h i l e . M a r d o n i u s with-
drew t o n o r t h e r n G r e e c e , w h e r e h e was not e x p o s e d t o any s u d d e n
attack a n d his a r m y could be supplied in t h e occupied c o u n t r y s i d e .
F r o m h e r e he was in a position to take up t h e offensive again at
any o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t .
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R V I I I
1. Berlin dissertation, 1914. R. T r e n k e l , publisher.

2. By t h e n a t u r e of H e r o d o t u s ' account, it is naturally n o t impos-
sible that a large p o r t i o n of the overall account has b e e n lost with-
o u t leaving any trace. Nevertheless, it is very u n u s u a l that we h e a r
n o t h i n g at all a b o u t why t h e large Persian a r m y , d u r i n g t h e four-
teen days it c a m p e d in Attica b e f o r e t h e battle, d i d not also occupy
Megara, which, after all, lay in front of the i s t h m u s a n d its wall. A
logical e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d be that the Spartiates, with the a r m y of
t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s , to t h e e x t e n t that they w e r e not digging in on

t h e i s t h m u s , w e r e o c c u p y i n g t h e passes l e a d i n g f r o m Attica t o
M e g a r a a n d t h a t X e r x e s , u n l i k e his a c t i o n a t T h e r m o p y l a e
—precisely because of his e x p e r i e n c e at T h e r m o p y l a e — d i d not at-
tack because he w a n t e d to do away with the fleet first. U n d e r those
circumstances, it is all t h e m o r e likely that a p a r t of the Greek fleet
could have b e e n on the beach at M e g a r a . It is, of course, obvious
that this construction is in direct contradiction to the historical nar-
rative.
3. All kinds of conclusions have b e e n p r o p o s e d as a result of the
fact that Xerxes r e t u r n e d by land, while s e n d i n g his children h o m e
with the fleet. F o r such details, however, so m a n y varied reasons
a r e imaginable that t h e r e is little p u r p o s e in going deeply into the
matter.
Chapter IX
Battle of Plataea
T h e leaders o f the Hellenes w e r e not u n a w a r e o f w h e r e a n d how
they s h o u l d carry o u t t h e i r c o u n t e r a t t a c k against a Persian offen-
sive t h a t h a d w i t h d r a w n only a step a n d m i g h t be r e n e w e d at any
m o m e n t . As early as t h e p e r i o d i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e battle of
Salamis Themistocles is s u p p o s e d to h a v e p r o p o s e d that the fleet
sail to t h e H e l l e s p o n t a n d d e s t r o y t h e Persian bridges; this p r o -
posal, in a form that could be u n d e r s t o o d by the masses, was a plan
for a c a m p a i g n into T h r a c e a n d Asia M i n o r in o r d e r to e n c o u r a g e
the G r e e k s in those areas to defect from the b a r b a r i a n s . T h e m i s t o -
cles w o u l d not h a v e n e e d e d to take this t r o u b l e j u s t for the p u r p o s e
of d e s t r o y i n g t h e H e l l e s p o n t b r i d g e ; wind a n d w e a t h e r took care of
that without any h e l p from the G r e e k s .
Themistocles' p l a n evoked no e n t h u s i a s m from his c o m p a t r i o t s ;
they w e r e s u p p o s e d to move off to a distant place while t h e large
Persian a r m y was laying waste to t h e i r h o m e l a n d ? Even in the fol-
lowing s p r i n g T h e m i s t o c l e s so failed to p u t over his idea t h a t t h e
A t h e n i a n s chose as c o m m a n d e r s in place of h i m — t h e victor of
Salamis—his political e n e m i e s Aristides a n d X a n t h i p p u s .
T h e m i s t o c l e s was b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t e d b y t h e S p a r t a n s — q u i t e
naturally, since, if the plan succeeded, M a r d o n i u s would h a v e to
a b a n d o n G r e e k soil, a n d the land battle that the S p a r t a n s feared so
greatly would be unnecessary.
With this difference existing between the two leading city-states,
n o t h i n g a t all o c c u r r e d a t f i r s t . T h e A t h e n i a n s d e m a n d e d t h a t the
P e l o p o n n e s i a n s m o v e forward with their full forces a n d h e l p cover
Attica against an invasion by the Persians. T h e S p a r t a n s insisted on
the sea e x p e d i t i o n . Each side tried to force t h e o t h e r to accept its
plan. T h e S p a r t a n s did not move out, a n d t h e A t h e n i a n s , a s Mar-
d o n i u s a p p r o a c h e d , h a d to give up t h e i r city a n d c o u n t r y for a sec-
o n d time a n d flee across t h e water. T h e y t h e r e u p o n t h r e a t e n e d the
S p a r t a n s that they would negotiate with the Persians, would m a k e
111
peace a n d even an alliance, if they received no help from the

Peloponnesus.
Finally a c o m p r o m i s e was r e a c h e d . F r o m t h e I o n i a n s t h e r e c a m e
o n e message after t h e o t h e r , saying they w e r e r e a d y to defect. C o n -
sequently, t h e e n t i r e fleet was no l o n g e r n e e d e d , b u t only a p a r t of
it, to m a k e the e x p e d i t i o n a worthwhile risk. T h r o u g h this step t h e
bulk of t h e A t h e n i a n hoplites b e c a m e available for t h e land war.
W h e r e a s at Salamis, a c c o r d i n g to t h e most m o d e s t estimate, 310
G r e e k t r i r e m e s w e r e r e p o r t e d to have b e e n in t h e fight, r e q u i r i n g a
c o m b i n e d m a n n i n g of 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 60,000 crew m e m b e r s , now only
110 t r i r e m e s crossed over t h e sea, with p e r h a p s 20,000 m e n , u n d e r
the c o m m a n d o f t h e S p a r t a n King Leotychides a n d t h e A t h e n i a n
Xanthippus. T h e Peloponnesian hoplite army, however, u n d e r
Pausanias, assembled o n t h e i s t h m u s , a n d a s M a r d o n i u s a b a n d o n e d
Attica, in o r d e r n o t to h a v e to fight with a r e v e r s e d front, took up
a position on M o u n t C i t h a e r o n n e a r Plataea, covering Attica. B u t it
r e m a i n e d h e r e , a n d t h e Persians c a m p e d o p p o s i t e , o n t h e plain.
N e i t h e r attacked t h e o t h e r .
Up to this point we have b e e n able to unfold t h e a c c o u n t without
g o i n g into a special study of the size of the two a r m i e s . O n e t h i n g
is clear: t h e Persians believed themselves to be tactically s u p e r i o r to
t h e G r e e k s , a n d t h e latter d i d not d a r e to give battle in t h e o p e n
field. Since the previous y e a r t h e circumstances for t h e G r e e k s h a d
b e c o m e m u c h m o r e favorable in that a p a r t of the c o m b i n e d fleet
crews t h a t h a d fought at Salamis was now serving on land, espe-
cially c o n t i n g e n t s from t h e A t h e n i a n s , the M e g a r a n s , Aeginetans,
a n d C o r i n t h i a n s . F o r this r e a s o n they w e r e now capable of taking
up t h e position n e a r Plataea covering Attica, s o m e t h i n g they would
not have felt capable of d o i n g a year earlier. In view of the fact
that p a r t s of t h e ships' crews w e r e still n e e d e d , b u t t h a t simultane-
ously t h e most s t r e n u o u s efforts w e r e m a d e to s t r e n g t h e n the l a n d
forces, w e may a s s u m e t h a t t h e S p a r t a n s a n d A t h e n i a n s each h a d
s o m e 5,000 h o p l i t e s , a n d all t h e o t h e r s t o g e t h e r h a d a b o u t t h e
same c o m b i n e d n u m b e r t h e r e ; the entire a r m y was t h e r e f o r e a b o u t
20,000 hoplites s t r o n g , a n d with the s a m e n u m b e r o f u n a r m o r e d
m e n , f o r m e d a mass of 4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . T h e Persians, with t h e Greeks
w h o w e r e subject t o t h e m , probably a p p r o a c h e d the s a m e s t r e n g t h .
If M a r d o n i u s h a d h a d a significant or even a twofold superiority,
h e w o u l d n o t have r e m a i n e d quietly o n the A s o p u s b u t would have
e n v e l o p e d the G r e e k s t h r o u g h o n e o f the e a s t e r n passes o f M o u n t
C i t h a e r o n with half of his a r m y a n d w o u l d have cut t h e i r supply
Battle of Plataea 113
lines o r a t t a c k e d t h e m f r o m t h e r e a r , while h o l d i n g t h e m f i x e d
from the front with the o t h e r half.
Even with a m o r e modest n u m e r i c a l superiority, M a r d o n i u s
would p r o b a b l y h a v e b e e n able t o carry o u t , a n d w o u l d actually
have c a r r i e d o u t , t h e e n v e l o p i n g m a n e u v e r without c o n c e r n that
the s e p a r a t e p o r t i o n s o f the a r m y c o u l d b e attacked individually
a n d defeated. For, b e i n g at least t h e equal of the G r e e k militia in
military quality, t h e Persian a r m y was so very s u p e r i o r to its e n e m y
in maneuverability, t h r o u g h its c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e various a r m s ,
that even an isolated force could n o t so easily be forced into a bat-
tle against its will. By virtue of t h e i r r e i n f o r c e m e n t by t h e G r e e k
c o m m u n i t i e s , t h e P e r s i a n s n o w h a d h o p l i t e s also, i n a d d i t i o n t o
their cavalry a n d a r c h e r s . T h e fact t h a t they r e m a i n e d quietly by
the A s o p u s can t h e r e f o r e only be satisfactorily e x p l a i n e d if we as-
s u m e that M a r d o n i u s was only barely the e q u a l of the G r e e k s in
n u m b e r s , p e r h a p s m o r e likely w e a k e r b y a few t h o u s a n d o r
p e r h a p s even by q u i t e a few t h o u s a n d m e n .
F r o m t h e s t r e n g t h o f M a r d o n i u s ' a r m y w e may now belatedly
conclude that X e r x e s , too, a y e a r earlier, h a d h a d a b o u t the s a m e
n u m b e r o f w a r r i o r s . T h e casualties a n d t h e t r o o p s t h a t e s c o r t e d
h i m back a n d r e m a i n e d with h i m w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y richly c o m p e n -
sated by t h e c o n t i n g e n t s of t h e subject G r e e k s a n d by s o m e sailors
1
from the fleet. T h e supply train o f his a r m y , j u d g i n g from t h e
m a n y aristocratic e l e m e n t s c o m p o s i n g t h e a r m y , was probably rela-
tively s t r o n g e r t h a n t h a t o f t h e G r e e k s a n d c a n e a s i l y h a v e
a m o u n t e d to some 40,000 to 50,000 persons, so that the entire
force f o r m e d a mass of 50,000 to 70,000 souls, a m u l t i t u d e t h a t
s e e m e d i n n u m e r a b l e to t h e Greeks, so t h a t they i n d u l g e d in t h e
most e x t r e m e n u m e r i c a l fantasies on t h a t score.
T h e p o p u l a r a c c o u n t of Plataea, as it a p p e a r s in H e r o d o t u s , is
t h o r o u g h a n d rich in details, b u t full of contradictions, which up to
the p r e s e n t h a v e n o t lent themselves to u n r a v e l i n g . W h o e v e r wishes
to get a correct c o n c e p t of how far l e g e n d can vary from the real
t r u t h in a single g e n e r a t i o n should, I suggest, refer o n c e again to
t h e history of t h e B u r g u n d i a n W a r s by B u l l i n g e r . It is also ex-
tremely i n t e r e s t i n g f r o m t h e viewpoint of n a t i o n a l psychology to
see how similarly t h e folk fantasy has w o r k e d with p e o p l e s w h o a r e
n e v e r t h e l e s s so d i f f e r e n t as H e l l e n e s a n d Swiss, a n d how it has
fashioned almost identical pictures a n d types, without any indica-
tion of imitation or copying.
B u t a l t h o u g h every single point, every single a c c o u n t m u s t be
c o n s i d e r e d a s n o t t r u l y p r o v e n a n d t h e r e f o r e subject t o d o u b t ,
nevertheless an a t t e m p t at r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is n o t so completely h o p e -
less. H o w e v e r unreliable t h e l e g e n d may be in all its details, a few
facts do still a p p e a r in it t h a t c a n n o t very well have b e e n invented
a n d t h a t give us t h e possibility of establishing with certainty what is
really i m p o r t a n t , t h e typical, t h e principal e l e m e n t s of the o u t c o m e
of t h e battle. B u t we may be led even f u r t h e r by t h e t o p o g r a p h y .
In his work, which was already r e f e r r e d to, G r u n d y p r e s e n t e d an
e x t r e m e l y careful study a n d identification of t h e t e r r a i n of Plataea,
which was still u n k n o w n to me w h e n I was writing t h e first edition
of this work, b u t which p r o v i d e d for o n e of my s t u d e n t s , Ludwig
2
W i n t e r , the basis for w h a t a p p e a r s to me to be a very successful
reconstruction.
T h r o u g h a c o r r e l a t i o n with t h e a d m i t t e d l y very few definite
points, it was possible to fix on t h e t e r r a i n all t h e n a m e s of passes,
bays, hills, t e m p l e s , which H e r o d o t u s wrote of in profusion a n d to
see if the m o v e m e n t s of t h e two armies could be reconciled with
t h e m . It is t h e s a m e situation as with M a r a t h o n a n d Salamis. T h e
t e r r a i n on which a battle is fought is such an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of
the event that, as soon as this is clarified, the military-history pic-
t u r e , too, loses its veil.
As soon as the G r e e k s d e b o u c h e d from t h e C i t h a e r o n pass onto
t h e n o r t h e r n side o f the m o u n t a i n , the Persian m o u n t e d archers
fell u p o n t h e m . T h e M e g a r a n s , w h o f o r m e d the point, were h a r d
p r e s s e d until the A t h e n i a n s c a m e to their aid with t h e i r archers.
G r a d u a l l y m o r e a n d m o r e G r e e k s came welling o u t o f t h e pass, a n d
since they d i d n o t p u s h f a r t h e r d o w n the m o u n t a i n b u t held fast
on the slope, t h e Persians b r o k e off the battle w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g
t h e i r foot soldiers.
Pausanias s h o w e d h e r e t h a t h e h a d u n d e r s t o o d the lessons o f
M a r a t h o n a n d i n t e n d e d t o b e g u i d e d b y t h e m . T h a t was n o t s o
simple, however. His a r m y consisted of t h e militia of some twenty
i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n i t i e s , p e o p l e w h o w e r e a n x i o u s t o get h o m e
again in o r d e r to get on with their n o r m a l lives, a n d w h o did not
u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n for t h e delaying strategy of their c o m m a n d -
e r . Pausanias knew w h a t he was about. He h a d a p r o p h e t c o m e to
h i m to w h o m he gave e n o u g h insight into the tactical situation to
allow h i m to recognize f r o m t h e o m e n s t h a t the Hellenes would
c o n q u e r if they r e m a i n e d on t h e defensive a n d did not cross the
A s o p u s , the small river in front of t h e m . A l t h o u g h t h e r e was finally
a serious lack of provisions in the G r e e k r a n k s , they still held fast
in their position.
After a few days Pausanias m o v e d his position f a r t h e r forward,
onto the last hill at t h e e d g e of the plain, directly at the foot of
which the A s o p u s flows. T h i s m a n e u v e r was obviously i n t e n d e d to
lure the e n e m y to attack. T h e y e x t e n d e d the position j u s t as far o u t
as possible w i t h o u t completely giving up the a d v a n t a g e of the d e -
fensive position, c o v e r e d as it was on the r i g h t a n d t h e left.
But M a r d o n i u s knew j u s t as well as Pausanias w h a t this tactic
d e m a n d e d of h i m a n d what the w o r t h of a g o o d p r o p h e t was. H e ,
too, h a d a soothsayer c o m e to h i m w h o saw from the o m e n s that
the Persians did n o t d a r e to cross over the A s o p u s .
Instead of attacking the G r e e k s on their hill, M a r d o n i u s with his
archers p r e v e n t e d t h e m from d r a w i n g water from the A s o p u s , a n d
his cavalry even r o d e a r o u n d the hill a n d s t o p p e d u p the s p r i n g
(Gargaphia) on the r e a r of the hill a n d i n t e r c e p t e d t h e i r supplies.
In this way he b r o u g h t the Greeks to such distress that Pausanias
finally h a d no o t h e r r e c o u r s e b u t to w i t h d r a w . He i n t e n d e d to take
up a position s o m e w h a t f a r t h e r to t h e r e a r , close to the city of
Plataea, w h e r e n e i t h e r water n o r supplies could be cut off from the
army. T h e w i t h d r a w a l was not so simple, since, with t h e Persian
army so close, they could easily be attacked while on t h e m a r c h . It
was t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d to withdraw in t h e night, dividing the a r m y
into t h r e e c o l u m n s . T h e S p a r t a n s r e m a i n e d until the e n d .
H e r o d o t u s tells of t h e l e a d e r of a lochus, A m o m p h a r e t u s , w h o h a d
hesitated to w i t h d r a w , h a d q u a r r e l e d with t h e King over that point,
a n d h a d finally laid a stone with b o t h h a n d s at t h e King's feet. B u t
since A m o m p h a r e t u s after all did finally follow the o t h e r s , it a p -
pears that t h e story s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as follows: t h e captain
was in no way o p p o s i n g the King b u t , on t h e c o n t r a r y , h a d sworn
to h i m to h o l d o u t on t h e hill like t h a t s t o n e , a n d to cover t h e
withdrawal.
W h e n the Persians discovered i n the m o r n i n g that t h e G r e e k s
had w i t h d r a w n , they m o v e d o u t a t o n c e a n d took u p t h e i r p u r s u i t .
. T h e y c a u g h t u p with t h e m before t h e G r e e k s h a d j o i n e d forces
again, a n d i t was u n d o u b t e d l y this division o f t h e G r e e k s t h a t
moved M a r d o n i u s to discount his oracle a n d to o r d e r the attack.
At o n e point, in t h e a r e a of the M e g a r a n s a n d the Phliasians, the
Persians w e r e victorious. T h i s may be because the M e g a r a n s a n d
Phliasians, after t h e o u t c o m e of the battle was already decided, ven-
t u r e d carelessly a n d in p o o r o r d e r o n t o t h e plain, as H e r o d o t u s re-
counts, o r — s i n c e we c a n n o t rely too strongly on t h e a c c o u n t as
such—because o t h e r a d v a n t a g e o u s circumstances favored the suc-
cess of the cavalry attack. T h e A t h e n i a n s , in t h e i r a r e a , fell u p o n
t h e G r e e k allies of t h e Persians a n d d e f e a t e d t h e m in a steady, but

p r o b a b l y n o t very s t u b b o r n , h o p l i t e battle. T h e real a n d charac-
t e r i s t i c c o m b a t , h o w e v e r , was w a g e d b y t h e S p a r t a n s a n d t h e
Tegeans, who were attached to them.
W h e n t h e Persians m o v e d u p into t h e attack against the Spar-
tans, H e r o d o t u s tells us, they literally s m o t h e r e d t h e m with arrows.
M a n y of t h e m w e r e killed a n d w o u n d e d , b u t they took the losses
a n d stood fast, because t h e o m e n s w e r e not yet favorable. Finally,
w h e n P a u s a n i a s i n v o k e d t h e aid o f t h e H e r a o f Plataea, whose
t e m p l e was visible from t h e S p a r t a n s ' position, t h e a u g u r y b e c a m e
favorable, t h e S p a r t a n s c h a r g e d against t h e e n e m y , a n d t h e Per-
sians, w i t h o u t sufficient defensive w e a p o n s , could n o t withstand the
m a s s e d s t o r m o f t h e ironclad m e n .
P a u s a n i a s knew h o w t o m a k e use o f p r o p h e t s a n d priests. A s
long as the f o r w a r d e l e m e n t s of t h e Persians w e r e only shooting at
t h e p h a l a n x f r o m a distance, probably to l u r e t h e G r e e k s into a
p r e m a t u r e attack, he h a d his m e n stand fast. N o t until the mass of
t h e P e r s i a n s h a d c o m e closer, o n t o t h e spot that h e h a d chosen, did
P a u s a n i a s raise his h a n d s i n p r a y e r t o the g o d d e s s , a n d t h e u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g priest i m m e d i a t e l y saw this a n d a n n o u n c e d that t h e au-
g u r y h a d b e c o m e favorable, w h e r e u p o n Pausanias gave the signal
for t h e attack.
A l t h o u g h r i g h t u p t o this m o m e n t w e h a d b e e n h e a r i n g continu-
ously of t h e Persian cavalry, w h o w e r e pressing t h e G r e e k s , we now
h e a r n o t h i n g o f t h e i r m o v i n g into t h e G r e e k flanks d u r i n g this at-
tack; t h e y only cover t h e w i t h d r a w a l . P a u s a n i a s m a n a g e d , t h e r e -
fore, to fight t h e battle on t e r r a i n w h e r e t h e Persian cavalry could
n o t attack t h e p h a l a n x in t h e flank, a n d W i n t e r has now b e e n able
to establish this position correctly. T h e analogy with M a r a t h o n is
c o m p l e t e . O n e m i g h t q u e s t i o n all t h e details, b u t this m u c h can still
be a c c e p t e d with certainty: t h e Persians finally risked t h e attack,
a n d t h e battle took place in a m a n n e r similar to t h a t of M a r a t h o n ,
j u s t as Pausanias h a d p l a n n e d it f r o m the very b e g i n n i n g . W i t h o u t
M a r a t h o n we w o u l d n o t be in a position to detect any kind of his-
torical n u c l e u s in t h e account, b u t M a r a t h o n p r o v i d e s the key to
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e battle, a n d from this p o i n t on I have no
hesitation in m o v i n g still o n e step f a r t h e r a n d d e c l a r i n g t h e account
of t h e steadfastness of t h e S p a r t a n s u n d e r t h e hail of Persian ar-
rows, o f the u n f a v o r a b l e a u g u r y , a n d o f t h e p r a y e r o f Pausanias t o
be verified historical facts. T h e r e a r e u n d o u b t e d l y few e x a m p l e s in
history in which we can so clearly recognize the c o r e of t h e histori-
cal h a p p e n i n g within the w o n d e r f u l e m b e l l i s h m e n t of the p o p u l a r
legend.
It seems to me not at all impossible that, in M a r d o n i u s ' decision
to force the issue by battle, a certain role was played by a strategic
consideration of which t h e r e is no trace in t h e account, b u t which
seems logical by t h e n a t u r e of the situation.
If we observe in an isolated way the Boeotian t h e a t e r of o p e r a -
tions, it seems t h a t it would have b e e n the G r e e k s w h o h a d to p u s h
for a decision. M a r d o n i u s h a d i n d e e d r e s o r t e d to a war of attrition;
he was having his a r m y supplied by the subjected G r e e k s a n d was
t h r e a t e n i n g Attica with r e n e w e d desolation. But Boeotia is only a
part o f t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s . I t c a n n o t h a v e e s c a p e d M a r -
donius' notice—the G r e e k s themselves u n d o u b t e d l y saw to it that
he k n e w — t h a t t h e i r fleet h a d sailed off to I o n i a a n d t h a t they
h o p e d to incite rebellion in that a r e a . It would, i n d e e d , n o t be too
bold to assume that X e r x e s himself recognized the d a n g e r in Sardis
and sent a message to M a r d o n i u s to hasten to b r i n g on a decision
in Hellas a n d send back a p a r t of his t r o o p s to p r o t e c t Ionia a n d
hold it in subjection. Consequently, M a r d o n i u s now h a d the
stronger r e a s o n for seeking a decision, a n d this would explain why,
despite his reasonable recognition that it would be m o r e favorable
for him tactically to r e m a i n on t h e defensive a n d await t h e G r e e k
attack on the plain, he nevertheless finally m o v e d to attack first.
It still r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d why a force of Persians u n d e r t h e
c o m m a n d of A r t a b a z u s did not, a c c o r d i n g to H e r o d o t u s ' account,
take p a r t in t h e battle. P r e s u m a b l y it simply a r r i v e d too late.
T h e fact that the G r e e k s divided their forces a n d , while m o v i n g
against M a r d o n i u s , simultaneously sent off a g r e a t fleet, a p p e a r s on
the face of it to be a g r e a t e r r o r . W h y d i d they not first strike Mar-
d o n i u s with t h e i r assembled forces a n d t h e n move o u t across the
sea? In this case, as we shall often see later, strategy is seen to be
d e p e n d e n t on tactics. Even 10,000 m o r e hoplites would not have
enabled t h e G r e e k s to m o v e d o w n o n t o t h e Boeotian plain a n d at-
tack the Persians at a favorable spot in the o p e n field. T h e y h a d no
choice b u t t o o f f e r t h e m a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e o n t e r r a i n c o v e r e d
against their cavalry a n d to seek to lure t h e m into attacking. T h i s
was accomplished by t h e sea e x p e d i t i o n a n d p e r h a p s also by the
r e p e a t e d shifting of position t h a t Pausanias o r d e r e d . Is a n y b o d y
willing to believe that t h e r e was only coincidence in all these con-
nected events, only t h e effects of blind superstition in the soothsay-
ing a n d sacrificial a u g u r i e s ? S u c h a n o p i n i o n c o u l d n o t b e dis-
History of t h e A r t of W a r
proved, but I have e n o u g h confidence in Themistocles and

Pausanias to believe that, as t h e G r e e k s picture t h e m to us, they
knew what they w e r e d o i n g . Side by side with Miltiades and
Leonidas, what m e n these w e r e , m e n w h o knew how to combine a
strategic u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d h e r o i s m with the cleverness a n d skill
of the s u p e r i o r m i n d , to u n d e r s t a n d the overall situation from afar,
a n d to resort to the most e x t r e m e means, the a p p e a r a n c e of
treachery, the utilization of t h e superstition of t h e masses, in o r d e r
to arrive at their high goals!
EXCURSUS
1. At the same time as the battle of Plataea the Greeks were also winning in Asia
Minor at Mycale. H e r e , where there is no m e n t i o n of Persian cavalry, the Greeks
were supposedly the attackers. D u r i n g the battle the Ionians defected to them. Since
the hoplite contingents of the Greek fleet were u n d e r any circumstances only very
small, the Persian army, too, at least after the withdrawal of the Ionians, must have
been very small—another bit of testimony that X e r x e s did not have h u g e masses of
warriors at his disposal. Otherwise, it w o u l d not have been hard for him to assemble
a new army in the interval of almost a year since Salamis. T h e military efficiency of
the Persians was not yet broken; e v e n s o m e twenty-five years later they defeated an
important Athenian army in Egypt a n d completely destroyed it.
2. T h e same i n g e n i o u s soothsayer w h o had g u i d e d the Spartans so well at Plataea
was also with them w h e n they c o n q u e r e d the Arcadians in a hard-fought battle at
Dipaea s o m e w h e r e around 4 6 7 B . C . D u r i n g the night before this battle an altar e m -
bellished with shining e q u i p m e n t had erected itself spontaneously in the Spartan
camp, and around it could be seen the tracks of two steeds. From these signs the
warriors realized that the godly Dioscuri had c o m e to their aid, and they were in-
spired with such courage and such e n t h u s i a s m that they overcame the e n e m y , who
was far superior to them in n u m b e r s . T h e e n l i g h t e n e d Greek w h o passed this story
on to us, however, explains that King A r c h i d a m u s had the altars erected and the
h o r s e s led a r o u n d t h e m i n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e c o u r a g e o f his warriors.
( H e r o d o t u s 9. 35; Polyaenus, Strategica 1. 41).
3. At this point I c o m e back o n c e again to Hauvette's book.
Hauvette believes in the 2 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 warrior strength of the Persian land army. He
admits that the n u m b e r might be e x a g g e r a t e d by some 100,000 m e n , but specifically
the 8 0 , 0 0 0 cavalrymen seem to him an entirely credible n u m b e r (pp. 3 1 1 - 1 2 ) . My
objection, to the effect that the Persian army, u n d e r m o d e r n conditions, would have
reached from Berlin to Damascus, a n d , e v e n if reduced to one-third of the space
required by a m o d e r n army, w o u l d have b e e n so long that, w h e n the head of the
c o l u m n was arriving before T h e r m o p y l a e , the tail could have b e e n just marching
out of Sardis—this objection makes no impression on Hauvette, since the conditions
g o v e r n i n g ancient armies, of course, were completely different from those of m o d -
ern armies. Modern armies march only in four-man ranks, so that half of the road
may remain o p e n , and furthermore a considerable interval is always maintained be-
tween companies, battalions, r e g i m e n t s , and divisions. According to Hauvette, the
Persians knew nothing of all this. X e n o p h o n in the Cyropaedia, on o n e occasion, has
a cavalry unit of 10,000 m e n f o r m i n g a square 100 m e n wide by 100 d e e p . T h e
Persians of Xerxes could have m a r c h e d in a similar formation.
T h e width of a marching troop c o l u m n d e p e n d s on the width of the road. If the
road is too narrow for the c o l u m n , e v e n at only a few places, that still creates a
march disruption that builds up progressively toward the rear and finally b e c o m e s
completely intolerable. T h e troops w h o are marching farther toward the rear are
forced to wait for hours and use up their strength in so doing, or, if they are not
well disciplined, they fall out of formation. T h e foremost troops e x t e n d out in the
same m a n n e r , and the c o l u m n falls completely apart. Every g o o d c o m m a n d e r there-
fore considers it of the highest importance to avoid march j a m - u p s , or, since with
large masses that is hardly ever attained, to reduce them to a m i n i m u m . For this
reason intervals are established between the various units, so that the smaller hold-
ups can immediately be absorbed, and the higher leaders are constantly c o n c e r n e d
with maintaining the intervals. If, as Hauvette believes and is certainly possible, the
Persians did not take these steps, their march c o l u m n s must have stretched out rela-
tively still farther than the m o d e r n o n e s . M o d e r n troops also see to it very deliber-
ately that half of the road remains as o p e n as possible. In the case of every march-
ing c o l u m n it is absolutely necessary, especially in e n e m y territory, that m o v e m e n t
and c o m m u n i c a t i o n be possible alongside the c o l u m n for h i g h - r a n k i n g officers,
liaison officers, messengers, and u n d e r certain circumstances also for quickly m o v i n g
forward a special unit, such as cavalry. That cannot have been any different with the
Persians. On the long route from Sardis to the Hellespont and from the Hellespont
t o Attica t h e r e are n u m e r o u s rivers t o b e c r o s s e d , m o u n t a i n o u s land t o p a s s
through, passes to o v e r c o m e . At many places the bridges, fords, and mountain paths
were undoubtedly not broader but narrower than those with which m o d e r n armies
have to c o n t e n d . T h e Persians must have marched with a column, not 100 m e n
wide, certainly often not e v e n 4 m e n wide, but only 2 m e n in width, using quite
naturally at the same time, wherever possible, several parallel roads.
In the handwritten account by a general of the Prussian Guard Corps, which on
18 A u g u s t 1870 marched forward u n d e r special orders with a wider than usual
front, I have f o u n d a rather long c o m m e n t to the effect that, in the e x p e r i e n c e of
the author, such a march with a broad front on a road d o e s not attain its purpose,
but "rather was very tiring because of frequent stops, holdups, and resumptions of
the march, and quite naturally for such a l o n g march, caused breaks to d e v e l o p in
the c o l u m n , which s h o w e d up as a lack of g o o d order."
T h e difference between Hauvette's estimate (something like 1,700,000 warriors)
and m i n e (at the most 2 5 , 0 0 0 , but probably m o r e like 15,000 to 2 0 , 0 0 0 warriors) is
very g r e a t , b u t i t g i v e s a q u i t e a p p r o p r i a t e i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e s o f
m e t h o d o l o g y of o u r respective research. T h e differences are so great that any kind
of reconciliation s e e m s impossible. Every single fact in the Persian Wars, every at-
tempt at a causal explanation of the relationships, necessarily appears different, de-
p e n d i n g on which of the two army strengths o n e accepts, or whether o n e can e v e n
c o m e close to o n e of them. I therefore believe that it is no use g o i n g further into
details, and I give up the idea of contradicting o t h e r false concepts in this book,
o n c e again p o i n t i n g out that Hauvette is in no way weak in either scholarship or
intelligence, but that our m e t h o d s are different—naturally different only from the
point of view of their application. In principle, Hauvette, too, d o e s not reject the ob-
jective approach. He too has cited practical, objective considerations, for e x a m p l e , in
the question of the run at Marathon, in connection with march intervals, and so o n .
But he d o e s not follow through with them, and he e x p o s e s himself to the illusion
that, w h e r e an eye with exclusively philological training sees no impossibilities, n o n e
are actually present.
4. Whatever mass the army of Xerxes f o r m e d and whatever it was by my esti-
mates, o n e can best u n d e r s t a n d b y i m a g i n i n g the army o n the m a r c h . T w e n t y
thousand warriors, or with the great supply train, in all perhaps s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 souls
strong, with many horses, little march discipline, roads that were often narrowed
down, u n e v e n , impaired by inclines, washouts, and o t h e r natural obstacles—we must
i m a g i n e this w h o l e c o n t i n g e n t as f o r m i n g a c o l u m n at least 73 kilometers l o n g
(where parallel roads could not be used). If the situation was not critical, the point
would normally not set out before five o'clock in the m o r n i n g and the tail of the
c o l u m n would not arrive in c a m p later than six o'clock in the evening. If o n e plans
to march 15 kilometers, or the equivalent of four hours, then the last troops must
start the march at two o'clock in the afternoon—that is, half the army d o e s not yet
reach the march objective on the first day, or, in other words, for more than two
days the inhabitants see new troops continuously marching by, and even on the
third day still s o m e further troops march by, and presumably even on the next few
days still many stragglers. It is not surprising that u n d e r these circumstances o n e
gives up counting.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I X
1. H e r o d o t u s 9. 32.
2. Berlin dissertation, 1907.
BOOK II
The Greeks at Their Height

Chapter I
Greek Tactics up to the

Peloponnesian War
T h r o u g h t h e e n t i r e fifth c e n t u r y the hoplite p h a l a n x , which h a d

defeated t h e Persians, r e m a i n e d the basic f o r m a t i o n of G r e e k tac-
tics.
T h e hoplite p h a l a n x is t h e logical tactical f o r m a t i o n for a military
citizens' militia. T h e d e m a n d s on t h e individual a r e all very simple
and r e q u i r e only little drill. Each m a n learns how to m o v e in his
heavy e q u i p m e n t , how to m a n i p u l a t e his s p e a r , how to stay in file
and maintain his direction. N o elaborate drills a r e necessary. T h e
ensemble f o r m s a single, closed f o r m a t i o n t h a t m a r c h e s straight
ahead a n d takes up t h e r u n for the attack a short distance in front
of the e n e m y . A c c o r d i n g to H e r o d o t u s , this a p p r o a c h r u n is s u p -
posed to h a v e b e e n d o n e for the first t i m e at M a r a t h o n .
In a n o r m a l h o p l i t e battle it usually h a p p e n e d t h a t b o t h sides
moved s o m e w h a t to their right a n d the left flank h u n g s o m e w h a t
behind, because e a c h individual m a n was a w a r e t h a t his right, u n -
shielded side was less p r o t e c t e d a n d for that r e a s o n s o u g h t to c o m e
at the e n e m y f r o m t h e right. Each side, t h e r e f o r e , easily overlap-
p e d t h e o t h e r from t h e right, won this flank from him, a n d conse-
quently h a d t h e b e t t e r of it at this spot. T h e n t h e two victorious
right wings h a d to fight, for the second time, often with their front
reversed, against each o t h e r , a n d it was not until this second act of
the e n c o u n t e r that t h e battle was d e c i d e d .
Nevertheless, no kind of tactical conclusions w h a t e v e r h a v e yet
been d r a w n f r o m this peculiarity; t h e basic c h a r a c t e r of the c o m b a t
r e m a i n s t h a t of a parallel battle without articulation.
T h e s e tactics w e r e r e t a i n e d , even t h o u g h their weaknesses w e r e
realized a n d h a d a l r e a d y b e e n k n o w n b e f o r e t h e Persian W a r s . A s
early as 511 B . C . t h e S p a r t a n s suffered a defeat at the h a n d s of t h e
123
T h e s s a l o n i a n cavalry on t h e plain not far from A t h e n s ( H e r o d o t u s

5 63), a n d t h e e n t i r e c o u r s e of t h e Persian W a r s was m a r k e d by
t h e G r e e k s ' fear of t h e Persian cavalry. Even in t h e battle of Plataea
some of t h e G r e e k c o n t i n g e n t s suffered very heavy losses by being
c a u g h t by the T h e b a n cavalry.
A n d yet we h e a r n o t h i n g of any a t t e m p t s to g u a r d themselves in
principle against this weakness by m e a n s of new tactical formations
o r b a t t l e tactics. T h e c a v a l r y m e n , a r c h e r s , a n d o t h e r lightly a r m e d
m e n r e m a i n e d s i m p l e auxiliary a r m s beside t h e hoplite p h a l a n x ,
p e r h a p s u n d e r certain circumstances exercising a s t r o n g influence,
b u t n o t yet c o n s i d e r e d capable o f b e i n g a n i m p o r t a n t , o r g a n i c p a r t
of the a r m y . Even as early as t h e Persian W a r s this was basically
t r u e . If in these wars we h e a r n o t h i n g a b o u t cavalry on the G r e e k
side, t h a t is not to be u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g t h a t they h a d previ-
ously n o t h a d a n y at all, b u t only t h a t t h e i r few c a v a l r y m e n could
not risk r i d i n g o u t against t h e Persians, a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y p r e s u m a -
bly m o s t of t h e m o u n t e d m e n left their h o r s e s at h o m e a n d took
t h e i r places in t h e hoplites' r a n k s .
N e i t h e r i n S p a r t a n o r i n A t h e n s w e r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s favorable
1
for f o r m i n g a truly s t r o n g cavalry, even t h o u g h in t h e c a m p a i g n
of t h e A t h e n i a n s on Sicily, for e x a m p l e , t h e cavalry did play quite
2
an important role.
As with t h e cavalry, so too m u s t t h e A t h e n i a n a r c h e r s , in my
3
o p i n i o n , b e r e g a r d e d a s a n elite c o r p s . Even t h o u g h their e q u i p -
m e n t was less e x p e n s i v e t h a n t h a t of t h e hoplites, nevertheless an
a r c h e r r e q u i r e d m u c h m o r e intensive t r a i n i n g i n o r d e r t o b e really
effective. A hoplite was very quickly sufficiently t r a i n e d to allow his
b e i n g i n c o r p o r a t e d in t h e mass, by which he was swept up a n d car-
ried a l o n g . T h e a r c h e r n o t only h a d t o b e a n e x p e r t shot b u t also
very quick a n d c o o r d i n a t e d , in o r d e r to be able to a p p r o a c h close
to t h e e n e m y a n d yet, w h e n he himself was a t t a c k e d , to be able to
w i t h d r a w a g a i n quickly. H e t h e r e f o r e h a d t o h a v e self-reliance,
a l e r t n e s s , j u d g m e n t , a n d p r e s e n c e of m i n d . In n a t i o n s with a war-
like t r a d i t i o n , such characteristics a r e i m p a r t e d f r o m an early age
t h r o u g h t h e t r a i n i n g of t h e y o u t h . In highly civilized states, such as
t h e A t h e n s o f t h a t day, t h e y a r e p r o d u c e d i n t h e h i g h e r classes,
w h o h a v e e n o u g h time a n d leisure t o d e v o t e themselves t o practice.
I look for the a r c h e r s , t h e r e f o r e , in the class of A t h e n i a n citizenry
whose sons were not rich e n o u g h to maintain a horse but who
c o u l d , nevertheless, s p e n d s o m e w h a t m o r e t i m e a n d effort i n mili-
tary t r a i n i n g t h a n t h e g r e a t mass of t h e citizens. M o r e o v e r , a truly
g o o d b o w was also an e x p e n s i v e w e a p o n .
Greek Tactics up to the Peloponnesian War 125
I n the r a n k s o f s h a r p s h o o t e r s , besides t h e a r c h e r s , t h e r e w e r e
also the slingers a n d the s p e a r - t h r o w e r s . T h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e
sling involves a g r e a t skill, which is only attained in places w h e r e
the youth, in k e e p i n g with a local t r a d i t i o n , practice at it from an
early age. On R h o d e s , for e x a m p l e , such a tradition existed, a n d
Rhodes slingers were consequently m u c h in d e m a n d as mer-
cenaries.
T h e s p e a r - t h r o w e r c a n n o t s t a n d u p t o e i t h e r t h e bow o r t h e
slinger if, like t h e latter, he has no defensive a r m s . B u t his w e a p o n
does not e x c l u d e t h e possibility of a light protective e q u i p m e n t .
And so, first of all, t h e r e w e r e f o r m e d a m o n g t h e n o r t h e r l y , half-
Greek strains, w h e r e o n e did not h a v e t h e m e a n s for the c o n s t r u c -
tion of m a n y sets of c o m p l e t e a r m o r , a special c o m b a t b r a n c h m a d e
up of s p e a r - t h r o w e r s , t h e peltasts. T h e y w e r e e q u i p p e d with a light
r o u n d shield, a hat, generally p r o b a b l y also a stiff c a p e m a d e of
leather or quilted linen, several s p e a r s , a n d a sword. T h e p r e s e n t -
day B a n t u a n d S u d a n N e g r o e s can t h r o w t h e s p e a r to a distance of
forty paces.
Naturally, t h e peltasts could n o t risk a direct clash with hoplites
in equal n u m b e r s , b u t it was easy to o r g a n i z e a larger n u m b e r of
4
t h e m , a n d u n d e r difficult t e r r a i n c o n d i t i o n s they could move m o r e
easily a n d o p e r a t e very effectively against flanks or r e a r of a h o p -
lite p h a l a n x . U n d e r such circumstances t h e a r c h e r a n d t h e slinger
were even m o r e d a n g e r o u s for t h e hoplites, but in case of
e m e r g e n c y t h e peltast h a d t h e a d v a n t a g e o f j o i n i n g i n t h e h a n d -
t o - h a n d c o m b a t . B o t h h o p l i t e a n d a r c h e r w e r e to a high d e g r e e
narrowly limited in t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e ; t h e peltast could be used
for anything. He t h r e w his s p e a r from a distance, m o v e d with ease
forward a n d to t h e rear, a n d by virtue of his shield he h a d j u s t
e n o u g h p r o t e c t i o n to e n a b l e h i m to participate in close c o m b a t , too.
T h e u n a r m o r e d m e n w h o a c c o m p a n i e d t h e a r m y a s servants o r
supply train d r i v e r s r e t a i n e d t h e same c h a r a c t e r they h a d in t h e
Persian W a r s . Q u i t e similar to t h e m a n n e r in which t h e A t h e n i a n s ,
a c c o r d i n g to t h e description in Aeschylus' Persians (verse 441), cross-
ed over to t h e island of Psyttalea after t h e decision at Salamis a n d
first b o m b a r d e d t h e isolated Persians with stones until they fell on
t h e m with cold steel—so, in T h u c y d i d e s 1. 106, t h e A t h e n i a n h o p -
lites blocked t h e r o u t e of a C o r i n t h i a n u n i t t h a t was cut off, a n d
the "lightly a r m e d m e n " * killed t h e m with stones. We might be see-
ing h e r e a c h a n g e , to t h e e x t e n t that, in A t h e n s at any rate, m o r e
a n d m o r e slaves w e r e t a k e n a l o n g into t h e field as servants. W h a t -
ever p u r e l y military w e a k e n i n g was c a u s e d by this was c o u n t e r b a l -
a n c e d by t h e b r o a d e n e d c o n t r i b u t i o n of specially t r a i n e d lightly
armed men.
In battle f o r m a t i o n , cavalry a n d u n a r m o r e d m e n , as well as the
peltasts, w e r e placed on t h e flanks of the hoplite p h a l a n x .
U n d e r f a v o r a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , n o w a n d t h e n cavalry o r the
lightly a r m e d units w e r e successful in s u p p o r t i n g t h e hoplites very
effectively in t h e fight a n d in b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e decision or even
in defeating a hoplite force on their own.
Simple as t h e tactical f o r m a t i o n s of t h e c o m b a t of the Pelopon-
nesian W a r may seem, t h e m e t h o d s of fortification a n d siegecraft
w e r e still m o r e primitive. T h e y built simple walls, a n d a l t h o u g h
they w e r e j u s t sufficiently g u a r d e d , they s e e m to have b e e n invinci-
ble. Even with i m m e a s u r a b l e superiority in n u m b e r s , the besiegers
n e i t h e r knew how, n o r d a r e d , to u n d e r t a k e an attack by force b u t
s o u g h t to starve o u t t h e besieged place.
EXCURSUS
1. T h e Greek word psiloi c o v e r s in g e n e r a l all t h o s e w h o have no protective

e q u i p m e n t , and consequently both the train attendants, w h o only occasionally exer-
cised a combat function, and also the real fighters, archers, slingers, spear-throwers.
For that reason I have translated it as "unarmored."
In T h u c y d i d e s 1. 6 0 , the Corinthians send 1,600 hoplites and 4 0 0 "lightly armed
men"* to Potidaea. Obviously it is not meant that these 4 0 0 were train attendants
but actual warriors.
In 2. 79, T h u c y d i d e s obviously also counts the peltasts a m o n g the "lightly armed
men."*
On the other hand, in 4. 9 3 , at Delium he makes a distinction and names first
10,000 "lightly armed men"* and then also particularly 5 0 0 peltasts.
In 4. 9 4 , it reads: "Regular lightly armed troops, e q u i p p e d and armed."* This
sentence is not very easy to understand. T h u c y d i d e s distinguishes "lightly armed
men"* in the sense of the a r m e d train, which had a c c o m p a n i e d this army in large
n u m b e r s but which had already m o v e d out on the withdrawal, from "regular lightly
armed men,"* that is, warriors w h o were equipped as such but had no defensive
weapons—consequently, archers, slingers, and perhaps peltasts. But now w h e n he
says that the city did not possess that kind of u n a r m o r e d m e n , this stands in con-
tradiction to the speech of Pericles, in 2. 13, where it is expressly said that the city
had 1,600 archers. T h e explanation probably is that T h u c y d i d e s was not thinking
h e r e of archers, w h o f o r m e d a special arm, but was c o n s i d e r i n g u n d e r "regular
lightly armed men"* lightly a r m e d m e n of the type of the peltasts. At any rate, this
passage shows that by plain "lightly armed men"* T h u c y d i d e s was not thinking of
any real fighting m e n , since they were not "regular,"* that is, intentionally, systemat-
ically, and specifically e q u i p p e d with weapons.
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C BATTLES O F T H I S P E R I O D
2. At Potidaea in 4 3 2 B . C . ( T h u c y d i d e s 1. 1. 2 ff.) both sides—the A t h e n i a n s and
their allied o p p o n e n t s , the Chalcidians and the C o r i n t h i a n s — h a d , in addition to
their hoplites, several h u n d r e d cavalry. T h e cavalry were d e t a c h e d however, and on
both sides held back at s o m e distance from the battle, so that only the hoplites
fought against each other. Each side was victorious on o n e of the flanks; the allies
then broke o f f the contact and, massed together tightly, quickly m o v e d past the vic-
torious Athenians and withdrew into the city of Potidaea.
3 In the battle of Spartolus in 4 2 9 B . C . ( T h u c y d i d e s 2. 79) the Chalcidian hoplites
were defeated by the 2,000-strong Athenian hoplites. T h e Chalcidian cavalry and
u n a r m o r e d m e n , i n c l u d i n g peltasts, o n the o t h e r h a n d , d e f e a t e d the A t h e n i a n
cavalry and u n a r m o r e d men. Encouraged by this success, the Chalcidian cavalry,
peltasts, and other u n a r m o r e d troops (apparently very superior in numbers) now at-
tacked the A t h e n i a n hoplites, constantly drawing back as soon as the latter attacked
and then moving forward again as soon as the A t h e n i a n s halted or turned away,
and shot at the A t h e n i a n s from afar. In this way they finally drove them into flight,
pursued them, and killed 4 3 0 hoplites of the total of 2 , 0 0 0 , including all the leaders.
4. In the year 4 2 6 B . C . , in Aetolia, the Athenians, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of o n e of
their best generals, D e m o s t h e n e s , suffered a defeat very similar to that at Spartolus.
As long as their archers still had arrows, they held off the e n e m y spear-throwers;
but when their arrows had all been shot, the lightly armed e n e m y , constantly attack-
ing and then withdrawing, p u s h e d in on the hoplites from all sides, wore t h e m
down, a n d finally a n n i h i l a t e d the majority of t h e m . In this w o o d e d , hilly area
cavalry played no part in the battle.
5. In the same m a n n e r the Athenians o v e r c a m e the 4 2 0 Spartans isolated on the
island of Sphacteria in 4 2 4 B . C . (Thucydides 4. 27-29). Small as the band of Spartan
hoplites was, the Athenians still did not wish to attack them directly, in o r d e r to
avoid the heavy losses associated with an obstinately fought hand-to-hand combat
against skillful and despairing warriors. T h e y therefore held back their hoplites and
released against the Spartans a huge mass of u n a r m o r e d m e n , ranging from archers
all the way d o w n to the o a r s m e n of triremes, w h o threw stones. To these over-
w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s , s w a r m i n g on them f r o m all sides, the Spartans finally suc-
c u m b e d , without the A t h e n i a n s having suffered any significant losses. Of special
note in this case was the fact that the noise of the mass prevented the Spartans from
understanding their leaders' c o m m a n d s .
In the second v o l u m e of the first edition of this work I a d d e d supplementary

c o m m e n t s to the foregoing passage, which might now better be m o v e d to this posi-
tion.
I did not introduce into my account in this work the taking of the Spartans as
prisoners on Sphacteria in the year 4 2 5 B . C . , for, interesting as this event is in itself,
it still has no place in a history of the art of war. A history of the military art is not a
general military history; I should also like, incidentally, to point this out to A d o l f
B a u e r , w h o is s u r p r i s e d that I t r e a t e d t h e history of the D i a d o c h i so briefly
{Historische Zeitschrift 86: 285). I am not willing to recognize this as an error until
somebody has proved that in this period a c h a n g e took place in the art of military
c o m m a n d — a change that escaped my notice.
With the stipulation, however, that it really d o e s not belong here, I still wish to
introduce a few w o r d s on Sphacteria, because Eduard Meyer (2:333) has declared
that he d o e s not agree with a study I published earlier on this subject ("The Strategy
of Pericles clarified t h r o u g h the Strategy of Frederick the Great," A n n e x [Die
Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen]), but his
polemic is based entirely on misunderstandings, and I would like to protect other
readers from these errors. I shall not hesitate to state in advance, however, that I
consider the present question, the description of T h u c y d i d e s and his j u d g m e n t of
Cleon in this matter, as the most difficult t h e m e and the finest psychological prob-
lem in all of world military history. T h u c y d i d e s is unconditionally, exclusively, and
completely right; whoever is not willing to be satisfied, however, with simply accept-
ing his j u d g m e n t but wants to form his o w n conclusion in i n d e p e n d e n t analysis,
should not risk this until he has studied Clausewitz t h r o u g h and through and has
b e c o m e so familiar with his psychology of strategy that he is able to apply it with

completely i n d e p e n d e n t certainty.
H e r e I shall simply list the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and errors of Meyer's study.
I stated that t h e landing of the A t h e n i a n s on the island s u c c e e d e d essentially be-
cause the Spartans were not on guard. I pointed out that the island was not even
four kilometers l o n g ; that if the Spartans had established posts all a r o u n d and had
set up a signal system, then a half-hour after the A t h e n i a n s ' approach had been
o b s e r v e d — c o n s e q u e n t l y before the landing was really c o m p l e t e d and the landing
force f o r m e d up in o r d e r — t h e main body of the Spartans c o u l d have b e e n on the
spot and have t h r o w n the landing force back into the sea. Meyer finds it "under-
standable" that t h e b e l e a g u e r e d troops did not act in this way. N o t o n c e in the two
months since the e n d of the armistice had the A t h e n i a n s a t t e m p t e d an attack. "So it
is not surprising that the Spartans were not e x p e c t i n g an attack a n d were not ex-
hausting their s t r e n g t h t h r o u g h strenuous guard duty." T h i s e x c u s e for the Spartans
is u n d o u b t e d l y all the less satisfying in that there could be no question of "strenuous
guard duty." After all, what d o e s a beleaguered garrison h a v e to do except to main-
tain its observation posts?
T h a n k s to an e x c e l l e n t topographical study by the E n g l i s h m a n G r u n d y (Journal of
Hellenic Studies, V o l . 16, 1896) we have recently b e e n put in a position to e x a m i n e
the tactical question still m o r e definitely, and my earlier conjectures, based m o r e on
theory, have thereby g a i n e d important reinforcement.
T h e island of Sphacteria rises up from the sea on all sides with s t e e p slopes and
cliffs to a height of several h u n d r e d feet. It is quite narrow ( 5 0 0 to 7 5 0 meters) and
some 2 miles long. O n l y at s e v e n locations is a landing possible, a n d of these seven
sites, o n e is at the n o r t h e r n point and all the others are in the m i d d l e or at the
south e n d . T h e n o r t h e r n a p p r o a c h , however, immediately rises up steeply, and it
was therefore not usable for the landing and d e p l o y m e n t of a rather large force.
T h e l a n d i n g sites of possible usefulness for the A t h e n i a n s w e r e the central and
southerly ones, w h e r e s t e e p slopes do not rise up immediately f r o m the beach but a
more gradual, b r o a d e r slope leads upward between the cliffs. T h e mission of the
Spartan leader Epitadas s h o u l d have b e e n to have all of these landing sites kept
under observation.
T h e posting at e a c h of the seven sites of two Spartiates and a d o z e n Helots, re-
lieved daily, could hardly be called a great effort. But, according to Meyer, even if
the Spartans had d o n e that, it w o u l d not have c h a n g e d the situation very m u c h . T h e
Athenians would at any place have o v e r c o m e the weak outposts and would have es-
tablished a f o o t h o l d before r e i n f o r c e m e n t s arrived. T h i s is, f r o m every point of
view, a false c o n c e p t of the military situation. T h e r e can be no question of "over-
coming" the outposts, since they w o u l d naturally not have allowed themselves to be
drawn into combat. T h e i r o n l y mission was to give the signal promptly and to dis-
patch a runner. It was a question of n o t h i n g else but the p r o p e r functioning of this
warning system. T h e landing of several thousand m e n (hoplites and lightly armed
soldiers) in a narrow space d o e s not take place so quickly. F u r t h e r m o r e , no point on
the island was m o r e than two kilometers distant from the Spartan c a m p in the mid-
dle of the island. In fact, since the landing sites that really called for a close watch
were all in the o n e general area, the Spartans, by c a m p i n g not exactly in the middle
but still somewhat farther to the south, could have b e e n on the scene e v e n faster. If
the Athenians l a n d e d at the northerly point, the Spartans w o u l d have taken some-
what longer to arrive there, but they would nevertheless still have certainly arrived
before the A t h e n i a n s had m o u n t e d the cliff. T h e site where the A t h e n i a n s actually
landed, according to G r u n d y , is not m o r e than 1,200 meters distant from the place
where the Spartans w e r e e n c a m p e d , near the spring in the m i d d l e of the island.
And here we must point out s o m e t h i n g that is at least very questionable: we doubt
that the Athenians w o u l d have b e e n in battle order before the Spartans, if they were
only alerted at o n c e , were already in the attack; moreover, in view of the a w e s o m e
respect that the Spartan phalanx still enjoyed, a large n u m b e r of already debarked
but still u n o r d e r e d troops would hardly have been inclined even to stand up to the
attack. It is not mistakenly that Grundy states that T h u c y d i d e s ' account of the battle
of the h u g e superior force of the Athenians against the small Spartan phalanx gives
the impression of a pack of snarling d o g s s u r r o u n d i n g a dying lion but afraid to
approach him.
If it were really true that, as Meyer says, "such an e x t e n d e d position as that of
Sphacteria cannot be d e f e n d e d against a surprise attack"—in other words, if a fail-
ure was as g o o d as impossible in view of the great numerical superiority of the
Athenians, then it must certainly be clear that all the Athenian leaders w h o were not
willing to m o v e into action are stamped as some kind of blockheads. But even Meyer
cannot avoid admitting, later, that "the attack on the island [was] nevertheless a risky
undertaking," since the e n e m i e s could by chance be warned or by chance be very
alert. If we assume, instead of a chance alertness, a constant and c o n t i n u o u s watch-
fulness, then we are in agreement. It is completely false to conclude, however, that
the realization of the danger of the undertaking m a d e it inadvisable.
W h e n Meyer misconstrues me by saying that I am "inclined to agree with the
j u d g m e n t , " as Nicias perhaps may have had it, "that the landing was the purest dil-
ettantism and flies in the face of the first rules of correct, methodical leadership,"
this only proves how completely he has m i s u n d e r s t o o d me. From the same misun-
derstanding there arises also the reproach that I had left out of consideration the
fact that the A t h e n i a n position would b e c o m e untenable if the blockade dragged on
into the winter. I did not indulge in this speculation, because there is n o t h i n g in the
world m o r e certain than that the A t h e n i a n s had the highest possible interest in
o v e r c o m i n g the beleaguered troops before the winter.
Since Meyer considers the landing on Sphacteria to be a rather easily accom-
plished affair, as a matter of consistency he rejects as inappropriate the reference I
made, by way of illustration, to the abortive landing on Alsen. He states that at
Alsen the D a n e s had dominated the sea and the Prussians had landed u n d e r the fire
of the Danish canister. H e r e , then, the operation was, to be sure, very difficult and
d a n g e r o u s . T h e difference is obvious, but it is c o m p e n s a t e d by other circumstances.
Alsen is an island 15 kilometers long, broken by steep-banked bays, so that it was
possible that many hours might pass before the main Danish force a p p e a r e d at a
point on the coast taken by surprise attack. Sphacteria is a very small island, on
which the garrison, at any point, if it but m a d e the correct preparations and main-
tained a sharp lookout, could be on the spot in almost a m o m e n t . T h e c o m m o n d e -
nominator therefore is the fact that in both cases success d e p e n d e d exclusively on
surprise. Finally, I should like to add that Meyer confuses the landing attempts at
Alsen. T h e o n e of which I spoke is not s u p p o s e d to have taken place at the same
location as the o n e that was actually carried out later u n d e r the fire of the Danish
cannon, the o n e of which Meyer speaks. At Ballegaard, where the first attack was to
take place, the bay is so wide that the interval from o n e e c h e l o n to the arrival of the
next was necessarily two hours; on the other hand, however, the position is also very
distant from S o n d e r b u r g . Satrup, where the crossing was actually carried out three
m o n t h s later, is situated quite close to Sonderburg, but there the bay is only very
narrow.
A l t h o u g h Meyer pictures the landing on Sphacteria as an operation that could
hardly fail, in his o p i n i o n the significant accomplishment, a purely technical o n e , is
attributed to D e m o s t h e n e s as the c o m m a n d i n g general.
"Cleon's role consists only of the fact that he m a d e the operation possible and
took u p o n himself the moral responsibility for it." It is impossible to misunderstand
m o r e strongly than this the nature of strategy. Great as the accomplishment of D e -
m o s t h e n e s in the e x e c u t i o n of the plan was, the real d e e d is still that of the man
w h o m a d e the overall decision and bore the responsibility for it and w h o , in addi-
tion, had e n o u g h understanding and k n o w l e d g e of h u m a n nature to call into his
service the most outstanding military technician and to turn over to him the practi-
cal execution of the plan. Not until o n e b e c o m e s completely aware of the full mean-
ing of Cleon's act can o n e also recognize the full difficulty of the problem: that this
same man, nevertheless, is s u p p o s e d to have been an upstart, brutal d e m a g o g u e .
From Grote to Lange the solution has been sought by exalting Cleon's personality
and declaring Thucydides' j u d g m e n t unjust. Meyer, w h o agrees with me in the con-
clusion that Amphipolis shows the complete nullity of Cleon, seeks to establish the
consistency of his personality by d o w n g r a d i n g his a c c o m p l i s h m e n t at Sphacteria.
T h e o n e solution is as false as the other. Cleon really accomplished a great deed at
Sphacteria, and it is in no way my o p i n i o n , as Meyer s e e m s to indicate (p. 333), that
he succeeded only because of the favorable circumstances.
If the matter were so simple, why would T h u c y d i d e s not have told it in that man-
ner? Why does he not simply attribute the accomplishment to D e m o s t h e n e s , as Aris-
tophanes did? Why d o e s he confuse us by first calling Cleon's d e m a n d s "crazy" and
then immediately afterward recounting their brilliant execution? Before o n e criti-
cizes Thucydides, o n e should seek to understand him, and I am glad that Meyer,
too. decisively rejects all the errors of false m o d e r n scholarship, which claims to
j u d g e Pericles' strategic plan or the events of A m p h i p o l i s more wisely than the mas-
ter. But the point about Cleon and Sphacteria must also be held firmly. T h u c y d i d e s
knew very well what he was d o i n g when he in no way diminished the objective ac-
complishment of the d e m a g o g u e and at the same time showed us the man himself
as a worthless poltroon.
It is precisely this paradox that makes Cleon primarily the political type, a role in
which he lives o n — a n d deservedly so—in history. T h u c y d i d e s would hardly have
considered it worth the trouble to picture this repulsive person for us so carefully if
his intervention had been of so little importance, or if the fruits of Sphacteria had
been so easily plucked. Yes, o n e may even go o n e step farther and say that not only
Cleon but all of Athens, in the period between the death of Pericles and the ascen-
dancy of Alcibiades, loses all political interest for us, if the city was at that time so
poor in political virtue, character, and intelligence as Meyer would have us believe.
But it was not at all like this. T h e task confronting A t h e n s was, rather, so great and
so difficult, that only a very great man could have d o n e justice to it in all respects.
Such a man was not at hand, and so it h a p p e n e d that Cleon was able not only to win
a position but also, for once, to accomplish a truly great d e e d . In no other way may
T h u c y d i d e s be interpreted, and whoever still has doubt in his soul and d o e s not feel
satisfied with my commentary in the above-mentioned p a m p h l e t — t o him I can only
give a single piece of advice: Study Clausewitz, again and again, until you have un-
derstood Thucydides. (Compare also the following chapter, excursus 6.)
6. At Olpae in 4 2 6 B . C . D e m o s t h e n e s defeated an Ambraciot and Peloponnesian
army, although his n u m b e r s were smaller, by laying an a m b u s h that fell on the
e n e m y from the rear as the battle was beginning. Very seldom do we find such a
maneuver.
5
7. T h e description that T h u c y d i d e s (4. 9 3 - 9 6 ) gives of the battle of Delium (424
B . C . ) seems to be a preview of a later period. Both sides, A t h e n i a n s and Boeotians,
had the same strength in hoplites, 7,000 m e n . In addition, the Boeotians had 10,000
u n a r m o r e d men, the Athenians only a few, since the mass of this type that they also
possessed had already marched off. T h e Boeotians had, further, 1,000 cavalrymen;
the number of Athenian cavalry is not given, but it was u n d e r any circumstances
considerably less than that of the Boeotians. At that time A t h e n s had all together
hardly m o r e than 9 0 0 m o u n t e d m e n , and of these there were naturally a considera-
ble number w h o were not participating in the campaign, and 3 0 0 cavalry had been
left behind at Delium in order to operate from that base against the Boeotians' rear;
they were, however, held in check by the Boeotian cavalry.
T h e entire mass of the Boeotian unarmored men had no effect at all in the battle,
since forest streams prevented them from closing with the enemy—probably an indi-
cation that the warlike zeal of the unarmored m e n was very slight. T h e battle was
fought, as usual, by the hoplites. T h e A t h e n i a n hoplites stood uniformly 8 m e n

d e e p , and therefore had a front of some 8 8 0 m e n . T h e Boeotians stood in varying
d e p t h in the different contingents; specifically, the main body, c o m p o s e d of the
T h e b a n s , was no less than 25 m e n d e e p . T h e Boeotian battle line must therefore
have been considerably shorter than the Athenian. T h i s was counterbalanced, how-
ever, by the superiority of the Boeotian cavalry.
T h e r e is no account of an actual cavalry combat. T h e Athenians were victorious
on their right flank and then swung around, s u r r o u n d i n g the Boeotians w h o stood
farther toward the middle, w h o suffered heavy losses. But in the meantime the d e e p
T h e b a n battle mass, covered on its flank by the cavalry and perhaps also by the ter-
rain, had pushed back the o p p o s i n g left wing of the Athenians, and w h e n the com-
bat went well for the Boeotians at this point, the T h e b a n c o m m a n d e r , Pagondas,
sent two cavalry d e t a c h m e n t s to the aid of the other wing. T h e i r s u d d e n appearance
spread terror a m o n g the Athenians, and here, too, the battle was decided in favor of
the Boeotians. In the pursuit of the fleeing Athenian hoplites, in addition to the
cavalry, the n u m e r o u s Boeotian u n a r m o r e d m e n also proved effective and killed
very many of the e n e m y .
8. In the a n n e x to my book The Strategy of Pericles (Die Strategie des Perikles) I gave
a t h o r o u g h treatment of the battle of A m p h i p o l i s (422 B . C . ) . T h e Athenians lost the
battle because of the lack of ability of C l e o n , w h o , in his insolent thoughtlessness,
e x p o s e d the army to an attack just as it had g o n e from battle formation into march
f o r m a t i o n . T h e L a c e d a e m o n i a n h o p l i t e s o f Brasidas were s u p p o r t e d b y lightly
armed m e n and cavalry.
9. In the battle of Mantinea (418 B . C . ) the Spartan army probably had a total
6
strength of some 7,000 to 8,000 m e n , a n d was slightly stronger than the o p p o s i n g
Mantineans, Argives, and Athenians. Of this battle in particular, T h u c y d i d e s reports
for us the characteristic pulling toward the right. King Agis of Sparta wanted to
prevent the e n v e l o p m e n t of his left wing and so o r d e r e d it to cut away from the
center and m o v e to the left. T w o overlapping units were supposed to m o v e into the
g a p from the right wing. But the c o m m a n d e r s of the two units did not want to give
up their g o o d locations, and so they refused to obey. T h u s the left wing remained
separated from the main body, and it was e n v e l o p e d from both flanks and defeated.
T h e right wing, however, w o n in the same manner, and since this latter victory was
w o n over a m u c h larger portion of the e n e m y army, it proved decisive; the right
wing of the Mantineans and Argives did not dare take up the battle again w h e n Agis
7
turned against it, and it a b a n d o n e d the battlefield.
T h u c y d i d e s points out that the losses of that wing of the Argives and Athenians
that was defeated first would have been m u c h greater if the Athenian cavalry had
not c o m e to their aid. T h e Spartans, too, had cavalry, but we hear nothing about
any cavalry combat. T h e r e is also no m e n t i o n of lightly armed troops.
10. In T h u c y d i d e s 6. 64, Nicias refuses to march by land from Cantania to Syra-
cuse, for the Syracusan cavalry would have inflicted great d a m a g e on the "lightly
armed men"* and the "mass"* on the way. T h e Athenians were without cavalry.
At Syracuse they took up a position where the cavalry could not do them m u c h
harm. "They were protected," says T h u c y d i d e s , "by walls, houses, trees, swamps,
and cliffs."
11. T h u c y d i d e s ' report (6. 67) on the first battle of Syracuse is very unclear. T h e
Athenians reportedly placed only half of their army in the actual battle line, forming
the other half in a square farther to the rear, in the middle of which was placed the
baggage; this second half was also o r d e r e d to go to the aid of the first half if neces-
sary. Both phalanxes were 8 m e n d e e p . H o w are we to picture the square with the
baggage in the middle? Why was the d e f e n s e of the baggage not left to the large
force of lightly armed m e n w h o were available from the ships' crews? As it was, the
army was weak in its n u m b e r of hoplites in comparison with the total levy of the
Syracusans.
T h e Syracusans had a phalanx twice as d e e p as the Athenians—16 m e n — a n d they
also had 1,200 cavalry. Nevertheless, the A t h e n i a n s were victorious. T h e enemy

cavalry accomplished nothing except to slow the pursuit.
T h e historians Grote and H o l m in History of Sicily in Antiquity (Geschichte Siziliens im
Altertum), 2:26, have, so far as I can see, simply repeated T h u c y d i d e s ' account with-
out looking into the questions it leaves unanswered.
Despite his victory, Nicias turned back to Catania, since he supposedly could do
nothing without cavalry.
T h e fact that the Syracusan cavalry, e v e n if it accomplished nothing in the battle,
did block the pursuit s e e m s to place it above the Persian cavalry, which did not suc-
ceed in d o i n g that at Marathon. T h e reason probably is that the Syracusans were
assured of a definite m e a n s of retreat, whereas the Persian h o r s e m e n at Marathon,
w h e n the foot soldiers broke into flight, were o v e r c o m e by the feeling that whoever
did not get quickly aboard ship was surely lost. At Plataea, supposing that part of
the Persian army was detached, the great numerical superiority of the Greeks must
be considered, and we do not know whether the Persian cavalry, nevertheless, suc-
c e e d e d somewhat in slowing the pursuit.
12. W h e n Gylippus came, he quickly discovered how the Syracusans should utilize
t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y i n c a v a l r y . H e s e n t t h e c a v a l r y with all his s p e a r - t h r o w e r s
( T h u c y d i d e s 7. 6) against the flank of the Athenians while he attacked them fron-
tally with hoplites, and the Athenians were defeated.
13. Diodorus' account (13. 72) on the march of King Agis against Athens in 4 0 8
B . C . contains so m u c h that is incomprehensible or unbelievable that it can hardly be
used from an historical point of view. Agis' army supposedly was 14,000 hoplites
strong, 14,000 "light-armed men,"* and 1,200 cavalry. T h e phalanx was 4 m e n d e e p
and 8 stadia—1,500 meters—long. According to those figures, therefore, there was
only 43 centimeters of front per man. At the same time, however, the army was
s u p p o s e d to have s u r r o u n d e d two-thirds of the wall of Athens. In that case it must,
therefore—quite contrary to the highly compressed formation of the phalanx—have
stretched out over s o m e 30 stadia (some 5,600 meters) t h r o u g h the entire plain
north of the city and on over the foothills of the Lycabettus. T h e Athenians report-
edly sent out their cavalry, numerically the equal of the e n e m y , to fight him, and it
was victorious. Is it conceivable that Athens could, as late as the year 4 0 8 B . C . , sud-
denly send out 1,200 battle-ready m o u n t e d m e n in front of her gates? On the fol-
lowing day the Athenian army was reportedly drawn up so close u n d e r the walls
that it was protected by the missiles being fired over its heads from above. How
many hoplites was A t h e n s actually able to form up at that time, while a great fleet
was abroad u n d e r Alcibiades? Did the Spartans, w h o after all must have been nu-
merically much stronger, actually hesitate to dash over the short area covered by the
hail of arrows and spears in front of the wall in order to achieve the certain defeat
of the Athenian hoplites, pressed as they were against the wall? As soon as they
closed in h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t , the l a u n c h i n g of projectiles from above surely
caused them little more d a m a g e than it did the Athenians, if the wall garrison did
not, indeed, stop firing altogether, in order to avoid hitting their o w n men.
14. T h e t h o r o u g h a c c o u n t that T h u c y d i d e s g i v e s u s o f the s i e g e a n d the
starving-out of Plataea in the P e l o p o n n e s i a n War, has b e e n c h a l l e n g e d by
Müller-Strübing in the Jahrbücher für Philologie, Vol. 131, on the basis of the topo-
graphical c o n d i t i o n s , but it has n e v e r t h e l e s s b e e n fully revalidated by H e r m a n n
Wagner in the Curriculum for the Gymnasium of Dobberan (Programm des Gymnasiums von
Dobberan), 1892 and 1893.
1. Not until the Peloponnesian War did the Spartans create

cavalry a n d a r c h e r units, in o r d e r to d e f e n d their land against the
Athenians, w h o w o u l d quickly attack from t h e sea, now h e r e a n d

now t h e r e . ( T h u c y d i d e s 4. 55.)
2 See B a u e r , Section 52.
3 Wernicke, in Hermes 26 (1891): 5 1 , states t h e o p i n i o n that t h e
Athenian citizens w h o served as " b o w m e n " * h a d c o m e from t h e
poorer classes.
4. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 1. 2. 1. T h r a s y l u s is sent o u t with a fleet
and equips five t h o u s a n d of his sailors as peltasts.
5 . D i o d o r u s ' d i v e r g e n t a c c o u n t , a s G r o t e has a l r e a d y correctly
pointed out, c a n n o t be c o m p a r e d with that of T h u c y d i d e s .
6. B e l o c h , Population (Bevölkerung), p. 140, counts 4,234
Lacedaemonians; a n d with t h e m t h e N e o d a m o d e i s , Brasidians, a n d
allies. T h a t t h e r e w e r e exactly 4 0 0 c a v a l r y m e n h e r e , too, is h a r d l y
to be c o n c l u d e d from T h u c y d i d e s 4. 55. ( C o m p a r e n o t e 2, C h a p t e r
III Book I . )
7. In T h u c y d i d e s ' a c c o u n t (4. 67 ff.) t h e r e is a contradiction, in
that h e f i r s t indicates that the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s h a d d r a w n u p their
units o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r in t h e center, a n d on t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t
flank "but few L a c e d a e m o n i a n s " h a d stood with t h e T e g e a n s , b u t
then, nevertheless, two whole units (lochi), a p p a r e n t l y L a c e d a e m o -
nians, are called away from this flank. Busolt, in Hermes 40 (1895):
399, seeks to solve t h e contradiction in this way: t h e two units h a d
not f o r m e d the e x t r e m e right wing b u t w e r e s u p p o s e d l y d r a w n o u t
from the r i g h t flank of t h e center; t h e resulting interval could be
filled again by a sliding t o w a r d t h e r i g h t on t h e p a r t of t h e o t h e r
L a c e d a e m o n i a n u n i t s . T h a t may n o t be impossible, but I w o u l d
nevertheless p r e f e r not to take a definite stand on this. T h e w o r d
"almost,"* as used by T h u c y d i d e s , can have a r a t h e r b r o a d r a d i u s
of m e a n i n g , as for e x a m p l e w h e n he says a short time earlier (5.
66. 4) t h a t "almost t h e whole a r m y " * of the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s con-
sisted of c o m m a n d e r s . It m i g h t t h e r e f o r e be only a case of a certain
c a r e l e s s n e s s o f e x p r e s s i o n , w h e r e i t i s first s a i d t h a t t h e
L a c e d a e m o n i a n s h a d d r a w n u p their units " o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r , " *
a n d w e later h e a r t h a t t h e "few" w h o w e r e s e p a r a t e d from t h e
others b y foreign c o n t i n g e n t s a n d w h o h a d b e e n o n t h e right f l a n k
h a d b e e n two w h o l e lochi (of seven). T h e expression "few" could
not possibly h a v e m e a n t individual w a r r i o r s s e p a r a t e d from their
units, b u t tactical units m u s t have b e e n i n t e n d e d ; that is, t h e r e f o r e ,
at least one lochus a n d possibly also two.
N o r am I r e a d y to accept the idea that t h e d i s o b e d i e n t polemarchs
in this battle w e r e not t h e c o m m a n d e r s of t h e units, but, as Busolt
states (on p. 418), staff officers of t h e King. Only o n e would have
b e e n n e e d e d for the delivery o f t h e o r d e r , a n d t h e insubordination

of o n e such staff officer is on t h e o n e h a n d hardly u n d e r s t a n d a b l e ,
on t h e o t h e r too easily disposed of by t h e dispatch of a second of-
ficer. T h e story is c o n s e q u e n t l y only u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in t h e sense
that t h e polemarchs w e r e t h e c o m m a n d e r s of t h e units.
Chapter II
Strategy: Pericles
As we h a v e seen, tactics c h a n g e d b u t little in the p e r i o d from t h e

Persian W a r s to t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e latter
war offers us a completely different p o i n t of view from the f o r m e r .
T h e Persian W a r is significantly d o m i n a t e d by the dissimilarity of
the o p p o n e n t s i n a r m s a n d tactics. I n t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r
Greeks were fighting against G r e e k s ; their a r m s a n d tactics w e r e
the same, b u t t h e peculiar characteristic is t h a t t h e o n e side h a d a
superiority on t h e sea j u s t as g r e a t as t h e o t h e r h a d on land. T h i s
situation established a completely new p r o b l e m of a strategic na-
ture. T h e Persian W a r was based on g r e a t decisive battles; it h a d to
end in o n e of two ways—either t h e King of Kings d e f e a t e d a n d
subjected t h e G r e e k s within a short time, or he himself suffered a
massive defeat. T h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r d r a g g e d o n for twenty-
seven years, b r o u g h t a b o u t p e r h a p s a few l a n d battles b u t no im-
p o r t a n t decision, a n d did not actually c o m e to its close until special
circumstances m a d e it possible for t h e S p a r t a n side, too, to d e v e l o p
into a sea p o w e r c o m p a r a b l e to that of t h e A t h e n i a n s .
W h e n t h e war b r o k e o u t , n e i t h e r side could have h a d an idea of
how this would develop. T h e y lived exclusively with the t h o u g h t
that the superiority on land on the o n e side a n d at sea on t h e o t h e r
was so g r e a t t h a t t h e weaker side could n o t risk a g r e a t tactical d e -
cision, a battle like Salamis or Plataea. C o n s e q u e n t l y , an u n u s u a l
new a s p e c t o f s t r a t e g y h a d t o b e f a c e d : w a r w i t h o u t d e c i s i o n ,
t h r o u g h simple attrition.
W h a t we e n c o u n t e r h e r e is o n e of the most complicated b u t most
f r e q u e n t p h e n o m e n a o f w o r l d history. I n t h e n o r m a l c o u r s e o f
events, t h e c o n c e p t of war calls for o n e o p p o n e n t to seek to c o m e
to grips with a n d s u b d u e t h e o t h e r o n e in o r d e r to submit him to
his will. All the forces a r e g a t h e r e d for a g r e a t blow, a battle that is
s u p p o s e d to b r i n g on a decision or which is followed by o t h e r s until
135
t h e decision is r e a c h e d . T h e task of strategy is to p r e p a r e this deci-
sion a n d to b r i n g it a b o u t u n d e r t h e most favorable possible condi-
tions. B u t h e r e we h a v e a w a r — a n d f r o m n o w on we shall en-
c o u n t e r this type time a n d again—that, for the most varied reasons,
eliminates t h e possibility of such a decision. Nevertheless, m e a n s
a r e to be f o u n d to b e n d t h e will of the e n e m y a n d to attain the
political goal of t h e war.
J u s t as at M a r a t h o n , T h e r m o p y l a e , Salamis, a n d Plataea, h e r e
again we find t h a t t h e G r e e k p e o p l e p r o d u c e d a m a n w h o g r a s p e d
t h e new task in its d e e p e s t m e a n i n g a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d it with classi-
cal certainty.
Pericles, t h e A t h e n i a n , recognized that his city was not the equal
of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n - B o e o t i a n L e a g u e on land, a n d from this fact
h e d r e w t h e i n e x o r a b l y logical c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e e n t i r e c o u n -
tryside of Attica h a d to be evacuated a n d left to t h e mercy of the
e n e m y a r m y . "If I t h o u g h t that I could p e r s u a d e you, I would de-
m a n d t h a t you lay waste y o u r land yourselves," he told t h e Athe-
nians. T h e c o u n t r y dwellers h a d to move back into t h e city a n d be-
tween t h e l o n g walls t h a t j o i n e d the city with its ports, Piraeus a n d
P h a l e r u m . T h e d a m a g e t h e e n e m i e s now w r e a k e d o n t h e Attican
c o u n t r y s i d e , h o w e v e r , was c o m p e n s a t e d t h r o u g h t h e A t h e n i a n
fleet's b l o c k a d e of t h e e n e m y coasts, d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e t r a d e of all
t h e e n e m y cities, a n d l a n d i n g first h e r e a n d t h e n t h e r e a n d sud-
denly a p p e a r i n g , b r i n g i n g t o the e n e m y c o u n t r y s i d e t h e same o r
even g r e a t e r d e s t r u c t i o n t h a n t h e e n e m y was accomplishing in At-
tica. W h a t c o u l d result f r o m such a c o n d u c t of war, which might
almost be called a " n o n c o n d u c t of war"? An o v e r w h e l m i n g deci-
sion, never. E v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e d on w h o first r e a c h e d t h e point of
no l o n g e r b e i n g able to b e a r t h e pain, w h o first b e c a m e e x h a u s t e d .
O n e could h a v e devised a way of c o n d u c t i n g t h e war w i t h o u t any
b l o o d s h e d ; b u t after all, it was not so completely o u t of the ques-
tion that s t r o n g blows be struck at some point, blows that could con-
t r i b u t e greatly to softening the e n e m y ' s will. With careful f o r e t h o u g h t
a n d wise a w a r e n e s s , Pericles a d d e d to t h e f o r e g o i n g points, as he
e x p l a i n e d his w a r plan to t h e A t h e n i a n s , t h e fact that o n e h a d to
seize " t h e o p p o r t u n i t y that does not wait." T h e strategy of attri-
tion, which by its very n a t u r e r e n o u n c e s t h e possibility of an abso-
lute decision, is a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e d a n g e r that t h e c o m m a n d e r s
m a y b e c o m e entirely too cautious. Each war creates crucial situa-
tions t h a t m u s t be e x p l o i t e d with bold c o u r a g e . B u t w h e t h e r this
will s u c c e e d i s a q u e s t i o n d e p e n d i n g o n fate. T h e c o m m a n d e r
n e v e r knows exactly how s t r o n g t h e e n e m y actually is or w h e t h e r
Strategy: Pericles 137
circumstances a r e involved that he c a n n o t perceive. While o n e hesi-

tates, estimates, studies t h e situation f u r t h e r — t h e o p p o r t u n i t y has
once again slipped away. A n d t h e c o m m a n d e r t h e n finds it twice as
hard—even ten times as h a r d — t o d e c i d e to act if he constantly has
h a n g i n g over him as t h e basic principle of t h e war t h e belief t h a t
the o u t c o m e is to be a r r i v e d at not t h r o u g h g r e a t decisions with
their risks, but t h r o u g h g r a d u a l attrition. O n l y t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of
o u r t h e o r y into m o r e m o d e r n times ( w h e r e we shall see time a n d
again how often c o m m a n d e r s have b e e n p r e y to this t e m p t a t i o n of
attrition strategy to avoid risky decisions) will b r i n g us to a com-
plete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how i m p o r t a n t was that s t a t e m e n t of Peri-
cles that d e s p i t e t h e g e n e r a l principle of an exclusive warfare of at-
trition, " t h e o p p o r t u n i t y that d o e s not wait" m u s t be exploited.
T h e A t h e n i a n s r e c k o n e d t h a t Pericles h a d won n i n e victories as a
c o m m a n d e r . Of these victories we know too little to be able to con-
clude from t h e m a n y t h i n g as to Pericles' strategic talent, b u t t h e
structure of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r , t o g e t h e r with t h e r e p o r t s of
n u m e r o u s battle victories, obliges us to give him a position not sim-
ply a m o n g t h e g r e a t statesmen, b u t also a m o n g t h e great military
leaders of world history. It is not his war p l a n as such that bestows
this right on h i m (for the fame of t h e c o m m a n d e r is g a i n e d n o t by
word, b u t by d e e d ) , but r a t h e r t h e gigantic p o w e r of decision that
a c c o m p a n i e d it, n o t to halt with a h a l f - m e a s u r e , b u t to p l u n g e in
wholeheartedly a n d give up completely what h a d to be sacrificed,
the entire Attican c o u n t r y s i d e , a n d in a d d i t i o n the s t r e n g t h of per-
sonal a u t h o r i t y that was able to m a k e such a decision u n d e r s t a n d -
able to a d e m o c r a t i c national assemblage a n d to gain their a p p r o v a l .
T h e execution of this decision is a strategic d e e d that can be com-
p a r e d favorably with any victory. In 4 8 0 a n d 4 7 9 B . C . , at t h e a p -
proach of t h e Persians, t h e A t h e n i a n s h a d evacuated not only t h e
c o u n t r y s i d e b u t also t h e city—a decision that, in itself, was even
m o r e magnificent, but of a completely different n a t u r e . It was a
d e e d of d e s p e r a t i o n , w h e n no o t h e r possibility r e m a i n e d if they
were n o t to be c o n q u e r e d . T h e battle in which the h o m e l a n d was to
be won back was to follow immediately. In t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r
it was also a question of an inevitable necessity, b u t not o n e that
was immediately obvious. On the c o n t r a r y , it was clear only to t h e
reflective strategic j u d g m e n t , a n d it was not a m a t t e r of only a
m o m e n t a r y evacuation, b u t of an action t h a t gave p r o m i s e of b e i n g
r e p e a t e d year in, year out, over a long p e r i o d . Even today o n e oc-
casionally e n c o u n t e r s scholarly prigs w h o d e n y t h e necessity for
such an act a n d t h e r e b y furnish new p r o o f of the p o w e r of m i n d of
Pericles, who was able to p e r s u a d e the sovereign A t h e n i a n citizenry

to a d o p t a strategy that was so h a r d to g r a s p .
Pericles' war plan was c a r r i e d o u t by A t h e n s over a long period;
in t h e first year a n d a half, or as long as Pericles was leader of the
city, t h e plan was c a r r i e d o u t with wise a n d e n e r g e t i c application of
individual details, so that t h e various u n d e r t a k i n g s w e r e well coor-
d i n a t e d ; a n d even after t h e fall a n d d e a t h of Pericles this was con-
t i n u e d with no less e n e r g y , b u t without t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of details,
in a s p o r a d i c way, p r o m p t e d by t h e f o r t u i t o u s p r e s s u r e s of the
m o m e n t , in k e e p i n g with the ideas of this or that speaker.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , A t h e n s m a i n t a i n e d an obvious s u p e r i o r i t y over its
o p p o n e n t s . Even t h e frightful ravages of t h e p l a g u e , which r o b b e d
t h e city of a f o u r t h of its citizens, did not break its s t r e n g t h , a n d
finally t h e c o n t i n u i n g guerrilla war even p r o v i d e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
for a g r e a t blow. F o u r h u n d r e d twenty L a c e d a e m o n i a n s w e r e cut
off on t h e island of S p h a c t e r i a ; a p o r t i o n of t h e g r o u p was killed
a n d the r e m a i n d e r , 292 m e n , i n c l u d i n g 120 Spartiates, w e r e t a k e n
prisoner.
With this success, five years after t h e d e a t h of Pericles, his war
plan was accomplished. O n e should not, of c o u r s e , a s s u m e as the
objective of t h e war t h e subjection of all of G r e e c e by A t h e n s , in
the m a n n e r in which R o m e later subjected Italy. N e i t h e r Pericles
n o r any o t h e r A t h e n i a n s t a t e s m a n h a d t h o u g h t o f this; A t h e n s was
m u c h too weak. T o d o this would have r e q u i r e d n o t only t h e vic-
torious c o n d u c t of g r e a t l a n d battles but, finally, also the siege a n d
c a p t u r e o f t h e e n e m y cities o f T h e b e s , M e g a r a , a n d C o r i n t h . I n
this war, as in m o d e r n E u r o p e a n wars, t h e task facing A t h e n s was
only t h e assertion of h e r position of i m p o r t a n c e , t h e m a i n t a i n i n g of
a balance of p o w e r , a n d a g r e a t e r or lesser e x p a n s i o n of h e r s p h e r e
of influence.
T h e lack of a capable, influential s t a t e s m a n after t h e d e a t h of
Pericles caused A t h e n s to miss the m o m e n t a n d t h e favorable situa-
tion for an a d v a n t a g e o u s peace settlement. B u t e v e n after A t h e n s
h a d suffered a defeat at t h e h a n d s of t h e talented S p a r t a n com-
m a n d e r Brasidas, at A m p h i p o l i s , she was still able to c o n c l u d e a
peace in which h e r position was completely r e c o g n i z e d , a n d basi-
cally a n y t h i n g b e y o n d this was n o t at all necessary.
E i g h t y e a r s l a t e r t h e w a r b r o k e o u t a g a i n , a n d this t i m e t h e
A t h e n i a n s lost it, because they h a d completely i g n o r e d Pericles' ad-
vice o n o n e i m p o r t a n t point. Pericles h a d w a r n e d " n o t t o m a k e any
new conquests d u r i n g t h e war."
As early as t h e year 4 2 4 B . C . , inflated o v e r t h e success at S p h a c -
teria, they h a d p l a n n e d a big o p e r a t i o n by land a n d h a d suffered a

very heavy defeat (Delium); they lost no fewer t h a n 1,000 hoplites.
After the conclusion of peace, however, which was actually still only
an armistice, they u n d e r t o o k the subjection of Sicily a n d lost s o m e
1
6 000 citizens in that v e n t u r e , t o g e t h e r with a g r e a t fleet a n d its
equipment. T h a t b r o u g h t the t u r n i n g point. Now the Ionians
risked b r e a k i n g away from A t h e n s , a n d t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s a p -
p e a r e d o n t h e sea a n d m a d e a n alliance with t h e Persian King.
Athens was not the equal of this coalition; she was finally d e f e a t e d
at sea a n d h a d to give in.
EXCURSUS
1. T h e basic q u e s t i o n in passing j u d g m e n t on the P e l o p o n n e s i a n War is, of

course, whether Pericles' plan was right, and the answer d e p e n d s , not in its least
important aspect, on the statistics involved. If it were true that Athens had at that
time 6 0 , 0 0 0 citizens, while it is accepted that L a c e d a e m o n n u m b e r e d no more than
2,000 to 3 , 0 0 0 Spartiates and 9 , 0 0 0 Perioeci-citizens, then Athens would u n d o u b -
tedly have been able to risk a policy and a conduct of the war in the m a n n e r of
Rome. O n e can see here the basic importance of the verification of these dry data.
O n t h e m d e p e n d s o u r j u d g m e n t o f Pericles, a n d o n the latter, a g a i n , that o f
Thucydides. T h e authority of the greatest of all historians is irreparably destroyed, a
pillar of Greek literature is o v e r t u r n e d , if s o m e o n e can prove that A t h e n s had
60,000 citizens in the year 431 B . C . In this case T h u c y d i d e s has falsely j u d g e d Peri-
cles and his policies, so that we can no longer trust his j u d g m e n t in any way.
Fortunately, there can be no question of such a possibility. T h e fact that the
Athenians m o v e d out at Delium "with the whole body of the city drawn up as an
army"* and still were only 7,000 hoplites strong, taken in conjunction with all the
other n u m b e r s that have been reported, is an irrefutable p r o o f that A t h e n s can
never have had 6 0 , 0 0 0 citizens.
One may assume that, aside from the 15,800 m e n mentioned by Pericles in his
speech, from the Thêtes and metics A t h e n s could still perhaps have drawn 8,000
men and provided them with hoplite equipment. In addition, she could have called
on a few allies and could have organized a great mass of mercenaries as hoplites. If
one estimates what troops were necessarily left behind in the form of garrisons and
that a certain n u m b e r of triremes always had to remain in service, too, Athens could
perhaps have put into the Field, through the m a x i m u m possible effort, an army of
25,000 hoplites. T h e army with which the Peloponnesians invaded Attica has been
2
estimated by Beloch (p. 152) at 3 0 , 0 0 0 , and m o r e recently at 2 7 , 0 0 0 hoplites. It
would therefore s e e m that a victory in an o p e n battle was not completely out of the
question for the Athenians. But what purpose would it have served? "Even if we
win," Pericles told the Athenians ( T h u c y d i d e s 1. 143), "we would still have to fight
again soon against just as strong an enemy." T h e large Athenian army could remain
in the field only a few days, or at most weeks,- since the citizens had to return to
their work. T h e r e could be no question of a pursuit of the e n e m y into his o w n
country, a siege of T h e b e s or of Corinth. N o t even any of the later popular leaders,
at the height of the success on Sphacteria, ever had any such idea. T h e r e f o r e a vic-
tory would have brought the Athenians nothing but a momentary respite; a defeat
could have cost them half of their citizens, and in any case such a campaign would
have m a d e such inroads on their finances that they would have been completely in-
capable of further campaigns. We shall have occasion to return very often to the law
of e c o n o m y of force, which m a d e itself felt so clearly here. In the fourth volume of
this work, which has now (1920) been published, this basic principle of strategy is
treated thoroughly.
2. In my book The Strategy of Pericles, illustrated through the Strategy of Frederick the
Great (1890) (Die Strategie des Perikles, erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen),
I have studied the problem of the Periclean strategy in all its details. Almost simul-
taneously with that book there a p p e a r e d the study by Nissen, " T h e Outbreak of the
P e l o p o n n e s i a n War" ("Der A u s b r u c h d e s P e l o p o n n e s i s c h e n Krieges"), Historische
Zeitschrift, Vol. 6 3 . T h e objections he raised against T h u c y d i d e s ' account are not jus-
tified, in my opinion, but in o n e significant point we have nevertheless c o m e to the
same conclusion—that is, that if A t h e n s wanted to concentrate on a positive objective
in this war, it had to be the incorporation of the Megaris.
3. Later there also appeared "A Chronological Contribution to the Historical Pre-
lude of the Peloponnesian War" ("Ein chronologischer Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte
d e s Peloponnesischen Krieges"), by W. Kolbe (Hermes, Vol. 3 4 , 1899). Kolbe places
the battle of Sybota as early as the fall of 4 3 3 B . C . (I estimated May of 432); from
that we derive no conclusions c o n c e r n i n g my c o n c e p t of the policies of Pericles.
4. In his study "On the War Plan of Pericles" ("Zum Kriegsplan des Perikles")
(Festschrift offered to Ludwig Friedlander by his students, 1895) Busolt took the posi-
tion of those w h o regard this war plan as theoretically correct, "but in its execution
there was a lack of energetic action and aggressive spirit." He notes particularly the
failure in the first years of the war to occupy e n e m y coastal sites like Pylos and the
island of Cythera. "An energetic application of power in the framework of the war
plan c o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y have s h o r t e n e d the duration of the war and led m o r e
quickly to the exhaustion of the enemy." Nevertheless, o n e cannot put forth this
claim quite so strongly as "undoubtedly." Busolt himself, in this very treatise, cor-
rectly stressed more than had previously been the case how important the blockade
of the P e l o p o n n e s u s was. Even if it was not carried out to the point of hermetically
sealing off the peninsula, it still r e d u c e d the trade and the almost indispensable
grain shipments for the larger coastal cities in an extremely effective manner. T h e
longer it lasted, the harder was the effect of this pressure. It certainly cannot be said
that the Athenians, if they had brought to bear on their e n e m y right in the first year
all the damage that they could have caused, would thereby have w o n the peace. T h e
length of suffering, the psychological factor of time had to play their roles. We are
faced here with a problem that arises time after time in the history of warfare.
W h e n a statesman-commander like Pericles establishes a war plan that is supposed
not to crush the e n e m y but to wear him out gradually, there is no definite indication
of how m u c h is to be undertaken each year, or to what extent the safeguarding of
one's o w n strength is to be given consideration. In the strategy of annihilation there
is such a measure—that is, the combat forces of the e n e m y . O n e must either commit
all the forces that are in any way available, or at least so m u c h that o n e can count
with certainty on victory. If that d o e s not c o m e about, an error has been made. In
the strategy of attrition, the standard is m o r e subjective. To concentrate all one's
forces at the same time w o u l d be w r o n g and would contradict one's o w n plans. No
matter what takes place, it is always possible for a critic to c o m e along and say that,
in addition, this or that should also have been d o n e . On page 116 of my Strategy of
Pericles I explained the reasons why m o r e was not d o n e in the first year and a half,
as long as Pericles was in power. In the second year, instead of occupying Cythera,
as Busolt calls for, he undertook s o m e t h i n g m u c h greater, that is the conquest of
Epidaurus, a venture in which, of course, he failed. T h e fact that, after this failure,
the m o v e against Cythera was not undertaken cannot, at any rate, be attributed to
Pericles, since he was dismissed. It is completely understandable, however, for the
reasons I presented on page 130 of my a f o r e m e n t i o n e d work.
5. Pericles' statement c o n c e r n i n g the "opportunities in warfare that do not wait"
( T h u c y d i d e s 1. 142) is first said of the o p p o n e n t s , w h o are not able to exploit the
opportunities because of a lack of ready m e a n s and because of the loose treaty of
alliance. Implicit in this, however, is naturally also the opposite—that the Athenians,
namely, are in a position to do it and should seize the opportunities.
6. In an a n n e x to my above-named book I treated the question of the importance
of Cleon. Again and again scholars appear w h o cannot understand that a n y o n e w h o
has carried o f f such a brilliant success as C l e o n did at Sphacteria is supposed to have
been in every respect a negative personality. N o w h e r e outside the military field is
the temptation greater to allow o n e s e l f to be carried away by success and to consider
s o m e o n e w h o has w o n a victory as a great strategist. N o w h e r e , however, is it more
important to free oneself from a worship of success and to test impartially whether a
reputation is deserved or whether it falls on o n e by chance. T h e case of C l e o n lends
itself quite especially to the d e v e l o p m e n t of one's power of j u d g m e n t and to practice
in criticism. A very interesting and, in many respects, downright striking analogy to
Cleon's leadership is provided by the great victory that the d e m a g o g u e General
l'Echelle w o n over the V e n d é e n s , which I suggest be read in the excellent book of
General v o n Boguslawski, The War of Vendée against the French Republic (Der Krieg der
Vendée gegen die französische Republik) (1894).
7. After o n e has become convinced that, in its cardinal points, c o n c e r n i n g the
j u d g m e n t of Pericles and his war plan, as well as that of C l e o n , the c o n c e p t of
T h u c y d i d e s is the only completely right o n e , o n e is not only justified in trusting this
author but also obliged to do so, e v e n in those points where a strict verification is
not possible with our faulty k n o w l e d g e of the facts. T h e account of the history of
this period is built on this base.
T h e complaints that some have wished to make against T h u c y d i d e s as a strategist,
based on his o w n account, are devoid of any basis and arise solely from the incorrect
tactical concepts of the critics.
8. H e r o d o t u s , in 3. 9, has Mardonius say to Xerxes: "As I have c o m e to under-
stand it, the Greeks have been accustomed to wage their wars most senselessly be-
cause of their foolishness and folly. W h e n they declare war against each other, they
discover the fairest and most level g r o u n d , a n d proceeding to it, they have their bat-
tles in the place. T h e result is that the victors c o m e away without m u c h harm; but
about the vanquished I shall say n o t h i n g at all, for they are completely destroyed."*
T h e y o u g h t preferably to understand and tolerate each other peacefully, "speak-
ing the same language . . . and if it was at all necessary to fight against each other,
they would have to discover the place where each one's strength lay, and try it out
t h e r e " * — " w h e r e victory is m o s t difficult for both sides," the translation reads.
Father H e r o d o t u s was not able to express what he meant or what was told him; the
meaning is apparently that each side should seek to exploit the terrain for its o w n
benefit.
O n e must recognize that such points were taken into consideration in Periclean
Athens.
9. In arriving at the population estimates for Attica, I assumed that the Athenians
had also called on slaves for duty with the fleet. Niese has declared this assumption
to be "completely untenable" and has d o c u m e n t e d his o p p o s i n g view thoroughly in
an a n n e x to his essay in Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 98 (see also p. 2 8 , above). T h e
question has no significance in o u r statistical estimate, since on the o n e hand it is
established that the main portion of the fleet personnel consisted of A t h e n i a n citi-
zens, and on the other hand that the noncitizens were essentially mercenaries, so
that in any case there remains but little room for the slaves that were possibly there.
Whether, in any case, we term the but roughly estimated contingent of noncitizens
as "mercenaries" or as "mercenaries and slaves" really makes no great difference in
the results. W h e n Böckh (National Economy [Staatshaushault], 1:329, 3d ed.) states that
"a large portion of the oarsmen were slaves," he may have g o n e somewhat too far. I
expressed myself m o r e cautiously by writing (page 145, below): "When there was to
be a levy in A t h e n s for a campaign—so we may a s s u m e — e n o u g h m e n , A t h e n i a n s or
foreigners, always volunteered for fleet service, or slaves were taken for this pur-
History of t h e Art of W a r
142
pose. T h e r e f o r e , in Athens, fleet service, aside from the expeditions 'with the whole
body of the city drawn up as an army,'* b e c a m e a purely mercenary duty very
shortly after the Persian Wars." T h e s e words seem to me to say clearly e n o u g h that
I should not regard the supplementary n u m b e r of slaves on the Athenian fleet as
something important, but as an auxiliary means, w h e n e v e r the citizens and mer-
cenaries were not n u m e r o u s e n o u g h , and therefore probably in the cases of the un-
usual levies, which I use as a basis for my statistical estimates. Consequently, Niese
e x p r e s s e s my v i e w p o i n t t o o sharply w h e n he r e p e a t s it in t h e s e w o r d s : "Hans
Delbrück has said in his History of the Art of War, p. 110, that the Athenians had
regularly called on slaves for the m a n n i n g of their warships."
Niese adduces for his theory first of all several argumenta ex silentio, to which a
certain weight can no d o u b t be attributed, so l o n g as they are directed against
Bockh's opinion that "a large portion of the o a r s m e n were slaves," but not against
me, since the slaves play such a secondary role with me that they could easily be
overlooked in enumerations.
It has been proved on n u m e r o u s occasions that slaves were used for rowing duty
in other Greek states. W h e n N i e s e claims (pp. 4 9 6 , 5 0 1 , 505), "There is sufficient
proof that the slaves in A t h e n s . . . were aboard only as servants for their masters
w h o were serving with the fleet," he unfortunately neglected to state this p r o o f in
his discussion, which is otherwise a b o u n d i n g in scholarly references, but laid himself
o p e n to the suspicion of having only very v a g u e ideas of the conditions on an an-
cient trireme. It is difficult for us to understand that there could possibly be e n o u g h
room on such a ship for 2 0 0 m e n — t o say nothing of slaves as servants. Except pos-
sibly for the captain and mate? A n d the masters would have rowed, with the slaves
looking on?
T h e positive pieces of e v i d e n c e that in the Athenian fleet, too, slaves did appear
as c r e w m e n are as follows: in T h u c y d i d e s 7. 13. 2, Nicias writes h o m e from Sicily
that there were people who, by bribing the captains, placed Hyccaran slaves in their
places and thereby nullified the established o r d e r of seafaring ("And there are some
who, being themselves commercial travelers, have p e r s u a d e d the trierarchs to take
o n b o a r d H y c c a r a n slaves i n t h e i r s t e a d , a n d s o h a v e r o b b e d the navy o f its
discipline,"*). Hyccara is a Sicilian city that was taken by the Athenians immediately
after their arrival and whose inhabitants they had enslaved. Nicias, then, finds the
error not in the fact that slaves were placed in the rowing crew, but rather in the
fact that slaves of such an origin, basically hostile, were s m u g g l e d in for rowing
duty, without practice or training. If he had intended to indicate that it was u n h e a r d
of that slaves should have been m i x e d in at all with the o a r s m e n , then he would not
have a d d e d the word "Hyccaran."
In T h u c y d i d e s 8. 73. 5, it is said of the paralus, the ship of state, that she was
m a n n e d only by freemen; t h e r e f o r e this was not the case with o t h e r ships. Niese (p.
5 0 1 , footnote) claims that this explanation, generally accepted up to now, is a mis-
understanding; he seems to want to understand the Greek w o r d eleutheroi as "in-
clined toward freedom"—an interpretation for which I see no basis.
X e n o p h o n , in Hellenica 1. 6 . - 2 4 , reports how, in the year 4 0 6 B . C . , the Athenians
assigned f r e e m e n and slaves in o r d e r to man their fleet. T h e same procedure is also
m e n t i o n e d in Aristophanes and in the commentaries, cited in Böckh, 1:329.
In his speech on peace (8. 48), Isocrates mentions that the Athenians formerly
had foreigners and slaves serve as sailors, the citizens as hoplites aboard ship. (See
Niese, p. 5 0 1 , note 3.)
All t h e s e bits of e v i d e n c e s e e m to me to leave no d o u b t that my a c c o u n t is
correct—which, to repeat, d o e s not actually differ so fundamentally from that of
Niese as the force of his polemics might suggest. For e v e n Niese admits that, at least
as an exception (in the case o f 4 0 6 B . C . ) , slaves were incorporated in the fleet crews,
and in my work they play such an incidental role that I, too, could have used the
expression "by way of exception" without c h a n g i n g anything in the statistics.
1. A t h e n s lost 4,450 hoplites a n d citizen-cavalrymen; in addition,

on each t r i r e m e at least a few A t h e n i a n citizens as officers. T h e e n -
tire e x p e d i t i o n , with all its logistical s u p p o r t , can be estimated at
60,000 m e n .
2. Klio 6 (1906): 77.
Chapter III
Mercenaries
In t h e Persian W a r t h e G r e e k a r m i e s consisted of citizen levies;
as t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r a p p r o a c h e d its e n d , this no l o n g e r held
true.
T h e g e n e r a l citizen levy, t h e mass t a k i n g to t h e field "with the
whole b o d y of t h e city d r a w n up as an army,"* h a d actually occur-
r e d only very seldom. As a n o r m a l t h i n g it would be d e c i d e d to
s e n d o u t an a r m y or a fleet of a certain s t r e n g t h , a n d the draft for
this p u r p o s e , as it took place in A t h e n s , we m u s t p i c t u r e s o m e w h a t
as follows. T h e citizenry was divided up into ten tribes, a n d each of
these was split into t h r e e trittyes—one in t h e city, o n e on t h e coast,
a n d o n e in the interior—which, in t u r n , included a variable
n u m b e r o f d e m e s . T h e total s t r e n g t h t o b e levied was divided u p
a m o n g these units a n d would h a v e h a d to be filled, a c c o r d i n g to
t h e rules, in a l t e r n a t i o n by t h e m e n w h o w e r e so obligated. Such a
r e g u l a r a l t e r n a t i o n w o u l d , h o w e v e r , have led to serious inequalities.
T h e individual e x p e d i t i o n s w e r e very different in length a n d diffi-
culty; hoplite service, which was p e r f o r m e d by t h e m e n of m e a n s ,
c a m e u p m u c h less often t h a n fleet service. T h e citizens h a d p r o -
vided for the short campaigns of earlier days out of their own
m e a n s , a n d they w e r e not so completely d i s r u p t e d in t h e i r profes-
sional a n d commercial life by t h e c a m p a i g n s . T h e long wars, often
fought abroad, had created completely different conditions. In
o r d e r to m a k e l o n g e r c a m p a i g n s possible, t h e practice h a d b e e n in-
1
itiated of paying wages, a n d in fact very h i g h o n e s . T h e m e a n s of
d o i n g this w e r e p r o v i d e d by t h e A t h e n i a n allies, w h o were t h e r e b y
e x e m p t e d from military service or at least m u c h less heavily b u r -
2
d e n e d with it. T h e A t h e n i a n citizens did t h e i r military service for
t h e m , a n d it was precisely in d o i n g so that they h a d attained such a
h i g h d e g r e e of military ability. A l t h o u g h they r e m a i n e d citizens,
they h a d nevertheless t a k e n o n , to a certain d e g r e e , t h e characteris-
tics of professional soldiers a n d w e r e also completely a w a r e of this.
144
Mercenaries 145
Before t h e f i r s t battle o f S y r a c u s e t h e i r c o m m a n d e r , Nicias, r e -

minded t h e m that they w e r e q u i t e different w a r r i o r s from t h e citi-
3
zen levy of t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w h e n e v e r t h e r e was to
be a levy in A t h e n s for a c a m p a i g n , we m a y a s s u m e that always
e n o u g h v o l u n t e e r s , A t h e n i a n s o r f o r e i g n e r s , e n r o l l e d for service
with the fleet, or slaves w e r e t a k e n for this p u r p o s e . By all a p p e a r -
ances, no special list was k e p t of m e n obligated for sea d u t y . In
cases of e m e r g e n c y , all those w h o w e r e not e n g a g e d w e r e called to
4
the r a n k s . In t h e case of hoplite service it was a different m a t t e r ;
this was, of c o u r s e , not only a f o r m of p e r s o n a l service b u t also a
kind of tax p a y m e n t , since t h e h o p l i t e h a d to p r o v i d e his costly
e q u i p m e n t personally. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e was an appraisal p r o c e -
d u r e for hoplite service a n d a m u s t e r roll, called " C a t a l o g , " was
k e p t o n e l i g i b l e m e n , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l c i t i z e n list.
Nevertheless, we m a y a s s u m e t h a t it was n o t so very difficult to
5
find a r e p l a c e m e n t if o n e did not wish to take t h e field himself,
and t h e state could not object to a suitable r e p l a c e m e n t . In taking
this viewpoint, t h e state s p a r e d t h e citizens in their n o r m a l work,
a n d m i l i t a r y efficiency d i d n o t necessarily s u f f e r f r o m this ex-
c h a n g e b u t could even i m p r o v e . As it was, hoplite service was, of
course, by its very c o n c e p t n o t a strictly p e r s o n a l d u t y ; r a t h e r each
house p r o v i d e d o n e m a n , with his servant. F r o m t h e start, t h e n , it
was p r o b a b l y c o n s i d e r e d as an i n t e r n a l family m a t t e r w h e t h e r it
was the father o r the son, o n e b r o t h e r o r t h e o t h e r , o r instead even
possibly a distant relative or a n e i g h b o r , w h o d o n n e d t h e hoplite
e q u i p m e n t a n d u n d e r t o o k t h e service. In o r d e r to be able to rein-
force the hoplite levy, t h e state, too, h a d e q u i p m e n t at t h e o u t b r e a k
of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r a n d e q u i p p e d a n u m b e r of Thêtes with
6
it. If for t h e Sicilian e x p e d i t i o n 1,500 hoplites from t h e Catalog
were e m b a r k e d a n d 700 T h e t e hoplites, this m e a n s that e i t h e r n o
m o r e t h a n 1,500 m e n from the u p p e r classes h a d r e p o r t e d for t h e
c a m p a i g n or, what is probably m o r e likely, it was not d e s i r e d to
ship so m a n y citizens of m e a n s so far away, a n d t h e r e f o r e no m o r e
t h a n 150 w e r e t a k e n from each tribe, a n d in addition to t h e m 700
Thêtes w h o h a d likewise r e p o r t e d as v o l u n t e e r s w e r e a r m e d at t h e
e x p e n s e of t h e state.
Fleet service in A t h e n s , t h e r e f o r e , except for t h e mass levies, be-
came a p u r e l y m e r c e n a r y service as early as the p e r i o d shortly fol-
lowing t h e Persian W a r s , a n d in the c o u r s e of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n
War hoplite service, too, gradually became m o r e a n d m o r e a
m e r c e n a r y service.
A similar d e v e l o p m e n t took place in t h e o t h e r states. In t h e first
]46 History o f t h e A r t o f W a r
years of the P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r t h e allies, for t h e most p a r t , did

n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n to invade Attica with two-thirds of their citizen
hoplites, p l u n d e r a n d lay waste the c o u n t r y for a few weeks, a n d
r e t u r n h o m e again. Soon it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that they w e r e not
w e a r i n g A t h e n s o u t in this way, a n d finally t h e S p a r t a n Brasidas
m o v e d o u t t o T h r a c e with a n a r m y , i n o r d e r t o attack A t h e n s
t h r o u g h h e r c o l o n i e s a n d h e r allied cities. T h i s a r m y c o u l d n o
l o n g e r be c o m p o s e d of citizens who w e r e leaving t h e i r business for
a s h o r t time a n d w e r e s u p p l y i n g themselves. B u t it did not consist,
say, of Spartiates, w h o h a d always p r i d e d themselves on having no
civilian profession b u t w e r e exclusively w a r r i o r s . Such a c a m p a i g n
at a distance with half or even only a f o u r t h of t h e Spartiates qual-
ified for military service ( a n d t h a t w o u l d actually h a v e b e e n no
m o r e t h a n 500 t o 6 0 0 m e n ) completely c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e c h a r a c t e r
of the state o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t h e p o i n t of view of t h e S p a r t a n s .
R a t h e r , they called o u t r o b u s t farm boys w h o w e r e in b o n d a g e ,
H e l o t s , a n d t r a i n e d t h e m a s hoplites. N a t u r a l l y , they h a d t o b e
given their rations a n d also a certain pay, in o r d e r to b i n d t h e m to
t h e colors. A n d so, because of the internal necessities of c a r r y i n g
o u t t h e war, S p a r t a p r o c e e d e d i n the same m a n n e r a s A t h e n s .
EXCURSUS
1. T h u c y d i d e s 5. 67, reports that the Argives, in addition to the general levy, had
an elite unit of 1,000 m e n w h o received special training at the e x p e n s e of the state
(". . . a thousand picked m e n of the Argives, for w h o m the state for a long time had
provided training at the public e x p e n s e in the arts of war").* Presumably these
1,000 were not only especially trained, but they had to be ready to participate in the
m o r e distant expeditions that from time to time were necessary and that would have
torn the average citizen too m u c h away from his business and would have harmed
him economically. For this they received regular pay.
2. W h e n Agesilaus n e e d e d cavalry in Asia in 391 B . C . , he levied the rich Asia
Minor Greeks for that purpose and allowed them to provide substitutes. ( X e n o p h o n ,
Hellenica 3. 4. 15.)
3. T h e shift to a mercenary army naturally also wiped out in Athens the old divi-
sion into classes. As early as in his speech of the year 431 B . C . Pericles took no
further h e e d of this division, since the state was actually outfitting the Thêtes, w h o
did not have the means to do it themselves. A potiori, however, it still was c o m m o n l y
said by the people that the citizens of the lowest class "did not wage war."* U s e n e r
(in the Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie, 1873, p. 162) states the o p i n i o n that the bar
had fallen definitively in 4 1 2 B . C . ; the speech of Lysias on the restoration of the
democracy shows that the hoplite service of the Thêtes was normal at that time,
whereas at the time of the staging of Aristophanes' Banqueters in 427 B . C . that was
not yet u n d e r s t o o d in the same way.
4. In Book I, Chapter II we established the fact that T h u c y d i d e s informed us in
Pericles' speech of the n u m b e r of Athenian citizens and of metic hoplites, but not
the n u m b e r of metics who were not hoplites. We see now that, as far as T h u c y d i d e s
was c o n c e r n e d , there was actually no reason for d o i n g so. T h e nonhoplite metics
Mercenaries 147
c a m e into consideration in the A t h e n i a n military situation only as fleet o a r s m e n ,

crews that could also be filled out with slaves. Even if a list was kept of all the me-
tics, nevertheless the poorer a m o n g them were a mass that was too unsettled to be
counted in the substance of the state. T h o s e w h o were well-to-do e n o u g h to be ap-
praised for hoplite service were also, however, because of their means, also m o r e
closely b o u n d to the state of Athens and were therefore included.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I I I
1. B ö c k h , National Economy (Staatshaushalt), 1: 152, 340 (3d ed.).

T h e wages varied b e t w e e n 4 obols a n d 1 d r a c h m a (6 obols) p e r
m a n ; for t h e hoplites, t h e r e f o r e , 2 d r a c h m a s , 1 for t h e w a r r i o r a n d
1 for his s e r v a n t , i n c l u d i n g r a t i o n m o n e y . W h e n t h e h u m o r i s t
T h e o p o m p says that a m a n could feed a wife on 2 obols a n d t h a t
h e could b e completely h a p p y o n 4 , h e probably m e a n s t h e base
pay a s i d e from t h e r a t i o n allowance, which was, w h e r e n e e d e d ,
p r o v i d e d by 2 additional obols. At t h e t i m e of Aristotle t h e A t h e -
nian ephebi received 4 obols daily, their instructors 1 d r a c h m a . State
of the Athenians (Staat der Athener), C h a p t e r 4 2 .
2. N ö t h e , Federal Council, Federal Taxes, and Military Service of the
Delhi League (Bundesrat, Bundessteuer und Kriegsdienst der delischen
Bündner), M a g d e b u r g P r o g r a m , 1880. G u i d e , Military Procedures of
the First Athenian League (Kriegsverfahren des ersten athenischen Bundes),
N e u h a l d e n s l e b e n P r o g r a m , 1888.
3. S p e e c h of Nicias, T h u c y d i d e s 6. 6 8 : ". . . A g a i n s t m e n t h a t
m e e t us in a m o b a n d a r e n o t picked m e n as we a r e , a n d e v e n
against Sicelots, w h o , o n t h e o n e h a n d , despise us, b u t yet d o n o t
stand t h e i r g r o u n d against us, because their skill is less t h a n their
daring."*
4. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 1. 6. 24. T h e A t h e n i a n s d e c i d e d to m o v e
o u t with 110 s h i p s , " p u t t i n g a b o a r d e v e r y o n e o f military a g e ,
w h e t h e r they w e r e slave or free. Even m a n y of t h e knights w e n t on
board."*
5. A c c o r d i n g to a r e p o r t c o n t a i n e d in Polyaenus 3. 3, T o l m i d a s ,
w h e n he was o n c e s u p p o s e d to m o v e o u t with 1,000 hoplites, was
j o i n e d by 3,000 volunteers. T w o passages in A r i s t o p h a n e s s e e m to
c o n t r a d i c t this. In The Knights, verse 1369, D e m o s e x p r e s s e s t h e
wish t h a t m e n will no l o n g e r be excused from hoplite service by
favoritism, a n d in Peace, verse 1179, an individual is very u n h a p p y
because he finds t h a t he is s u d d e n l y o n c e again called up for ser-
vice, a n d h e c o m p l a i n s t h a t i n g e n e r a l t h e c o u n t r y p e o p l e a r e o p -
pressed in this r e g a r d , while t h e city dwellers a r e given t h e prefer-
e n c e . It is clear, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t at t h a t time (424 a n d 421 B . C . ) t h e
a r m y levy h a d not yet become a purely voluntary, r e i m b u r s e d ser-

vice.
6. In Aristotle, On the State of the Athenians, C h a p t e r 24, w h e r e he
explains that t h e mass of A t h e n i a n s lived from t h e state (by virtue
of t h e taxes of t h e allies), it is also said that t h e city maintained
2,500 hoplites. It is not easy to say how we s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t this.
T h e r e can be no t h o u g h t of a s t a n d i n g a r m y . T h e peripoloi, who
h a d a s t r e n g t h of a b o u t 2,000, can h a r d l y be m e a n t h e r e . P e r h a p s
t h e r e existed a n a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y 2,500 m e n w e r e t o k e e p
themselves in a special d e g r e e of readiness at a n y given m o m e n t ,
w e r e occasionally a s s e m b l e d , h a d to d r i l l , a n d r e c e i v e d a small
r e i m b u r s e m e n t . It can hardly have b e e n otherwise, at any rate, with
the 1,200 cavalrymen a n d 1,600 a r c h e r s w h o m Aristotle m e n t i o n s
in t h e s a m e line. Beloch, in Klio 5: 3 5 7 , e x p r e s s e d the conjecture
that it must simply have b e e n 12,500 instead of 2,500, a n d , in the
e n d , t h a t seems to me to be the most logical solution.
Chapter IV
Refinement of the Existing

Tactical System
in the Fourth Century
As long a n d oscillating as t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r was, it still did

not p r o d u c e new forms of t h e a r t of war. T h e o n e new aspect it
did b r i n g to G r e e c e was t h e professional military status. M u c h ear-
lier Greece h a d already b e c o m e familiar with professional soldiers
as m e r c e n a r i e s ; t h e tyrants, like Polycrates of Samos a n d Pisistratus
1
of Athens, had b o d y g u a r d s on which their h e g e m o n y rested.
Polycrates is e v e n s u p p o s e d to h a v e h a d a small a r m y of 1,000
2
a r c h e r s . T h e kings o f E g y p t a n d Lydia h a d a n a r m y o f G r e e k
mercenaries. But, after all, those a r e n o t decisive sizes, a n d the real
mercenary system, which b e c a m e a significant factor of t h e life of
the G r e e k p e o p l e a n d of G r e e k history, was basically a p r o d u c t of
the P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r . But it is n o t only t h e mass of private sol-
diers that comes into consideration, b u t m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y the com-
pletely new position of t h e m e r c e n a r y leaders, t h e professional of-
f i c e r s w h o now a p p e a r .
T h i s transition is p r o v i d e d by t h e A t h e n i a n s D e m o s t h e n e s a n d
Lamachus, t h e S p a r t a n s Brasidas, G y l i p p u s , a n d L y s a n d e r . W h e n ,
shortly after t h e close of the P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r , t h e Persian Prince
Cyrus, viceroy of Asia Minor, rebelled against his b r o t h e r , King Ar-
taxerxes, he was able to enlist in his pay an a r m y n u m b e r i n g no
fewer t h a n 13,000 G r e e k soldiers u n d e r n o t h i n g b u t e x p e r i e n c e d
military leaders of h i g h e r a n d lower r a n k .
T h e g r a d u a l transition from citizen a r m i e s t o m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s
certainly h a d as a result a refining a n d a m o r e intensive application
of drill; in o t h e r w o r d s , t h e drill discipline of t h e S p a r t a n s was ex-
tended to the other Greek armies. T h e army of the Spartans,
149
T h u c y d i d e s says (6. 66), consists a l m o s t entirely of c o m m a n d e r s

("rulers of rulers"*), a n d the a u t h o r of State of the Lacedaemonians
r e p o r t s that S p a r t a n drill is based on t h e principle that each man
follows his p l a t o o n l e a d e r (enomotarch); this m a d e t h e most compli-
cated formations easy. T h e individual steps in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
this drill a r e not recognizable for us, b u t the d e v e l o p m e n t lies in
the n a t u r e of things, a n d a few individual indications on the retreat
o f the T e n T h o u s a n d show u s clearly that t h e r e h a d b e e n progress.
T h e administrative lower echelons o f the a r m y w e r e capable, u n d e r
c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o f m o v i n g a s small i n d e p e n d e n t tactical
units, a n d their cohesiveness—which can only be attained t h r o u g h
drill—was so s t r o n g that the hoplites o n c e in a battle with Phar-
nabazus h a d t h e self-confidence to move f o r w a r d on the offensive
against Persian cavalry, even t h o u g h they themselves h a d only a
very few m o u n t e d m e n to cover their flanks. (Anabasis 6. 3. 30.) As
a substitute for cavalry, a few d e t a c h m e n t s of 2 0 0 hoplites each
w e r e placed 30 m e t e r s b e h i n d t h e p h a l a n x (6. 3. 9). T h e increase in
cavalry that we have o b s e r v e d was t h e r e f o r e balanced by i m p r o v e -
m e n t in t h e military quality of t h e infantry.
On o n e occasion we also find a completely new c o m b a t formation
e m p l o y e d . T h e Colchians blocked t h e r o u t e o f t h e T e n T h o u s a n d
by o c c u p y i n g a b r o a d m o u n t a i n in front of t h e m . An attack in the
usual closed p h a l a n x was not feasible, for the p h a l a n x on this very
i r r e g u l a r t e r r a i n would necessarily have b r o k e n d u r i n g the forward
m o v e m e n t a n d would h a v e fallen a p a r t . A n d so, on t h e advice of
X e n o p h o n , they f o r m e d 8 0 s m a l l e r c o l u m n s o f a b o u t 100 m e n
each, which w e r e d r a w n u p i n g r e a t d e p t h — p r o b a b l y a b o u t 2 0 m e n
d e e p a n d 5 m e n w i d e — a n d which left m o d e r a t e intervals between
t h e m . In this way each c o l u m n could seek its o w n r o u t e , a n d the
e x t e r i o r o n e s o u t f l a n k e d t h e e n e m y . T h e peltasts m o v e d forward i n
t h r e e g r o u p s , assigned to the two wings a n d the m i d d l e , with the
hoplites. Against a G r e e k p h a l a n x they w o u l d n o t have b e e n able to
m o v e f o r w a r d in this way; completely aside from t h e fact that t h e
peltasts w e r e i n t h e m i d d l e a m o n g t h e hoplites, t h e s e p a r a t e d h o p -
lite c o l u m n s would also n o t have b e e n able to withstand a shock en-
c o u n t e r with a closed hoplite p h a l a n x : t h e h e a d of each of t h e in-
dividual c o l u m n s would have b e e n t a k e n at t h e m o m e n t of impact
simultaneously from t h e r i g h t a n d t h e left a n d w o u l d have been
c r u s h e d , a n d s o all t h e c o l u m n s o f t h e c e n t e r w o u l d h a v e b e e n
b e a t e n b e f o r e t h e o u t f l a n k i n g p h a l a n x e s m i g h t h a v e b e e n able t o
e x e r t any effect on t h e flanks of t h e e n e m y p h a l a n x . Naturally, a
massive, closed front is s t r o n g e r t h a n o n e with intervals. Against
Refinement of the Existing Tactical System in the Fourth Century 151
barbarians, however, w h o d e p e n d e d m o r e on protection by t h e i r

mountains t h a n on their own w e a p o n s , a n d w h o did not have suffi-
cient l e a d e r s h i p to m a k e a c o o r d i n a t e d offensive blow at t h e right
m o m e n t against such an e n e m y , on such t e r r a i n — a g a i n s t such an
enemy the small, d e e p c o l u m n s with intervals w e r e t h e best-suited
tactical f o r m a t i o n . T h e Colchians did not d a r e to p u s h into t h e in-
tervals, because they feared that they would t h e n be attacked in t h e
rear by t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o l u m n s a n d cut off. A n d so this inspired
improvisation fulfilled its p u r p o s e , b u t it n e i t h e r was n o r did it be-
come, as some have claimed, a step t o w a r d a f u r t h e r theoretical d e -
velopment of t h e G r e e k tactics.
T h e peltast a r m benefited particularly from the m e r c e n a r y estab-
lishment. M o r e was necessary for a capable peltast t h a n for a h o p -
lite. T h e fixed f r a m e w o r k of the p h a l a n x carries a l o n g with it even
the m o d e r a t e l y t r a i n e d m a n a n d t h e m o d e r a t e l y b r a v e m a n ; i t
binds h i m a n d increases his w o r t h . B u t t h a t peltast w h o is not a
completely capable w a r r i o r has basically no w o r t h at all. W h e n e v e r
he is forced to w i t h d r a w before the better a r m a m e n t of the hoplite,
the peltast m u s t m o v e f o r w a r d again at t h e right m o m e n t ; every-
thing d e p e n d s o n this. I n o r d e r t o d o that, each individual m u s t
have a very s t r o n g i n n e r drive, a n d t h e l e a d e r s h i p m u s t enjoy t h e
highest c o n f i d e n c e o f t h e m e n a n d m u s t h a v e t h e m securely i n
h a n d . T h e c o m m a n d e r w h o attains t h a t can do a g r e a t deal with it,
and such l e a d e r s , f o r m e d t h r o u g h practice a n d constantly t r a i n i n g
their m e n , now a p p e a r o n the scene.
T h e A t h e n i a n m e r c e n a r y c o m m a n d e r I p h i c r a t e s i s particularly
f a m o u s f o r g r e a t a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s w i t h his p e l t a s t s . H e t r a n s -
formed this a r m , which t h e r e t o f o r e h a d b e e n c o n s i d e r e d as half
barbarian, into t h e a r m truly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of G r e e k military p r o -
fessionalism, by c o n c u r r e n t l y i m p r o v i n g w e a p o n s a n d e q u i p m e n t .
T h e long sword instead of t h e s h o r t sword, a n d a long s p e a r in ad-
dition to the s h o r t e r javelin, b o t h of which m a d e t h e peltasts m o r e
capable of e n g a g i n g in close c o m b a t with the hoplite, w e r e s u p -
posedly i n t r o d u c e d by I p h i c r a t e s . T h e m a i n stress, however, s h o u l d
not be placed on these inventions, which, strictly speaking, a r e n o t
i n v e n t i o n s a t all, b u t r a t h e r o n t h e excellent disciplinary system
that, a c c o r d i n g t o N e p o s , I p h i c r a t e s i n t r o d u c e d a m o n g his t r o o p s .
T h i s is what e n a b l e d h i m to e m p l o y so effectively the light infantry,
which h a d previously b e e n held in low esteem. X e n o p h o n tells us
(Hellenica 4. 4. 16) that, for fear of t h e peltasts of Iphicrates, t h e
A r c a d i a n hoplites h a d n o t d a r e d t o m o v e o u t from b e h i n d their
city walls. In t h e face of the L a c e d a e m o n i a n hoplites, however, w h o
h a d their y o u n g e r age g r o u p s swarm o u t against t h e m , the peltasts,

i n t u r n , w e r e afraid a n d w e r e unwilling t o m o v e within javelin
r a n g e . T h e y o u n g e r L a c e d a e m o n i a n hoplites w e r e , consequently, s o
s t r o n g in their r u n n i n g t r a i n i n g that they w e r e able to overtake the
peltasts despite their heavy e q u i p m e n t .
B u t on o n e occasion w h e n a L a c e d a e m o n i a n mora with excessive
self-confidence m o v e d across in front of C o r i n t h , it was s u d d e n l y
attacked n e a r L e c h a e u m by Iphicrates with g r e a t superiority a n d
was c r u s h e d , while t h e peltasts continuously fired on the m a r c h i n g
m e n a n d t h e n , as the e n e m y attacked, fell back on their following
h o p l i t e s . A cavalry g r o u p that t h e n c a m e to t h e aid of the
L a c e d a e m o n i a n s was a p p a r e n t l y too weak a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d noth-
ing. X e n o p h o n r e p r o a c h e s t h e m for having b e e n too lackadaisical
(Hellenica 4. 5).
At Abydos Iphicrates w o n a similar victory to t h a t at L e c h a e u m
with his peltasts by falling s u d d e n l y on the L a c e d a e m o n i a n hoplites
while they w e r e d e s c e n d i n g a m o u n t a i n , s t r e t c h e d o u t loosely in a
long line (Hellenica 4. 8. 37).
W h e n , shortly t h e r e a f t e r , Agesilaus was attacked in a similar way
in A c a r n a n i a , he succeeded in a resolute attack, with t h e s u p p o r t of
his cavalry, in inflicting heavy losses on t h e e n e m y peltasts a n d
driving their reserve of hoplites to flight, so t h a t he was able to
c o n t i n u e the m a r c h freely (Hellenica 5. 6).
T h e T h r a c i a n o r N o r t h e r n G r e e k peltasts, w h o a p p e a r e d i n the
earlier p e r i o d as m e r c e n a r i e s , w e r e probably not uniformly a r m e d
a n d e q u i p p e d . It was left to the individual w h e t h e r he w o u l d pro-
vide himself with a l o n g e r or s h o r t e r sword a n d w h e t h e r he wore
greaves o r boots o r simple sandals. T h e use o f u n i f o r m military
a r m s a n d e q u i p m e n t was probably first established in t h e r e g u l a r
m e r c e n a r y service u n d e r G r e e k leaders like I p h i c r a t e s .
W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c a v a l r y , t o o , m a d e a n y p r o g r e s s i n this
period c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d . Cavalry was a p p r e c i a t e d principally
by the Boeotians, who also d e v e l o p e d the m i x e d c o m b a t concept by
a t t a c h i n g to the cavalry swift-footed light i n f a n t r y m e n , the
3
hamippen. Agesilaus realized, X e n o p h o n tells us, t h a t in his w a r in
Asia he could do n o t h i n g in the o p e n field without cavalry, a n d he
4
t h e r e f o r e f o r m e d a cavalry u n i t . X e n o p h o n himself d e v o t e d two of
his works to this a r m . W h a t we have to say on this subject is best
t r e a t e d in the discussion of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s in the n e x t book.
T h e p r o g r e s s t h e G r e e k s m a d e d u r i n g this p e r i o d i n the art o f
siegecraft is very significant. As far back as on t h e original wall
paintings a n d reliefs of the Egyptians a n d t h e Assyrians o n e can

recognize siege engines. T h e G r e e k s , however, w e r e still quite inept
in their use, even in the P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r . Pericles h a d already, it
is t r u e , h a d siege m a c h i n e s built at the investment of Samos, a n d
the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s m a d e some a t t e m p t s d u r i n g the siege of Plataea
to s u b d u e the town by m e a n s of an e m b a n k m e n t that was built u p ,
a b a t t e r i n g r a m , or fire, b u t failing to achieve their goal by any of
these m e a n s , they f i n a l l y c o n t e n t e d themselves with s u r r o u n d i n g
the wall, t h u s s h u t t i n g in the city a n d starving t h e inhabitants. T h e
Greeks seem to have l e a r n e d the real art of siegecraft first of all on
Sicily from t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w h o attacked a n d took Selinus, H i m -
5
era, A c r a g a s , a n d Gela with m i n e s , t o w e r s , a n d b a t t e r i n g r a m s
(409-405 B . C . ) . Dionysius the Elder, t y r a n t of Syracuse, was a g r e a t
m a c h i n e builder, a n d this a r t s p r e a d from Sicily to ancient G r e e c e .
A r o u n d this t i m e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f c a n n o n , c a t a p u l t s , a n d
petrobols was also i n v e n t e d in Syracuse, a n d t h e t r i r e m e s w e r e en-
6
larged into p e n t e r e m e s . As D i o d o r u s r e c o u n t s , Dionysius g a t h e r e d
in Syracuse t h e most e x p e r t technicians from t h e whole world, per-
sonally c o n c e r n e d himself with t h e w o r k e r s , s p u r r e d t h e m o n , re-
w a r d e d t h e i n d u s t r i o u s a n d capable o n e s , a n d invited t h e m t o his
table. So they b e n t every effort a n d devised new kinds of projectiles
7
and machines.
EXCURSUS
1. A m o n g the Spartans we find a very t h o r o u g h , precise organization, but it was

changed so often that we cannot d e t e r m i n e its details with certainty. T h e lochi were
divided into pentecostys, the pentecostys into enomotys, which n u m b e r e d from 32 to 36
8
m e n . U n d o u b t e d l y drills were also c o n d u c t e d in these smallest units.
2. N e p o s recounts the work of Iphicrates in such a way as to give the impression
that the latter had transformed hoplites into peltasts and had, in fact, been the first
o n e to invent the peltast branch. That may be correct for Athens, which up to this
time had had no peltasts, since they were considered a barbaric arm. By virtue of a
systematic d e v e l o p m e n t this arm was raised so high that e v e n Athenian citizens were
willing to serve in it. Nevertheless, the description N e p o s gives of Iphicrates' peltasts
is unsatisfactory. He makes no m e n t i o n of the throwing w e a p o n s but only of the
long spear and the long sword. From this account o n e would be forced to believe
that it was a question of a close-in fighter, and Rüstow and Köchly did, in fact, feel
obliged to believe that they should understand Iphicrates' changes in this way, that
he had created a new type of m e d i u m infantry. T h i s concept, however, has already
been rejected, and rightly so, by Bergk and also by H. Droysen (p. 26) and A d o l f
Bauer (Section 42). N o w h e r e in the accounts of military actions d o e s such a type of
infantry appear; the decisive arm continued to be the hoplites. T h e only doubtful
point is to what extent the l e n g t h e n e d spear and the longer sword, used in conjunc-
tion with the light protective equipment (burlap armor; boots instead of the "Iphic-
rates greaves") were inventions of Iphicrates or were already the regular e q u i p m e n t
of the peltasts before his time.
History of t h e A r t of W a r
154
N O T E W O R T H Y BATTLES O F T H I S P E R I O D
3. With the battle of Cunaxa, as with all the Persian battles, o n e must First under-
take a trimming-down of the n u m b e r s involved. T h e Greeks had become so accus-
tomed to the idea that Persian armies, in keeping with the h u g e size of that empire,
had to be gigantic, that even a sober, clearheaded thinker and practical soldier like
X e n o p h o n simply passes on the current fables as if hypnotized. At Cunaxa Artax-
erxes is s u p p o s e d to have had four army corps of 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e n each, three of which
9
were on the s c e n e . Even the n u m b e r of 100,000 m e n that Cyrus was supposed to
have had with him, in addition to the 13,000 Greeks, is the object of well-founded
doubts, as L. Hollaender has shown, in the Annex to Annual Report of the Cathedral
Gymnasium of Naumburg, 1793 (Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Domgymnasiums zu Naum-
burg, 1793). Presumably this was only a rather unimportant corps.
In the battle the Persian cavalry u n d e r Tissaphernes charged d o w n on the Greek
peltasts, w h o were in position beside the hoplite phalanx. T h e peltasts gave way be-
fore the attack, allowed the Persian h o r s e m e n to pass through, and shot at them
from both sides as they p l u n g e d through. T h e cavalry did not risk charging into the
phalanx, although they could now have attacked it from behind and, after the Per-
sians of Cyrus had taken flight, also from the flank, where Cyrus' m e n had been.
T h e Greeks were c o n c e r n e d about such an attack and therefore wanted to make
such a m a n e u v e r as to provide cover for their rear and flank, that is, to form up
with their rear to the Euphrates, which up to this point had been on their right
flank. T h e y would therefore have had to make a full 9 0 - d e g r e e wheeling movement,
a m a n e u v e r that is most difficult to carry out for a d e p l o y e d long line. T h e move-
1 0
ment, the logic and possibility of which are not clear to u s , s e e m s nevertheless not
to have been executed.
T h e Persians assembled in their old position, and the Greeks—whether it be that
1 1
the Persians were threatening an attack or n o t — m a d e at them once again and
threw them back. Presumably the Persians did not follow t h r o u g h seriously in this
second action, because their infantry had already left the battlefield. Otherwise, it
would be impossible to explain why the cavalry did not attack the Greeks on their
flank.
It is o b v i o u s h o w g r e a t l y the c o n d i t i o n s h a d c h a n g e d in c o m p a r i s o n with
Marathon and Plataea. T h e Greek phalanx, c o m p o s e d of mercenaries with profes-
sional officers, had a very m u c h stronger cohesiveness than the Athenian citizen
militia. C o r r e s p o n d i n g to this awareness and the morale superiority that the events
of the century had given the Greeks, their phalanx went into battle with much great-
er self-confidence, the Persians with correspondingly less. Finally, the phalanx was
being supported by an excellent auxiliary arm with projectile weapons. A n d so the
Greek infantry was now capable of meeting the Persians in the o p e n field.
All of this also explains the possibility of a withdrawal. T h e Persians would proba-
bly have been able to overwhelm the Greeks, but they probably wanted to spare
their o w n blood and h o p e d that the Greeks, without their intervention, would col-
lapse in the Carduchian mountains. It d o e s not follow from this that there was a
positive superiority of the Greek infantry over the Persian cavalry. Even the 50 m e n
w h o m the Greeks had m o u n t e d as cavalry cannot have frightened the Persians back
in such a way. X e n o p h o n himself recounts, in Hellenica 3. 4. 15, as already men-
t i o n e d a b o v e , that Agesilaus, in the war against T i s s a p h e r n e s , r e c o g n i z e d that
cavalry was indispensable if he was to be able to hold his o w n against the Persians in
the o p e n field.
Dr. Marie Pancritius, in her Studies on the Battle of Cunaxa (Studien über die Schlacht
bei Kunaxa) (Berlin, Alex. Dunker, 1906), successfully disproves many of the dis-
torted points that have recently been put forward by scholars c o n c e r n i n g X e n o p h o n
and the T e n T h o u s a n d , but she d o e s not facilitate the insight into the strategic and
tactical circumstances, since she p r o c e e d s from false assumptions.
4. X e n o p h o n , in Hellenica 3. 4. 2 3 , tells of a combat action of Agesilaus against
Persian cavalry. He wanted to support his own, obviously weaker cavalry with his
infantry. For this purpose he sent the ten youngest classes of hoplites ahead, then
the peltasts, and then the main body of the phalanx. T h e purpose of this separation
was to allow not only the peltasts but even the hoplites to move against the e n e m y
horsemen, and since the main body of the phalanx, with many older men, was too
slow for this, the y o u n g e r m e n , w h o could continue r u n n i n g for a longer time, were
sent out ahead.
5. On the battle of C o r i n t h , in 3 9 4 B . C . , we have, it is t r u e , an a c c o u n t by
X e n o p h o n (Hellenica 4. 2) and a few other bits of information, but they are not
e n o u g h for a true understanding. On both sides the right wing triumphed by out-
flanking the e n e m y left wing, thanks to the pulling to the right, and taking the
enemy from the flank. T h e Lacedaemonians then s w u n g to the left with their vic-
torious corps and beat the e n e m y contingents that were returning from the pursuit,
one after the other.
From this account we must therefore a s s u m e that the excellent discipline and
good order of the Spartans, which did not let up after the victory and made possible
the difficult m a n e u v e r of the 9 0 - d e g r e e wheel (with 6 , 0 0 0 men), proved to be the
decisive factor. Many of the details, however, still remain obscure.
According to X e n o p h o n the allied Corinthians, Boeotians, and A t h e n i a n s had
1,550 h o r s e m e n , the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s only 6 0 0 ; and the former, moreover, had
numerical superiority in light infantry. How was it possible for the Lacedaemonian
hoplites to e n v e l o p the Athenian flank if at that point there was a superior force of
cavalry with a larger n u m b e r of light infantrymen? According to a remark in Plato's
Menexenus (cited in Grote), the A t h e n i a n s are supposed to have attributed their d e -
feat to the bad terrain ("since they were making use of r o u g h ground"*). Perhaps
this explains why the cavalry did not intervene—but why then did they fight on ter-
rain where the superiority of their cavalry could not be exploited?
According to X e n o p h o n , the allies are s u p p o s e d to have had also 2 4 , 0 0 0 hoplites,
the Spartans only 13,500. T h e latter achieved their first partial victory with 6 , 0 0 0
men against 3,600 A t h e n i a n s (6 tribes), while the rest of their army, with the e x c e p -
tion of a small d e t a c h m e n t , was b e i n g d e f e a t e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y there w e r e n o w
20,400 victorious o p p o n e n t s facing the 6 , 0 0 0 victorious Lacedaemonians—and the
allies were then supposedly all defeated, o n e after the other. T h a t sounds, however,
quite unlikely, especially if we r e m e m b e r also the cavalry and the fact that we do not
know where it remained. What is more, if we now observe from Diodorus (14. 8 2 .
83) that another report gave the two sides 5 0 0 h o r s e m e n each, but the Spartans
23,000 m e n on foot against 15,000, it seems clearly best to conclude that we know
too little of a definite nature concerning the course of this battle to enable us to
analyze its details.
6. A few weeks after the battle of Corinth the army that was defeated there had
to take to the field again in order to block, at Coronea, the route of Agesilaus, w h o
was approaching from Asia. T h i s time the o p p o s i n g strengths were quite equal, e v e n
according to X e n o p h o n . Again we learn n o t h i n g of the activity of the h o r s e m e n and
the light infantry, and again the right flank is victorious on both sides. But contrary
to the previous battle, the two victorious wings now took up the fight in earnest,
turning to face each other, and they fought it out with the greatest obstinacy. T h e
T h e b a n s finally forced Agesilaus' soldiers aside and so gained a means of retreat,
but suffered very heavy losses. X e n o p h o n says that the battle was "such as no other
during our times."* T h a t is probably attributable to the unusually energetic e x e c u t i o n
of the second combat, since it was otherwise normal for o n e side to give way im-
mediately after the clash of the phalanxes. In Agesilaus there is a description of how,
the next day, the g r o u n d was seen soaked with blood, the dead—friend and foe
alike—lying next to each other, splintered shields, b r o k e n spears, bared swords on
the g r o u n d , in bodies, and still in the h a n d s of the d e a d .
7. In Hellenica 4. 2. 5, Agesilaus a n n o u n c e s a bounty for "whoever should j o i n the
army with the best-equipped force of hoplites, b o w m e n , and peltasts."*
K. Hartmann, in On Arrian's Tactics (Uber die Taktik des Arrian) (Bamberg Program
of 1895), p. 16, understands that as a lochus c o m p o s e d of a combination of the three

arms. That is hardly correct. It is probably a question of o n e lochus of each arm.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I V
1. H e r o d o t u s 1. 6 1 . T h e m e r c e n a r i e s of Pisistratus seem, in fact,

to have b e e n n o t G r e e k s b u t Scythians. Helbig, Sitzungs-Berichte der
Münchner Akademie 2 (1897): 2 5 9 . A military review by Pisistratus or
H i p p i a s on a d a r k - f i g u r e d bowl.
2. H e r o d o t u s 3. 39.
3. T h u c y d i d e s 5. 57. 2. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 3. 5. 24.
4. Hellenica 3. 4. 15: ". . . Unless he p r o c u r e d a sufficient cavalry
force, he would n o t be able to c a m p a i g n in t h e plains; he t h e r e f o r e
took it to m i n d t h a t o n e s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d , so t h a t he would n o t
h a v e to fight t h e war shirkingly."*
5 . Adolf B a u e r , p a r a . 4 7 .
6. D i o d o r u s , Book 10.
7 . " O n Machines a n d T h e i r N a m e s " ("Ueber die K o n s t r u k t i o n e n
u n d N a m e n " ) , B a u e r , p a r a . 58.
8. T h e details a r e d e b a t a b l e a n d a r e described in various ways.
C o m p a r e B a u e r , p a r a . 2 3 ; D r o y s e n , p . 6 8 ; B e l o c h , Population
(Bevölkerung), p. 131. Busolt, in Hermes 40 (1905): 387, seeks to ex-
plain t h e contradictions in the accounts by p r o v i n g (successfully, in
m y o p i n i o n ) that t h e r e w e r e m a n y c h a n g e s .
9. Reuss, in Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 145: 550, has m a d e it
a p p e a r p r o b a b l e that X e n o p h o n is i n n o c e n t in t h e m a t t e r of these
n u m b e r s . It seems t h a t P a r a g r a p h s 10 to 13 of C h a p t e r 7, Book 1,
a r e a l a t e r i n s e r t i o n . T h i s will s e r v e p e r h a p s t o a n s w e r t h e
philologists w h o w o u l d like to attack my r e s e a r c h with t h e following
conclusion: X e n o p h o n , a n eyewitness, t r u t h - l o v i n g m a n , a n d practi-
cal soldier, has t h e a r m y of A r t a x e r x e s d e p l o y with 900,000 m e n .
Naturally, we c a n n o t i m a g i n e how that took place, b u t a witness of
such prestige m u s t be believed. W h a t was possible at C u n a x a was
also possible e l s e w h e r e — c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e a r m y of X e r x e s also can
h a v e b e e n s e v e r a l m i l l i o n m e n s t r o n g . T h e so-called objective
analytical m e t h o d t h e r e f o r e is n o t suitable for antiquity; t h e r e is
n o t h i n g else for us to do b u t to seek o u t t h e best a c c o u n t a n d to
r e p e a t it.
10. H o w the w o r d s o f X e n o p h o n a r e t o b e i n t e r p r e t e d has b e e n
t h e subject of very m u c h research, i n c l u d i n g very recent works by
F. Reuss, Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie (NJP), 1883, p. 817; B ü n g e r ,
NJP 1 3 1 : 2 6 2 ; a n d G. F r i e d r i c h , NJP 1 5 1 : 19. Scholars always im-
agine t h e m o v e m e n t s of large t r o o p masses as m u c h too easy. Even

if t h e r e p o r t e d n u m b e r s of the Persian a r m y a r e r e d u c e d by 95 to
97 p e r c e n t , t h e r e still r e m a i n masses t h a t a r e very difficult to con-
trol tactically a n d absolutely incapable of c o m p l i c a t e d evolutions.
T h e b a c k w a r d wheel of the G r e e k p h a l a n x , even if we p i c t u r e it as
a forward wheel, after a face-about, which, as Reuss tells us, they
caused to be c a r r i e d o u t by only o n e wing, is an e x t r e m e l y difficult
m a n e u v e r . See in this c o n n e c t i o n the special study on G a u g a m e l a
below.
11. D i o d o r u s , whose account probably is traceable to Ctesias, t h e
d o c t o r o f A r t a x e r x e s , still tells o f a n a t t a c k b y t h e P e r s i a n s ;
X e n o p h o n , probably m o r e accurately, d o e s not.
Chapter V
Theory: Xenophon
T h e p r o g r e s s i n g t e c h n i q u e o f warfare also fostered t h e develop-

m e n t of t h e o r y . It probably h a d its start in t h e observation of the
a d v a n t a g e s of t h e various w e a p o n s . A special clue as to how the
lively A t h e n i a n s d e b a t e d t h e subject is to be f o u n d in Euripides'
t r a g e d y Hercules, in which t h e a u t h o r , w i t h o u t actually being forced
to do so by his material, b u t a p p a r e n t l y only to delight t h e public
spirit by t h e poetic e c h o of his o w n speeches, has Lycus, w h o por-
trays H e r c u l e s in a b a d light as a simple a r c h e r , fight with A m p h i t -
ryon.
Lycus says (according to Wilamowitz' translation into G e r m a n ) :
W h a t is H e r c u l e s after all? A r e p u t a t i o n for c o u r a g e

H a s he won by w a r r i n g on wild animals.
I n that h e may b e brave, b u t n o w h e r e else.
Never, after all, has t h e r e b e e n a shield at his side,
N o r has he ever t o u c h e d a spear. His w e a p o n s
A r e cowardly a r r o w s , his skill is in flight.
F o r manly c o u r a g e has n e v e r b e e n s h o w n by a n y o n e
As an a r c h e r . F o r that, o n e must stand fast
On his two feet a n d unflinchingly c o u c h his s p e a r .
He d o e s not step aside. His look is d i r e c t e d on the
Forest of s p e a r s stiffly s t a n d i n g over t h e r e — a n d he
Moves not a muscle.
A m p h i t r y o n t h e r e u p o n answers h i m :
T h a t very logical invention, bow a n d a r r o w ,

You, too, reject. So listen now a n d learn.
T h e lance fighter is t h e slave of his w e a p o n ;
If his point breaks, he is defenseless,
158
Theory: Xenophon 159
For only o n e w e a p o n protects him;

A n d if he fights in a r a n k with p o o r m e n ,
T h e n he falls because of his n e i g h b o r ' s cowardice.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e whose h a n d controls t h e bow,
He has t h e a d v a n t a g e (and it is the greatest of all),
Even if he has already fired off a t h o u s a n d shots,
He still lacks not an a r m to p r o t e c t h i m .
Even from afar his missile strikes, a n d t h e foe,
Feeling himself hit, still does n o t see by w h o m .
H e , however, stands in a covered place a n d d o e s not offer
His b o d y to t h e e n e m y . T h i s is in war
T h e greatest skill, i n d e p e n d e n t of c h a n c e ,
T o h a r m t h e e n e m y while s p a r i n g oneself.
At j u s t a b o u t this t i m e , d u r i n g t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r , a few
Sophists b e g a n to c o n d u c t lectures on the a r t of war. X e n o p h o n
must be r e g a r d e d , however, as t h e first o n e to analyze systemati-
cally the n a t u r e of t h e c o n d u c t of w a r a n d to p r e s e n t his findings.
H e already recognized a n d stressed r e p e a t e d l y t h a t t h e c o n d u c t o f
war is not a science, but r a t h e r it calls on t h e whole m a n , with all
his abilities. He has Socrates saying t h a t "tactics a r e only a very
small p a r t of t h e art of w a r f a r e " (Memorabilia 3. 1). T h e field com-
m a n d e r m u s t also b e a w a r e o f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t h a s t o d o w i t h
e q u i p m e n t a n d m u s t be skilled at p r o v i d i n g t h e necessities of life
for his soldiers. " H e m u s t be i n g e n i o u s , e n e r g e t i c , careful, full of
stamina a n d p r e s e n c e o f m i n d , loving a n d t o u g h , s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d
and crafty, alert a n d deceptive, r e a d y t o g a m b l e e v e r y t h i n g a n d
wishing t o have e v e r y t h i n g , g e n e r o u s a n d g r e e d y , t r u s t i n g a n d sus-
picious." N a t u r e a n d e d u c a t i o n m u s t b e b l e n d e d i n his m a k e u p .
A n o t h e r passage (3. 4. 3) states that it is useful for t h e c o m m a n d e r
to be e a g e r for glory. T h e Cyropaedia is a t e x t b o o k on politics a n d the
art of war in t h e f o r m of a historical novel. I m p o r t a n t as t h e book
is in its literary aspect a n d m u c h as it has b e e n r e a d by practical
soldiers, nevertheless, for o u r p u r p o s e , r e s e a r c h into t h e history of
the art of war, t h e r e is little to be d e r i v e d f r o m it. T h e e t e r n a l a n d
u n c h a n g i n g e l e m e n t s of t h e c o n d u c t of war, t h e psychological a n d
m o r a l e aspects, w e r e t r e a t e d a d m i r a b l y by X e n o p h o n , but t h e his-
torical forms, subject to c h a n g e , a r e t r e a t e d by h i m only cursorily
or even fantastically, so that o n e m u s t be careful not to take t h e
novel for reality. T h e f o r m s of w a r f a r e in X e n o p h o n ' s time a r e so
simple t h a t t h e r e was not m u c h to be said a b o u t t h e m . X e n o p h o n
was not the type of creative spirit w h o w o u l d have t a k e n the m a t e r i -
al at h a n d a n d d e v e l o p e d a n d solved new p r o b l e m s . W h e r e v e r he
tries to do so, he obviously fails, a n d , practical soldier that he is, he
even falls off into impractical theorizing.
A m o n g the problems that must have occupied every Greek
l e a d e r was t h a t o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f b r e a d t h t o d e p t h i n the
p h a l a n x . S h o u l d o n e f o r m u p , say 10,000 hoplites, preferably 1,000
m e n wide a n d 1 0 m e n d e e p , o r 500 m e n wide a n d 2 0 m e n deep?
I n t h e o n e case o n e could outflank the e n e m y , i n t h e o t h e r case
1
o n e w o u l d h a v e a m u c h g r e a t e r weight for t h e i m p a c t . It is sur-
prising that, in t h e e n t i r e r a n g e of ancient l i t e r a t u r e , we find no
real observations on this q u e s t i o n . In fact, we do n o t even have a
definite r e p o r t a b o u t h o w d e e p t h e p h a l a n x e s w e r e normally actu-
ally a r r a n g e d . It is so often a question of an 8 - m a n d e p t h , that we
h a v e t e n d e d to r e g a r d this n u m b e r as a k i n d of n o r m a l formation,
a n d t h a t may be correct. B u t in individual cases this was varied, not
only because of special n e e d b u t also arbitrarily. We can h a r d l y un-
d e r s t a n d it w h e n T h u c y d i d e s r e p o r t s of t h e battle of M a n t i n e a that
t h e v a r i o u s c a p t a i n s h a d d r a w n u p t h e i r d e t a c h m e n t s i n varying
d e p t h s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r o w n ideas. In t h e battle of Delium the
T h e b a n s f o r m e d u p 2 5 m e n d e e p , while t h e o t h e r c o n t i n g e n t s were
of v a r y i n g d e p t h , b u t in any case very m u c h m o r e shallow.
X e n o p h o n a d d r e s s e s this question in t h e feigned battle of Cyrus
against C r o e s u s . It was r e p o r t e d to C y r u s t h a t t h e Egyptians were
d r a w n up 100 m e n d e e p , while his own a r m y stood 12 m e n d e e p .
O n e o f his s u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s was c o n c e r n e d a b o u t w h e t h e r
they would be s t r o n g e n o u g h when faced with such a d e e p
p h a l a n x . C y r u s replied that, if t h e p h a l a n x was d e e p e r t h a n the
range of the weapons, then the latter would cause no more
d a m a g e — a n objection t h a t m u s t be t e r m e d unsatisfactory in every
respect. Even with 12 or 8 r a n k s , m o r e t h a n half of the w e a p o n s
can no l o n g e r have a direct impact. T h a t t h e a d v a n t a g e of a d e e p
f o r m a t i o n is its p o w e r of i m p a c t can, least of all, have b e e n u n -
k n o w n to a m a n like X e n o p h o n , a n d he was still to e x p e r i e n c e it
a n d t o b e called u p o n t o r e c o u n t how this p o w e r p r o v e d itself a n d
developed.
A n o t h e r p r o b l e m t h a t m u s t h a v e p r e o c c u p i e d G r e e k military
m e n is the coordination of the hoplites with the long-distance
w e a p o n s . Actually, up to t h a t t i m e each a r m c o n d u c t e d its o w n bat-
tle; no tactics of c o o r d i n a t e d a r m s existed. O n l y infrequently was
t h e r e success in using missile w e a p o n s effectively against hoplites
a n d i n s u p p o r t i n g o n e a r m with a n o t h e r . X e n o p h o n h a s C y r u s
placing his s p e a r - t h r o w e r s b e h i n d t h e hoplites a n d t h e a r c h e r s be-
hind the s p e a r - t h r o w e r s a n d each s h o o t i n g over t h e h e a d s o f t h e

ranks in front of h i m (4. 2). For t h e s h a r p s h o o t e r s , we a r e told,
were not able to h o l d their own in h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t ; b u t w h e n
covered by the hoplites they could h u r l t h e i r spears a n d fire over
them.
If such a disposition of t h e a r m s w e r e possible f r o m a practical
point of view, it w o u l d naturally be e x t r e m e l y effective, a n d we
would e n c o u n t e r it s o m e w h e r e in actuality. B u t it is p u r e t h e o r y .
T h e spears a n d a r r o w s t h a t a r e fired off in an a r c h i n g trajectory
2
over the hoplites can have at best a m i n i m a l effect; a n d t h e y a r e
almost completely u n u s a b l e w h e n t h e hoplite p h a l a n x is in t h e fast
motion of its final assault pace. If t h e projected w e a p o n s a r e seri-
ously t o h a r m a n d w e a k e n t h e e n e m y p h a l a n x b e f o r e t h e i m p a c t o f
the h a n d w e a p o n s , t h e n t h e hail of missiles m u s t start from a con-
siderable distance, o r t h e hoplite p h a l a n x itself m u s t h a v e s o m e
kind of firing a r m . H o w could such a practical, c l e a r h e a d e d writer
as X e n o p h o n p a i n t such a p h a n t a s m a g o r i a as the posting of
sharpshooters in t h e r e a r r a n k s of t h e p h a l a n x ? T h i s w o u l d be in-
c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , if it w e r e not for o t h e r e x a m p l e s of history show-
ing how easily t h e o r y can w a n d e r f r o m t h e firm g r o u n d of reality.
T h a t e m i n e n t p r a c t i t i o n e r N a p o l e o n I p r o p o s e d in his observations
on the "Seven Years' W a r " ( R e m a r k s 2 to 11 a n d C h a p t e r 12) giv-
ing t h e m e n in t h e t h i r d r a n k of t h e infantry cork soles 3 to 5 in-
ches thick so that they w o u l d be able to shoot over the h e a d s of t h e
other r a n k s . W e r e they t o buckle o n t h e i r cork sandals j u s t b e f o r e
firing, or w e r e they to m a r c h with their cork soles? T h i s is t h e p r e -
cise c o u n t e r p a r t t o X e n o p h o n ' s p r o p o s a l . N o t o n l y o u r f r i e n d
H o m e r , b u t even t h e greatest g e n e r a l s n o d a t times.
More realistically conceived seems to be t h e r e g u l a t i o n t h a t mili-
tary police s h o u l d be placed in t h e r e a r m o s t positions in o r d e r to
see to it t h a t n o b o d y straggles a n d , in e x t r e m e cases, to strike d o w n
deserters. W h e n o n e reflects m o r e closely o n this, however, this a d -
vice, too, shows up as theoretical a n d we see t h a t it has n e v e r yet
b e e n c a r r i e d o u t i n p r a c t i c e b y a n y f i e l d c o m m a n d e r ; for w h o
g u a r a n t e e s t h e c o u r a g e of t h e military police? If t h e y a r e really
m e n o n w h o s e c o u r a g e o n e can c o u n t with absolute certainty, t h e n
they a r e no d o u b t better used in t h e front line t h a n in t h e r e a r .
A t h i r d p r o b l e m X e n o p h o n t o u c h e s on is t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a
reserve. T h e G r e e k hoplite p h a l a n x attacks in a single closed for-
mation. If a p o r t i o n of this f o r m a t i o n is left b e h i n d , it is available
for special use, b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e force of t h e initial i m p a c t
is c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y w e a k e n e d . With his g e n i u s for d i s c e r n i n g practi-
cal necessities, X e n o p h o n h a d r e m o v e d a small r e s e r v e from the

p h a l a n x in t h e battle against P h a r n a b a z u s d e s c r i b e d above, in order
to be able to c o u n t e r possible flank attacks by t h e Persian cavalry. A
c o n c e p t o f t h e most f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p o r t a n c e — b u t w e d o not f i n d
this idea t r e a t e d in t h e Cyropaedia; at best, o n e m i g h t find an ap-
p r o a c h to that idea in t h e positioning of the cavalry in t h e great
fantasy battle (7. 1). H e r e t h e cavalry t h a t h a d b e e n held back was
used by C y r u s to take f r o m the flank, in his t u r n , t h e outflanking
a n d e n v e l o p i n g e n e m y cavalry.
T h e a u t h o r goes into m u c h m o r e detail, h o w e v e r , i n a n appraisal
of t h e scythed chariot a n d p r o p o s e s (6. 1. 30) h a v i n g t h e phalanx
followed by high w o o d e n towers o c c u p i e d by 20 m e n , to be towed
into battle by 16 o x e n a t t a c h e d to 8 shafts, a n d he r e c o u n t s how a
test h a d shown t h a t they w e r e easily t r a n s p o r t a b l e . He explains that
in t h e case of a b a g g a g e w a g o n each t e a m of o x e n has 25 talents to
pull a n d m a n a g e s to do so; with these towers, h o w e v e r , each team
would have only 15 talents of weight, a n d so it was obviously prac-
ticable.
We a r e a b u n d a n t l y r e p a i d for these trivialities, which o n e can ac-
c o u n t for as fiction, by a little story (2. 3. 17), which is s u p p o s e d to
show us what a g r e a t s u p e r i o r i t y close-combat w e a p o n s have over
projectiles. A taxiarch divided up his m e n a n d gave half of them
clubs, while h e h a d t h e o t h e r half take clods o f e a r t h . T h e n h e had
t h e m fight each o t h e r , a n d on t h e following day t h e fight was re-
p e a t e d with the w e a p o n s e x c h a n g e d . C y r u s invited the taxis, to a
meal a n d asked t h e m e n how they h a d g o t t e n t h e i r b u m p s a n d how
t h e fight h a d g o n e . T h e y were all a g r e e d that they did, i n d e e d , get
a few bruises from the clods, b u t that in e x c h a n g e they took all the
g r e a t e r p l e a s u r e later in b e a t i n g t h e c l o d - t h r o w e r s with t h e i r clubs.
A c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , C y r u s for this r e a s o n i n t r o d u c e d t h e type
of c o m b a t with h a n d - t o - h a n d w e a p o n s , with which o n e directly at-
tacks t h e e n e m y soldiers (2. 1. 7 - 9 ; 2. 1. 2 1 ; 2. 3. 17). In his time,
however, it is said at t h e e n d of the work, t h e Persians h a d again
t u r n e d to o t h e r customs; they h a d r e p o r t e d l y again b e c o m e missile
f i g h t e r s , a n d a l t h o u g h they w e r e a r m e d with sabers, they avoided
h a n d - t o - h a n d combat.
T h e definite way X e n o p h o n stresses t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e h a n d -
t o - h a n d fighter, w h o c o m e s directly to grips with his e n e m y , is to
be given all the m o r e weight because in G r e e c e precisely at that
time t h e light b r a n c h e s of t h e a r m s , particularly t h e peltasts, were
d e v e l o p e d a n d perfected a n d h a d r e a c h e d such a point as to have
defeated t h e hoplites now a n d t h e n . O n e may assume that t h e in-

trospective a n d analytical G r e e k s also f r e q u e n t l y a r g u e d that t h e
heavy hoplite p h a l a n x could be completely d e f e a t e d a n d d e s t r o y e d
in this way.
But the G r e e k s ' tradition did not allow t h e m to forget that t h e
spear h a d o v e r c o m e t h e bow in t h e Persian W a r s , a n d X e n o p h o n
was no m o r e misled on this point t h a n was t h e G r e e k practice. T h e
phalanx always r e m a i n e d the b a c k b o n e of t h e G r e e k a r m i e s , a n d all
the o t h e r b r a n c h e s of the a r m s , h o w e v e r g r e a t t h e p r o g r e s s that
they m a d e , r e m a i n e d as auxiliary a r m s .
In addition to t h e Cyropaedia, X e n o p h o n has also left us military
m o n o g r a p h s with m a n y an interesting detail, in his work on t h e
L a c e d a e m o n i a n state, as in two cavalry-related essays on the a r t of
h o r s e m a n s h i p a n d t h e cavalry leader.
T h e f i r s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e work o n military t h e o r y , free o f any
poetic t r a p p i n g s a n d o r i e n t e d directly t o w a r d practical applications,
came from the p e n o f a n A r c a d i a n , the S t y m p h a l i a n A e n e a s , w h o ,
using X e n o p h o n as a source, w r o t e a r o u n d t h e year 357 B . C . O n l y
one of the various books of his w o r k , that d e a l i n g with t h e d e f e n s e
of a city, has c o m e d o w n to us, a n d even it does not give us very
much i n f o r m a t i o n . Most of the book is t a k e n up with p r e c a u t i o n a r y
m e a s u r e s against t r e a s o n , s t r a t a g e m s of war, secret writing, tele-
graphy, a n d g e n e r a l observations. Nevertheless, t h e book contains
but little c o n c e r n i n g siege m a c h i n e s a n d c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s for t h e
defense, a n d even this little is possibly a later interpolation.
EXCURSUS
1. Baldes, in Xenophon's Cyropaedia as a Text on Tactics \Xenophons Cyropädie als Lehr-

buch der Taktik] (Birkenfeld Program, 1887), claims that X e n o p h o n had already es-
tablished the theory for what the Macedonians later put into execution: tactics of the
coordinated arms, battle cavalry, pursuit. T h e description in 3. 2. 5 he conceives of
as an e c h e l o n formation. I cannot agree. T h e formation of the Armenians in the
face of the Persians s e e m s to me to be a simple description of the battlefield situa-
tion, not the e m b o d i m e n t of a special tactical concept. With the first-named items,
however, the situation is different; they are actually described, as Baldes brings out,
but his account is not of very m u c h c o n s e q u e n c e , for the thought is just as easy as
the d e e d is difficult. Only in the latter is there true merit.
2. A e n e a s was edited by Köchly and Rüstow, and recently by H u g . Furthermore,
H u g treats h i m in the Gratulationsschrift der Universität Zurich an die Universität
Tubingen, 1897 (Congratulatory Volume from the University of Zurich to the University of
Tubingen, 1897). See also Jähns, History of the Science of War (Geschichte der
Kriegswissenschaft), V o l . 1, S e c t i o n 8, a n d A d o l f B a u e r , Military Antiquity
(Kriegsaltertum), Sections 2 and 47.
164 H i s t o r y of t h e A r t of W a r
1. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 4. 2. 13: T h e allied forces m o v i n g out

against S p a r t a in the year 395 B . C . take c o u n s e l "into how many
(ranks) o n e o u g h t to o r d e r the a r m y so t h a t you do not have to
move t h e hoplites too m u c h while t h e cities (allies) a r e s u r r o u n d i n g
the e n e m y . " * F r o m this it seems as if t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t i n g e n t s
h a d t h e t e n d e n c y to f o r m up as d e e p as possible, in o r d e r to con-
c e n t r a t e a s m u c h p o w e r a s possible, w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g t h a t this
could cause the e n t i r e battle line to be too short, or in t h e h o p e
that the o t h e r s would be so kind as to line up in a shallower forma-
tion.
2. For an exception, see p. 56, above.
Chapter VI
Epaminondas
All the extensions a n d r e f i n e m e n t s of t h e G r e e k a r t of war since
the Persian W a r s that we h a v e studied do n o t constitute any c h a n g e
or deviation in principle. A f u n d a m e n t a l innovation, however, can
b e attributed t o t h e T h e b a n E p a m i n o n d a s .
T h i s i n n o v a t i o n is r e l a t e d to a p u r e l y e x t e r n a l , c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
p h e n o m e n o n o f t h e old p h a l a n x tactics, t h e peculiar m o v e m e n t t o
the right, which h a d no very p r o f o u n d significance at all, b u t was
only a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e fact that t h e shield was b o r n e on t h e left
arm, b u t it h a d t h e f u r t h e r result that t h e r i g h t flank, sometimes
on both sides, was n o r m a l l y victorious.
E p a m i n o n d a s t h e r e f o r e r e i n f o r c e d h i s left f l a n k , s o t h a t i t
formed a d e e p e r c o l u m n — a t L e u c t r a 50 m e n d e e p — a n d held back
the right flank, which n o r m a l l y t e n d e d t o b e a h e a d . T h e e n e m y
right flank, t h e r e f o r e , which was a c c u s t o m e d to w i n n i n g , e n c o u n -
tered h e r e a cleverly reinforced o p p o s i t i o n ; the left flank, however,
also a c c o m p l i s h e d n o t h i n g , since it was at a n y r a t e a c c u s t o m e d to
a p p r o a c h the e n e m y s o m e w h a t hesitatingly, a n d t h a n k s t o the hold-
ing back of t h e e n e m y right, the battle on this flank n e v e r d i d d e -
velop fully, or only late in the action c a m e into full play.
R e i n f o r c e m e n t in d e p t h forces a s h o r t e n i n g of t h e front; in a
case o f e q u a l o p p o s i n g forces t h e e n e m y r i g h t w o u l d h a v e b e e n
able to o u t f l a n k t h e T h e b a n left wing, e n v e l o p it, a n d attack it
simultaneously f r o m front a n d flank. W h e t h e r , w h e n the e n c o u n t e r
takes place in this m a n n e r , t h e d e e p e r f o r m a t i o n is t h e b e t t e r o n e
is t h e big q u e s t i o n . If t h e e n e m y front h o l d s fast until its o v e r l a p -
ping p a r t has c a r r i e d o u t t h e e n v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e d e e p e r c o l u m n
is now attacked f r o m two directions, t h e latter will have difficulty
h o l d i n g its o w n . T h e r e f o r e a n essential c o m p l e m e n t o f t h e d e e p e r
formation on t h e o n e flank is the c o v e r i n g of t h a t s h o r t e n e d flank
by cavalry. E p a m i n o n d a s , however, b r o u g h t the two a r m s , infantry
165
a n d cavalry, t o g e t h e r in a fruitful organizational b l e n d . For now

since t h e left wing, d e s p i t e its s h o r t e n i n g , could not be outflanked
it was able with t h e full weight of its d e p t h n o t only to withstand
t h e e n e m y right b u t to attack it. Like a t r i r e m e r a m m i n g its o p p o -
n e n t , X e n o p h o n says of t h e battle of M a n t i n e a , t h e d e e p c o l u m n of
the T h e b a n s b r o k e t h r o u g h the S p a r t a n p h a l a n x with its mighty
impact.
E p a m i n o n d a s ' f o r m a t i o n is called t h e o b l i q u e o r d e r of battle;
even earlier, as we have seen, t h e p h a l a n x e s h a d m o v e d obliquely
against each o t h e r , b u t t h e oblique f o r m a t i o n b e c a m e a tactical con-
cept only because E p a m i n o n d a s t u r n e d it a b o u t , cleverly holding
back t h e r i g h t wing, which normally pressed f o r w a r d , a n d p u s h e d
a h e a d t h e left, while at t h e same time r e i n f o r c i n g it. Earlier both
o p p o s i n g p h a l a n x e s h a d p u s h e d t h e i r r i g h t flanks f o r w a r d in iden-
tical fashion, so t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e i r o b l i q u e f o r m a t i o n , they still
struck each o t h e r with parallel lines. T h a n k s to E p a m i n o n d a s ' ar-
r a n g e m e n t , they m e t obliquely, at a s h a r p a n g l e to each o t h e r , so
t h a t t h e o l d e r parallel battle b e c a m e a flank battle. O n l y t h e one
flank h a d to carry t h e offensive shock; t h e o t h e r flank was refused
a n d s o u g h t to stay completely o u t of t h e fight as l o n g as possible
a n d simply, t h r o u g h its p r e s e n c e a n d its d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , to occupy
a n d pin d o w n a p o r t i o n of t h e e n e m y force. F o r this p u r p o s e less
s t r e n g t h is n e e d e d , a n d t h e o t h e r w i n g — t h e offensive o n e — c a n be
reinforced with the s u r p l u s m e n , thus p r o v i d i n g an ingenious
superiority o n this flank. A n d w h e n i t h a d o n c e t h r o w n back the
r i g h t flank with its mass, t h e n t h e left flank, which c o n s i d e r e d itself
u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h e w e a k e r o n e , gave way a u t o m a t i -
cally.
We have a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d t h e e l e m e n t s peculiar to these tactics,
t h a t is, the d e e p c o l u m n a n d the c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e cavalry on both
sides of t h e T h e b a n s in t h e battle of Delium (Book II, C h a p t e r I,
Section 7). T h e fact t h a t a new c o n c e p t is e m b o d i e d in E p a m i n o n -
das' battle f o r m a t i o n is seen in t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e flanks. If the
T h e b a n commander had adopted the shortening and deepening of
t h e wing o n the right, n o t h i n g i m p o r t a n t w o u l d h a v e b e e n accom-
plished t h e r e b y ; it h a d already often h a p p e n e d that, first of all, the
two r i g h t flanks w e r e victorious, a n d for t h a t n o u n u s u a l formation
was n e e d e d . All of this is valuable only because it g u a r a n t e e s one's
o w n left wing t h e victory over t h e e n e m y right.
A new concept, however, n o r m a l l y m a k e s its p o w e r felt quickly in
several directions. A t L e u c t r a t h e B o e o t i a n a r m y probably h a d o n
its left side a n a t u r a l flank cover that, well s o u g h t out, m a d e any
Epaminondas 167
e n v e l o p m e n t difficult, a n d at M a n t i n e a t h e c o v e r i n g cavalry was, in

turn, s u p p o r t e d by its own light infantry, t h e hamippen, w h o w e r e
well t r a i n e d for this.
As an indication of X e n o p h o n ' s military insight, it is also w o r t h y
of m e n t i o n h e r e t h a t he finds t h e significance of E p a m i n o n d a s in
no way limited to t h e latter's discovery of t h e new tactics, but brings
out as particularly a d m i r a b l e "that he h a d a c c u s t o m e d his a r m y to
shy away from no effort, either by day or by night, to avoid no
d a n g e r , a n d to m a i n t a i n its discipline e v e n with t h e sparsest ra-
tions."
EXCURSUS
1. T h e basic e l e m e n t s of the changes m a d e by E p a m i n o n d a s are correctly recog-

nized and presented by Rüstow and Köchly. As to details, a few points—and not
entirely insignificant ones—are subject to correction. In general it is important to
observe that it was not first the Macedonians, but Epaminondas, w h o conceived the
tactics of combined arms.
2. As to detail, it is incorrect to c o m b i n e the e s t i m a t e of D i o d o r u s that
Epaminondas had 6,000 m e n at Leuctra with that of Plutarch, who gives the Spar-
tans 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry, and to conclude from that that the Boeotians
had c o n q u e r e d a force twice as large as theirs. It is true that even Diodorus states
that the Boeotians had defeated an e n e m y four times as strong as themselves, but
since the same author assures us that the Spartans had lost 4 , 0 0 0 m e n , the Boeotians
only 300, his numerical strengths must be regarded as worthless. From the way the
battle went, o n e cannot assume that o n e side was very significantly stronger than the
other. A d o l f Bauer has already correctly remarked that the numbers are unreliable.
Grote, too, rejects them, but nevertheless he accepts the fact that the Lacedaemo-
nians were superior in strength. I can see no basis for this. T h e 6,000 Boeotians are
presumably identical with the "one-twelfth of the 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n " m e n t i o n e d in Chap-
ter 24 of Plutarch's Pelopidas.
Rüstow and Köchly, furthermore, have the e n d a n g e r e d left flank of the Boeotians
covered not so m u c h by the cavalry as by a very complicated m a n e u v e r of the infan-
try: while the Spartans were wheeling with their e x t r e m e right wing in order to take
the T h e b a n s in the flank, Pelopidas, with his 3 0 0 - m a n - s t r o n g "Sacred Band," broke
out from the tail of the T h e b a n c o l u m n and, in turn, threatened the flank and the
rear of the Lacedaemonians. T h i s account rests on a combination of Plutarch's reci-
tal (Pelopidas, Chapters 19 and 23) with that of X e n o p h o n (Hellenica 6. 4). A d o l f
Bauer and H. Droysen, too, have accepted this account, the latter with the reserva-
tion that nobody knows where Pelopidas was stationed before making his move.
Against this account it can be argued that nothing whatever is to be found in
Plutarch about a breaking-out from the c o l u m n by Pelopidas, m u c h less about a
breaking-out toward the flank or an attack on the Spartans' flank. It is only stated
that the T h e b a n attack s u c c e e d e d , while the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s were p l a n n i n g to
wheel and therefore were not in g o o d order. It would have been impossible, too, for
a small d e t a c h m e n t of 3 0 0 m e n w h o broke loose from the large mass to be able to
accomplish such a result. Even in this battle o n e cannot deny the Spartans the proof
of the greatest courage—"all of the d e a d had been struck in the front." T h r e e
h u n d r e d m e n would not have been able to hold up the wheeling m a n e u v e r of such
a greatly superior n u m b e r of such men. O n e can, furthermore, neither assume that
it was a question of an improvisation by Pelopidas—for E p a m i n o n d a s must have
t a k e n s o m e p r e c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t e n v e l o p m e n t , i n view o f t h e s h o r t n e s s o f his
front—nor can o n e a s s u m e that this was a p r e p a r e d m a n e u v e r , for in this case
Pelopidas' d e t a c h m e n t would not have been placed at the tail of the c o l u m n but
would, as a withheld echelon, have been stationed to the side of the column in order
to cover its flank. A n d it follows that, had this been the case, the formation would
have had to be expressly reported to us. T h e r e seems to me to be no doubt of the
fact that Pelopidas with his "Sacred Band" fought at the head of the c o l u m n and
that it is nothing more than Plutarch's rhetorical elaboration that appears to give a
special position to his hero with the "Sacred Band." But Rüstow and Köchly believed
that what they were observing in this combat must have been the flank protection of
the large column, because they quite correctly postulated that such a unit must have
been at hand although specific m e n t i o n of it was missing.
I think, however, that this information is to be inferred from X e n o p h o n without
difficulty. T h e latter, w h o in any event carries m u c h greater authority for us than
d o e s the account in Plutarch, which passed perhaps t h r o u g h many hands and is
especially slanted toward P e l o p i d a s — X e n o p h o n , then, places all his stress on the
preceding cavalry combat and the fact that the Lacedaemonians were beaten in this
encounter. In the w o u n d e d pride associated with his prejudice for the Spartans he
thoroughly explains how and why their cavalry had been of no avail. N o w , after the
Laconian cavalry was d e f e a t e d , the hoplite phalanx was not able to carry out a
w h e e l i n g m o v e against the flank of the e n e m y in the presence of the victorious
e n e m y cavalry—but this fact was so obvious to him that he did not make any special
m e n t i o n of it at all. We may (without any hesitation), however, add this point, which
is essential for our understanding, instead of reading into Plutarch's lengthy and
unclear account the i n g e n i o u s but still inadequate m a n e u v e r of Pelopidas.
According to X e n o p h o n the Lacedaemonian cavalry was d r a w n up in front of the
p h a l a n x o f i n f a n t r y i n s t e a d o f o n t h e flank. W h y ? R ü s t o w a n d K ö c h l y say,
"Xenophon's answer to this question—'because the terrain b e t w e e n the two armies
was flat'—is no answer," and explain their idea to the effect that, during the ap-
proach march of the Lacedaemonians, the cavalry unintentionally got out in front
of the infantry. H. Droysen, on page 99 of his work m e n t i o n e d above, correctly
takes issue with this, saying that the specific expression of X e n o p h o n , "proetaxanto,"
eliminates this interpretation, and he asks, "Did Cleombrotus possibly want to shift his
infantry toward the right b e h i n d his cavalry, in o r d e r to take the Boeotian battle
mass in the flank and rear? Was the cavalry perhaps s u p p o s e d to wait until the in-
fantry had m a d e this move, in o r d e r then to attach itself to the infantry on the left
(right?), instead of attacking at that time, before the entire army had m o v e d up?"
T h e simple remark that the terrain between the armies was flat d o e s not, to be
sure, explain anything; it appears superfluous, since the Greek hoplite battles were
almost always fought out on flat g r o u n d . But if we look m o r e closely, we see that
X e n o p h o n d o e s not actually give any absolute cause-and-effect relationship. T h e
passage reads;
"Since there was a plain between the armies, the Lacedaemonians placed the cavalry
in front of their phalanx while the T h e b a n s also were arranging theirs."*
T h e "kai" following the "h ate" shows that the "plain b e t w e e n the armies" was only
a supporting reason for the formation, not the principal o n e . If, however, the level
g r o u n d between the phalanxes attracted the cavalry, it is to be a s s u m e d that the ter-
rain on the flank was less passable or e v e n perhaps not at all so.
Epaminondas, then, drew his army up in such a way that his left flank was cov-
ered by a natural obstacle. T h e Spartan line overlapped the Boeotian o n e but could
not e n v e l o p it because of the terrain. T h e n the Spartan cavalry tried to drive off the
Boeotian cavalry and for this purpose m o v e d out in front of their o w n hoplites in
o r d e r to o p e n up for them a route into the flank of the Boeotian hoplites. If the
Epaminondas 169
terrain had permitted an attack by the overlapping cavalry from the flank simul-
taneously with the advance of the hoplites, such a mistake would be completely in-
comprehensible. If, however, there was a terrain obstacle on the left flank of the
Boeotians, everything is clear. T h e strange and insufficient reason for the position
of the Spartan cavalry, "because the field between the infantry was flat," s e e m s to be
the psychological c o m p l e m e n t of the counteridea that the author had in m i n d but
forgot to express—that is, that the terrain on the left of the T h e b a n s was impass-
able. Nevertheless, this omission is so striking that a c o r r u p t e d text, the loss of several
words between "hate" and "kai," d o e s not appear to be out of the question.
T h e account in Plutarch, Pelopidas, Chapter 2 3 , that Epaminondas, for his o w n
part, at first tried to e n v e l o p the Spartans and take them in the flank, is to be c o m -
pletely rejected as entirely impracticable. With such a m o v e m e n t E p a m i n o n d a s
would have completely lost the cohesiveness of his already shorter front. A d e e p
column such as he had f o r m e d can be used only for penetration, not for a flanking
movement. T h i s passage shows most effectively that Plutarch's entire account of this
battle is unusable.
Busolt, in Hermes 4 0 : 4 5 5 , estimates the army of E p a m i n o n d a s at s o m e 6,500 h o p -
lites, 6 0 0 to 8 0 0 cavalry, and an indefinite n u m b e r of lightly a r m e d m e n ; the
L a c e d a e m o n i a n a r m y at s o m e 9 , 2 6 0 h o p l i t e s , at least 6 0 0 cavalry, a n d a few
hundred peltasts. Nevertheless, the allies on both sides were said to be unreliable
and unwilling; the actual battle, therefore, is based on the combat between the ap-
proximately equally strong T h e b a n s and Lacedaemonians, and here the superiority
was on the side of the T h e b a n s , since the quality of their cavalry far e x c e e d e d that
of the e n e m y .
I do not believe that this correctly characterizes the factors that were decisive at
Leuctra. T h e mighty numerical superiority of the Spartans is supposed to have been
counterbalanced by the p o o r morale of many of their allied contingents. T h e ex-
perience of military history teaches, however, that e v e n politically quite unreliable
contingents, o n c e they are incorporated into a larger military organization, have
often completely fulfilled their military duty (Rhine Alliance T r o o p s ) . Disaffection
would already have to be imminent; otherwise the battle action itself, the d a n g e r
and the passion of the battle, the concept of h o n o r are all strong e n o u g h to over-
come possible political antipathy and e v e n to cause forced allies to fight valiantly. It
is for this reason that great c o m m a n d e r s have so often been able to risk taking along
even unwilling allies into a campaign and using them as reinforcements. T h e expla-
nation of the victory of the minority over the majority at Leuctra is therefore not to
be found in these circumstances and it is not e v e n necessary to d e p e n d further on
them, since the basis of the estimates is not certain e n o u g h to permit a positive claim
of the numerical superiority of the Spartans.
Busolt's other military observations in this essay are also not all appropriate; ad-
mirable, however, is the rejection of Kromayer's statistical estimates, which Busolt
discounts just as sharply as Beloch did at the same time. (See also above, p. 6 0 , note
2.)
3. T h e account of the battle of Mantinea is also based, in Rustow and Kochly, on
a combination of X e n o p h o n ' s and Diodorus' reports. From D i o d o r u s the informa-
tion is taken that the army of E p a m i n o n d a s had a strength of 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n on foot
and 3 , 0 0 0 cavalry, w h e r e a s the Spartan army had 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n on foot and 2,000
cavalry. If that were correct, then once again the B o e o t i a n victory would not have
been a work of art, but there is not the slightest reason for believing the account of
such an unreliable m a n as Diodorus. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the battle gives no indica-
tion o f any g r e a t s u p e r i o r i t y o n the part o f the B o e o t i a n s , a n d the fact that
X e n o p h o n says n o t h i n g of this excuse for the Spartans' defeat tends to contradict it
directly.
C o n c e r n i n g the course of the battle itself, Rustow and Kochly have this to say:
" X e n o p h o n really concentrates only on the e v e n t s on E p a m i n o n d a s ' left wing and,
further, tells the story quite inaccurately, despite all his verbosity. Diodorus, on the
other hand, restricts himself principally to the combats on the flanks, to the cavalry
and the light infantry. A n d thus the two of them, together, give a tolerably clear
picture of the battle." Even from the methodological point of view this basis seems
to me incorrect. If, as we must unquestionably believe from X e n o p h o n , the battle on
the Boeotians' left flank, with the great c o l u m n "like a trireme" and the cavalry,
brought about the decision, how can we trust an author who, as Diodorus does, re-
counts practically n o t h i n g of this but who, on the other hand, has Epaminondas, in
the style of the Trojan heroes (as Grote has already so correctly remarked), fight
and fall? Factually, the description of the battle is spoiled by Diodorus' portrayal of a
great cavalry battle raging back and forth on the Boeotians' right flank. In this ac-
count the "oblique order of battle" d o e s not receive its rightful recognition. In my
o p i n i o n , not a single point can be accepted from Diodorus' account; presumably (ac-
cording to Grote) it was just this description of the battle that served as the basis for
Polybius' disparaging j u d g m e n t of Ephorus. T h e battle of Mantinea may be re-
counted only as described by X e n o p h o n , who, it is true, makes no secret of his pre-
ference for the Spartans and, as at Leuctra, strongly emphasizes the mitigating fac-
tors (surprise attack), but w h o is nevertheless a much too conscientious author, and
perspicacious soldier, to give a picture that is not factually correct. According to
him, the decisive factor at Mantinea, just as at Leuctra, is the combination of the
d e e p infantry column on the left flank with a superior cavalry. As new factors, there
appear here also the support of the Boeotian cavalry by their o w n lightly armed
m e n (hamippen) and the support of the refused right flank by detached units that
threaten the e n e m y left flank with attacks in the flank and rear and by means of
these demonstrations hold it off from attacking long e n o u g h for the decision to be
reached on the other flank.
4. Epaminondas' strengthening of the left flank and his m a k i n g it the attacking
wing has its basis, as Rüstow has already recognized and I have taken over from
him, in the accidental, external circumstance that, in the old p h a l a n x battle, al-
t h o u g h it was in theory a parallel battle, both right wings normally pressed forward.
Kromayer, in Ancient Battlefields in Greece (Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland), I: 79,
believes that that is a point of c o n f u s i o n between " m o v e m e n t to the right" and
"pressing forward of the right wing," and that only the former was recorded in the
sources. T h i s alleged substitution stems only from the inadequacy of Kromayer's
study of elementary tactics and of the sources. A phalanx that m o v e s to the right
will, e v e n in a simple approach march, "hang u p " automatically with its left flank-
—that is, hold back—and all the m o r e so if the left wing on each side, thanks to the
m o v e m e n t to the right, finds itself outflanked and threatened, while on the contrary
the right flank, e n c o u r a g e d by t h e e n v e l o p m e n t that n o w s e e m s likely, p u s h e s
energetically on. Moreover, with the Greeks the best troops often were placed on the
right wing. Also, the holding-back of the left flank is proved by the sources in the
battle of Coronea, in Hellenica 4. 3. 15 ff., where the O r c h o m e n i a n s on Agesilaus'
e x t r e m e left flank await the T h e b a n s ' attack while the other contingents move for-
ward to meet them.
A l o n g with Kromayer's false assumption, all his conclusions collapse, too, and it is
not worth the trouble to dwell further on this—especially since in his work there is
no clear idea at all that E p a m i n o n d a s actually p r o t e c t e d his w e a k e r flank. In
Rüstow's concept of the battle the situation is simple and clear; since the e n e m y left
flank customarily m o v e d forward somewhat slowly and cautiously, E p a m i n o n d a s
only n e e d e d to o r d e r his right to hold back correspondingly, and so he gained the
n e c e s s a r y a d v a n c e d p o s i t i o n for his left flank. In place of this clear c o n c e p t ,
Kromayer advances indefinite, general observations concerning terrain and pseudo-
scholarly e r r o n e o u s comparisons with the tactics of Frederick the Great. I shall have
m o r e to say on this subject w h e n this work treats of Frederick. See also Roloff,
Problems in Greek Military History (Probleme an der griechischen Kriegsgeschichte), pp. 42
ff., where Kromayer is thoroughly rebutted.
Epaminondas 171
Likewise in that work (pp. 12 ff.) Kromayer's reflections on Epaminondas as a
"practitioner of the strategy of annihilation" are rebutted, ideas that, o n c e again,
originate both in Kromayer's incomplete technical understanding of the difference
between all-out-victory strategy and attrition strategy and in his defective source
studies. E. von Stern (Literarisches Central-Blatt, 1903, N o . 2 4 , C o l u m n 777), w h o in
other respects often agrees with Roloff, feels obliged to side with Kromayer on this
point. Nevertheless, his reasons are not sound.
He misses the express testimony for the fact that Epaminondas had to wait such a
long time for the approach of the Peloponnesians, and he believes that it is com-
pletely out of the question that such nearby c o m m u n i t i e s as Argos, Megalopolis, and
so on, were not on the scene.
But aside from the fact that the passage cited by Roloff (Hellenica 7. 5. 9) d o e s ,
nevertheless, probably m e a n this—why did E p a m i n o n d a s actually wait so l o n g before
forcing the decision? If all his troops, or even the majority of them, were on the
spot, did he not have such an o v e r w h e l m i n g superiority as to be able to e n v e l o p any
position, no matter how strong?
Stern, furthermore, finds it very improbable that the missing contingents should
all have arrived, "as if by agreement", within a few days. Why not, after all? A n d
moreover, why not by agreement?
Stern believes also that Epaminondas, w h e n he m a d e his move against Sparta in-
stead of fighting a battle, could definitely have c o u n t e d on forcing Sparta to peace
terms if he succeeded in taking the city by a quick stroke and divesting the w o m e n
of their young, as well as the m e n who had remained behind. To this o n e must an-
swer that E p a m i n o n d a s would have had to be a rather miserable c o m m a n d e r to think
in that way; great wars are not decided by s u d d e n strikes against unfortified places.
Whether E p a m i n o n d a s would really have taken so many prisoners is doubtful, for
the Spartan w o m e n and the others would probably have taken to flight before that.
Even if the T h e b a n s had, however, taken such a great booty, why should the Spar-
tans and their allies have then avoided the battle that would actually have brought
about the final decision about the disposition of the booty? Quite distortedly Stern
reminds us that the Spartans sued for peace after their people had been taken pris-
oner at Sphacteria. T h e r e the conditions were quite different, for they could see no
possibility of liberating the prisoners or of otherwise dealing the Athenians a heavy
blow. Epaminondas' army, on the other hand, m o v i n g but slowly because of its
booty, could not avoid a battle with the revenge-thirsty Spartans. T h e r e is no doubt,
then, that Roloff is right w h e n he sees in this m o v e not a serious plan for the cap-
ture of the city, but only a demonstration for the purpose of gaining time for his
reinforcements to arrive.
T h e detailed description of the battle of Mantinea in Kromayer is completely
worthless, is full of factual distortions, and d o e s not agree with the sources. In this
case even Stern c a n n o t avoid agreeing with Roloff's criticism. Kromayer did not
even definitely establish with certainty the topography of the battlefield at the time
of his visit, since it did not occur to him until after his return which things really
needed to be verified.
T h e discovery Kromayer claims to have m a d e , to the effect that E p a m i n o n d a s
gave special consideration to the terrain and analyzed it carefully, is also to be re-
jected. T h e exploitation of the terrain had already been understood by Miltiades
and Pausanias, and the fact that Epaminondas, too, m a d e good use of it is no new
discovery but rather something to be taken for granted, and so broadly recognized
that it was also q u o t e d in the above presentation.
BOOK III
The Macedonians
Chapter I
The Macedonian
Military System
E p a m i n o n d a s ' t a c t i c a l concepts w e r e t a k e n u p a n d d e v e l o p e d b y
King Philip II of M a c e d o n . M a c e d o n was a basically a g r a r i a n state
with o p e n c o u n t r y a n d very little u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n . T h e g r e a t mass
of f a r m e r s a n d s h e p h e r d s w e r e not sufficiently well-off to p r o v i d e
themselves with hoplite e q u i p m e n t a n d w e r e also u n a b l e , w i t h o u t
difficulty, to g a t h e r in large units in a single place. In o r d e r to ar-
rive at t h e capital, Pella, which lay m o r e or less in t h e m i d d l e of t h e
country, it took four to five days of m a r c h i n g from the most distant
b o r d e r areas. C o n s e q u e n t l y a special type of military class, a kind
of nobility, h a d d e v e l o p e d , fighting on horseback, while t h e c o m -
m o n folk f o r m e d only peltasts, w h o , fighting without tactical or-
ganization, w e r e r e g a r d e d only as a simple auxiliary a r m a n d w e r e
u n a b l e to face up to G r e e k hoplites.
A p p r o p r i a t e l y , T h u c y d i d e s (4. 126) o n c e h a d Brasidas m a k e t h e
distinction for his m e n b e t w e e n G r e e k a n d b a r b a r i a n m e t h o d s o f
warfare. T h e S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r h a d t o take u p a w i t h d r a w a l i n
the face of a very s u p e r i o r g r o u p of warlike Illyrians, a n d his sol-
diers w e r e terror-stricken, b u t he said to t h e m :
O n l y t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f the b a r b a r i a n s , their n u m b e r s , t h e i r war

cries, t h e b r a n d i s h i n g of their w e a p o n s a r e frightful. B u t in h a n d -
t o - h a n d c o m b a t they are worthless, for they do n o t r e m a i n in for-
m a t i o n a n d feel n o s h a m e a t falling b a c k o u t o f p o s i t i o n . B u t
w h e n e v e r it is up to e a c h i n d i v i d u a l w h e t h e r he s h o u l d fight or
give way, t h e r e is never any lack of r e a s o n s for w i t h d r a w i n g ; for
that reason, the barbarians p r e f e r to threaten from a distance
1
rather than engage in hand-to-hand combat.
Since t h e r e a l M a c e d o n i a n w a r r i o r class, t h e nobility, o n t h e
175
o t h e r h a n d , could n o t be very large, t h e o l d e r M a c e d o n was only a

very w e a k state f r o m t h e military p o i n t o f view. O n l y t h e firm
m o n a r c h i c a l a u t h o r i t y established by King Philip II c r e a t e d from
t h e s e e l e m e n t s a military system t h a t soon b e c a m e s u p e r i o r to that
of all t h e n e i g h b o r i n g states. T h e King levied t h e s u m s to m a i n t a i n
a s t a n d i n g a r m y of his s u b o r d i n a t e s in a d d i t i o n to t h e G r e e k m e r -
cenaries t h a t he took into his service, gave t h e m military training,
f o u n d n e w a n d different battle f o r m a t i o n s for this a r m y , a n d d r e w
f o r t h f r o m t h e art of tactics p o w e r s that s h o w e d t h e G r e e k world a
new level of t h e a r t of war.
W e b e g i n with t h e cavalry.
CAVALRY
We p i c t u r e to ourselves t h e G r e e k cavalry as r a t h e r loose-knit d e -

t a c h m e n t s t h a t , p r o v i d e d with p r o t e c t i v e a r m o r , d i d o n occasion g o
into c o m b a t with cold steel, b u t which also u s e d t h e s p e a r still m o r e
f r e q u e n t l y as a missile t h a n as a t h r u s t i n g w e a p o n .
X e n o p h o n , f r o m w h o m we have two works on cavalry, Concerning
Horsemanship a n d The Cavalry Leader, says t h a t he p r e f e r s t h e set of
2
e q u i p m e n t with two s h o r t spears t o that with o n e l o n g o n e . T h e
latter is, a c c o r d i n g to h i m , u n c o m f o r t a b l e to c a r r y a n d fragile; of
t h e s h o r t s p e a r s , which a r e easier t o carry a n d s t r o n g e r , o n e can
3
t h r o w t h e o n e a n d use t h e o t h e r t o t h r u s t o u t i n all d i r e c t i o n s . I n
a d d i t i o n to t h e s p e a r s , t h e c a v a l r y m e n also c a r r i e d a sword or a
c u r v e d saber; t h e latter, X e n o p h o n says, is b e t t e r , since t h e caval-
r y m a n c a n strike d o w n f r o m above. X e n o p h o n r e c o m m e n d s that
n o t only t h e r i d e r b u t also t h e h o r s e b e p r o v i d e d with a r m o r . H e
d o e s n o t p r o v i d e t h e r i d e r with a shield. S t i r r u p s w e r e not yet in-
v e n t e d ; c a v a l r y m e n r o d e o n f i r m l y tied blankets o r cushions. T h e
t h r u s t with t h e lance, t h e r e f o r e , h a d t o b e m a d e m u c h m o r e with
t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e a r m t h a n i s t h e case today, w h e n the r i d e r can
p u t t h e w h o l e w e i g h t o f his b o d y a n d t h e m o m e n t u m o f his steed
into t h e t h r u s t . I n t h e n u m e r o u s designs o n vases t h a t p o r t r a y bat-
tle scenes a n d h a v e b e e n p r e s e r v e d to o u r time, I h a v e n e v e r f o u n d
t h e lance c a r r i e d as is p r e s c r i b e d today for o u r cavalry (pressed be-
t w e e n t h e u p p e r a r m a n d t h e body). O n t h e mosaic that p r e s u m -
ably p o r t r a y s t h e battle of Issus, A l e x a n d e r carries the very long
lance free in his h a n d .
I n its a r m a m e n t a n d e q u i p m e n t t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry was
similar t o t h e G r e e k . T h e cavalry force m a d e u p o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n
n o b i l i t y was called t h e c o m p a n i o n s (hetairoi) o f t h e k i n g . T h e y
The Macedonian Military System 177
fought with t h e s p e a r , which t h e y u s e d as b o t h a missile a n d a

4
t h r u s t i n g w e a p o n , a n d with t h e sword. T h e use o f a r m o r for t h e
horse, of which X e n o p h o n speaks, does not seem to have been
5
c o m m o n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o m p a n i o n s did carry shields.
T h e principal a d v a n t a g e t h a t t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry p r o b a b l y
had over t h e G r e e k s lay in t h e fact t h a t they w e r e disciplined; we
may ascribe to their s q u a d r o n s (ilai) such g r e a t cohesiveness as to
classify t h e m a s "tactical u n i t s . " O n e m a y d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n
" m o u n t e d m e n " a n d "cavalry" by t h e fact t h a t the f o r m e r t e r m in-
dicates g r o u p s of individual r i d e r s , w h e r e a s "cavalry" m e a n s r i d e r s
in disciplined units.
T h a t b e i n g t h e case, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s w o u l d have constituted t h e
first r e a l c a v a l r y . T o d e v e l o p tactical u n i t s f r o m r i d e r s is, f o r
n u m e r o u s r e a s o n s of which we shall s p e a k later, m u c h m o r e dif-
ficult t h a n to f o r m infantry units. It is only n a t u r a l , t h e n , t h a t t h e
Greek c a n t o n republics n e v e r went b e y o n d t h e hoplite p h a l a n x ; t h e
monarchical authority of the M a c e d o n i a n kings, on the o t h e r
h a n d , forced e v e n t h e individualistically inclined h o r s e m e n into t h e
firm f r a m e w o r k of a u n i t following t h e l e a d e r s h i p of a single will.
With t h e M a c e d o n i a n s w e find n o trace o f t h e m i x e d t r o o p s , t h e
hamippen, a fact t h a t also leads to t h e conclusion that they h a d m o r e
firmly o r g a n i z e d tactical units t h a n t h e Boeotians.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c o m p a n i o n cavalry, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d t h e
"sarissa-bearers" a r m e d with the lance, w h o m m a n y h a v e b e e n in-
clined to c o n s i d e r as light cavalry. Nevertheless, I c a n n o t find in
t h e s o u r c e s a n y basis for this c o n c e p t . T h e fact t h a t t h e y w e r e
a r m e d with t h e l o n g sarissa would, in fact, m o r e logically lead to t h e
conclusion t h a t they w e r e a heavy cavalry. T r u e e n o u g h , it was t h e
c o m p a n i o n cavalry (hetairoi) t h a t principally w a g e d t h e h a n d - t o -
hand combat; u n d e r certain circumstances, however, they even
used t h e i r lances in t h e o l d e r m a n n e r , as missiles. T h e sarissa was
too long to be t h r o w n , a n d so its b e a r e r was even m o r e u n c o n d i -
tionally o b l i g e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n close-in c o m b a t t h a n w e r e t h e
hetairoi, a point t h a t again suggests protective a r m o r a n d t h e r e f o r e
leads to t h e conclusion that they w e r e heavy cavalry. In battle t h e
sarissa -bearers s e e m to h a v e b e e n e m p l o y e d in j u s t t h e s a m e way as
the hetairoi, a n d t h e latter w e r e also used for r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d
pursuit. I t seems, t h e n , t h a t t h e difference i n a r m s a n d e q u i p m e n t
between t h e two types of u n i t was only a small o n e . P e r h a p s it lay
only in t h e varied p r o v e n a n c e of t h e m e n .
D u r i n g t h e w a r against Darius, A l e x a n d e r also f o r m e d , of Asi-
atics, a force of m o u n t e d a r c h e r s .
T H E PHALANX
T h e M a c e d o n i a n h o r s e m e n h a d probably always b e e n called t h e

c o m p a n i o n s (hetairoi) of t h e king. To t h e newly f o r m e d infantry
Philip gave t h e p r e s t i g i o u s title of pezetairoi or foot c o m p a n i o n s .
T h e y w e r e t r a i n e d to fight in t h e p h a l a n x , in a tight tactical forma-
tion, in t h e m a n n e r of t h e G r e e k s . Nevertheless, t h e r e was a certain
difference: t h e M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x was d r a w n u p i n t i g h t e r for-
mation t h a n was c u s t o m a r y with t h e G r e e k s , a n d it was e q u i p p e d
with a l o n g e r spear, t h e sarissa, which p e r m i t t e d it effectively to use
t h e spears of several r a n k s simultaneously. In t h e same way, Fred-
erick the G r e a t h a d his infantry d r a w n up in a closer formation
t h a n was c u s t o m a r y b e f o r e t h a t t i m e — f o u r m e n within t h r e e paces
r a t h e r t h a n within f o u r paces—in o r d e r t o have m o r e m u s k e t s f i r -
6
ing at t h e same t i m e .
We do not know in detail t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e sarissa p h a l a n x
of the classical M a c e d o n i a n p e r i o d , a n d we a r e i g n o r a n t , in particu-
lar, of t h e l e n g t h of t h e sarissa at that time. I suspect that t h e first
r a n k or t h e first two r a n k s of t h e p h a l a n x , j u s t as previously, car-
r i e d t h e easily h a n d l e d h o p l i t e s p e a r a n d t h a t o n l y t h e r a n k s
f a r t h e r to t h e r e a r c a r r i e d t h e long spear, which even at t h a t was
probably not so m u c h l o n g e r that it could not be m a n i p u l a t e d with
7
one hand.
T h e r e a s o n s for this variation from t h e old Doric o r d e r have not
c o m e d o w n to us, b u t can be a r r i v e d at from t h e n a t u r e of things.
We may be allowed to a s s u m e that the c e n t u r i e s - l o n g e x p e r i e n c e
o f t h e G r e e k s h a d t a u g h t t h e m t o c o n s t r u c t t h e i r principal w e a p o n ,
t h e spear, in such a way—that is, with carefully m e a s u r e d length,
thickness, a n d weight—as to r e n d e r it most effective for combat: as
long as possible, so as to r e a c h t h e e n e m y , b u t n o t so long that it
could n o t b e m a n i p u l a t e d effectively with o n e h a n d o r t h a t t h e
t h r u s t could b e p a r r i e d too easily b y the e n e m y . T o j u d g e from the
vase figures, t h e s p e a r was s o m e w h a t l o n g e r t h a n t h e h e i g h t of a
8
m a n — t h e r e f o r e a b o u t 2 m e t e r s . Nevertheless, n u m e r o u s variations
m a y well h a v e o c c u r r e d . As to w h a t is t h e best length, even today
military m e n a r e not i n a g r e e m e n t o n this point. T h e lance o f the
G e r m a n cavalry is 3.52 m e t e r s long; t h e Russian is 3.16; the F r e n c h
9
3.29; t h e A u s t r i a n 2.63 m e t e r s . I f t h e n t h e M a c e d o n i a n s e x c e e d e d
even t h e longest m e a s u r e a d o p t e d b y t h e G r e e k s after their experi-
ence, it was a d i s a d v a n t a g e in a m a n - t o - m a n c o m b a t , a n d the tight
formation a c c e n t u a t e d t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e still m o r e by h i n d e r i n g the
free m o v e m e n t of t h e individual soldier. T h e sarissa p h a l a n x , how-

ever, was s u p p o s e d to have h a d its effect less in m a n - t o - m a n com-
bat t h a n t h r o u g h t h e tightly o r d e r e d m o m e n t u m o f t h e w h o l e
mass. A n d if it h a l t e d in a defensive stance, it was impossible to
p e n e t r a t e into t h e m a n y - b a r b e d mass.
Philip probably d e c i d e d on this c o m b a t f o r m a t i o n because he was
aware that his newly f o r m e d t r o o p s w o u l d n o t be able to hold t h e i r
own u n d e r similar conditions with the G r e e k hoplites, w h o w e r e
full of t h e self-confidence of seasoned w a r r i o r s . It is also possible
that he did not initially have t h e m e a n s of outfitting all the m e m -
bers of his p h a l a n x with t h e c o m p l e t e , costly hoplite e q u i p m e n t . In
the tight f o r m a t i o n , which less frequently led to an actual m a n - t o -
m a n c o m b a t , t h e r e a r r a n k s c o u l d , w h e r e n e c e s s a r y , get a l o n g
without t h e full p r o t e c t i v e e q u i p m e n t . T h a t is, h o w e v e r , only a
surmise that m u s t r e m a i n u n c e r t a i n . T h e i m p o r t a n t point i s t h a t
the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x as such is not to be conceived as t h e in-
vention of a new, m o r e refined battle f o r m a t i o n , b u t as a r e d u c t i o n
o f the f o r m e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e infantry. T h e new p h a l a n x was
m o r e c u m b e r s o m e t h a n t h e old o n e , fell m o r e easily into disarray,
a n d was still m o r e sensitive on its flanks. F o r t h e kind of individual
c o m b a t t h a t t h e w a r r i o r is s u p p o s e d to be able to c a r r y o u t in
n u m e r o u s a s s i g n m e n t s o u t s i d e t h e mass battle, t h e sarissa-bearer is
very awkward. T h e old Doric hoplite p h a l a n x , which c o m b i n e d t h e
g r o u p action of a tactical b o d y with t h e c o m b a t skill of each indi-
vidual, is, of itself, t h e h i g h e r tactical f o r m a t i o n . Nevertheless, at
the time of Philip a n d A l e x a n d e r this difference was not yet very
i m p o r t a n t . In all t h e battles of this p e r i o d of which we have ac-
counts the p h a l a n x moves with such ease a n d shows so little distinc-
tion from t h e old hoplite p h a l a n x that we could almost d i s r e g a r d
the difference if a few r e p o r t s did not indicate distinctly that t h e
difference t h a t later b e c a m e very significant—that is, t h e l o n g e r
s p e a r a n d t h e t i g h t e r f o r m a t i o n — h a d a l r e a d y a t least s t a r t e d i n
Philip's time.
An elite c o r p s , t h e hypaspists, was a r m e d entirely in t h e m a n n e r of
t h e old h o p l i t e s — p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t m o r e lightly—with t h e cer-
tainty t h a t t h e lighter protective a r m o r would be offset in h a n d -
t o - h a n d c o m b a t by increased flexibility. T h e hypaspists f o r m in battle
the c o n n e c t i n g link b e t w e e n the offensive wing of t h e cavalry a n d
the g r e a t mass of t h e sarissa p h a l a n x , which moves up m o r e slowly.
T h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y was also s t r o n g in light infantry, peltasts,
10
archers, a n d m i s s i l e - t h r o w e r s .
T A C T I C S O F T H E C O M B I N E D ARMS
T h e progress m a d e by the M a c e d o n i a n s lies in t h e organizational

b l e n d i n g of all b r a n c h e s of t h e a r m s in a u n i f i e d c o o p e r a t i o n .
E p a m i n o n d a s h a d p a v e d t h e way for this, b u t in such a way that
the infantry still r e m a i n e d t h e principal a r m , w h e r e a s t h e cavalry
was only a s u p p o r t i n g e l e m e n t .
F r o m the very start Philip was m u c h s t r o n g e r in cavalry t h a n the
Boeotians h a d ever b e e n , a n d all t h e m o r e s o after h e h a d b r o u g h t
Thessaly u n d e r his d o m i n a n c e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , he was able not only
to defeat the e n e m y cavalry with his own, b u t also to attack the
e n e m y infantry in t h e flank. We know from t h e t i m e of M a r a t h o n
how sensitive the G r e e k h o p l i t e p h a l a n x was in this respect.
F r o m now o n , t h e r e f o r e , t h e cavalry is no l o n g e r a s u p p o r t i n g
a r m b u t is of equal i m p o r t a n c e a n d e v e n delivers t h e m a i n blow. It
may even be t h a t t h e p h a l a n x d o e s not close with t h e e n e m y until
o n e of his flanks is already b e a t e n a n d t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry of
the offensive w i n g is a l r e a d y a t t a c k i n g t h e m a i n b o d y f r o m the
flank. It can also h a p p e n that, u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of this blow, the
entire e n e m y a r m y gives up t h e battle a n d takes to flight, so that
the p h a l a n x does not even e n t e r into t h e battle.
Rüstow a n d Köchly h a v e e v e n g o n e so far as to believe that the
cavalry has now b e c o m e t h e principal a r m , t h e p h a l a n x only the
shadow, n o l o n g e r t h e l i g h t — t h e mass a n d n o t t h e n u c l e u s o f the
army. A c c o r d i n g to t h e m , t h e mission of t h e p h a l a n x was now only
to m a i n t a i n t h e c o m b a t , to f o r m an i m p e n e t r a b l e defensive wall
until the cavalry h a d won the decision. A careful analysis of
Alexander's battles shows t h a t such a s t a t e m e n t goes too far. T h e
heavy infantry, too, hypaspists a n d p h a l a n x alike, play a positive, ac-
tive role in t h e victory. T h e cavalry, in t u r n , is s u p p o r t e d by t h e
mobile light i n f a n t r y m e n , w h o p a v e t h e way a n d lend g e n e r a l assis-
tance with javelin, a r r o w , a n d slingshot.
T h e close i n t e g r a t i o n of all t h e individual units is t h e s t r e n g t h of
the M a c e d o n i a n a r m y o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e u n i f i e d c o n c e p t o f the
army c o m m a n d e r , w h o is at t h e s a m e time c r e a t o r of t h e a r m y a n d
leader, g o v e r n s t h e whole. T h e M a c e d o n i a n art of w a r is a p r o d u c t
of royalty.
T h e peculiar aspect of t h e G r e e k p h a l a n x led to t h e necessity for
E p a m i n o n d a s , w h e n he i n v e n t e d t h e flank battle a n d i n t r o d u c e d it
in place of the parallel battle, to assign t h e offensive action to the
left wing a n d to h o l d back the right. Philip no l o n g e r n e e d e d to
a d h e r e to this s c h e m e . He was able to place his cavalry on
whichever flank was t h e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e in view of the terrain
conditions. T h e fact t h a t , i n t h e battle a c c o u n t s t h a t h a v e b e e n
h a n d e d d o w n to us, t h e cavalry of t h e right flank almost always d e -
livers t h e decisive offensive blow is not f u n d a m e n t a l to the n a t u r e
of the situation b u t is to be r e g a r d e d r a t h e r as a d e v e l o p m e n t of
the older G r e e k tradition or as p u r e coincidence.
A n o t h e r result of a military system centralized in a single h a n d
and a single h e a d is t h e fact that t h e M a c e d o n i a n s took up a n d de-
veloped t h e m e a n s for a d v a n c e d siegecraft. As late as the m i d d l e of
the c e n t u r y little was k n o w n in G r e e c e of t h e i n v e n t i o n s of
Dionysius of Syracuse; Philip carried o u t two g r e a t sieges, at Perin-
thus a n d B y z a n t i u m , using every m e t h o d of this t e c h n i q u e .
We shall not go into t h e details of a technical n a t u r e . T h e fact
itself, however, is of the greatest i m p o r t a n c e in t h e c o h e r e n t d e -
v e l o p m e n t of the a r t of war. A l e x a n d e r ' s strategy w o u l d not have
been feasible if he h a d b e e n able to o v e r c o m e Halicarnassus, T y r e ,
a n d Gaza only by m e a n s of an i n t e r m i n a b l e starving-out, instead of
by an attack in force pitting skill against skill.
EXCURSUS
1. King Philip's military reforms have to be envisaged principally from the con-
duct of war and battle by A l e x a n d e r , which is in a g r e e m e n t with the little informa-
tion we have c o n c e r n i n g Philip himself. Philip's first battle against the Illyrians, in
359 B . C . , is recounted by D i o d o r u s (16. 4) as follows: Philip had his cavalry on the
right flank; he had them attack the barbarians from the flank, and the d o u b l e at-
tack, from front and flank, and finally from the rear, too, eventually o v e r c a m e
them, but only after the most c o u r a g e o u s resistance.
"Philip, c o m m a n d i n g the right wing—the best of the Macedonians serving u n d e r
h i m — g a v e o r d e r s to his cavalry to ride past a n d attack the barbarians on their
flanks, while he, falling frontally on the e n e m y , began the bitter battle. "*
Also, speaking of the battle in Thessaly in the year 3 5 3 B . C . , Diodorus expressly
makes the point (12. 35) that it was decided in Philip's favor by the cavalry.
2. We have only very incomplete reports on the battle of Chaeronea. From both
Diodorus (16. 86) and Polyaenus (6. 2. 2 and 7), however, we learn e n o u g h to know
that it was likewise a flank battle. T h e King was in c o m m a n d of the wing o p p o s i n g
the Athenians, which he held back, while his son A l e x a n d e r was in c o m m a n d of the
offensive wing against the Boeotians, which w o n the decision. If Diodorus has the
King moving into the attack only after he has seen the victory of his son, because he
does not wish to leave all the glory to him alone, or if Polyaenus, without taking into
account the cooperation of the two Macedonian wings, has Philip, after first giving
way, suddenly o v e r c o m e the fiery Athenians with all his force, these are popular ac-
counts which do not penetrate to the real reasons for the decision.
Since the above words were written, Kromayer has studied the topography of the
battlefield and, based on that study, has attempted to make a m o r e exact reconstruc-
tion of the battle in the above-cited work. His reconstruction effort, however, c o m -
pletely failed, as Roloff has proved in the work already cited and E. von Stern has
also recognized, for the attempt is based not only on completely insufficient and u n -
reliable source materials, but also on the monstrous idea that Philip's phalanx pulled
back 6 0 0 meters "without making a turn" (p. 167, note). An individual man c a n
hardly move backwards 6 0 0 meters, on a g o o d road, without stumbling; a phalanx
that tried to do that in the o p e n field would very quickly e n d up with its m e n lying
on the g r o u n d , o n e on top of the other. W h e n a unit moves backward on the drill
field, it can go only a few feet in the strictest drill formation of the back step. It is
particularly characteristic that Kromayer's idea of an orderly backstep m o v e m e n t by
a close mass formation of 15,000 men is not just a possible accidental slip, but t h e
author sought to justify his grotesque concept in detail in the Historische Zeitschrift 95:
20. Whoever cannot find the rebuttal himself is referred to the Preussische Jahrbücher
121: 164.
Roloff and Stern at least believed that they could recognize Kromayer's service in
describing the battlefield. But even this contribution has not stood up under inves-
tigation. G. Sotiriades, in Mitteilungen des königtichen deutschen Archeologischen Instituts,
in A t h e n s , 2 8 ( 1 9 0 3 ) : 3 0 1 a n d 3 0 ( 1 9 0 5 ) : 1 13, has p u b l i s h e d d e t a i l e d t o p o -
graphical studies of the battlefield that point up a series of mistakes in Kromayer's
observations and upset his basic points. Kromayer has admitted the decisive point,
the position of the Macedonian burial m o u n d , in Historische Zeitschrift 95: 27. On t h e
other objections, he has justified himself in a single point: he actually had not stated
that the wall r e m n a n t s of the T u r k i s h Chans w e r e a n t i q u e , a point on which
Sotiriades (p. 326) had reproached him and which I had referred to thereafter in
Preussische Jahrbücher 116: 2 1 1 , but he had only brought up, and left unanswered,
the question whether it was the remains of an ancient building. T h e other errors,
h o w e v e r , r e m a i n , particularly the lack o f m e n t i o n o f the ravine o f Bramaga,
through which, according to Sotiriades (p. 328), there leads a path that is no worse
than the o n e leading t h r o u g h the Kerata pass, a point that was of great importance
for a withdrawal on that side.
3. T h e prevailing opinion is that the sarissa phalanx, in the form in which we
meet it later in the battles of the Macedonians with the Romans and in which it h a s
been described by Polybius, is identical with the o n e that already existed in the time
of Philip and Alexander. But H. Droysen had already been impressed (Untersuchung,
p. 64) with the great flexibility with which Alexander's phalanxes moved, and I my-
self have gradually arrived at the conviction that a later progressive development
must have taken place. For the sources and factual basis of this opinion, see below,
Book VI, Chapter I.
4. Rüstow and Köchly, in Greek Military Historians (Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller) ( p .
2 4 0 ) , picture the hypaspists as a r m e d with burlap armor, the small shield of t h e
pezetairoi, light footwear, the Macedonian hat, a thrusting lance, and perhaps a long
sword. T h a t seems to me, however, m u c h too light a protective equipment for w a r -
riors w h o are not simply to be used in case of e m e r g e n c y , but w h o are specifically
intended for hand-to-hand combat and possess no missile w e a p o n s at all, and t h e
above-named authors themselves (p. 2 4 1 ) also add the reservation that the equip-
ment of the hypaspists was perhaps not so significantly lighter than that of the hoplites.
lites.
On the other hand, H. Droysen has d e n i e d them any armor (Heerwesen, p. 110).
He bases this o p i n i o n on the coins of the King of Paeonia, Patraos, w h o lived at t h e
time of Alexander. A Paeonian h o r s e m a n is pictured o n the point of piercing a f a l -
len warrior. T h e latter is wearing chiton and broad-brimmed hat, and his weapons
are shield and lance. T h e shield can be recognized as Macedonian by its peculiar
type of embellishment, as can be seen on the coins of the later Macedonian kings,
and so the warrior is a Macedonian, and specifically not a pezetairoi, for his lack of a
sarissa is immediately noticeable, but a hypaspist (Untersuchung, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 ) .
Droysen's o p i n i o n has also been seconded by A dolf Bauer, w h o also refers to t h e
illustration of the coin, but I feel that this concept is quite questionable. T h e Pae-
onians were obliged in 3 5 9 B . C . by Philip of Macedon to recognize his rule, and when
they tried to throw off this yoke, they were defeated by him in 3 5 8 B . C . and by
Alexander in 3 3 5 B . C . Patraos was their prince from about 340 B . C . until 3 1 5 B . C . Is

it logical to assume that such a vassal prince would dare to show on his coins a pic-
ture clearly showing that a warrior of the royal guard of his sovereign was being
overcome by a Paeonian? And if the shield decoration really allows us no other in-
terpretation, w h o can tell us that this is really the picture of a man of the newly
formed arm of the hypaspists} It may be an imaginary illustration, or it may be a
peltast that we see portrayed here. Consequently, nothing can be concluded from
this coin, and the utilization of the hypaspists leaves no doubt that they formed not a
type of light infantry, but heavy infantry with complete protective armor.
1. Thucydides does not mention here the superior protective

a r m o r o f the G r e e k s , a n d p e r h a p s t h e Illyrians w e r e better e q u i p p e d
i n this r e g a r d t h a n t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , w h o w e r e m o r e a c c u s -
tomed to t h e agricultural life a n d t h e r e f o r e , in g e n e r a l , less war-
like, a l t h o u g h A r r i a n (1. 1. 12) again specifically characterizes t h e
Illyrian a n d T h r a c i a n b a r b a r i a n s as "ill-equipped allies."* F u r t h e r -
m o r e , i n his s p e e c h B r a s i d a s specifically calls t h e I l l y r i a n s t h e
equals of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , a n d we may t h e r e f o r e apply the d e -
scription to t h e latter also.
2. " C o n c e r n i n g H o r s e m a n s h i p " * (12. 12), "in place of a s p e a r
made of cane."* T h e m e a n i n g of t h e G r e e k w o r d "kamakinon" is
not certain, n o r is even t h e m a n n e r of r e a d i n g it, b u t j u d g i n g from
the whole context, it is almost impossible t h a t a n y t h i n g b u t a long
spear is m e a n t h e r e .
3. X e n o p h o n ' s r e m a r k may be c o n s i d e r e d in connection with t h e
cavalry c o m b a t in Hellenica 3. 4. 13. T h e a c c o u n t shows, h o w e v e r ,
that at that time t h e G r e e k cavalry carried not the s h o r t s p e a r , b u t
the long o n e .
F u r t h e r m o r e , it is not u n d e r s t a n d a b l e without f u r t h e r e x p l a n a -
tion in this account, why t h e Persians h a d such a d e e p f o r m a t i o n .
T h e y w e r e n o t able to t h r o w their spears from the r e a r m o s t r a n k s .
T h e e x p l a n a t i o n lies p e r h a p s i n t h e fact t h a t t h e P e r s i a n s w e r e
c o u n t i n g o n p e n e t r a t i n g t h e G r e e k line with t h e i r d e e p c o l u m n
and, in d o i n g so, t h r o w i n g their spears to t h e r i g h t a n d left.
4. D i o d o r u s 17. 60. A r r i a n 1. 15.
5. Adolf B a u e r , p a r a . 313 (2d ed., p a r a , 433), concludes from
Arrian 1. 6. 5 t h a t t h e c o m p a n i o n s did not normally carry a shield.
1 cannot find t h a t t h e passage necessitates this conclusion; in fact, it
hardly p e r m i t s it. Cavalry shields w e r e naturally m u c h smaller t h a n
those of t h e i n f a n t r y . Since in P l u t a r c h , Alexander, C h a p t e r 16,
t h e r e is specific m e n t i o n of the shield t h a t t h e k i n g carries i n t o
combat, a n d later, a c c o r d i n g to Polybius 6. 2 5 . 7, t h e M a c e d o n i a n

cavalrymen u n d o u b t e d l y h a d shields, it seems certain to me that
such was also the case in earlier periods.
6. See also below, Vol. IV, Book I I I , C h a p t e r I I I .
7. C o n c e r n i n g the discomfort of c a r r y i n g a n d t h e difficulty of
fighting with the long spear, see also Vol. I V , Book I, C h a p t e r I.
8. A d o l f B a u e r , p a r a . 2 7 2 , estimates 3 m e t e r s ; a m o n g all the
vase figures that I have looked t h r o u g h , h o w e v e r , I have n e v e r
f o u n d such long hoplite spears, even w h e r e t h e r e is no limitation of
space.
9. R. Wille, Text on Arms (Waffenlehre), p. 79.
10. A. Krause, in Hermes, 1890, para. 66, p r o v e d quite conclusively
t h a t A l e x a n d e r also h a d slingers in his a r m y a n d that A r r i a n in-
t e n d s t h e m to be i n c l u d e d in the w o r d "toxetai" ("archers").*
Chapter II
Alexander and Persia:

The Battle on the Granicus
T h e a r m y with which A l e x a n d e r m o v e d o u t t o c o n q u e r Asia was

estimated at various s t r e n g t h s by his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , b u t we may
1
accept as well g r o u n d e d 32,000 m e n on foot a n d 5,100 h o r s e m e n .
O n t h e G r a n i c u s a n d a t Issus s o m e 30,000 m e n probably took p a r t
in t h e Fighting. At G a u g a m e l a A r r i a n gives a figure of 40,000 m e n
on foot a n d 7,000 h o r s e m e n , while very significant n u m b e r s of
g a r r i s o n a n d line-of-supply t r o o p s h a d r e m a i n e d b e h i n d i n t h e
c o n q u e r e d areas. A l e x a n d e r ' s a r m y was, at any rate, considerably
s t r o n g e r — p r o b a b l y a b o u t twice as large—as the a r m y with which
Xerxes h a d f o r m e r l y set o u t to c o n q u e r G r e e c e .
T h e G r e e k a u t h o r s have e n g a g e d i n q u i t e t h e s a m e n u m e r i c a l
fantasies c o n c e r n i n g t h e armies that Darius sent against the
Macedonians as they had once d o n e c o n c e r n i n g the h o r d e s of
Xerxes. In a well-balanced p r o g r e s s i o n t h e sources have the Per-
sians f o r m i n g up on t h e G r a n i c u s with 100,000 m e n , at Issus with
6 0 0 , 0 0 0 , at G a u g a m e l a with 1 million m e n on foot a n d 4 0 , 0 0 0
cavalry.
We can reject t h e s e n u m b e r s completely; we do not know how
strong t h e Persian a r m i e s w e r e t h a t A l e x a n d e r c o n q u e r e d , a n d i n
t h e first e d i t i o n of this w o r k I left in d o u b t t h e q u e s t i o n as to
w h e t h e r t h e n u m e r i c a l superiority lay on t h e side of A l e x a n d e r or
of the Persians.
T h e conclusions of t h e t h i r d v o l u m e , t h e medieval military sys-
tem, h o w e v e r , t u r n e d m e back t o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e Persian
E m p i r e a n d to conclusions that fully d e s t r o y e d t h e bases for t h e
concept of t h e Persian mass a r m i e s t h a t was previously c o m m o n l y
held. H o w gigantic was t h e e x p a n s e of t h e Persian E m p i r e from
the H i n d u K u s h t o t h e B o s p o r u s , f r o m the C a u c a s u s t o t h e S a h a r a !
185
It was c o n c l u d e d , t h e r e f o r e , that this e m p i r e could also raise gigan-

tic armies. But what a r m i e s the G e r m a n E m p i r e w o u l d have h a d to
levy a m o n g the O t t o dynasty, the Salians, a n d t h e H o h e n s t a u f e n s if
a r m i e s always c o r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e m a s s o f t h e subject p e o p l e s
— a n d how small, in fact, w e r e t h e armies of t h e s e e m p e r o r s ! It is
not on t h e mass of the p e o p l e t h a t t h e size of t h e a r m y d e p e n d s ,
but on their military concept, a n d , as we h a v e l e a r n e d from t h e his-
tory of t h e M i d d l e Ages, knightly armies w e r e u n i f o r m l y small. We
have already c o m e to know the Persian a r m y u n d e r X e r x e s as a
knightly o n e , with respect to its organization. T h e h u g e mass of
subjects of the A c h a e m e n i d K i n g was entirely u n w a r l i k e . W a r s were
waged a n d g o v e r n m e n t was exercised by t h e Persian national war-
rior class, whose c o u r a g e , e v e n in the times of D a r i u s C o d o m a n n u s ,
was recognized by the G r e e k s , whose n u m b e r s , h o w e v e r , w e r e very
small—so small that t h e Persian K i n g s o u g h t to increase t h e m with
foreign m e r c e n a r i e s , primarily with G r e e k s . T h e so relatively small
areas o f M a c e d o n a n d Hellas p r o d u c e d very m a n y m o r e warriors
t h a n the e n t i r e Persian E m p i r e as far as I n d i a .
O n e can best u n d e r s t a n d this by a study of t h e military events of
E u r o p e a t t h e e n d o f t h e fifteenth c e n t u r y . I n c i r c u m s t a n c e s that
offer m a n y a point of c o m p a r i s o n with those of the G r e e k s , t h e in-
habitants of t h e G e r m a n A l p i n e region h a d d e v e l o p e d a military
system that rested on t h e warlike o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e p e o p l e .
A n d so it c a m e a b o u t that t h e inhabitants of these few valleys were
able t o s e n d forth a r m i e s t h a t struck fear i n t o t h e s u r r o u n d i n g
large nations. If we i m a g i n e that at that t i m e a single king, himself
the m a s t e r of a capable a r m y of knights a n d infantry, could have
b o u n d to himself the Swiss in t h e s a m e way t h a t A l e x a n d e r did the
Greeks, t h e n h e could h a v e s u b d u e d E u r o p e j u s t a s the Macedo-
nians did with Asia. A l e x a n d e r stood at t h e p e a k of an e m p i r e a n d
a league of completely warlike c h a r a c t e r . T h e P e r s i a n king, it is
t r u e , r e i g n e d over a m u c h l a r g e r e m p i r e , geographically b o u n d l e s s ,
but only with a very thin military s t r a t u m at t h e t o p . T h e c a m p a i g n
of the y o u n g e r Cyrus, with his 13,000 G r e e k s , a n d t h e c a m p a i g n s
of the S p a r t a n Agesilaus in Asia M i n o r h a d a l r e a d y shown how
fragile the p o w e r of resistance of t h e colossus actually was.
A l e x a n d e r ' s last battle against Darius will show t h a t n o t even at t h e
b o r d e r o f t h e h e a r t l a n d a n d from t h e native P e r s i a n p o p u l a t i o n
was it possible to assemble a truly mass a r m y .
As a result of t h e assistance of t h e G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s , t h e Per-
sian armies w e r e m a d e u p o f hoplites, a r c h e r s , a n d h o r s e m e n , j u s t
a s was t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y . O n t h e G r a n i c u s , says A r r i a n , t h e
Alexander and Persia: The Battle on the Granicus 187
cavalry w e r e at a d i s a d v a n t a g e against t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , since they

were fighting with javelins against t h r u s t i n g lances. He himself r e -
counts, however, in detail, how t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , too, t h r e w lances
. a n d the Persians hacked away with t h e sword. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e
could n o t h a v e b e e n any i m p o r t a n t difference i n t h e e q u i p m e n t
and the m a n n e r o f fighting. T h e c o m b i n i n g o f t h e Persian knightly
cavalry a n d t h e Persian a r c h e r s with G r e e k hoplites h a d f o r m e d an
army that was q u i t e similar to t h e o n e t h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d on t h e
other side, e x c e p t that p r e s u m a b l y the participation of the different
branches of t h e a r m s in the two a r m i e s was in varying d e g r e e s .
A n i m p o r t a n t p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e c a m p a i g n was t h e fact t h a t
Alexander's father had bent the Greeks u n d e r the hegemony of
Macedon. In a solemn s t a t e m e n t t h e C o r i n t h i a n L e a g u e d e c l a r e d
the war to be a national Hellenic war, a n d G r e e k as well as o t h e r
contingents c o m p o s e d t h e l a r g e r half o r even m o r e o f A l e x a n d e r ' s
2
a r m y . T h i s positive c o o p e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is not e v e n t h e most
i m p o r t a n t point. T h e principal gain lies in t h e security of t h e r e a r ,
which was achieved t h r o u g h the pacification of G r e e c e . By stirring
up a war in G r e e c e itself, the Persians h a d o n c e forced t h e S p a r t a n
Agesilaus to b r e a k off his c a m p a i g n against t h e m . B u t A l e x a n d e r
not only h a d G r e e c e b e h i n d h i m , he was also s t r o n g e n o u g h to
leave b e h i n d in M a c e d o n an a r m y of 12,000 m e n on foot a n d 1,500
h o r s e m e n u n d e r A n t i p a t e r , which relieved h i m of any c o n c e r n over
the h o m e l a n d .
BATTLE ON T H E GRANICUS
A p r o o f o f t h e c o m p l e t e a r b i t r a r i n e s s with which t h e G r e e k s
j u d g e d t h e s t r e n g t h s of the Persian a r m i e s is f o u n d in t h e con-
tradictions i n t h e r e p o r t s o f the battle o n t h e G r a n i c u s . T h e s o u r c e
t h a t D i o d o r u s a d o p t e d gives 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n f a n t r y m e n a n d 1 0 , 0 0 0
c a v a l r y m e n . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , A r r i a n e x p r e s s l y says t h a t t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s w e r e far s u p e r i o r to t h e Persians in infantry, giving
no total n u m b e r for t h e Persians at all b u t m e n t i o n i n g only t h a t
they h a d 2 0 , 0 0 0 G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s a n d 20,000 h o r s e m e n . Accord-
ing to t h e n o r m a l principles of critical analysis, we would h a v e to
a s s u m e t h a t t h e lowest e s t i m a t e , c o m i n g f r o m t h e c a m p o f t h e
e n e m y , is always t h e m o r e credible o n e . B u t t h e figures given by
A r r i a n suffer from an i n n e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n : in a d d i t i o n to t h e G r e e k
m e r c e n a r i e s a n d Persian h o r s e m e n , t h e r e must, after all, h a v e b e e n
Persian infantry on h a n d . If, t h e n , t h e total of infantry is s u p p o s e d
to have b e e n considerably w e a k e r t h a n t h a t of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s ,
which was h a r d l y s t r o n g e r t h a n 25,000 m e n , the Persians could not

have h a d 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n o n t h e s p o t f r o m t h e G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s
alone. We may only a s s u m e as certain t h e fact t h a t t h e Persian in-
fantry was in fact w e a k e r t h a n t h e M a c e d o n i a n . W h i c h side was
superior in cavalry we do not k n o w ; probably, however, it was the
Macedonians, since t h e c o n d u c t of the Persians d o e s not show any
consciousness of s u p e r i o r i t y , least of all with respect to t h e cavalry.
T h e y did not seek a b r o a d , o p e n plain for t h e battle, b u t instead
they took up a position with a l a r g e obstacle b e f o r e their front, the
Granicus River, to await t h e r e t h e attack of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s . As it
a p p e a r s , t h e G r a n i c u s was p r o b a b l y fordable at almost any point,
but t h e right b a n k , o n which t h e Persians w e r e d r a w n u p , was high
a n d steep.
O n e m i g h t s u p p o s e t h a t t h e Persians d i d n o t really want t o en-
gage in battle h e r e at all b u t h a d t a k e n up this position with the
expectation t h a t A l e x a n d e r w o u l d not risk an attack on such u n -
favorable t e r r a i n b u t w o u l d h a v e to resort to t i m e - c o n s u m i n g ma-
n e u v e r s . In the m e a n w h i l e the Persians w o u l d h a v e b e e n able to u n -
d e r t a k e a diversion t o w a r d E u r o p e . B u t t h e e n t i r e c o n d u c t of the
Persians, s u p p o r t e d by t h e positive s t a t e m e n t s of all t h e sources,
leaves no d o u b t t h a t , in fact, t h e choice of t h e battlefield was de-
t e r m i n e d b y tactical c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n l y . W e h a v e h e r e a n e w
p h e n o m e n o n in t h e history of w a r : while t h e P e r s i a n s , a w a r e of
their weakness, seek aid in t h e t e r r a i n , they c h o o s e a frontal obsta-
cle in o r d e r to m a k e t h e attack m o r e difficult for t h e e n e m y .
T h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y was d r a w n u p i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e
heavy infantry f o r m e d t h e c e n t e r , while t h e cavalry a n d t h e
s h a r p s h o o t e r s m a d e u p t h e flanks. A l e x a n d e r himself was o n t h e
right flank with t h e hetairoi cavalry, a n d n e x t to h i m t o w a r d t h e
m i d d l e w e r e t h e hypaspists. T h i s f l a n k — h o r s e m e n a n d s h a r p s h o o t -
ers, p e r h a p s s u p p o r t e d by a d e t a c h m e n t of hypaspists—crossed t h e
river first a n d w i t h o u t difficulty d r o v e t h e P e r s i a n cavalry to flight.
A l t h o u g h t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e c o m b a t i n c i d e n t t o the climbing o f
the river b a n k a r e q u i t e d e t a i l e d , we still c a n n o t arrive at any clear
picture o f the tactical d e v e l o p m e n t , since o n t h e o n e h a n d w e h a v e
no knowledge of the comparative strengths and on the other hand
n o n e o f t h e sources r e p o r t s a n y t h i n g o f t h e activity o f t h e Persian
dismounted archers. It is hardly believable that n o n e of t h e m
should have b e e n o n h a n d . I t i s obvious t h a t , u n d e r t h e prevailing
circumstances, it is precisely this a r m t h a t w o u l d be necessary to
develop the greatest effectiveness.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e G r e e k s o u r c e s , h o w e v e r , it was precisely t h e
Alexander and Persia: The Battle on the Granicus 189
arm that was t h e most i n a p p r o p r i a t e of all for t h e d e f e n s e of a

steep slope, t h e Persian cavalry, t h a t w a g e d the battle alone. T h a t it
succumbed to t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of M a c e d o n i a n s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d
h o r s e m e n was only n a t u r a l , even if t h e n u m e r i c a l superiority did
not also lie on t h e latter side.
T h e i m p o r t a n t factors for an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e battle have
consequently e s c a p e d us. W e can only r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e frontal
obstacle was of no use to the Persians—a p h e n o m e n o n that we shall
have f u r t h e r occasion to speak of q u i t e o f t e n — a n d that t h e battle
was decided by t h e c o m b a t of t h e cavalry a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s on t h e
right flank. As soon as the Persian cavalry h a d fled from t h e field,
the p h a l a n x o f G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s , w h i c h , s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e
enemy by t h e river, h a d stood so long inactive, was attacked by t h e
Macedonian p h a l a n x from the front, by the cavalry a n d the
s h a r p s h o o t e r s o n the flanks, a n d was c h o p p e d u p o r t a k e n p r i s o n e r
without offering significant resistance.
A c c o r d i n g to t h e best source, A r r i a n , t h e losses of t h e M a c e d o -
nians a r e s u p p o s e d to have a m o u n t e d to 85 h o r s e m e n a n d 30 in-
f a n t r y m e n killed. T h i s f i g u r e w o u l d b e i n c r e d i b l e i f t h e G r e e k
mercenaries, as t h e sources would h a v e us believe, h a d b e e n almost
completely m o w e d d o w n . T h e s e m e r c e n a r i e s w e r e p e o p l e w h o sold
their lives dearly. Probably, h o w e v e r , n e i t h e r their n u m b e r n o r t h e
slaughter was so very great; t h e majority of t h e m w e r e p r o b a b l y
spared a n d t a k e n p r i s o n e r . If this was i n d e e d the case, t h e n t h e
figure for t h e M a c e d o n i a n losses a p p e a r s quite credible. T h e mass
of the infantry did not fight at all, a fact that explains why t h r e e -
fourths of t h e casualties fell to t h e lot of t h e cavalry, a n d this situa-
tion in the loss figures s u p p o r t s t h e accounts of t h e events of t h e
battle. A total of 115 killed leads to an estimate of 500 to 1,000
w o u n d e d . S u c h a casualty f i g u r e , it is t r u e , is n o t g r e a t , a n d it
shows t h a t t h e resistance by t h e Persians was n o t exactly obstinate;
but if, as it a p p e a r s , t h e real battle was c a r r i e d o u t by no m o r e t h a n
some 6,000 m e n , t h e n it is easy to reconcile t h e casualty figures
with t h e a c c o u n t of t h e c o u r a g e o u s fighting of the Persian k n i g h t s ,
w h o b r o u g h t A l e x a n d e r personally into t h e most e x t r e m e d a n g e r .
O f c o u r s e , o n e c a n n o t g o b e y o n d probabilities h e r e , a n d w e s h o u l d
not deceive ourselves. If o n e chooses to accept t h e idea of t h e mas-
sacre of t h e G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s , a n d a l o n g with it the n u m b e r t h a t
has b e e n h a n d e d d o w n , t h a t they w e r e 2 0 , 0 0 0 s t r o n g , t h e n h e can
base this on t h e s a m e sources t h a t p u t t h e losses of the M a c e d o n i a n
infantry at 30 m e n . T h e r e is no positive p r o o f for rejecting t h e first
r e p o r t while accepting t h e s e c o n d . O n e can only say with c o m p l e t e
c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e t w o r e p o r t s s t a n d i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n with o n e
a n o t h e r a n d o n e of t h e two m u s t necessarily be given u p .
EXCURSUS
( A d d e d in second and third editions.) I have not u n d e r t a k e n a real study of the

battle on the Granicus, since it a p p e a r e d to me, in view of the status of the sources
to offer too little prospect of a fruitful result and to be unnecessary for the purposes
of this work. T h e important aspects of the art of war in this period will stand out
sufficiently in the later battles. In the meanwhile, the material on the battle on the
Granicus is greatly i m p r o v e d by a new topographical survey and description of the
area in the work, On the Trail of Alexander the Great. A Trip through Asia Minor (Auf
Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden), by A. Janke, Colonel of Reserves (Berlin: W e i d m a n n ,
1904). T h r o u g h this work, which discovers and disposes of a fundamental error in
the previous concepts of the terrain on the Granicus, there has been created, actu-
ally for the first time, the possibility of a critical treatment of the battle from the
military history point of view. Since I cannot personally concur with Janke's descrip-
tion, it s e e m s to me that we have here o n c e again the material for a special study;
such a study will necessarily bring to light also the questions of the differences in the
s o u r c e s (Plutarch and D i o d o r u s against Arrian), the peculiar problem of the failure
of the Persian infantry to appear, and so on. T h e focal point of the study, however,
is to be s o u g h t in the question whether the Persians really i n t e n d e d to fight and to
m a k e full use of the frontal obstacle only as a tactical e x p e d i e n t , or whether they
i n t e n d e d to m a n e u v e r in o r d e r to gain time.
Basically, I have had reprinted above without c h a n g e the observations of the first
edition with their significantly skeptical sharpness.
1. T h a t is t h e result of t h e careful e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e sources in

W. D i t t b e r n e r , Issos (Berlin: G e o r g e N a u c k , 1908).
2. B a u e r , p a r a . 314 (2d ed., 434) even claims t h a t t h e M a c e d o -
n i a n s r e p r e s e n t e d not m u c h m o r e t h a n a sixth of t h e e n t i r e a r m y .
T h a t is too small u n d e r any circumstances. A. K r a u s e , in t h e pas-
s a g e cited a b o v e (Hermes, 1890), d i s t i n g u i s h e s a m o n g (1) a field
a r m y ; (2) an a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n ; (3) a s a t r a p a r m y , which was
f o r m e d in t h e c o n q u e r e d areas by the a p p o i n t e d satraps.
T h a t is fundamentally correct but m u c h too sharply distin-
g u i s h e d . Naturally, t h e r e w e r e t r o o p s that w e r e u s e d primarily for
o p e r a t i o n s a n d battles, o t h e r s t h a t w e r e m o r e often a s s i g n e d t o
garrisons, and finally the appointed governors did indeed form
n e w military o r g a n i z a t i o n s B u t a c c o r d i n g to t h e circumstances, all
o f t h e s e various t r o o p s w e r e naturally u s e d for t h e various p u r -
p o s e s of t h e waging of war, sometimes in battle, s o m e t i m e s as oc-
c u p a t i o n forces.
Chapter III
1
The Battle of Issus
T h e battle o f Issus was fought u n d e r t h e strategically n o t e w o r t h y

circumstances t h a t the two e n e m y a r m i e s first m a r c h e d past each
o t h e r t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n t passes o f the s a m e m o u n t a i n c h a i n a n d
then both faced a b o u t a n d f o u g h t t h e battle with a r e v e r s e d front.
Alexander had marched a r o u n d the innermost angle of the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , t h e Bay o f I s k e n d e r o n ( A l e x a n d r e t t a ) , w h e r e o n e
t u r n s from Asia M i n o r to Syria; h a d m o v e d f o r w a r d a b o u t a day's
march t o w a r d the s o u t h ; a n d now, t u r n i n g about, took u p his front
toward t h e n o r t h . Darius, c o m i n g from t h e east, h a d crossed over
the A m a n u s M o u n t a i n s b e h i n d h i m , was in position on t h e coastal
plains of Issus, a n d took up his front t o w a r d the south. A l e x a n d e r ' s
a r m y was p r o b a b l y almost as s t r o n g as on t h e G r a n i c u s , since a
considerable n u m b e r o f r e p l a c e m e n t s h a d m a d e u p for t h e casual-
ties a n d h a d t a k e n the place of the n u m e r o u s garrisons t h a t h a d
had to be left b e h i n d in Asia Minor.
T h e P e r s i a n a r m y c a n n o t h a v e b e e n s o very n u m e r o u s , since,
even with t h e large train of t h e Persian court, it h a d moved
t h r o u g h t h e m o u n t a i n passes in time a n d space q u i t e c o m p a r a b l e to
those o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y . I f o u r s o u r c e s s p e a k o f 3 0 , 0 0 0
Greek m e r c e n a r i e s w h o fought for t h e Persian K i n g in this battle,
this n u m b e r is not only completely u n c o n f i r m e d but also incredible.
Of the m e r c e n a r i e s at t h e battle on t h e G r a n i c u s , only a few h a d
escaped, a n d e v e n if t h e Persian fleet was still in t h e A e g e a n Sea
a n d was s e e k i n g t o stir u p t h e G r e e k s a g a i n s t t h e M a c e d o n i a n
h e g e m o n y a n d t h e g o v e r n o r s w e r e s e n d i n g their G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s
2
to D a r i u s , o n e still c a n n o t avoid t h e question of w h e r e their 3 0 , 0 0 0
m e n w e r e s u p p o s e d to have c o m e from. T h e fact that all t h e G r e e k
states e x c e p t S p a r t a w e r e c o m m i t t e d in t h e league with A l e x a n d e r
a n d a national war against the Persians h a d b e e n p r o c l a i m e d in t h e
most s o l e m n t e r m s , a n d the allied assembly h a d declared each Hel-
191
l e n e w h o s h o u l d b e a r a r m s a g a i n s t t h e allies a n d t h e K i n g o f
M a c e d o n i a to be a traitor—all of this was certainly an obstacle to
recruiting, e v e n in those c o u n t r i e s t h a t w e r e a l r e a d y t r e a t i n g once
again with t h e Persians, a n d e n t i r e fleets s u p p o s e d l y h a d finally to
stand r e a d y to t r a n s p o r t the r e c r u i t e d soldiers to Syria, a point that
was n e i t h e r in the sources n o r is to be believed.
T h e G r e e k infantry of Darius, t h e n , c a n n o t possibly have b e e n so
very n u m e r o u s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e m a y s u r m i s e t h a t h e r e , s o
m u c h closer to the h e a r t of t h e c o u n t r y , t h e native Persians, cavalry
as well as d i s m o u n t e d a r c h e r s , a n d possible c o n t i n g e n t s of t h e na-
tions o f i n n e r Asia, w e r e m u c h s t r o n g e r t h a n o n t h e G r a n i c u s . I n
cavalry, t h e r e f o r e , t h e P e r s i a n s m a y h a v e b e e n s u p e r i o r t o t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s . In infantry they w e r e certainly w e a k e r , especially in
that t h e f i g h t i n g a r m s w e r e o r g a n i z e d differently. T h e hoplites—al-
t h o u g h in a d d i t i o n to t h e Hellenes t h e r e a r e also C a r d a c e s m e n -
t i o n e d — w e r e fewer, t h e a r c h e r s m o r e n u m e r o u s o n t h e side o f the
3
Persians.
In k e e p i n g with t h e s e relative s t r e n g t h s , t h e Persians, w h e n they
h e a r d t h a t A l e x a n d e r h a d t u r n e d a b o u t a n d was m a r c h i n g t o w a r d
t h e m , took u p t h e i r position.
A l e x a n d e r could not lead his e n t i r e a r m y into t h e battle, b u t h a d
to leave t r o o p s b e h i n d for t h e p r o t e c t i o n of his r e a r a n d his c a m p
at M y r i a n d r u s , or at t h e exit from t h e Beilan pass, since he could
not know w h e t h e r D a r i u s h a d already m o v e d his e n t i r e force o n t o
the plain of Issus or if p e r h a p s a c o r p s was still m o v i n g up t h r o u g h
t h e Beilan pass. F o r this mission he d e s i g n a t e d his G r e e k allies,
w h o h a d b e e n t h e farthest f o r w a r d w h e n t h e a r m y s u d d e n l y h a d t o
4
face a b o u t a n d took u p t h e m a r c h t o w a r d t h e battlefield.
T h e Persians m o v e d f o r w a r d slightly t o m e e t t h e M a c e d o n i a n s .
T h e y did n o t r e m a i n in t h e m i d d l e of t h e plain, w h e r e it is some
five miles wide, at Issus, a l o n g t h e Deli-Tschai River, b u t took posi-
tion f a r t h e r s o u t h w a r d , o n the P i n a r u s River, t o d a y t h e Pajas. O n
the plain b e h i n d the Deli-Tschai the Persian cavalry could, of
course, h a v e h a d f r e e d o m o f m o v e m e n t , a n d since t h e M a c e d o n i a n
a r m y , with fewer t h a n 30,000 m e n on t h e spot, could by no m e a n s
have b e e n stretched o u t to a b r e a d t h of five miles, it w o u l d have
h a d to accept, in its attack, an o u t f l a n k i n g a n d e n v e l o p i n g move-
m e n t on e i t h e r t h e r i g h t or left flank by t h e Persian cavalry. B u t
t h e Deli-Tschai can be f o r d e d at most places w i t h o u t significant dif-
ficulty; a n d e v e n w h e r e t h e b a n k s fall off steeply, they a r e soft.
T h e Persian infantry, t h e r e f o r e , would h a v e f o u n d n o protection
Fig. 2 BATTLE OF ISSUS
from the river against the assault of t h e s t r o n g e r Macedonian

p h a l a n x . If the s u p e r i o r i t y of t h e Persian cavalry h a d b e e n very
g r e a t a n d the prospects o f their victory s u r e a n d s p e e d y , t h e n the
situation by t h e river w o u l d not have m a t t e r e d ; t h e flank attack of
these h o r s e m e n would in t h a t event also have b r o u g h t t h e Macedo-
nian p h a l a n x to a standstill before it could have b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s
for the Persian infantry. Since the s u p e r i o r i t y of t h e Persian
cavalry, however, if it existed at all, was only m o d e r a t e , t h e Persian
King, w h o m we m u s t certainly give credit for t h e best a n d most
d i s c e r n i n g ideas, in k e e p i n g with t h e t r a d i t i o n of his p e o p l e a n d ,
f u r t h e r m o r e , advised by t h e Greeks as he was, c h o s e t h e position
on t h e Pajas, which c o r r e s p o n d e d to the n e e d s of his a r m y still bet-
ter t h a n t h e position in t h e m i d d l e of t h e plain w o u l d h a v e d o n e .
Since t h e d e s c r i p t i o n J a n k e gives of t h e a r e a still leaves a few
d o u b t f u l points, I took t h e t r o u b l e to secure a verification, which
Senior E n g i n e e r Hossbach, w h o was e m p l o y e d o n t h e construction
of t h e railroad, was kind e n o u g h to p r o v i d e m e . I am r e p r o d u c i n g
it below.
T h e result is that t h e u p p e r c o u r s e of t h e river is b o r d e r e d by
steep, rocky banks t h a t m a k e it almost impassable. E v e n t h e m i d d l e
p o r t i o n of t h e river is n o t at all passable for cavalry, a n d passable
only with difficulty for infantry. Only t h e last 1,600 m e t e r s , t h e n ,
a r e passable for infantry, a n d t h e last 500 m e t e r s , e v e n t h o u g h still
difficult, passable for cavalry.
Since it is expressly r e p o r t e d that the M a c e d o n i a n left flank ex-
t e n d e d to t h e sea, we can r e g a r d these 1,600 m e t e r s as t h e actual
battle front. I n c o n f o r m a n c e with t h e t e r r a i n , t h e P e r s i a n s h a d t h e
m a i n b o d y of their cavalry on t h e right flank, s t a r t i n g at t h e sea;
n e x t c a m e the G r e e k hoplites, on their left t h e C a r d a c e s , w h o s e na-
tionality is not certain ( p e r h a p s K u r d s or e v e n Persians), w h o w e r e
also hoplites. T h e f o r m a t i o n of the Persian a r c h e r s is n o t specifi-
cally r e p o r t e d in t h e sources; j u d g i n g from t h e t y p e of situation,
they w e r e s p r e a d along the e n t i r e b a n k of t h e river in o r d e r to take
5
the attacker u n d e r f i r e a s h e c r o s s e d . Also f a r t h e r u p t h e b a n k , t o
t h e m o u n t a i n s , t h e places w h e r e a crossing s e e m e d possible w e r e
probably covered by a r c h e r s , so that t h e width of t h e Persian front
was only a relative concept; t h e front of t h e a r t i c u l a t e d , c o n t i n u o u s
line, i n f a n t r y or cavalry, was only s o m e t h i n g o v e r 1,600 m e t e r s
wide. T h e line o f s h a r p s h o o t e r s that f o r m e d a n e x t e n s i o n t h e r e o f
6
may have stretched s o m e t h r e e kilometers f a r t h e r .
A r a t h e r small d e t a c h m e n t of Persians was p u s h e d o u t on a s p u r
of t h e m o u n t a i n that e x t e n d s o u t into t h e small plain, so that it
The Battle of Issus 195
t h r e a t e n e d t h e M a c e d o n i a n s f r o m t h e i r r i g h t flank a s t h e y a p -
p r o a c h e d the Persian defensive position, a n d finally in their r e a r also.
A n d so the position of the Persians s e e m e d to be invincible. T h e
infantry, t h e i r w e a k e r c o n t i n g e n t , was covered by t h e d r o p in t h e
g r o u n d to its front, b u t t h e cavalry was r e a d y to take on the e n e m y
if he s h o u l d a t t e m p t to b r e a k t h r o u g h a l o n g t h e seashore a n d was
also in a position to move forward itself.
In this position, which was f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d with defensive
works h e r e a n d t h e r e , Darius awaited t h e attack. Each point in t h e
position s e e m e d to be so well d e f e n d e d t h a t t h e M a c e d o n i a n attack
had no c h a n c e of p e n e t r a t i n g a n y w h e r e a l o n g t h e line. If, however,
it was t h r o w n back, t h e n A l e x a n d e r , cut off from his h o m e l a n d ,
would be lost with his entire a r m y . W i t h t h e h e l p of t h e Phoenician
ships, t h e Persians d o m i n a t e d t h e sea. A l e x a n d e r h a d used all his
strength for his l a n d a r m y a n d h a d finally d i s p e r s e d his fleet, since
it was too weak to o p p o s e the Persian o n e u n d e r any circumstances.
Once their attack s h o u l d be t h r o w n back, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s would
have h a d a very difficult t i m e r i s k i n g a r e n e w e d attack. C o n s e -
quently, t h e Persians did not at all n e e d to win an o u t r i g h t victory
a n d d r i v e t h e M a c e d o n i a n s to flight; t h e y only n e e d e d to force
t h e m to a b a n d o n their attack a n d to h o l d fast themselves in t h e i r
position, in which case their c o m p l e t e success would be a s s u r e d .
O u r sources point r e p e a t e d l y t o how i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e Darius'
e r r o r was in c o m m i t t i n g himself on such a restricted piece of ter-
rain that he could not b r i n g his gigantic superiority to bear. T h e y
believe that he s h o u l d h a v e awaited A l e x a n d e r ' s attack s o m e w h e r e
on t h e Syrian plain, so that he could e n v e l o p him with his h o r s e -
m e n . W h e t h e r this advice w o u l d really have b e e n helpful to Darius
will be s h o w n in t h e battle of G a u g a m e l a . T h e r e is no d o u b t of t h e
fact t h a t the situation was s p o k e n of in this way t h r o u g h o u t t h e
rank a n d file of t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y , stimulated by the h e a d q u a r -
ters. T h e r e c o u l d be no m o r e plausible a r g u m e n t to fill t h e soldiers
with t h e c o n f i d e n c e of victory in t h e c o m i n g battle.
Actually, t h e situation was quite different. If the Persians h a d ac-
tually h a d a g r e a t n u m e r i c a l superiority, they w o u l d still h a v e b e e n
completely c a p a b l e of c h o o s i n g a battlefield a p p r o p r i a t e to such
s t r e n g t h , as we h a v e seen. T h e plain of Issus has a width of up to
f i v e miles a n d t h e r e f o r e e n o u g h r o o m for a n a r m y t h r e e a n d even
five times as l a r g e as t h a t of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s . But all of these o b -
servations are eliminated for us, since obviously, even if the Persian
King h a d h a d at his disposal t h e massive a r m y ascribed to h i m by
G r e e k p o p u l a r belief, i t c o u l d b y n o m e a n s h a v e c r o s s e d t h e
A m a n u s M o u n t a i n s so quickly a n d t a k e n position in t h e plain of

Issus. To w h a t e x t e n t A l e x a n d e r himself was convinced of the Per-
sian mass a r m y we do n o t know. At any r a t e , w h e n it was r e p o r t e d
to h i m in M y r i a n d r u s ( n e a r A l e x a n d r e t t a ) that t h e Persians were
s u d d e n l y a r r i v i n g in his r e a r , he can h a v e b e e n c h e e r e d principally
by t h e fact t h a t only a few w e r e at h a n d a n d n o t that the many
w e r e u n a b l e to find space e n o u g h to fight. H o w e v e r this may be, in
no case can t h e M a c e d o n i a n King have failed to recognize t h e h u g e
s t r a t e g i c d i s a d v a n t a g e a t w h i c h h e was s u d d e n l y p l a c e d . T h e
M a c e d o n i a n s w e r e cut off from t h e i r base, while t h e Persians were
not. T h e P e r s i a n s w e r e able, if they w e r e b e a t e n , to w i t h d r a w again
t h r o u g h t h e A m a n u s passes, w h e n c e they h a d c o m e ; t h e Macedo-
nians, if they w e r e d e f e a t e d , i n d e e d even if the battle was j u s t inde-
cisive, w e r e lost.
T h e s o u r c e s tell u s h o w A l e x a n d e r h a d his officers assembled
a n d e n c o u r a g e d t h e m a n d j u s t b e f o r e t h e start o f t h e b a t t l e r o d e
u p t o t h e individual t r o o p units, u r g e d t h e m on, a n d held u p be-
fore t h e m t h e d o m i n a t i o n of all Asia as t h e prize for victory over
the Great King.
T h e Persians h a d w o n t h e u p p e r h a n d strategically, not a s the
result of any p l a n b u t p u r e l y by c h a n c e , as o u r sources r e p o r t , cer-
tainly with accuracy. T h e y h a d believed that A l e x a n d e r , w h o h a d
stayed r a t h e r long in Cilicia, h e l d up because of illness a n d o t h e r
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w o u l d n o t m o v e u p t o w a r d Syria for t h e present,
a n d since t h e P e r s i a n K i n g , with his a s s e m b l e d a r m y , could not
possibly r e m a i n in Syria for an indefinite p e r i o d j u s t looking on as
t h e M a c e d o n i a n s m a d e themselves c o m f o r t a b l e in c o n q u e r e d Asia
M i n o r , h e h a d f i n a l l y d e c i d e d t o m o v e f o r w a r d across the m o u n -
tains. As c h a n c e w o u l d h a v e it, however, on precisely the s a m e days
A l e x a n d e r , too, m o v e d f o r w a r d , a n d b o t h a r m i e s m a r c h e d b y o n e
a n o t h e r t h r o u g h different passes—a situation t h a t t h e n , by t h e na-
t u r e o f things, w o r k e d o u t t o the a d v a n t a g e o f t h e Persians.
It has b e e n asked why the Persians d i d n o t simply occupy the
passes a n d cut A l e x a n d e r off f r o m his h o m e l a n d . It is not h a r d to
find the answer. We already know from T h e r m o p y l a e that the
blocking of a pass is always a very p r e c a r i o u s u n d e r t a k i n g , a n d par-
ticularly so h e r e , w h e r e t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e attacker lay in his infan-
try, t h a t of t h e d e f e n d e r in his cavalry. If worse c a m e to worst,
A l e x a n d e r c o u l d have left t h e Persians s t a n d i n g t h e r e a n d could
have m a r c h e d back f a r t h e r into Syria. If he really was c o n c e r n e d
t h a t t h e Persians could s h u t t h e "Syrian Gates" b e h i n d h i m , it was
not because he w o u l d h a v e b e e n lost by t h a t action, b u t because t h e
great decision for which he l o n g e d w o u l d t h e n h a v e b e e n post-

poned for an indefinite time. T h e Persians, t h e r e f o r e , were in no
way a c t i n g s i m p l y n e g l i g e n t l y b y l e a v i n g t h e pass o p e n t o t h e
Macedonians a n d d r a w i n g themselves up for a pitched battle in an
a d v a n t a g e o u s position, b u t w e r e a c t i n g in full a w a r e n e s s of t h e
situation. At some m o m e n t , s o o n e r or later, t h e g r e a t tactical deci-
sion h a d t o b e f o u g h t o u t , a n d t h e P e r s i a n s c o u l d n e v e r h a v e
fought u n d e r m o r e favorable circumstances t h a n h e r e , w h e r e they
offered battle, d r a w n u p b e h i n d t h e Pajas, a n d A l e x a n d e r took u p
the challenge.
But it was precisely this physical a d v a n t a g e — w h i c h t h e g o d s h a d
bestowed on t h e Persians a n d which t h e latter s o u g h t to utilize in
the best possible w a y — t h a t w o r k e d against t h e m spiritually.
A l e x a n d e r carefully m o v e d his a r m y o u t of the Syrian pass, a n d
as the field b e c a m e wider, gradually h a d it deploy from m a r c h col-
u m n into linear f o r m a t i o n , with cavalry a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s on t h e
right a n d left, t h e hoplites in the m i d d l e . Slowly, with pauses, so as
not to fall into d i s o r d e r , t h e front, 1 to 1½ kilometers wide, m o v e d
7
f o r w a r d . T h e m a i n body o f the cavalry, u n d e r A l e x a n d e r ' s p e r -
sonal c o m m a n d , was on the right flank, but w h e n the King noticed
that t h e mass of t h e Persian cavalry was d r a w n up on their right
flank, beside t h e sea, he sent the T h e s s a l i a n cavalry, which h a d to
that point b e e n with him, across b e h i n d t h e p h a l a n x to reinforce
his left flank, so t h a t the left was now t h e s t r o n g e r flank in cavalry.
Against t h e Persian d e t a c h m e n t stationed on t h e m o u n t a i n s as a
t h r e a t t o the r i g h t flank o f the M a c e d o n i a n s , the latter d r e w u p
t h e i r o w n flank g u a r d , w h i c h d r o v e t h e e n e m y h i g h e r u p t h e
m o u n t a i n s . T h e n A l e x a n d e r left o n l y 3 0 0 c a v a l r y m e n a n d a
n u m b e r of a r c h e r s t h e r e as a c o v e r i n g force a n d d r e w the r e m a i n -
d e r into his o w n battle line, which now o u t f l a n k e d t h e Persians at
this point. B u t since the river was practically u n f o r d a b l e h e r e , t h a t
could not h a r m t h e Persians.
A t s o m e distance f a r t h e r u p s t r e a m , h o w e v e r — a c c o r d i n g t o J a n k e
2½ kilometers f r o m t h e river m o u t h , a c c o r d i n g to Hossbach 3½
k i l o m e t e r s — t h e r e is a crossing point. It is h e r e that A l e x a n d e r with
his cavalry m u s t h a v e crossed t h e river. It is t r u e , of course, t h a t
the a c c o u n t in t h e M a c e d o n i a n r e p o r t s , to t h e effect that he t h r e w
back t h e e n e m y in a cavalry c h a r g e , is impossible, because of t h e
n a r r o w n e s s o f t h e a p p r o a c h , the steep b a n k s , a n d t h e stony b o t t o m
of t h e r i v e r — a n d t h e account m u s t t h e r e f o r e be rejected as an ex-
pression of c o u r t l y zeal. N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is e n t i r e l y possible a n d
must t h e r e f o r e be a s s u m e d , in k e e p i n g with all t h e circumstances,
that t h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d light infantry did drive the

Persian d e f e n d e r s away f r o m t h e ford a n d t h a t t h e h o r s e m e n , too,
t h e n quickly crossed t h e ford a n d threw back a n d p u r s u e d the Per-
sian cavalry, which was n o t very s t r o n g on this flank.
In t h e m e a n t i m e the m a i n body of the p h a l a n x f o u n d itself heavi-
ly e n g a g e d . While the soldiers of t h e p h a l a n x scrambled d o w n into
the ravine of t h e Pajas, they w e r e e x p o s e d to t h e Persians' arrows,
a n d w h e n they c a m e u p over t h e opposite b a n k , with t h e i r forma-
tion b r o k e n b y t h e m o v e m e n t forward a n d t h e n u m e r o u s impass-
able points along the rocky banks, they w e r e attacked by the Greek
hoplites w h o w e r e in t h e Persian pay a n d w e r e t h r o w n back and
d o w n w a r d . T h e sources r e p e a t e d l y e m p h a s i z e t h e d i s o r d e r e d state
of the M a c e d o n i a n battle f o r m a t i o n , a n d up to now that has been
a t t r i b u t e d solely to the n a t u r a l d i s r u p t i o n of t h e p h a l a n x caused by
t h e crossing of t h e river, with its u n e v e n rocky b a n k s . After we
realize, however, t h a t t h e cavalry of t h e r i g h t flank h a d n o t been
able to cross at all in t h e m i d d l e stretch of t h e Pajas but h a d been
obliged, for this p u r p o s e , to leave its position in t h e c e n t e r a n d
m a k e a wide swing a r o u n d , t h e n we m u s t take into account, too,
t h e effect of this u n c o v e r i n g of t h e left [sic] flank of the p h a l a n x on
t h e so frequently e m p h a s i z e d d i s o r d e r . It is not difficult to imagine
how t h e p h a l a n x soldiers c l a m b e r e d up t h e far b a n k , only to be
m e t t h e r e by a c o u n t e r a t t a c k of t h e G r e e k s a n d t h e i r flank attack
a n d to be p u s h e d back into the river.
O n t h e left flank, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e r e t h e Persian cavalry
was m a s s e d , n o t only was the attack of t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry
repulsed—if, i n d e e d , it a m o u n t e d to an a t t a c k — b u t t h e Persians, in
t u r n , took up t h e attack, a n d crossing to t h e left b a n k of t h e river,
b r o u g h t t h e T h e s s a l i a n s into a p r e c a r i o u s situation.
T h e t u r n i n g point of t h e battle was d e t e r m i n e d by t h e fact that
t h e M a c e d o n i a n r i g h t wing, which o u t f l a n k e d t h e e n e m y line o f
battle, c a m e to t h e assistance of its heavily e n g a g e d c e n t e r . T h e
King h a d two taxis of t h e p h a l a n x follow t h e t r o o p s with which he
himself h a d forced t h e crossing, r i g h t t h r o u g h t h e s a m e b r e a c h ,
a n d while h e with his h o r s e m e n a n d t h e hypaspists p u r s u e d t h e
t r o o p s w h o h a d d e f e n d e d t h e crossing p o i n t o r t h o s e w h o , i n posi-
tion beside t h e m , h a d also taken to flight (Cardaces), those two taxis
t u r n e d against t h e left flank o f t h e G r e e k p h a l a n x . K i n g D a r i u s
himself, w h o h a d probably t a k e n position with his staff b e h i n d t h e
G r e e k s or at t h e point of contact of G r e e k s a n d C a r d a c e s , on see-
ing his left flank d e f e a t e d , h a d given up t h e battle for lost a n d
h a d t a k e n to flight. U n d e r t h e i m p a c t of this flight a n d of t h e flank
attack by t h e soldiers of t h e p h a l a n x , the G r e e k s gave up t h e river

bank a n d began to withdraw.
Almost up to this very m o m e n t t h e balance actually stood almost
even, i n a s m u c h as t h e Persian cavalry of the right flank h a d j u s t as
great a n a d v a n t a g e o v e r its o p p o n e n t — p e r h a p s e v e n a g r e a t e r
one—as t h e M a c e d o n i a n right flank h a d over the Persian left. We
can imagine that t h e victorious Persian cavalry, m o v i n g from t h e
shore, m i g h t j u s t as easily have fallen on t h e M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x
in its flank as did the M a c e d o n i a n s in attacking t h e G r e e k flank
from the direction of the m o u n t a i n s . B u t t h a t did not h a p p e n .
T h e reason is not to be f o u n d so m u c h in the p e r s o n a l a n d tacti-
cal superiority of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s or in t h e s t r o n g e r military spirit
of A l e x a n d e r t h e Soldier, as in the battle concepts of the two sides.
T h e M a c e d o n i a n s waged an offensive battle, the Persians a defen-
sive o n e . We have seen how the G r e e k s , t o o , u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d
of Miltiades w e r e forced to wage a defensive battle at M a r a t h o n be-
cause of t h e special circumstances, b u t at t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m o m e n t
Miltiades went over from defense to attack, a n d this attack m e a n t
victory. T h e Persians h a d deliberately p l a n n e d a purely defensive
battle at Issus. T h e y h a d t a k e n position b e h i n d such a f o r m i d a b l e
frontal obstacle t h a t any attack on their p a r t was impossible from
the start. O u r s o u r c e s d o n o t e x p r e s s l y tell u s why t h e P e r s i a n
cavalry of the r i g h t flank, which is c r e d i t e d with a c o u r a g e o u s fight,
which u n d o u b t e d l y h a d n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y , a n d w h i c h e v e n
crossed over t h e river, did not gain a real victory. F r o m t h e overall
situation, we m a y be allowed to d e d u c e , without hesitation, that
that did not t a k e place because it was n e v e r i n t e n d e d by t h e high
c o m m a n d . First of all, t h e account shows that t h e c o m b a t on this
flank started considerably later t h a n on t h e o t h e r flank. A l e x a n d e r
had wisely d r i v e n forward with his right flank at a point w h e r e ,
once he h a d crossed t h e river, he was certain of having t h e advan-
tage, a n d he h a d held up his left flank. F u r t h e r m o r e , as we now
know, t h e river b e d is so rocky that f o r w a r d or backward move-
m e n t s of the cavalry w e r e very difficult. W h e n t h e battle b e g a n on
this flank, it was probably already d e c i d e d on the o t h e r o n e . If the
Persians h a d c a r r i e d t h e offensive t o t h e M a c e d o n i a n s with t h e
same energetic offensive spirit as t h e M a c e d o n i a n s showed against
t h e m , it is h a r d to see why they should not have b e e n j u s t as vic-
torious on t h e right flank, with their g r e a t e r n u m b e r s , as Alexan-
d e r was on his flank.
O n e s o u r c e (Curtius) speaks of the feigned flight by m e a n s of
which t h e Thessalian cavalry m a n a g e d to hold off their o p p o n e n t s .
T h a t is the a c c o u n t by t h e h o r s e m e n themselves, w h o c o n s i d e r e d
t h e success to be of t h e i r o w n d o i n g . T h e "feigned" flight, however,
would very quickly have b e c o m e a real o n e if t h e e n e m y , for his
p a r t , h a d not held u p his p u r s u i t b u t h a d c o n t i n u e d t o p u r s u e re-
lentlessly. B u t t h e Persian a r m y h a d d r a w n up b e h i n d a river a n d
its rocky b a n k s a n d h a d e v e n d u g s o m e defensive works o n the
h i g h b a n k s . T h e battle was p l a n n e d so as to exploit this a d v a n t a g e .
It is no w o n d e r , t h e n , t h a t the cavalry, too, e v e n w h e n it was suc-
cessful, did not m o v e o u t very far b e y o n d this line. Naturally, they
could not e x p e c t any c o o p e r a t i o n f r o m o t h e r units on t h e far side
of t h e river. T h e y c o n t e n t e d themselves t h e n at best, after their
successful attack, with r e t u r n i n g again to their position.
For exactly t h e s a m e r e a s o n , in all probability, t h e flank position
o f t h e Persian d e t a c h m e n t o n t h e m o u n t a i n s also r e m a i n e d ineffec-
tive. In t h e face of t h e attack by t h e M a c e d o n i a n t r o o p s , it h a d
m o v e d back quickly o n t o t h e crests of t h e m o u n t a i n s a n d h a d no
o t h e r alternative. I n d e e d , if it h a d accepted c o m b a t while t h e main
Persian a r m y stood motionless in its fixed d e f e n s e , it would have
b e e n d e f e a t e d i n its i s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n . A n y m o v e m e n t f o r w a r d
again, t o attack t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y f r o m t h e r e a r j u s t a t t h e
m o m e n t w h e n i t was b e c o m i n g e n g a g e d with t h e m a i n P e r s i a n
a r m y , was p r e v e n t e d by t h e t r o o p s that A l e x a n d e r h a d left back as
a flank g u a r d . A n d so t h e Persian flank d e t a c h m e n t was probably
waiting for the M a c e d o n i a n s , o n c e they w e r e b e a t e n a n d b e i n g p u r -
sued, to have to m o v e by o n c e again in front of t h e m ; or at least
they w e r e waiting for t h e situation in t h e m a i n battle to b e c o m e
favorable for t h e i r a d v a n c e , a n d since t h a t d i d n o t occur, the flank
d e t a c h m e n t did not m o v e into action at all, a n d t h e e n t i r e effort
t u r n e d o u t to be a useless d e m o n s t r a t i o n , since A l e x a n d e r did n o t
allow himself to be i n t i m i d a t e d by it. To have an isolated force in-
t e r v e n e in a battle is an u n d e r t a k i n g that succeeds only very infre-
q u e n d y , so that o n e c a n n o t rightly c h a r g e cowardice in this case.
As t h e G r e e k p h a l a n x b e g a n its w i t h d r a w a l , t h e Persian cavalry
of the right flank, t o o , realized t h a t t h e battle was lost, a n d it fled
t h e field. T h e G r e e k s s e e m e d now to be in a d e s p e r a t e situation.
A b a n d o n e d by the Persian cavalry, attacked by infantry and
cavalry, they h a d to m o v e at least seven miles back across a plain
t h a t in no way offered any s t r o n g point for t h e r e t r e a t but, on t h e
c o n t r a r y , p u t f u r t h e r obstacles in t h e way in t h e form of several
d e e p s t r e a m b e d s c r o s s i n g t h e plain. I f t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry
should contain t h e m a n d t h e p h a l a n x attack t h e m , they would all
be lost. T h e y d i d , i n d e e d , suffer very heavy losses; nevertheless, a

large n u m b e r o f t h e m r e a c h e d o n e o f t h e m o u n t a i n passes a n d es-
caped. T h e y w e r e v e t e r a n , e x p e r i e n c e d w a r r i o r s w h o knew what
had to be d o n e , did not break t h e i r r a n k s , but, h o l d i n g their close
8
formation, w e r e still able to fend off attacks. It probably took long
e n o u g h for t h e m a i n body of the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x to o v e r c o m e
the steep rocky b a n k s of t h e P i n a r u s to allow t h e G r e e k s to gain a
head start. As for A l e x a n d e r , w h e n he saw that t h e battle was d e -
cided, h e p r e p a r e d t o p u r s u e t h e Persian King himself. T h a t p a r t
of the Persian a r c h e r s t h a t h a d d e f e n d e d t h e river b a n k in front of
the G r e e k s p r o b a b l y w i t h d r e w a l o n g with the G r e e k s , a n d d u r i n g
the r e t r e a t w a r d e d off the T h e s s a l i a n a n d o t h e r cavalry t h a t w e r e
besetting t h e m a r c h c o l u m n with missiles a n d javelins. At the battle
of G a u g a m e l a t h e r e w e r e still G r e e k s in t h e a r m y of the Persian
King; the majority of them, however (according to one
source—Curtius—8,000; according to the other—Arrian—4,000),
gave up their involvement, m a r c h e d to Phoenicia, a n d in t h e city of
T r i p o l i f o u n d ships that c a r r i e d t h e m away.
T h e G r e e k r e p o r t o f this b a t t l e , a c c o r d i n g t o which the M a c e d o -
nians lost 150 cavalrymen a n d 300 i n f a n t r y m e n killed, may, it is
t r u e , n o t be r e g a r d e d as absolutely a c c u r a t e , b u t it is not inconsis-
tent with t h e n a t u r e o f t h e situation a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e
battle. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is characteristic that the loss of the cavalry is
relatively m u c h heavier t h a n that of t h e infantry. A total of 450 killed
leads to an estimate of between 2,000 a n d 4,000 w o u n d e d .
T h e m o d e r a t e casualties o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n s lead u s back o n c e
again to t h e i m p o r t a n t question a b o u t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e Persian
a r m y . We h a v e seen that the sources plainly leave no alternative to
t h e Pajas as t h e battlefield, a n d this, in t u r n , is only acceptable on
t h e c o n d i t i o n of a M a c e d o n i a n superiority of n u m b e r s in infantry.
T h e chain of testimony s h o w i n g that, in fact, the Persians, w h o s e
c o u r a g e even t h e i r o p p o n e n t s d o not d e n y , w e r e not numerically
the s t r o n g e r force in the battle, receives a final, closing link in t h e
casualty figures of t h e victor, which show t h a t his victory in t h e
p r i m a r y battle was n o t too h a r d - w o n .
As long as t h e t e r r a i n was not so accurately k n o w n as it is today,
o n e was b o t h p e r m i t t e d a n d obliged to classify the battle of Issus,
like t h e o t h e r M a c e d o n i a n battles, u n d e r t h e simple t y p e o f t h e
oblique battle f o r m a t i o n with t h e r i g h t flank leading. We have seen
that this s c h e m e was significantly modified by virtue of the fact t h a t
t h e M a c e d o n i a n r i g h t wing h a d to m a k e a r a t h e r w i d e - s w e e p i n g
m o v e m e n t . T h i s swing a n d t h e separation of t h e right flank from

t h e c e n t e r are not specifically r e c o u n t e d in o u r sources. T h i s point
is, h o w e v e r , v e r y easily e x p l a i n e d . W e h a v e o n l y s e c o n d - h a n d
sources, a n d t h e a u t h o r s , especially A r r i a n , w e r e h a r d l y familiar
with t h e terrain at first h a n d . T h e original sources, however, ob-
scured the t r u e overall p i c t u r e by their e x a g g e r a t e d description of
how t h e King, at t h e head of his knights, pressed t h r o u g h t h e hail
of a r r o w s to the e n e m y left flank a n d d r o v e him to flight. T h e re-
sult of this situation for m o d e r n r e s e a r c h e r s was that, w h e n they
l e a r n e d of the difficulties of the terrain, they d e c l a r e d it completely
impossible for t h e battle to have t a k e n place at this point a n d con-
c l u d e d that it m u s t have b e e n on a n o t h e r river, the Deli-Tschai. In
d o i n g so, h o w e v e r , t h e y e n c o u n t e r e d , a s D i t t b e r n e r has p r o v e d
with telling effect, simply unsolvable contradictions, as well with the
descriptions of t h e sources c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e of t h e terrain as
with their very precise accounts of t h e m a r c h e s on both sides, a n d
with t h e strategic situation. T h e fact must r e m a i n t h a t t h e Pinarus
is the Pajas, a n d if we have to strike out t h e brilliant cavalry attack
u n d e r t h e p e r s o n a l c o m m a n d o f t h e King a s the decisive m o m e n t
of the day, still we gain in t u r n the d e e d of t h e c o m m a n d e r . W h e n
he recognized t h e impassable n a t u r e of the t e r r a i n b e f o r e his front,
with g r e a t flexibility of concept he m o v e d t h e right wing away from
the m i d d l e , in o r d e r to arrive at his goal by a r o u n d a b o u t way, a n d
j u s t as he previously h a d sent a p a r t of his cavalry f r o m t h e right
flank to t h e left flank, because it was n e e d e d t h e r e m o r e urgently,
h e n o w m o v e d a p a r t o f t h e heavy i n f a n t r y t o t h e e n v e l o p i n g
flank, in o r d e r by m e a n s of the flank attack to t h r o w t h e Greek
p h a l a n x from their position, which was unassailable from the front.
It m a y be said that A l e x a n d e r a d a p t e d t h e m e t h o d of t h e flank
battle to t h e actual circumstances, without violating t h e concept. His
victory was d u e j u s t as m u c h to t h e bravery a n d t h e n u m b e r of his
w a r r i o r s as to the efficiency of the a r m y organization t h a t kept the
individual units so closely u n d e r the control of t h e c o m m a n d e r that
he h a d t h e m with certainty at his disposition at any m o m e n t a n d
could direct t h e m a c c o r d i n g to his will a n d his insight. J u s t as im-
p o r t a n t as t h e s e factors was his i n s p i r e d l e a d e r s h i p , which con-
t r o l l e d t h e a p p r o a c h with p e r s p i c a c i t y , self-confidently i g n o r e d
the Persian flanking position a n d the a p p a r e n t l y i n s u r m o u n t a b l e dif-
ficulties of the t e r r a i n , a n d , wisely deviating from t h e n o r m a l pat-
t e r n , s u b s e q u e n t l y r e i n f o r c e d t h e flank t h a t was n o r m a l l y to be
held back a n d filled t h e e n t i r e a r m y with t h e spirit of the bold of-
fensive.
EXCURSUS
1. Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin all agree on an estimated loss of 150 cavalrymen,
but Diodorus estimates 3 0 0 infantrymen, Curtius 32, and Justin 130. It must remain
uncertain whether it is a case here of obscuring of the originally uniform n u m b e r
(some 332?), which might very well be true in view of the difference of up to half a
millennium between these authors and their original sources and in view of the
identical n u m b e r for the cavalry. At any rate, the highest figures come nearest to
the truth, since Arrian gives 120 m e n as the loss of the phalanx just in the combat
with the Greek hoplites.
When Curtius further reckons 504 as w o u n d e d , either this number is false or only
the seriously w o u n d e d are included. In m o d e r n reckoning every injury or contusion
is counted, even the smallest ones.
2. T h e actual source study account that I had a d d e d to the discussion of the bat-
tle in the first edition I have d r o p p e d here, since it has been superseded by the
more exact topographical verifications in Janke's book and the exhaustive m o n o -
graph by Dittberner. In order to clarify a few doubtful points that still remained with
respect to the topography, I turned to Consul Walter Rossler in Aleppo. He pro-
vided me a report by Chief Engineer Hossbach, which 1 am reprinting below. For all
details, I refer the reader to Dittberner. Only the following is repeated here.
Callisthenes' report has c o m e d o w n to us only because Polybius uses it to show
how little the author understood about warfare. Remarkably, it now c o m e s about
that recent scholars have consistently taken Callisthenes' side and have been inclined
to conclude from Polybius' o w n report that he did Callisthenes an injustice, misun-
derstood him, and in fact himself c o m m i t t e d quite serious oversights. I, too, as
highly as I respect Polybius, believe that o n e may not so unhesitatingly trust his
authority—as still is often the case—in that his figures are often sketchy and he him-
self is more d e p e n d e n t on his sources than it appears; but what he has to say about
Issus and Callisthenes is essentially accurate. We cite here only those points that
promise to shed s o m e light on the battle itself:
According to Polybius, Callisthenes has said that A l e x a n d e r gradually had his
army deploy as it came out of the narrow pass, finally giving it a d e p t h of 8 men. In
this formation it reportedly m o v e d forward 40 stadia (about 4½ miles).
Polybius estimates the army at 4 2 , 0 0 0 foot soldiers and 5,000 cavalry and points
out that such a large phalanx in the formation described would have had to have a
breadth of 40 .stadia, whereas Callisthenes asserts at the same time that the plain was
only 14 stadia wide, that three of these were taken up by the cavalry, and that there
was still room left over.
9
It is not clear how Polybius arrived at the width of 40 stadia. With 4 2 , 0 0 0 m e n in
a formation 8 m e n d e e p , allowing 3 feet per man, the result is a r o u n d 16,000 feet,
or 27 stadia. O n e may let the matter d r o p there, or o n e may take into account the
fact that Polybius, in his eagerness to prove the absurdity of Callisthenes, set the
strength of the infantry considerably too high. Nevertheless, he is still right with re-
spect to the principal point, namely, that the phalanx cannot possibly have been
formed with a depth of only 8 m e n .
Bauer has corrected this in the opposite direction and has claimed to prove that
that phalanx with a d e p t h of only 8 m e n fit very well into the terrain and that Callis-
thenes only erred in estimating the width of the plain at 14 stadia (2½ kilometers),
which was m u c h too small. Now in this respect Bauer is right; but his concept is
impossible, because a phalanx of a depth of 8 m e n and a width of almost 4½ miles
is an absurdity. It would not be able to move 10 steps forward without breaking, and
after 100 steps it would be in complete disarray. It would even be absolutely impos-
sible to have it form up or come to a halt uniformly.
T h e correct solution has already been stated by K. N e u m a n n in "On the Geog-
raphy and H i s t o r y of Cilicia" ("Zur L a n d e s k u n d e u n d G e s c h i c h t e Kilikiens"),
Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie 127 (1883): 5 4 4 , where he points out that in Curtius
(going back to Ptolemy) it is stated that the phalanx at Issus had a d e p t h of 32 men.
If we assume that the pezetairoi and hypaspists together were s o m e 2 0 , 0 0 0 strong, then
the phalanx, with its intervals, was less than 1 kilometer, or 4 to 5 stadia, wide. To
10
that must be a d d e d the cavalry and the light i n f a n t r y . Callisthenes, who had crossed
the area with Alexander's staff a few days before the battle, is perhaps not en-
tirely right, but still partially right, in his topographic description, and consequently,
just as Polybius describes, incorrect in his military description. He probably was not
a witness to the battle itself, but remained behind with the civilian part of the head-
quarters in Myriandrus. On the following day he heard how the army had gradually
d e p l o y e d out of the d a n g e r o u s pass, had drawn up in phalanx formation, and had
m o v e d against the enemy. Since he knew that the normal formation of hoplites was
8 m e n d e e p , in his rhetorical painting he had the whole mighty phalanx deploy in
this formation, and since he r e m e m b e r e d that the pass was about 40 stadia from the
river, he had the phalanx m o v e this distance forward. His military knowledge did
not e x t e n d far e n o u g h to let him know that such an approach march is impossible,
that the phalanx of a large army is drawn up d e e p e r than that of a single detach-
ment, and that with the plain's width of only 14 stadia, as he himself gave it, the
shallow phalanx would not even have fit into the space.
3. In his review of Dittberner's work (Historische Zeitschrift 112: 348), Kromayer
agrees with us to the extent that he, too, established that the most logical interpreta-
tion of the sources leads to the Pajas as the river on which the battle was fought.
Nevertheless, he considers the assumption as impossible, since the u p p e r and middle
portions of the Pajas are absolutely impassable for troops in close formation, and the
break in the upper part of the river bank, which Dittberner describes as 3 0 0 meters
wide, actually consists only of two small gaps of 50 and 30 meters in breadth. I reply
that such gaps are completely sufficient for an operation such as Dittberner and I
picture this o n e to be. T h e difference, in the final analysis, is again a difference in
numbers. If the Persian army had been so large as to form a full, close battle forma-
tion e x t e n d i n g across and b e y o n d those gaps, then A l e x a n d e r would have been un-
able, of course, to penetrate. For a close-order attack by heavy cavalry the gaps are
too small and not sufficiently passable. Since travelers w h o have inspected the bat-
tlefield have always a p p r o a c h e d their study with the preconceived idea of a Persian
mass army that was f o r m e d up closely along the entire river bank up to the m o u n -
tains, they have naturally rejected the possibility of a crossing at this point and so
from the start have not seriously e x a m i n e d this possibility. Of what use, after all,
would a break e v e n as large as 3 0 0 m e t e r s in width have been for Alexander's
cavalry, Kromayer asks, if the phalanx could not cross simultaneously? T h e answer
is: the crossing was so weakly d e f e n d e d that the cavalry with the lightly armed infan-
try, u n d e r such forceful and direct leadership as that of A l e x a n d e r , could force its
way across even without the support of the phalanx. T h e inadequate defense of the
crossing was, on the other hand, the simple result of the weakness of the Persian
army, which was drawn up b e h i n d the m i d d l e and lower sections of the river's
course.
4. With respect to Beloch's strange idea that it was not A l e x a n d e r himself but the
c h i e f of his g e n e r a l staff, P a r m e n i o , w h o was really the great strategist of the
Macedonians, let it be noted at this point that this concept cannot be proved in any
way, but rather can be directly refuted by the chain of events of the battle of Issus.
For the decisive features of this battle—the reinforcing of the cavalry on the left
flank while the d e p l o y m e n t was still u n d e r way, the m o v i n g off of the right wing
toward the right, its reinforcement first by the troops in the holding position and
then by the two taxis of the phalanx—all of these can only have been at Alexander's
personal direction.
5. In his Greek History, 2: 6 3 4 , Beloch has stated the o p i n i o n that it was not by
c h a n c e but intentionally that D a r i u s passed a r o u n d the M a c e d o n i a n army and
fought the battle with his front reversed, and as a matter of fact, u n a n i m o u s as our
sources are, we are still justified in not trusting them unquestioningly on this point.
In keeping with the entire m a n n e r in which the Persians are presented a n d charac-
terized, such a bold, e v e n excellent stratagem would have fit too poorly into the pic-
ture to be acceptable, e v e n if there had b e e n definite information on this in the
Macedonian camp.
Nevertheless, I think that the situation itself and the details of the overall picture
eliminate Beloch's assumption.
Darius w o u l d not have b e e n able to m a k e the d e c i s i o n to m o v e a r o u n d the
Macedonians until the latter had actually arrived in Myriandrus. If the Persians had
not started their march until the Macedonians themselves were on the march be-
tween Mallus and Issus, they would have risked colliding with the e n e m y army di-
rectly as they were c o m i n g out of the passes, and in d o i n g so they would have fallen
into a very poor strategic situation. T h e y could not know until o n e or two days in
advance how long the Macedonians would delay their march. T h e essential point for
the completion of Beloch's hypothesis, then, is that A l e x a n d e r m a d e a halt of several
days in Myriandrus, d u r i n g which the Persians carried out their e n v e l o p i n g march
through the A m a n u s passes. T h e fact is that Arrian d o e s not state with absolute clar-
ity how long the Macedonians had already b e e n in Myriandrus w h e n they received
the information of the Persians' arrival in Issus. According to the overall tenor of
the account, however, this occurred on just the second day, and the report in Cur-
tius, d e s p i t e its rhetorical e x a g g e r a t i o n s , that the t w o armies m a r c h e d past o n e
another in one night also adds weight to the conclusion that the events followed in
close succession.
All the Greeks' observations concerning the incomprehensible stupidity of the Per-
sian m a n e u v e r of g o i n g into the narrow passes with their h u g e masses we have
completely disregarded, since the masses of the Persians were neither so great nor
was the plain at Deli-Tschai so small as to prevent any desired maneuvers. But it
would nevertheless be hard, for other reasons, to understand the Persians' conduct
under the assumption that they already knew of the arrival of the Macedonians in
Myriandrus. We have assumed that Darius started his march across the A m a n u s
Mountains in the belief that A l e x a n d e r would not go b e y o n d Cilicia with his o f f e n -
sive. If he was already in Myriandrus, however, it was also quite certain that he
would continue o n , and, to be exact, not along the Syrian coast (for by following
that coast he would obviously have been voluntarily giving up to the Persians his
base of operations and his field hospital in Issus), but across the Beilan pass into the
interior, in o r d e r to seek out the Persian army. Darius was near Sochi, the exact
location of which we do not know; at any rate it was not far from the exit of the
Beilan pass. T h e only logical decision for Darius at the m o m e n t w h e n he received
the information that A l e x a n d e r was in Myriandrus would have been to take up posi-
tion at the exit of the Beilan pass and with his a s s e m b l e d force to fall on the
M a c e d o n i a n s a s t h e y c a m e o u t o f the p a s s . T h e i d e a o f n o w e n v e l o p i n g the
Macedonians w o u l d have forfeited this decisive tactical advantage in return for the
strategic gain of cutting off the Macedonians' line of withdrawal. T h i s gain was not
significant, however, since the Macedonians, if they suffered any defeat at all so far
from their h o m e l a n d , were in any case lost, w h e t h e r their retreat was cut off from
the start or not.
O u r c o n c e p t is t h e r e f o r e as follows: After A l e x a n d e r had already arrived in
Myriandrus, the Persians could no longer logically have d e c i d e d on the e n v e l o p i n g
movement, and consequently there is no reason to reject the sources' report that the
marches of the two armies took place simultaneously.
T h e Persians must therefore have d e c i d e d on the march while the Macedonians
were still in Mallus. But at that time they c o u n t e d on the fact that the Macedonians
would not go any farther forward, for otherwise they would have risked r u n n i n g
into the Macedonians as soon as they c a m e out of the A m a n u s passes o n t o the plain
of the Deli-Tschai. T h e march was, therefore, not an e n v e l o p m e n t march but a sim-
ple advance, and it was a simple coincidence that it became an e n v e l o p m e n t march

because on precisely that same day the Macedonians, too, took up their advance
march—exactly as it is reported in o u r sources.
6. T h e report that the surviving Greek mercenaries embarked in Tripoli led Ditt-
b e r n e r (p. 156) to the idea that t h e y had p e r h a p s c o m p l e t e l y p e n e t r a t e d the
Macedonian phalanx and had escaped via the direct route toward the south. This
conclusion, however, is not only not convincing, but it is e v e n completely eliminated
because of the o t h e r circumstances. T h e road d o e s lead, to be sure, from the Issus
plain across the A m a n u s M o u n t a i n s to P h o e n i c i a in a half-circle a r o u n d the
Macedonians, but such a flight a r o u n d the back of the e n e m y occurs quite often in
military history; for e x a m p l e , in this m a n n e r a part of the B u r g u n d i a n army es-
caped at Murten in 1476, and a part of the French army from the battle of Novara
in 1513.
As is s h o w n in the account by Arrian, the Macedonians naturally did not take up
their advance again on the day after the battle. If the Greeks had broken through
the Macedonians, they would have m o v e d out on the road on which A l e x a n d e r had
m o v e d up and would therefore have passed through his train and would not have
left it u n d i s t u r b e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , A l e x a n d e r ' s G r e e k allies w e r e in p o s i t i o n at
Myriandrus or at the entrance of the Beilan pass. It is completely impossible that
our sources should not have retained the slightest trace of such a prodigious event
as the breakthrough itself, the crossing of the Pajas, a n d all the events that would
necessarily have taken place on the withdrawal route.
7. K o e p p , in Alexander the Great (Alexander der Grosse), p. 3 1 , believes that the Per-
sians' bypassing action makes the Macedonian reconnaissance units appear in a bad
light. H e r e he underestimates the difficulty of conducting a reconnaissance two days'
march away, over mountain passes, in e n e m y country. Even if A l e x a n d e r sent out
patrols in this direction and they e n c o u n t e r e d e n e m y troops w h o were c o m i n g to-
ward them, they still were not able to determine whether it was only a Persian scout-
ing party or actually the whole army that was approaching. Even w h e n Darius was
already in Issus, A l e x a n d e r was still in doubt and before turning about, he first dis-
patched a ship to take a closer look. Such uncertainties and surprises are inevitable
in war and very frequent, and they do not necessarily indicate any laxness.
8. Description of the terrain by Senior Engineer Hossbach in a letter to Consul
Rossler dated 21 N o v e m b e r 1913:
"After inspecting the Pajas-Tschai in the m e a n t i m e twice from its m o u t h up to the
point where it breaks out of the mountain, I want to s e n d you today the following
c o m p l e t e report of the results:
"1. From its m o u t h upstream for about 5 0 0 meters the river bed is only here and
there contained in banks of about 1 to 2 meters in height, but steep. A crossing by
cavalry along this stretch is possible, to be sure, but difficult because of the stretches
with steep e d g e s and the very stony river bed.
"2. From the 5 0 0 meter point to the westernmost (newer) highway bridge (some
1,600 meters from the m o u t h ) , the river bed is only about 5 to 15 meters wide, with
steep-cut banks. A c r o s s i n g by cavalry in any n u m b e r s is i m p o s s i b l e a l o n g this
stretch, a crossing by infantry possible.
"3. From the 1.6 kilometer point to the easternmost (older) highway bridge (about
3.5 kilometers from the m o u t h ) the river bed is alternately narrower and wider. T h e
banks here have been considerably c h a n g e d as a result of the later construction in
the city of Bajae. T h e i r nature is, however, consistently steep and difficult to take,
e v e n for infantry. A l o n g a stretch of about 3 0 0 meters the walls consist of from 2- to
4-meter-high conglomerate rock falling off vertically, which makes a crossing almost
impossible, even for infantry.
"4. From the 3.5 kilometer point on (that is, directly after the second bridge)
there is a place of about 30 (not 300) meters in length, at which a narrow path leads
t h r o u g h the river bed, a route that presumably served as a ford earlier—that is, be-
fore the construction of the bridges. (At this point, besides the present bridge, there
are still at hand the remains of two apparently very old bridges.) On the south side
the path leads steeply d o w n into the river bed, and on the north side it rises some-
hat more gently along the flattened-off river bank. T h e attached photograph N o . 1
shows this north side with the clearly recognizable footpath, as well as, on the lower
left the e d g e of the bridge from which the photograph was taken and also, from
the center on (behind the white figure), toward the right, the c o n t i n u o u s steep
banks that start here (compare para. 5, below). T h e unusually stony river bed is also
clearly recognizable.
"5. From about the 3.53 kilometer point on, the river bed is some 15 to 40 meters
wide, but on both sides, continuously to the foot of the mountain (that is, for about
1.5 kilometers) enclosed in vertical rock walls varying in height from 3 to 20 meters
and completely impassable, even for infantry, unless they should be e q u i p p e d with
scaling ladders, and so on, as are used in our m o d e r n maneuvers for attacks on for-
tresses. Illustration 2 shows the start of this section, that is, about 100 meters from
the bridge, where the continuous rocky banks start with a height of about 3 meters.
T h e water forms a small lake here, which accounts for the reflection of the bushes.
"I hope that the foregoing description will give Professor Delbrück a basis for his
conclusions on the question of the battlefield of Issus. I was j o i n e d on my inspection
by two other engineers, both of w h o m are g o o d h o r s e m e n , and we were all in a-
greement that a crossing by cavalry in battle formation at the point described in
paragraph 4 would be impossible."
1. After having h a d to r e w o r k the p r e s e n t a t i o n of this battle for

the second edition, I have now o n c e again h a d to m a k e not u n i m -
portant changes. T h e r e a s o n was t h e same b o t h times—that is, a
m o r e correct a n d m o r e detailed u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the s t r u c t u r e o f
the terrain. Even now, however, I h a v e felt obliged to stand by t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l fact that the battle took place not on the Deli-Tschai,
but on the Pajas. Accordingly, I c o n t i n u e to r e g a r d the dissertation
of W. D i t t b e r n e r (Berlin, 1908) as t h e authoritative work a n d can-
not find that it has b e e n eliminated by Colonel J a n k e , to w h o m we
are i n d e b t e d in o t h e r respects for the t o p o g r a p h y (Klio 10: 137,
" A n n e x to P e t e r m a n n ' s R e p o r t s , " May 1911 ["Beilage von Peter-
m a n n s M i t t e i l u n g e n , " 1 9 1 1 , M a i h e f t ] ) . S e e also t h e r e v i e w o f
Dieulefoy's study by D i t t b e r n e r in t h e Deutsche Literarische Zeitung,
No. 24, (1912), C o l u m n 1525, a n d t h e article by K r o m a y e r in t h e
Historische Zeitschrift 112: 3 4 8 .
2. A r r i a n 2. 2. 1. C u r t i u s 3. 8. 1.
3. An absolute p r o o f for the m o d e r a t e s t r e n g t h of the Persian
a r m y is not to be c o n c l u d e d from the m a r c h action, in that, accord-
ing to J a n k e , a r a t h e r large n u m b e r of m o r e or less usable passes
lead o v e r t h e A m a n u s m o u n t a i n c h a i n i n t o t h e plain o f Issus.
Nevertheless it can hardly be a s s u m e d that t h e r e was an elaborate
allocation of forces to various a p p r o a c h r o a d s , a n d since in t h e bat-
tle it was almost exclusively t h e G r e e k s w h o played a significant in-

fantry role, t h e n t h e o t h e r i n f a n t r y c o n t i n g e n t s o n h a n d c a n n o t
have b e e n so very s t r o n g .
K r o m a y e r , i n t h e w o r k cited a b o v e , believes t h a t t h e P e r s i a n
a r m y can be estimated at 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , since t h e Seleucids
h a d raised a r m i e s of similar s t r e n g t h . T h e D i a d o c h i states differ,
however, from t h e A c h a e m e n i d a e E m p i r e precisely in t h e fact that
they h a d a completely different c o n c e p t of war, a n d in any case no
c o m p a r i s o n is possible in view of t h e positive factors t h a t exclude
t h e possibility o f a n a r m y o f m o r e t h a n s o m e 2 5 , 0 0 0 m e n .
4. A r r i a n 2. 5. 1 r e p o r t s t h a t P a r m e n i o h a d b e e n sent o u t in ad-
vance with t h e G r e e k s a n d o t h e r t r o o p s from T a r s u s i n o r d e r t o
s e c u r e t h e Cilician-Syrian passes. N o w since t h e G r e e k s a r e not
m e n t i o n e d in t h e two s o u r c e s specifying t h e battle f o r m a t i o n at
Issus, we can accept the a c c o u n t above with certainty. Köhler, in
" T h e C o n q u e s t of Asia" ("Die E r o b e r u n g Asiens"), in Abhandlungen
der Berliner Akademie, 1898, p. 130, believes that A l e x a n d e r did not
n e e d to post t r o o p s to cover his rear, since t h e Persian a r m y was,
obviously, in front of him. T h e flimsiness of this conclusion is evident.
5. A r r i a n ' s description, t h a t b e h i n d the Persian battle line, which
he describes for us, t h e r e still stood in useless d e p t h h u g e n u m b e r s
of b a r b a r i a n peoples, has b e e n u n d e r s t o o d by r e c e n t historians as
an echelon f o r m a t i o n . Aside from the fact t h a t an e c h e l o n e d for-
mation, as we shall see, m e a n s a r e f i n e m e n t of tactics that did not
o c c u r u n t i l a l a t e r p e r i o d , A r r i a n ' s r e p o r t is n a t u r a l l y only t h e
c o m p l e m e n t of his estimate of the Persian a r m y at a s t r e n g t h of
600,000 m e n . W h a t the G r e e k s saw in front of t h e m was only a
moderate-sized a r m y ; t h e b a r b a r i a n s , however, w e r e , o n c e a n d for
all, masses—consequently these masses w e r e placed s o m e w h e r e or
o t h e r i n t h e rear, d r a w n u p "in unusable d e p t h . "
6. Polybius 12. 17. 7, ". . . the peltasts in a line which s t r e t c h e d to
t h e m o u n t a i n s , " * a c c o r d i n g t o Callisthenes. T h e s e lightly a r m e d
m e n , w h o stretched out all t h e way to the m o u n t a i n s , w e r e p r o b a -
bly principally Persian a r c h e r s . A r r i a n , in 2. 10. 6, r e p o r t s specifi-
cally that the M a c e d o n i a n s , after moving forward slowly at first in
o r d e r not to have their battle line become wavy, finally attacked on
the r u n so that they would not suffer too m u c h from the e n e m y
archers.
T h a t t h e front of the Persians did not e x t e n d t h e length of the
river is shown expressly in A r r i a n 2. 9. 4, w h e r e it is said that the
Macedonians, after A l e x a n d e r h a d drawn t h e t r o o p s from the flank
g u a r d positions to h i m , outflanked the Persian formation. T h e sen-
tence in 2. 8. 6, " T h e g r o u n d on which they w e r e s t a n d i n g allowed
this n u m b e r of m e n to be c o n t a i n e d in a straight p h a l a n x , " * could
be i n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n t h a t t h e width of t h e plain would not have
contained any m o r e than were formed u p , so that the phalanx
stretched o u t f r o m t h e sea t o t h e m o u n t a i n . T h e citation above,
however, excludes this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
7. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius, Callisthenes e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e plain of
Pajas was n o t q u i t e 14 stadia (254 k i l o m e t e r s ) w i d e a n d t h a t t h e
Macedonian p h a l a n x r e m a i n e d at a c o n s i d e r a b l e distance from t h e
m o u n t a i n s . A r r i a n r e p o r t s t h a t t h e i r left flank t o u c h e d t h e sea.
Now t h e plain is n o t 2½ b u t 4 kilometers wide a c c o r d i n g to J a n k e ,
5 kilometers by Hossbach's e s t i m a t e — a n e r r o r of estimation t h a t is
not a b n o r m a l (see D i t t b e r n e r , p. 122); nevertheless, we may believe
Callisthenes w h e n he says t h e M a c e d o n i a n front was considerably
less t h a n 2½ kilometers wide. It t h e r e f o r e r e a c h e d from t h e sea
about t h e same d i s t a n c e — o r p e r h a p s not q u i t e as far—as the river
was m o r e or less fordable for infantry.
8. C u r t i u s 3. 1 1 . 1 8 : " G r a e c i . . . a b r u p t i a c e t e r i s h a u d s a n e
fugientibus similes e v a s e r u n t . " ( " T h e G r e e k s , s e p a r a t e d from t h e
rest, h a d escaped, n o t at all in t h e way d e s e r t e r s do.")
9. F r o m all a p p e a r a n c e s , he initially e s t i m a t e d , in c o n n e c t i o n with
an estimate of Callisthenes, only 3 2 , 0 0 0 p h a l a n x soldiers, b u t as-
s u m e d for each m a n not t h e c o m b a t width, b u t t h e m a r c h o r d e r
width of 6 feet.
10. Polybius 12. 18, estimates 800 h o r s e m e n p e r stadium with t h e
d e e p e s t n o r m a l f o r m a t i o n of 8 h o r s e s , a n d t h e r e f o r e 6 feet p e r
horse with intervals. It is also very possible, however, that they w e r e
s o m e t i m e s d r a w n u p d e e p e r a n d t h e y m a y very well h a v e b e e n
m u c h closer t o g e t h e r ; 5,000 h o r s e m e n , 8 h o r s e s d e e p with 6 feet to
a h o r s e w o u l d e x t e n d , even w i t h o u t intervals, m o r e t h a n a kilometer.
Chapter IV
The Battle of Gaugamela
After t h e victory at Issus A l e x a n d e r first subjected Phoenicia a n d

Syria, a n d t h e n h a d to carry o u t two very h a r d sieges, at T y r e a n d
Gaza. T h e n he m a r c h e d on, in o r d e r to seize control of Egypt as
well. T h e r e has b e e n a t e n d e n c y to criticize this latter c a m p a i g n
a n d even to find t h a t t h e e x p e d i t i o n can only be e x p l a i n e d by tak-
ing into c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e fact t h a t for t h e Ancients t h e relative
positions of t h e countries w e r e not clearly u n d e r s t o o d a n d Alexan-
d e r , t h e r e f o r e , could not have b e e n aware of how seriously he was
e x p o s i n g his r e a r w a r d line o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o w a r d B a b y l o n
1
w h e n he struck o u t in this d i r e c t i o n .
B u t I think that A l e x a n d e r knew very well w h a t he was d o i n g . It
could be a s s u m e d t h a t t h e Persians would not yet a p p e a r again in
Syria in t h e following year (332 B . C . ) with a large a r m y , a n d if they
did so, they would fall a s u r e p r e y to h i m . In o r d e r to have a firm
base for his f o r t h c o m i n g c a m p a i g n i n t o t h e i n t e r i o r o f Persia,
A l e x a n d e r n e e d e d to have not only the mastery of Syria b u t also
that of Egypt. Certainly it would have sufficed to d e t a c h a g e n e r a l
with a small force in that direction, b u t by no m e a n s has it b e e n
said that it was only for t h e c o n q u e r i n g of Egypt t h a t A l e x a n d e r
held up a n d left his o p p o n e n t time to r e e q u i p . It is t r u e that the
m o r e quickly t h e M a c e d o n i a n s a p p e a r e d in Persia, the less time
r e m a i n e d for Darius to o r g a n i z e a new a r m y . B u t A l e x a n d e r , too,
was s t r e n g t h e n i n g himself in t h e m e a n t i m e . At Issus he probably
h a d s o m e t h i n g over 30,000 m e n with him; from that n u m b e r w e r e
subtracted the losses of t h e battle a n d of t h e sieges a n d t h e garri-
sons t h a t w e r e n e c e s s a r y in Syria. If he h a d , t h e n , also s e n t a
f u r t h e r d e t a c h m e n t t o E g y p t , h e w o u l d h a v e crossed t h e T i g r i s
with hardly m o r e t h a n 2 0 , 0 0 0 — o r , a s s u m i n g that s o m e reinforce-
ments r e a c h e d him, with some 25,000 to 30,000 men. At
G a u g a m e l a , however, h e h a d 4 7 , 0 0 0 m e n , a n d i t d o e s not a p p e a r
210
The Battle of Gaugamela 211
that that n u m b e r was too great. We m u s t t h e r e f o r e praise again, as

we did before, t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of boldness a n d c i r c u m s p e c t i o n that
p r e v e n t e d t h e y o u n g King from d a s h i n g blindly after his d e f e a t e d
o p p o n e n t a n d c a u s e d h i m first of all to assemble t h e forces neces-
sary for t h e o p e r a t i o n that was to r e a c h o u t into b o u n d l e s s a r e a s
a n d t o fill t h e i n t e r i m profitably with t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e
Macedonian h e g e m o n y in Egypt a n d the w i n n i n g over of the c o o p -
eration of t h e E g y p t i a n gods.
Darius did not contest t h e crossing o f t h e E u p h r a t e s a n d Tigris
rivers by his f o r m i d a b l e e n e m y b u t awaited h i m on t h e g r e a t plain
b e y o n d t h e twin-river a r e a , n o t far from t h e r u i n s o f N i n e v e h .
G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s a r e said to have b e e n with h i m still at this point,
but so few that they play no f u r t h e r role in the battle. It is also
r e p o r t e d (Diodorus 17. 55) t h a t the Persian K i n g h a d h a d m a d e for
his w a r r i o r s l o n g e r spears a n d s w o r d s t h a n they c a r r i e d previously,
because t h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d s u c h w e a p o n s . Since t h e P e r s i a n s
previously f o u g h t principally with t h e bow a n d javelins ( H e r o d o t u s ,
too, m e n t i o n s t h e l o n g e r spears o f t h e G r e e k s ) , this c h a n g e can
probably be i n t e r p r e t e d as m e a n i n g that D a r i u s i n t e n d e d to f o r m a
p h a l a n x with his Asiatics, with t h e s u p p o r t of his G r e e k followers;
for t h e l o n g s p e a r is no l o n g e r a missile b u t r a t h e r a close c o m b a t
w e a p o n , a n d t h e Persians h a d n o d o u b t not r e m a i n e d blind t o t h e
fact t h a t it was most effective in t h e tightly o r d e r e d p h a l a n x . B u t
w h e t h e r this r e p o r t is a u t h e n t i c or not, t h e fact r e m a i n s t h a t a tac-
tical b o d y like t h e p h a l a n x c a n n o t be i m p r o v i s e d ; it r e q u i r e s drill
a n d military t r a i n i n g .
T h i s is r e m i n i s c e n t of t h e r e p o r t t h a t Melchior Russ von L u z e r n ,
a m b a s s a d o r to K i n g Louis XI of F r a n c e , sent h o m e in 1480: " T h e
King is r e s h a p i n g his a r m y a n d is h a v i n g m a n u f a c t u r e d a g r e a t
n u m b e r of long spears and halberds of the G e r m a n type. If he
could also m a n u f a c t u r e m e n t o h a n d l e t h e m , h e w o u l d n o l o n g e r
2
need a n y b o d y else's services." T h e a r t of w a r has n e e d of w e a p o n s ,
but it is n o t c o m p o s e d essentially of w e a p o n s , a n d so in t h e battle
of G a u g a m e l a we h e a r n o t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e e d s of a Persian
phalanx.
T h e new w e a p o n s by m e a n s of which D a r i u s actually s o u g h t to
break t h e fearful shock of the p h a l a n x , after t h e t e r r a i n obstacle
before his front h a d p r o v e d ineffective at Issus, w e r e t h e scythed
chariots a n d with t h e m a small n u m b e r of e l e p h a n t s .
F o r t h e rest, t h e real s t r e n g t h of t h e Persian army, as was inher-
e n t in t h e n a t u r e of things, lay in its cavalry, as at Issus, a n d cer-
tainly it was for this reason t h a t D a r i u s left t h e river crossings o p e n
to A l e x a n d e r , in o r d e r to be able to wait for h i m on a battlefield of

his o w n c h o o s i n g , t h a t is, o n a b r o a d p l a i n w h e r e t h e P e r s i a n
cavalry could d e p l o y w i t h o u t h i n d r a n c e a n d take full a d v a n t a g e of
its superiority. If A l e x a n d e r h a d 7,000 cavalry at G a u g a m e l a , as
A r r i a n r e p o r t s , t h e n it can be a s s u m e d t h a t D a r i u s h a d assembled
p e r h a p s 12,000—but certainly no m o r e t h a n that, for 12,000
h o r s e m e n in o n e place is such a large mass t h a t they can h a r d l y be
m a n a g e d a n d controlled e v e n t h r o u g h a skill of o r g a n i z a t i o n , sup-
3
ply, a n d l e a d e r s h i p d e v e l o p e d to t h e point of virtuosity. It is h a r d
to imagine Darius' infantry. A r c h e r s — t h e old a r m of the
Persians—can only be d r a w n up a few r a n k s d e e p in o r d e r to be
effective. It was useless to d r a w up loose-knit g r o u p s of an unmili-
tary p e o p l e against a hoplite p h a l a n x , a n d t h e Persians u n d e r s t o o d
t h e a r t of war well e n o u g h to know t h a t a n d to p r e f e r to use all
t h e i r s t r e n g t h for t h e r e i n f o r c i n g of t h e cavalry, instead of involv-
i n g t h e m s e l v e s in i n s u p e r a b l e s u p p l y difficulties t h r o u g h useless
mass levies. If t h e r e w e r e any a t t e m p t s to d e v e l o p a h o p l i t e
p h a l a n x , t h e battle shows n o t h i n g of any success in this area. C o n -
sequently it is quite possible t h a t t h e Persian a r m y , aside from the
cavalry, e l e p h a n t s , a n d scythed chariots, h a d only a relatively small
n u m b e r o f foot s o l d i e r s — t h a t is, c e r t a i n l y n o t m o r e t h a n t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s , a n d probably fewer. T h e native Persian cavalry,
however, was reinforced by Scythian a n d p r e s u m a b l y I n d i a n m e r -
cenaries as well.
O u r sources, i n c l u d i n g e v e n the principal s o u r c e , A r r i a n , a r e a
m i x t u r e of very a c c u r a t e , d o c u m e n t e d r e p o r t s , especially c o n c e r n -
ing t h e formations, a n d o f c a m p f i r e l e g e n d s that can, nevertheless,
be critically sifted o u t with r e a s o n a b l e certainty.
T h e m o s t e x t r e m e f o r m o f t h e c a m p l e g e n d has i t that t h e Per-
sians a t G a u g a m e l a , j u s t a s a t I s s u s a n d o n t h e G r a n i c u s , h a d
s o u g h t a frontal obstacle a n d h a d on this occasion fabricated o n e
artificially with pitfalls a n d caltrops. B u t A r r i a n himself h a d already
rejected this account, r e p o r t i n g it only as a suspicion on t h e p a r t of
t h e M a c e d o n i a n s . He claims, in fact, q u i t e to t h e c o n t r a r y , that t h e
Persians h a d artificially c l e a r e d t h e t e r r a i n b e f o r e t h e i r front a n d
h a d r e m o v e d obstacles in o r d e r to o p e n up a clear a r e a for t h e i r
scythed chariots.
Since we do not h e a r t h a t any M a c e d o n i a n soldier w h a t e v e r fell
i n t o t h e pitfalls or s t e p p e d on a c a l t r o p in t h e b a t t l e , we shall
eliminate these distortions f r o m t h e history of t h e battle. B u t we
may also p u t aside t h e idea of artificial s m o o t h i n g of t h e field for
t h e scythed chariots, in view of t h e fact t h a t t h e Persians, after all,
could not know in a d v a n c e w h e r e the M a c e d o n i a n s would attack,

and such clearings c a n n o t be effected in a p e r i o d of a few days.
Suffice it to say that t h e Persians h a d s o u g h t for t h e battle a gener-
ally o p e n plain with only small rises a n d d e p r e s s i o n s , w h e r e their
two p r i n c i p a l a r m s , t h e cavalry a n d t h e s c y t h e d c h a r i o t s , could
m a n e u v e r u n i m p e d e d . If the scythed chariots succeeded in disrupt-
ing the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x a n d h a l t i n g its f o r w a r d m o v e m e n t ,
while the s u p e r i o r Persian cavalry carried o u t an e n v e l o p i n g attack
against the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry a n d d r o v e it off, the victory would
be decided in favor of the Persians. It was t h u s on o n e earlier occa-
sion ( X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 4. 1. 19) t h a t t h e S a t r a p P h a r n a b a z u s
had b r o k e n up a f o r m a t i o n of 700 G r e e k s with two scythed
chariots, falling on t h e m t h e n with his cavalry a n d c u t t i n g t h e m
4
down.
T h e p h a l a n x , d e p r i v e d of its own cavalry, w o u l d not have b e e n
able to w a r d off t h e j o i n t attack of t h e Persian cavalry a n d a r c h e r s
but would gradually have h a d to be a n n i h i l a t e d .
A c c o r d i n g to t h e account of t h e G r e e k s , t h e battle formation of
the Persians was f o u n d later a m o n g t h e booty, a n d it has been passed
down to us in detail, but it d o e s not really p r o v i d e us with any-
thing of i m p o r t a n c e . T h e only n o t e w o r t h y point in it is the fact
that, from all a p p e a r a n c e s , not only w e r e t h e flanks c o m p o s e d of
cavalry, b u t in t h e c e n t e r , too, h o r s e m e n a n d foot soldiers w e r e
m i x e d t o g e t h e r , a n o t h e r indication t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y was n o t s o
very n u m e r o u s .
A l e x a n d e r was again able at a glance to a d a p t the n o r m a l ar-
r a n g e m e n t of his f o r m a t i o n to the circumstances. He did not use
the great mass of his infantry to e x t e n d t h e battle line, which would
have i m p e d e d too m u c h their o r d e r l y m o v e m e n t , b u t instead d o u -
bled t h e d e p t h of his f o r m a t i o n a n d gave his r e a r e l e m e n t s t h e
c o m m a n d to face a b o u t in case of an attack from t h e rear. Mainly,
however, he p r o t e c t e d himself against t h e d a n g e r of an e n v e l o p -
m e n t on t h e p a r t of the s u p e r i o r e n e m y cavalry in the o p e n plain
b y m e a n s o f u n i t s o f h o r s e m e n a n d light i n f a n t r y , w h i c h w e r e
stationed in an a n g l e d formation on t h e two flanks. C o n s e q u e n t l y
these h o r s e m e n a n d light infantry units could follow t h e a d v a n c i n g
line in a d e e p c o l u m n from which they could either deploy to ex-
t e n d t h e battle line (the c o l u m n b e h i n d t h e right flank h a d t h e r e -
fore m a r c h e d off with its left leading) or, swinging into line t o w a r d
the flank, could form a c u r v e d e x t e n s i o n to meet an attack from
the flank, or, finally, could fill up from the r e a r any possible breaks
i n t h e p h a l a n x t h a t m i g h t d e v e l o p d u r i n g t h e advance.
In this formation t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y m o v e d f o r w a r d across

the plain against the Persians. A s s u m i n g that, of t h e 4 7 , 0 0 0 - m a n
total r e p o r t e d to us, a few t h o u s a n d m e n w e r e left b e h i n d as c a m p
g u a r d s a n d sick, t h e r e still r e m a i n s a powerful mass, which, o n c e it
has f o r m e d u p , can move forward only with difficulty a n d slowly
without falling into d i s o r d e r .
T h e Persian battle plan b r o k e d o w n insofar as the scythed
chariots were c o n c e r n e d . Of the e l e p h a n t s we h e a r n o t h i n g at all in
the battle. A l e x a n d e r sent o u t s h a r p s h o o t e r s against t h e scythed
chariots, who, s w a r m i n g o u t in front of the p h a l a n x , shot d o w n the
drivers of the chariots as they a p p r o a c h e d , or, r u n n i n g a r o u n d the
chariots, d r a g g e d t h e drivers out. T h e driverless h o r s e s w e r e t h e n ,
in p a r t , frightened away, a n d in those cases w h e r e they c h a r g e d
d o w n on the p h a l a n x , space was o p e n e d up for t h e m , so that only
5
a few m e n w e r e c a u g h t a n d w o u n d e d by the scythes. In t h e m e a n -
time, the cavalry of b o t h sides h a d tried to win t h e flanks, t h e Per-
sians outflanking the M a c e d o n i a n s a n d t h e latter d e p l o y i n g against
them the troops from the angled formations, a n d the resulting
combat kept flowing back a n d forth. T h e o u t c o m e was still d o u b t -
ful w h e n the p h a l a n x , after disposing of t h e scythed chariots, o n c e
again took up its forward m o v e m e n t . T h e r i g h t wing, which h a d
b e e n s e p a r a t e d from t h e left, was in a d v a n c e , a n d w h e n it now
reinforced t h e cavalry a n d d r o v e in on the Persians, they took to
flight.
While it is probably t r u e that Persian a n d I n d i a n cavalry b r o k e
t h r o u g h the g a p a s t h e p h a l a n x split u p d u r i n g its f o r w a r d move-
m e n t , nevertheless t h e undisciplined units d r o v e for t h e M a c e d o -
n i a n c a m p instead of attacking the M a c e d o n i a n a r m y in t h e r e a r , so
that this incident h a d no influence on t h e o u t c o m e of t h e battle.
F o r a while the left flank of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , c o m m a n d e d by
P a r m e n i o , was h a r d pressed, but it was d i s e n g a g e d by t h e victori-
ous right flank.
J u s t as h a d b e e n the case in the two previous battles, G a u g a m e l a ,
too, was f o u g h t as a flank battle with t h e offensive right flank vic-
torious. Exactly why it was t h e r i g h t flank t h a t was victorious at
G a u g a m e l a is not a p p a r e n t from t h e account. F r o m t h e allocation
of t r o o p s it is not obvious t h a t t h e right flank was a n y s t r o n g e r in
cavalry t h a n t h e left (Rüstow a n d Köchly h a v e e v e n e s t i m a t e d the
o p p o s i t e ) , a n d it is also n o t clear t h a t t h e o p p o s i n g P e r s i a n left
flank was the weaker.
D i o d o r u s ' estimate t h a t t h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d lost s o m e 500 m e n
killed in the battle, a l o n g with very m a n y w o u n d e d , d o e s n o t a p -
6
p e a r to be u n r e l i a b l e .
EXCURSUS
1, Rüstow and Köchly, and most writers along with t h e m , conceive the Macedo-
nian battle formation differently from that which is described above. T h e y see in the
troops formed "into an angle"* a second echelon, which followed both flanks. Objec-
tively that would not be inconceivable; nevertheless, I believe, along with H. Droysen
(Heerwesen, p. 119), that the Greek for "into an angle"* can be translated in no other
way than "hook-shaped," and that which follows allows no other interpretation than
this. Arrian tells first of all how on the e x t r e m e right flank, starting with the royal
squadron, "into an angle"* the troops of Attalus (Agrianians, peltasts) were drawn
up, and with t h e m t h o s e o f Briso (archers), a n d n e x t t o t h e m ("having s o m e
archers"*) those of Cleander (arm unknown). In the e x t r e m e case, that could be in-
terpreted as an alignment in the second echelon. N o w , however, Arrian continues:
"The f r o n t - r u n n i n g cavalry and the P a e o n i a n s — A r e t e s and Ariston were their
commanders—were lined up in front of the Agrianians and the archers."* T h e s e
troops could not possibly all have been placed between the first and second eche-
lons, and Rüstow and Köchly therefore assign to them, with correct perceptiveness,
the space beside the troops of Attalus and the archers, and consider them as an over-
lapping portion of the second echelon. If Arrian had intended to say that, he would
at least have expressed it very specifically. T h e matter is completely clear, however,
if we imagine the troops of Attalus, Briso, and Cleander as a d e e p (march) c o l u m n ,
at the e x t r e m e right flank of the main battle line, f o r m i n g a right angle with the
royal squadron of hetairoi; beside them on the right, at a certain interval, the other
two columns, first that of Aretes and Ariston; then Menidas'. T h i s word "beside" is
expressed by Arrian and his source with "in front of'* since these troops were, of
course, f o r m e d in a hook shape and consequently had their actual front toward the
flank. (See also Dittberner, Battle of Issus [Schlacht bei lossos], p. 10.) T h e difference
between my concept and that of Rustow-Köchly, therefore, is that I picture the
troops in question as three parallel, d e e p (march) c o l u m n s , whereas Rustow-Köchly
imagine them as already d e p l o y e d side by side.
T h e three parallel c o l u m n s on the right flank had the order "If necessity were to
hold him, to fold back or to close up the phalanx."* T h e expression ""anaptyssein" (to
open up, fold back) has been variously translated as "explicare" (to unfold, d e v e l o p ,
form u p , deploy) or as "replicare" (to turn about). As far as the m e a n i n g of the word
is c o n c e r n e d , both translations are possible. If Arrian i n t e n d e d here the second
meaning, the c o m m a n d means: in case of n e e d the troops are to bend a r o u n d the
phalanx—that is, form a hook. T h e y are, of course, already in the position "in an
angle"* with respect to the main battle line, but not yet deployed. If there should
now be an attack by the e n e m y on the flank, they are to form a front toward that
side by swinging a r o u n d . T h e y are therefore presumably drawn up with their left
leading. Otherwise, they are there to "close", "to close up"* the phalanx—that is, if
breaks d e v e l o p d u r i n g the m o v e m e n t forward, to m o v e into them or possibly also to
extend the front toward the right (a point which, of course, is not directly inherent
in the expression).
For anybody w h o claims that "anaptyssein" means "to unfold," the c o m m a n d is to
be interpreted: the troops are either to form up beside the phalanx—that is, e x t e n d
the front—or to "close" the phalanx—that is, to cover it on the flank. T h e m e a n i n g
of the two expressions "to o p e n up, roll back"* and "to close up"* could therefore
almost be reversed and the sense of the whole would still remain almost the same.
T h e passages w h e r e "anaptyssein" is used elsewhere in Greek literature in a military
sense permit in s o m e cases both interpretations, in others only o n e or the other.
In Arrian's o w n account of the battle of Issus (2. 8. 2), A l e x a n d e r has his army
debouch from the passes, and as it arrives on the plain, "he continued to fold back
the wing to the phalanx, leading in more and m o r e the ranks of the hoplites."* T h i s
can be translated as follows: he had the march c o l u m n s deploy into the phalanx and
had one taxi form up after the other. But o n e could also say: he had the march
columns swing into the phalanx by having o n e taxi deploy after the other.
At Cunaxa the Greek hoplite phalanx is threatened on the left flank (of the origi-
nal front) by the Persian cavalry, while the right flank is covered by the river. T h e n
the Greeks decide "to fold back the wing so as to have the river at their back."* That
can m e a n : the phalanx first m a d e a swing toward the threatened flank and then
marched up into line on this side, or rather, deployed toward this side, since such a
d e e p c o l u m n would fall into c o m p l e t e disorder during a simple march into line. To
c o m p l e t e such a m a n e u v e r in g o o d o r d e r would require the elaborate form of
d e p l o y m e n t — t h a t is, right-angled m o v e m e n t s of the individual units by c o m m a n d .
O p p o s i n g this interpretation is the fact that the Greeks would thereby have taken a
position 1½ to 2 kilometers away from the river, and would therefore actually have
had no further protection from it. For this reason, it has also been claimed that the
m o v e m e n t was probably made toward the other flank, so that the Greeks would
have turned their backs to the e n e m y d u r i n g the m o v e m e n t . But X e n o p h o n could
also have meant that the Greeks bent their threatened flank around—that is, they
formed a hook. T h i s maneuver, too, would have been hard to carry out, of course,
and the new position would have been tactically very unfavorable, since, if either of
the two fronts should make an attack, the phalanx would be torn apart.
A third and a fourth time we find the expression "to o p e n up, roll back"* used bv
X e n o p h o n in the Cyropaedia 7. 5, 3 and 5. Cyrus wishes to shorten by half a very
long but shallow phalanx and thereby double its d e p t h . For this purpose he orders
the hoplites stationed on the flanks to place themselves behind the halted center.
T h i s is expressed in this way: "He gave the order that the hoplites should fold back
the phalanx from each extremity and move back toward the place where the main
body of the army was standing, until the wings on both sides s h o u l d meet with him
in the center."* If the intention here is to relate the "rolling back of the phalanx"*
to the already formed phalanx, there is no other way to translate it than by "bend,"
and that gives a clear, logical m e a n i n g . Otherwise, the "phalanx" that is referred to
here would not be the o n e in which the hoplites were formed up, but the o n e into
which they were now s u p p o s e d to deploy. T h i s would therefore be translated: "He
ordered the hoplites from the two flanks to draw up in a phalanx and to march
back to a position behind the halted center, until the two leading units met in the
middle." T h e execution of such an order, however, would probably be excessively
difficult. Further it g o e s on to say, "When the phalanx was thus rolled back, it fol-
lowed that the front ranks and the rear ranks were m a d e up of the best m e n . . . ."*
"When the phalanx was thus rolled back"* can be translated either as "in the case of
a phalanx forming up in this way" or as "in the case of a phalanx bent a r o u n d in
this way."
In Plutarch's description of the battle of Leuctra, Pelopidas, Chapter 2 3 , the Spar-
tans intend to e n v e l o p the T h e b a n s ; "they were o p e n i n g up their right wing and
making a circle round about, so as to encircle [them]."* T h i s can probably only be
translated as "they inclined their right and m o v e d it a r o u n d [or, they swung their
right around], in o r d e r to encircle their enemy."
On the other hand, in Dio Cassius 4 9 . 2 9 , the R o m a n s u n d e r A n t o n y in battle
with the Parthians f o r m e d a thick covering screen with their shields and suddenly
broke out in front of it "at the same time they o p e n e d up [or rolled back] the whole
phalanx."* Here it can hardly be translated as anything o t h e r than "deployed the
phalanx" or "had the whole phalanx form up."
In Arrian's Tactics 8. 3 (Köchly and Rüstow, Greek Military Authors [Griechische
Kriegsschriftsteller], Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 286) the point is made that in an army whose
units can always be divided in two, all m o v e m e n t s can be e x e c u t e d most easily. In
this connection, "to e x t e n d [the line] by o p e n i n g it up [or by rolling it back]"* is also
named. Here, too, it is impossible to use a m e a n i n g like "bend"; the context with "to
extend"* requires the m e a n i n g "form up" or "deploy."
C o m p a r e in this connection Köchly and Rüstow, Greek Military Authors (Vol. 2 Part
2, p. 267), and the observations on X e n o p h o n ' s Anabasis 1. 10. 9 in the editions of
S c h n e i d e r , V o l b r e c h t , a n d K r ü g e r , a s well a s D i n d o r f ' s n o t e s t o X e n o p h o n ' s

Cyropaedia 7. 5. 3. Also Reuss, Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie (NJP) 127- 817 and
B u n g e r , N J P 131: 2 6 2 .
3. Just as the formation of troops behind the two wings has been conceived of as
a second echelon, so too has the "double phalanx" in the center been pointed out as
a formation in two echelons. Reservations c o n c e r n i n g this concept were already ex-
pressed by H. Droysen in Heerwesen (p. 120), and certainly rightly so. Primarily there
arises the question of what kinds of troops were posted here; it would after all be
extremely curious that they would not be m e n t i o n e d at all, while otherwise every
small unit is n a m e d for us, and all the more so in that these troops execute an inde-
pendent m o v e m e n t — t h a t is, they drive off the e n e m y forces that have broken into
the camp. Niese has surmised that the Greek allies that are not n a m e d elsewhere
might very well have been stationed here, but it is probable (Köhler, Sitzungsberichte
der Berliner Akademie, 1898) that these troops did not participate in the battle at all,
and the whole idea of a second e c h e l o n must be a b a n d o n e d . We shall have occasion
later to discuss the significance and the character of the formation in several e c h e -
lons; at Gaugamela the use of this formation is not only not adequately proved but
is in fact absolutely impossible because of the account of the splitting of the phalanx
and the penetration t h r o u g h this breach by the e n e m y cavalry. T h e interval b e t w e e n
two e c h e l o n s can probably not a m o u n t to less than 100 paces; the two e c h e l o n s
move independently. If the first line breaks, s o m e t h i n g that can h a p p e n very easily,
then the second e c h e l o n , unless it should by chance h a p p e n to break just at the
same place, is there to fill the breach or perhaps to take care of those e n e m y soldiers
who break through. A similar function was also s u p p o s e d to be exercised in case of
need by the reserve troops behind the flanks, w h o fall short of forming a second
echelon only in that they are not deployed. In the center, behind the phalanx, how-
ever, there was even less chance of the existence of a second e c h e l o n ; otherwise the
enemy h o r s e m e n would not have broken t h r o u g h so easily. T h e d o u b l e phalanx,
consequently, is to be u n d e r s t o o d only as o n e that has been d o u b l e d in d e p t h , the
rearmost units of which have b e e n o r d e r e d to face about in case of necessity.
4. According to Arrian's account, at a point w h e n the two armies were already so
close to each other that the Macedonians could recognize King Darius on the other
side with his retinue, A l e x a n d e r had his army make a rather long m o v e m e n t toward
the right. Rüstow and Köchly repeat that as follows: "Alexander m o v e d by e c h e l o n s
halfway to the right . . . the m o v e m e n t w h i c h was calculated to put the w h o l e
Macedonian army against the left flank of the Persians." To make such a flank
march with a large army p r e s u p p o s e s a skill of m a n e u v e r that I would, after all, not
be willing to attribute to the Macedonians. Furthermore, the m o v e m e n t would be so
dangerous that it can be characterized as inconceivable; the e n e m y would only n e e d
to m o v e forward to attack the Macedonian army in a position in which it could
hardly d e f e n d itself. A flank march so close along the front of the e n e m y is only
feasible when o n e can be certain that the e n e m y will remain in his defensive posi-
tion. But the Persians, whose strength lay in their cavalry and their scythed chariots,
were only waiting for the m o m e n t w h e n they c o u l d charge forward. S o m e b o d y
might be inclined to recall the flank march of Frederick the Great at Leuthen—but
this was d o n e u n d e r the cover of a chain of hills, so that the e n e m y did not notice it
promptly, could not observe it sufficiently, and even took the m o v e to be a with-
drawal. T h e Persians, however, are s u p p o s e d to have had the alleged Macedonian
flank march take place directly before their eyes and, in o r d e r to k e e p pace with it,
to have m a d e their o w n m o v e m e n t toward the flank paralleling the Macedonian
move. N o t only d o e s such skill of m a n e u v e r seem e v e n less likely a m o n g Persians
than it w o u l d a m o n g Macedonians, but also the m o v e m e n t is completely i n c o m -
prehensible. If the Macedonians marched toward the right, they were of course ex-
posing their left flank to the Persians; the latter w o u l d therefore only n e e d to m o v e
straight ahead (on the terrain that they had presumably cleared in advance) in o r d e r to
strike the Macedonians simultaneously on the march, in the flank, and in the rear.
N o t until the mutual flank m o v e m e n t had g o n e on for a while did Darius report-
edly realize that it would be best to move to the attack—but probably not because of
the unfavorable plight in which the Macedonians found themselves at the m o m e n t ,
but rather so that the armies would not m o v e away from the elaborately cleared ter-
rain onto a rougher area, where the chariots would not be usable.
It is clear that this action cannot possibly have taken place in the m a n n e r de-
scribed by Arrian and analyzed militarily by Rüstow-Köchly. Perhaps the account
that has come d o w n to us has confused maneuvers that were carried out during the
approach march, before the armies were so close to each other, with the m o v e m e n t s
on the battlefield itself. A careful critic is not justified in assuming from the action
described above anything beyond the fact that the cavalry and the lightly armed in-
fantry of the right flank tried on both sides to get the flanking advantage.
According to Arrian, the breaking of the phalanx d u r i n g the march forward was
related to the flank march. Such a break, however, is not unusual even when no
intentional m o v e m e n t at all toward the right has taken place, since it is extremely
difficult, in fact almost impossible, to move a widely d e p l o y e d line straight forward,
and in the case of a rather long m o v e forward a break in the line is almost inevita-
ble. If the Macedonian army did move toward the right d u r i n g the march forward,
that certainly was not part of Alexander's plan, since any deviation from the straight
line is accompanied by the d a n g e r of disorder, but on the contrary, it was an acci-
dental error that the c a m p legend later characterized as a tactical maneuver.
5. In his report of E n g i n e e r Cernik's study e x p e d i t i o n (Supplement No. 45 to
Petermann's Geographic Reports [Ergänzungsheft Nr. 45 zu Petermanns Geographischen
Mitteilungen] 1876, p. 3), von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld seeks to establish more accu-
rately the location of the battle and finds it in a rich, fertile plain near the town of
Keramlais. From the military point of view, there is nothing further of interest in
this work.
6. T h e battle of Gaugamela s e e m s to be the only large battle in world history in
which the scythed chariot played a real, t h o u g h unsuccessful, role. In the Cyropaedia
(6. I. 3 0 ; 6. 2. 17, 18; 7. 1; 8. 8. 24) X e n o p h o n speaks of t h e m repeatedly and
in detail, probably not only because they b e l o n g e d to the picture of Persian military
might, but because the adventurous fearfulness of the w e a p o n appealed to his fan-
tasy. T h e same point has held true for others after him; L e o n a r d o da Vinci studied
the construction of such chariots and made sketches of how they drove into the
e n e m y mass and arms and legs went flying.
As thoroughly as X e n o p h o n treats of the scythed chariots, nevertheless, he too
points out w h e r e their weakness lies. He states that the horses are protected by
armor, and in the battle (7. 1) the drivers suffer heavy losses, and in his concluding
chapter he states that the Persians of the time no longer understand how to drive
the scythed chariots. While it is true that they start o f f in the charge, the drivers
s o o n either j u m p or fall out, and the driverless teams often cause more harm to
friend than to foe.
7. Friedrich H a c k m a n n , in The Battle of Gaugamela (Die Schlacht bei Gaugamela), a
dissertation (Halle, 1902), sought to reconstruct the battle in a significantly different
form. Nevertheless, I have been able to extract from the undertaking only a few
corrections of details; as a whole, it is unsuccessful, since the author was lacking in
the necessary knowledge of elementary tactics and their possibilities. See my review
in the Deutsche Literarische Zeitung, N o . 51, 1902, Col. 3 2 2 9 .
1. G r a f York, A Brief Survey of the Campaigns of Alexander the Great

(Kurze Uebersicht der Feldzüge Alexanders des Grossen), p. 32.
2. R e p o r t e d by M a n d r o t , Jahrbuch für Schweizerische Geschichte, 6

(1881): 2 6 3 .
3 . G e n e r a l v o n V e r d y says, " T w e n t y - f o u r s q u a d r o n s ( 3 , 6 0 0
horses) must be c o n s i d e r e d as t h e m a x i m u m s t r e n g t h of a cavalry
division, since with larger n u m b e r s t h e control of the battle suc-
ceeds only with very o u t s t a n d i n g l y talented leaders, a n d even with
t h e m only u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f t h o r o u g h t r a i n i n g o f lower c o m -
manders and troops."
4. See also Cyropaedia 7. 1; also 6. 2 a n d Book 8, conclusion.
5. D i o d o r u s describes how terrible t h e w o u n d s caused by t h e s e
scythes were, b u t also m a k e s it clear t h a t t h e n u m b e r of w o u n d e d
or killed was only small, a point specifically e m p h a s i z e d by A r r i a n .
6. A r r i a n says, "of the m e n s u r r o u n d i n g A l e x a n d e r , " * at t h e most
100 m e n w e r e killed; t h e expression is very indefinite. If o n e r e -
lates it to the total losses of t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y , as is usually t h e
case, this small n u m b e r would c o n t r a d i c t A r r i a n ' s o w n description
of the battle. Niese claims that it applies only to t h e actual M a c e d o -
nians. Still o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e possible, b u t t h e r e is no p u r -
pose in a c c u m u l a t i n g speculations on t h e subject.
Chapter V
The Battle on the Hydaspes
A c c o r d i n g to t h e generally accepted estimates, A l e x a n d e r is s u p -

p o s e d to have u n d e r t a k e n t h e c a m p a i g n against I n d i a with an a r m y
o f 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , c o n s e q u e n t l y with t h r e e t i m e s t h e
s t r e n g t h that h e h a d against Darius. Nevertheless, t h e n u m b e r a s
1
passed d o w n to us is n o t reliable, a n d it is per se u n t r u s t w o r t h y ,
even impossible. T h e decisive e n c o u n t e r against P o r u s o n the
H y d a s p e s was, a c c o r d i n g to t h e specific a n d u n q u e s t i o n a b l e r e p o r t
2
of A r r i a n , fought by 11,000 m e n (including 5,000 cavalry). It is
not logical to a s s u m e that, against e n e m i e s so incapable of s t r o n g
resistance, A l e x a n d e r w o u l d have mobilized an a r m y m a n y times
larger t h a n the o n e with which he o v e r c a m e t h e gigantic e m p i r e of
D a r i u s . T h e a r m y was, m o r e o v e r , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a very l a r g e
3
train, a n d even b y w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , a n d i t w o u l d t h e r e f o r e ,
with a s t r e n g t h of 120,000 c o m b a t a n t s , h a v e n u m b e r e d several
h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d souls. S u c h a mass does n o t m o v e as easily a n d
rapidly a s A l e x a n d e r d i d , a n d f u r t h e r m o r e t h e passage over t h e
H i n d u k u s h M o u n t a i n s , over a pass 4,000 m e t e r s h i g h , is completely
impossible for such masses in o n e move. T a k i n g as a point of de-
p a r t u r e t h e fact t h a t 11,000 m e n participated in t h e fight on t h e
H y d a s p e s a n d that c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n s o f t h e a r m y h a d r e m a i n e d
o n t h e o t h e r side o f t h e river, b u t t h a t A l e x a n d e r , o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , would p r o b a b l y not h a v e accepted a decisive battle without
having at least a t h i r d of his a r m y on the spot, we m a y t h e n esti-
m a t e t h e e n t i r e s t r e n g t h o f t h e a r m y a t 20,000 t o 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n .
C o n c e r n i n g t h e s t r e n g t h o f P o r u s ' a r m y , t h e G r e e k sources have
h a n d e d d o w n to us t h e most varied Figures, obviously based on
completely a r b i t r a r y estimates. D i o d o r u s (17. 87) gives, h i m m o r e
t h a n 50,000 m e n on foot in c o m p a r i s o n with 3,000 cavalry, over
1,000 chariots, a n d 130 e l e p h a n t s . A r r i a n gives h i m 4,000 cavalry,
300 chariots, a n d 2 0 0 e l e p h a n t s ; P l u t a r c h 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n o n foot a n d
220
The Battle on the Hydaspes 221
2,000 cavalry; C u r t i u s only 85 e l e p h a n t s . It is significant t h a t t h e

sources all a g r e e in giving the M a c e d o n i a n s t h e n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r -
ity i n c a v a l r y : 5 , 0 0 0 m e n a g a i n s t 4 , 0 0 0 ( a c c o r d i n g t o A r r i a n ) ,
against 3,000 (Diodorus), against 2,000 (Plutarch). T h e s t r e n g t h o f
the I n d i a n s lay in t h e e l e p h a n t s , for which we s h o u l d probably ac-
cept t h e lowest figure, 8 5 .
Porus did not d a r e t h r o w d o w n t h e c h a l l e n g e for a decision in a
field b a t t l e , b e l i e v i n g h e c o u l d d e f e n d h i m s e l f b y d e n y i n g t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s t h e c h a n c e t o cross t h e full-flowing H y d a s p e s . T h a t
could not possibly succeed, since a reasonably clever a n d energetic
e n e m y would s o o n e r or later necessarily find t h e m e a n s of getting
a p a r t of his a r m y across, u p s t r e a m or d o w n s t r e a m , with s u r p r i s e
effect. Since we h e a r that a n o t h e r I n d i a n p r i n c e was ready to lend
P o r u s assistance, it is always possible t h a t P o r u s was not c a u g h t up
in t h e mistaken idea that the river could serve as an absolute obsta-
cle b u t was a i m i n g at w i n n i n g only a few days' time in o r d e r to give
4
the reinforcing t r o o p s time to a r r i v e .
T h e decisive e n c o u n t e r c a m e as a result of A l e x a n d e r ' s crossing
over u n e x p e c t e d l y with 11,000 m e n 18 miles u p s t r e a m from t h e
point w h e r e the two armies were c a m p e d opposite each other,
w h e r e u p o n P o r u s , after a d e t a c h e d force was d e f e a t e d , m o v e d to
meet him.
Like t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , P o r u s divided his cavalry between t h e two
flanks. T h e y w e r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e battle chariots, a d e s i g n a t i o n
probably m e a n i n g not scythed chariots b u t light vehicles o c c u p i e d
by a r c h e r s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , as we k n o w , t h e cavalry was n o t s t r o n g ; t h e
s t r e n g t h of t h e I n d i a n a r m y lay in its e l e p h a n t s . T h e y w e r e c o m -
bined in t h e c e n t e r of t h e battle line with t h e infantry in a c u r i o u s
f o r m a t i o n . T h e a n i m a l s , e a c h b e a r i n g , besides its m a h o u t , a few
s h a r p s h o o t e r s in a small tower, w e r e p o s t e d at considerable inter-
vals from each o t h e r ; the infantry was directly b e h i n d t h e m , so that
foot soldiers e v e n spilled f o r w a r d s o m e w h a t into t h e intervals be-
tween t h e e l e p h a n t s . Since A r r i a n expressly says t h a t the infantry
h a d f o r m e d a second front, o n e probably has as little right to say
that it was s p r e a d o u t in small g r o u p s as t h a t it was posted b e h i n d
t h e e l e p h a n t s at a short interval. R a t h e r , the p h a l a n x m u s t h a v e
been d r a w n u p a t each place b e h i n d t h e e l e p h a n t s m o r e shallowly
a n d between t h e e l e p h a n t s m o r e d e e p l y . T h e overall p i c t u r e , ac-
c o r d i n g to t h e G r e e k s ' r e p o r t , looked like a city wall with its towers.
P o r u s s u p p o s e d l y e x p e c t e d that t h e G r e e k s would not risk m o v i n g
into t h e intervals b e t w e e n t h e e l e p h a n t s . T h e h o r s e s w o u l d shy
away from the e l e p h a n t s , a n d t h e infantry w o u l d n o t risk it either.

F o r if they m o v e d f o r w a r d in o r d e r to attack t h e e l e p h a n t s from
t h e side, they w o u l d h a v e to fear t h e I n d i a n infantry, a n d if they
m o v e d f o r w a r d against t h e latter, they w o u l d h a v e to worry a b o u t
t h e e l e p h a n t s ' t u r n i n g against t h e m a n d t r a m p l i n g t h e m .
It is not specifically r e p o r t e d how the I n d i a n infantry was a r m e d .
T h e G r e e k s call t h e m hoplites; b u t w e c a n n o t a s s u m e that w e a r e
d e a l i n g h e r e with a tightly closed unit i n t e n d e d for close combat,
like the G r e e k - M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x . T h e d e p l o y i n g o f the
e l e p h a n t s in front of this infantry seems to indicate that t h e real
decision was e x p e c t e d from t h e f o r m e r ; in this a r m y still m o r e t h a n
in t h e Persian o n e , t h e infantry was a simple auxiliary a r m . As t h e
G r e e k s r e p o r t , it was s u p p o s e d to form a k i n d of cover for t h e
5
e l e p h a n t s . Nevertheless, t h e I n d i a n infantry may have b e e n con-
siderably s u p e r i o r i n n u m b e r s t o t h e 6,000 m e n w h o m A l e x a n d e r
brought up.
T h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d their c u s t o m a r y f o r m a t i o n , with the
6
p h a l a n x i n t h e c e n t e r , t h e cavalry o n t h e f l a n k s ; t h e right wing,
which m o v e d a l o n g t h e river a n d which on o t h e r occasions h a d al-
ways b e e n c o m m a n d e d by t h e K i n g himself, was c o m m a n d e d by
C o e n u s . T h e left wing, which h a d no g e o g r a p h i c a l f e a t u r e to tie to
a n d was c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e m o r e v u l n e r a b l e , while b e i n g t h e best
able to e x e c u t e t h e flanking a n d e n v e l o p m e n t m o v e m e n t s , was led
b y A l e x a n d e r himself. H e o r d e r e d t h e p h a l a n x , however, t o h o l d
back until he s h o u l d have t h r o w n t h e e n e m y into confusion with
his cavalry; for this p u r p o s e he o r d e r e d t h e cavalry to attack t h e
e n e m y not only in t h e front but, r a n g i n g o u t f a r t h e r , also quickly
in t h e flank.
Since the M a c e d o n i a n s , as we may certainly a s s u m e , were
s u p e r i o r to t h e I n d i a n cavalry e v e n m o r e in tactical t r a i n i n g t h a n in
n u m b e r s , the m a n e u v e r s u c c e e d e d o n b o t h flanks. T h e I n d i a n bat-
tle chariots w e r e e v e n less able to withstand t h e o n s l a u g h t of t h e
tightly f o r m e d M a c e d o n i a n s q u a d r o n s t h a n was t h e cavalry, a n d
t h e losers fled to positions b e h i n d t h e e l e p h a n t s , followed by the
M a c e d o n i a n s . T h e attack c a m e to a standstill in t h e face of the
e l e p h a n t s , s o m e o f which evidently h a d t u r n e d a r o u n d a n d passed
t h r o u g h t h e i r infantry t o m e e t t h e M a c e d o n i a n s . T h e horses shied
away a n d could not be p u s h e d up to t h e h u g e a n i m a l s . Since Alex-
a n d e r h a d already b e e n i n t h e I n d i a n b o r d e r a r e a for l o n g e r t h a n
a year a n d on I n d i a n soil for a n u m b e r of m o n t h s a n d was allied
with I n d i a n princes w h o h a d b r o u g h t e l e p h a n t s t o h i m , this battle
was in no way a s u r p r i s e for the M a c e d o n i a n s . Because t h e horses
would shy away f r o m the e l e p h a n t s , A l e x a n d e r h a d n o t risked a
crossing over the H y d a s p e s in t h e face of t h e e n e m y a r m y b u t h a d
m a d e the e n v e l o p m e n t . We m i g h t well be s u r p r i s e d that t h e r e is no
r e p o r t a b o u t w h e t h e r the M a c e d o n i a n s did not a t t e m p t t o accustom
their horses t o t h e a p p e a r a n c e a n d t h e t r u m p e t i n g o f t h e gigantic
animals. At any rate, they now w e r e forced first of all to w i t h d r a w ,
a n d P o r u s went over into t h e attack against the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry
a n d the p h a l a n x o p p o s i t e h i m , so t h a t t h e battle now b e c a m e g e n -
eral.
T h e G r e e k sources vie with o n e a n o t h e r in describing the fear-
fulness of this battle: the e l e p h a n t s p e n e t r a t e d into t h e e n e m y lines,
no m a t t e r how closely f o r m e d the latter stood, t r a m p l e d the e n e m y
o r seized t h e m with their t r u n k s a n d t h r e w t h e m into the air o r
d u g t h e i r t e e t h into their bodies, while t h e s h a r p s h o o t e r s o n t h e i r
backs, a n d especially the m i g h t y K i n g P o r u s himself, d i s p a t c h e d
their missiles.
Nevertheless, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s w e r e finally victorious. W i t h ar-
rows a n d javelins they b r o u g h t d o w n t h e m a h o u t s from t h e
e l e p h a n t s , leaving t h e beasts driverless, a n d most i m p o r t a n t of all,
they w o u n d e d t h e e l e p h a n t s themselves so seriously t h a t t h e ani-
mals finally refused to move f a r t h e r f o r w a r d , or they even t u r n e d
about.
As soon as t h e e l e p h a n t s slackened t h e i r efforts, t h e I n d i a n s w e r e
lost. T h e i r infantry, even if s u p p o s e d l y m o r e n u m e r o u s t h a n that
of the M a c e d o n i a n s , was not of the caliber to take a d v a n t a g e of t h e
confusion t h a t t h e e l e p h a n t s h a d initially c a u s e d a n d t o defeat t h e
M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x in close c o m b a t . M o r e o v e r , t h e whole I n d i a n
attack was certainly i m p e d e d from t h e very start by the fact that
the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry, following up their initial victory, h a d c o m e
to t h e r e a r of t h e e n e m y battle line, a n d e v e n if they h a d at first
recoiled f r o m t h e e l e p h a n t s , they still r e m a i n e d n o t only on t h e
battlefield b u t also in t h e r e a r of t h e e l e p h a n t s a n d t h e e n e m y in-
fantry.
With their great superiority they chased the I n d i a n cavalry,
which h a d again v e n t u r e d o u t , back again to t h e line of e l e p h a n t s .
With g o o d foresight A l e x a n d e r h a d o r d e r e d that his p h a l a n x , shal-
low as it was, s h o u l d at first hold back; it could p e r h a p s not have
w i t h s t o o d a n u n i m p e d e d attack o f t h e e l e p h a n t s i n c o n j u n c t i o n
with t h e I n d i a n infantry. B u t t h e c o n t i n u i n g cavalry c o m b a t in t h e
r e a r u n d o u b t e d l y lowered t h e c o n f i d e n c e a n d t h e e n e r g y o f t h e
I n d i a n a d v a n c e from t h e start, a n d o n c e they c a m e to a standstill,
they w e r e as g o o d as s u r r o u n d e d a n d w e r e now gradually squeezed
closer a n d closer t o g e t h e r . T h e y w e r e t r a m p l e d by their own

e l e p h a n t s , which t u r n e d a r o u n d a n d which t h e y could n o longer
avoid, while t h e M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y n e a r t h e o u t e r r i n g gave way
before those e l e p h a n t s t h a t w e r e still m o v i n g f o r w a r d , only to drive
t h e m back with s h o t s , f o l l o w i n g t h e m t h e n closely, a n d s o they
p u s h e d t h e e n e m y a r m y t o w a r d t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry.
A very large p a r t of t h e I n d i a n a r m y was c u t d o w n in this way,
a n d most o f the e l e p h a n t s a n d K i n g P o r u s h i m s e l f w e r e c a p t u r e d .
A c c o r d i n g to A r r i a n , t h e M a c e d o n i a n s lost o n l y 310 m e n killed
in this battle, 230 of w h o m w e r e cavalry. T h i s small n u m b e r could
cause us to question w h e t h e r t h e battle was really so terrible a n d
h a r d - f o u g h t as t h e sources d e s c r i b e it. If we t a k e into considera-
tion, h o w e v e r , t h e fact t h a t t h e r e a f t e r t h e M a c e d o n i a n g e n e r a l s
w h o h a d taken p a r t in t h e battle a n d later, as successors of Alexan-
d e r , d i v i d e d his e m p i r e a n d f o u g h t o v e r i t a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s ,
b r o u g h t m o r e a n d m o r e e l e p h a n t s into t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f their
armies, we may d r a w a conclusion from this a b o u t the n a t u r e of
this battle. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s m u s t h a v e h a d t h e i m p r e s s i o n o f
great a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d military effectiveness o n t h e p a r t o f the
e l e p h a n t s , a n d t h e victory c a n n o t have b e e n so very easy for t h e m .
Therefore, when we read in Diodorus that the Macedonians had
lost 280 cavalry a n d m o r e t h a n 700 infantry, we t e n d to accept this
n u m b e r in p r e f e r e n c e to t h a t of A r r i a n . A l m o s t 1,000 killed a n d
certainly several t h o u s a n d w o u n d e d in an a r m y of 11,000 m e n in-
dicates a very t o u g h , h a r d - f o u g h t battle. Finally, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s
w h o crossed over t h e H y d a s p e s i n t h e r e a r o f t h e I n d i a n s must
h a v e e x e r c i s e d a c e r t a i n i n f l u e n c e , e v e n b e f o r e t h e y actually at-
tacked. A n d a p a r t of t h e casualties may be c o u n t e d against these
t r o o p s a n d t h e r e f o r e d e d u c t e d from those o f t h e m a i n a r m y , since
the f o r m e r still took p a r t in the p u r s u i t .
EXCURSUS
1. Plutarch's report of the battle is based on a letter from A l e x a n d e r himself,

which his biographer repeats in indirect quotation. T h e authenticity of this letter has
been doubted, and A d o l f B a u e r especially, in a very fine study (Publication in Honor
of Büdinger [Festgaben für Büdinger], Innsbruck, 1898) a d d u c e d the p r o o f that, in
those places where this letter differs from Arrian (who again repeats the reports of
Ptolemy and Aristobulus, which are essentially in agreement), it is in the sense that
everything is said to have h a p p e n e d as the King had foreseen. That applies particu-
larly to the crossing of the Hydaspes with its many incidents, which we have passed
over in o u r account. Now, Bauer continues very correctly, the greatness of a com-
m a n d e r consists in no way of his being able to foresee all the possible events, but
— a n d it is precisely this quality that A l e x a n d e r showed here so brilliantly—in being
capable of dealing with the many unforeseeable chance h a p p e n i n g s with quick deci-
siveness. T h e letter, which is intended to flatter Alexander, therefore is the work of

a militarily ignorant person. It cannot possibly be from A l e x a n d e r himself, but was
composed by some courtier w h o was familiar with the reports of Ptolemy and Aris-
mbulus but did not find t h e m sufficient.
If it were really a question of a personal d o c u m e n t of Alexander, then it would
indeed either have to be rejected as fraudulent or it would constitute a very shabby
testimonial for its royal author. A forgery, however, d o e s not seem credible to m e ,
since on the o n e hand the relationship with the report that we find in Arrian (from
Ptolemy) is undeniable and on the other hand the d o c u m e n t contains original ex-
pressions that point toward a real expert. W h e n , by w h o m , and for what purpose
would the forgery h a v e b e e n m a d e ? Did P t o l e m y p e r h a p s publish, still d u r i n g
Alexander's lifetime, the account which he later gave in his history, or did s o m e o n e
after all, a w h o l e g e n e r a t i o n later, wish to flatter the d e a d King by m e a n s of a
fraudulent letter?
We avoid all these difficulties if we regard the letter as being, in fact, g e n u i n e ,
but, rather than a personal composition of A l e x a n d e r , a kind of bulletin that had as
its author s o m e secretary from the King's retinue. What Bauer so perceptively n o t e d
in the d o c u m e n t as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c — t h a t is, that it h a d t h e K i n g a n t i c i p a t i n g
everything—is precisely the style of official military history writing. On that point
one needs only to e x a m i n e m o d e r n general staff works, e v e n t h o u g h they are writ-
ten by officers; and also in the Memorial de Sainte-Hélene, for e x a m p l e those passages
concerning 1796, and especially in the official French accounts of the campaign of
1800, o n e finds many an equivalent to this.
That the art of war is so difficult precisely because it must operate in the darkness
of ignorance or of half-knowledge and the perspicacity e v e n of the greatest c o m -
mander can never completely penetrate the darkness—that is a thesis that can never
be used to convince the public of a man's greatness but that can at best be cited to
forgive his mistakes. T h e easiest way of making the genius of the c o m m a n d e r clear
to the public is always to show how he foresaw everything and planned accordingly.
Consequently, we are not o f f e n d i n g A l e x a n d e r w h e n we insist that he allowed the
bulletin to go out u n d e r his name, although it d o e s color the account, as indicated above.
2. Arrian claims that Porus' e l e p h a n t s had been stationed at intervals of a plethron
(100 feet), and on the strength of this Rüstow and Köchly estimated the length of
his entire battle line at s o m e 5½ miles. Alexander, on the other hand, supposedly
had only a very short front, reaching as far as the twentieth elephant. His battle
plan, therefore, s u p p o s e d l y consisted of defeating, first of all, the o n e flank—the
left—of the Indians. In our sources there is n o t h i n g to be f o u n d of such a flank
battle. It is hard to see why the 180 elephants e x t e n d i n g beyond the Macedonian
line did not fall on their flank, and in Rüstow and Köchly's o w n report, too, there is
nothing said about the flank battle. But h o w is the 1 1 , 0 0 0 - m a n Macedonian army
supposed to have b e e n stretched out to a length of over 5 miles?
T h e solution can only lie in the fact that in Arrian not only is the n u m b e r of
elephants greatly e x a g g e r a t e d but also the interval b e t w e e n the individual animals is
much too large. It might very well h a p p e n that even a Ptolemy, according to his
personal impression (he was present in the battle), estimated the interval at a plethron
without stopping to realize what the resulting length of the entire battle line would
be. Polyaenus (4. 3. 22), in a battle account, which incidentally can serve as an ex-
ample of and w a r n i n g against unreliable sources, estimates the distance b e t w e e n
elephants at 50 feet.
3. T h e account I have given of the course of the battle differs significantly from
the o n e normally accepted up to now in its concept of the cavalry combat on the two
flanks and in the related attack from the rear. T h e critical question hinges on solv-
ing a point of difficulty in Arrian's account.
Alexander, he says, turned with the main body .of his cavalry against the left flank
of the e n e m y . But he sent C o e n u s with two regiments against the right flank ("as if
u p o n the right wing"*) with the order to attack the barbarians in the rear w h e n they
m o v e d against the King. We might well ask: How could C o e n u s do that if he was
stationed at the other flank? He could not very well ride a r o u n d the entire enemy
battle line. Rüstow and Köchly consequently assumed that he was sent not against
the e n e m y right flank, but on the e x t r e m e right flank of the Macedonians, and
Bauer (loc. cit.) made such an effort to reconcile that with the text that he had the
word "right wing"* indeed refer to the Indians, but he explained the whole action as
a diversionary maneuver; that is, Coenus set out in that direction but then turned
about and supported Alexander. Both these interpretations seem to me absolutely
impossible, both objectively and literally. T h e clear text says that, as Alexander ad-
vanced against the e n e m y left flank, C o e n u s a d v a n c e d against the e n e m y right
7
flank. If Coenus, however, was s u p p o s e d to attack from the rear the Indian cavalry
w h o were o p p o s i n g Alexander, he had to hasten and could not first make a diver-
sionary m o v e m e n t that, furthermore, would have had no p u r p o s e at all, and Arrian
would not have been able to omit that he returned from the feint against the enemy
right flank to the real attack against the left o n e . Furthermore, the Macedonian
phalanx must necessarily have had cavalry also on its left flank.
T h e r e is nothing left to do but establish the fact that Arrian's account contains an
unsolvable contradiction. It can serve no purpose to cover it up halfway with some
forced interpretation; rather, we must identify the error and seek to eliminate it.
But that is not so very difficult, e v e n without assistance from the other sources.
A l e x a n d e r necessarily had cavalry on both flanks of his army. T h e cavalry on o n e
flank was c o m m a n d e d by the King himself, on the other by Coenus. T h e Macedo-
nians were superior in cavalry on both flanks. Of the right flank, Arrian g o e s on to
relate: the King sent his m o u n t e d archers against the e n e m y ; "he himself, with the
hetairoi, drove his cavalry sharply against the left wing of the barbarians; the cavalry
hastened to attack those w h o were already in confusion along the wings, before their
cavalry was lined up against the phalanx."*
T h e King, therefore, attacked the Indian cavalry in the flank with his cavalry,
while the former were being attacked in their front by his m o u n t e d archers.
To this point everything is quite clear. Now, however, Arrian goes on to say that
C o e n u s , too, appeared in the rear of the Indians, and they were forced to form a
double front against him and against Alexander. T h i s is the point of confusion.
C o e n u s is, of course, on the other flank, and the Indians already had to form the
d o u b l e front before this, that is, against the m o u n t e d archers and against the
hetairoi. If Coenus, too, had now c o m e up from the rear, they would have had to
fight on three fronts.
T h e r e is no other explanation except that Arrian was careless here and misunder-
stood his sources. C o e n u s had n o t h i n g to do with the fight on this flank. In the
source there must have been said s o m e t h i n g to the effect that, just as on Alexander's
flank, C o e n u s , too, e n v e l o p e d his e n e m y and e n g a g e d him simultaneously in the
front and from the flank (which, if the e n e m y did not make a c o u n t e r m o v e at the
right time, always means also an attack from the rear). Consequently, the e n v e l o p -
ment that C o e n u s carried out on his flank was attributed by Arrian to Alexander's
flank.
If we correct Arrian's account in this manner, it not only b e c o m e s clear in itself,
but it also moves into a g r e e m e n t with the bulletin. In the latter it is expressly said
that A l e x a n d e r attacked on o n e flank, C o e n u s on the other, and that the e n e m y was
defeated on both flanks and fell back to the line of elephants.
T h i s testimony is absolutely decisive; o n e would otherwise be obliged to declare
the bulletin fraudulent, for which, however, there is no basis at all.
Not only can the misconception that Arrian created by confusing the right and
left flanks be established, but I believe we can go another step farther and indicate
the point at which it originated. T h e bulletin (in Plutarch's indirect quotation) re-
ports the order of A l e x a n d e r as follows: "He himself o r d e r e d t h e m to attack along
the other wing, but C o e n u s to charge against the right."* If we had only these
words, there would be no doubt c o n c e r n i n g their m e a n i n g ; they would be trans-

lated: "The King attacked o n e flank but ordered C o e n u s to drive against the right
[flank]." According to this, then, Alexander himself led the right wing, C o e n u s the
left. Now the entire sentence, however, reads as follows: "Being afraid of the ani-
mals and the n u m b e r of the e n e m y , he himself o r d e r e d an attack along the other
wing, but he o r d e r e d C o e n u s to charge against the right."* T h e r e f o r e , it is the for-
mation of the flanks that is particularly accounted for here; it was not the customary
one. "Because of the concern over the elephants and the mass of the enemy"—the
King takes over o n e wing and C o e n u s the o t h e r o n e . T h i s makes no sense if there
was not something unusual in the formation of the flanks. According to the concept
of every Greek, however, the king c o m m a n d s the right flank and attacks the e n e m y
left flank. If, instead of that, he wishes to attack the e n e m y right flank, then that is
"the other one," and the words that are used c o n c e r n i n g C o e n u s may very well also
be meant in this sense, that is, not that he is to charge against the (enemy) right
flank, but that he is to attack with the right flank (his o w n ) . Most interpreters, be-
cause of the context and the a g r e e m e n t with Arrian, have translated the passage in
the first sense, but a few have also adopted the second sense, and there is a quite
good objective basis for this latter arrangement. T h e Indians had their left flank
based on the river, so that, if they were defeated here, they had the possibility of
withdrawing inland. If, however, they were e n v e l o p e d and defeated on their right
flank, then the main body of their army could be forced back against the river and
cut off. Any success at this point would necessarily have the strongest effect at o n c e
on the morale of the entire Indian army. A l e x a n d e r , then, by personally taking over
this time the left flank, chose for himself the post that was at the same time the most
dangerous and at which he could exercise the greatest influence, and he risked from
the start a battle of destruction in which he did then succeed in capturing Porus
himself and the most valuable part of his army, that is, almost all of the elephants.
Porus himself is supposed to have taken his post on his left, probably in the expecta-
tion that the King of the Macedonians would lead his right flank, as usual.
T h e r e is still another indication that A l e x a n d e r actually c o m m a n d e d his left flank
in this battle.
According to Curtius, Alexander orders C o e n u s : " Q u u m e g o Ptolemaeo, Perdicca-
que et Hephaestione comitatus in laevum hostium c o r n u i m p e t u m fecero . . . ipse
dextrum m o v e et turbatis signa infer." ("When I, accompanied by Ptolemy, Perdic-
cas, a n d H e p h a e s t i o , shall h a v e m a d e m y a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e e n e m i e s ' left
wing . . . yourself move the right and bring in the standards against them in their
confusion.") Later, however, it is said: " C o e n u s ingenti vi in laevum c o r n u in-
vehitur." ("Coenus was sent to attack into the right flank with great force.")
Curtius, therefore, contradicts himself. But it is not the first passage, but rather
the second o n e that seems to contain the truth. For it is expressly said that the regi-
ment of Perdiccas, too, belonged to those that the King intended to c o m m a n d . But
in the fight that A l e x a n d e r conducts against o n e of Porus' detached forces before
the actual battle, A l e x a n d e r sends Perdiccas with his cavalry against the right flank
of the e n e m y (8. 47: "Perdiccam cum equitibus in d e x t r u m cornu hostium emisit").
("He sent Perdiccas with the cavalry against the right wing of the enemy.") It is not
likely that the same h o r s e m e n who had already fought on the left flank were later
drawn in for the e n v e l o p m e n t on the e x t r e m e right flank.
Speaking against our interpretation is the fact that the bulletin, to be sure, d o e s
not mention in any way the reason we p r o p o s e d for the e x c h a n g e of c o m m a n d posi-
tions, but only m e n t i o n s in a general way the elephants and the e n e m y numbers.
But why should the bulletin concern itself specifically with these reasons? To what
extent d o e s an effective means against elephants and a large e n e m y lie in the fact
that o n e general c o m m a n d s o n e flank and the other general the other flank? O n e
could s u p p o s e that Plutarch's reference is inexact and that the unusual aspect of
Alexander's formation is to be found in the fact that, as reported by Arrian, both
cavalry wings drove forward and the phalanx initially held back. If we take into ac-
count, however, the concepts of the Greeks, shared also by the author of the bulle-
tin, then it d o e s not appear impossible, after all, that Plutarch is repeating the con-
tent quite correctly. T h e real strategic reason for Alexander's c o m m a n d i n g the left
flank this time is too complicated and too fine a point for a bulletin. T h e principal
point, from the author's viewpoint, is to emphasize the impression of the greatest
clanger and of an extraordinary accomplishment. In a normal battle the King com-
m a n d s the right flank, which, formed of the best troops, usually carries the victory.
With the e n e m y numbers, however, and the d a n g e r o u s character of the elephants, it
could have h a p p e n e d that the e n e m y , too, might be victorious on his right flank,
and therefore the King had to take it u p o n himself to o p p o s e him in this, the most
e n d a n g e r e d spot.
It is impossible to draw a definite conclusion here, but perhaps this was the origi-
nal meaning. Because the w o r d s of the bulletin were so indefinite and ambiguous,
perhaps the authors became uncertain e v e n at an early time, and so Curtius as well
as Arrian became confused. Curtius contradicts himself directly by having the King
attack in o n e passage with the right flank, whereas in another passage it is Coenus.
Arrian combines the attacks on the two flanks into a single o n e — a n d in d o i n g so he
completely omits the left flank.
1. C u r t i u s ' figures a r e worthless. At no place in t h e Anabasis does

A r r i a n give an overall n u m b e r , b u t m e n t i o n s only in t h e Indica,
C h a p t e r 19, that t h e King, w h e n he started his withdrawal, was fol-
lowed by 120,000 c o m b a t a n t s ("fit for battle"*), i n c l u d i n g m a n y
b a r b a r i a n s . H u g e levies of I n d i a n princes, m o r e or less fictitious,
may have been included in the count. Even putting that point
aside, it is not k n o w n what the origin of this n u m b e r is a n d
w h e t h e r it is reliable. We may rely on t h e n u m b e r s A r r i a n gives in
the Anabasis c o n c e r n i n g t h e M a c e d o n i a n a r m y , since he is d e p e n d -
ing h e r e significantly on Ptolemy, b u t what we find in the Indica
may h a v e b e e n t a k e n f r o m almost any u n c l e a r s o u r c e . P l u t a r c h ,
Chapter 66, even puts the army that makes the march t h r o u g h
Gadrosia at 120,000 m e n on foot a n d 150,000 h o r s e m e n .
T h e c o m p u t a t i o n by Rüstow a n d Köchly (p. 298) is not suffi-
ciently s u p p o r t e d ; they claim to estimate t h e s t r e n g t h of the a r m y
c o n c e n t r a t e d o n the H y d a s p e s a t 69,000 m e n a n d 10,000 horses.
T h e a u t h o r s themselves characterize the a d v a n c e g u a r d force a s the
o n e "that really fights t h e battles." A n d t h a t is t h e way it actually is;
a n d h e r e I ask, W h y s h o u l d a c o m m a n d e r like A l e x a n d e r h a v e
complicated t h e c o n d u c t of the war by d r a g g i n g a l o n g with h i m
o t h e r large masses o f t r o o p s for which t h e r e n e v e r a p p e a r s any
need t h r o u g h o u t the c o u r s e of t h e war?
2. T h e rest of the a r m y — a c c o r d i n g to t h e positive s t a t e m e n t of
A r r i a n , which we have no reason to d o u b t — d i d not cross o v e r \ t h e
Hydaspes until t h e battle was d e c i d e d a n d t h e r e f o r e may n o t be

counted as participating in t h e actual c o m b a t .
3. C r a m e r , Contributions to the History of Alexander the Great (Beiträge
zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen), M a r b u r g dissertation, 1893.
4. In any event Rüstow a n d Köchly's idea t h a t this I n d i a n p r i n c e ,
Abisares, m o v e d up to P o r u s on the right b a n k of the H y d a s p e s , is
false. T h e r e h e w o u l d h a v e r u n d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e h a n d s o f t h e
Macedonians a n d would have b e e n i n t e r c e p t e d without b e i n g able
to receive h e l p f r o m P o r u s or himself h e l p i n g P o r u s . C u r t i u s (8.
47) also says expressly t h a t P o r u s e x p e c t e d t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s on
the left b a n k .
5. In his essay " T h e Use of t h e E l e p h a n t for Military P u r p o s e s in
A n t i q u i t y " ("Die V e r w e n d u n g d e s E l e f a n t e n z u k r i e g e r i s c h e n
Zwecken im Altertum"), Jahrbücher fur die deutsche Armee and Marine,
Vol. 4 9 , D e c e m b e r 1883, Major O h l e n d o r f states t h e belief t h a t t h e
infantry h a d t h e mission o f p r e v e n t i n g t h e e l e p h a n t s from t u r n i n g
a r o u n d . It is difficult to know how t h e infantry was s u p p o s e d to go
a b o u t t h a t . T h e c o n c e p t is a p p a r e n t l y f o u n d e d on a t r a n s l a t i o n
error.
6. A l e x a n d e r h a d also t a k e n a l o n g to t h e crossing point two taxis
of pezetairoi. Nevertheless, they do not a p p e a r in t h e battle f o r m a -
tion; only hypaspists a n d light infantry w e r e involved. T h e n u m b e r ,
too—a total o f 6,000 m e n o n foot—eliminates t h e m . R ü s t o w a n d
Köchly (p. 229) h a v e a s s u m e d t h a t they w e r e left b e h i n d at t h e
crossing point in o r d e r to o p p o s e Abisares in case of n e e d . T h a t
would h a v e b e e n a n e r r o r , e v e n i f Abisares was e x p e c t e d h e r e ;
primarily, it was a question of striking P o r u s with a c o m b i n a t i o n of
all one's forces a n d of a v o i d i n g a fight with Abisares until t h a t was
accomplished. An isolated force of light infantry could easily have
fallen a victim to h i m . T h e r e a s o n t h e pezetairoi w e r e n o t in t h e bat-
tle is p r o b a b l y simply that they h a d not c o m p l e t e d their crossing.
To cross a b r o a d river with inflated skins a n d j u s t a few boats r e -
quires a g r e a t deal of time.
7. T h a t is also t h e o p i n i o n of Kaerst, Philologus 5 6 : 4 1 2 .
Chapter VI
Alexander as a
Military Commander
T h e G r e e k city-states fought countless battles a n d e n g a g e m e n t s
on land a n d at sea against o n e a n o t h e r ; all t o g e t h e r , so to speak,
they h a d only negative, destructive, or obstructive effects. No great
h e g e m o n y was established in this way. T h e d e f e a t of the A t h e n i a n s
on Sicily a n d t h e sea battle of A e g o s p o t a m i e n d e d A t h e n i a n d o m i -
n a n c e b u t gave S p a r t a only a leading position, n o t a d o m i n a n t o n e .
Sparta's own i n n e r s t r e n g t h was e v e n less sufficient for this t h a n
that of A t h e n s earlier. Even a victory like t h e o n e Agesilaus w o n at
C o r o n e a h a d n o significant positive results, j u s t a s E p a m i n o n d a s '
victories a t L e u c t r a a n d M a n t i n e a h a d n o n e , because the armies,
like t h e states, w e r e lacking in t h e sustained p o w e r to follow up t h e
victories on t h e battlefield to the point of establishing a lasting new
o r d e r o f things. O v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n w e a d m i r e t h e w i s d o m o f
Pericles, w h o did n o t allow himself to be misled by all the a b u n d a n t
s t r e n g t h of his A t h e n s into a strategy of u n c o n d i t i o n a l victory a n d
c o n q u e s t a n d refused to seek useless victories. T h e gigantic suc-
cesses of the two M a c e d o n i a n kings did not b e c o m e possible until the
m e a n s for achieving t h e m h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d . King Philip w a g e d
his wars n o t only with a h o p l i t e p h a l a n x , D e m o s t h e n e s told t h e
1
A t h e n i a n s , b u t at t h e s a m e time with light infantry, a r c h e r s , a n d
cavalry. It was no longer, he said, like t h e times of t h e i r ancestors,
w h e n t h e S p a r t a n s took t o t h e f i e l d f o u r o r f i v e m o n t h s i n t h e
s u m m e r , i n v a d e d t h e c o u n t r y , a n d t h e n r e t u r n e d h o m e again i n
winter. He w e n t on to say that, if the M a c e d o n i a n King d i d n o t
find his e n e m y in t h e o p e n field, he went on to besiege him with
his siege m a c h i n e s . H e went w h e r e v e r h e wished, a n d s u m m e r a n d
winter were all t h e s a m e to h i m . T h e c r u x of this whole m a t t e r lay
i n t h e fact t h a t t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y h a d r e p l a c e d t h e citizen
230
Alexander as a Military Commander 231
army. In the u n i n t e r r u p t e d work of o n e g e n e r a t i o n , p u s h i n g for-

ward step by step, King Philip h a d won a n d b e q u e a t h e d to his son
a d o m i n i o n that justified his c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e greatest possible ac-
complishments, a n d with t h e g r o w t h of the m e a n s , of t h e extensive
as well as intensive increase of military power, t h e c o n d u c t of war
itself h a d c h a n g e d its c o u n t e n a n c e a n d t a k e n on o t h e r forms. Alex-
a n d e r not only was victorious on t h e battlefield, but he also ex-
ploited his victory. I m m e d i a t e p u r s u i t d e s t r o y e d the e n e m y ' s fighting
force; his s t r a t e g i c - p o l i t i c a l c o m b i n a t i o n b r o u g h t t h e c o u n t r i e s
u n d e r his p o w e r that t h e n served as a base for new c a m p a i g n s . T h e
p u r s u i n g rides o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n cavalry, t h e m a r c h e s t h r o u g h
m o u n t a i n s a n d deserts w e r e no less i m p o r t a n t military accomplish-
2
ments t h a n the battles themselves a n d t h e razing of fortress walls.
D u r i n g t h e p u r s u i t after G a u g a m e l a m a n y horses collapsed from
fatigue.
A l e x a n d e r was n o t only a g r e a t field c o m m a n d e r , but also a
c o m m a n d e r in the g r a n d m a n n e r . B u t he was still m o r e t h a n that.
He occupies a u n i q u e position in that he c o m b i n e d in o n e p e r s o n
the world-conquering strategist a n d the unexcelled c o u r a g e o u s
knightly c o m b a t a n t . Skillfully he led his a r m y t o w a r d the e n e m y ,
o v e r c a m e t e r r a i n obstacles, h a d it d e p l o y o u t of n a r r o w passes,
c o m b i n e d t h e various a r m s in a different way each time, a c c o r d i n g
to the differing circumstances, for the strongest possible total ef-
fect, strategically s e c u r e d his base a n d his c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , gave
d u e consideration to his supplies, waited until the p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d
e q u i p p i n g were c o m p l e t e d , s t o r m e d forward, p u r s u e d t h e victory
up to the point of t h e most e x t r e m e e x h a u s t i o n of his forces—and
the same m a n fought in each battle at t h e h e a d of his cavalry with
sword a n d spear, d r o v e into the b r e a c h at t h e h e a d of his assault
column, or was t h e first to s p r i n g over t h e e n e m y wall. It was t h e
only m o m e n t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of w a r f a r e in which the e l e m e n t s
of the c o n d u c t of war w e r e so close to each o t h e r that the com-
m a n d e r , following his n a t u r e , was at the s a m e time a c o m b a t a n t .
T h e strategic a n d tactical action was so simple that this unity d o e s
not n e e d to be p o i n t e d out, particularly in t h e p e r i o d from Mil-
tiades a n d L e o n i d a s up to E p a m i n o n d a s . With Philip first, a n d t h e n
completely with A l e x a n d e r , t h e c o m m a n d o f a n a r m y d e v e l o p e d
into an o r g a n i c function of such m a g n i t u d e a n d complexity t h a t it
became s e p a r a t e d from personal participation in combat. We can-
not withhold t h e highest a d m i r a t i o n in seeing that A l e x a n d e r , in
the inexhaustible s t r e n g t h a n d self-confidence of his personality,
still m a i n t a i n e d this unity. His g e n i u s r e c o g n i z e d with u n e r r i n g
a c u m e n all t h e new r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d possibilities t h a t w e r e de-

m a n d e d a n d offered by t h e new conditions, t h e organization and
size of the armies, as well as t h e e x t e n t a n d the n a t u r e of t h e con-
q u e r e d lands. It has b e e n r e p e a t e d l y e m p h a s i z e d , a n d rightly so
how he recognized a n d exploited the a d v a n t a g e s of the p u r s u i t fol-
lowing a victory, s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a d b e e n u n a t t a i n a b l e at t h e time
3
of t h e Greek c i t i z e n - c o m m a n d e r s . In t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r the
S p a r t a n s h a d not b e e n able to consider besieging A t h e n s ; Alexan-
d e r c o m p l e t e d t h e success of his victory at Issus by t h e skillful
s e v e n - m o n t h siege a n d f i n a l s t o r m i n g o f T y r e . I n I n d i a h e was
faced with the p r o b l e m of fighting the new a r m m a d e up of the
e l e p h a n t s , a n d of crossing a s t r e a m in t h e face of this a r m . He was
able to solve t h e p r o b l e m , a n d in d o i n g so he continuously risked
his own p e r s o n , u n c o n c e r n e d that, if t h e soldier's fate s h o u l d befall
h i m in t h e midst of the melee, his whole work t h r e a t e n e d to col-
lapse with him.
H e r e I wish to indicate at which point t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of military
c o m m a n d e r a n d w a r r i o r , which still held t r u e with A l e x a n d e r , fi-
nally h a d necessarily to be given u p : i.e., as soon as the principle of
tactical r e s e r v e s a p p e a r e d . A l e x a n d e r m i g h t still b e allowed t o
p l u n g e personally into t h e melee of battle because, with t h e signal
for t h e attack, t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s activity is finished; o n c e his troops
a r e e n g a g e d in t h e battle, the c o m m a n d e r retains only very limited
control over t h e m . It is t r u e that, with A l e x a n d e r too, we find a
certain m e a s u r e of l e a d e r s h i p within the battle; t h e victorious flank
is not s u p p o s e d to d a s h blindly after t h e d e f e a t e d e n e m y , but to
assemble again a n d h e l p d i s e n g a g e the flank t h a t is held u p , in case
t h e latter is still e n g a g e d . Even that, however, is no l o n g e r the re-
sponsibility of t h e s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r b u t it falls r a t h e r into the
s p h e r e o f l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t r o o p u n i t s a n d can still
occur in conjunction with the leader's participation in t h e battle.
O n l y with t h e a d v e n t of t h e principle of withheld units whose in-
tervention as to time a n d place is directed by t h e c o m m a n d e r him-
self is the latter's r e g u l a r involvement in the fighting eliminated.
EXCURSUS
1. According to Arrian 7. 2 3 , Alexander, shortly before his e n d , is supposed to

have undertaken a c o m p l e t e reorganization of his army. He created a new phalanx,
16 m e n d e e p , in which the first three ranks and the last o n e were c o m p o s e d of
Macedonians with their native arms and equipment, while the twelve interior ranks
were m a d e up of Persians with bows and javelins. It is an astonishing proof of the
might of the written word that m o d e r n scholars have f o u n d it possible to continue
to copy such an absurdity and to draw up clever h y p o t h e s e s on the subject of what
Alexander as a Military Commander 233
Alexander might possibly have had in mind with this formation and how its e m -
ployment was to be imagined. As an excuse we may point out that of course even
X e n o p h o n in his Cyropaedia, as we have seen above, describes such an arrangement
of combined cutting and thrusting weapons and missiles. W h o e v e r the authors were
from whom Arrian may have taken his account, it is clear that here o n c e again we
have o n e of the doctrinaire interpretations that o n e e n c o u n t e r s so often in military
history, e v e n with professional military m e n , despite the fact that, when they are
transposed into reality, they can immediately be recognized as invalid and never in
any historical battle is there even an attempt at putting them into practice.
it is also stated in Arrian and Aelian's Tactics 3. 4. 3 (Köchly and Rüstow, Greek
Military Authors, Part II, Section 1, p. 270) that the lightly armed troops could shoot
over a phalanx of 16-man depth with javelins, slings, and arrows.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R VI
1. Against Philip* (Philippics) 3. 123. p a r a . 4 9 .

2. H. Droysen, in Studies (Untersuchungen), p. 66, assembled the
accounts of A l e x a n d e r ' s forced m a r c h e s . I would, however, p r e f e r
not to r e p e a t t h e detailed figures c o n c e r n i n g time a n d space. T h e
estimate of distances is very arbitrary, a n d it is also quite doubtful
w h e t h e r t h e time is always r e p o r t e d accurately. Schwarz, in his very
w o r t h w h i l e s t u d y Alexander's Campaigns in Turkestan (Alexanders
Feldzüge in Turkestan), 1893, which is based on his p e r s o n a l know-
ledge of t h e l a n d a n d the p e o p l e , has established, probably cor-
rectly, t h a t t h e m a r c h t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o A r r i a n 4 . 6 , A l e x a n d e r
m a d e within t h r e e days was from C h o d s c h e n t to S a m a r k a n d . Ar-
r i a n e s t i m a t e s t h e d i s t a n c e a t 1,500 stadia, w h i c h m e a n s 2 7 5
kilometers or 170 miles, a n d t h e latest m e a s u r e m e n t s actually give
278 kilometers. S u c h a m a r c h in t h r e e days, however, exceeds t h e
capabilities of even t h e best unit.
In 3. 15, A r r i a n r e c o u n t s t h a t A l e x a n d e r r e a c h e d the Lycus (Zab)
on t h e s a m e e v e n i n g as the battle of G a u g a m e l a , a n d Arbela on t h e
following day, which is situated 600 stadia—i.e., 68 miles—from t h e
battlefield. We may say with reasonable certainty that the distance
was a b o u t half that great, b u t even that is still a t r e m e n d o u s per-
formance.
3. Of course, it is not a completely new idea t h a t a p u r s u i t m a g -
nifies a n d c o m p l e t e s a victory. After Plataea t h e M a n t i n e a n s wished
to p u r s u e the Persians as far as Thessaly, a c c o r d i n g to H e r o d o t u s
9. 77. After t h e victory at Delium the B o e o t i a n cavalry a n d light
infantry p u r s u e d the Athenians until darkness intervened
( T h u c y d i d e s 4. 96). Likewise Alcibiades p u r s u e d t h e b e a t e n Per-
sians with cavalry a n d hoplites (Hellenica 1. 2. 16). D e r d a s p u r s u e d
the d e f e a t e d O l y n t h i a n s a distance of 90 stadia (Hellenica 5. 3. 2).
See also o t h e r passages in Liers, p. 184. T h e s e a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s

only exceptional cases a n d a r e not to be c o m p a r e d with A l e x a n d e r ' s
pursuits. In theory, X e n o p h o n , too, in the Cyropaedia (5. 3, conclu-
sion), h a d already r e c o m m e n d e d pursuit, with t h e addition that not
all the t r o o p s should be c o m m i t t e d to it b u t t h a t some should al-
ways be kept at h a n d in good o r d e r .
Chapter VII
The Diadochi
F r o m t h e world e m p i r e of A l e x a n d e r t h e r e stem a n u m b e r of
s u b e m p i r e s that, f o u n d e d by his g e n e r a l s , w e r e actually what we
call military m o n a r c h i e s , an e x p r e s s i o n o n e m a y n o t yet use in
s p e a k i n g o f A l e x a n d e r ' s d o m i n i o n . T h e largest o f t h e s e s u b e m -
pires, Syria, defied any n a t u r a l , n a t i o n a l , or g e o g r a p h i c a l basis.
Egypt, even if it h a d no unified national basis, did at least have a
geographical o n e . Macedon possessed, to a certain extent, the
character of a national state.
T h e armies that held these states t o g e t h e r were essentially
m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s . T h e b a r b a r i a n s w h o c a m e s t r e a m i n g into t h e m
i n g r e a t n u m b e r s w e r e m o r e o r less a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o t h e
M a c e d o n i a n - G r e e k system. T h e quality o f t h e t r o o p s may have d e -
creased in that, w h e n the romantic-idealistic glow that e n v e l o p e d
the world c o n q u e s t a n d the p e r s o n of A l e x a n d e r , a n d also probably
threw its reflection on his whole a r m y , faded away, the c o n d u c t of
war t h e n sank to the status of a m e r e occupation in the senseless
battles of t h e subkings a m o n g themselves. But m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s
with their professional warriors always have the specialized skill of
any professionally practiced activity, a n d t h e r e is no reason to d e n y
this quality to t h e Hellenistic a r m i e s of t h e n e x t c e n t u r y a n d a half.
1
Drill masters a n d energetic drilling a r e expressly attested t o . T h e
original w a r r i o r elan that the M a c e d o n i a n s b r o u g h t from their state
o f half-barbarism, o r that they h a d b e e n i m b u e d with t h r o u g h t h e
inspiration of t h e two g r e a t kings, was replaced by a military arti-
2
sanship. A p o r t i o n of these m e r c e n a r i e s f o r m e d a s t a n d i n g a r m y .
T h i s p e r i o d p r e s e n t s us with military history questions in t h r e e
different areas. First of all, t h e r e are t h e e l e p h a n t s .
T h i s new a r m forms t h e real p r o b l e m o f t h e p e r i o d . H o w w e r e
they w o r k e d into the traditional organization? H o w w e r e they com-
bined with t h e infantry, with t h e cavalry? To what e x t e n t did t h e
r e p e r c u s s i o n s o f this new e l e m e n t r e a c t o n t h e functions o f t h e
235
older ones? What form did the battle take when there were
e l e p h a n t s on both sides?
A second p r o b l e m lies in the i n n e r d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e p h a l a n x ,
t h e g r a d u a l l e n g t h e n i n g of the sarissa.
A third question is t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e relationship of the
a r m s a m o n g themselves. K ö c h l y a n d R ü s t o w have voiced the opin-
ion that the cavalry gradually b e c a m e the only decisive a r m ; that it
h a d c o n t i n u o u s l y g o t t e n l a r g e r ; t h a t t h e p h a l a n x did n o t really
fight any m o r e , b u t awaited the o u t c o m e of t h e cavalry battle a n d
was g o v e r n e d by t h a t decision. Little is to be e x t r a c t e d directly
from the military history of this p e r i o d . We have, it is t r u e , e n o u g h
accounts (Diodorus a n d Plutarch), but they a r e highly unreliable.
T h e r e may very well be a g o o d deal of t r u t h in t h e m , b u t it c a n n o t
with certainty be s e p a r a t e d from t h e false material. J u s t the same,
m u c h of it may a p p e a r credible e n o u g h to w a r r a n t o u r simply r e -
p e a t i n g it, a l t h o u g h it is not credible e n o u g h to serve as a basis for
conclusions, a s o u r p u r p o s e d e m a n d s .
We plan to discuss t h e question of t h e e l e p h a n t s after we have
reviewed in t u r n t h e o t h e r battles in which these animals took part,
up to the last o n e , t h e battle of T h a p s u s .
Likewise, we do n o t i n t e n d to discuss t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e sarissae
until we r e a c h t h e p o i n t w h e r e it faces us in a practical way, in the
last battles of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s with t h e R o m a n s . King P y r r h u s of
E p i r u s , too, w h o b e l o n g s militarily to the g r o u p of A l e x a n d e r ' s suc-
cessors, will best be c o n s i d e r e d in connection with R o m a n military
history.
T h e t h i r d q u e s t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g t h e relationship o f infantry a n d
cavalry, we can answer at o n c e simply by b r i n g i n g it u p . T h a t is, if
we look carefully at t h e sources, we see t h a t Rüstow a n d Köchly's
actual a s s u m p t i o n d o e s n o t hold t r u e ; t h e n u m e r i c a l relationship
did not c h a n g e significantly after A l e x a n d e r .
Aside, then, from the elephants and the lengthening of the
sarissa, t h e M a c e d o n i a n s y s t e m o f w a r f a r e d i d n o t u n d e r g o a
c h a n g e after A l e x a n d e r , a n d w e c a n i m m e d i a t e l y a d d t h a t t h e
G r e e k states also, which w e r e asserting themselves in a kind of u n -
certain i n d e p e n d e n c e , copied the Macedonians' perfected art of
war, to include finally also the sarissa.
It is astonishing that, when the Gauls invaded the country
A l e x a n d e r ' s successors p r o v e d to be incapable of c o p i n g with t h e m .
T h i s was not because of t h e individuals involved; r a t h e r , it seems
unmistakably clear that all their skill in t h e a r t of military o p e r a -
tions was still n o t sufficient to withstand t h e n a t u r a l p o w e r of t h e
The Diadochi 237
warlike spirit of t h e b a r b a r i a n s . O n l y t h e g r e a t m i g h t of t h e Syrian

King A n t i o c h u s I, with his e l e p h a n t s , is s u p p o s e d to have halted
the Gauls. T h e historical account has p r e s e r v e d his s t a t e m e n t : "I
am a s h a m e d t h a t we a r e i n d e b t e d for o u r salvation to these sixteen
animals." We a r e not really sufficiently i n f o r m e d , however, on t h e
details of these events.
EXCURSUS
1. T h e opinion of Rüstow and Köchly to the effect that in this period the cavalry
had become still greater in n u m b e r and importance has already been d r o p p e d by
Adolf Bauer in his account. T h e n u m b e r s that have c o m e d o w n from the sources
(Droysen, p. 134) s h o w in g e n e r a l the s a m e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n infantry a n d
cavalry that already existed in Alexander's army—between 5 and 7 to 1. T h e varia-
tions above and below may be conditioned by particular circumstances about which
we can hypothesize with a certain d e g r e e of probability. In d o i n g so we automati-
cally dispose of the question raised by Droysen (p. 154), and which he was unable to
answer, of why, in the later Hellenistic period, the phalanx suddenly again became
of such great importance and the cavalry declined.
In order to give a better overall view of the question, I have arranged below in
tabular form the figures h a n d e d d o w n to us, which, of course, I in no way endorse
as completely credible.
Year (B.C.) Infantry Cavalry Elephants
(Macedonians 43,000 5,000

322 Crannon
(Greeks 25,000 3,500
321 E u m e n e s against ( E u m e n e s 20,000 5,000

Craterus (Craterus 20,000 2,000
(Antigonus 10,000 2,000 30

321 N e a r Orcynii
(Eumenes 20,000 5,000
319 Antigonus 60,000 10,000 30
(Antigonus 40,000 7,000

319 Cretopolis (Alcetas 900
16,000
(Antigonus 28,000 8,500 65

(or a few
317 Paraetacene thousand more) (10,300)
(Eumenes 35,000 6,100 114
(6,200) (125)
(Antigonus 22,000 9,000 65

316 Gabiene
(Eumenes 36,700 6,050 114
314 Demetrius 13,000 5,000 40
(Ptolemy 18,000 4,000

312 Gaza (and light int.)
(Demetrius 12,800 5,000 40
Year (B.C.) Infantry Cavalry Elephants
312 Demtrius 15,000 4.000
306 Antigonus 80,000 8.000 83
302 (Demetrius 56,000 1,500

(Cassander 29.000 2,000
(Allies 64,000 10,500 400

301 Ipsus (12,000) (480)
(Antigonus 70,000 10 0 0 0 75
288 Demetrius 98.000 12.000
222 Sellasia (Antigonus 28,000 1,200

(Cleomenes 20,000
total
70,000 5,000 73
217 Raphia (Antiochus 62.000 6,000 102
197 Cynoscephalae Philip 23,500 2,000
171 Perseus 39,000 4,000
2. In the battle of Crannon (Diodorus 18. 17), the Greek cavalry defeated the
Macedonian, although the former n u m b e r e d only 3,500 whereas the Macedonians
had 5,000. T h e Greek infantry, however, only 2 5 , 0 0 0 strong, was thrown back by
the Macedonian, which n u m b e r e d over 43,600 men. T h e Greeks, trusting in the skill
of their cavalry, are supposed to have stationed them in front of their phalanx ("in
front of the phalanx of foot soldiers"*). T h e Greek phalanx m o v e d back onto higher
terrain and in doing so held off the press of the e n e m y phalanx. T h e victorious
Greek cavalry turned about w h e n they noticed the withdrawal of their phalanx,
without, however, intervening further in the battle.
T h i s operation is not clear.
3. Diodorus and Plutarch say that E u m e n e s wisely provided himself in advance
with a large and skilled cavalry arm. With it he first defeated N e o p t o l e m u s and also
overcame the latter's phalanx w h e n , after it had defeated his o w n infantry, it fell
into disorder. In the second e n g a g e m e n t there was no fight with the infantry, since
E u m e n e s , after defeating the e n e m y cavalry with his p r e p o n d e r a n c e of power (5,000
against 2,000), started negotiations with the e n e m y phalanx in order to persuade
them to c o m e over to his side.
4. From the military history point of view, the e n g a g e m e n t near Orcynii cannot
be evaluated, since it was decided by treason.
5. At Cretopolis Antigonus had such a great numerical superiority and Diodorus'
report is moreover so indefinite that there is nothing to be learned of military his-
tory interest from this encounter.
6 . D i o d o r u s ( 1 9 . 2 7 - 3 1 ) g i v e s u s a t h o r o u g h d e s c r i p t i o n o f the battle o f
Paraetacene between A n t i g o n u s a n d E u m e n e s (317 B . C . ) ; I have serious doubts,
however, as to whether o n e may consider m u c h of it as historical. Without going
into the many details, I shall bring up here only those points that, completely aside
from the general unreliability of the source, make the whole matter suspect from my
point of view.
The Diadochi 239
Diodorus states the overall strength and the individual strengths very exactly, but,
as Rüstow and Köchly nave already remarked (p. 3 7 1 , note), the numbers do not
agree with each other.
Eumenes is said to have formed up 45 elephants in a curved formation in front of
his left flank, with archers and slingers in the intervals. ("He lined up 45 elephants
at an angle in front of all of them, along with sufficient archers and slingers in the
spaces between the animals."*) Rüstow and Köchly conceive of this line as being
curved toward the e n e m y . That is not impossible, but o n e cannot see a reason for it.
A formation that is curved forward, if it d o e s not have an absolutely secure terrain
feature on which to lean, is always vulnerable itself to e n v e l o p m e n t by the e n e m y .
In the center stood the infantry, on the right wing again cavalry, and in front of
the infantry and cavalry 80 elephants with lightly armed men. We ask this question:
Why were the elephants drawn up in a curve on o n e flank, while those in the center
and on the other flank were in front of the other troops? H o w was the phalanx
supposed to operate behind the 40 elephants that were allocated to it? Were they
supposed to follow the elephants and charge the e n e m y phalanx after the latter had
been broken up by the elephants? A n t i g o n u s , too, is s u p p o s e d to have f o r m e d
elephants in front of his phalanx. In the account of the battle, however, we hear no
further word of these elephants on the two sides; the phalanxes advance against
each other as usual.
Antigonus is s u p p o s e d to have observed that the right flank of the e n e m y was
particularly strong because of the p r e s e n c e there of the e l e p h a n t s and the best
("elite"*) of the cavalry. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s ' o w n account, h o w e v e r , a large
number of elephants and a considerable numerical superiority of cavalrymen were
on the other flank.
Antigonus, like his o p p o n e n t s , is said to have formed the elephants of his left
flank in a curved line ("along the wing . . . making an angle"*). Rüstow and Köchly
conceive of this formation as curved to the rear.
A n t i g o n u s m o v e d up for the attack in an oblique order of battle with his right
flank in advance. Nevertheless, it is not the right, but rather his withheld left flank
that supposedly o p e n e d the attack. It was c o m p o s e d principally of light cavalry, who,
hesitating to m o v e directly against the elephants, sought to take the e n e m y from the
flank. Since E u m e n e s did not feel capable of o p p o s i n g them successfully with his
heavy cavalry, he m o v e d reinforcements of light cavalry from his other flank.
O n e wonders why he did not have his elephants, which were immediately at hand,
turn against the e n e m y cavalry, and particularly how he could risk weakening in this
m a n n e r his left flank, which was obviously most seriously threatened by the e n e m y
offensive flank.
With the help of his reinforcements, while the elephants also cooperate but actu-
ally only by following ("followers"*), E u m e n e s defeats the enemy left flank; likewise,
his phalanx, which has a numerical superiority of 3 5 , 0 0 0 against 2 8 , 0 0 0 , defeats the
e n e m y phalanx.
During this combat the supposedly advanced offensive flank of A n t i g o n u s was
completely passive. O n e would think that the victorious army of Eumenes, u n d e r his
excellent leadership, would have detached a few units and m o v e d them into the
flank and the rear of the e n e m y wing that was still standing fast, in order to com-
plete the victory. Instead, h o w e v e r , D i o d o r u s r e c o u n t s how E u m e n e s ' victorious
troops took no further action than to pursue the defeated units. T h e left flank,
however, stood fast, so that the battle formation broke apart. Into this breach A n -
tigonus charged with his cavalry and defeated that flank of the e n e m y which had so
far been passive and was w e a k e n e d by the detaching of some of its units. On hear-
ing this, the defeated troops of A n t i g o n u s again c a m e to a halt, and E u m e n e s called
his troops back from the pursuit. H o w it is s u p p o s e d to be possible that, w h e n
eight-ninths of an army is in full flight, a partial victory by the last ninth again
stabilizes the battle, is hard to understand. With his well-disciplined troops, it cer-
tainly would have been possible for E u m e n e s to call back a few units from the pur-
suit and use them to finish o f f A n t i g o n u s .
C o m p l e t e l y i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e and fantastic, moreover, is Diodorus' account that
then follows, showing how the two armies spent half the night marching along at a
distance of 4 0 0 feet from each other.
7. In the battle of Gabiene (316 B . C . ) E u m e n e s is said o n c e again to have stationed
60 of his best e l e p h a n t s in a c u r v e d line ("bent at an angle"*) in front of his left
flank ("in front of the w h o l e wing"*) and the remainder, like Antigonus, in advance
of his front (Diodorus 19. 4 0 - 4 3 ) .
In the cavalry combat of the left flank, Eumenes, weaker in cavalry and treacher-
ously left in the lurch by o n e of his corps, was defeated. N o t h i n g is reported of any
advantage that he might have gained from his great superiority in elephants. We
only hear that the elephants f o u g h t against each other and that the leading animal
of his side was killed in a battle with an o p p o n e n t .
In the infantry battle E u m e n e s ' phalanx, which was superior both in numerical
strength and in quality, was completely victorious; it killed 5,000 of the e n e m y with-
out losing a single m a n of its o w n . N o t h i n g is said about the elephants and the light
infantry that are s u p p o s e d to have stood in advance of the front line.
We also hear n o t h i n g of the battle on the other cavalry flank, which was held back
on both sides.
Now a very unusual battle would have had to d e v e l o p , since on the o n e side was
d e p l o y e d a very s t r o n g a n d skilled infantry ( 3 6 , 7 0 0 m e n ) with many e l e p h a n t s ,
against cavalry (9,000) with only half as many elephants. T h e superiority appears to
have been unquestionably on the first side, that of E u m e n e s , and all the m o r e so in
that he also still had a portion of his cavalry at hand. T h e phalanx, f o r m i n g a
square, also r e p u l s e d an attack from A n t i g o n u s ' cavalry, but then s u d d e n l y the
military action was broken off, as the troops of E u m e n e s betrayed their c o m m a n d e r
and delivered him over to the e n e m y . D u r i n g the battle A n t i g o n u s had had his
superior cavalry capture E u m e n e s ' camp, where the w o m e n and children of the sol-
diers were also, and that is s u p p o s e d to have e x e r t e d such an influence on the
morale of the soldiers, although it is hard to understand why they did not quickly
move to drive o f f the invaders. T h e c a m p was situated at only 1,500 paces behind
the battlefield.
8. Gaza (312 B . C . ) would be a very interesting battle from the military history
point of view, if we had any kind of reliable account of it. According to the only
report we have (Diodorus 19. 8 0 - 8 4 ) , Demetrius had the advantage in cavalry (5,000
3
against 4 , 0 0 0 ) and i n e l e p h a n t s (40), o f which the e n e m y (Ptolemy) had n o n e ,
whereas Ptolemy was far stronger in infantry (18,000 against 11,000 heavy infantry,
"very many" against 1 8 , 0 0 0 light infantry). We w o u l d t h e r e f o r e have to e x p e c t
s o m e t h i n g similar to the battle of G a b i e n e . C o n c e r n i n g a battle b e t w e e n the
phalanxes, however, we hear absolutely nothing. T h e battle took place exclusively
between Demetrius' left flank, consisting of cavalry, 30 elephants, and sharpshooters,
and Ptolemy's right flank, c o m p o s e d in a like m a n n e r , except for the elephants.
U n d e r these conditions Demetrius would have had to have the superiority. But
Ptolemy found an unusual m e t h o d of combatting the elephants. He had palisades
reinforced with iron and bound together with chains set up in front of his right
flank. In what way this stake obstacle was s u p p o s e d to hold up the animals is not
clearly stated. It is impossible to ram in stakes hastily in such a way that they will
hold up elephants. Later in the account of the battle, reference is made to the ani-
mals' soft feet and to the fact that they impaled themselves on the palisade. T h i s
would lead o n e to think of a kind of foot trap or, as H. Droysen believed, inverted
harrows, which were b o u n d together with chains so that they could not be removed.
But "charax" has neither this meaning, nor would it h e l p us m u c h from the objective
point of view. T h e emplacing and binding together of the "harrows" took place after
The Diadochi 241
all in full view of the enemy. It appears that the cavalry saw this also, and conse-
quently, since every obstacle of this kind holds up one's o w n advance as well as that
of the e n e m y , the cavalry combat e n s u e d on the e x t r e m e flank and was drawn even
farther toward this side by an e n v e l o p m e n t by the Ptolemaic forces, thereby avoid-
ing the stake obstacle. Only those for w h o m it was intended, that is, the elephants,
instead of exerting their well-known effect on the e n e m y h o r s e m e n , persisted in
moving directly to the point where they were e x p e c t e d . H e r e they were received by
the light infantry with missiles, and the stake or harrow works held them up and
wounded them. T h e y were captured, w h e r e u p o n the c o u r a g e o u s and initially vic-
torious cavalry of Demetrius became terrified; they fled, and the battle was lost.
T h e entire account is a guard room story, not a word of which may be accepted in
an historical account.
In the case of the artificial obstacle against the elephants, o n e could think of what
is recounted in D i o d o r u s 18. 7 1 . T h i s is, however, a completely different matter. At
the siege of Megalopolis, in order to make a breach impassable for the elephants,
Damis had planks laid d o w n through which heavy nails had been driven, and they
were lightly covered with earth. Naturally, the elephants could not pass over t h e m ,
but this was a narrow, limited area in a purely defensive situation, where there was
sufficient time for the work and it could be h i d d e n from the e n e m y .
9. Concerning the battle of Ipsus (301 B . C . ) , in addition to a few fragments from
Diodorus (21. 1), we have only a very short report in Plutarch's Demetrius (Chapter
29). U n d e r conditions of approximately equal strength in infantry and cavalry, the
allies had a very great superiority in e l e p h a n t s — 4 0 0 (or 480) against 75. Demetrius
first defeated the e n e m y cavalry and p u r s u e d it; w h e n he turned back, the e n e m y
elephants blocked his path, so that he could neither attack the e n e m y phalanx nor
protect the flank of his o w n . T h r e a t e n e d by the rest of the e n e m y cavalry, A n -
tiochus' phalanx went partially over to the side of his e n e m i e s .
If we could unreservedly trust this report, then Ipsus would have been the first
battle that was d e c i d e d by the e l e p h a n t s . On the H y d a s p e s , at P a r a e t a c e n e , at
Gabiene, at Gaza, it is always the side that is strong in elephants that loses, and e v e n
at Ipsus they did not produce a real tactical decision.
10. Antiochus' victory over the Gauls is recounted in Lucian's Zeuxis or Antiochus
(Jacobitz edition, 1: 398). T h e account is quite detailed but not very credible. T h e
Gauls are s u p p o s e d to have had scythed chariots, whereas the Syrian army is sup-
posed to have consisted principally of light infantry. T h e victory was d e c i d e d exclu-
sively by the sixteen elephants, the sight of which was completely new to the Gauls.
T h e horses immediately turned about and raced with the scythed chariots t h r o u g h
the ranks of their o w n m e n ; a general panic seized the barbarians and almost the
entire army perished or was captured.
BATTLE OF SELLASIA (221 B . C . )

On this battle between the Spartan King C l e o m e n e s and the Macedonian King
Antigonus we have a thorough, well-reasoned report in Polybius (2. 65) and also in-
formation in Plutarch's Cleomenes and Philopoemen. T h i s battle could be very interest-
ing from a military history point of view, since in it the various arms—heavy and
light infantry and cavalry—appear to be cleverly c o m b i n e d with a greatly varying
terrain and field fortifications in a m a n n e r and to a d e g r e e unmatched in a battle of
antiquity. Nevertheless, in the first edition of this work I treated the battle only
peremptorily, since from my analysis of the reports I was unable to discern any suf-
ficiently reliable and clear picture of the events. It s e e m e d to me that Polybius had
l a c u n a e in his causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s that c o u l d be c o m p l e t e d only by m e a n s of
hypotheses of an uncertain type; many of the details in his report e v e n s e e m to con-
tradict o n e another.
T h e situation has been significantly improved since then; Kromayer has given us
an accurate topographical description of the battlefield, which brought to light a
serious error in the accounts on which I still had to base my study at that time.
Furthermore, repeated special studies, too, of other portions of the text have led to
a different interpretation of Polybius' report.
Kromayer's o w n research (Archaeological Clarifications [Archäologische Anzeigen], 1900,
p. 2 0 4 , and Battlefields of Antiquity [Antike Schlachtfelder], I: 199) is, of course, riddled
with so many e r r o n e o u s military concepts and so m u c h false reasoning that it tends
m o r e to confuse and obscure than to clarify and is worthwhile only in a few details.
Furthermore, I cannot concur with Lammert's astute reconstruction of the battle
(Neue Jahrbücher fur das Klassische Altertum, 1904, Division 1, Vol. 13, Books 2 - 4 ) . On
the other hand, Rolott, in his Problems of Greek Military History (Probleme aus der
griechischen Kriegsgeschichte), if o n e fills in his work in one important aspect, has prob-
ably correctly worked out everything of a positive nature that is to be said about the
4
battle, and he has especially analyzed critically and rejected Kromayer's aberrations.
In the main, of course, n o t h i n g has really been changed—that is, the battle plays no
role in the d e v e l o p m e n t of military history and Polybius' report is too incomplete to
allow o n e to recognize the relationships with certainty. Nevertheless, an important
step forward has been realized. It is not necessary here to turn back to the details
and the controversies; for this, I can refer the reader to Roloff's work. Here I shall
give only a general overview and weave into it those particular details that enable me
to correct something I said in the first edition [original G e r m a n edition of 1901],
Vol. I, p. 2 0 8 and Vol. II, p. 11, or to add still something further of a positive na-
ture to Roloff's position.
Polybius (2. 65) tells us that C l e o m e n e s d e f e n d e d the other approaches to the
country by watchposts, ditches, and the felling of trees; but he himself was camped
with his army near Sellasia, where he expected the e n e m y invasion.
T h e s e words make it s o u n d as if all the other approaches to L a c e d a e m o n were
actually blocked and A n t i g o n u s was limited to the road from Sellasia. In reality, a
country like L a c e d a e m o n cannot be blocked off in this manner.
T h i s passage should therefore be understood as m e a n i n g that C l e o m e n e s had de-
fensive positions p r e p a r e d on the various approach roads that might c o m e into
question, especially in the Eurotas valley, and he m o v e d into the position near Sel-
lasia, 12 kilometers north of Sparta, w h e n Antigonus' approach on this route was
reported.
T h e road to Sparta leads here from the north through a narrow valley; the hills
on the two sides are not so easy to pass around. T h e hill on the right (east) side, the
Olympus, has a gentle slope, which C l e o m e n e s occupied with his phalanx; the hill
on the left, the Euas, which has at its front and on the left a steep slope, he turned
over to light infantry, especially Lacedaemonian h o m e g u a r d s (Landsturm) u n d e r the
c o m m a n d of his brother Eucleides. In the valley he placed his small force of cavalry,
again with light infantry. Across both hills e x t e n d e d a field fortification system with
ditches, a rampart, and palisades. C l e o m e n e s had s o m e t h i n g approaching 2 0 , 0 0 0
m e n , whereas A n t i g o n u s had 2 9 , 8 0 0 , including 1,200 cavalry, and was therefore half
again as strong.
For me, the indefinite point in this formation was the valley. T h e installation of
the fortifications s e e m e d to apply only to the two hills; Roloff, too, understood it in
this way. But in the travel descriptions and available maps, e v e n t h o u g h they dif-
fered considerably a m o n g themselves, the valley appeared quite wide. What, there-
fore, was to prevent King A n t i g o n u s from rolling over the small number of horse-
m e n and the light infantry in the valley, thereby piercing t h r o u g h the e n e m y posi-
tion in the center, and then rolling up the two flanks? Kromayer's first publication
s e e m e d to me to clarify this point t h r o u g h the fact that the valley was very narrow,
almost like a ravine, and was therefore d o m i n a t e d on the right and left by the hills.
That turned out, however, to be a misunderstanding on my part; even if the actual
valley is only 100 meters wide, nevertheless the hills rise so gently on the right and
left that there can be no question of d o m i n a t i n g the valley from above, and so I
The Diadochi 243
cannot agree with Roloff w h e n he says that the penetration of the terrain at this
point is impracticable. Rather, the correct solution can only be that which calls for
blocking the valley, too, by fortifications. T h e context of Polybius' work d o e s not
rule this out, and Kromayer, too, has already stated that this interpretation is possi-
ble, but without drawing the proper conclusions from it.
With this assumption, the dispositions of C l e o m e n e s f o r m e d an extremely strong
defensive position, a n d if Polybius praises it by p o i n t i n g o u t that the f i g h t i n g
branches were correctly arranged in it and how, as with a clever fencer, nothing was
left out of consideration concerning either defensive or offensive possibilities, that
statement should be u n d e r s t o o d as meaning that the Euas with its steep slopes was
occupied with light infantry, whereas the Olympus, with its gentle approach, was oc-
cupied by the phalanx. It remains to be discovered to what extent the position of-
fered the possibility of an offensive counterattack.
According to Polybius, the battle d e v e l o p e d in such a way that Antigonus, since he
realized that the position could not be o v e r c o m e with a simple, direct attack, c a m p e d
for several days directly in front of the Spartan p o s i t i o n a n d r e c o n n o i t e r e d it
thoroughly. T h e n he decided to attack the left flank on the Euas, while he himself
marched up on his left flank with his phalanx close to C l e o m e n e s and, without at-
tacking, fixed him there. His center, too, in the valley, where his cavalry was natu-
rally placed, with s o m e heavy infantry, was to hold back until it received the signal
for the attack—that is, until the Euas was taken, which automatically effected the
outflanking of the Spartans' position in the valley, which we consequently picture as
protected by fortifications.
It was not such an easy matter to take the Euas with its steep slopes and the for-
tifications at its summit. As a reason for its falling after a very short fight, Polybius
states that Eucleides, instead of m o v i n g out against the attack, as was tactically
proper, awaited the attack. T h i s explanation cannot satisfy us, since not a word of
consideration is given to the fortifications in this explanation. A fortification consist-
ing of a rampart, a ditch, and palisades (at any rate, the palisades were m e n t i o n e d
on the other hill) is, after all—even if we do not know exactly how high, d e e p , and
5
strong it was—not so simple to storm. It is also certainly not proper to lead the
garrison out against the e n e m y on the slope, since, if it were pressed back again, it
would find the hardest obstacle right up against its o w n fortification. At the most, it
can only be a question of sending out a m o r e or less large number of sharpshooters
and particularly agile light infantry for the fight in the forward area. As o n e reads
the account in Polybius, o n e can hardly avoid the suspicion that this somewhat di-
dactically inclined author, with the tactical rule of the counterattack in mind (which
only holds true w h e n there are no real fortifications at hand), momentarily forgot
about the fortification. At any rate, his explanation for Eucleides' defeat d o e s not
suffice. W h e n we then find it mentioned in Plutarch that the Euas was taken by an
envelopment, that forms an additional e l e m e n t that we can hardly reject, e v e n if its
validity is not great insofar as its source is c o n c e r n e d .
Kromayer (p. 259) cites by way of clarification of his opinion—"reluctantly," as he
says, since it is a question of the obvious—some rather long observations from m o d -
ern military authors, which provide an excellent e x a m p l e of how d a n g e r o u s histori-
cal analogies b e c o m e in the hands of a novice. T h a t is, Kromayer did not see at all
that the c o n d i t i o n s are d i f f e r e n t for t r o o p s with n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c a n n o n ,
firearms, a n d fieldworks from those applying to troops of antiquity without long-
range arms. In antiquity, a m o d e r n , short e n t r e n c h m e n t would be not only worth-
less but d a n g e r o u s , since this trench, with the low e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the missile
weapons, would quickly be e n v e l o p e d and taken from the rear. T r o o p s of antiquity,
therefore, can only use either very long lines or completely enclosed camps with a
few narrow o p e n i n g s . T h i s also creates completely different conditions for an ad-
vance out of a fortification.
In a m o d e r n trench system troops fleeing from the terrain in front of the battle
line c o m e back in through the narrow entrance while the fire of the garrison hits
and holds up the e n e m y . In the e x t e n d e d or enclosed e n t r e n c h m e n t s of antiquity,
however, the troops w h o are being driven back from the forward terrain cannot get
in again—unless it be only a few m e n — s i n c e the e n e m y is following much too closely
on their heels. W h e n K r o m a y e r , t h e r e f o r e , a d d s to his g l e a n i n g s from m o d e r n
military authors the advice to transfer these rules analogously to the conditions of
antiquity, then his "reluctance" against this whole investigation has tricked him to
the point that he himself did not carry through the analogous transposition, and so,
despite his study, the problem has remained as it was—that is, Polybius' account as
well as his criticism c o n c e r n i n g the events on the Euas leaves us with obscurities that
we are not in a position to dispel.
T h e false m o d e r n analogies with which Kromayer works tactically are, moreover,
almost e x c e e d e d by his strategic comparison of C l e o m e n e s ' position to Benedek's
conduct in B o h e m i a in 1866. T h e r e is not e v e n the slightest similarity between these
two, but rather in each and every respect quite the direct opposite.
W h e n the troops of A n t i g o n u s had b e g u n their climb up the Euas, the Spartan
troops in the center m a d e a s u d d e n sortie and fell on the flank and rear of the at-
tackers. T h e Macedonian center, awaiting the c o m m a n d of the King, stood passively
by, so that the attackers of the Euas might have been easily d e f e a t e d . T h e bold ini-
tiative o f the y o u n g M e g a l o p o l i t a n P h i l o p o e m e n , h o w e v e r , set the M a c e d o n i a n
cavalry in action; their counterattack drove back the Spartan center, which had been
7
followed by its o w n cavalry as a covering f o r c e , and that enabled the attackers to
storm the Euas.
T h e account by Polybius in this e p i s o d e is completely unobjectionable. It is par-
ticularly noteworthy that precisely here Kromayer (p. 2 3 8 ) states very stiffly: "There
can be no question of Philopoemen's receiving, as Polybius claims, the credit for the
success of the attack against the Euas." In exactly the same way, furthermore, Roloff
(pp. 7 2 ff.) has s h o w n that a l s o i n the p r e c e d i n g c a m p a i g n o f the t w o k i n g s
Kromayer rejects precisely those j u d g m e n t s of Polybius the correctness of which
cannot be doubted.
In his first account of the battle, Kromayer had claimed that 4 , 0 0 0 men w h o m
A n t i g o n u s o r d e r e d to follow the attackers as a reserve were s u p p o s e d to "mask" this
attack. I have remarked in that connection (1st ed., Vol. II, p. 14), that I could not
conceive of this. To what extent, after all, could the 4 , 0 0 0 m e n have covered the fact
that other units of the great army were undertaking o t h e r tasks? Kromayer now says
of this point (p. 2 6 1 ) that he could even have considered the entire d e p l o y m e n t of
the Macedonian army as a masking of the s u d d e n attack on the Euas. I have no
objection to make to that, no m o r e so than if Kromayer had written now that, in-
stead of a military absurdity, he could even have said s o m e t h i n g correct. He would
e v e n have had many an opportunity to do this.
W h i l e the M a c e d o n i a n s were taking the Euas a n d the valley position, d u r i n g
which on both sides, aside from the cavalry, the fighting was principally by the light
infantry, the two phalanxes were in position on the O l y m p u s , d e p l o y e d opposite
each other, and only the light infantrymen assigned to t h e m — w h o were, it is true,
quite numerous—skirmished out in front. A n t i g o n u s knew very well how d a n g e r o u s
it would have been for him to storm the Spartan fortification b e h i n d which their
phalanx stood. N o t until his o t h e r wing had b e e n victorious and was threatening
Cleomenes' flank from the valley a n d his phalanx from the rear, did the m o m e n t
for action arrive. But C l e o m e n e s , recognizing the defeat of that half of his army, did
not await Antigonus' attack but o r d e r e d the palisades to be torn d o w n and m o v e d
out over his o w n fortifications to attack the Macedonians. Despite an initial success,
however, he finally could not avoid defeat, since his o w n phalanx was only 6,000
m e n strong, whereas the e n e m y phalanx had 10,000 m e n .
H e r e is the real problem of the battle: Polybius says that C l e o m e n e s had been
forced to m o v e to the attack ("he was constrained"*) but d o e s not indicate what
The Diadochi 245
forced him and to what extent. After all, o n e can imagine many possibilities. Did he
have no route of withdrawal over the mountains? T h i s is what Kromayer claims
from his knowledge of the terrain. T h a t , however, would have been such a serious
error in the position that Polybius could not possibly have failed to c o m m e n t on it.
After all, how many of his readers could know that? Furthermore, was it impossible
to entrust the d e f e n s e of the palisade to the light infantry, and in the meanwhile to
lead the phalanx as quickly as possible into the valley and bring about there, if not a
turn in the f o r t u n e of battle, at least the possibility of a withdrawal? What did
Cleomenes have in m i n d anyway with his attack? Did he still h o p e for victory? Or an
honorable defeat? In the e n d he was still able to save himself, although most of the
soldiers of his phalanx were killed.
Polybius leaves us no answer to all these questions. From the entire context, Roloff
worked out as probable the fact that C l e o m e n e s , when he saw that the valley road,
his withdrawal route, was lost, realized that the s u d d e n dash against the e n e m y
phalanx was the only chance of a victory, however slim that chance might be, and in
any case the most honorable defeat. If he had waited longer behind his entrench-
ment, he would s o o n have been s u r r o u n d e d on all sides. If he had turned d o w n into
the valley immediately, that would only have b e c o m e a disorderly flight and, u n d e r
the best circumstances, a withdrawal without further h o p e .
It is quite probable that it h a p p e n e d this way, but nevertheless, as Roloff himself
stressed most strongly, no more than an hypothesis. Inasmuch as Polybius d o e s not
reveal the subject to us clearly, we cannot arrive at the answer to the principal ques-
tion: how d o e s a Greek-Macedonian phalanx go about d e f e n d i n g a field fortifica-
tion? In the defense of the Euas Polybius had the d e f e n d e r m o v i n g out to meet the
attacker in front of his fortifications. H e r e we are dealing with light infantry, w h o
are able to move back into the fortification relatively fast. Despite this, the whole
matter s e e m e d quite doubtful to us, since with a rather large n u m b e r such a with-
drawal is still difficult u n d e r any circumstances and can cause heavy losses. Polybius
himself knows this difficulty and does not clarify it, but rather makes no further
mention of the fortifications, so that the suspicion arises that he expressed a rule
that refers to combat without fortifications in a context where, because of the pres-
ence of fortifications, it did not apply. N o w , on the O l y m p u s , where the m e n of the
heavy phalanx were formed up behind the fortification, Polybius states that they
tore d o w n the d e f e n s e s in o r d e r to make their sortie. It seems quite clear that there
was no other possibility, if they wanted to attack. T h e fact that no fewer than 5,000
light infantry are s u p p o s e d to have fought already in front of the palisades is dif-
ficult to understand; but to let the phalanx soldiers out, the palisades had to c o m e
down. But what if they now, as is after all the true purpose of a fortification, wanted
to d e f e n d it instead of destroying it? It would be very interesting to have some in-
formation on this from o n e of our sources. Only then would we be able to under-
stand C l e o m e n e s ' battle plan fully and j u d g e its value. Unfortunately, in this respect,
too, Polybius leaves us o n c e again in the dark. I would believe, if the phalanx sol-
diers did not simply d e f e n d the wall and the palisades, as the legionaries of Caesar
did at the circumvallation of Alesia, that it would probably be the normal thing for
the light infantry to d e f e n d the fortification and the phalanx to be stationed a few
d o z e n paces behind t h e m , in reserve. If then the e n e m y drove back the light infan-
try, stormed the fortification, and in the course of driving into it lost his tactical
formation, the phalanx would then move forward and throw him back with an of-
fensive push. In actual fact, however, at Sellasia the light infantry were d e p l o y e d in
front of the fortification, and the phalanx, w h e n it wished to m o v e out to the attack,
tore down its o w n palisades in order to make r o o m for the m o v e m e n t . Tactically,
therefore, the fortification served no p u r p o s e at all.
U n d e r these circumstances it also remains uncertain whether Polybius, w h e n he

praises the position of C l e o m e n e s for being suited to the attack also, had in m i n d
only the possibility of an attack in the valley, or if he also considered this attack of
the phalanx out over its own destroyed fortifications. For o n e can hardly imagine
that Cleomenes had had that in mind from the very start. Nevertheless, since the
possibility did exist, we may also consider that Polybius included it in connection
with his statement. Finally, however, Polybius may also have t h o u g h t of an offensive
drive by the phalanx behind the fortification, after the e n e m y had overrun it and
was still in disorder. Here, too, we cannot go beyond suppositions and possibilities.
Both Polybius and Plutarch say that the Macedonian phalanx was victorious over
the courage of the Lacedaemonians because of its tactical uniqueness. Polybius, who
has reported previously that the depth of the phalanx was d o u b l e d because of the
narrowness of the terrain, speaks of the "weight" of the M a c e d o n i a n formation.
Plutarch speaks not only of the mass but also of the type of armament, "through the
use of their equipment and the weight of their phalanx of hoplites,"* which gave the
Macedonians the preponderance. T h i s observation would be very interesting if it
were not subject to suspicion resulting from questionable aspects of the sources. At
another place (Chapter 11; see also Chapter 23), that is, Plutarch has told us that
Cleomenes had armed and drilled the Spartan hoplites with the sarissa, thereby in-
troducing the Macedonian style of close combat. If they themselves had already ac-
cepted it, how could the Lacedaemonians succumb precisely to the uniqueness of the
Macedonian art of war? T h e sources make no mention of their not understanding it
sufficiently or of their not yet having trained sufficiently, but seek the reason for the
defeat in the differences of the o p p o s i n g formations.
T h e contribution of this battle to the history of the art of war is therefore but
little. Only in a very general way can we conclude from this how the art of leader-
ship, the combining of weapons, the exploitation of the terrain have been improved
and refined. On both sides the n u m b e r of light infantry, w h o adapt themselves
more readily to the terrain, is very great. A constant and continuing d e v e l o p m e n t in
this direction d o e s not, however, seem to be imminent. That will be seen in the later
collision of the Macedonians with the Romans.
BATTLE OF RAPHIA (217 B . C . )

At Raphia Ptolemy IV of Egypt and Antiochus of Syria fought against each other.
I n intantry P t o l e m y h a d a s m a l l s u p e r i o r i t y ( 7 0 , 0 0 0 a g a i n s t 6 2 , 0 0 0 ) , but
Antiochus had a greater one in cavalry (6,000 against 5,000) and elephants (102
against 73). Polybius' account (5. 86) is very simple, but still not quite irreproachable.
Antiochus was victorious at first on his right flank with his superiority in cavalry
and in elephants. Ptolemy's peltasts, w h o were next in the line, were also involved in
this defeat. As reason for the defeat of the Egyptian elephants, Polybius states that
the African race of these animals was not up to the quality of the Indian animals;
they were afraid of their size and strength and shied from their smell and their cry.
8
Modern naturalists reject this contrast; the African elephant is not only not smaller
but actually larger than the Indian, and the two species do not shy away at all from
each other but get along very well. T h e r e is, therefore, m u c h to be said for the sup-
position that it was not so m u c h the advantage of the race that led the Indian
9
elephants to victory h e r e , as the greater skill of the Indian mahouts, w h o had an
old tradition in this respect, whereas the Egyptians were only imitating them and
had no practice in training.
While Antiochus was winning in this m a n n e r on the flank that he himself com-
manded, on the opposite flank in a similar way the Egyptian cavalry was victorious,
in spite of the elephants, which here as on the other flank were assigned to the
cavalry wings.
Now Polybius reproaches Antiochus for having driven on in the pursuit following
his victory. Demetrius is supposed to have made the same mistake at Ipsus, and we
shall encounter this error again quite often, for e x a m p l e at Naraggara (Zama) in 202
B . C . and Mollwitz in 1741. We would not hesitate to attribute the final decision at
The Diadochi 247
Raphia to this point if we were told that the victorious Egyptian cavalry wing on the
other flank had attacked the e n e m y phalanx in the flank instead of falling into this
same error. But we hear n o t h i n g of the kind; rather, the two phalanxes are said to
have fought against e a c h o t h e r in quite isolated fashion, with the result that the
Egyptian phalanx defeated the Syrian.
T h e important point that we learn from this battle could be that the elephants
were, in general, f o r m e d up not in conjunction with the phalanx, but with the
cavalry, and that their effect, however, was still not the decisive one.
BATTLE OF MANTINEA (207 B.C.)

Kromayer's accurate topographic description of the battlefield has not c h a n g e d
anything in the historical account. His military history study, closely tied in with the
topography, was successful in two places, however, in clarifying points that I had
misunderstood in the first edition of this work. But at the same time he o n c e again
brought the whole matter into a false light, not simply because of e r r o n e o u s military
reasoning, but also because of repeated translation errors. T h i s has been pointed out
by Roloff with excellent clarity and accuracy in his Problems from Greek Military History
(Probleme aus der griechischen Kriegsgeschichte). Consequently I can forgo discussing the
controversies in detail here, and I simply repeat what I already said in the first edi-
tion, passing over or correcting. as appropriate, those points that have been taken
care of or corrected by the two authors n a m e d above
Once again we have Polybius' account which has not c o m e d o w n to us in its e n -
tirety, however, and also Plutarch, who drew on the other, lost, work of Polybius on
Philopoemen.
According to Polybius, P h i l o p o e m e n formed up the Achaeans behind a trench
with b o t h flanks r e s t i n g on hills. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the S p a r t a n s u n d e r the tyrant
Machanidas m o v e d in against them. A new instrument of war is said to have b e e n
e m p l o y e d here for the first time in a field battle: Machanidas had a n u m b e r of
catapults m o v e d up in front of his phalanx, in order to fire on the e n e m y phalanx.
To forestall this, P h i l o p o e m e n started the battle by having the light cavalry (Taren-
tines) w h o were stationed on his left flank and other lightly a r m e d mercenaries
move forward.
T h e logic of this combination is not entirely clear. P h i l o p o e m e n had taken up a
defensive position with an obstacle to his front and is n o w supposed to have had his
10
own flank m o v e forward over this o b s t a c l e . What was supposed to be gained by
this? If the Achaean light infantry was victorious, then the question was whether the
phalanx should follow or not. If it followed, then it would have to cross over the
frontal obstacle of its o w n choosing in the full view of the e n e m y ; if it did not fol-
low, the victory of the light infantry was useless, and they would have to withdraw
before the e n e m y phalanx. Furthermore, o n e d o e s not quite understand how the
battle of the light infantry on the o n e flank is supposed to have i m p e d e d the work
of the catapults in the center, least of all since in that fight the Spartan light infantry
was victorious and drove the Achaeans off across the trench in flight."
Now victory would have belonged to Machanidas if he had fallen on the Achaean
phalanx in the flank with his victorious right wing, while his own phalanx attacked it
simultaneously from the front. T h e trench would then have been as ineffective in
saving the Achaeans as was the Granicus or the Pinarus at Issus in saving the Per-
sians and t h e Greek hoplites. But Machanidas, instead of m a k i n g this o b v i o u s
m o v e m e n t , either did not have his men sufficiently u n d e r control or was, as Polybius
says, impassioned and childish e n o u g h to charge blindly after the fleeing e n e m y .
Philopoemen, on the other hand, assembled as many as possible of the defeated sol-
diers behind his phalanx and pushed a portion of the phalanx toward the left o n t o
the position that the fugitives had left o p e n , and as the Lacedaemonian phalanx,
confident of its victory, now charged forward against his phalanx, P h i l o p o e m e n led
his phalanx against them at the m o m e n t w h e n they were crossing the trench and
had fallen into disorder, and he defeated t h e m .
In opposition to this account there arises a whole series of questions and doubts.
From which place did P h i l o p o e m e n take the phalanx soldiers w h o l e n g t h e n e d the
f r o n t ? A c c o r d i n g t o the t e x t , i t was t h e c l o s e s t u n i t s o f the p h a l a n x that
P h i l o p o e m e n d e p l o y e d there, and with larger intervals than ordinarily. T h e r e was
consequently now a wide breach in the Achaeans' formation. With equal forces, that
would have to be counted as an outright error. Why P h i l o p o e m e n could risk such a
maneuver, Polybius d o e s not say; in fact, he gives no real reason at all for the entire
m a n e u v e r of the voluntary tearing apart of his o w n battle line. Furthermore, we
have no information about what P h i l o p o e m e n would have d o n e or planned to do if
the Lacedaemonian phalanx waited to attack until the m o m e n t w h e n Machanidas
came back from the pursuit and attacked him from b e h i n d .
T h e logical explanation would be that we picture the Achaeans as being consider-
ably stronger. Unfortunately, on this decisive point, too, Polybius leaves us in the
dark. But he states expressly that Machanidas was the stronger of the two on the
flank where he initially was victorious, not only in the quality of his troops, but also
in the numbers involved. N o w since these troops were for the m o m e n t at a distance
from the battlefield, we can i m a g i n e that P h i l o p o e m e n had a very considerable
superiority in this short period, which enabled him both to divide his phalanx in two
and to consider taking the offensive. T h i s now seems to be the proper maneuver for
him.
We would normally e x p e c t that P h i l o p o e m e n would now take up the offensive
w i t h his a d m i t t e d l y b r e a c h e d b u t e x t e n d e d b a t t l e l i n e a n d w o u l d s e i z e the
Lacadaemonians in their u n c o v e r e d flank with his superior wing. That appears all
the more necessary in that at any m o m e n t the return of the victorious Machanidas
could be expected. Only some 2 , 0 0 0 paces behind the battlefield lies the city of Man-
tinea, beyond which the pursuit could not be continued, and Machanidas might even
realize sooner that there was still something to do in the battle. T h e n he would have
attacked the phalanx in the rear: the assembled stragglers would hardly have held
him up very much.
According to Polybius' account, however, it was not P h i l o p o e m e n w h o m o v e d out
in the attack but the Lacedaemonians, and it was not the improvised lengthening of
the flank that gave the decision, but everything can be attributed exclusively to the
frontal obstacle, the trench.
O u r suspicions with respect to the unconditional reliability of Polybius' account
that we have at hand are now necessarily increased, however, w h e n we read the
completely different account in Plutarch's Philopoemen. T h a t is, we find here pre-
cisely what we missed in Polybius: that it was the Achaean phalanx that took up the
offensive and that it was this phalanx that fell on the flank of the e n e m y , w h o was
not expecting an attack:
"He straightway led in the Lacedaemonians when he saw that the phalanx had
been left e x p o s e d , and he c h a r g e d , passing over along the flanks, for they had lost
their leader and were u n p r e p a r e d to fight. For they reckoned that they could win
the battle and g e t the u p p e r h a n d o v e r the lot o f t h e m , w h e n they saw that
Machanidas was in pursuit."*
Efforts have been m a d e in various ways to reconstruct the battle. H. Droysen as-
s u m e s that Machanidas knew n o t h i n g of the existence of the trench and could not
see it during his approach march. That solves only a portion of o u r difficulties and
is only barely credible in view of the proximity of Mantinea and Lacedaemon. In the
opposite vein, C. Guischard (Military Memoirs [Mémoires militaires], 10: 159) conjec-
tures that Machanidas a s s u m e d from the start that the A c h a e a n s would deploy be-
hind the trench, and for that reason he had had his catapults brought up a n d put
into play. He further assumes that the report of Polybius has c o m e d o w n to us with
lacunae, a n d he fills these voids partly from his fantasy, partly from Plutarch—for
The Diadochi 249
example, the contradiction between the l e n g t h e n i n g of the Achaean flank for the
purpose of an e n v e l o p m e n t and the persistence in remaining on the defensive he
explains in this manner: P h i l o p o e m e n saw, at the m o m e n t w h e n he himself had
planned to go over to the attack, how the Lacedaemonians were already in motion,
and now, naturally, first became aware of the advantage of his defensive position
and (according to Plutarch) o r d e r e d his e x t e n d e d , superior left flank to swing in-
ward and cross over the trench at the m o m e n t w h e n the Spartans were seeking to
cross.
T h i s is probably correct as to the principal points, but it assumes, as we have said,
a considerable superiority on the part of the Achaeans, for without that the com-
mander could not have considered an attack in two separated masses, of which at
least o n e was charged with the difficult trench-crossing.
Polybius also fails to i n f o r m us sufficiently c o n c e r n i n g the o t h e r wing of the
Achaeans. On this flank was posted their o w n assembled cavalry—therefore heavy
cavalry. Are we to assume that this unit had no effect against the enemy phalanx; in
what way, then, was it hindered from d o i n g so? T h e failure to m e n t i o n this unit is
all the m o r e noticeable in that Polybius previously described in detail (10. 2 2 - 2 4 ) the
advantages that P h i l o p o e m e n had acquired precisely as a result of the reorganization
of the Achaean cavalry. H. Droysen (p. 182) has conjectured that the cavalry, which
could not be e m p l o y e d behind the trench, had probably been held aside for the pur-
suit. But on the o n e hand we hear that the trench could be crossed without serious
difficulty, and on the other it would have been after all m u c h too gross an error to
have the h o r s e m e n stationed here and stand fast, while on the other flank they
could possibly have prevented the defeat.
For our purpose we are c o n c e r n e d not so m u c h with eliminating the contradic-
tions and lacunae as with identifying them, in o r d e r to draw from them the conclu-
sion that o n e may probably not give m u c h credence to the account in a history of
the art of war.
Kromayer's account suffers from the following errors: He either did not recognize
or insufficiently filled in the lacunae in Polybius' account, such as we know it; he
overlooked the faultiness of concept in splitting a phalanx w h e n the o p p o s i n g forces
are equal; and finally he sought to correct Polybius at the wrong place in the latter's
text. We have seen that Polybius expressly points out Machanidas' right, victorious
wing as numerically superior. Kromayer sees in this an intentional untruth; accord-
ing to him, Polybius, in his o u t s p o k e n preference for the Achaeans, wanted to cover
12
up their not very creditable d e f e a t . N o t only is there no basis for such a suspicion
of Polybius, but also the false correction eliminates, as we have seen, the most logical
(though admittedly only hypothetical) explanation of the battle, for if in fact a con-
siderable n u m b e r of Achaeans were defeated here by a smaller unit, then there is all
the less c h a n c e that they still had the superiority for the decisive battle, without
which the m a n e u v e r of P h i l o p o e m e n is incomprehensible.
Let it not be said that I am being unduly cautious in declining to make use of this
kind of uncertain account of military events for the history of the art of war. For the
simple historical account, events that can be reconstructed with a certain d e g r e e of
probability may suffice, but a history of the art of war d e m a n d s a m o r e rigorous
basis consisting only of events that are completely verified by the sources. It is true
that we know m u c h less still about the battles of the Persian Wars than about Sellasia
and Mantinea and have nevertheless taken the Persian battles as a point of depar-
ture for the w h o l e series of d e v e l o p m e n t s . But it is only the principles that we have
taken from these battles and, in view of the simplicity of the structures of that
period, that is all we could extract from them; the positive, detailed points there we
have in many cases had to leave in doubt, and we have b e e n able to do so. In the
period of Polybius the events are so m u c h m o r e complicated that only very exact
reports can satisfy the d e m a n d s that we must make.
1. H. D r o y s e n Studies (Untersuchungen), p. 155. D r o y s e n incor-

rectly concludes, precisely from t h e fact of the e n e r g e t i c drilling,
t h a t t h e r e was a w o r s e n i n g of the soldier material. R a t h e r , o n e may
draw from the energy of the military training the opposite
conclusion—i.e., t h a t a s t r o n g military spirit existed. T h e conclusion
on p. 132, too, that with t h e increasing size of t h e a r m i e s t h e ma-
terial must have gotten continuously worse, is inadmissible. In the
h u g e a r e a of all t h e Diadochi e m p i r e s the militarily qualified mate-
rial was hardly e x h a u s t e d e v e n with a few h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d m e n ,
a n d "pirates" can b e c o m e very excellent soldiers.
2. A t h e n a e u s r e p o r t s (5. 3 5 . 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ) a b o u t a procession in Alex-
a n d r i a in a b o u t 275 or 274 B.C. in which 57,600 d i s m o u n t e d m e n
a n d 23,210 m o u n t e d m e n h a d f o r m e d the r e a r units.
A p p i a n r e p o r t s in Preface, C h a p t e r 10, t h a t Ptolemy II h a d pos-
s e s s e d , t o w a r d t h e e n d o f his r e i g n , a n a r m y o f 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 d i s -
m o u n t e d m e n , 40,000 cavalry, 300 e l e p h a n t s , 2,000 war chariots,
1,500 warships a n d 2,000 t r a n s p o r t ships.
Paul M. Meyer, in The Military System of the Ptolemies and the Ro-
mans in Egypt (Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Aegypten), p.
8, accepts these figures. Nevertheless, it is not h a r d to recognize
that they a r e greatly e x a g g e r a t e d . O n e n e e d only i m a g i n e what a
parade of 57,600 dismounted men and 23,210 m o u n t e d men
t h r o u g h t h e streets of a city m e a n s . Egypt m a y at t h a t time have
h a d 3 to 4 million i n h a b i t a n t s (Beloch, Population [Bevölkerung], p.
258); or 7 million, as it was r e p o r t e d a n d a p p a r e n t l y accepted by
Ulrich Wilcken, Greek Potsherds from Egypt and Nubia (Griechische Os-
traka aus Aegypten and Nubien), p. 4 9 0 . T h i s w o u l d h a v e m a d e a
s t a n d i n g a r m y of 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n a m o u n t to 3½ to 7 p e r c e n t of the
p o p u l a t i o n . A fifth of t h e r e p o r t e d figures w o u l d still be q u i t e a
large n u m b e r .
3. A c c o r d i n g to C h a p t e r 6 9 , D e m e t r i u s has 5,000 cavalry; if o n e
a d d s u p those individual t r o o p units that a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e battle
f o r m a t i o n , o n e f i n d s only 4,400.
4. In a r e v i e w of t h e R o l o f f b o o k in Berliner Philologische
Wochenschrift, 6 A u g u s t 1904, C o l u m n 9 9 2 , K r o m a y e r states t h a t
t h e differences b e t w e e n his position a n d that of Roloff are n o t very
i m p o r t a n t . T h a t is an illusion, as Roloff himself w r o t e in his reply
to t h e review in t h e same weekly.
5 . K r o m a y e r , p . 2 3 7 , n o t e 3 , states t h a t t h e fact t h a t Polybius
The Diadochi 251
never again m e n t i o n s the e n t r e n c h m e n t s on the r i d g e is very u n -
d e r s t a n d a b l e , since they a c c o m p l i s h e d n o g o o d . Q u i t e r i g h t — b u t
why did they accomplish n o t h i n g ? It is precisely this point t h a t we
would h a v e to know in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d t h e battle.
6. K r o m a y e r ' s s t a t e m e n t in the n o t e on p. 234, that t h e r e is no
basic difference b e t w e e n Polybius' a c c o u n t a n d Plutarch, is inaccu-
rate. A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, we m u s t a s s u m e that t h e Illyrians actu-
ally did e n v e l o p t h e Euas a n d climbed up t h e h e i g h t w h e r e the for-
tification n o l o n g e r e x t e n d e d . T h e m o d e r n r e a d e r , with his m a p
before him, can also r e a d that into Polybius' account, b u t in his text
itself o n e r e a d s only of a frontal attack. T h i s difference b e t w e e n
the two sources is very i m p o r t a n t a n d in no way simply t h e use of a
terminus technicus t h a t o n e could omit, if he wished, as K r o m a y e r
states.
7 . Since w e m u s t necessarily a s s u m e t h a t t h e valley, t o o , was
blocked by a fortification, t h e n t h e situation c a n n o t be conceived in
any o t h e r way t h a n it is p r e s e n t e d above. Polybius has the S p a r t a n
light infantry m o v e o u t to t h e flank attack against t h e attackers of
the Euas a n d t h e n m o v e back again w h e n t h e i r cavalry was attacked
b y t h e e n e m y h o r s e m e n . T h e h o r s e m e n , too, t h e r e f o r e m u s t have
moved out in front of t h e fortification ( p r e s u m a b l y t h e valley for-
tification h a d s o m e kind o f gate). H e r e K r o m a y e r t r a n s l a t e d er-
roneously in several respects, as Roloff proves on p p . 108 ff, a n d
t h e r e b y h e a r r i v e s a t t h e false j u d g m e n t , r e p e a t e d a b o v e , o f
P h i l o p o e m e n ' s d e e d a n d a t t h e u n w a r r a n t e d rejection o f Polybius.
8. B o l a u ( d i r e c t o r of t h e Zoological G a r d e n in H a m b u r g ) , The
Elephant in War and Peace (Der Elefant in Krieg und Frieden), 1887,
p p . 8 a n d 13.
9. Scharff, On the Nature and Utilization of African Elephants in
Antiquity (De natura et usu elephantorum Africanorum apud veteres),
W e i m a r , P r o g r a m of 1855.
10. K r o m a y e r believes t h a t t h e t r e n c h d i d n o t stretch across t h e
whole plain b u t c a m e to an e n d in front of t h e left flank of t h e
A c h a e a n s . T h e text of Polybius, however, as Roloff has s h o w n , con-
tradicts this concept. B u t o n e can imagine, for e x a m p l e , t h a t it was
easier to cross at t h e east e n d t h a n in t h e m i d d l e a n d at t h e west
e n d . By no m e a n s has a n y t h i n g c h a n g e d with respect to t h e objec-
tion I raised a b o v e ; even if the t r e n c h d i d not e x t e n d to a point in
front o f t h e left flank o f t h e A c h a e a n s , o n e c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d
what t h e partial offensive was s u p p o s e d to accomplish.
1 1 . F o u g e r e s , Bulletin de Correspondence hellenique 14: 82, seeks to
fill this lacuna by m e a n s of t h e forced correction that the catapults

h a d fired not on the p h a l a n x , as Polybius r e p o r t s , b u t on the left
flank of the A c h a e a n s .
1 2 . In his r e v i e w of R o l o f f ' s Problems (Probleme), Berliner
Philologische Wochenschrift, 6 A u g u s t 1 9 0 4 , S e c t i o n 9 9 5 , n o t e 4,
K r o m a y e r retracted this c h a r g e b u t did not d r a w t h e necessary log-
ical conclusions from the m a t t e r .
BOOK IV
Ancient Rome
Chapter I
Knights and Phalanx
If we wished to begin the history of t h e R o m a n military system

a n d e x p e r i e n c e o n t h e s a m e bases t h a t w e u s e d for t h a t o f t h e
Greeks, we w o u l d have to start with t h e Second Punic W a r . F o r it is
not until this p e r i o d that we have accounts that give us a truly reli-
able a n d clear p i c t u r e of t h e c o u r s e of a battle a n d t h e special
character of t h e R o m a n m e t h o d s of c o m b a t . B u t as in t h e case of
R o m a n history, R o m a n h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , too, is of a completely dif-
ferent type from that of the G r e e k s ; we can trace with reliability
the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e R o m a n political system m u c h f a r t h e r back
t h a n t h a t o f t h e G r e e k s , a n d from that t h e r e results a n o t h e r p r o c e -
d u r e for o u r p u r p o s e . T h e G r e e k city-states e i t h e r h a d i n t h e i r
constitutions s o m e t h i n g conducive to stagnation, as in S p a r t a , which
is m o r e o v e r only vaguely k n o w n to us, or they p l u n g e d from o n e
radical c h a n g e to a n o t h e r , so that Aristotle was able to c o u n t eleven
different constitutions for A t h e n s , each of which replaced its p r e d -
e c e s s o r . I n all t h e c o n v u l s i o n s t h a t R o m e e x p e r i e n c e d , i t still
1
m a i n t a i n e d a continuity of d e v e l o p m e n t . Even t h e transition f r o m
k i n g d o m to republic, t h o u g h no d o u b t a revolution, nevertheless
carried on t h e old political system in its i m p o r t a n t basic concepts.
A n d so, too, t h e institutions, even in a m u c h later p e r i o d , allow in
their f o r m s t h e earlier stages of the d e v e l o p m e n t to be recognized
a n d lead us far back into p e r i o d s for which we no l o n g e r possess a
direct line of historical source accounts. T h e voting a r r a n g e m e n t s
of later p e r i o d s r e t a i n e d s o m e e l e m e n t s of the a r m y organization of
primeval times. T h e real a c c o u n t o f t h e m o r e ancient R o m a n his-
tory is completely l e g e n d a r y ; almost n o t h i n g b u t t h e purely obvious
dates o f wars a n d battles o r t h e n a m e s o f c o m m a n d e r s has b e e n
passed d o w n with i n d e p e n d e n t certainty. B u t with the R o m a n his-
torians of t h e ancient p e r i o d t h e r e lived a tradition c o n c e r n i n g the
d e v e l o p m e n t of R o m a n political law a n d of the military constitu-
255
tion, which was constantly verified in t h e p r e s e n t a n d t h e r e f o r e

n e v e r got completely lost in fantasy a n d which also "disciplined"
t h e l e g e n d from a historical point of view, so to speak.
Historical r e s e a r c h would have arrived m o r e easily at verified re-
sults if this p e c u l i a r legal-political t r a d i t i o n h a d n o t b e e n very
strongly glossed over with political bias a n d in i m p o r t a n t places ab-
solutely falsified. But with t h e passage of time t h e historical m e t h o d
has f o u n d ways a n d m e a n s of recognizing these falsifications and
e x p u n g i n g t h e m . W h e r e a s e a r l i e r e v e n critical h i s t o r i a n s naively
r e p e a t e d that t h e census t h a t King Servius Tullius h a d c a r r i e d out
resulted in a total of 8 0 , 0 0 0 citizens, today we know t h a t we can
check on such figures t h r o u g h t h e size of t h e national a r e a a n d the
city itself, a n d we eliminate t h e m , with all t h e results that follow for
t h e history of t h e constitution.
With these a n d similar reservations, we can place a certain trust
in t h e r e p o r t s t h a t h a v e c o m e d o w n to us. O u r tools s e p a r a t i n g the
t r u t h from t h e l e g e n d a r y , t h e false, t h e m i s u n d e r s t o o d , a n d what-
ever else has naturally slipped in, a r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h a t p e r i o d
t h a t we can recognize in t h e clear light of history, plainly a n d with
certainty. T h o s e bits of i n f o r m a t i o n that, as p r e l u d e s to t h e histori-
cally clear p e r i o d , a r r a n g e t h e m s e l v e s i n s e q u e n c e w i t h o u t con-
tradiction m u s t be t h e r i g h t o n e s : those t h a t can be u n d e r s t o o d in
no way, n o t even as exceptions, speculations, transitory a b e r r a t i o n s
or t h e like, a r e to be rejected.
Many indications point to the fact t h a t in Italy m o u n t e d combat
in the ancient times h a d a g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e t h a n in G r e e c e . In
t h e first edition of this w o r k I c o n t e n t e d myself at this point with
this s t a t e m e n t a n d r e f e r r e d to the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
w h e r e I would o n c e again c o m e back to this point. In o r d e r to be
able to illuminate a n d m a k e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h e social significance
o f t h e cavalry a r m a m o n g t h e e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e Latin
r a c e , I first n e e d e d t o p r e s e n t t o t h e r e a d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f
medieval k n i g h t h o o d in its e n t i r e b r e a d t h a n d to d e v e l o p it geneti-
cally. A t r u e insight into t h e values of t h e s e military-social f o r m s is
n o t to be achieved with a few abstract sentences. Since t h e t h i r d
v o l u m e of this work is now available, I may be allowed to refer to it
a n d t o apply t o t h e R o m a n prehistorical p e r i o d t h e conclusions that
2
t h e medieval forms allow us to d r a w . It is a m a t t e r of t a k i n g into
consideration t h e highly d e v e l o p e d m o u n t e d c o m b a t in Italy as a
factor c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e b i r t h of t h e patrician class in R o m e .
T h e fact t h a t in the level m i d d l e p a r t of Italy cavalry c o m b a t was
actually m u c h m o r e highly d e v e l o p e d in ancient times t h a n in cen-
Knights and Phalanx 257
tral Greece a n d in t h e P e l o p o n n e s u s is i n h e r e n t in the n a t u r e of

things a n d is c o n t a i n e d in the historical accounts. It is t r u e t h a t all
the individual c o m b a t s a n d fights in t h e first books of Livy a r e to
be r e g a r d e d as absolutely mythical, b u t the g e n e r a l p r e p o n d e r a n c e
of cavalry c o m b a t stands o u t so strongly t h a t o n e can spot in this
fact a reflection of reality. If o n e is not willing to give c r e d e n c e to
that a n d sees in these accounts n o t h i n g b u t fiction c o m p o s e d for
the foremost houses in R o m e , we nevertheless still have testimony
for t h e h i s t o r y o f C a p u a , w h i c h , t h o u g h i n d i r e c t , i s still very
weighty. Of this city which, n e x t to R o m e , was the most i m p o r t a n t
one of this whole a r e a , Livy informs us at t h e very b e g i n n i n g of t h e
Second Punic W a r that t h e infantry was lacking in fighting spirit,
3
whereas t h e cavalry was very c o m p e t e n t . H e describes a n i n d i -
vidual combat b e t w e e n two h o r s e m e n with t h e lance, q u i t e like t h e
ones w e r e a d a b o u t medieval k n i g h t s . T h e difference i n t h e d e -
velopment of t h e two cities probably consisted of this: C a p u a r e -
mained at this stage of possessing a skilled m o u n t e d a r m b u t a use-
less infantry, w h e r e a s R o m e , t h r o u g h o r g a n i z a t i o n , strict military
training, a n d discipline, also d e v e l o p e d t h e mass of h e r citizens into
useful a n d skilled soldiers. T h e p r e p o n d e r a n t a n d almost exclusive
effectiveness of t h e cavalry h a d lasted long e n o u g h , however, to es-
tablish a s h a r p distinction between t h e status of those w h o b o r e a n d
used their w e a p o n s in this m a n n e r a n d t h e mass of c o m m o n citi-
zens a n d f a r m e r s . T h e idea t h a t t h e p a t r i c i a n s h a d f o r m e d t h e
original citizenry a n d t h e plebeians w e r e t h e i m m i g r a n t s — t h a t t h e
d i f f e r e n c e o f classes lay, t h e r e f o r e , i n t h e i r p l a c e o f o r i g i n — i s
a d o p t e d , it is t r u e , by no less a p e r s o n t h a n T h e o d o r M o m m s e n ,
but it completely contradicts t h e sources, as he himself admits, a n d
was p r o b a b l y o n l y a n e x p e d i e n t , b e c a u s e n o o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n
could be f o u n d . T h e key to the c o r r e c t solution of this p r o b l e m is
given to us by t h e fact, which we can now take from the history of
the M i d d l e Ages, o f t h e u n c o m m o n superiority o f t h e knights over
bourgeois a n d p e a s a n t infantry before the latter a r e t r a i n e d a n d ac-
customed to b e i n g g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r in tactical units. T h e r e was a
time in R o m e w h e n t h e p h a l a n x of legionaries did not yet exist.
T h e idea that R o m u l u s h a d a legion can be eliminated as a fable
without any valid source. At that t i m e t h e decisive p o w e r was t h e
R o m a n k n i g h t . We shall have to r e g a r d as t h e nucleus of this g r o u p
the old families of clan chieftains, all or most of which gradually
had m o v e d their residence to the city, possibly because of a kind of
"living t o g e t h e r , " * as it is r e p o r t e d in G r e e c e . F r o m the city these
families, b o t h rich a n d warlike, also d o m i n a t e d t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . In
t h e city, which was a c e n t e r of t r a d e , the transition point for sea

traffic a n d t h e great river region of the T i b e r , t h e e c o n o m i c posi-
tion of these families d e v e l o p e d greatly. T h e y d o m i n a t e d the whole
c a n t o n , the small p e a s a n t residents of the flat land, b o t h t h r o u g h
their military skill a n d their loans. T h e oldest R o m a n history is full
of the usury practices by which the patricians o p p r e s s e d the
plebeians.
R e g a r d l e s s o f how s h a r p a n d impassable t h e division b e t w e e n
patricians a n d plebeians was later on in R o m e , t h e historical ac-
c o u n t s nevertheless lead us to believe that, at its origin, the patri-
cian status was not quite u n i f o r m . T h e r e was a difference between
o l d e r a n d y o u n g e r families. Successful m e r c h a n t s who w e r e also
capable of p e r f o r m i n g military d u t y a n d accepted such d u t y were
probably a b s o r b e d into the class of the o l d e r families, j u s t as we see
in t h e medieval cities t h e original knightly families b e i n g blended
into a single class with rising m e r c h a n t s . But in R o m e it a p p e a r s
that the e l e m e n t of the old warrior chieftain families was s t r o n g e r
a n d the commercial e l e m e n t weaker t h a n in t h e cities of the Middle
Ages, a n d in any case t h e w a r r i o r e l e m e n t was indispensable in the
formation of the patriciate. It was evidently n o t a purely economic
d e v e l o p m e n t ; a r u l i n g class based on a purely e c o n o m i c s t a n d a r d
a n d c o m p o s e d of a few families favored by f o r t u n e would not have
4
m e t with t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e mass of the Latin p e o p l e . But in the
j o i n i n g o f w a r r i o r s u p e r i o r i t y a n d ruthlessly e x p l o i t e d financial
p o w e r t h e r e d e v e l o p e d a new aristocratic class s t e m m i n g from t h e
original g r o u p , a class that eventually also d i s d a i n e d m a r r i a g e with
t h e i r fellow citizens, t h e plebeians, a n d , as a fraternity particularly
favored by the gods, d e m a n d e d a n d held the d o m i n a n t position.
T h e n u m b e r o f military-economic-based aristocratic families that
f o r m e d the patriciate in t h e most ancient p e r i o d of R o m e we must
r e g a r d as very small. E x t e r n a l military p o w e r was t h e r e f o r e very
small, as in t h e case of t h e medieval cities. A n d so it h a p p e n e d , ac-
c o r d i n g to o n e of o u r sources t h a t we may trust, that R o m e came
u n d e r t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f n e i g h b o r i n g E t r u s c a n princes.
T h e Latin city freed itself again from this foreign d o m i n a t i o n
a n d it is entirely possible that this struggle, as it p r o g r e s s e d , p r o -
v i d e d t h e occasion for t h e e x t e n s i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
p r e v i o u s military o r g a n i z a t i o n , b a s e d p u r e l y o n t h e k n i g h t h o o d .
J o i n i n g now with the knightly o r g a n i z a t i o n c a m e t h e levy of t h e en-
tire citizenry a n d peasant g r o u p in a c o m p a c t mass, in the p h a l a n x .
T h i s organization was c a r r i e d o u t by a king w h o was p r o v i d e d with
absolute power. T h e s e R o m a n kings w e r e not a h e r e d i t a r y dynasty,
nor w e r e they tyrants in t h e G r e e k sense, b u t they w e r e the highest

official, invested for their lifetime. F r o m t h e G r e e k point of view
they would most a p p r o p r i a t e l y be called a r c h o n s ; the clearest u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g would be given us by the title " d o g e . " As with t h e most
ancient V e n e t i a n doges, the R o m a n kings, too, h a d at h a n d a c o u n -
cil, t h e Senate, b u t it hardly limited t h e m , a n d t h e desire to m a k e
the royal position h e r e d i t a r y may also have c r e a t e d in this p e r i o d
of R o m a n history i n n e r conflicts as in ancient Venice. T h e princi-
ple of t h e office, however, was m a i n t a i n e d a n d was d e v e l o p e d into
the highest p o w e r a n d sternness, since t h e patriarchal mildness that
often a c c o m p a n i e s h e r e d i t a r y royalty was missing, a n d t h e precari-
ous situation of the nation allowed only t h e strongest personalities
to be e n t r u s t e d with this office. It was such a r u l e r w h o o r g a n i z e d
the a r m e d levy of the people, the p h a l a n x of infantry.
He divided t h e R o m a n c a n t o n into 20 tribes, 4 of which w e r e in
the city a n d 16 in t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . Each tribe was f u r t h e r divided
into 4 centuries, 3 of which w e r e c h a r g e d with a p p e a r i n g with p r o -
tective a r m o r , by which, of c o u r s e , we can hardly assume in this
older p e r i o d full h o p l i t e e q u i p m e n t , b u t for most m e n only t h e
most necessary items in the way of shield a n d h e a d protection. T h e
fourth c e n t u r y was c o m p o s e d of t h e light infantry, t h e G r e e k psiloi,
who simultaneously w e r e used as o r d e r l i e s , w a g o n e r s , a n d for sec-
o n d a r y military tasks. Since the soldiers p r o v i d e d themselves with
weapons, a certain financial position was involved in b e c o m i n g a
hoplite. If p r o l e t a r i a n s were assigned with t h e m , t h e state h a d to
5
give t h e m their w e a p o n s .
W h e r e a s in A t h e n s e a c h h o p l i t e was a s s i g n e d a lightly a r m e d
m a n , in R o m e service was so m u c h m o r e a u s t e r e that t h r e e hoplites
had to be c o n t e n t with t h e services of a single lightly a r m e d m a n ,
a n d while this o r d e r l y in A t h e n s was often surely a m e r e slave, in
R o m e he was also a citizen w h o could be assigned c o m b a t duties.
By the time of the b a n n i n g of the kings, the area h a d been
b r o a d e n e d s o m e w h a t a n d a new tribe, t h e 21st, t h e C l u s t u m i n i a n ,
was o r g a n i z e d , all 4 of whose centuries, however, w e r e set up only
for light service, so that now t h e r e w e r e 2 lightly a r m e d m e n for
every 5 hoplites, a n d R o m e now h a d a l t o g e t h e r 84 centuries of in-
fantry. In a d d i t i o n to these, t h e r e w e r e also, aside from 6 centuries
of cavalry, 2 c e n t u r i e s of smiths a n d c a r p e n t e r s , 2 of t r u m p e t e r s
a n d buglers, a n d 1 of q u a r t e r m a s t e r officials a n d scribes (accensi).
T h e R o m a n national a r e a a t t h e time o f t h e elimination o f t h e
kings e m b r a c e d no m o r e t h a n a scant 370 s q u a r e miles (983 s q u a r e
kilometers), m u c h less t h a n half of Attica. W h e n the p h a l a n x was
i n t r o d u c e d , it was still s o m e w h a t smaller. At a t i m e w h e n t h e area

was still so small, t h e city, too, c a n n o t yet have b e e n large; other-
wise it would have o v e r p o w e r e d t h e s u r r o u n d i n g small towns ear-
lier a n d faster. T h e c o u n t r y town of Veii, which was situated at
only 9 miles from t h e gates of R o m e , was n o t subjected a n d d r a w n
into t h e R o m a n s p h e r e until m o r e t h a n 100 years later. T h e area
a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n of a city always have a certain relationship to
each o t h e r . T h e m a x i m u m that o n e may a s s u m e for the R o m a n na-
tion of t h a t p e r i o d is p r o b a b l y s o m e t h i n g o v e r 150 souls to t h e
s q u a r e mile, a n d t h e r e f o r e altogether s o m e 6 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants, a
6
few t h o u s a n d s of w h o m m u s t be subtracted as slaves.
W i t h a p o p u l a t i o n n o t as h i g h as 6 0 , 0 0 0 free i n h a b i t a n t s , the
n u m b e r of service-qualified m e n b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n a n d forty-six
can be estimated at 9,000 to 10,000, the n u m b e r of older m e n a n d
physically unfit at s o m e 5,000 to 6,000, a n d t h e total of a d u l t male
citizens at 16,000.
F r o m these n u m b e r s it is evident that t h e tribes a n d centuries
w e r e n o t r e c r u i t i n g a r e a s b u t w e r e each a division of t h e general
levy; they i n c l u d e d all t h e service-qualified m e n a n d c o r r e s p o n d e d
to the n a m e " h u n d r e d u n i t " only if all t h e m e n w e r e actually as-
sembled t o g e t h e r . For t h e 9,000 to 10,000 m e n qualified for field
service w e r e divided, as we have seen, a m o n g 95 c e n t u r i e s (84 cen-
turies of infantry, 5 auxiliary centuries, 6 c e n t u r i e s of cavalry).
W h e n t h e last king, w h o m t h e historical r e c o r d calls T a r q u i n i u s
S u p e r b u s , was d e p o s e d a n d banished, t h e constitution was c h a n g e d
in such a way that, in t h e place of o n e s u p e r i o r official with lifetime
t e n u r e , t h e r e w e r e to be two officials chosen each year, initially call-
e d p r a e t o r s , later c o n s u l s . T h i s election was c a r r i e d o u t b y t h e
p e o p l e t h r o u g h t h e i r a r m y organization, t h e centuries. F r o m this
point on, t h e r e f o r e , t h e centuries were no l o n g e r simply levy or-
g a n i z a t i o n s b u t political v o t i n g b o d i e s . T h e y r e m a i n e d a s s u c h
t h r o u g h all t h e c h a n g e s of the R o m a n constitution, a n d it is be-
cause of this that t h e original military o r g a n i z a t i o n of the R o m a n
p e o p l e is k n o w n to us.
In o r d e r to use t h e levy organization for this political p u r p o s e ,
t h e election of t h e consuls (praetors), t h e old m e n , too, w h o w e r e
n o l o n g e r service-qualified, h a d t o b e o r g a n i z e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
parallel to t h e 84 c e n t u r i e s of t h e juniores t h e r e w e r e c r e a t e d 84
c e n t u r i e s of seniores, a n d this resulted, either intentionally or by the
f o r t u i t o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , in giving t h e o l d e r
citizens a considerably g r e a t e r voice t h a n the y o u n g e r o n e s . T h e
cavalry a n d t h e auxiliary c e n t u r i e s w e r e n o t divided into seniores
and juniores, from which we may c o n c l u d e t h a t by their n a t u r e they
were s o m e w h a t different from t h e i n f a n t r y c e n t u r i e s . T h e latter
were n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e levy organization, a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e
old m e n , as long as the military levy was t h e only p u r p o s e , h a d not
belonged. On the o t h e r h a n d , the cavalry centuries should be
looked on as m o u n t e d societies, to which t h e old m e n also h a d al-
ways b e l o n g e d , who, in k e e p i n g with the knightly character, also
continued to r i d e a l o n g into battle. In like m a n n e r t h e smiths, car-
penters, musicians, a n d scribes w e r e professional fraternities, guilds
if o n e will, which by their n a t u r e also i n c l u d e d o l d e r m e n .
T h i s insight into the relationship of t h e later R o m a n voting a n d
election p r o c e d u r e with t h e original military organization has b e e n
available for a long time a n d is not only c o n f i r m e d for us t h r o u g h
the so obviously military allocation principle, b u t it is also particu-
larly clarified by t h e reconciliation of t h e n u m b e r s involved. In t h e
first p e r i o d of t h e R o m a n Republic t h e state was divided into 21
tribes, b u t the n o r m a l s t r e n g t h of t h e legion—that is, t h e half of
the total levy c o m m a n d e d by each consul—was, as late as t h e sec-
o n d c e n t u r y B . C . , 4,200 m e n on foot. T h e s e two figures have b e e n
passed d o w n with consistent certainty a n d c a n n o t possibly a g r e e
with each o t h e r by p u r e coincidence. T h e y can be e x p l a i n e d r a t h e r
in this way: at t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e Republic o n e half of t h e infan-
try levy was actually 4,200 m e n , c o m p a r e d with 300 h o r s e m e n , a n d
this n u m b e r , in itself p u r e l y circumstantial, was t h e n r e t a i n e d con-
tinuously a s t h e n o r m a l s t r e n g t h . T h e t h i r d figure c o n t a i n e d i n the
a c c o u n t s d o e s n o t a g r e e e x a c t l y w i t h t h e o t h e r s — t h a t is, t h e
n u m b e r of c e n t u r i e s of juniores a m o u n t e d to 8 5 , instead of 84, as
we would expect. A very simple e x p l a n a t i o n has b e e n f o u n d for
this small deviation, h o w e v e r (see below, c o m m e n t 1), so that even
this figure, d e s p i t e the e r r o r in it, can be r e g a r d e d as a confirma-
tion of those two o t h e r s , a n d consequently of t h e e n t i r e system.
T h a t t h e seniores centuries w e r e not a d d e d until later, w h e n t h e
a r m y u n i t s w e r e s e r v i n g a s v o t i n g b o d i e s , c a n n o t b e subject t o
d o u b t . An actual levy of the m e n over forty-six years of age was
such a r a r e event that t h e r e certainly did n o t exist for this p u r p o s e
a c o n t i n u i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h its b u r d e n s o m e r e g i s t r a t i o n
7
p r o c e d u r e s . T h e accounts with which a u t h o r s w h o lived 2 0 0 t o
300 years later r e c o r d e d the wars of Camillus a n d spoke of t h e levy
of the seniores have absolutely no source validity for us.
As t h e basic principle of the R o m a n military constitution, as it
was already c r e a t e d u n d e r t h e kings a n d c o n t i n u e d in the Republic,
we have recognized universal military service, universal service in
t h e sternest imaginable effort a n d extent.
T h e R o m a n military constitution h a d a m u c h stricter application
t h a n t h e A t h e n i a n , e v e n if we take into account t h e latter's effort at
sea, which did n o t exist for t h e R o m a n s . For this effort in A t h e n s
was, after all, e x c e p t for individual short p e r i o d s , mostly accom-
plished by m e r c e n a r i e s or even slaves.
T h e R o m a n military constitution also went d e e p e r t h a n the Spar-
tan. F o r in S p a r t a t h e g r e a t mass of the p e a s a n t s w e r e n o t free a n d
w e r e n e i t h e r qualified n o r r e q u i r e d to do military service until the
necessities of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r b r o k e d o w n this principle.
T h e military effort of R o m e is all the g r e a t e r in that t h e pay that
was g i v e n — a n d h a d to be given—to t h e soldier serving in the field
was n o t o b t a i n e d from t h e tribute of some subject p e o p l e or o t h e r ,
as in A t h e n s , b u t h a d to be raised t h r o u g h taxes. T h e historical ac-
counts c o n n e c t t h e b e g i n n i n g of military pay with t h e siege of Veii;
M o m m s e n believes, probably correctly, that it m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d
as e x t e n d i n g f a r t h e r back. Even in the p e r i o d w h e n R o m e already
r u l e d all of Italy, t h e l e a d i n g families p r i d e d themselves on the
traditional simplicity of t h e i r style of life. In this ancient e m p o r i u m
on t h e T i b e r River in t h e m i d d l e of a fertile c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e r e
m u s t always have b e e n m e a n s of attaining p r o s p e r i t y ; b u t this gain
served, n o t for an easy life, b u t for t h e p u r p o s e s of the state, a n d
this a t t i t u d e r e m a i n e d alive in t h e R o m a n citizenry for a long time
after t h e living conditions h a d b e c o m e q u i t e different. T h e histori-
cal l e g e n d of t h e G r e e k s , too, told of t h e a n t i l u x u r y legislation of
L y c u r g u s in S p a r t a a n d of t h e p o o r b u t i n c o r r u p t i b l e Aristides in
A t h e n s , b u t these figures show, after all, only episodes of t h e Hel-
lenic e x p e r i e n c e . C i n c i n n a t u s , C u r i u s D e n t a t u s , Fabricius a r e still
m o r e characteristic of t h e national type of ancient R o m e .
T h e two p u r p o s e s t h a t w e r e c o m b i n e d i n t h e c e n t u r y organiza-
tion after t h e y e a r 510 B . C . , a r m y levy a n d v o t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
naturally drifted a p a r t with time. T h e r e w e r e s o m e wars in which
t h e e n t i r e m a n p o w e r was n o t c a l l e d t o t h e c o l o r s , b u t o n l y a
selected g r o u p , a n d t h e l a r g e r t h e state b e c a m e , t h e f a r t h e r t h e
m a r c h e s , t h e l o n g e r t h e c a m p a i g n s , the less was it possible to take
all t h e m e n away f r o m h o m e . I n t h e place o f t h e g e n e r a l levy,
t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e arose t h e practice o f r e c r u i t i n g , a n d t h e districts
for r e c r u i t i n g w e r e naturally n o t t h e small units of t h e centuries
b u t t h e r e g i o n a l districts, t h e t r i b e s . T h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d
" c e n t u r y " t h e r e u p o n split into two concepts, n e i t h e r o n e of which
any l o n g e r h a d any relationship with the o t h e r or with t h e original
m e a n i n g of " g r o u p of a h u n d r e d . " On t h e o n e side they w e r e t h e
political voting bodies, on the o t h e r the s u b o r d i n a t e units of t h e
legion. As t h e R o m a n national a r e a s p r e a d , new tribes were
f o r m e d — u p to 3 5 — a n d with t h e m also new centuries as election
bodies. T h e 6 original cavalry c e n t u r i e s w e r e at s o m e u n k n o w n
time ( p e r h a p s in the year 304 B.C.) increased to 18.
T h e c o m b a t f o r m a t i o n of the a n c i e n t R o m a n a r m y levy we can
picture as exactly the same as that of the old Greek hoplite
phalanx. We may t h e r e f o r e carry this G r e e k n a m e , too, over to the
R o m a n s . It is t r u e that we do not have any positive historical ac-
count of this point; b u t since b o t h internal reasons a n d t h e follow-
ing d e v e l o p m e n t m a k e it impossible for t h e R o m a n s in t h e most
ancient times to have h a d c o m b a t units a r m e d only with the sword,
then the linear formation, or p h a l a n x , fighting with t h e s p e a r a n d
in heavy protective e q u i p m e n t , a p p e a r s as t h e only possible o n e .
T h e legion was a military-administrative o r g a n i z a t i o n , not a tacti-
cal unit. It owed its existence to t h e c h a n c e fact that, at t h e time of
the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e two c o n s u l s , e a c h o f
w h o m was to c o m m a n d half of t h e levy, this half a m o u n t e d p r e -
8
cisely to 4 , 2 0 0 m e n on foot a n d 300 cavalry. T h a t was also r e -
tained as the r e g u l a r s t r e n g t h later, w h e n t h e basic factors of mass
a n d t y p e h a d completely c h a n g e d . T h e y d i d not a d h e r e blindly t o
the n o r m a l figures; often t h e s t r e n g t h of the unit fell far below,
a n d s o m e t i m e s t h e i n f a n t r y went u p t o 5,000, f i n a l l y t o b e in-
creased, probably by Marius, to 6,000 m e n , but t h e basic principle
r e m a i n e d , so that with large a r m i e s t h e legions themselves w e r e not
indefinitely e n l a r g e d , b u t the n u m b e r of legions was increased.
T h e s u b o r d i n a t e units o f the legion o f t h e o l d e r p e r i o d , t h e cen-
turies, like t h e legion, also h a d in no way a tactical significance b u t
only an administrative o n e .
W h e n R o m e b e c a m e the capital a n d leading city of a g r e a t al-
liance a n d obliged h e r allies to p r o v i d e c o n t i n g e n t s , t h e s e u n i t s
were n o t f o r m e d into legions; t h a t would have served no p u r p o s e ,
since t h e legions, after all, w e r e only administrative bodies a n d each
allied c o n t i n g e n t h a d to retain a certain administrative organization
of its own. T h e principle was t h a t half of an a r m y always h a d to
consist of R o m a n t r o o p s , half of allies. In g e n e r a l , t h e n , o n e may
d o u b l e t h e n u m b e r of legions in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e the s t r e n g t h of
a R o m a n a r m y , a l t h o u g h of c o u r s e in actual practice t h e r e w e r e
9
often very s t r o n g deviations from t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e .
In cavalry t h e allies w e r e called on to p r o v i d e d o u b l e the n u m b e r
that the R o m a n s themselves furnished.
T h e very g e n e r o u s b e s t o w i n g o f R o m a n c i t i z e n s h i p o n e n t i r e
c o m m u n i t i e s m a d e possible the c o n t i n u a t i o n of this relationship,

but this is already taking us into m u c h later p e r i o d s t h a n we are
now studying.
EXCURSUS
1. T h e identification of the ancient Roman military organization led to the upset-

ting and reconstruction of the concepts concerning the constitution of ancient Rome
in their entirety. Formerly the Servian class division was regarded as fundamental to
this constitution. Already in the first edition of this work the class principle was
emptied of its real content, since it was apparent from the population estimate that
the centuries of the various classes could not possibly have been very different in
strength, and that consequently the idea that there had existed in R o m e not a strict
general military obligation, but only a graduated, limited obligation and in keeping
with it a graduated voting privilege according to one's property—this concept had to
be reversed. Why then the classes at all? "The only interpretation that remains," I
wrote at that time, "for the explanation of the class principle in the framework of
the universal equal voting privilege, is the stiff R o m a n class consciousness." O n e has
the feeling that this interpretation was basically only a last, desperate means to avoid
having to give up fully the concept passed d o w n to us. O n e of my students has
finished this off since then; the entire Servian class organization must be eliminated
from ancient R o m a n history. Francis Smith in the book The Roman Timocracy (Die
römische Timokratie),'" has convincingly proved that the so-called Servian constitution
stems not from the sixth, but from the second century. It represents the unsuccess-
ful attempt of a constitutional reform in the sense of Cato's middle-class policy, in
order to save the state from the growing d a n g e r of ochlocracy in the service of aris-
tocratic corruption. Every probability indicates that this attempt was made in the
year 179 B . C . by the Censors Marcus Aemilius Lepidus and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior.
(Mutarunt suffragia, r e g i o n a t i m q u e g e n e r i b u s h o m i n u m causisque et quaestibus
tribus descripserunt. "They c h a n g e d the m e t h o d of voting and constituted the tribes
on a regional basis and according to the clans and situations and occupations of the
men." Livy 4 1 . 51.) It is probable also that at that time the tribes were divided into
10 centuries each, instead of into 8 each, as formerly. T h a t it must have been 8 orig-
inally is to be seen from the concordance of the figures: 21 tribes at 4 centuries of
juniores each equals 8,400 m e n or 2 legions of infantry.
In order to make the division according to the new principles acceptable to the
people in the year 179 B . C . , it was presented as the inherited, truly ancient R o m a n
law, and, like the writings of King N u m a Pompilius, so were now also the c o m m e n -
taries of King Servius Tullius s u p p o s e d to have been f o u n d . From Servius Tullius'
somewhat disconnected notes the R o m a n historians then constructed the sections of
the Servian constitution (which are so contradictory of each other). T h i s procedure
has its parallel in D e u t e r o n o m y , in the Priest's C o d e x , in the Draconian and the
Lycurgian constitutions. T h e falsifiers still knew that R o m e had 21 tribes at the time
of the banning of the kings, and correspondingly 168 centuries of infantry. In con-
junction with their division into classes, they r o u n d e d off the total (at least, we may
assume so) to 170 (80; 2 0 ; 2 0 ; 2 0 ; 30) and thereby introduced the error that has cost
m o d e r n scholars so very many headaches, that the army of 8 , 4 0 0 men (2 legions)
was now s u p p o s e d to have had 85 centuries, consequently o n e too many.
In the matter of the other irregularity—that with 21 tribes in each of which there
were 3 centuries of hoplites and 1 century of lightly a r m e d m e n the legion must
have n u m b e r e d not 3 , 0 0 0 hoplites and 1,200 lightly a r m e d m e n , but 3,150 hoplites
and 1,050 lightly a r m e d m e n — t h e historians are obviously innocent. H e r e there
must be an irregularity in the historical d e v e l o p m e n t , and o n e can point it out with
a relative d e g r e e of probability. It may be a s s u m e d as certain that Rome originally

counted only 20 tribes; the irregularity must therefore have originated t h r o u g h the
addition of the 21st tribe, the Clustuminians. T h e new tribe m e m b e r s were probably
not regarded at the start as completely equal to the others, and since at any rate the
ratio of 3 hoplites to 1 lightly armed man was very tight, the Clustuminians were all
designated for the auxiliary service, a relationship that in time, as the character of
the levy completely c h a n g e d , disappeared automatically. All of this is, of course, not
directly capable of proof, but it may nevertheless be accepted as plausible. As an
adjunct to the book by Smith I have d e v e l o p e d this w h o l e concept thoroughly in an
essay in the Preussische Jahrbücher 131 (1908): 87, to which I refer the reader for the
details. A series of sections of the first edition have b e e n superseded by this. Let me
repeat here only the following.
2. T h e ancient R o m a n phalanx is s u p p o s e d to have had the peculiarity of not
having all the ranks identically a r m e d ; only the leading ranks wore the full hoplite
equipment, then c a m e a rank without body armor, t h e n o n e that also was without
greaves, and the last o n e s had only spears and finally simply sling stones. Even
though not verified, there could nevertheless be a certain d e g r e e of truth in this. We
have disclosed above (Book I, Chapter III) that it is of no use to the phalanx to have
unarmored m e n follow in the rearmost ranks, but these Roman u n a r m o r e d m e n are
not to be u n d e r s t o o d as ranks of the phalanx; rather, they correspond to the Greek
psiloi, wagoners, orderlies, w h o also accomplish a certain secondary combat mission
as light infantry. With the Romans they are o n e d e g r e e m o r e combat-oriented than
with the Greeks, since they consist entirely of citizens, whereas in the more well-to-
do Greek cities, especially Athens, the masters often took slaves along into the field,
and the Spartans took Helots. T h e m e n without body armor and without greaves,
that is, with shield and helmet, can on the other hand still be regarded as heavily
equipped and can fight in the phalanx. Naturally, there were in the most ancient
period very many w h o were not in a position to provide themselves with the costly
armor and greaves. T h e y had to be placed in the rearmost ranks, but it was too
m u c h in the interest of the state, as of each of these m e n himself, that he be pro-
vided with c o m p l e t e e q u i p m e n t for this graduated a r m a m e n t arrangement to have
been m o r e than a transitional measure. T h e hoplites marching out to battle must
have been e q u i p p e d with as m u c h armor as was to be found in public arsenals or in
private h o m e s . T h e supposition that it was never really a question of varying arma-
ment but only of how m u c h the individual could provide for himself and what the
state had to issue to him has s o m e t h i n g in its f a v o r . " T h e details of the historical
reports—that the first class had round metal shields (clipei), the second class (because
of the lack of body armor) long, rectangular shields (scuta), and that the third class
was w i t h o u t g r e a v e s — a r e clearly to be r e c o g n i z e d as the c o m p o s i t i o n of anti-
quarians. At a time w h e n the state was not even capable of giving all of its hoplites a
complete set of e q u i p m e n t , such fine distinctions could not possibly have b e e n car-
ried out or e v e n prescribed. W h e t h e r the shield was metal and round or rectangu-
lar, w o o d e n , leather-covered, with iron trim—all of this probably was of little con-
cern to the consuls, and again the greaves were such an insignificant part of the
e q u i p m e n t (the later R o m a n legionaries did not wear them at all), that they are ob-
viously only m e n t i o n e d in order to allow the demonstration of class differences. T h e
w o o d of the spear, the sharpness of the point, the t e m p e r of the sword were m u c h
more important distinctions for the combat capability of the individual than the
question of w h e t h e r a soldier had perhaps wrapped strong leather leggings a r o u n d
his shins instead of wearing metal greaves.
3. T h e knight centuries obviously had a particular history of their o w n , differing

from that of the infantry, since they originally were called not centuries but tribes.
T h e y were not divided into juniores and seniores, and their n u m b e r is relatively too
large for the most ancient period of the Republic. It is impossible that, at a time
w h e n R o m e had a total of no m o r e than 9 , 0 0 0 to 10,000 service-qualified citizens at
the most, there should have been 1,800 cavalry a m o n g them. T h e normal adjunct to
8,000 to 9,000 infantry (2 legions) would be 6 0 0 h o r s e m e n ; I therefore accept this as
the available number of cavalry at that time.
If o n e takes into consideration that the 3 oldest and most outstanding cavalry cen-
turies had their individual n a m e s — t h e Ramnes, the Titles, and the Luceres—to which
were a d d e d the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres secundi and then the 12 additional un-
named centuries, there results the supposition that the first-named centuries were
ancient societies of the nobility that existed before the mass of the people was or-
ganized into centuries. T h e s e societies of nobles m o v e d into the field as cavalry, with
a certain retinue on foot; since they were, h o w e v e r , m o r e than simple military
levies—that is, fraternal organizations, clubs—the older m e n and the physically dis-
qualified also belonged to t h e m . N o w w h e n , after the banishing of the kings, the
army units began to function as voting bodies and for that reason the centuries of
seniores were created, that was not necessary and not possible in the case of the
cavalry centuries, because the o l d e r m e n already b e l o n g e d to t h e m , even if they no
longer regularly rode along on a campaign. T h e outstanding m e n of Rome never
tried to base their power, at any rate, on their voting privilege in the centuries, but
rather on influencing the people's vote through the officials and priests.
4. O n e main proof that the army was the basis for the division into centuries is
given by the centuries of musicians and artisans. T h e smiths are no doubt to be con-
sidered principally as w e a p o n s artificers w h o were taken along in order to be able to
accomplish the repairs that are always necessary in the field.
In addition to the f o r e g o i n g , there was also a century of accensi velati (super-
numerary troops). T h e R o m a n antiquarians were themselves very uncertain about
what was to be u n d e r s t o o d by this term (see the passages in Joachim Marquardt,
Roman Political Administration [Römische Staatsverwaltung], 2: 3 2 9 , note 2). Sometimes
they were identified with the scouts; sometimes they were said to be replacements
who were to move in for the killed and w o u n d e d , taking over the latters' weapons.
T h i s is the preferred meaning today. I cannot imagine such m e n . Did they, until an
o p e n i n g occurred, have no function at all and no weapon? T h a t would have been a
waste of strength, since they w o u l d nevertheless have had to be fed, like the others.
If a hoplite became incapable of fighting, it was of course very important that his
costly weapons be saved. T h e best solution would be to e q u i p another man with
them at once. But the 100 accensi in an army of 8,400 m e n w o u l d no longer suffice
after the first combat. If it was a matter of particular concern that the hoplites re-
main as close as possible to full strength, the light infantrymen were, after all, there
for the purpose of m o v i n g into the vacant positions. If that was the case, however,
then this small g r o u p loses its raison d'etre as a specific "replacement century." T h e y
would be a century of light infantry, as the others were also. T h e i r purpose, since
they were after all m e n t i o n e d as a special unit, must have been s o m e t h i n g else.
I b e l i e v e that t h e i n s c r i p t i o n s a n d p a s s a g e s c i t e d by M o m m s e n in Political
Administration (Staatsverwaltung), Vol. III, Part 1, p. 2 8 9 , lead to the right clue. Here
the centuria accensorum velatorum appears as a privileged g r o u p , a n d the individual
accensus velatus as a respected m a n , w h o is proud of this position. T h i s seems to me
in no way to agree with the tradition that conceives of the accensi velati as fhe lowest,
completely impoverished class of citizens. How is there s u p p o s e d to have d e v e l o p e d
from the century of proletarians a society, m e m b e r s h i p in w h i c h was a c o v e t e d
h o n o r and in which we actually find persons of knightly rank? M o m m s e n concluded
quite correctly that "they must at o n e time have been active in public affairs." What
kind of affairs can that have been? T h e y were related to the army; they were called
up for their service. T h e y were, therefore, the people of the army administration,
the staff of clerks, accountants, supply officials, and aides, w h o were n e e d e d by both
higher and lower leaders. Varro (cited in Marquardt) reports this expressly in vari-
ous passages. If the army was called up for muster, they too had to join the forma-
tion as unarmed m e n (velati), and w h e n the army was divided into voting centuries,
they were considered together and organized as a century, just as the trumpeters,
buglers, smiths, and carpenters each formed o n e . T h e idea that the accensi velati
were proletarians did not arise until a division of the people by wealth was created
in the classes, for the purpose of a timocratic election organization. Here the accensi
did not fit in by any means; consequently, they were simply placed at the bottom. If
it is right that they were also called ferentarii (according to Festus and Varro) and
that the word is to be traced from ferre, and consequently to mean "carrier," then
they were originally simple servants, who gradually d e v e l o p e d into more important
assistants.
5. Such notes as the o n e in Athenaeus 6. 106 ("They borrowed from the Tyrrhe-
nians the practice of fighting pitched battles in phalanxes"*) s h o u l d not be re-
peated. It is already a great deal if Cato still knew of a real tradition that the Ro-
mans originally fought in the phalanx and did not invent that himself simply from
the nature of things. That the Romans, however, took over this m e t h o d of fighting
from some people or other cannot in any way have still been reported in any truly
historical account.
And it is just as purposeless to repeat that the scutum was, according to A t h e n a e u s ,
originally a Samnite w e a p o n or, according to Plutarch's Romulus, a Sabine weapon,
or according to Plutarch's Camillus, that it had been reinforced with iron since the
time of that c o m m a n d e r . All of these are completely arbitrary fantasies and inven-
tions of later antiquarians, full of contradictions a m o n g themselves. According to
Livy 8. 8, for e x a m p l e , the Romans originally carried clipei and did not carry scuta
until they became stipendiarii (paid soldiers), that is, since the time of Camillus.
6. W. Helbig, in "The Castors as Patron G o d s of the R o m a n Cavalry" ("Die Cas-
tores als Schutzgötter des römischen Equitatus") (Hermes, Vol. 4 0 , 1905) and "On the
History o f t h e R o m a n Cavalry" ("Zur G e s c h i c h t e d e s r ö m i s c h e n Equitatus"),
(Abhandlungen der königlichen Bayrischen Akademie d. W. I. Kl., Vol. 2 3 , 2d Section, 1905.)
sought to prove for the Romans, just as he had d o n e for the Greeks (see above, p.
59), that in the older period the equites were not to be thought of as cavalry but as
mounted hoplites. His Roman study is, however, m u c h more productive than his
Greek o n e , because it is based not so very m u c h on the interpretation of pictures,
but on direct sources and evidence. Helbig determines, above all through presenta-
tion of all the n u m e r o u s source passages, how strong the tradition was that in the
most ancient period the Romans waged m o u n t e d battles and m o v e d out to battle on
horseback. In c o n t r a d i c t i o n to this tradition stands the account in the ineditum
Vaticanum (Hermes, 27 [1892]: 118), which probably goes back to Fabius Pictor; ac-
cording to which it was not until the Samnite Wars that the Romans had created a
skilled cavalry. Helbig reconciles these points by explaining that at that time the
m o u n t e d h o p l i t e s , u n d e r H e l l e n i c inspiration, h a d b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d into real
cavalry and he relates this to the parade of the knights t h r o u g h the city, which, ac-
cording to the tradition, was arranged by Fabius Maximus as censor in the year 304
B . C . ( M o m m s e n , Staatsrecht, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 4 9 3 , note 1).
T h e error in this study lies, as in the c o r r e s p o n d i n g o n e on the Greeks by the
same author, in the t o o sharp distinction between infantry and cavalry. Helbig cites
the e x a m p l e of the d r a g o o n s of the seventeenth century, w h o represented m o u n t e d
infantry. T h e s e d r a g o o n s were for a fact m o u n t e d infantry w h o were given horses
of only m i n i m u m value so that they could easily put up with their loss. T h a t cer-
tainly d o e s not fit in with the hippeis and equites. T h e actual analogy to the Roman
equites is found in the medieval knights, w h o fought both on foot and on horseback,
for w h o m the horse was by no m e a n s simply a m e a n s of transportation. Helbig's
argument that the equites could not have fought on horseback because the shield
they carried in the illustrations was too large for that purpose d o e s not ring true;
after all, if they wanted to fight on horseback, they may have given up the shield
and fought without this protection. Even a small shield is a very inconvenient and
often d a n g e r o u s adjunct for the rider, w h o n e e d s his left hand to control the reins.
To what extent any conclusion can be drawn from the size and shape of the shield
concerning the type of combat could probably be learned only from a careful com-
parison with the combat m e t h o d s of the medieval knights. T h e R o m a n knights of
the most ancient period may often e n o u g h have fought on foot, and still so even
when the legion phalanx was introduced, but most certainly never, as Helbig states
on p. 3 1 2 , as reserve, but rather then as the first rank of the phalanx, as the knights
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries so often did. "Reserve" is a concept that
d o e s not apply at all to the older phalanx tactics.
T h e contradiction between the surely correct tradition, to the effect that ancient
R o m e had at her disposal a m o u n t e d knightly class, and the ineditum Vaticanum is
therefore to be eliminated in s o m e other way. T h e passage reads: "We were not able
to ride, and the w h o l e — o r almost all—of the R o m a n force was on foot . . . but we
forced t h e m to ride."* N o t h i n g forces us to read into the passage any more than its
context states—that is, that in the Samnite Wars the R o m a n s s t r e n g t h e n e d their
cavalry significantly; to wit, they organized 12 new centuries, so that they then had
18. That this took place no earlier than the year 304 B . C . and precisely in that year
cannot be considered as definitely proved; just the same, it is not impossible that the
formal parade through the city was related to the change.
Of great interest is a stone tablet that is discussed and illustrated in Helbig, dating
from the sixth century B . C . and showing R o m a n knights, o n e of w h o m carries a
sword and another a battle axe; the third man's w e a p o n cannot be recognized. T h i s
mixture of w e a p o n s is completely out of keeping with "cavalry" but genuinely consis-
tent with the "knightly" concept.
W h e t h e r there is really such a strong case to be m a d e for the honoring of the
Dioscuri as the patrons of k n i g h t h o o d , as Helbig undertakes to d o , is b e y o n d my
judgment.
7. T h e entire source material as a bibliography of the R o m a n military system is
c o n t a i n e d in t h e s e c o n d v o l u m e of Roman Political Administration (Römische
Staatsverwaltung), by J o a c h i m Marquardt; 2d ed., edited by A. von Domaszewski,
1884 (Vol. 5 of the Handbook of Roman Antiquities [Handbuch der Römischen Altertümer],
by Joachim Marquardt and T h e o d o r M o m m s e n ) . T h e second edition is in substance
only a reprint of the first, with the addition of supplementary material, especially a
listing of the newer literature. Consequently the second still presents the concept of
the chessboard formation of the maniples in combat, a concept that has almost gen-
erally been given up by now.
I m y s e l f first t r e a t e d the p r o b l e m of the R o m a n m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x in the
Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 5 1 , 1 8 8 3 , a n d later in Hermes, Vol. 2 1 , 1886, a n d the
Historische Zeitschrift 56 (1886): 5 0 4 and 60 (1888); 239. T h e first two essays are pre-
s e n t e d t o g e t h e r in t h e a n n e x to the Persian and Burgundian Wars (Perser- und
Burgunder-Kriege). O t h e r concepts have b e e n d e v e l o p e d by F. Fröhlich, Contributions
to the Conduct of War and the Art of War of the Romans in the Period of the Republic
(Beiträge zur Kriegführung und Kriegskunst der Römer zur Zeil der Republik), 1886; Sol-
tau, Hermes, Vol. 2 0 ; Bruncke, Neue philologische Rundschau, 1888, p. 4 0 ; Kuthe in a
Festschrift dedicated to Director Nölting, 1888; Steinwender, Program of the Marien-
burg Gymnasium (Programm des Marienburger Gymnasiums), 1877, and Journal for the
Gymnasium System (Zeitschnft fur Gymnasiums-Wesen), 1878; Giesing, Program of the Vit-
zthum Gymnasium (Programm des Vitzthumschen Gymnasiums), 1891. All of these works
have the c o m m o n error that they imagine the tactical events, whose highest law is
that of simplicity, as m u c h too complicated.
A d d e d to the above now is E d m u n d Lammert, The Development of Roman Tactics
(Die Entwicklung der römischen Taktik) [Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum], 1902,
where on p. 102 the ancient R o m a n knighthood is presented very well, based on the
f r a g m e n t a r y t e s t i m o n y available a n d o n a n a l o g i e s . For the rest, h o w e v e r , the
author's inventions are too artificial and have now been overtaken by Smith's book.
V e r y w o r t h w h i l e is t h e a r t i c l e "Exercitus" ( A r m y ) , by L i e b e n a m in Pauly's
Real-Encyklopädie; it contains a carefully worked-out survey of both the entire source

material and the newer literature and its points of controversy.
In 1913 there was a d d e d Steinwender's Roman Tactics at the Time of the Manipular
formation (Die römische Taktik zur Zeit der Manipularstellung), Danzig: H. Bruning. T h i s
study, which is unsuccessful in most of its details, is discussed in a valuable review by
Robert Grosse in Deutsche Literarische Zeitschrift II (1914): 6 8 5 .
9. [sic] C o n c e r n i n g the m e a n i n g of the expressions classis, infra classem, classes, Sol-
tau published a study in Philologus, 72 (1914): 3 5 8 that followed the right track but
did not go all the way to the end. My o w n concept is as follows: "classis" means orig-
inally the levy; the levy was followed from the b e g i n n i n g by a n u m b e r of orderlies,
light infantrymen, and so on, the psiloi, w h o were called the "infra classem"; w h e n
these light infantrymen became regularized and 1,200 of them were allocated to
each legion, this became a second "classis." T h u s the word received the m e a n i n g "di-
vision" and o n e could now speak of "classes."
8. [sic] Of decisive i m p o r t a n c e for the formation of the R o m a n infantry was
naturally the payment of salary that, if not paid from the very start, was nevertheless
introduced very early. In this connection it is interesting that Schlossmann (Archiv
fur lateinische Lexikographie, Vol. 14, 1905) d e t e r m i n e d that stipendium, which later
meant both soldier's pay and tax, originally meant the tax that was levied especially
for the purpose of paying the soldiers.
1. In spite of the contradiction that E d u a r d Meyer b r o u g h t up in

his History of Antiquity (Geschichte des Altertums), Vol. 2, p a r a . 4 9 9 , I
still feel p e r m i t t e d a n d obliged to h o l d to this c o n c e p t of " t h e con-
tinuity of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of R o m e in its constitutional history."
For it is completely clear that the basic principle of t h e R o m a n con-
stitutional law, the official p o w e r of t h e m a g i s t r a t u r e , dates back to
a very early t i m e a n d was gradually divided up a n d w e a k e n e d . It is
completely impossible that such a strict concept of t h e p o w e r of t h e
official p o s i t i o n m i g h t n o t h a v e b e e n f o r m e d u n t i l t h e f o r m a l
sovereign p o w e r was already in t h e h a n d s of t h e g e n e r a l people's
assembly; it is astonishing e n o u g h that t h a t s t r o n g concept was able
to assert itself for so long within t h e f r a m e w o r k of the sovereignty
of the p e o p l e .
F u r t h e r m o r e , it is fully clear t h a t t h e voting organization of t h e
historical p e r i o d originally h a d a p u r e l y military a n d no political
basis; consequently, this institution, too, goes back to t h e p e r i o d of
a very s t r o n g m o n a r c h y .
O n e may therefore truly speak of the "continuity of the de-
v e l o p m e n t of R o m a n constitutional history," without, of c o u r s e , tak-
ing for m o r e t h a n they actually w e r e t h e historical c h a n g e s of o u t e r
form—against which, after all, really only t h e voice of Meyer has
a p p a r e n t l y b e e n raised.
I can leave aside h e r e all t h e d o u b t over t h e authenticity of t h e
c h r o n o l o g y a n d the historical a c c o u n t i n detail. T h e m a t e r i a l i n

which I am interested for this work is not affected by it.
2. See particularly Vol. III, Book I I I , C h a p t e r s I a n d II, especially
p. 251 [of the G e r m a n 2d ed., 1923].
3 . Livy (23. 46 [215 B . C . ] ) says of t h e C a p u a n s : "Sex milia ar-
m a t o r u m h a b e b a n t , p e d i t e m imbellem; equitatu plus p o t e r a n t , ita-
q u e e q u e s t r i b u s proeliis l a c e s s e b a n t h o s t e m . " ( " T h e y h a d 6,000
a r m e d m e n ; t h e infantry was not inclined to fight, b u t t h e cavalry
was m o r e capable a n d so they p r o v o k e d the e n e m y into cavalry bat-
tles.")
4 . T h e t h e o r y that t h e original inhabitants h a d b e c o m e t h e patri-
cians by m e a n s of the i n c o m e from their l a n d is also o p p o s e d by
Schmoller, Basic Outline . . . (Grundriss), 2d ed., 1: 4 9 7 : "If o n e imag-
ines that capital in itself a n d its u n e q u a l distribution p r o d u c e s big
business; if o n e imagines that, because the heirs of f o r t u n a t e en-
t r e p r e n e u r s i n the second a n d t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n s a p p e a r primarily
as possessors of capital, t h e possession of t h e capital h a d created
the financial projects, t h a t is completely false. It is always p e r s o n a l
characteristics that create a n d sustain such v e n t u r e s . "
5. In Gellius 16. 10. 1 t h e r e is c o n t a i n e d a verse of E n n i u s , " p r o -
letarius publicitus s c u t i s q u e f e r o q u e o r n a t u s f e r r o . " ( " T h e p r o -
letarian is a r m e d with shield a n d sword; a r m e d with sword at t h e
p u b l i c c o s t . " ) C i t e d b y T h e o d o r M o m m s e n i n Political Law
(Staatsrecht), Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 29. See also Polybius 6. 2 1 . 7: " T h e y
chose t h e y o u n g e s t a n d p o o r e s t of the m e n to be fighters with the
javelin."*
6. F o r Attica we e s t i m a t e d , in t h e year 4 9 0 B . C . , 1 2 0 - 1 4 5 inhabit-
ants to t h e s q u a r e mile; for Boeotia in the fifth c e n t u r y , 110; for
L a c e d a e m o n a n d M e s s e n i a 7 5 ; for t h e P e l o p o n n e s u s 9 5 t o 110.
U n d e r the primitive conditions of agriculture, disturbed by the
continual warfare with n e i g h b o r i n g states, as we m u s t i m a g i n e t h e
situation in Italy 2,500 years ago, certainly 120 to 145 is t h e m a x -
i m u m n u m b e r that could be fed, even for t h e fertile soil. As an old
t r a d i n g city, R o m e m a y a l r e a d y h a v e h a d s o m e g r a i n i m p o r t s by
sea as early as 510 B . C . , b u t surely n o t yet any g r e a t quantity, for if
the city h a d a l r e a d y b e e n large, it would h a v e h a d a m o r e i m p o r -
t a n t position politically. T h a t the city was still small in c o m p a r i s o n
with the c o u n t r y a r e a is f u r t h e r attested by t h e fact that only 4 of
the 20 tribes w e r e m e t r o p o l i t a n ones. T h e so-called Servian wall,
which enclosed a very large area, dates only from the p e r i o d of t h e
S a m n i t e Wars.
7. A r e g u l a r , official p r o c e d u r e for m a i n t a i n i n g registration lists
a p p e a r s at first glance to be s o m e t h i n g q u i t e simple, b u t if it is to

be reliable, it actually is very difficult a n d d e m a n d s an e x t r e m e l y
careful a n d energetic control. T h e a d v a n t a g e s a n d disadvantages
that are at stake a r e very great a n d t h e work, by its very n a t u r e , is
in the h a n d s of clerks w h o , in a d d i t i o n to t h e question of careless-
ness, can also be subject to bribery. In 214 B . C . w h e n every y o u n g e r
m a n w h o was not on active d u t y in t h e field could not h e l p b e i n g
noticed in t h e street, a c h e c k - u p f o u n d 2,000 juniores w h o h a d
avoided military duty. Livy 24. 18. 7.
8. If o u r a s s u m p t i o n is correct, that at t h e start of t h e c o n s u l a r
regime R o m e h a d 21 tribes a n d a b o u t 8,400 service-qualified infan-
t r y m e n , the origin of t h e n o r m a l n u m b e r of 4,200 for the legion is
probably to be e x p l a i n e d in no o t h e r way t h a n that each of t h e
consuls was allocated half the n u m b e r . If the e n t i r e a r m y was as-
sembled a n d b o t h consuls p r e s e n t , t h e n they e a c h h a d t h e com-
m a n d in t u r n on a daily alternation.
9. Very informative on this point is T h e o d o r S t e i n w e n d e r , Annual
Program of the Marienburg Gymnaisum (Programm des Gymnasiums zu
Marienburg), 1879.
10. B e r l i n : G e o r g N a u c k , 1906. See also Preussische Jahrbücher,
Vol. 1 3 1 , J a n u a r y 1908.
( A d d e d in t h e t h i r d edition.) A. R o s e n b e r g , too, in Research into
the Roman Century-Organization (Untersuchungen zur römischen
Zenturienverfassung), 1 9 1 1 , recognizes t h e indefensible position of
M o m m s e n ' s constitutional construction a n d seeks a m i d d l e p a t h be-
tween M o m m s e n a n d m e . To try to go into details h e r e on this
c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l would lead us too far. Rosenberg's basic e r r o r is
that he did n o t acquaint himself sufficiently with t h e p o p u l a t i o n
statistics of the c a n t o n of R o m e .
11. B r u n c k e , Philologus, 1 8 8 1 , p. 3 6 8 .
Chapter II
The Manipular Phalanx
About the period of the Samnite Wars the original, simple
p h a l a n x u n d e r w e n t a c h a n g e t h a t eventually led to t h e m a n i p u l a r
phalanx.
T h e individual stages t h r o u g h which t h e d e v e l o p m e n t p r e s u m a -
bly p r o c e e d e d can no l o n g e r be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , b u t t h e result, the
o r g a n i z a t i o n i n which t h e R o m a n s w e r e still f o r m e d w h e n t h e y
went into the struggle with H a n n i b a l , is completely clear to us.
T h e hoplites w e r e now divided into t h r e e sections, a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e i r y e a r g r o u p s : t h e hastati, t h e principes, a n d t h e triarii. T h e
y o u n g e s t m e n f o r m e d t h e hastati, 1,200 m e n s t r o n g ; the m i d d l e
g r o u p m a d e up the principes, also 1,200 in n u m b e r ; a n d the eldest
w e r e t h e triarii, n u m b e r i n g 6 0 0 m e n . With this f o r m a t i o n t h e old
c e n t u r i e s , t h e levies by g r o u p s of 100, w e r e given u p . T h e n a m e ,
however, lived on as t h e d e s i g n a t i o n for t h e smallest s u b o r d i n a t e
u n i t of t h e legion, which, in t h e case of the hastati a n d the principes,
was now fixed at 60 m e n . T w o such c e n t u r i e s t o g e t h e r f o r m e d a
m a n i p l e ; each section h a d 10, a n d so t h e whole legion c o u n t e d 30
maniples. T h e triarii m a n i p l e s , however, h a d only half t h e s t r e n g t h
of t h e two y o u n g e r types.
T o each m a n i p l e t h e r e was assigned a n e q u a l n u m b e r o f 4 0 u n -
a r m o r e d m e n . T h e old r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 3,000 hoplites a n d 1,200
u n a r m o r e d m e n t o the legion t h e r e f o r e r e m a i n e d . T h e fact that
t h e merely 6 0 - m a n - s t r o n g m a n i p l e s of triarii w e r e assigned as m a n y
u n a r m o r e d m e n a s t h e 1 2 0 - m a n - s t r o n g m a n i p l e s o f hastati a n d
principes was naturally related to t h e o r d e r l y c h a r a c t e r of these u n -
a r m o r e d m e n ; t h e o l d e r m e n of t h e triarii unit w e r e favored with
m o r e p e r s o n a l service t h a n t h e y o u n g e r hastati a n d principes.
T h e reason for t h e new f o r m a t i o n was a tactical o n e .
As simple as t h e p h a l a n x f o r m a t i o n was, it still fell easily into
d i s o r d e r . It is e x t r e m e l y difficult with a r a t h e r long line even to
m a r c h s t r a i g h t a h e a d ; s u d d e n l y t h e line is b r o k e n at a c e r t a i n
272
The Manipular Phalanx 273
point, while a t a n o t h e r t h e r e o c c u r s a s q u e e z i n g t o g e t h e r . T h a t
h a p p e n s e v e n on a perfectly level drill field, a n d if t h e t e r r a i n
should have even any kind of irregularity or obstacles, or if the a d -
vance s h o u l d d r a w off s o m e w h a t obliquely to t h e right or left, t h e n
a c o r r e c t f o r w a r d m o v e m e n t is simply impossible. On t h e o t h e r
h a n d , it is e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t to m e e t the e n e m y with a reasona-
1
ble d e g r e e of o r d e r ; for soldiers w h o a r e pressed t o g e t h e r c a n n o t
use their w e a p o n s p r o p e r l y , a n d w h e n t h e r e a r e breaks in t h e line,
the e n e m y can p e n e t r a t e ; even c o n c e r n over this in- a d v a n c e p r o -
duces a faltering of c o u r a g e , as X e n o p h o n points o u t on o n e occa-
sion (Anabasis 4. 8. 10). T h i s weakness is s u p p o s e d to be r e m e d i e d
by the m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x .
Even with t h e G r e e k a n d M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x e s we can a s s u m e
with certainty t h a t they did not f o r m a completely u n i n t e r r u p t e d
line, but t h a t from o n e u n i t to a n o t h e r small intervals w e r e left,
facilitating a n o r d e r l y a p p r o a c h m a r c h , a n d w e r e filled u p a u t o m a t -
ically a t t h e m o m e n t o f c o n t a c t w i t h t h e e n e m y , a s t h e r a n k s
farther t o the r e a r welled f o r w a r d into t h e m . T h e R o m a n s now ar-
r a n g e d for these intervals systematically.
T h e 10 m a n i p l e s of t h e hastati, e a c h 20 m e n wide a n d 6 m e n
d e e p in t h e n o r m a l formation, w e r e placed side by side with small
intervals. W i t h t h e small size of t h e m a n i p l e s , t h e n , the intervals
w e r e very f r e q u e n t . B e h i n d t h e m t h e class of t h e principes was
f o r m e d up as a second echelon, b u t in such a m a n n e r that each
m a n i p l e c o v e r e d t h e interval between two of t h e hastati m a n i p l e s .
A n d b e h i n d t h e m w e r e the m a n i p l e s of t h e triarii.
T h e two c e n t u r i e s into which each m a n i p l e was divided stood
side by side a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y each h a d half t h e b r e a d t h of t h e
maniple.
Each m a n i p l e stayed in a close-knit f o r m a t i o n . If a squeezing oc-
c u r r e d a t o n e spot, i t was n o t p r o j e c t e d o n t h r o u g h t h e w h o l e
p h a l a n x b u t was taken up in t h e n e x t interval, or at t h e latest in t h e
second interval b e y o n d , a s these w e r e closed u p . T h e b r e a c h t h a t
o p e n e d on t h e o t h e r side, however, was closed up as soon as it was
large e n o u g h b y having the c e n t u r y o r t h e e n t i r e m a n i p l e o f t h e
principes s p r i n g forward into t h e line of hastati on t h e c e n t u r i o n ' s
c o m m a n d . I n a n e x t r e m e case t h a t could even b e r e p e a t e d o n c e
again by h a v i n g t h e triarii m a n i p l e , which was of course still in the
rear, m o v e into t h e front line.
T h e small intervals that m i g h t have r e m a i n e d w e r e closed u p au-
tomatically at t h e m o m e n t of contact.
B o t h actions, t h e squeezing a n d t h e pulling a p a r t o f t h e p h a l a n x ,
o c c u r r e d in a n a t u r a l alternation. If t h e soldiers p r e s s e d t o g e t h e r at
o n e spot, a b r e a c h would probably d e v e l o p at a n o t h e r place.
T h e r e f o r e a c u r e h a d to be c r e a t e d for b o t h evils simultaneously. If
o n e divided u p t h e old p h a l a n x a n d established intervals between
t h e units in o r d e r to avoid the squeezing t o g e t h e r a n d the resulting
d i s o r d e r , o p e n i n g s easily d e v e l o p e d . T h e intervals, in fact, t e n d e d
to e x a g g e r a t e this situation. It was necessary, t h e r e f o r e , to impose
t h e m a x i m u m limitation o n t h e s e i n t e r v a l s . N u m e r o u s intervals
could be i n t r o d u c e d only by taking at the same t i m e the greatest
c a r e to close up any o p e n i n g s t h a t arose, a n d that was effected by
splitting t h e legion into t h e t h r e e echelons of hastati, principes, and
triarii a n d positioning the m a n i p l e s a r o u n d t h e intervals. W h e n the
p h a l a n x was f o r m e d , i t h a d t o b e a l i g n e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b o t h
crosswise a n d lengthwise.
T h e p r o c e d u r e was very simple a n d yet at the s a m e time ingeni-
ous. T h e Greeks w e r e n o t capable o f accomplishing it. T h e y did
not h a v e t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e for it, t h e R o m a n discipline. It s e e m e d so
simple for each soldier to be t a u g h t : t h e individual, t h e c e n t u r y , or
the m a n i p l e m o v e d f o r w a r d as soon as a b r e a c h o p e n e d up in front
of t h e m . B u t this simple m a t t e r becomes unusually difficult in a
c o m b a t situation. With t h e noise a n d t h e e x c i t e m e n t o f c o m b a t a n d
u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e o f i m m i n e n t m o r t a l d a n g e r , such rules a r e not
always followed. B u t the m a n in t h e front line, seeing that a breach
has o p e n e d u p beside h i m , falls into d o u b t a n d uneasiness a b o u t
which way he s h o u l d close in. If o n e meets the e n e m y without hav-
ing closed up t h e b r e a c h , t h e last m a n is as g o o d as lost, for it is
precisely h e r e t h a t t h e e n e m y will p e n e t r a t e a n d attack him from
the side.
T h e hoplite in the p h a l a n x , as we have h e a r d above from
E u r i p i d e s (2. 5), was n o t simply d e p e n d e n t on himself a n d his own
c o u r a g e , b u t he also l e a n e d heavily on his c o m r a d e s beside a n d
b e h i n d h i m . T h e r e f o r e t h e b r e a c h must n o t only b e closed, b u t the
m e n of t h e first r a n k s m u s t be given the certain a s s u r a n c e that this
would h a p p e n in o r d e r to k e e p their m o r a l e up to t h e point of full
effectiveness.
T h e s p r i n g i n g f o r w a r d o f the m a n i p l e s o f t h e second a n d t h i r d
echelons could not, h o w e v e r , be accomplished on t h e basis of the
perspicacity a n d t h e goodwill o f a n individual. O n e m u s t not move
u p too s o o n ; a small i n t e r v a l was s u p p o s e d t o r e m a i n , a n d t h e
b r o a d e n e d interval was p e r h a p s only a m o m e n t a r y situation that
w o u l d quickly pass. At t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e b r e a c h has b e c o m e
large e n o u g h , however, t h e move forward m u s t take place with u n -
conditional reliability, for if it is delayed, it can lead to loss of t h e

battle. T h e m a n i p u l a r formation t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a n e x t r e m e l y
sure a n d firm l e a d e r s h i p of the m a n i p l e . T h e hastati m u s t be able
to rely on the fact t h a t t h e c e n t u r i o n of t h e next principes m a n i p l e
would give the c o m m a n d at t h e r i g h t m o m e n t a n d lead his m a n i p l e
into t h e t h r e a t e n e d spot. T h e whole m o r a l e o f the legion rested o n
the firm belief of t h e hastati in this m o v e m e n t of the principes.
T h e f o r m a t i o n a n d p u r p o s e o f t h e m a n i p l e also led t h e R o m a n s
to the invention of battle s t a n d a r d s , s o m e t h i n g that r e m a i n e d
foreign to the G r e e k s . U n d e r no circumstances was t h e soldier to
become s e p a r a t e d from his m a n i p l e ; for this r e a s o n each m a n i p l e
was given a visible, symbolic c e n t e r , a s t a n d a r d . In t h e battle itself
the ensigns w e r e n o t exactly of directly significant m e a n i n g . O n l y
d u r i n g t h e f o r m i n g - u p in line could they serve as an aid for t h e
formation; d u r i n g the direct a p p r o a c h m a r c h i t could n o l o n g e r
very well be a question of aligning oneself on t h e s t a n d a r d ; one's
whole a t t e n t i o n was necessarily d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e front. In t h e
m i d d l e o f the d a n g e r o u s h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t , the soldier looked
exclusively t o w a r d t h e e n e m y a n d , at most, cast a g l a n c e to t h e
right a n d left t o w a r d his flank m e n , to see t h a t he did not lose
them.
T h e principal significance of t h e m a n i p u l a r s t a n d a r d is probably
to be s o u g h t in p e a c e t i m e training, in t h e c o n d i t i o n i n g of the indi-
vidual to r e m a i n with his m a n i p l e u n d e r any circumstances. In t h e
course of t r a i n i n g for this cohesiveness, the s t a n d a r d s w e r e also not
simply symbolic d u r i n g drill, b u t of practical use for h e l p i n g to
k e e p the f o r m a t i o n .
T h e m a n i p u l a r f o r m a t i o n a d h e r e s completely t o t h e basic princi-
ple of t h e p h a l a n x b u t gives it t h e possibility of m o v i n g with m u c h
g r e a t e r ease, even over unfavorable t e r r a i n . W h a t e v e r may occur, it
d o e s n o t fall into d i s o r d e r , it will always reach t h e e n e m y with a
closed, u n b r o k e n front. An articulated unit has t a k e n t h e place of
an almost stiff o n e . T h e p h a l a n x has b e e n given j o i n t s .
T h e a r r a n g e m e n t o f intervals i n t h e p h a l a n x offered still a n o t h e r
a d v a n t a g e in a d d i t i o n to speed a n d g o o d o r d e r in t h e m o v e m e n t
f o r w a r d . W e h a v e seen t h a t with t h e p h a l a n x t h e light i n f a n t r y
could only be used in very small n u m b e r s . Now, t h e intervals give
the possibility of allowing a certain n u m b e r of s h a r p s h o o t e r s to be
placed in front of the front line, since they could w i t h d r a w t h r o u g h
t h e intervals without c r e a t i n g d i s o r d e r , even if t h e hoplites w e r e al-
2
r e a d y q u i t e close t o g e t h e r . O n e m u s t n o t believe, however, t h a t all
1,200 m e n of t h e legion w e r e used in this m a n n e r . If t h e hoplites
w e r e d r a w n u p 1 5 m e n d e e p , a n d consequently 2 0 0 m e n wide, that

would have resulted in a forward skirmish line 6 m e n d e e p ,
w h e r e a s , after all, 2 r a n k s at most, o n e b e h i n d t h e o t h e r , could
3
really use their missiles effectively.
4
A c c o r d i n g to a n o t e c o n t a i n e d in Livy, only 20 m e n from each
hastati m a n i p l e , c o n s e q u e n t l y altogether 200 m e n from t h e legion,
w e r e used for this service; p r e s u m a b l y also an additional n u m b e r
on t h e flanks. A n o t h e r g r o u p followed the hoplites in o r d e r to care
for t h e w o u n d e d ; t h e r e m a i n d e r stayed b e h i n d as garrison for the
entrenched camp.
With t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x t h e r e was u n d o u b t -
edly also a n associated c h a n g e i n the R o m a n a r m a m e n t a n d
m e t h o d o f f i g h t i n g . T h e o l d e r R o m a n h o p l i t e s f o u g h t like t h e
G r e e k s with t h e s p e a r a n d h a d t h e s h o r t s w o r d , a d a g g e r , or a
knife a s a n auxiliary w e a p o n . B y this t i m e , t h e R o m a n soldiers
t h r e w t h e i r spears a h e a d a n d t h e n c h a r g e d f o r w a r d a t t h e assault
pace to c o m p l e t e t h e battle with t h e sword. A l t h o u g h t h e s p e a r has
t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e g r e a t e r length, it is an a w k w a r d w e a p o n for
5
f i g h t i n g with a n a r m o r e d o p p o n e n t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e n o r m a l
m e t h o d of h o l d i n g t h e s p e a r , w h e r e t h e " u n d e r - g r i p " is used (to
6
e m p l o y t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of t h e G e r m a n a r m y ) , t h e t h r u s t is very
u n c e r t a i n a n d n o t very s t r o n g , since the lower a r m a n d t h e h a n d
m u s t take an u n n a t u r a l , almost vertical position while m a k i n g it.
T h i s t h r u s t really has its full effect only w h e n m a d e d o w n w a r d
from above. T h e lance t h r u s t , as it is principally practiced by t h e
cavalry today, with " o v e r - g r i p " a n d tightly squeezed between the
b o d y a n d the u p p e r a r m , was n o t usable for hoplite combat. It is
t h e t h r u s t of t h e attacking h o r s e m a n , w h o is s u p p o s e d to strike his
o p p o n e n t only in a g e n e r a l way a n d also accomplishes his p u r p o s e
i f h e strikes t h e shield o r b o d y a r m o r a n d u n s e a t s t h e m a n without
w o u n d i n g h i m . T h e hoplite, however, m u s t look sharply for a n u n -
covered spot on his a r m o r e d e n e m y in o r d e r to strike him effec-
tively.
T h e p o i n t e d heavy sword o r t h e s h o r t light sword i s m u c h m o r e
7
suitable for this p u r p o s e t h a n t h e s p e a r , a n d it is naturally doubly
effective to use b o t h w e a p o n s , o n e after t h e o t h e r , as t h e R o m a n s
m a d e possible by t h r o w i n g t h e s p e a r a h e a d , which for that p u r p o s e
was suitably c o n s t r u c t e d as a "pilum,"* a n d t h e n b r e a k i n g into the
e n e m y line, a l r e a d y s h a k e n by this salvo, with t h e sword. We can
a s s u m e t h a t t h e s a m e military a u t h o r i t y that articulated the p h a l a n x
b y m e a n s o f t h e m a n i p u l a r f o r m a t i o n also o r d e r e d a n d carried o u t
the increased effectiveness in h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t by the c o m b i n a -

tion of t h e spear a n d the h a n d - t o - h a n d battle.
As a n o r m a l thing, naturally only the first two r a n k s executed the
spear t h r o w ; t h e o t h e r s held theirs in their h a n d s . T h e triarii, w h o
hardly ever c a m e to the point of t h r o w i n g , d i d not even a d o p t t h e
9
pilum b u t r e t a i n e d the old hoplite spear, the hasta.
T h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e m a n i p u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o year-
g r o u p s is also w o r t h y of n o t e . In t h e o l d e r R o m a n class-phalanxes
the b e s t - a r m e d a n d most reliable m e n stood i n t h e f r o n t r a n k s .
Now the youngest m e n w e r e placed in the foremost r a n k s , t h e old-
est in t h e r e a r w a r d r a n k s . T h i s is a sign that in this a r m y the mili-
tary a n d t h e citizenship principles both held t r u e a n d h a d b e e n
b l e n d e d . T h e r e a r m o s t r a n k s o f a d e e p p h a l a n x w e r e only very
slightly e x p o s e d to d a n g e r , they h a r d l y ever c a m e into t h e h a n d -
t o - h a n d c o m b a t , a n d , e x c e p t for t h e case of a g e n e r a l r o u t , they
were hit, at most, by a few stray shots. In a purely citizen a r m y o n e
c a n n o t assign t h e d a n g e r simply a c c o r d i n g to age, for o n e citizen is
equal to the o t h e r . In a purely m e r c e n a r y a r m y this is even less
possible, for e a c h o n e is s t a k i n g his life for t h e s a m e pay. In a
militarily o r g a n i z e d militia, however, it is t h e n a t u r a l t h i n g for the
family fathers with long service to have themselves placed in the
r e a r r a n k s a n d to say to the y o u n g soldiers: "Now it's y o u r t u r n to
m o v e u p . " It is t h e s a m e t h i n g as with u s , w h e n t h e Landwehr
( h o m e g u a r d ) is used m o r e for g a r r i s o n p u r p o s e s a n d in t h e r e a r
area t h a n for o p e n battles. "Res ad triarios venit" ("Now it is up to
the triarii") has no m o r e t h e significance that " N o w the elite, t h e
most o u t s t a n d i n g warriors, m u s t be sent in" t h a n it m e a n s for us to
say "Die L a n d w e h r k o m m t " ( T h e h o m e g u a r d is coming). It m e a n s
no m o r e t h a n : " T h e situation is u r g e n t . " O u r Landwehrmann, too,
has a g r e a t military p r i d e as an old soldier vis-a-vis t h e y o u n g lads,
but this in no way m e a n s t h a t t h e Landwehr is to be c o n s i d e r e d as
an elite t r o o p .
Within t h e hastati, w h o t h e r e f o r e have to b e a r the real b u r d e n of
the battle, selected m e n w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y d e s i g n a t e d t o f o r m t h e
foremost r a n k s , as was the case with the G r e e k s .
EXCURSUS
1. I have taken 6 m e n as the normal d e p t h of the maniple; that results for the
whole phalanx in 15 m e n , since the triarii were only half the number of the others.
We may conclude that from the ratio of the various figures. To each maniple there
belong 40 u n a r m o r e d men, w h o form the rearmost ranks for the muster. T h e n u m -
bers were probably d e t e r m i n e d in such a way that at full strength there were no
blank files. T h e maniples of the triarii undoubtedly had the same depth as that of
the other units and so were only half as wide and formed up with very large inter-
vals. Only in this manner could they accomplish their purpose. If they had possibly
formed only 3 m e n d e e p , their m o v e m e n t up into the front lines would have been
of little use, since in hand-to-hand combat such a shallow line d o e s not have e n o u g h
power to hold fast. T h e large intervals in the third e c h e l o n did no harm, since, dur-
ing the approach march, the c o m m a n d e r s could m o v e over toward those places
where the o p e n i n g s were occurring and the pushing forward of the principes into the
hastati line was imminent or was actually being carried out.
T h e normal width of the maniples must therefore have been such as to be divisi-
ble into the three n u m b e r s 120, 6 0 , and 4 0 , and the d e p t h such as to be divisible
into 120 and 60. T h a t results in a hoplite width of 20 (10 in the case of the triarii)
and a depth of 6 m e n , and for the entire phalanx partly 18, partly 12, or an average
of 15 hoplites. For the muster, the unarmored m e n stood 2 m e n d e e p behind the
two y o u n g e r units and 4 men d e e p behind the triarii, provided that they were not
completely withdrawn from the hoplite phalanx and placed behind the triarii. A
combination that is also possible from the point of view of the n u m b e r s concerned,
that the hoplite maniple might have lined up only 3 m e n d e e p , is impossible from
an objectively considered viewpoint, since the total phalanx w o u l d then have been
too shallow and the maniple would have been too wide for the purpose of filling in
the breaches.
With the Greeks the normal d e p t h was accepted as 8 m e n . It seems striking that
the Romans should have formed almost doubly that d e e p . But in the first place that
is, after all, only a normal formation, which could be c h a n g e d according to the
n e e d ; we even hear quite often that the Greeks f o r m e d up 12 or even 25 m e n deep.
Moreover, the intervals of the R o m a n s must be taken into consideration. T h e disad-
vantage of the d e e p formation is, of course, the short front, which is vulnerable to
e n v e l o p m e n t and flanking attack. But the R o m a n f o r m a t i o n was l e n g t h e n e d by
means of the intervals, and at the place where the principes m o v e d up to the front,
the depth decreased to 6 m e n until the nearest triarii maniple m o v e d in behind. A
legionary phalanx of an average d e p t h of 15 m e n would therefore correspond to a
Greek one of some 10 to 12 m e n .
2. In the older legion the light infantry are supposed to have been called "rorarii,"
later "veliti." Whether the change of name also meant some kind of physical change
is not clear. In Livy 2 6 . 4, it reads for the year 211 B . C . : "Institutum ut velites in
legionibus essent." ("It was m a d e the custom to put lightly armed men in the le-
gions.") T h e sentence reads as if it stems from an old record. T h e account into which
Livy weaves this has the veliti, however, appearing as hamippen, light infantry who
are combined with the cavalry, whereby they would have been taken out of the le-
gions. In other respects, too, the account is subject to serious suspicion—for e x a m p l e ,
w h e n Livy gives the veliti a lance with a point "quale hastis velitaribus inest" ("such as
are on the spears of the lightly armed troops."). Furthermore, Livy also speaks quite
often in the earlier books about veliti. (See also Marquardt, 2: 3 4 9 , note 4.) Perhaps
the connection is that not until the year 211 B . C . were the 2 0 0 m e n taken out of the
rorarii, and from then on specially trained and e q u i p p e d with special javelins as the
m e n w h o were to take position in front of the legion. T h e s e were n a m e d veliti, and
from them the name was gradually transferred over to all the rorarii.
3 . T H E STANDARDS
T h e question of the standards in the R o m a n army is very difficult, and I would
not like to risk speaking the last word on this subject. Domaszewskj, in his valuable
treatise in Abhandlungen des Archäologischen Epigraphischen Seminars der Universität
10
Wien, 1885, has at any rate greatly overestimated the practical importance of the
field ensigns. He believes (p. 2): "They form during the long hand-to-hand combat
the rallying points of the subordinate units, a r o u n d which the combatants resume
their formation, and the c o m m a n d e r , by controlling their m o v e m e n t s in the battle,
succeeds in leading the mass according to a unified plan." He states further on (p. 6)
that the c o m m a n d e r controlled the m o v e m e n t s of the standard by means of the bu-
glers and the soldiers then followed the standard.
This entire idea is incorrect for the reason that the soldier w h o is already e n g a g e d
in hand-to-hand combat can, for all practical purposes, no longer be led, and even if
he could, then certainly only t h r o u g h a signal that strikes his ear without his listen-
ing for it, but not by m e a n s of a standard toward which he would first have to look.
As a result of his concept, Domaszewski assigns the standards their place in the
first rank of the maniple, where they can be seen by all the soldiers. Stoffel, in his
History of Julius Caesar (Histoire de Jules Cesar), 2: 3 2 9 ff., believes that they were
placed in the second rank, and I should like to agree with him on this, with the
reservation that this man, too, w h o is both scholar and soldier, seems to me to place
s o m e w h a t t o o h i g h t h e practical i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e s t a n d a r d i n b a t t l e . T h e
antesignani (those in front of the standard) are, according to Stoffel's completely
plausible presentation, the first two ranks of the maniple. It seems questionable to
me, however, as to whether s o m e t h i n g that applied to the cohort tactics at the time
of Caesar may be carried over to the older period. It is, for e x a m p l e , very possible
that in the manipular phalanx the expression antesignani applied to all the hastati and
the expression then c h a n g e d its meaning with the c h a n g e in tactics. T h e passages
from Livy cited by Domaszewski—8. 11. 7; 9. 3 9 . 7; 2 2 . 5. 7—do not allow at all the
interpretation that the standards were placed in the first or second rank, but they
make it appear probable that all the standards of the legion had their place side by
side during battle, b e t w e e n the principes and the triarii. Since here once again, how-
ever, even in that early period, the standard (signa sequi) is said to have been a spe-
cial symbol of the R o m a n soldiers and the custom of expressing military m o v e m e n t s
by means of the m o v e m e n t of the standards (signa tollere, movere, ferre, efferre, pro-
ferre, constituere, inferre, conferre, convertere, referre, transferre, promovere, retro recipere; ad
laevam ferre, obicere, signa armaque expedire), as Domaszewski correctly observes, stems
at any rate from an older period, it seems that there is here a contradiction in the
sources. Domaszewski (p. 12) sees no other solution than that it was a question of
various standards. He assumes that the recollection reported by Pliny in Nat. Hist.
10. 16—that the R o m a n s in earlier times had carried as standards, in addition to the
eagles, also wolves, minotaurs, boars, and horses—still held true for the Punic Wars
and that these symbols had their regular place between the principes and the triarii,
while the field standards that had a tactical purpose, the manipular ensigns, were
with each maniple.
I consider still a n o t h e r solution as possible: that the practical use of the manipular
standards not only originated on the drill field but that it was limited to that place.
In wartime the standards were used only as a g u i d e for forming up and were then
brought into the m i d d l e of the legion, w h e r e they were not e n d a n g e r e d and did not
limit anybody in the first rank in the use of his weapon. T h e y would have had no
practical importance for maintaining g o o d order and alignment in battle anyway,
and the lift of morale that a revered standard, carried forward, can give, did not
enter into consideration as long as the phalanx m o v e d as a powerful, closely f o r m e d
mass.
T h i s c h a n g e d after the introduction of the cohort tactics. For these small tactical
units, acting individually, the standards were of m u c h greater importance, especially
from the morale point of view. T h e r e f o r e , they were now given their place in battle,
too—not in the first rank, it is true, but nevertheless in the second.
4. Appian (Celtica, Chapter 1) reports that the dictator C. Sulpicius o r d e r e d in a
battle with the Boii that the javelins be thrown by an entire rank simultaneously and
that each rank, after throwing, should kneel d o w n in order to allow the next o n e to
throw over t h e m . Since this was told of four ranks and finally, after "all" had
thrown, they were s u p p o s e d to have g o n e over to the attack, it has been concluded
(Fröhlich, Caesar's Conduct of Warfare [Kriegswesen Cäsars], p. 146) that the hastati were
drawn up four ranks d e e p . I should like to o p p o s e this conclusion as being neither
methodical nor objective.
All the battles of the fourth century are accounts of pure fantasy, without any his-
torical validity in their details. T h e kneeling of the three foremost ranks so close to
the approaching, perhaps e v e n assaulting, e n e m y c o l u m n is completely impossible.
Even as a simple drill u n d e r peacetime conditions it is not without danger, since it is
all too easy for o n e man from the first rank to kneel too late or to stand up again
too s o o n or for s o m e b o d y from the rear rank to throw too soon, with the result that
s o m e are w o u n d e d . A n d even if this d o e s not h a p p e n , the simple possibility, the
necessity for being concerned about it, inevitably brings restiveness and nervous un-
certainty to the foremost ranks, a situation that d o e s m u c h more harm than the
s t e p p e d - u p launching of spears can do g o o d .
5. Polybius (4. 22 ff.) gives us a t h o r o u g h description of the R o m a n armament,
but in his manner, which, with all its breadth, is still often flighty, he forgot the ac-
tual construction of the armor. In 6. 2 3 . 14 he says: "The c o m m o n soldiers wear a
brass plate a span square that they place in front of their breasts and which they call
their 'heart protector,' and they have it as their last piece of equipment. But those
whose property qualification is above 10,000 drachmas have, instead of this 'heart
protector,' a coat of chain mail to protect their chests."* A c c o r d i n g to the sense of
this passage o n e would have to assume that the mass of R o m a n legionaries had worn
no armor at all but only s o m e kind of piece of sheet iron h u n g about the neck, one
span wide and o n e long, as a "heart protector." T h e r e can be no doubt, however,
that this heart protector was only an additional piece, a reinforcement to s o m e kind
of leather and linen armor. A m o n g the legionaries outfitted in this way there were
now supposed to be the citizens of the first class, as it was earlier expressed (those
w h o were assessed as having fortunes over 10,000 denarii, as we must now say with
Polybius), wearing c o m p l e t e scale armor. (See also Marquardt, 2: 337, note 4, and
Fröhlich, Kriegswesen Cäsars, p. 6 8 . ) It is c u s t o m a r y simply to repeat this from
Polybius, but what are we to make of this? Are certain m e n in the middle of the
hastati, principes, and triarii, w h o h a p p e n e d to be well-to-do, s u p p o s e d to have been
placed here and there with completely different armor? T h e state cannot possibly
have had an interest in having individual m e n in ranks better e q u i p p e d than were
the others.
I think the explanation probably is that the "heart protectors" were the simplest
form of body armor that the state had factory-produced and provided. Each indi-
vidual, however, was free to wear another, better, or more h a n d s o m e armor, and
the very well-to-do procured the c o m p l e t e scale armor for themselves. "Men whose
property qualification is above 1 0 , 0 0 0 drachmas" d o e s not m e a n here, therefore,
that a remnant of the old class formation still held true, but it m e a n s n o t h i n g more
than "the richest," which Polybius has passed on in this m i s u n d e r s t o o d and errone-
ous manner.
Likewise, it is an u n d o u b t e d misunderstanding of Polybius w h e n he gives each
legionary two pila, a light o n e and a heavy o n e (4. 23). Not every legionary is outfit-
ted with two pila, but there are two different types of pilum; aside from the light one
that the legionary takes into the field, there is a still heavier o n e , which is used for
the d e f e n s e of fortifications.
1. T h u c y d i d e s (6. 98) tells us how the Syracusans p l a n n e d to wage

a battle against t h e A t h e n i a n s a n d were a l r e a d y d r a w n up in for-
mation w h e n the c o m m a n d e r s noticed that " t h e a r m y was disor-

dered a n d did n o t readily fall into line."* As a result, they led t h e
troops back into the city.
2. Polybius 1 1 . 22. 10.
3. Vegetius, too ( 1 . 20), shows expressly t h a t the n u m b e r of light
infantry w h o w e r e active in front of t h e battle line was small a n d
that they m o v e d forward principally from t h e flanks.
4. In Livy's C h a p t e r V I I I of Book V I I I , to be discussed in g r e a t e r
detail below (p. 00).
5 . Each w e a p o n h a s c e r t a i n a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s , a n d
the evaluation r e m a i n s a subjective o n e . In G r u p p , Cultural History
of the Middle Ages (Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters), 1: 109, it is said,
for e x a m p l e : " T h e N o r w e g i a n Royal C o d e w a r n s against t h r o w i n g
t h e s p e a r too s o o n ; i n l a n d b a t t l e t h e s p e a r i s b e t t e r t h a n two
swords."
6. Regulations for Drills with Cavalry Weapons (Vorschrift fur die
Waffenübungen der Kavallerie), Berlin, 1891.
7 . I t i s n o t k n o w n h o w t h e o r i g i n a l R o m a n s w o r d was c o n -
structed; it was s u p p o s e d l y only a long, s t r o n g knife, "Bowie knife,"
c u t l a s s , o r even only the s a m e knife t h a t t h e m a n used for c u t t i n g
m e a t a n d w o o d . In t h e S e c o n d P u n i c W a r t h e gladius Hispanus
(Spanish s w o r d ) was i n t r o d u c e d , a s t r a i g h t , t w o - e d g e d , p o i n t e d
sword, short a n d very b r o a d at t h e t o p , b e t t e r suited for t h r u s t i n g
t h a n for hacking.
A. Midler, Philologus 4 7 : 5 4 1 . F r o m Villenoisy's " O n the M e t h o d
o f U s i n g A n c i e n t S w o r d s " ("Du m o d e d ' e m p l o i des é p é e s a n t i -
ques"), Revue archéologique, 1894, p. 230, t h e r e is n o t h i n g i m p o r t a n t
to be g l e a n e d .
8. T h e pilum, which was initially, at any rate, a simple javelin with
a very long, thin point, has its o w n history. For the best discussion
of this now, see D a h m , Jahrbücher des Vereins von Altertumsfreunden
im Rheinland, 1 8 9 6 - 1 8 9 7 , p. 226. T h e surprisingly e r r o n e o u s con-
struction t h a t Rüstow p r e s e n t e d is a p r o o f of how difficult critique
is from t h e objective point of view of t h e ancient written accounts,
even for the e x p e r t s , a n d how easily it can go astray. T h e credit for
having r e c o n s t r u c t e d t h e correct pilum goes to L i n d e n s c h m i t , a n d
the excavations that N a p o l e o n I I I h a d c a r r i e d o u t p r o v e d also to be
very valuable in this m a t t e r .
( A d d e d in t h e t h i r d edition.) A. Schulten, Rhein. Museum N. F. 66
(1911): 5 7 3 , points o u t t h e probability that t h e actual pilum was
p e r h a p s taken over from t h e Iberians, as late as t h e Second Punic
W a r . T h a t would, of c o u r s e , n o t eliminate t h e possibility that t h e
Romans had already long before that a d o p t e d the method of

t h r o w i n g the spear a h e a d a n d c a r r y i n g o n the actual h a n d - t o - h a n d
fight with knife, d a g g e r , or sword a n d w e r e i n d e b t e d to t h e
Iberians only for t h e final technical i m p r o v e m e n t in the construc-
tion of t h e javelin. We h a v e no positive testimony a b o u t w h e n the
R o m a n s i n t r o d u c e d t h e described combination o f s p e a r a n d sword
combat, a n d by t h e n a t u r e of the t h i n g we c a n n o t have such evi-
dence.
9. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius. In the period of t h e E m p i r e we find
t h a t i n t h e a r m o r i e s t h e w e a p o n s w e r e d i v i d e d i n t o "arma
antesignana" a n d "arma postsignana" ( " b e f o r e - t h e - s t a n d a r d " a n d
" b e h i n d - t h e - s t a n d a r d " arms), which can hardly m e a n a n y t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n that t h e foremost r a n k s carried the pilum, the r e a r r a n k s
t h e hasta. See also D o m a s z e w s k i , Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger
Akademie, 1910, p. 9.
10. See the s u p p l e m e n t to this in Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen
Archäologischen Epigraphischen Instituts, Vol. 15, 1892. See also the
t h o r o u g h discussion by M o m m s e n , in the same periodical, 10
(1886): 1 ff.
Chapter III
Roman Drills, Campcraft,
It is impossible to f o r m a n d m o v e a p h a l a n x w i t h o u t h a v i n g
trained t h e m e n w h o m a k e it u p . F r o m the very first day o n , after
the p h a l a n x idea was conceived, we m u s t i m a g i n e that a c e r t a i n
a m o u n t of d r i l l t o o k place. T h e r e was a systematic t r a i n i n g in
Sparta a n d with t h e G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s . T h e discipline-oriented at-
t i t u d e o f t h e R o m a n s u n d o u b t e d l y d i d n o t allow this e x c e l l e n t
means to escape them, and the m a n i p u l a r formation d e m a n d e d
m o r e t h a n t h e G r e e k - M a c e d o n i a n soldiery p r e s u m a b l y ever accom-
plished. O n t h e specialized drill o f t h e m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x t h e r e has
c o m e d o w n to us a description that, strongly e x a g g e r a t e d , led t h e
research into this subject astray for a long time, b u t which, after
the e r r o n e o u s g a r n i s h m e n t is r e m o v e d , may be c o n s i d e r e d as a
very good p i c t u r e .
T h e principal mission of the m a n i p u l a r legion was to h o l d t h e
individual m a n i p l e s t o g e t h e r in a close-knit f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g their
a p p r o a c h m a r c h , a n d as soon as o p e n i n g s d e v e l o p e d in t h e l e a d i n g
echelon, to fill these in an o r d e r l y way by having a c e n t u r y or a
m a n i p l e from t h e second o r t h i r d e c h e l o n m o v e forward. T h i s was
drilled i n t h e following m a n n e r . T h e maniples took u p , from t h e
start, a n interval o f o n e m a n i p l e ' s b r e a d t h from each o t h e r . T h e n
t h e f o r m a t i o n m a r c h e d f o r w a r d , a n d t h e c e n t u r i o n s h a d t o pay
close a t t e n t i o n to see that the distances w e r e m a i n t a i n e d .
U n d e r battle conditions t h e intervals between the m a n i p l e s could,
o f c o u r s e , n o t b e m a d e s o wide, since each interval o f f e r e d t h e
e n e m y a point of p e n e t r a t i o n .
O n t h e drill field, h o w e v e r , t h e a c t i o n o f precisely m a r c h i n g
straight forward, which is so h a r d to d o , was practiced in this m a n -
n e r . T h e m a n i p u l a r s t a n d a r d s i n t h e first r a n k o f each m a n i p l e
283
facilitated t h e m a i n t a i n i n g o f t h e d i r e c t i o n , t h e d r e s s i n g o n the
guide, a n d t h e interval. Finally t h e t r u e test was h e l d by h a v i n g the
principes m a n i p l e s s p r i n g forward into t h e hastati intervals. T h e n the
principes c o n t i n u e d to m o v e forward as t h e first line, a n d the hastati
r e m a i n e d b e h i n d , in o r d e r to fill t h e o p e n i n g s again, in t h e same
m a n n e r , o n c o m m a n d . T h e triarii, too, w e r e n o d o u b t p u t t h r o u g h
this drill, a l t h o u g h it is n o t clear how that was d o n e , since they ob-
viously always h a d e i t h e r a hastati or a principes m a n i p l e in front of
t h e m as long as no b r e a c h h a d o p e n e d up as a result of d i s o r d e r or
of losses in a battle situation.
In t h e m a t t e r of campcraft, too, the difference between a G r e e k
a n d a R o m a n a r m y was h a r d l y less t h a n t h a t c a u s e d by the m a n i p u -
lar organization.
Very seldom d o w e h e a r a n y t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e G r e e k s ' c a m p s .
X e n o p h o n tells us in his description of the L a c e d a e m o n i a n state
( C h a p t e r 12) that they m a i n t a i n e d good o r d e r in c a m p a n d m a d e it
circular w h e n t h e t e r r a i n did not dictate otherwise. B u t w h e t h e r
they regularly fortified it, he does not say. J u d g i n g from t h e overall
context, we s h o u l d almost c o n c l u d e so, a n d time a n d again we h e a r
1
of fortified c a m p s , b u t we obviously c a n n o t speak of a s t a n d i n g
c u s t o m o f fortifying t h e i r c a m p s , e i t h e r b y t h e L a c e d a e m o n i a n s , o r
with e v e n less certainty, by t h e o t h e r G r e e k s . Even in t h e case of
A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t a n d his successors, t h e fortifying of a c a m p is
m e n t i o n e d only u n d e r special c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d it p r o b a b l y was
n o t d o n e otherwise. Polybius says expressly (6. 42) t h a t t h e G r e e k s ,
in o r d e r to save themselves the t r o u b l e of e n t r e n c h i n g , s o u g h t o u t
2
for their campsites areas of t e r r a i n with n a t u r a l p r o t e c t i o n .
B u t t h e R o m a n s a l r e a d y h a d from very ancient times t h e firm
principle of enclosing every c a m p , w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , with a t r e n c h
a n d palisaded r a m p a r t . H o w e v e r t r o u b l e s o m e t h a t was, t h e m a n y
a d v a n t a g e s w a r r a n t e d it. T h e G r e e k s ' habit of seeking cover from
t h e terrain misled t h e m naturally into b e i n g satisfied now a n d t h e n
with very m e d i o c r e p r o t e c t i o n a n d so to e x p o s e themselves to sur-
p r i s e a t t a c k s . T h e c o m m a n d e r d o e s n o t like t o d e m a n d o f his
t r o o p s s o m e t h i n g that they a r e n o t a c c u s t o m e d t o d o i n g . T h e p r o g -
ress of o p e r a t i o n s is necessarily c o n t i n u o u s l y i n f l u e n c e d by this
kind o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r , w h o i n t h e t r a i n i n g
a n d t h e habits of his soldiers always a n d in all places carries his
security a l o n g with h i m , is t h e r e b y given t h e capability of m u c h
m o r e e x t e n d e d a n d m u c h longer-lasting o p e r a t i o n s t h a n was t h e
G r e e k leader. T h e g r a d u a l , systematic subjection of Italy, on which
Roman Drills, Campcraft, and Discipline 285
the R o m a n national system was based, would n o t have b e e n possible
w i t h o u t t h e R o m a n fortified c a m p . E v e n a f t e r a lost battle t h e
camp offered a t e m p o r a r y refuge.
Of almost as m u c h i m p o r t a n c e , however, is an indirect result that
Polybius brings u p . T h e G r e e k s , w h o pitched their c a m p s a c c o r d i n g
t o the circumstances, h a d n o fixed forms for t h e m . T h e R o m a n s
3
had a completely specified p l a n , in which each u n i t a n d each m a n
had a d e f i n i t e p l a c e . T h e c a m p was r e c t a n g u l a r a n d h a d f o u r
gates; in the m i d d l e was the c o m m a n d e r ' s tent. T h e c a m p streets
were a r r a n g e d in definite lines a n d definite symbols showed t h e di-
rections. Consequently the action of m a r c h i n g in and out took
place in a n a t u r a l o r d e r , without d i s t u r b a n c e , a n d e v e n in case of
s u d d e n alarms each soldier immediately knew his place.
In Livy (44. 39) Aemilius Paullus delivers a talk to his soldiers
before t h e battle of P y d n a , in which he says of the c a m p s :
Y o u r ancestors c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t r e n c h e d c a m p as a c o n t i n u -
ously available h a v e n for t h e a r m y , from which they c o u l d
move o u t to battle, in which, if they w e r e b e a t e n by the s t o r m
of the battle, they could find a s u r e refuge. T h e c a m p is a
resting place for t h e victor, a r e f u g e for t h e loser. T h i s military
residence is o u r second f a t h e r l a n d , t h e r a m p a r t forms t h e city
walls, a n d for each soldier his t e n t is his h o u s e a n d h e a r t h .
T h e b u r d e n t h a t the regulations for t h e fortification o f t h e c a m p

c r e a t e d f o r t h e R o m a n s was e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y g r e a t . Since t h e r e
would n o t always have b e e n time a n d o p p o r t u n i t y to cut t h e neces-
sary stakes for t h e fortification o n t h e spot, t h e soldiers h a d t o
carry a l o n g with t h e m often e n o u g h — i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r heavy
h o p l i t e e q u i p m e n t , t h e i r p r o v i s i o n s a n d tools, axes, s p a d e s , a n d
4
saws—even t h e stakes t h e m s e l v e s .
A s w e know, each G r e e k hoplite r e q u i r e d a n o r d e r l y o r h e l p e r ;
t h e R o m a n legionaries h a d only two lightly a r m e d m e n for every
five hoplites. T h e G r e e k s , Polybius says (18. 18), h a r d l y believed
that they c o u l d c a r r y t h e i r o w n w e a p o n s o n t h e m a r c h ; for t h e
R o m a n s it was, he says, an easy m a t t e r to c a r r y t h e fortification
stakes as well. C a e s a r (Bell. Civ. 1. 78) occasionally m e n t i o n s t h a t
foreign auxiliary troops would not take on the b u r d e n s of the
legionaries.
It is with g o o d r e a s o n t h a t t h e R o m a n l e g e n d has Camillus saying
o n c e (Livy 5. 27. 8) t h a t t h e factors t h a t e n a b l e the R o m a n s to con-
q u e r t h e i r e n e m i e s a r e "virtus, opus, arma" ( " c o u r a g e , w o r k ,

weapons"). T h e opus, t h e b u r d e n s o m e , thankless digging, played no
less a role in the R o m a n c o n q u e s t t h a n c o u r a g e a n d w e a p o n s .
All t h e differences between t h e G r e e k a n d R o m a n military sys-
tems can be traced back to t h e difference in discipline. T h e Athe-
nian c o m m a n d e r s h a d , it is t r u e , a certain right to mete out
p u n i s h m e n t , but they nevertheless did not use it, a c c o r d i n g to the
5
t e s t i m o n y of A r i s t o t l e . E v e n in t h e case of specifically military
crimes, such as refusal to a p p e a r at the levy, cowardice, fleeing be-
f o r e t h e e n e m y , t h e r e was n o i m m e d i a t e p u n i s h m e n t , b u t t h e
c o m m a n d e r s , after t h e e n d of the c a m p a i g n , m a d e a public accusa-
6
tion in A t h e n s . W h e n , in t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r , D e m o s t h e n e s hit
u p o n t h e plan to fortify Pylos, an action which later led to the great
victory of Sphacteria, he was initially u n a b l e to convince e i t h e r his
fellow c o m m a n d e r s or his soldiers to accept it, as T h u c y d i d e s (6. 4)
r e c o u n t s q u i t e mildly. N o t until they h a d h a d to r e m a i n in place
t h e r e for a r a t h e r long t i m e because of t h e r o u g h sea, did his sol-
diers decide, from b o r e d o m , to c a r r y o u t t h e idea of their com-
mander.
In his recollections of Socrates, X e n o p h o n has Pericles complain-
ing that the A t h e n i a n s - w e r e o b e d i e n t to t h e i r g y m n a s i u m instruc-
tors a n d their choir directors all right, b u t that t h e knights a n d h o p -
lites w e r e r e f r a c t o r y vis-a-vis t h e i r l e a d e r s ( 3 . 5. 19). W h e r e v e r
possible, t h e A t h e n i a n s took p r i d e in acting against h i g h e r a u t h o r -
ity (3. 5. 16). Socrates finds the r e a s o n for this in t h e fact that t h e
c o m m a n d e r s themselves u n d e r s t o o d n o t h i n g o f t h e art o f war; o n e
s h o u l d c h o o s e m e n w h o , t h r o u g h t h e superiority o f their know-
l e d g e a n d ability, w o u l d force t h e v o l u n t a r y o b e d i e n c e o f t h e i r
units, j u s t like t h e m a s t e r s of gymnastics a n d of c h o r a l music.
W h e n Phocion was o n c e asked (Plutarch, Phocion, C h a p t e r 23)
w h e n he would advise the A t h e n i a n s to m a k e war against the
M a c e d o n i a n s , he replied, " W h e n I see that y o u n g m e n are r e a d y to
do their service, rich m e n to pay their taxes, a n d s p e a k e r s to avoid
embezzling public f u n d s . "
T h e S p a r t a n s w e r e f a m o u s for their o b e d i e n c e t o a u t h o r i t y , a n d
it is c e r t a i n t h a t this w a r r i o r f r a t e r n i t y e x e r c i s e d its d o m i n a t i o n
over its n u m e r o u s subject p e o p l e s t h r o u g h its firm cohesiveness. If
o n e e x a m i n e s t h e situation m o r e closely, h o w e v e r , it becomes a p -
p a r e n t t h a t t h e S p a r t a n discipline was m o r e of a pedagogical na-
t u r e , not really the k i n d we call military discipline. I n h e r e n t in t h e
c o n c e p t of discipline is t h a t it e m a n a t e s from t h e c o m m a n d a u t h o r -
ity. B u t in S p a r t a t h e c o m m a n d a u t h o r i t y was very limited. In this
complicated political system, c o m m a n d of t h e a r m y was vested in

the h a n d s of t h e h e r e d i t a r y kings. B u t t h e s e kings did not r u l e ;
r a t h e r , they h a d a kind of p r e s i d i n g position within the aristocracy,
and i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t their a s s u m i n g m o r e p o w e r t h r o u g h their
c o m m a n d of t h e a r m y , t h e c o m m a n d a u t h o r i t y was very limited.
T h e royal dignity was not j u s t a single position, b u t a d o u b l e o n e ;
both kings originally held t h e s u p r e m e c o m m a n d jointly in t h e field
as well, a n d w h e n this practice was a b a n d o n e d ( a r o u n d 510 B . C . ) ,
because of serious disadvantages, o t h e r p r e c a u t i o n s w e r e t a k e n to
assure that their p o w e r , even in t h e field, r e m a i n e d tightly limited;
o t h e r w i s e this r o y a l t y w o u l d h a v e e n h a n c e d its p o s i t i o n q u i t e
7
differently.
Pausanias is said to have h a d t h e e x p e r i e n c e at Plataea of h a v i n g
o n e o f t h e Spartiate colonels, A m o m p h a r e t u s , w h o did not u n d e r -
stand his activity, refuse to carry o u t a c o m m a n d a n d openly q u a r -
rel a b o u t it with t h e King. Later t h e kings w e r e p r o v i d e d with a
council of t h e e p h o r s in the field. W h e n K i n g Agis in 4 1 8 B . C .
p l a n n e d to give battle to t h e e n e m y on u n f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n a n d h a d
already m o v e d u p within s t o n e - t h r o w i n g r a n g e , o n e o f t h e e l d e r s
called o u t to h i m t h a t he was no d o u b t p l a n n i n g to c u r e o n e evil
t h r o u g h a n o t h e r , w h e r e u p o n h e led t h e a r m y back. I n t h e battle o f
M a n t i n e a , which followed shortly t h e r e a f t e r , two p o l e m a r c h s r e -
fused to obey, failed to c a r r y o u t a m o v e m e n t t h a t was o r d e r e d ,
a n d w e r e p u n i s h e d for that, not i m m e d i a t e l y by the King, b u t later
by the authorities at h o m e , w h o o r d e r e d b a n i s h m e n t .
W h e n t h e G r e e k m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s c a m e into being, t h e r e n a t u r -
ally d e v e l o p e d also a different type of discipline from t h a t of t h e
citizen a r m i e s . At as early a p e r i o d as that of the conversation be-
tween Pericles a n d Socrates, X e n o p h o n has Socrates praising t h e
good o r d e r o f t h e fleet i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e l a n d a r m y . W h e n t h e
S p a r t a n Brasidas f o r m e d his h o p l i t e u n i t with H e l o t s , which h e
t h e n led to T h r a c e , he certainly instilled g o o d discipline in t h e m .
Of Clearchus, the most famous soldier of fortune of the T e n
T h o u s a n d , X e n o p h o n tells us (2. 6. 10) t h a t he h a d established t h e
principle that t h e soldier should fear his c o m m a n d e r m o r e t h a n t h e
e n e m y , a n d he himself wielded t h e r o d w h e n e v e r he saw o n e of his
m e n h o l d i n g back. B u t w h e n X e n o p h o n himself in a w i t h d r a w a l
o n c e beat a soldier because he h a d r e f u s e d to h e l p a l o n g a sick
c o m r a d e , the soldier b r o u g h t c h a r g e s against h i m before t h e a r m y
assembly, a n d X e n o p h o n was f o u n d i n n o c e n t only after r e c o u n t i n g
the r e a s o n for t h e p u n i s h m e n t .
With t h e M a c e d o n i a n s , u n d e r t h e a s s u r e d a u t h o r i t y of a royal
c o m m a n d e r , g o o d discipline no d o u b t prevailed. In serious cases

t h e king carried o u t p o w e r o f p u n i s h m e n t with t h e c o n c u r r e n c e o f
8
his a r m y . A m o n g t h e successors of A l e x a n d e r , too, w h e n t h e ar-
mies w e r e s t a n d i n g m e r c e n a r y units, t h e kind of discipline peculiar
to this t y p e of soldiery m u s t h a v e p r e v a i l e d , b e c a u s e w i t h o u t it
m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s can n e i t h e r be used n o r held t o g e t h e r . Polybius
( 1 . 66) states wisely that a peaceful situation has no value for mer-
c e n a r i e s a n d i s b u t t h e s o u r c e o f r e b e l l i o n . C e r t a i n l y for this
r e a s o n , t o o , t h e r e was a g r e a t d e a l of drill u n d e r t h e Diadochi.
Polyaenus (3. 9. 35) said t h a t Iphicrates always k e p t the soldiers oc-
c u p i e d , so that they w o u l d not get the idea of r e f o r m s ; n e v e r t h e -
less, drilling is n o t n a m e d a m o n g these activities, b u t r a t h e r dig-
ging, felling trees, m o v i n g e q u i p m e n t , a n d c h a n g i n g position.
If, after all, o n e c a n n o t say of the G r e e k s t h a t t h e basic principles
of military discipline w e r e completely u n k n o w n to t h e m , n e v e r t h e -
less it was really not until t h e m e r c e n a r y a r m y t h a t this concept
arose, a n d a c c o r d i n g to Polybius' testimony t h e G r e e k s never really
l e a r n e d t r u e o b e d i e n c e at all. A completely different a t m o s p h e r e
strikes us as soon as we e n t e r a R o m a n c a m p . O n l y with t h e Ro-
m a n s w e r e t h e c o n c e p t a n d t h e p o w e r of discipline fully recognized
a n d accomplished.
T h e strict concept of t h e right of c o m m a n d was not relaxed with
t h e b a n n i n g of t h e kings, b u t only t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e two alternat-
ing consuls. Six lictors b e a r i n g t h e fasces walked in front of each of
t h e m , a s i m m e d i a t e e x e c u t o r s o f their c o m m a n d s . T h e citizen in-
side t h e city was only partially p r o t e c t e d personally from the claws
of this official p o w e r ; b u t in t h e field it h e l d u n h a m p e r e d sway
over life a n d d e a t h , a n d it m o v e d a b o u t mercilessly. F r o m the con-
suls it was d e l e g a t e d to t h e o t h e r leaders. Each c e n t u r i o n carried a
r o d ; t h e later p e r i o d looked on this as his very special insignia of
9
rank and as such chiseled it into stones. Vegetius describes
t h o r o u g h l y for us (2. 19) how carefully rosters a n d r e c o r d books
w e r e k e p t o n each a n d every item i n t h e R o m a n c o m p a n i e s — p a y ,
service, c o m m a n d , leave. In t h e process of enlisting recruits, care
was t h e r e f o r e t a k e n to sign up a few m e n capable of writing a n d
k e e p i n g accounts. We can a s s u m e that this administrative exactness
w e n t back to very early times, for without such t h o r o u g h n e s s t h e r e
is no o r d e r a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y also no discipline. F o r this r e a s o n ,
from t h e early days o n w a r d t h e c e n t u r i o n s w e r e also assigned u n -
10
a r m e d m e n (accensi velati), t h a t is, c l e r k s . Polybius (6. 36 ff.) tells
us that the sentry posts w e r e inspected in t h e R o m a n system ac-
c o r d i n g to a fixed s c h e m e . If the inspecting officer f o u n d a m a n
who was n o t on his post or was sleeping, on the n e x t day he was

court-martialed. T h e t r i b u n e t o u c h e d with his staff t h e m a n w h o
had j u s t b e e n f o u n d guilty, w h e r e u p o n all t h e soldiers b e g a n to
beat him or t h r o w stones at h i m . If he s h o u l d succeed in escaping
from the stoning a n d fleeing from t h e c a m p , he could nevertheless
never again r e t u r n t o his h o m e . T h e s a m e h a r s h p u n i s h m e n t was
meted o u t to t h e c e n t u r i o n s (Polybius says " t h e officer of t h e r e a r
and the leader of t h e troop"*) w h o did not m a k e their r o u n d s cor-
rectly. I n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , d e s e r t i o n , a n d c o w a r d i c e w e r e p u n i s h e d
with d e a t h . If e n t i r e units w e r e guilty, they w e r e d e c i m a t e d ; every
tenth m a n was s e n t e n c e d to d e a t h by lot.
Even h i g h officers of t h e most o u t s t a n d i n g families w e r e s o m e -
11
times sentenced to c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t .
No account is more famous and more characteristic in the
R o m a n l e g e n d t h a n that of t h e C o n s u l Manlius, w h o h a d his own
son e x e c u t e d b e c a u s e h e h a d t r a n s g r e s s e d a c o m m a n d a n d ac-
c e p t e d i n d i v i d u a l c o m b a t with o n e o f t h e e n e m y w h o h a d chal-
lenged h i m . Stiff with h o r r o r , a c c o r d i n g to Livy's description, t h e
a r m y stared at t h e terrible e x e c u t i o n a n d did not c o m e to itself
again until t h e h e a d lay s e p a r a t e d from t h e torso a n d t h e blood
was s t r e a m i n g o u t — b u t o b e d i e n c e was a s s u r e d .
A few years later, t h e R o m a n history books go on to relate, it
h a p p e n e d that Master of the H o r s e Q u i n t u s Fabius Rullianus
waged a n d w o n a battle against the c o m m a n d of t h e dictator L.
Papirius C u r s o r , in t h e latter's absence. T h e dictator cited t h e ex-
a m p l e o f Manlius a n d s u m m o n e d the d i s o b e d i e n t s u b o r d i n a t e be-
fore his c o u r t . Fabius fled from t h e c a m p t o w a r d R o m e . T h e Sen-
ate i n t e r v e n e d . T h e f a t h e r o f t h e guilty m a n , w h o himself h a d
been dictator a n d t h r e e times consul, a p p e a l e d t o t h e p e o p l e a n d
the people's c o u r t s . B u t t h e c o u r t s , for t h e sake of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e
principles of discipline, did not d a r e to intervene. Not until
e v e r y b o d y — F a b i u s himself, son a n d father, t h e Senate, t h e j u d g e s ,
and the people—had had recourse to entreaties, and the right of
c o m m a n d a n d t h e law o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n h a d t h e r e b y b e e n recog-
nized, did t h e dictator allow himself to r e l e n t a n d t u r n t h e criminal
over t o t h e R o m a n p e o p l e a n d the p o w e r o f the c o u r t s , because
they h a d m a d e a plea r a t h e r t h a n trying to establish a right.
On G r e e k soil n e i t h e r t h e story of Manlius n o r that of Papirius
would be i m a g i n a b l e . Even in S p a r t a t h e r e n e v e r existed such a
c o n c e p t of official power. By m e a n s of this official p o w e r t h e aris-
tocratic a n d d e m o c r a t i c e l e m e n t s i n R o m e w e r e held t o g e t h e r a n d
balanced; n e i t h e r was able to o v e r c o m e a n d r e p r e s s the o t h e r c o m -
pletely. In this state of universal equal suffrage, in which the prin-

ciple o f t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e p e o p l e was formally r e c o g n i z e d ,
t h e r e existed at the s a m e time, from a practical viewpoint, an aris-
tocracy with t h e p o w e r to rule a n d actually h o l d i n g the c o m m a n d .
T h e c o u n t e r a c t i o n s o f these p o w e r s f o r m e d the R o m a n national
c h a r a c t e r ; the official p o w e r was t h e root of discipline, a n d on t h e
t r e e of discipline grew the fruit of the m a n i p u l a r tactics a n d of the
systematic fortifying of t h e c a m p s .
EXCURSUS
1. T h e description from which I believed that I could extract the picture of an-
cient Roman drills was interwoven by Livy into his account of the Latin War (340
B . C . ) a n d c o n n e c t e d with a survey o f the entire d e v e l o p m e n t o f R o m a n battle
m e t h o d s . In view of the importance of this report, we must treat it in context and
try to justify in a sentence-by-sentence analysis the m a n n e r in which we have used
and evaluated it. Livy (8. 8) says:
"Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt, dein postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro
clipeis fecere." ("In former times the R o m a n s made use of r o u n d shields, but w h e n
they later became paid by stipend they manufactured o b l o n g shields in place of the
round ones.")
T h i s note is obviously the composition of a R o m a n antiquarian w h o imagined that
the Romans in o l d e n times must also have had the shield of the Homeric heroes,
and (one might say not at all unskillfully) linked the transition to the shield form of
the legionary of his time with the introduction of soldier's pay.
"Et q u o d antea phalanges similes Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa
acies coepit esse, postremo in plures o r d i n e s instruebantur." ("Although their line
had been drawn up at an earlier time in a way similar to Macedonian phalanxes, it
began later to be drawn up in maniples, and, finally, in several ranks.")
T h i s sentence shows that we are dealing with a real expert; it is to be u n d e r s t o o d
as: "The original phalanx was at first formed by maniples and finally divided into
several echelons."
T h e introduction of the e c h e l o n formation took place, as we shall find out later,
toward the e n d of the third century B . C . , in the Second Punic War. T h e next stage,
the cohort tactics, which was reached toward the turn of the second and first cen-
turies, was not yet m e n t i o n e d . From this we can c o n c l u d e that the description is that
of an author of the second century and, still m o r e exactly, of the first half of the
s e c o n d c e n t u r y . T h e w r i t e r c o m p a r e s the a n c i e n t R o m a n f o r m a t i o n with \the
Macedonian; he d o e s not m e a n , naturally, that the R o m a n s had been armed with
the sarissa in the most ancient times. If he had meant that, he would have had to call
the phalanx not simply "similar" but identical to the Macedonian. He can only have
meant the closed linear formation with the spear as individual arm—that is, the old
Greek hoplite phalanx. T h e author, presumably Cato, selects for his comparison,
however, the Macedonian phalanx instead of the Greek, because at that time, w h e n
they were waging war with the Macedonians or had just finished d o i n g so, the lat-
ters' phalanx was a very timely concept in Rome.
"Ordo s e x a g e n o s milites, d u o s centuriones, vexillarium u n u m habebat." ("The ordo
had 60 soldiers, 2 centurions, and 1 standard-bearer.")
T h e ordo, which had 60 m e n , was the later century as half of the maniple. T h e
later ordo, however, did not have 2 but only 1 centurion, and besides the 60 hoplites
there were 40 lightly a r m e d m e n . Furthermore, it hardly had its o w n standard-
bearer, since it was not the century but the maniple that carried an ensign. Either
Livy was completely confused at this point, and therefore, by reading in his source
the word "ordo" in the sense of "echelon," thinking of ordo in the sense of century,
and wishing to give an explanation, he injected his indefinite and slanted recollec-
tion at this point—or a later interpolator corrupted the text in this manner. T h e
sentence should therefore be struck out.
"Prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim." ("The first line was made up of
the hastati, 15 maniples.")
Aside from this we know only of a division of the legion into the 3 echelons of the
hastati, principes, and triarii, each of 10 maniples. T h e 15 maniples Livy reports here
may, however, very well be historically accurate. It is conceivable that originally the
old phalanx was divided into only 2 echelons, of 15 maniples each, and that a recol-
lection of this was retained in the account. It is true, of course, that Livy d o e s make
the mistake of giving all 3 echelons 15 maniples. But a legion of 45 maniples cer-
tainly never existed. T h e original legion of 42 centuries is definitely proved for us
by the voting organization of the century elections, and the relationship between this
legion and that described by Polybius, in which there are 1,200 lightly armed m e n
allocated to 3 , 0 0 0 hoplites, equaling 42 centuries, is completely clear. T h i s d e v e l o p -
ment cannot possibly have been interrupted o n c e by a totally different table of
strengths, from which, either by chance or intentionally, they had c o m e back again
to the old figures. T h e consistency of these numbers over several h u n d r e d years
shows us, rather, how conservatively they t h o u g h t in the retention of the normal
figures, o n c e they were adopted.
". . . Distantes inter se modicum spatium. manipulus levis vicenos milites, aliam
turbam scutatorum habeat; leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vo-
cabantur. haec prima frons in acie f l o r e m i n v e n u m p u b e s c e n t i u m ad militiam
habebat. robustior inde aetas totidem m a n i p u l o r u m , quibus principibus est n o m e n ,
hos sequebantur scutati o m n e s , insignibus m a x i m e armis." ("There was only a small
space between them. T h e light maniple had 20 infantrymen and another squad of
troops armed with shields. T h o s e maniples were called 'light' that carried only the
spear and the long javelin. T h i s was the front of the line, and it was c o m p o s e d of
young m e n who were new to military service. After them came m e n of a m o r e ma-
ture age in so many other maniples—they were called principes—and they were all
shield-bearers, whose arms were especially marked.")
Of value in this extract is the note that the maniples of hastati were allocated 20
lightly armed m e n , but those of the principes had n o n e . It is not clear why a n y o n e
would have made such a statement falsely, and so it is to be regarded as g e n u i n e
and verifies our interpretation that only a small n u m b e r of the lightly armed m e n
are to be regarded as real combatants.
"Hoc triginta m a n i p u l o r u m a g m e n antepilanos appellabant, quia sub signis j a m
alii quindecim o r d i n e s locabantur. . . ." ("They used to call this host or 'battalion' of
30 maniples the antepilani because 15 [other] lines were placed behind the stand-
ards.")
A special tactical m e a n i n g of the "antepilani" and of the troops "sub signis" is no-
w h e r e to be f o u n d ; f u r t h e r m o r e , the w o r d "antepilani" can o n l y be e x p l a i n e d
through the fact that the triarii were o n c e called pilani, and therefore their first cen-
turion was still called at a later period primus pilus. T h e true meanings of the words
pilus and pilani, however, are not known; as Soltau has correctly pointed out, they
are not related to pilum. We may, however, also conclude from this passage that in
combat the standards were placed between the principes and the triarii.
"Ex quibus o r d o u n u s quisque tres partes habebat. e a r u m unam q u a m q u e primam
pilum vocabant. tribus ex vexillis constabat, vexillum centum octoginta sex h o m i n e s
erant. primum vexillum triarios ducebat, veteranum militem spectatae virtutis; se-
c u n d u m rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque; tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae
m a n u m : eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur." ("Of these, every single ordo had 3
parts. T h e first o n e of each of them was called the pilum; it consisted of 3 units and
there were 186 m e n in e a c h unit. T h e first unit was formed of the triarii, veteran
soldiers of proven courage; the second was f o r m e d of the rorarii, of lesser strength,
age, and e x p e r i e n c e ; and the third was f o r m e d of the accensi, the least reliable unit;
for that reason they were placed back in the last line.")
T h i s passage has caused scholars a great deal of trouble. If the 3-by-15 maniples
are difficult to explain, then the 3 units, each of 186 m e n , are absolutely impossible
to cope with. T h e y have tried to c h a n g e the handwritten "vexillum" into "vexilla III,"
but that, too, is only an apparent solution. Finally, the entire sequence from "earum
unam quamque" up to "octoginta sex homines erant" was eliminated as being an interpo-
lation. B u t how is an i n t e r p o l a t o r s u p p o s e d to have arrived specifically at the
n u m b e r 186?
All the researchers are now agreed that there are s o m e very serious errors in-
volved. I should like to try to find the solution in the following way. First of all, the
45 maniples of triarii are to be eliminated. T h e y c a m e into the picture through the
fact that, in Livy's source, it was a question of an earlier period, where there were
only 2 e c h e l o n s in the legion, e a c h of 15 maniples. Livy erroneously attributed this
number to the triarii as well. After the triarii came into existence, each of the eche-
lons had only 10 maniples.
Moreover, the distinction b e t w e e n triarii, rorarii, and accensi according to their
military skill is obviously false. T h e distinction between triarii and rorarii lay in age,
armament, and function. T h e accensi, however, were not soldiers at all.
T h e formation that Livy describes, therefore, is not the battle formation, but the
muster formation, and this results also in the n u m b e r 186. At the muster, the non-
combatants and, where appropriate, the half-combatants, stood behind the combat-
ants, therefore behind the triarii. O n e maniple each of hastati, principes, a n d triarii
b e l o n g e d together. B e h i n d each triarii maniple, which was itself 60 m e n strong,
stood the 3-by-40 rorarii of the three maniples and the 6 accensi (orderlies, company
clerks) of the 6 centuries—that is, 186 m e n sub signis (behind the standard).
T h e confusion that Livy causes is only that he gives the rorarii and the accensi their
o w n detachments and that, as is later revealed, he considers the overall formation to
b e the battle o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n this s e n s e h e e x a g g e r a t e s ; his s o u r c e , h o w e v e r
—precisely the controversial n u m b e r 186 proves the point—was excellent. In Book
VI, Chapter I, below, in the battle of Cynoscephalae, we shall b e c o m e acquainted
with an analogy for o u r author's p r o c e d u r e : in using Polybius, he makes a transla-
tion error and then imagines the situation with his o w n fantasy on the basis of this
false translation and invents reasons for it. Since in this case we still possess the orig-
inal that he translated, his p r o c e d u r e can easily be seen through. T h e accensi of the
consuls and the tribunes, of w h o m there naturally must have b e e n some, did not, as
belonging to the staff, form up at musters of the legion.
"Ubi his ordinibus exercitus instructus esset, hastati o m n i u m primi p u g n a m ini-

bant, si hastati profligare hostem n o n possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in in-
t e r v a l s o r d i n u m principes recipiebant. turn principum p u g n a erat; hastati sequeban-
tur, triarii sub vexillis considebant sinistro crure porrecto, scuta innixa humeris, has-
tas suberecta c u s p i d e in terra fixas, haud secus q u a m vallo saepta inhorreret acies,
tenentes. si apud principes q u o q u e haud satis prospere esset p u g n a t u m , a prima acie
ad triarios sensim referebantur. i n d e rem ad triarios redisse, c u m laboratur, prover-
bio increbuit. triarii c o n s u r g e n t e s , ubi in intervalla o r d i n u m s u o r u m principes et
hastatos recepissent, e x t e m p l o compressis ordinibus velut claudebant vias, u n o q u e
c o n t i n e n t i a g m i n e iam nulla s p e post relicta in h o s t e m incidebant: id erat for-
midolosissimum hosti, c u m velut victos insecuti n o v a m r e p e n t e aciem e x s u r g e n t e m
auctam n u m e r o cernebant."
("When the army had been d r a w n up in these ranks, the hastati were the first of all
to go into battle; if they were not able to o v e r c o m e the e n e m y , they fell back and let
the principes m o v e into the breach, and the fight then b e c a m e theirs. T h e hastati then
followed t h e m , and the triarii took their positions u n d e r the banners, with their left
legs e x t e n d e d , their shields strapped to their shoulders, their spears pushed into the
ground and pointing upwards, just as if their battle line were strengthened by a
bristling palisade. If the principes were also losing the fight, they fell back slowly
from the battle line to the triarii. From this fact c a m e the saying 'to have c o m e to the
iriarii,' used w h e n things were g o i n g badly. T h e triarii, rising up after they had ab-
sorbed the hastati and principes into the intervals b e t w e e n their units, would im-
mediately draw their units together and close ranks, as it were; then, with no m o r e
available reserves, they would charge the e n e m y in o n e solid mass. T h i s was incredi-
bly terrifying to the e n e m y , who, pursuing those w h o m they thought they had con-
quered, suddenly perceived a new line rising up, increasing in number.")
Any possibility of an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d e v e l o p m e n t of R o m a n tactics is out of

the question as l o n g as we regard this description, with Livy, as that of a R o m a n
battle. In o r d e r for the maniples of principes to be able to pass t h r o u g h the maniples
of hastati, the latter would have had to be f o r m e d with intervals equal to the width
of a maniple front. T h a t is feasible to a certain extent on a completely level drill
field, where the unit m o v e s only a short distance forward and then halts at will to
correct errors and b e c o m e realigned. But this is completely impossible u n d e r war
conditions, since in the approach march the intervals would all be lost, here becom-
ing too large, there too small. Even if the hastati should succeed in reaching the
enemy with the correct intervals, that would still result in the most foolish battle
formation o n e can imagine. Each maniple would immediately be e n v e l o p e d on both
flanks and pressed together. Worse yet is the idea that the hastati had m o v e d for-
ward, to be sure, with intervals but had then taken up greater intervals between in-
dividuals just before making contact with the e n e m y , in order to close the front in
this manner. T h e most irremediable disorder would result if, just at the m o m e n t of
the final assault against the e n e m y , the soldiers first had to direct their attention to
taking up a new interval. Only to allow the principes to move up, the hastati would
have to squeeze together, m o v i n g in a l o n g the e n e m y front, with the latter con-
stantly slashing at them, into such a tight formation that they could use their o w n
weapons only with difficulty; and before the principes would have m o v e d into the
intervals, which, after all, c o u l d only gradually b e c o m e wide e n o u g h , the e n e m y
would naturally have used these freely offered breaches to penetrate and completely
overpower the hastati in their helpless, c o m p r e s s e d situation. T h e whole idea, there-
fore, of the chessboard-shaped formation of the maniples in battle must be thrown
out. But it immediately b e c o m e s usable and understandable as soon as we conceive
of it, as we did above, as simply a drill maneuver. For this purpose it is quite excel-
lently s u i t e d . T h e o n l y p o i n t that m i g h t b e e r r o n e o u s i n Livy's a c c o u n t a n d
which again is to be attributed to pure exaggeration is that the hastati were s u p p o s e d
to pull back while the principes m o v e d up. To carry out such a m o v e m e n t to the rear
in orderly fashion with a c o m p a n y of 120 m e n is hardly possible and m o r e o v e r
completely purposeless. Rather, the m a n e u v e r probably was e x e c u t e d in such a way
that the hastati stood still and the principes c o n t i n u e d to move forward. Livy necessar-
ily reversed this, since he imagined the whole action not as a drill but as a combat
m a n e u v e r and described it accordingly.
T h e interval b e t w e e n the R o m a n legionaries, as between Greek hoplites, was m u c h

greater than is the case today with us, in order to allow the free use of weapons.
T h e breadth of a file was estimated as 3 feet, whereas the width of a man at the
shoulders a m o u n t s to only 1 !4 feet. With the lack of contact, drilling is naturally
m u c h harder. T h e second rank was presumably f o r m e d not covering the files of the
front rank, but with the m e n behind the intervals, or at any rate they m o v e d over to
this position at the m o m e n t of contact with the e n e m y . For this reason, Vegetius, in
3. 14, estimated not 3 but 6 feet as interval between ranks, that is, from the first to
the third, from the second to the fourth, and so on. See also Rudolf Schneider,
Philologische Wochenschrift N o . 2 0 , 15 May 1886, and B o o k V I , Chapter I, below,
"Concerning the Sarissa and the Interval between Files."
2. In a very creditable way S t e i n w e n d e r has a t t e m p t e d to establish from the
12
sources the march formation of the Roman a r m y . I myself, however, would prefer
not to speak with c o m p l e t e certainty of such details in the present state of our
sources. Steinwender's study suffers, moreover, from his mistake in not taking into
account the gradual d e v e l o p m e n t of Roman tactics from the simple phalanx through
the manipular formation to the e c h e l o n e d series of lines. T h e manipular formation
is treated as if it had been a series of e c h e l o n s from the start. In a review of this
treatise in Militär-Literaturzeitung 9 (1907): 3 3 6 , Major Balck adds: "To j u d g e from
the n u m e r o u s R o m a n camps with which I am familiar, the porta praetoria (general's
gate) always had a greater width than the gates on the sides. According to my con-
cept, the m o v e m e n t out of the c a m p took place by using all the exits (see the citation
from Polybius: 'And the entire c a m p necessarily goes into motion'), in o r d e r to short-
en as m u c h as possible the time spent deploying from a narrow passage, in such a
way that the two legions simultaneously m o v e d out t h r o u g h the porta praetoria in two
march c o l u m n s side by side, while the allies left by the two side exits. In expectation
of a battle the 'agmen quadratum'—approach march formation—could then be taken
up by means of d e p l o y m e n t [Contrary to the author, I understand by this term a
march in a s h o r t e n e d march column], or, by controlling the times for marching off,
the n o r m a l m a r c h c o l u m n , the 'agmen pilatum' (with a front of f o u r files) was
formed."
1. X e n o p h o n , Hellenica 3. 2. 2; 4. 4. 9; 6. 2. 2 3 . P l u t a r c h , Phocion,
C h a p t e r 13.
2. Polyaenus 3 . 9 . 1 1 : I p h i c r a t e s has a fixed p o i n t on t h e t e r r a i n
in front of t h e c a m p o c c u p i e d , in o r d e r to p r o t e c t t h e c a m p . Of
course, immediately t h e r e a f t e r it is r e c o u n t e d a g a i n (para. 17) that
Iphicrates, in e n e m y territory, also h a d a t r e n c h d u g a r o u n d the
c a m p so that, as c o m m a n d e r , he would p e r h a p s n o t have to say: "I
h a d not t h o u g h t of that." ("I did not think as befits a general."*)
J u d g i n g from that, it p r o b a b l y h a p p e n e d m o r e often, after all, t h a n
a p p e a r s in t h e sources, t h a t at least a t r e n c h was d u g for t h e p r o -
tection of the c a m p .
3 . P o l y b i u s calls i t f o u r - s i d e d ; t h e l a t e r c a m p d e s c r i p t i o n o f
H y g i n u s gives t h e s h a p e a s r e c t a n g u l a r . T h e c o r n e r s w e r e r o u n d e d
off in t h e later p e r i o d , a n d p r e s u m a b l y also from t h e start. To a
certain e x t e n t t h e c a m p was naturally always laid o u t in conformity
with t h e t e r r a i n , w i t h o u t e l i m i n a t i n g t h e basic s h a p e . S o m e o f t h e
c a m p s of Caesar in G a u l a r e to this very day so well p r e s e r v e d that
N a p o l e o n I I I was able to have t h e i r size a n d s h a p e very accurately
established t h r o u g h excavations.
We c a n n o t go into t h e details of t h e R o m a n c a m p h e r e . I refer
the r e a d e r , in a d d i t i o n to M a r q u a r d t , to Fröhlich, Caesar's Military

System (Kriegswesen Cäsars), p p . 74 a n d 220 ff.
4. It is usually a s s u m e d (see M a r q u a r d t , p. 426), on the basis of a
description by Cicero in t h e Tusculanae Disputationes (2. 16. 37), t h a t
t h e l e g i o n a r i e s r e g u l a r l y c a r r i e d a l o n g t h e fortification s t a k e s .
Against this viewpoint, Liers (p. 155) p r o p e r l y cited t h r e e passages
from Livy (8. 3 8 . 7; 10. 2 5 . 6; 2 5 . 36. 5), w h e r e it is related as t h e
n o r m a l t h i n g that t h e soldiers did n o t cut t h e stakes until r e a c h i n g
the c a m p site; a n d he gives a f o u r t h citation (33. 6. 1), w h e r e t h e
practice of c a r r y i n g t h e m along obviously a p p e a r s as s o m e t h i n g ex-
ceptional.
( A d d e d in t h e t h i r d edition.) Stolle, in The Roman Legionary and
his Equipment (Der Römische Legionar und sein Gepäk) (1914), believes,
after all, that he m u s t go along with t h e a c c o u n t that the fortifica-
tion stake also was i n c l u d e d in the soldier's r e g u l a r e q u i p m e n t ; that
it was, however, only a r a t h e r thin pole, t h e weight of which he es-
timates at 1,310 g r a m s . See below, e x c u r s u s 6 to Book VI, C h a p t e r II.
5. S e e also A d o l f B a u e r . Greek Military Antiquity (Griechisches
Kriegsaltertum), p a r a . 39.
6. Gilbert, in Handbook of Greek National Antiquities (Handbuch der
griechischen Staatsaltertümer) (2d e d . ) , 1: 3 5 6 , n o t e , s t a t e s : " T h e
c o m m a n d e r has t h e p o w e r o f t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n the f i e l d " a n d
cites as a u t h o r i t y Lysias 13 ("Against Agoratos"*), 67. T h e passage
reads: " H e was c a u g h t while he was s e n d i n g secret signals to the
e n e m y a n d was e x e c u t e d o n a p l a n k b y o r d e r o f L a m a c h u s . " *
T h e r e was, c o n s e q u e n t l y , o n e m a n w h o was b e a t e n t o d e a t h for
treason u n d e r L a m a c h u s b e f o r e Syracuse. U n d e r which f o r m o f
j u d g m e n t that took place we do n o t know. It is naturally to be as-
s u m e d that crimes like t r e a s o n could, in t h e field, be immediately
p u n i s h e d by d e a t h , b u t how far in this p r o c e d u r e t h e disciplinary
p o w e r o f t h e c o m m a n d e r c a m e i n t o t h e p i c t u r e c a n n o t b e seen
from t h e cited passage.
7. Aristotle, in Politics 3. 14 (9). 2, says t h a t in c o m b a t the S p a r t a n
kings h a d t h e p o w e r of life a n d d e a t h ; o u t of c o m b a t this was n o t
the case. T h i s base is too n a r r o w for the f o r m a t i o n of real military
discipline.
8. C o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t by B e l o c h in Greek History (Griechische
Geschichte), 2: 4 7 9 .
9. F o r t h e earlier p e r i o d this right of the c e n t u r i o n s is not directly
p r o v e d for us, a n d w h o e v e r sees in t h e R o m a n citizen a r m y a levy
of p r o p e r t y o w n e r s could h a r b o r t h e p r e s u m p t i o n that this kind of
discipline was n o t i n t r o d u c e d until t h e c h a n g e o v e r t o r e c r u i t i n g

a m o n g the masses. As I conceive the history of the R o m a n military
constitution, however, t h e r e can be no d o u b t that t h e discipline was
based from t h e start on t h e same principles. W h e r e v e r in the high-
est position t h e d e a t h sentence is h a n d l e d with such discretionary
power, it lies in t h e n a t u r e of things that s u b o r d i n a t e officials, too,
have b r o a d a u t h o r i t y . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , it also lies in t h e n a t u r e
of things that, as long as t h e c e n t u r i o n felt himself to be a citizen
a m o n g fellow citizens, h e m a d e c e r t a i n distinctions, a n d t h e r e -
spected head of a h o u s e h o l d was not really e x p o s e d to t h e d a n g e r
of strokes in o r d i n a r y service.
Against my concept it would be possible to cite Polybius 6. 3 7 . 8,
w h e r e t r i b u n e s a r e given t h e right to p u n i s h , to fine, a n d to lash
("fines, or sureties, or flogging"*), without m e n t i o n i n g t h e c e n t u -
rions. But Polybius is speaking here of p u n i s h m e n t in the
f r a m e w o r k of formal p r o c e e d i n g s , in addition to which t h e r e could
very well have existed an additional b e a t i n g by t h e captains, not
specifically p r o v i d e d by t h e law, in o r d e r to m a i n t a i n good o r d e r .
10. See also above, p. 2 6 3 , a n d below, p. 2 9 2 .
11. Livy 29. 9. 4. Valerius M a x i m u s 2. 7. 4. F r o n t i n u s , Strategemetos
4 . 1 . 3 0 - 3 1 . " C o t t a c o n s u l P . A u r e l i u m s a n g u i n e sibi j u n c t u m ,
quern obsidioni L i p a r a r u m , ipse ad auspicia r e p e t e n d a M e s s a n a m
t r a n s i t u r u s , praefecerat, c u m a g g e r incensus et capta castra essent,
virgis c a e s u m in n u m e r u m g r e g a l i u m p e d i t u m r e f e r r i et m u n e r i b u s
fungi jussit." ("When the consul Cotta was on t h e p o i n t of g o i n g to
Messana to take t h e auspices again, he placed in c o m m a n d of the
blockade of t h e L i p a r i a n Islands a certain Publius A u r e l i u s w h o was
related to h i m by blood. B u t w h e n t h e latter's line of blockade was
b u r n e d a n d his c a m p was c a p t u r e d , Cotta o r d e r e d h i m t o b e flog-
g e d , r e d u c e d to t h e r a n k s , a n d to p e r f o r m t h e tasks of a c o m m o n
soldier.")
12. T h e o d o r S t e i n w e n d e r , p r o f e s s o r in t h e Royal Gymnasium in
Danzig, The March Formation of the Roman Army at the Time of the
Manipular Organization (Die Marschordnung des römischen Heeres zur
Zeit der Manipularstellung) (Danzig: A. W. K a s e m a n n , 1907).
Chapter IV
Pyrrhus
We h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h e most ancient R o m a n tactics from t h e ac-
counts h a n d e d d o w n to us i n t e r w o v e n with R o m a n constitutional
history; we have received no i n f o r m a t i o n , however, on t h e details
of any particular battle. T h e most ancient R o m a n battles of which
w e m i g h t know s o m e t h i n g from t h e n a t u r e o f t h e sources a r e t h e
battles with P y r r h u s . A l t h o u g h it is t r u e t h a t even t h e n a n d for a
l o n g t i m e t h e r e a f t e r n o t r u e h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t was w r i t t e n i n
R o m e , n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e G r e e k s w h o took p a r t d i d not let t h e s e
n o t e w o r t h y e v e n t s p a s s u n n o t i c e d . P y r r h u s h i m s e l f left h i s
m e m o i r s , which w e r e used in t h e sources we have at h a n d , espe-
cially P l u t a r c h .
Nevertheless, t h e r e is practically n o t h i n g to be learned c o n c e r n -
ing t h e history of the military a r t from t h e s e accounts. Q u i t e a
n u m b e r of t h e details of the accounts m a y well be t r u e , a n d t h e
historian may be allowed to r e p e a t t h e accounts without d o i n g any
h a r m . F o r o u r p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , h o w e v e r , we m u s t establish a
stricter criterion. F o r us it is a q u e s t i o n of establishing t h e c o n t i n u -
ing d e v e l o p m e n t of a t e c h n i q u e , a n d for this p u r p o s e only u n c o n -
ditionally reliable details may be u s e d . B u t t h e accounts of the Pyr-
rhic W a r , e v e n t h o u g h they go back to originally valid witnesses,
have c o m e to us t h i r d - h a n d , so t h a t t h e r e is so little we can do to
test their sources a n d to s e p a r a t e t h e m from t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g fa-
bles a n d l e g e n d s t h a t n o n e of t h e facts may be c o n s i d e r e d as com-
pletely reliable.
P y r r h u s was t h e n e p h e w a n d imitator o f A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t .
With full t r u s t in t h e military system a n d t h e a r t of war d e v e l o p e d
by t h e g r e a t M a c e d o n i a n s , whose disciple he was, he m a r c h e d o u t
to c o n q u e r t h e West, as A l e x a n d e r h a d subjected t h e East. By t h e
addition o f e l e p h a n t s h e h a d m a d e this military p o w e r even m o r e
fearful t h a n i t h a d f o r m e r l y b e e n u n d e r A l e x a n d e r . B u t h e was
297
u n a b l e t o o v e r c o m e t h e t o u g h r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e city-state t h a t
d o m i n a t e d Italy, with its u n i q u e l y s t r u c t u r e d m i l i t a r y s y s t e m .
T h o u g h victorious in battle on several occasions, he was still even-
tually forced to give up t h e war. We do n o t know w h e t h e r he fi-
nally suffered a real tactical defeat or if the tactical battle r e m a i n e d
u n d e c i d e d a n d only t h e impossibility of gaining a reliable political
base m o v e d t h e k i n g - s o l d i e r of f o r t u n e to give up t h e struggle as
hopeless. At any rate, t h e R o m a n s w e r e able to h o l d their o w n , de-
spite r e p e a t e d defeats in t h e field, a n d that was e n o u g h to p r e v e n t
P y r r h u s from establishing an h e g e m o n y from which he could have
d r a w n t h e m e a n s for c a r r y i n g on t h e struggle. W i t h o u t such a d o m -
inant position in Italy itself a n d having to rely solely on supplies
from t h e u n i m p o r t a n t E p i r u s , he was not able to c a r r y on t h e fight.
EXCURSUS
1. In addition to the general works on Roman history by M o m m s e n and Ihne, as

well as Niese's History of the Greek and Macedonian States (Geschichte der griechischen und
macedonischen Staaten) (see especially the battle of Chaeronea), two m o n o g r a p h s are
important for a study of Pyrrhus: R. von Scala, The Pyrrhic War (Der Pyrrhische Krieg),
1884; R. von Schubert, History of Pyrrhus (Geschichte des Pyrrhus), 1894.
T h e worthlessness of the R o m a n accounts for this period is well p r e s e n t e d by
Schubert, p. 182.
2. T H E BATTLE OF HERACLEA
T h e strength of the R o m a n s is estimated by M o m m s e n as at least 5 0 , 0 0 0 , by Scala
at some 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n . T h e size of Pyrrhus' army is equally u n k n o w n to us.
Pyrrhus drew up his army b e h i n d the Siris River and is s u p p o s e d to have wished
to avoid battle while awaiting allies. T h i s is improbable in every respect. Pyrrhus was
a capable e n o u g h c o m m a n d e r to know that a small river like the Siris offered no
real obstacle. If he was awaiting m o r e allies, the R o m a n s could likewise easily have
m o v e d up reinforcements; they were far from being at full strength, reportedly hav-
1
ing only a fourth of their army on h a n d .
It may be correct that a quick decision meant m o r e to the R o m a n s than to the
E p i r o t e . T h e m e r e fact o f his c o n t i n u i n g p r e s e n c e o n Italian soil was already
weakening the authority of the R o m a n s vis-a-vis their subject states, and whatever
the R o m a n s lost, Pyrrhus gained. O n c e the two sides faced each other, however,
Pyrrhus would have to accept the tactical decision in o r d e r to prove the superiority
of his military skill to the anxiously waiting p e o p l e s of Italy. Hesitation on his part
would have w e a k e n e d their confidence in him. Pyrrhus no doubt, then, took up his
position behind the river not with the idea of avoiding battle but in o r d e r to gain
the tactical advantage in the e x p e c t e d battle. He did not pitch his camp directly by
the river, but at a certain distance, and he o b s e r v e d the crossing only with his
cavalry. W h e n the sources report that, on hearing that the R o m a n s had crossed the
river, he was at first surprised and confused, that s e e m s to me to be absolutely in-
credible, for he could not possibly have wished for anything better.
Just as incredible is the report that, now recognizing his advantage and wishing to
attack the R o m a n s while they were still in disorder d u r i n g the crossing, he drove
against them with his cavalry alone, leaving his phalanx in place. Why this splinter-
ing of his o w n forces?
Pyrrhus 299
W h e n his cavalry gave way, Pyrrhus is s u p p o s e d to have sent his phalanx into the
attack, and after it had fought for a long time without gaining a decision, he finally
was able to carry the day by means of his elephants. Every attempt to explain why
Pyrrhus supposedly committed his forces individually in such an illogical m a n n e r
falls flat. Since the crossing of a large army over a river that, as is expressly reported
by Plutarch, was passable by infantry only at o n e ford, takes a long time and Pyr-
rhus was promptly informed by his cavalry c o n c e r n i n g the approach of the Romans,
there can be no doubt that he had plenty of time to form his army properly in battle
formation and to have it move up in close order. It is impossible to find any reason
for holding back the elephants. Pyrrhus w o u l d no d o u b t have truly been wantonly
exposing his infantry to heavy losses if, instead of driving off the Roman cavalry
with the h e l p of his elephants at the very start and then falling on the flank of the
Roman infantry, he had, as Plutarch's source fabricates, first had his phalanx alter-
nate seven times with the Roman legions between flight and pursuit. T h e King, after
all, had complete f r e e d o m to choose to avoid battle by taking up a withdrawal be-
fore the R o m a n s had crossed the river—or to give battle, whether it be directly at
the river or farther to the rear somewhat later. T h e idea that, in unthinking haste in
order to attack the R o m a n s while they were still crossing, he committed his troops
piecemeal against the e n e m y is in itself incredible on the part of a c o m m a n d e r of
recognized importance, and it is finally quite impossible that the elephants should
have c o m e up later than the infantry, which always requires a rather l o n g time to
form up.
Even if we are willing to assume that the King initially still did not want to offer
battle but by committing his cavalry simply wanted to drive back across the river
those portions of the R o m a n force that had crossed, it would still continue to be
incomprehensible that he did not also immediately bring up the infantry and espe-
cially that he left the elephants behind.
T h e account passed d o w n through Zonaras also indicates, it is true, that the battle
started as a result of the Romans' crossing the river, and it also has the elephants
uncommitted until the end, but in o t h e r respects it is very different and is notably
lacking in any account of the long, indecisive struggle of the two phalanxes.
T h e reported n u m b e r s of the R o m a n casualties vary between 7,000 and s o m e
15,000. Since we do not know their overall strength, however, these figures have
only very little interest for us. It is noteworthy that in the sources absolutely n o t h i n g
is said of the difficulties the defeated R o m a n s must have had in withdrawing across
the river. Only Zonaras mentions that they had to m o v e back across the river. Pyr-
rhus is s u p p o s e d to have called o f f the pursuit because of a w o u n d e d elephant that
became wild and frightened the others.
3. BATTLE OF ASCULUM
T h e reports on this battle are e v e n m o r e uncertain and more contradictory than
those on the battle of Heraclea.
T h e r e is contained in Dionysius a very exact account of the formation of the two
armies; in Frontinus 2. 3. 21 a different o n e . Schubert (p. 194) has shown that we
have here late R o m a n fantasies, presumably of Claudius Quadrigiarius and of Val-
erius Antias.
According to Plutarch's source (probably H i e r o n y m u s ) the battle lasted two days,
according to Dionysius only o n e day.
On the first day the battle is s u p p o s e d to have taken place on an u n e v e n , swampy
piece of terrain, limited by a stream, so that Pyrrhus could not make good use of his
cavalry and elephants. According to the accounts of the battle of Heraclea, it was
precisely by m e a n s of these arms that he finally won; how then is such a c o m p e t e n t
c o m m a n d e r s u p p o s e d to have c o m e to the point of accepting battle on terrain that
was especially unfavorable for him? In his tactical ability he was, after all, certainly
superior to the annually c h a n g i n g mayors w h o c o m m a n d e d the Roman armies. On
the second day the battle is said to have been continued on an o p e n plain. Why did
the Romans, who on the previous day had arranged the scene so cleverly, go along
with this? It is not impossible, of course, that it h a p p e n e d this way, but we know
nothing about the circumstances under which this took place and on which every-
thing d e p e n d s for an understanding of the events.
As at Heraclea, according to both Plutarch and Dionysius, Pyrrhus is said to have
brought his elephants up only toward the e n d of the battle and t h r o u g h them to
have gained the victory.
Both armies are r e p o r t e d t o have had s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n o n foot and 8 , 0 0 0
cavalry, and Pyrrhus also had 19 elephants. Simply because, by chance, no differing
numbers are given, these figures are no more credible than others of this period. It
may be correct, however, that Pyrrhus lost 3,505 m e n killed and the R o m a n army
some 6,000, since this information comes from Pyrrhus' memoirs.
According to Dionysius, Pyrrhus did not fight his way to any victory at all, but the
battle remained indecisive, because Pyrrhus himself was w o u n d e d . A c c o r d i n g to
Zonaras, it was in fact the Romans w h o won a complete victory.
4. BATTLE OF BENEVENTUM
O u r reports on the battle of B e n e v e n t u m are completely worthless; we cannot
even say whether Pyrrhus suffered a real defeat here or simply was unable to carry
out his attack, thus leaving the battle undecided. In this respect I invite the reader's
attention to what Niese (2: 52) says. T h e usual account, which distorts the result of
the battle in saying that the R o m a n s had by now learned to d e f e n d themselves
against the elephants by shooting them with burning arrows and thereby frightening
them back against their o w n m e n , is found in Eutropius and Orosius. It is contradic-
tory, however, with the relatively best report that we have, in Plutarch, where it is
said that the elephants drove the o n e R o m a n flank back as far as their c a m p and
only at that point were themselves driven o f f by the attack and the missiles of the
fresh forces of the camp garrison. T h e use of burning arrows in a battle is probably
almost out of the question, since the soldier, w h e n he is so close to the e n e m y , has
no o p p o r t u n i t y to set fire to his arrow, and c o n s e q u e n t l y we also hear n o t h i n g
further of the use of this alleged invention against elephants in later battles. Of
course, this use of burning arrows is conceivable from a fixed fortification.
Zonaras shifts the use of fire against the elephants to an earlier date, the battle of
A s c u l u m . Special chariots to fight against the e l e p h a n t s and use fire were s u p -
posedly built. T h e y were of no use, however, since Pyrrhus perversely refused to
have his elephants attack in the area where the chariots had been placed. At Be-
n e v e n t u m , according to Zonaras, a w o u n d e d y o u n g e l e p h a n t s e e k i n g its mother
brought disorder into the ranks of Pyrrhus' army and defeat to the King.
N O T E FOR C H A P T E R IV
1. Schubert, p. 174.
Chapter V
The First Punic War
T h e situation with respect to o u r k n o w l e d g e of t h e First Punic
W a r is q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y of that g o v e r n i n g t h e Pyrrhic W a r . N o w a
historian of t h e first r a n k a n d a m a n w h o h a d particular interest in
the art of w a r a n d m a d e very informative e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e sub-
ject comes into t h e picture—Polybius. Aside from his account t h e r e
are practically no i n d e p e n d e n t sources at all, a n d he has t h e habit
of t h i n k i n g a situation t h r o u g h objectively, backing it up with his
w e l l - g r o u n d e d a u t h o r i t y . C o n s e q u e n t l y it has always b e e n custom-
ary simply to r e p e a t his account. B u t it is n o t impossible t h a t t h e r e
might be a certain delusion in d o i n g so. Polybius did not personally
e x p e r i e n c e t h e First Punic W a r , a s h e did s o m e o t h e r s , n o r was h e
able t o q u e s t i o n c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d w i t n e s s e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e
events. His book is based principally on two sources—a R o m a n o n e ,
Fabius Pictor, a n d a G r e e k o n e written from t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n point
of view, P h i l i n u s . Polybius was sufficiently critical a n d well in-
f o r m e d to be able to seek verification by balancing the two a u t h o r s
against each o t h e r a n d in this way to create a new a n d excellently
h a r m o n i o u s p i c t u r e . B u t precisely by eliminating e v e r y t h i n g with
which he d i s a g r e e d , he m a d e it impossible for us to recognize what
value his s o u r c e s really h a d . T h i s w o r t h c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , h a v e
b e e n s o very g r e a t . F a b i u s P i c t o r was b o r n a b o u t 2 5 3 B . C . a n d
probably did n o t write his w o r k until after t h e e n d of t h e Second
Punic W a r . We know, however, how very m u c h oral tradition dis-
torts t h e events even i n t h e c o u r s e o f o n e g e n e r a t i o n . T h e skeleton
of t h e basic facts was given by t h e city diary, b u t t h a t is n o t w h a t we
a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n h e r e . T h e r h y m e d c h r o n i c l e o f Naevius, which
p r e c e d e d Fabius in t h e a c c o u n t of t h e First P u n i c W a r , will still
h a r d l y s t r e n g t h e n t h e g u a r a n t e e for t h e accuracy of the p i c t u r e , as-
s u m i n g that Fabius d i d use it, even t h o u g h t h e c o m p o s e r was h i m -
self o n e of the c o m b a t a n t s . Philinus probably took p a r t in t h e w a r
301
on the C a r t h a g i n i a n side a n d to t h a t e x t e n t was closer to the events

1
t h a n was Fabius, b u t a c c o r d i n g to what Polybius himself r e p o r t s
a b o u t h i m , he was n o t very reliable. F r o m such sources even the
greatest m a s t e r can h a r d l y create a history t h a t is reliable in its de-
tails. In A l e x a n d e r ' s case, too, no d o u b t , we do not possess any real-
ly p r i m a r y source, but a l t h o u g h A r r i a n offers us t h e information
s e c o n d - h a n d , j u s t as d o e s Polybius, a n d even t h o u g h Polybius is the
s h a r p e r critic of t h e two, we a r e nevertheless better off with A r r i a n ,
because his original sources w e r e by far the better o n e s . Ptolemy
a n d Aristobulus, w h o m h e used for t h e most p a r t , w e r e direct par-
ticipants, even eyewitnesses of the events from a d o m i n a t i n g position.
Fabius a n d probably Philinus, too, w e r e h a r d l y any closer to the
events of the First Punic W a r t h a n was H e r o d o t u s to those of the
Persian Wars. B u t with H e r o d o t u s we a r e able to see a n d to test,
with o u r o w n eyes, what we s h o u l d accept a n d w h a t reject; for the
First Punic W a r w e a r e completely d e p e n d e n t o n Polybius' j u d g -
m e n t . N o m a t t e r , t h e n , how highly o n e m i g h t evaluate t h e critical
a n d h i s t o r i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f P o l y b i u s a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y also a p -
preciate t h e fact t h a t he h a d sources f r o m b o t h sides, nevertheless
o u r k n o w l e d g e of t h e battles in a n d a r o u n d Sicily a n d Africa has a
less solid basis as to details t h a n t h a t c o n c e r n i n g M a r a t h o n a n d
Plataea.
T h e result of this observation, t h e r e f o r e , is that, d e s p i t e Polybius,
we m u s t r e n o u n c e a closer investigation of t h e accounts of the First
Punic W a r . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t a n d decisive for us, t h e g e n e r a l as-
pects, the R o m a n m a n i p u l a r tactics—this we know already a n d owe
o u r k n o w l e d g e partly to this very s o u r c e ; b u t we may n o t trust the
details sufficiently. T o fill i n o u r c a n v a s with p r o b a b i l i t i e s a n d
h y p o t h e s e s would n o t increase o u r k n o w l e d g e . W e t h e r e f o r e pass
quickly over this war.
It is incorrect, as has long b e e n recognized, to see in this war the
struggle of a purely l a n d p o w e r against a sea p o w e r . R o m e was it-
self a very old t r a d i n g city, t h e m a r k e t of L a t i u m , a n d h a d as its
crest t h e galleon. T h e alliance, m o r e o v e r , of which it was t h e head,
included t h e seafaring cities of G r e a t e r G r e e c e from C u m a e a a n d
N a p l e s t o T a r e n t u m . I f u p t o t h a t t i m e R o m e h a d u s e d all its
p o w e r for land w a r f a r e , t h a t was because its o p p o n e n t s w e r e land
p o w e r s . A n d to t h e e x t e n t t h a t such was n o t the case, as in the old-
est t i m e s with t h e o t h e r L a t i n sea p o w e r s o r finally T a r e n t u m ,
R o m e h a d waged these battles in league with no o t h e r than
2
C a r t h a g e , which s p a r e d h e r the t r o u b l e of c r e a t i n g a s t r o n g e r sea
power. N o t until t h e s t r u g g l e against C a r t h a g e herself was it neces-
The First Punic War 303
sary to d e v e l o p f u r t h e r in this direction. R o m e built herself t h e

fleet of five-rowed galleys (or p e n t e r e m e s ) that she did not yet pos-
sess, a feat that, with h e r rich variety of materials n e e d e d for ship-
building, she was able to accomplish without g r e a t difficulty.
It will be useful to n o t e t h a t the f a m o u s account that t h e R o m a n s
had u n d e r s t o o d absolutely n o t h i n g o f s e a f a r i n g , h a d built t h e i r
ships on t h e m o d e l of a s t r a n d e d C a r t h a g i n i a n p e n t e r e m e , a n d h a d
trained their o a r s m e n on scaffoldings on land stems from Polybius,
who h e r e clearly fell victim to a m o n s t r o u s rhetorical e x a g g e r a t i o n .
T h e c o u n t e r p a r t to this is t h a t t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d to h a v e
themselves i n s t r u c t e d in t h e art of l a n d w a r f a r e by t h e S p a r t a n
X a n t h i p p u s . M o m m s e n considers this account, too, to be t h e e c h o
of G r e e k g u a r d h o u s e tales. Nitzsch c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m , since o n e
finds often e n o u g h in world history, he says, a n a r r o w - m i n d e d lack
of u n d e r s t a n d i n g such as t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s showed h e r e . T h a t is
quite right; Polybius, too, may have t h o u g h t this w h e n he took t h e
account possibly from Philinus. B u t even if it is not such an obvious
fable as t h e story of t h e b u i l d i n g of t h e R o m a n fleet, we certainly
also fail to find a n y w h e r e in Polybius' account any g u a r a n t e e that it
is t r u e .
T h e w a r e n d e d with the victory o f R o m e over C a r t h a g e , b o t h o n
land a n d at sea. T h i s superiority that R o m e h a d d e v e l o p e d was not,
however, so g r e a t ; t h e struggle h a d lasted for twenty-three years,
until this difference was at last p r o v e d , a n d on land the C a r t h a g i n -
ians had held their own up to the e n d on Sicily. T h e final decision
came at sea. W h e t h e r the invention of t h e b o a r d i n g b r i d g e really
c o n t r i b u t e d as m u c h to giving the R o m a n s t h e u p p e r h a n d in t h e
sea struggle as the accounts would p i c t u r e it, is probably also to
some e x t e n t d o u b t f u l . In the later sea battles t h e r e is no f u r t h e r
mention of this at all, a n d t h e R o m a n s still lost a g r e a t sea battle
despite t h e i r invention. T h e i r superiority in land warfare did n o t
g u a r a n t e e t h e m against t h e defeat of R e g u l u s in Africa, n o r could
they drive t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s completely from t h e island of Sicily.
T h e decisive factor i n the R o m a n s ' f i n a l l y w i n n i n g the u p p e r h a n d
was n o t so m u c h t h e c o u r a g e a n d military skill of the legionaries as
the capabilities o f t h e g r e a t Italian alliance, u n i t e d u n d e r R o m e ,
which allowed h e r again a n d again, after a certain time, to l a u n c h
new fleets in t h e place of those that w e r e w r e c k e d or w e r e b e a t e n .
Even C a r t h a g e could probably still have d o n e that, as t h e Merce-
nary W a r a n d t h e war t r i b u t e sent off to R o m e later s h o w e d , b u t
the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e w a r o f f e r e d h e r n o f u r t h e r p r o s p e c t s o f
success. S h e c o u l d surely h a v e h e l d o u t still l o n g e r a n d p e r h a p s
even have b e e n able to win a n o t h e r victory, b u t t h e victory would

have b e e n in vain. In a n y case, t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n land forces w e r e
too weak to wrest t h e cities a n d forts of Sicily back f r o m t h e Ro-
mans, and, as had already been proved, Rome could not be
b r o u g h t d o w n simply t h r o u g h defeats at sea. M o r e o v e r (assuming
t h a t o u r sources a r e r e p o r t i n g the full t r u t h in this respect), t h e
greatest R o m a n losses at sea w e r e attributable not so m u c h to t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n s as to wind a n d w e a t h e r c o m b i n e d with careless sea-
manship.
A n d s o t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w i t h o u t b e i n g fully d e f e a t e d , b u t
realizing that no final, positive victory was possible for t h e m , sub-
mitted to a peace u n d e r tolerable conditions. Even t h e R o m a n s did
not feel s t r o n g e n o u g h to struggle for m o r e t h a n this peace offered
t h e m . To do this they w o u l d have h a d to cross over to Africa—a
hopeless u n d e r t a k i n g as long as they w e r e n o t even able to d r i v e
H a m i l c a r B a r c a o u t of Sicily.
EXCURSUS
1. In the battle for the relief of A g r i g e n t u m (Polybius 1. 19) the Carthaginians

are said to have formed their 50 elephants behind their mercenaries. T h e s e mer-
cenaries are to be understood at any rate as light infantry, since still other "files"*
were formed up with (or behind) the elephants. T h e mercenaries were thrown back
by the Romans, and their flight is s u p p o s e d to have carried off with it the elephants
and all the rest of the army.
2. DEFEAT OF REGULUS IN AFRICA

After the Carthaginians had b e e n beaten in a m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t (Chapter 30)
because they accepted battle on terrain that was impassable for their cavalry and
elephants, the Spartan X a n t h i p p u s is said to have taught t h e m how they had to o p -
erate in order to beat the Romans. He chose an o p e n plain for a battlefield, had his
100 elephants in front of the line of infantry, and the cavalry with the light infantry
on both flanks. As we know of the action of the elephants from the battle on the
Hydaspes, this formation had the d a n g e r of having the elephants driven back by the
e n e m y missiles and bringing disorder to their o w n phalanx, which was aligned be-
hind them. T h e Romans, who were now familiar with the e l e p h a n t s from the ex-
perience of at least four battles and had recently captured a large n u m b e r of them
at A g r i g e n t u m , knew how to d e f e n d against t h e m . T h e y stationed spear-throwers in
the advanced e c h e l o n and b e h i n d t h e m f o r m e d the infantry unusually d e e p , so that
they could not be broken t h r o u g h by the elephants. T h i s formation is praised by
Polybius expressly as suited to combat against elephants. Nevertheless, the Romans
lost the battle because of the great superiority of the e n e m y cavalry (4,000 against
500), which, after driving off the R o m a n h o r s e m e n , attacked the phalanx in the
rear.
3. A l t h o u g h , according to Polybius' definite statement, it was not the elephants
but the cavalry that had brought about the defeat of Regulus in Africa, he says,
nevertheless, later in his account (Chapter 39), that fear of the elephants prevented
the R o m a n s for two years from allowing themselves to be e n g a g e d in a land battle in
Sicily- Finally the Carthaginians, for their part, had e n o u g h confidence (Chapter 40)
to attack the R o m a n s directly in front of Palermo, on the fortifications of which the
latter were basing their flanks. With arrows, javelins, and lances, s o m e of which were
shot and thrown from the walls, the R o m a n s w o u n d e d the elephants of the Car-
thaginians so extensively that they drove t h e m back into their own troops, w h o , swept
into confusion, were now beaten by the Romans, w h o sallied out from the city with
fresh troops.
4. T h e battle in which Hamilcar c o n q u e r e d the m u t i n o u s mercenaries (Chapter
76) is incomprehensible. In general, it is repeatedly pointed out that it was with the
help of the elephants that the Carthaginians finally seized the u p p e r hand in this
dangerous war.
5. Beloch, in Population (Bevölkerung), pp. 3 7 9 and 4 6 7 , has pointed out that the
numbers reported for the First Punic War, and particularly for the huge fleets that
both sides are s u p p o s e d to have outfitted, are subject to the strongest suspicion.
Fabius Pictor accepted the reported n u m b e r of ships, which actually included many
small ships, as n o t h i n g but p e n t e r e m e s and based the total number of the c o m b i n e d
crews on that.
C O N Q U E S T O F T H E CISALPINE GAULS
6. T h e transition from the First to the Second Punic War is f o r m e d by the con-
quest of Gallic u p p e r Italy by the Romans. Polybius gives us a rather t h o r o u g h ac-
count of this, and scholars w h o have treated R o m a n military subjects have m a d e
much use of this account. Precisely with respect to it, however, we must never forget
that Polybius is a distorted source, not at all an original o n e , and that the sources he
used were of greatly varying, generally only small value; therefore, whether it may
have been t h r o u g h carelessness or that he was dazzled by the colorful nature of the
legend or the piquant quality of discovery, he forgot the critical approach fairly
often and reported things that, despite his authoritativeness, we cannot accept as
true. T h e information contained in his second book c o n c e r n i n g the battles between
the R o m a n s and the Cisalpine Gauls from 2 3 8 to 2 2 2 B . C . is taken undoubtedly
from Fabius Pictor, w h o was in a position to report on t h e m as a contemporary of
the events and quite o f t e n an eyewitness. But for me the account inspires very little
confidence.
7. In the battle of T e l a m o n the Gallic Gaesatae (Transalpine mercenaries w h o had
m o v e d over to join their c o u n t r y m e n in u p p e r Italy) are said to have r e m o v e d their
clothing and to have f o r m e d up naked in battle order, t h r o u g h braggadocio and be-
cause they were c o n c e r n e d about being caught up in the thorny underbrush and
being i m p e d e d in the use of their weapons.
As the battle started, then, and the R o m a n s threw their pila, the Gauls, w h o had
kept on their coats and trousers, were reportedly protected by them, but the naked
Gaesatae, w h o because of their large stature were offered no protection by the Gallic
shields, suffered heavily. If it seems surprising that trousers and coat supposedly
provided better protection against the R o m a n javelins than did the shields, then it is
completely i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e that the attack with javelins should have taken the
Gaesatae completely unawares ("unexpectedly"*), since the author states immediately
before this that the R o m a n s had attacked according to their custom ("as is usual"*).
According to the apparent m e a n i n g of the account (2. 30), we would e v e n have to
assume that the Gaesatae were defeated simply by the light infantry massed in front
of the phalanx. "When the javelin-throwers advanced from the R o m a n ranks, as is
the custom, they threw their javelins with rapid and thick volleys. . . . W h e n the
javelin-throwers had withdrawn into the R o m a n ranks, the R o m a n maniples
attacked."*
8. In the next battle, against the Insubres (Polybius 2. 33), the R o m a n tribunes
are s u p p o s e d to have urged their soldiers to try a special manner of fighting. T h e y
had b e c o m e convinced that the Gauls were to be feared principally in the first at-
tack, and that the Gallic swords, u n d e r any circumstances g o o d only for hacking and
not for thrusting, were so poorly forged that after a blow they bent, both in their
width and along their length; for the second blow the soldiers had to put their feet
on them and bend them straight again.
In view of this circumstance, the tribunes gave the spears of the triarii to the
hastati. Against these spears the Gauls bent their swords as they struck, and before
they could straighten them again, the Romans fell on them with their sharp-pointed
swords and thrust them d o w n .
O n e would think that it would be easy for any well-equipped unit to defeat m e n
armed with such w e a p o n s as these Gauls had, and that no particular stratagems
would be necessary. But what d o e s the alleged stratagem have to do here with the
d a n g e r o u s aspect of the first assault of the spirited Gauls, and why did they strike
their swords crooked against the e n e m y spears, instead of catching up the spear
points with their shields and slashing away directly at the man? For a century and a
half the Romans had been fighting the Gauls, and now for the first time they discov-
ered the best way of e n g a g i n g them? A battle-seasoned p e o p l e like the Gauls is
supposed to have marched into battle with completely useless swords, instead (if the
state of their metal-working art was really still so primitive) of providing themselves
with the so easily m a n u f a c t u r e d and so effectively usable spear, t o p p e d off with a
piece of iron?
If it occurs anywhere, t h e n it is a particularly striking case here of the most palpa-
ble guard room tales distorted into serious historical reporting, and if that fact, as
soon as it is expressed, s h o u l d not be perfectly clear in and of itself, then we are also
in a position to cite a direct c o u n t e r p r o o f from o u r k n o w l e d g e of antiquity. For-
merly it was e v e n a s s u m e d that the Germanic tribes, early as was their period, had
possessed an effective metal-working technique. T h i s concept had to be given up, as
Lindenschmit e x p l a i n s in his treatise, "The Prehistoric Iron Sword N o r t h of the
Alps" ("Das vorgeschichtliche Eisenschwert nördlich der Alpen") in Antiquities of Our
Prehistoric Pagan Period (Altertümer unserer heidnischen Vorzeit), Vol. 4, Book 6:
" T h e shining light that was attributed to the distant prehistoric period of our
country through the a s s u m p t i o n of the existence of an i n d e p e n d e n t , highly per-
fected metal-working technique was extinguished in the face of the realization of the
s u d d e n disappearance of the same with the e n d of the R o m a n domination." But the
Celts had what the G e r m a n i c p e o p l e s still did not have. In Krain there was a very
old forge, c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h there have c o m e d o w n to us not only many classical
3
r e f e r e n c e s , but also m a n y actual artifacts. T h e iron has b e e n tested for its quality,
and it was f o u n d that an excellent steel was produced. Admittedly, with the primi-
tive preparation m e t h o d s u s e d , the malleable iron was not worked out with complete
uniformity; but they took the lower quality for the axes, where it is the mass that is
most important, and the best metal went into the swords. W h e n the scholar to whom
we are indebted for this research, Müllner-Leubach, adds that perhaps the poorer
warriors had to content themselves with swords of p o o r e r metal and in this way
4
clarifies for himself the a c c o u n t in Polybius, it s e e m s to me that it is absolutely un-
necessary, in fact is not e v e n permissible, to make this concession to the authority of
the written word. O n c e it is established that the Celts were skilled in iron working,
then it was too m u c h in the interest of the w h o l e c o m m u n i t y as of the individual for
them not to have s e e n to it that every m a n in the formation should be provided with
a usable weapon. If there actually was a shortage of swords, this was certainly not
the case with spears. S i n c e we now hear in a n o t h e r place from Polybius himself
(Fragment 137 Dindorf, 1 0 0 Becker, to the extent that this fragment is derived from
Polybius) that the swords of the Celtiberians had b e e n so excellent that the Romans
had adopted t h e m from t h e m , and D i o d o r u s , too, (5. 33) praised the Celtiberians as
particularly g o o d smiths, it can be seen that all these points actually converge to ex-
pose Polybius' account as p u r e fable.
Finally we read in the same chapter that the Consul Flaminius vitiated the special
trait of the R o m a n system of combat in this battle by forming up the army with its
back to a river, so that the maniples had no r o o m to draw back. T h i s criticism
naturally has nothing to do with the marching t h r o u g h of the maniples and the re-
lief of the echelons, as it was d o n e on the drill field and as it was earlier thought to
have taken place on the battlefield, too, since for this p u r p o s e no withdrawal is
necessary behind the position of the triarii. If the R o m a n s actually did have the river
directly behind them in the battle, that w o u l d have been, of course, a completely
incomprehensible formation—we would have to c o n c l u d e in this case perhaps that
the Consul had in mind raising the c o u r a g e of his m e n by removing any possibility
of a withdrawal—but this would hold true for any army and has nothing to do with
the particular m e t h o d of combat.
1. U n g e r , Rheinisches Museum 3 4 : 102. von Scala, Römische Studien

(a c o m p l i m e n t a r y g r e e t i n g from I n n s b r u c k to t h e 4 2 d Assembly of
G e r m a n P h i l o l o g u e s , 1 8 9 3 ) , s h o w e d t h a t i t was p r o b a b l e t h a t
Naevius, too, w h o did n o t write until h e h a d r e a c h e d a n a d v a n c e d
age, h a d already used Philinus.
2. Very e n l i g h t e n i n g on this point is W. Soltau in Neues Jahrbuch
für Philologie 154 (1896): 164.
3. Collected in L. Beck, History of Iron (Geschichte des Eisens), p.
5 1 0 , a n d f r o m Jähns, History of Offensive Arms (Geschichte der
Trutzwaffen), p. 72.
4. Korrespondenzblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie),
1889, p . 206.
BOOK V
The Second Punic War
Introduction
I n t h e history o f t h e art o f w a r f a r e t h e S e c o n d P u n i c W a r i s
epochal. We have b e e n able to d e t e r m i n e only a l o n g general lines
the first g r e a t c h a n g e in R o m a n tactics, o r , otherwise stated, t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e specifically Roman, m a n i p u l a r tactics from t h e
general f o r m of t h e hoplite p h a l a n x , b u t n o t really to observe it up
t o this p o i n t i n c o n c r e t e f o r m i n d e f i n i t e b a t t l e s o r t o fix i t
chronologically. T h e Second Punic W a r shows us t h e last massive
a p p e a r a n c e of this battle f o r m a t i o n in great battles, its defeat, its
inadequacy, a n d t h e shift to a new f o r m of tactics, technical skill in
which gave t h e R o m a n s mastery of t h e world within two g e n e r a -
tions. F o r t u n e has willed also that we s h o u l d receive t h o r o u g h a n d
concrete knowledge of these events. It is the account of these
events that w o n Polybius fame a n d a u t h o r i t y as a g r e a t historian.
F r o m this point on he was in a position to work with g e n u i n e m a t e -
rial, so to speak. Fabius Pictor, w h o served t h r o u g h o u t as his p r i n -
cipal g u i d e for t h e R o m a n side of these accounts, is h e r e r e p o r t i n g
as a c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d participant in t h e events; d u r i n g this war he
was a R o m a n s e n a t o r . F o r t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n side, h o w e v e r , his
s o u r c e is a G r e e k w h o , as a m e m b e r of H a n n i b a l ' s r e t i n u e , r e -
c o u n t e d the latter's acts; t h e a c c o u n t of t h e battle of C a n n a e is of
such quality t h a t it can only have b e e n written by a very g r e a t m a n .
I h a v e no d o u b t that we have at h a n d h e r e H a n n i b a l ' s o w n ac-
count, p e r h a p s dictated by h i m personally.
T h e r e a s o n s for this conjecture will be d e v e l o p e d below; it may
be n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a conjecture, b u t even this simple possibility
fills us with awe as we glance at these p a g e s : t h e city of the C a r t h a -
ginians has b e e n destroyed, a n d n o t a stone r e m a i n s on a stone;
t h e e n t i r e n a t i o n has b e e n e r a d i c a t e d , a n d not a m o n u m e n t of its
existence, n o t a d o c u m e n t , h a r d l y a s o u n d of its voice has b e e n
p r e s e r v e d or has a place in the m e m o r i e s of m a n . O n l y history tells
of Hamilcar's lion's b r o o d a n d follows t h e life of H a n n i b a l from t h e
oath t a k e n by t h e nine-year-old boy to his d e a t h , to t h e extinction
by his o w n h a n d of the old m a n , h a r a s s e d by t h e world, tired of
living. It is like an e n r i c h m e n t of m a n k i n d w h e n we i m a g i n e t h a t
311
we are h o l d i n g in o u r h a n d , in the account of his greatest victory, a

d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e m i n d o f this h e r o , t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g
storm-tossed p a g e from t h e existence of the o n c e so mighty Car-
t h a g e as it s t r u g g l e d for world s u p r e m a c y .
T h i s s o u r c e b r e a k s d o w n for t h e last y e a r s o f this w a r , b u t
Polybius was still able, in t h e circle of Scipio t h e Y o u n g e r , w h e r e he
lived, to seize a n d hold t h e living account himself. T h i s p a r t of the
a c c o u n t is not at t h e s a m e high level as t h a t of the first p a r t ; again
we recognize that Polybius was m o r e d e p e n d e n t on his materials
1
t h a n seems to be t h e c a s e . Nevertheless, d e s p i t e all t h e objections
that m u s t be raised, t h e a c c o u n t still r e m a i n s of such quality that,
after careful critical analysis, we can get to the b o t t o m of things.
In their first g r e a t s t r u g g l e C a r t h a g e was inferior to t h e R o m a n s
less o n l a n d t h a n a t sea. S o a s t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n p a t r i o t s , with
Hamilcar Barca at t h e i r h e a d , c o n s i d e r e d how they could succeed
in a future repetition of t h e war with R o m e , it is easy for us to con-
clude that it w o u l d be t h e most n a t u r a l t h i n g for C a r t h a g e , t h e old
t r a d i n g city, to strive for u n c o n d i t i o n a l superiority at sea. B u t t h e
recently c o m p l e t e d war h a d t a u g h t h e r otherwise. F r o m t h e start it
was impossible for C a r t h a g e to gain t r u e superiority at sea against
t h e n u m e r o u s seafaring cities of Italy u n i t e d u n d e r R o m e , a n d all
t h e m o r e so in that Sicily, too, with its m a n y t r a d i n g c e n t e r s a n d
p o r t s , b e l o n g e d to this alliance; a n d e v e n if she s h o u l d succeed
t e m p o r a r i l y , as h a d of c o u r s e h a p p e n e d in t h e First P u n i c W a r ,
nevertheless little would be accomplished t h e r e b y if she w e r e not
able t o e x p l o i t t h e a d v a n t a g e t h r o u g h l a n d w a r f a r e a n d d e f e a t
R o m e directly. In o r d e r n o t simply to hold h e r o w n b u t also to be
able for o n c e to d e f e a t R o m e , C a r t h a g e h a d to create, above all
else, a s u p e r i o r land a r m y a n d use it to attack R o m e at t h e very
seat of h e r power.
To f o r m this a r m y a n d simultaneously to give C a r t h a g e a substi-
tute for h e r lost h e g e m o n y in Sicily, H a m i l c a r m a r c h e d off to con-
q u e r Spain. As his son, H a n n i b a l was also t h e heir of his concept,
a s A l e x a n d e r o f M a c e d o n h a d b e e n t h e son a n d h e i r o f Philip.
H a n n i b a l d e f e a t e d t h e R o m a n s r e p e a t e d l y i n g r e a t battles a n d
b r o u g h t R o m e close to disaster. At sea, however, R o m e r e m a i n e d
t h e s t r o n g e r side, a n d we shall see how i m p o r t a n t t h a t b e c a m e for
the final result.
It is n o t t h e mission of a history of t h e a r t of w a r to p r e s e n t
these events in d e t a i l — t h a t would lead to a constantly b r o a d e n i n g
g e n e r a l m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y — b u t o n l y t o e x a m i n e a n d t o establish
which new f o r m s a n d discoveries t h e a r t o f w a r m i g h t p e r h a p s
Introduction 313
show in this p e r i o d a n d how the strategic genius of the C a r t h a g i n -

ian m a n i p u l a t e s a n d develops t h e traditional forms of t h e art. If
up to this point we have given o u r a t t e n t i o n to each r a t h e r i m p o r -
tant military action, we w e r e b o t h p e r m i t t e d a n d forced to do t h a t
because t h e accounts we have received w e r e only j u s t sufficient to
let us recognize t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d elucidate it. F r o m h e r e on
the sources flow d o w n to us so m u c h m o r e a b u n d a n t l y t h a t it suf-
fices to select individual typical events. M o r e o v e r we a r e obliged to
be satisfied with this selective p r o c e d u r e , since now t h e c o n d u c t of
war, in a p e r i o d w h e n very great, similar, a n d mutually w o r t h y a d -
versaries c o n f r o n t each o t h e r , b e c o m e s so complicated t h a t t h e in-
vestigation of every single action would lead into a limitless a r e a .
First of all, we must establish t h e tactical aspects. W h a t was t h e
basis for t h e s u p e r i o r i t y t h a t H a n n i b a l ' s t r o o p s s h o w e d in battle
vis-a-vis t h e R o m a n s ? T h i s tactical factor p r i n c i p a l l y — t h e confi-
d e n c e in b e i n g able to d e f e a t t h e R o m a n s in o p e n b a t t l e — m u s t
have d o m i n a t e d H a n n i b a l ' s strategy. J u s t as we w e r e able from t h e
tactical relationships to clarify t h e strategic decisions of Miltiades,
Themistocles, Pausanias, a n d Pericles, so m u s t we seek h e r e the key
to Hannibal's actions, his initial victories, a n d his final lack of suc-
cess. C o n s e q u e n t l y , we shall not p r o c e e d chronologically b u t shall
seek o u t first of all t h a t p a r t i c u l a r m i l i t a r y e v e n t in w h i c h t h e
specific tactical superiority of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y over t h e Ro-
mans is most clearly a n d fully recognizable. T h a t is the battle of
C a n n a e . T h e o t h e r battles a n d e n g a g e m e n t s w e n e e d t o treat only
to t h e e x t e n t t h a t is necessary to establish w h e t h e r they a r e in a-
g r e e m e n t with what we conceive of as t h e typical aspects of t h e bat-
tle of C a n n a e . N o t until we have established with certainty, t h r o u g h
this c o m p a r i s o n , t h e really characteristic e l e m e n t , t h e tactics of t h e
two sides, will w e b e able t o t u r n t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e i r
strategy.
EXCURSUS
In 1912 there a p p e a r e d the third v o l u m e of Kromayer's Ancient Battlefields (Antike

Schlachtfelder), the first half of which contained "Italy," treated by Kromayer, the
second containing "Africa," treated by G. Veith. T h e greatest a m o u n t of space is
naturally devoted to the Second Punic War. I have been quite critical in my j u d g -
ment of the earlier v o l u m e s of this work, and I must say now that, in relationship to
the great e x p e n d i t u r e of energy and the great pains taken on the spot in the topo-
graphic investigations, the useful results are only minor. Nevertheless, important
progress is to be n o t e d with respect to the strategic reasoning; this applies particu-
larly to Kromayer's p a m p h l e t for the g e n e r a l public, Rome's Struggle for World
Hegemony (Roms Kampf um die Weltherrschaft) (Leipzig: B. G. T e u b n e r ) , which con-
tains m u c h excellent material. T h e errors are to be found in the tactical aspects,
which the author has still not mastered. Even if he has now accepted a number of
my conclusions, he has still not arrived at clear perspectives, but by holding to the
old philological constructions, he has fallen into inner contradictions. Nevertheless, I
have been able to accept gratefully a few individual conclusions.
T h e History of the Carthaginians from 218 B . C . to 146 B . C . , (Geschichte der Karthager
von 218 bis 146), by Ulrich Kahrstedt (3d vol. of the work by Meltzer), 1913, is dedi-
cated almost entirely to the S e c o n d Punic War. T h e book is grandiloquent and
vague, the results completely useless. T h e numerical estimates, whether they be for
the city of Carthage or for the strengths of the armies, are, as Kromayer strikingly
proved in Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 8 (1917): 4 7 9 ff., not only false but completely
lacking in any real perception, w h e n , for e x a m p l e , the author has the Romans send
an army of one legion to Spain against Hannibal and has the Carthaginians gradually
beaten d o w n after Cannae by two R o m a n legions. I will not conceal the fact that
Eduard Meyer praises the book in that it has "significantly furthered our under-
standing of the war with Hannibal," but I support Kromayer's j u d g m e n t (p. 467) to
the effect that "the entire u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Italian war after Cannae has re-
mained closed" to Kahrstedt.
In the Reports of the Sessions of the Berlin Academy (Sitzungsberichte der Berliner
Akademie), Eduard Meyer has published three "Studies on the History of the Second
Punic War" ( " U n t e r s u c h u n g e n zur Geschichte d e s zweiten p u n i s c h e n Krieges"),
1913, p. 6 8 8 ; 1915, p. 937; 1916, p. 1068. W h e n he says in the last-cited o n e , on p.
1069, "Further, Mommsen's j u d g m e n t , too, on military questions and military his-
tory is only too often untenable; apparently these things, by their nature, are alien
to him"—one can easily agree. T h e same thing applies, however, to other historians.
C o n c e r n i n g Dessau's investigation, see below, Book V, Chapter I, C o m m e n t 3,
"Added in 3d edition."
N O T E FOR I N T R O D U C T I O N
1. This opinion has, moreover, already been expressed by

a n o t h e r writer, U n g e r in Rheinisches Museum 34: 97.
Chapter I
The Battle of Cannae

T h e R o m a n a r m y a t C a n n a e was twice a s large a s the o n e t h a t
h a d tried the first time, on t h e T r e b i a , to offer H a n n i b a l resistance
in pitched battle; it a m o u n t e d to no less t h a n 8 R o m a n legions a n d
c o r r e s p o n d i n g allied contingents, or a total of 16 legions—or, after
d e d u c t i n g t h e c a m p garrison a n d t h e rorarii, w h o did not function
as c o m b a t a n t s , on t h e o r d e r of 5 5 , 0 0 0 hoplites, 8,000 to 9,000 light
infantry, a n d also 6,000 cavalry. T h e g r e a t mass of hoplites was n o t
used to b r o a d e n t h e front b u t to increase t h e d e p t h of t h e f o r m a -
tion. T h e legions w e r e n o t f o r m e d o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r , since they
were a r r a n g e d , of c o u r s e , a c c o r d i n g to age classifications, a n d t h e
y o u n g m e n c o u l d n o t very well b e placed b e h i n d t h e f a t h e r s o f
families. T h e g r e a t e r d e p t h was t h e r e f o r e arrived at, as Polybius
r e p o r t s , b y f o r m i n g u p each individual m a n i p l e with m u c h g r e a t e r
d e p t h t h a n width ("making t h e d e p t h m a n y times a s large a m o n g
the m a n i p l e s in front"*) a n d , in k e e p i n g with t h e n a r r o w e r front,
t h e intervals between m a n i p l e s w e r e s h o r t e n e d . I a s s u m e t h a t t h e
front of the infantry was not a n y b r o a d e r t h a n s o m e 800 to 900
1
m e t e r s , estimating t h e d e p t h o f the f o r m a t i o n a t s o m e 7 0 m e n .
T h e c o n s u l T e r e n t i u s V a r r o , w h o o r d e r e d this f o r m a t i o n a n d i s
s u p p o s e d to h a v e p o i n t e d o u t to t h e R o m a n s in a speech b e f o r e t h e
battle t h a t they h a d almost a two-to-one superiority, probably esti-
m a t e d that t h e l o n g e r the front was, t h e m o r e awkwardly a n d m o r e
slowly t h e a r m y would m o v e ; that, in view of t h e superiority of t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry (a point t h a t his colleague, Aemilius Paullus,
r e p e a t e d l y stressed with g r e a t c o n c e r n ) , t h e r e w o u l d b e n o t h o u g h t
of a possible o u t f l a n k i n g a n d e n v e l o p m e n t of the e n e m y a r m y ; so
t h a t , finally, e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e d o n p r o d u c i n g a n irresistible
shock action with a d e e p mass.
T h e cavalry was divided between t h e two flanks; the r i g h t flank
rested on t h e A u f i d u s River.
T h e battlefield was f o r m e d of a b r o a d plain w i t h o u t any obsta-
cles.
315
H a n n i b a l was n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n half as s t r o n g as his o p p o n e n t

in infantry, h a v i n g 32,000 heavily e q u i p p e d m e n against 5 5 , 0 0 0 ; of
a b o u t e q u a l s t r e n g t h in s h a r p s h o o t e r s , that is, 8,000 m e n each. But
in cavalry he enjoyed j u s t about the same superiority, namely,
10,000 horses against 6,000. H e , too, divided his cavalry between
t h e two flanks a n d f o r m e d his p h a l a n x of his I b e r i a n s a n d Celts,
s o m e t h i n g over 20,000 m e n . H e f o r m e d his Africans, divided into
halves of a b o u t 6,000 m e n each, b e h i n d each flank in a m a n n e r
similar to t h a t of A l e x a n d e r at G a u g a m e l a , in a d e e p c o l u m n , at
t h e point of j u n c t i o n of infantry a n d cavalry. F r o m such a forma-
tion the Africans w e r e in a position to d e p l o y e i t h e r t o w a r d the o n e
side to r e i n f o r c e a n d s u p p o r t the c e n t e r , if t h a t s h o u l d be neces-
sary, o r t o w a r d t h e o t h e r t o e x t e n d the infantry front i n o r d e r t o
outflank a n d e n v e l o p t h e e n e m y .
Polybius uses a very bold picture for this f o r m a t i o n . At first all
units f o r m e d a straight line: cavalry, Africans, I b e r i a n s a n d Celts,
Africans, a n d cavalry; t h e n t h e c e n t e r m o v e d f o r w a r d a n d , as it be-
c a m e t h i n n e r , t h e figure of a half-moon was c r e a t e d .
O n e s h o u l d be careful not to be taken in too m u c h by the c h a r m
of this p i c t u r e , as Polybius himself was, a n d to t h i n k of this line
p e r h a p s as a c u r v e d o n e , or to believe t h a t t h e c e n t e r , t h r o u g h its
m o v e forward, g r a d u a l l y was t h i n n e d o u t on its own. D u r i n g an
a p p r o a c h m a r c h , c u r v e d lines form only too easily, it is t r u e , b u t
they a r e not f o r m s in which o n e can m o v e tactically, b u t are r a t h e r
distortions t h a t c a n n o t be entirely avoided a n d that o n e m u s t try to
get a l o n g with, b u t which o n e tries to p r e v e n t as m u c h as possible
in o r d e r to h o l d a straight line.
If we take Polybius' d e s c r i p t i o n literally, t h e Africans would also
h a v e r e m a i n e d b e t w e e n t h e c e n t e r a n d t h e cavalry, a n d t h e latter
would h a v e b e e n a t t h e e x t r e m e e n d s o f t h e h a l f - m o o n , a n d conse-
q u e n t l y farthest f r o m t h e e n e m y , w h e r e a s we h e a r later that it was
precisely t h e cavalry t h a t h a d t h e f i r s t f i g h t a n d t h e r e f o r e m u s t
h a v e b e e n closest to t h e e n e m y . It was t h e Africans, however, w h o
outflanked t h e R o m a n p h a l a n x . T h i s can be reconciled only
t h r o u g h t h e fact that, as t h e first shock of contact c a m e , t h e Afri-
cans w e r e in position b e h i n d t h e cavalry. O n e can best p i c t u r e t h e
situation as follows: w h e n all t h e c o r p s w e r e still d r a w n up in a
straight line side by side, they w e r e not yet d e p l o y e d . T h e front
was t h e r e f o r e f o r m e d by t h e h e a d s of s o m e six c o l u m n s t h a t h a d
t a k e n such a distance f r o m o n e a n o t h e r t h a t t h e d e p l o y m e n t could
take place in t h e intervals—the f o r m a t i o n that, in t h e tactics of t h e
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i s called t h e flankwise m o v e i n t o line ("der
The Battle of Cannae 317
flügelweise A b m a r s c h " ) . But, instead of h a v i n g all his c o l u m n s d e -

ploy u n i f o r m l y , H a n n i b a l h a d only t h e cavalry a n d the I b e r i a n s
a n d Celts of t h e c e n t e r deploy, t h e latter, however, so shallowly
that with their 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n they h a d t h e s a m e width as t h e 55,000
legionaries on t h e o t h e r side. B e h i n d this front, still in c o l u m n , at
the point w h e r e t h e cavalry m a d e contact with t h e c e n t e r , t h e Afri-
cans w e r e f o r m e d up on b o t h flanks. T o d a y we normally call such
a formation " h o r s e s h o e - s h a p e d " ( b o r r o w i n g an expression from t h e
cavalry), with t h e same reservation as in t h e case of t h e h a l f - m o o n
image, n a m e l y t h a t the lines are n o t c u r v e d b u t right-angled. Since
d u r i n g a n a p p r o a c h m a r c h o n a b r o a d f r o n t t h e m i d d l e easily
moves a h e a d a n d b e n d s f o r w a r d , t h e p i c t u r e o f t h e half-moon was
probably still m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e from t h e point of view of t h e ob-
server in t h e m i d d l e (from t h e perspective of the s u p r e m e com-
m a n d e r , so to speak), t h a n for o u r tactical analysis, which looks
u p o n t h e p h a l a n x as a s t r a i g h t front, e v e n w h e n in practice t h e
a l i g n m e n t has b e e n lost.
After the e n g a g e m e n t h a d b e e n started by the skirmishing of t h e
n u m e r o u s light i n f a n t r y m e n in front of t h e line on b o t h sides, t h e
cavalry of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n left flank u n d e r H a s d r u b a l first m o v e d
forward in a decisive attack a l o n g t h e river b a n k . As it was, H a n n i -
bal was of c o u r s e significantly s u p e r i o r in this a r m ; in addition, he
2
h a d c o n c e n t r a t e d all o f h i s h e a v y c a v a l r y o n this f l a n k . T h e
R o m a n cavalry was i m m e d i a t e l y o v e r r u n , cut d o w n , p u s h e d into
the river, a n d d r i v e n from t h e battlefield.
I n t h e m e a n t i m e , o n t h e o t h e r flank, t h e light N u m i d i a n cavalry
h a d only b e e n skirmishing with t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . Now H a s d r u b a l
sent t h e m r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a r o u n d b e h i n d t h e R o m a n infantry, a n d
when t h e R o m a n cavalry t h e r e u p o n took to flight on this side, too,
the C a r t h a g i n i a n g e n e r a l led his e n t i r e cavalry mass in an attack
against the r e a r o f t h e R o m a n p h a l a n x .
While t h e cavalry battle was still g o i n g on, t h e R o m a n p h a l a n x
h a d m a d e c o n t a c t with t h e e n e m y i n f a n t r y a n d , with its h u g e
superiority, 55,000 hoplites against 2 0 , 0 0 0 , h a d d r i v e n t h e e n e m y
back. B u t t h e n H a n n i b a l ' s c a v a l r y a t t a c k e d f r o m t h e r e a r a n d
b r o u g h t t h e f o r w a r d - p r e s s i n g mass t o a standstill. N o t t h a t t h e
I b e r i a n , Celtic, a n d N u m i d i a n cavalry could have p e n e t r a t e d into
the legions a n d h a v e b r o k e n u p t h e h u g e mass—but they attacked
it with t h e i r javelins a n d soon t h e Punic light infantry j o i n e d t h e m ;
the hail o f s p e a r s , a r r o w s , a n d s l u n g s h o t which d r u m m e d d o w n o n
t h e R o m a n s from b e h i n d forced t h e r e a r r a n k s t o face a b o u t a n d
o b s t r u c t e d the f u r t h e r m o v e m e n t f o r w a r d o f the e n t i r e p h a l a n x .
Now the Punic c e n t e r held; the two withheld c o l u m n s of C a r t h a g i n -

ian infantry, the Africans, m a r c h e d forward a n d in d o i n g so came
into t h e flank of t h e R o m a n p h a l a n x , t u r n e d to t h e right a n d left,
a n d in this way c o m p l e t e d t h e e n v e l o p m e n t , so t h a t t h e R o m a n s
w e r e b e i n g simultaneously attacked from all sides.
A l t h o u g h their cavalry h a d fled t h e field, t h e R o m a n s w e r e still
considerably s u p e r i o r in total n u m b e r s . " C o n c e n t r i c activity against
t h e e n e m y is not a p p r o p r i a t e for t h e w e a k e r side," says Clausewitz
in his w o r k Vom Kriege, a n d in a similar vein N a p o l e o n o n c e said
t h a t t h e weaker side m u s t not simultaneously e n v e l o p b o t h flanks.
H e r e t h e w e a k e r h a d e n v e l o p e d o n b o t h flanks, u p t o the point o f
closing the r i n g in t h e r e a r . If t h e consuls o r d e r e d the maniples to
maintain a defensive stance in t h r e e directions, they could p e n e -
trate on the f o u r t h side, with a mighty p u s h , the b u t m o d e r a t e l y
s t r o n g r i n g i n t h e i r front a n d roll u p t h e e n e m y a r m y from the
point of b r e a k t h r o u g h . B u t for such a m a n e u v e r m o r e is n e e d e d
t h a n t h e R o m a n citizen a r m y could accomplish tactically. T h e m a n -
iples w e r e not i n d e p e n d e n t tactical units; they w e r e only c o m p o -
n e n t p a r t s o f t h e o n e unified tactical body, t h e p h a l a n x . N o r w e r e
t h e legions tactical bodies, capable of a n d a c c u s t o m e d to acting in-
d e p e n d e n t l y ; they w e r e simple administrative bodies. If the legions
h a d b e e n d r a w n u p two d e e p , w e could p e r h a p s i m a g i n e t h a t i n
this e x t r e m e e m e r g e n c y t h e o n e s i n t h e r e a r w o u l d h a v e faced
a b o u t a n d t h e flank legions would have t u r n e d o u t w a r d in o r d e r to
w a r d off t h e e n e m y cavalry a n d t h e Africans, while t h e o t h e r six
legions would have completely c r u s h e d t h e I b e r i a n s a n d Gauls of
t h e e n e m y front, w h o m they w e r e already, o f c o u r s e , p u s h i n g back.
B u t t h e R o m a n s w e r e n o t d r a w n up in this way at all, b u t legion
beside legion. No o n e of t h e m could m a k e a m o v e m e n t on its own
w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g u p t h e e n t i r e p h a l a n x . T h e g r e a t d e p t h was
a c h i e v e d — n o t h i n g is m o r e characteristic of t h e state of t h e R o m a n
tactics—by increasing the d e p t h of each individual m a n i p l e , a n d t h e
t h r e e echelons of t h e m a n i p l e s , hastati, principes, a n d triarii, could
not be s e p a r a t e d from each o t h e r . It seems so simple to us for t h e
m a n i p l e s of t h e triarii to h a v e faced a b o u t , in o r d e r to h o l d off
H a s d r u b a l ' s cavalry with t h e i r s p e a r s , while t h e hastati a n d t h e
principes c o n t i n u e d t h e attack t h a t h a d a l r e a d y b e e n s t a r t e d , d e -
p e n d i n g o n t h e i r g r e a t superiority. B u t n o m a t t e r how simple they
may seem, such tactical shifts c a n n o t be i m p r o v i s e d , a n d t h e triarii
w e r e all t h e less capable of t a k i n g up t h e battle t o w a r d the r e a r in
t h a t t h e i r m a n i p l e s w e r e f o r m e d with v e r y l a r g e i n t e r v a l s (see
above, p. 277) a n d w e r e not capable of f o r m i n g at o n c e an or-
d e r e d , closed front. T h e e n t i r e R o m a n infantry was accustomed t o

moving f o r w a r d in closed f o r m a t i o n until t h e e n e m y gave way a n d
fell back. So now, as soon as t h e cry r a n g o u t "Attack from t h e
r e a r " a n d t h e r e a r m o s t r a n k s h a d t o face a b o u t , t h e f o r w a r d -
driving p r e s s u r e o f t h e mass s t o p p e d , a n d t h e r e u p o n t h e e n t i r e
p h a l a n x c a m e to a standstill. At this m o m e n t they w e r e hopelessly
lost. T h e a d v a n t a g e of n u m e r i c a l superiority was paralyzed. It ob-
viously c o n s i s t e d exclusively o f t h e g i g a n t i c physical a n d m o r a l
p r e s s u r e exercised by t h e r e a r m o s t r a n k s ; the actual use of t h e i r
w e a p o n s is limited in any p h a l a n x to a very small p a r t of the for-
mation. A t t h e m o m e n t w h e n a n attack from t h e r e a r r e m o v e s this
p r e s s u r e , only t h e exterior edges of t h e p h a l a n x still c o m e into con-
sideration as c o m b a t a n t s , a n d they a r e limited to defensive action
only.
W i t h t h e i r victory s u r e a n d t h e i r booty b e f o r e t h e i r eyes, t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n m e r c e n a r i e s d r o v e in from all sides. It was impossible
for any missile h u r l e d into t h e mass of R o m a n s to miss, a n d t h e
m o r e t h e terrified R o m a n s allowed themselves t o b e p r e s s e d to-
g e t h e r , t h e less capable w e r e t h e y of u s i n g their w e a p o n s a n d t h e
m o r e certain was the harvest r e a p e d by t h e e n e m y swords.
In a killing t h a t lasted for h o u r s t h e e n t i r e R o m a n a r m y was
s l a u g h t e r e d ; o n l y a few w e r e t a k e n p r i s o n e r alive. N o t e v e n a
fourth succeeded in e s c a p i n g from t h e m e l e e .
T h e decisive factor h e r e was t h e attack f r o m t h e r e a r b y t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry. T h e r e is in this respect a n o t e w o r t h y d i s c r e p -
ancy in Polybius' account: he has H a n n i b a l giving a talk to his sol-
diers b e f o r e t h e battle, s h o w i n g t h e m h o w they may e x p e c t a s u r e
victory in t h e plain from their s u p e r i o r cavalry, a n d Polybius in his
own conclusions n a m e s this superiority as t h e basic factor of t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n victory; nevertheless, in his account, he stresses m u c h
m o r e the flanking attack of t h e Africans. In fact, he d o e s n o t e v e n
have t h e m a n e u v e r o f t h e cavalry a p p e a r a s t h e result o f a n o r d e r
by H a n n i b a l , b u t as a s p o n t a n e o u s action on t h e p a r t of H a s d r u b a l .
T h e R o m a n s , he says, as they first collided with t h e p r o t r u d i n g
c e n t e r o f t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d d r o v e i t back, h a d s q u e e z e d to-
g e t h e r t o w a r d the m i d d l e a n d in this way h a d gradually c o m e be-
tween t h e Africans, j u s t as H a n n i b a l h a d previously calculated. T h a t
a certain p r e s s i n g t o g e t h e r of t h e R o m a n s t o w a r d t h e m i d d l e took
place is q u i t e n a t u r a l . T h e i r flank m a n i p l e s , which p r o b a b l y ex-
t e n d e d s o m e w h a t b e y o n d the flanks o f t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n c e n t e r , d i d
not swing in against the latter's flanks, since they of c o u r s e saw in
front of t h e m t h e African c o l u m n s , which would have m o v e d into
t h e i r own flanks as t h e result of such an action. T h e y c o n t i n u e d

forward, but the e n t h u s i a s m of the n e a r e s t o n e s , w h o still h o p e d to
be able to c o m e to a position w h e r e they could slash away directly
at t h e Celts a n d Iberians, caused t h e m to squeeze t o w a r d t h e mid-
dle in d o i n g so. M o r e o v e r , the e x t r e m e flank m a n i p l e s no d o u b t
m o v e d s o m e w h a t m o r e slowly f o r w a r d , s i n c e t h e u n f a v o r a b l e
c o u r s e of the cavalry battle that was taking place beside t h e m was a
strongly distracting factor. T h i s action, h o w e v e r , is naturally not to
be u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g that this squeezing was t h e cause of the
o u t f l a n k i n g by the Africans. N o r is it any m o r e likely t h a t it could
have b e e n t h e flanking action of t h e Africans t h a t b r o u g h t t h e at-
tack by t h e R o m a n c e n t e r to a standstill. If t h e r e w e r e n o t h i n g
m o r e to overcoming a courageous, superior army than to make
one's own line l o n g e r a n d t h i n n e r a n d lead t h e flank extensions
against the e n e m y flanks, t h e n this artifice w o u l d have b e e n used
often. T h e d a n g e r h e r e , h o w e v e r , is that while o n e is in t h e process
of outflanking the e n e m y , one's own c e n t e r , which has to be
w e a k e n e d in o r d e r to allow this, can be p e n e t r a t e d . T h e fact that
this did not h a p p e n at C a n n a e is t h e truly significant e l e m e n t of
t h e battle. T h e only e x p l a n a t i o n for it is t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry
masses' attack from t h e r e a r , a n d t h e r e f o r e it is logical that
Polybius, in his c o n c l u d i n g observations, finds t h e decisive aspect in
t h e superiority of the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry. Clearly, it was not on
his o w n initiative that H a s d r u b a l carried o u t t h e m a n e u v e r , b u t in
f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e battle plan of his c o m m a n d e r .
H o w e v e r plausible m a y be t h e rule t h a t it is not p r o p e r for t h e
w e a k e r side t o e n v e l o p s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o n b o t h flanks, since h e
m u s t weaken his c e n t e r too drastically for this p u r p o s e — H a n n i b a l
nevertheless d a r e d , d e s p i t e t h e rule, to encircle completely 70,000
m e n with 5 0 , 0 0 0 , a n d he was r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e i r b e i n g killed,
m a n by m a n , in this i r o n ring. T h i s h o r r i b l e b u t c h e r y m u s t have
r a g e d for h o u r s . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s themselves lost n o fewer t h a n
5,700 killed, b u t of all t h e R o m a n s , 4 8 , 0 0 0 d e a d c o v e r e d t h e bat-
tlefield, 16,000 e s c a p e d , a n d the rest were t a k e n p r i s o n e r .
E v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e d on t h e fact that t h e Punic c e n t e r held fast
until their cavalry h a d d r i v e n off the R o m a n h o r s e m e n a n d h a d
c o m p l e t e d their e n v e l o p m e n t . W h y t h e n d i d H a n n i b a l not place his
m o r e reliable t r o o p s , t h e Africans, in the m i d d l e , a n d why, in addi-
tion, did h e p u s h his c e n t e r f o r w a r d ? T h e l o n g e r t h e c e n t e r was
held back a n d t h e later t h e battle b e g a n a t t h a t point, t h e g r e a t e r
was t h e probability t h a t t h e cavalry could c o m p l e t e its mission in
t i m e a n d t h e lesser was t h e d a n g e r that t h e c e n t e r m i g h t s u c c u m b
too soon. W h y d i d H a n n i b a l not, on t h e c o n t r a r y , p u s h his cavalry
forward a n d place t h e m in front of his two infantry flanks, so that
the half-moon, s p e a k i n g in Polybius' t e r m s , would be t u r n e d about?
If we observe t h e situation correctly, we see that it did i n d e e d
h a p p e n that way. T h e p u s h i n g forward o f t h e c e n t e r was n o t rela-
tive to its position vis-a-vis t h e cavalry; on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e latter
moved f o r w a r d while t h e light infantry w e r e still skirmishing o u t in
front. T h e y h a d to be careful, however, n o t to r i d e f o r w a r d too
soon, for in t h a t case the full d e v e l o p m e n t of the battle m i g h t h a v e
been i m p e d e d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r h a d t o b e conscious
of t h e possibility t h a t t h e consuls, on seeing how t h e i r cavalry was
being swept away, w o u l d lead their infantry as quickly as possible
back into t h e fortified c a m p . N o t until t h e e n t i r e R o m a n a r m y was
so close t h a t it could n o t possibly w i t h d r a w from t h e battle was t h e
cavalry c h a r g e to be u n l e a s h e d ; that is why t h e cavalry stood on the
same line with t h e infantry, a n d t h e Africans, w h o w e r e to m a k e
the e n v e l o p i n g m o v e m e n t s , w e r e f o r m e d u p b e h i n d the cavalry.
T h e p r e c a r i o u s p e r i o d o f time d u r i n g which the weak C a r t h a g i n -
ian c e n t e r was e x p o s e d without assistance to the press of t h e h u g e
mass of t h e R o m a n legions was t h e r e f o r e inevitable. T h i s m a k e s it
doubly c u r i o u s that t h e less reliable allies, t h e Gauls, w e r e placed in
this position.
B u t in this battle the c e n t e r was also t h e position that was suscep-
tible to t h e heaviest losses; t h e Gauls left no fewer t h a n 4,000 killed
on the field, w h e r e a s t h e I b e r i a n s a n d Africans t o g e t h e r lost only
1,500. H a n n i b a l h a d to be careful about s h e d d i n g t h e blood of his
most loyal units, w h o w e r e to f o r m t h e c o n t i n u i n g n u c l e u s of t h e
a n t i - R o m a n a r m y in Italy. H o w s t r o n g m u s t have b e e n the t h o u g h t :
Place t h e O l d G u a r d in the spot w h e r e t h e absolutely reliable resis-
tance h a s t o b e p r o v i d e d ! H o w i m m e a s u r a b l e would h a v e b e e n t h e
results if at t h a t point, w h e r e in t h e final analysis it was a m a t t e r
but o f m i n u t e s , t h e R o m a n s h a d p e n e t r a t e d b e f o r e H a s d r u b a l t o r e
t h e m back from b e h i n d — i f the c o m m a n d e r h a d t h e n h a d to say to
himself: " T h e Africans would h a v e held o u t for s u c h - a n d - s u c h a
time longer. W h a t an e r r o r not to have placed t h e m at that spot!"
In the military art n o t e v e r y t h i n g can be calculated, weighed, a n d
m e a s u r e d ; in situations defying such calculations, t h e belief in his
own star m u s t g o v e r n t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s decision. I n o r d e r n o t t o
sacrifice t h e f u t u r e to the p r e s e n t , H a n n i b a l risked e n t r u s t i n g t h e
critical position t o t h e G a u l s , m i x i n g t h e m , for g r e a t e r security,
with his I b e r i a n s , a n d e x p l a i n i n g to t h e m in a speech in a d v a n c e
how effective his s u p e r i o r cavalry w o u l d be in the b r o a d plain. He
p u t t h e final seal on their reliability by taking up his own position

n e a r t h e m . A l e x a n d e r h a d personally e n g a g e d in t h e melee at the
h e a d of his cavalry. H a n n i b a l t u r n e d the c o m m a n d of his cavalry
over to o n e of his t r u s t e d g e n e r a l s a n d took up his station with his
staff,' having his y o u n g b r o t h e r M a g o at his side, in t h e c e n t e r , in
o r d e r to be able to c o n d u c t t h e battle from t h e r e a n d to steel the
soft iron of t h e resistance with t h e force of his personality. Seeing
t h e i r c o m m a n d e r n e a r b y a n d h e a r i n g the s h o u t of his voice gave
t h e Gauls an u n s h a k a b l e confidence in t h e i r victory, a n d they with-
stood the most difficult of all tests: pulling back before an over-
w h e l m i n g e n e m y w i t h o u t letting themselves be d e f e a t e d by him;
c o n t i n u i n g t h e battle in t h e face of t h e heaviest losses until the
p r o m i s e d help a p p e a r e d f r o m t h e o t h e r side. N o description o f the
battle would be c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t specific a t t e n t i o n given to t h e im-
p o r t a n c e of the position t a k e n by H a n n i b a l . Not only spiritually but
also physically H a n n i b a l was the m i d p o i n t of t h e battle—no longer
by wielding t h e sword, like A l e x a n d e r , n o r in such a way t h a t the
battle was divided into a series of different actions that t h e com-
m a n d e r himself h a d t o d i r e c t (with t h e d e p l o y m e n t a n d t h e
c o m m a n d t o f o r m u p , t h e c o u r s e o f t h e b a t t l e was c o m p l e t e l y
p r e a r r a n g e d ) — i t was t h e personality as such that in its simple pre-
sence at a specified spot exercised the decisive effect in a m a n n e r at
o n c e passive a n d active.
T h e only c o m m a n d t h a t H a n n i b a l h a d t o give after t h e battle
signal h a d r u n g o u t was for the a d v a n c e of t h e Africans on t h e two
flanks. Since they initially were still lined up in c o l u m n , H a n n i b a l
h a d in this connection t h e idea that, in case of necessity, instead of
using t h e m for t h e e n v e l o p m e n t o f the e n e m y p h a l a n x , h e could
have t h e m d e p l o y in r e i n f o r c e m e n t of his c e n t e r , in case the latter
m i g h t seem incapable of offering sufficient resistance to t h e press
of the Romans, up to the moment when Hasdrubal's envelopment
m a d e itself felt. We recognize t h e similarity of t h e battle plan to
t h a t o f G a u g a m e l a . Like A l e x a n d e r , H a n n i b a l , too, h a d G r e e k au-
t h o r s in his h e a d q u a r t e r s , w h o w e r e to describe his actions. It is n o t
g o i n g too far to s u p p o s e t h a t w h o e v e r h a d such m e n in his r e t i n u e
also s h a r e d i n t h e i r c u l t u r e a n d h a d l e a r n e d w h a t Hellas c o u l d
offer h i m . W h a t e v e r m a y have b e e n t h e case with that S p a r t a n ,
X a n t h i p p u s , w h o is s u p p o s e d to have t a u g h t t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s in
t h e First Punic W a r how to defeat Regulus, t h e r e is no d o u b t that
H a n n i b a l h a d studied t h e G r e e k - M a c e d o n i a n a r t o f war, a n d w e
m u s t i m a g i n e how in t h e e v e n i n g s in w i n t e r q u a r t e r s t h e G r e e k
Silenos r e a d to him K i n g Ptolemy's book c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e e d s of
the great A l e x a n d e r a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n d e v e l o p e d his ideas in

keeping with t h e r a d i a n t e x a m p l e of the son of Zeus.
At C a n n a e t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s w e r e victorious with their b a r b a r i a n
m e r c e n a r i e s because of their superiority in cavalry, because of their
officer corps, t h e g e n e r a l s a n d staff officers, w h o h a d their t r o o p s
well in h a n d a n d knew how to direct t h e m tactically, a n d because of
the c o m m a n d e r , w h o with t h e u n m i s t a k a b l e c e r t a i n t y o f g e n i u s
b l e n d e d t h e forces at h a n d into an organically unified effectiveness.
In my o p i n i o n , we a r e also i n d e b t e d to this c o m m a n d e r for t h e
account of the battle as we r e a d it today in Polybius a n d in its p r i n -
cipal features in Livy as well. T h i s d o e s not show up so m u c h in
what is r e c o u n t e d — f r o m that we w o u l d be u n a b l e to c o n c l u d e any-
thing, since, excellent as t h e description m a y be, nevertheless s o m e
o t h e r m a n of talent could have b e e n on t h e s p o t — b u t it stands o u t
in that which is omitted a n d in its n u a n c e s of light a n d shadow.
T h e truly decisive point, t h e attack by t h e cavalry in the rear, is
not particularly stressed; in fact, it a p p e a r s to be not at all a c o m -
m a n d of H a n n i b a l b u t t h e action of a cavalry g e n e r a l . T h e e n t i r e
emphasis of t h e a c c o u n t is placed on t h e assignment of the Afri-
cans t o t h e two e n v e l o p i n g flanks. T h e m o t i v e for h o l d i n g o u t
these t r o o p s is n o t m e n t i o n e d in t h e account. T h e r e is always some-
t h i n g painful for t h e c o m m a n d e r w h e n h e intentionally e x p o s e s
certain t r o o p s , a n d especially allies, to g r e a t e r losses t h a n o t h e r s .
He is h a r d l y willing to a d m i t to himself t h e fact t h a t he calculates
in this way, or at what time he d o e s so. Nevertheless we may be
allowed to a s s u m e that he h a d this motive; any t h i r d p e r s o n would
have b e e n justified in this a s s u m p t i o n a n d would not have passed
over so lightly this t r a n s p a r e n t motive. O u r account, however, says
n o t h i n g of it b u t discourses exclusively on t h e tactical m a n e u v e r of
the e n v e l o p m e n t , for t h e latter is t h e original idea of this battle
plan. T h e t r u e d e c i d i n g feature, t h e cavalry attack, fades into t h e
b a c k g r o u n d , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , for this m a n e u v e r is n o t h i n g u n -
usual for t h e c o m m a n d e r , b u t is his n o r m a l t e c h n i q u e . It would
have sufficed this time, too, a n d even m o r e ; if H a n n i b a l h a d not
used the Africans for t h a t f o r m a t i o n b u t h a d simply reinforced his
p h a l a n x with t h e m , h e w o u l d still h a v e h a d t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y
s u r e victory in his h a n d s . B u t he did not want simply victory; he
wanted t h e c o m p l e t e destruction o f the e n e m y a r m y . T h e r e f o r e h e
d a r e d to m a k e his c e n t e r thin a n d to f o r m t h e Africans in a posi-
tion of r e a d i n e s s for the e n v e l o p m e n t from the two flanks, for t h e
R o m a n a r m y was n o t even to be able to take flight in any direction
w h a t e v e r b u t simply to be e n c i r c l e d . E v e n in his battle a c c o u n t ,
t h e r e f o r e , his h e a r t goes o u t to t h e Africans, to w h o m he assigned

this mission, a n d in d o i n g so he h o l d s back on t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t
of the cavalry.
T h e f o r m a t i o n is d e s c r i b e d with impressive completeness—in the
illustration of t h e h a l f - m o o n a n d in the n a r r a t i o n of the squeezing
t o g e t h e r of t h e R o m a n s t o w a r d t h e m i d d l e , t h e swinging in of the
Africans from b o t h sides, t h e shaking u p o f t h e thin c e n t e r , a n d
t h e e x h o r t a t i o n o f t h e c o m m a n d e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e a d e r even
today still has a feeling for the particular viewpoint from which the
e n t i r e p i c t u r e of the battle is seen a n d realizes that, in t h e account
t h a t he is r e a d i n g , t h e h i g h e s t priority is given n o t to what was
physically t h e most i m p o r t a n t , b u t r a t h e r t o w h a t most c o n c e r n e d
the commander's mind.
EXCURSUS
1. A strongly a r g u e d controversial point is whether the battle was fought on the

right or the left bank of the Aufidus. Since it is specifically said that the Roman
right and the Carthaginian left rested on the river, with a shift from o n e side of the
river to the other we would also have to turn about the entire position of the armies.
I am not reprinting here what I said about this in the previous editions, since that
has been overtaken by the investigation of Konrad L e h m a n n , Klio 15 (1917): 162.
T h e status of the research up to that point was that the sense of the sources pointed
to the right bank, but n o b o d y was able to find a strategic explanation of how the
R o m a n s in this position had their backs toward the sea, a n d how the R o m a n fugi-
tives would have saved themselves by fleeing from the battle toward C a n u s i u m and
Venusia. I have pointed this out in m o r e detail in Historische Zeitschrift 109: 5 0 2 .
Konrad L e h m a n n has now established that e v e n the idea that the source accounts
force us to the conclusion that the battle took place on the right bank was in error.
He proves, t h r o u g h a comparison b e t w e e n Polybius' statement that Hannibal moved
out from G e r u n i u m at the start of the harvest and the actual date of the battle (2
August), that the battle did not take place almost directly after the departure from
G e r u n i u m , but that an interval of two m o n t h s must be a s s u m e d . During this time
Hannibal was occupied foraging in Apulia south of the Aufidus. T h e crossings of
the river shortly before the battle, which up to now were considered to have taken
place from the north to the south, must therefore have started from the south bank
and, seen in this light, the interpretation of the sources leads to the conclusion that
the battlefield was on the north side of the river.
T h e strategic sequence can now be established in the following manner. Hannibal
marched from G e r u n i u m into the Apulian plain. T h e R o m a n s followed him, seeking
unassailable positions on the bordering heights of the m o u n t a i n o u s country. Since
they established a supply d e p o t in Cannae and had their provisions m o v e d there
from the region of C a n u s i u m , they must therefore have had at the e n d a position
that was closer to Cannae than to Canusium and still not in the immediate vicinity of
Cannae, since Hannibal, after all, succeeded in taking from t h e m Cannae with its
depot. I therefore assume that the c a m p was in the region of M o u n t Altino, s o m e 6
kilometers southeast of Cannae, consequently as far forward as possible in order to
cover a m a x i m u m area of the countryside and yet still be protected by the terrain
from a Punic surprise attack. But Hannibal, covered by his strong cavalry, marched
from south to north t h r o u g h the plain, passing by the R o m a n c a m p , took Cannae
with its d e p o t by a s u d d e n stroke, and forced the R o m a n s to withdraw farther into
the countryside toward C a n u s i u m .
L e h m a n n now goes on to conjecture that the R o m a n s had chosen as a battlefield a
place where, because of the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry, they had natural
terrain features on which their flanks could rest. He finds such a position, s o m e 3
kilometers wide, which is b o u n d e d on the right by the river, on the left by a steep
escarpment. To this very day the field is called "pezzo del sangue" (field of blood).
That is probably not at all certain, and in any case I would place the actual bat-
tlefield a bit farther o n , where the plain b e c o m e s narrower, since 3 kilometers s e e m s
too broad to me.
2. S T R E N G T H AND CASUALTY FIGURES

T h e strength of the R o m a n army at Cannae is usually given as 8 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , 6 , 0 0 0
of w h o m were cavalry. T e n thousand m e n remained in the c a m p , so that 7 6 , 0 0 0
Romans were d e f e a t e d by 5 0 , 0 0 0 Carthaginian mercenaries, 10,000 of w h o m were
cavalry. Polybius, Livy, and A p p i a n are in essential a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g these
n u m b e r s . T h e 8 0 , 0 0 0 i n f a n t r y m e n are a c c o u n t e d for a s b e i n g c o m p o s e d o f 8
Roman legions of 5,000 m e n each and a similar n u m b e r of allies.
Only recently has this estimate been contested by P. Cantalupi in The Roman Le-
gions in the War with Hannibal (Le Legioni Romane nella Guerra d'Annibale), published by
Beloch in Studi di Storia Antica, Vol. 1.
Cantalupi calls attention to the fact that Livy expressly r e p o r t e d still a n o t h e r
source, according to which the R o m a n s had f o r m e d in 2 1 6 B . C . not 4 new legions,
but had only levied 10,000 replacements. W h e n working with figures, o n e can as a
rule always accept the smaller o n e s as the more likely ones. Cantalupi-therefore es-
timates the R o m a n army at a strength of only 4 4 , 0 0 0 m e n , and whereas Polybius
gives the n u m b e r of killed R o m a n s as 7 0 , 0 0 0 , Cantalupi arrives, after painstaking
comparisons, at only 10,500 to 16,000. If these n u m b e r s were accepted, the battle
picture w o u l d therefore be very considerably c h a n g e d .
But the reasons given by Cantalupi for his estimates are in no way convincing. He
believes that it was only t h r o u g h the battle of C a n n a e itself that Hannibal became
the terror of the R o m a n s , the role in which he lives on in history. Previously, accord-
ing to Cantalupi, the R o m a n s had had no occasion to arm themselves to such an
unusual d e g r e e . On the Ticinus there had been only a cavalry combat, whereas on
the T r e b i a t h e R o m a n s h a d w i t h d r a w n w i t h o u t very s e r i o u s l o s s e s . A t L a k e
T r a s i m e n e the consul had allowed himself to be attacked by surprise. T h e dictator
Fabius did not have more than 4 legions, and public opinion in R o m e d e m a n d e d
that he fight a battle with this force. It was therefore c o m m o n belief that, with g o o d
leadership, such an army was the equal of Hannibal. W h e n the new consuls arrived
with the reinforcements, a new c a m p was established, in addition to the older o n e ,
and it was o c c u p i e d by a legion and 2 , 0 0 0 allies. T h e reinforcements can therefore
not have b e e n very n u m e r o u s , since, with the exception of this detachment, they all
found their places in the older camp.
T h e s e a r g u m e n t s are n o t e x a c t l y o f g r e a t c o n s e q u e n c e i n c o m p a r i s o n with
Polybius' positive testimony. T h e fact that Hannibal was considered in R o m e as a
frightful e n e m y already for a considerable time before C a n n a e is proved by the
strategy of the dictator Fabius, and if an o p p o s i n g party d e m a n d e d of him that he
fight, it is still not said that the d e m a n d was that he should fight with his 4 legions.
T h e "battle party" might very possibly have a d d e d that the dictator s h o u l d first
bring the army up to the necessary strength and then fight. Furthermore, w h e t h e r
the reinforcements f o u n d , for the most part, their place in the existing c a m p is in
no way a proven fact; the c a m p might have b e e n enlarged, and Livy or his source
might not have considered it necessary to m e n t i o n this. Of course, it d o e s remain a
curious fact that Livy f o u n d widely differing figures and that, as Cantalupi also
points out, only the military tribunes of 4 legions are m e n t i o n e d a m o n g those w h o
survived. Critical estimates, however, point inevitably to the fact that the R o m a n
army must have b e e n considerably stronger than 4 4 , 0 0 0 m e n .
In o r d e r to make his o p i n i o n credible, Cantalupi is also obliged to reduce consid-
erably the strength of the Carthaginian army as reported in Polybius. For it is clear
from the outset that the Romans, who were not short of m a n p o w e r , would not have
marched out for a decisive battle against Hannibal without considerable numerical
superiority. Otherwise the defeat at Cannae would not at all have had such a fright-
ful significance; and the consul pointed out specifically, in the speech that, according
to Polybius, he delivered to his officers before the battle, the twofold superiority
which the R o m a n s had on their side. T h e figure given by Polybius, that the Cartha-
ginian army at C a n n a e consisted of 4 0 , 0 0 0 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, goes back
to the recognized excellent Carthaginian source, Silenos, to w h o m we owe our over-
all picture of the battle in general. What reason would Silenos have had for exag-
gerating the Carthaginian forces? If we had to assume that the 8 6 , 0 0 0 figure for the
Romans also s t e m m e d from him, o n e might possibly believe, if inclined to be ex-
tremely suspicious, that, p r o m p t e d by the o v e r w h e l m i n g impression of the event, he
exaggerated equally on both sides. But the 8 6 , 0 0 0 figure for the R o m a n s stems, as
Appian proves, drawing on R o m a n sources, from their o w n side, and as we shall
establish further below in a closer examination of the composition of the Carthagin-
ian army, no objective reason exists to cause us to doubt the strength of that army.
If then Hannibal's army was 5 0 , 0 0 0 strong, the Roman army cannot possibly have
consisted of only 4 legions. T h e positive information that it was 8 legions strong and
included allies can be considered as undoubtedly correct. At that time a legion n u m -
bered 5,000 m e n ; that would bring the n u m b e r to 8 0 , 0 0 0 R o m a n infantry. T h i s
number, however, cannot be c o m p a r e d directly to the 5 0 , 0 0 0 Carthaginian mer-
cenaries. In each legion 1,400 men were the light infantry, w h o played only a sec-
ondary military role. T h e 8 , 0 0 0 Balearics (slingers) and peltasts of Hannibal were
undoubtedly technically trained m e n , full-fledged warriors; the 2 2 , 4 0 0 Roman light
infantrymen were, completely aside from their lack of technical ability, for the most
part not at all usable in battle. On the Trebia we are expressly told (Polybius 3. 72.
2) that 6,000 light infantrymen skirmished in front of the phalanx. Since there were
4 legions present, S e m p r o n i u s had, including his allies and after d e d u c t i n g his los-
ses, at least 10,000 light infantry. T h e r e f o r e he had left a part of them in the camp.
T h e hoplite phalanx on the Trebia was probably about 1,000 m e n wide. If some
2,000 light infantry were stationed on each of the 2 wings, then 2,000 remained for
the front—that is, 2 ranks; light infantry could not be drawn up any d e e p e r than
that. T h e front of the phalanx at Cannae was probably not wider—but, taking the
most e x t r e m e estimate, it could possibly have b e e n s o m e 2 , 0 0 0 m e n wide—and so it
therefore provided r o o m for 2,000, or say, an absolute m a x i m u m of 4 , 0 0 0 light in-
fantry in the front. If we estimate 2,000 to 3 , 0 0 0 on each flank, we can say with a
certain d e g r e e of probability that s o m e 8,000 to a m a x i m u m of 10,000 R o m a n light
infantry took part in the battle as combatants. A n o t h e r g r o u p may have followed the
phalanx as litter-bearers and for o t h e r similar duties. T h e remainder stayed in the
camp.
T h e c a m p garrison is s u p p o s e d to have been, all together, 10,000 m e n strong, in-
cluding u n d e r any circumstances also a few thousand hoplites, of w h o m a grand
total of 16 by 3 , 6 0 0 , or 5 7 , 6 0 0 m e n were at hand. A c c o r d i n g to this, I estimate the
R o m a n army in the battle at 5 5 , 0 0 0 hoplites, 8 , 0 0 0 to 9 , 0 0 0 combatant light infan-
try, and 6 , 0 0 0 h o r s e m e n , for a total of about 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n .
It is not clear whether Hannibal, too, in addition to his 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n in the battle,
had other troops w h o m he had left b e h i n d as c a m p garrison, or whether we should
perhaps make a d e d u c t i o n from the battle strength for this purpose.
T h e Roman light infantry, which we did not include in the estimate as combat-
ants, are naturally included in the casualty figures. We must t h e r e f o r e consider
these from a base of 8 0 , 0 0 0 m e n on foot and 6 , 0 0 0 cavalry. According to Polybius,
7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n were killed, 3 , 0 0 0 infantry and 3 7 0 h o r s e m e n escaped, and 10,000 were
taken prisoner. T h e 10,000 prisoners would be those w h o were left behind in the
camp, w h o had attacked the Carthaginian c a m p d u r i n g the battle, and who, later
surrounded, surrendered. Polybius' expression is so unclear, however, that o n e has
generally despaired of interpreting it correctly. It e v e n seems possible that he meant
that, in addition to those taken prisoner in the camps, another 10,000 m e n were
taken alive by the Carthaginians on the battlefield, and this probably is in a g r e e m e n t
with the nature of things. It can hardly be assumed that, after the great majority of
Romans already covered the g r o u n d , the butchery-sated mercenaries did not prefer
to spare the remainder and k e e p them for sale as slaves or for ransom.
T h i s is of course contradicted by the estimate m a d e by Polybius, w h o obviously
arrived at the figure of 7 0 , 0 0 0 killed by subtracting some 10,000 prisoners and a
few thousand fugitives and stragglers from the original 8 6 , 0 0 0 .
T h e 7 0 , 0 0 0 killed figure can in no way be s u p p o r t e d , however, for it is definitely
established that the R o m a n s formed two full legions from the survivors, and these
were specifically Roman legions. Besides these, a reasonably c o r r e s p o n d i n g n u m b e r
of allies must also have escaped. Consequently, the n u m b e r of 7 0 , 0 0 0 is not based
on a real account but on a somewhat flighty and e r r o n e o u s estimate, and it thereby
loses any value it might have had for us.
Now Livy reports that the losses of the Romans a m o u n t e d to 4 5 , 0 0 0 infantry and
2,700 cavalry, and e v e n t h o u g h the authoritativeness of Livy is in general m u c h less
than that of Polybius, nevertheless everything points here to the fact that he was
passing on a truly reliable official estimate. It is extremely improbable—in fact,
impossible—that, as Polybius claims, almost the entire body of R o m a n cavalry, too,
remained dead on the battlefield. After all, they were not s u r r o u n d e d but were driv-
en to flight and were not even pursued very far or very energetically, since the
main body of the Carthaginian cavalry quickly turned away from them and turned
against the legions. Even a loss of 2 , 7 0 0 killed and 1,500 taken prisoner, as Livy
reports, therefore seems very high and it also lends credibility to his figure on the
infantry.
According to Livy, s o m e 14,000 infantry were saved; taken as prisoners by the
Carthaginians were 3 , 0 0 0 on the battlefield, 2 , 0 0 0 in the village of Cannae, 13,000
in the c a m p , and 1,500 cavalry.
If we add up the figures and take into consideration that the prescribed strength
of 5,000 m e n per legion was probably not fully reached in every case, we can draw
up the following list:
Killed—Infantry 45,500
Killed—Cavalry 2,700
Captured—Infantry 18,000
Captured—Cavalry 1,500
Escaped—Infantry 14,000
Escaped—Cavalry 1,800
U n a c c o u n t e d for 2.300
86,000
T h e original strengths were:

Hoplites in the battle 55,000
Hoplites in the c a m p 2,600
Rorarii in the battle 8,000
Rorani serving as orderlies
behind the front 7,000
Rorarii in the c a m p 7,400
Cavalry 6,000
86,000 men
Of these 8 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , therefore, 2 , 5 0 0 should probably be subtracted as missing.

For the figures on Hannibal's army, see Chapter III, below.
3. Since, for Cannae, we are in the exceptionally favorable and very rare position
of having a reliable and clear picture of the battle, based on reports from both sides,
it is appropriate for us to realize fully from this e x a m p l e how little can be d o n e with
battle accounts that are lacking in this quality. T i m e and again our historians are
e x p o s e d to the temptation, w h e n good material is lacking, to make use of the bad,
and to pass on in their accounts what has been passed d o w n to them, if no other
information of a contradictory nature is at hand, throwing out what is obviously
false. T h i s procedure, however, is not justified. It might very well be that in such an
account e v e r y t h i n g accurate has fallen out and only the false has r e m a i n e d . Let
there serve as p r o o f of this the detailed description of C a n n a e that has c o m e d o w n
to us in Appian's work. If, by chance, this were the only o n e that had c o m e d o w n to
us, it would be absolutely impossible to gain from it an account having even the faint-
est resemblance to the truth. Since it is so very important that the readers of this
book be thoroughly impressed with the truth of this methodological principle, I am
c o p y i n g below the account of Appian, w h o repeats s o m e R o m a n account or other, in
its e n u r e detail. It reads as follows.
T h e r e were elected as consuls Lucius Aemilius, because of the military reputation

he had gained for himself in the war with the Illyrians, and T e r e n t i u s Varro, be-
cause of his popularity, in that o n c e again this time, full of ambition as usual, he
promised great things. As the two m e n were marching off, the people accompanied
t h e m and asked t h e m to bring the war to a decision by m e a n s of an o p e n battle and
not to wait until the city was completely exhausted by the long duration of the war,
and endless military service, the taxes, famine, and the lying fallow of the devastated
fields. T h e consuls then j o i n e d the army of Iapygians to their o w n , so that they had
all together 7 0 , 0 0 0 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. With these forces they occupied a
c a m p near a village n a m e d C a n n a e , and Hannibal went into c a m p o p p o s i t e them.
Bellicose by nature and always an e n e m y of inactivity, Hannibal found himself just
at this juncture, because of a pressing shortage of provisions, daily obliged to move
out in battle array and in this way to challenge the e n e m i e s to battle—all the m o r e
necessary because he had to worry at the same time over the possibility that his mer-
cenaries, w h o were not being paid regularly, would desert to the e n e m y or scatter to
gather food.
T h e consuls were of different opinions. Aemilius believed that by h o l d i n g off they
should wear Hannibal d o w n and that he would at any rate not be able to resist
m u c h longer because of his lack of supplies; and they s h o u l d not allow themselves to
be drawn into a battle with a c o m m a n d e r and an army so accustomed to battle and
to victory. T e r e n t i u s on the o t h e r hand, as always seeking the approval of the peo-
ple, said they had to k e e p in mind the mission that had been given to them by the
people as they marched out and should risk a decisive battle as soon as possible.
Servilius, the consul of the previous year, w h o was still with the army, agreed with
A e m i l i u s ; the o p i n i o n of T e r e n t i u s , on the o t h e r h a n d , was shared by all the
senators and the knights w h o had positions of c o m m a n d in the army.
While the two sides had still not c o m e to an a g r e e m e n t , Hannibal suddenly at-
tacked those R o m a n s who had m o v e d out to seek f o d d e r or w o o d , p r e t e n d e d that
he was beaten, and about the time of the last watch of the night set his whole army
in motion, as if he intended to march away. Hardly had T e r e n t i u s noticed this than
he led his army out as if there was nothing else to do but to pursue Hannibal in his
flight. It was in vain that Aemilius still tried to dissuade him. But w h e n he refused,
Aemilius, according to the R o m a n custom, had the o m e n s read for himself alone,
sent after the other, w h o had already marched out, and had him told, " T h e day is
of unfavorable o m e n . " T h e r e u p o n , out of respect for the o m e n s , T e r e n t i u s did in-
d e e d move back, but in full view of the army he tore out his hair and complained
bitterly, saying that the envy of his official colleague had taken victory from his
hands. T h i s indignation spread also through the mass of the army.
As soon as Hannibal saw that his attempt had failed, he returned unhesitatingly
into his c a m p , giving obvious proof that his action had only been a pretense. But
even this did not make it clear to T e r e n t i u s that o n e had to be suspicious of every
act of Hannibal's. Rather, fully armed, just as he had c o m e back, he ran into the
commanders' tent, where the senators, captains, and highest c o m m a n d e r s were still
assembled, and accused Aemilius of having taken the o m e n s only as an excuse and
of depriving the city of an obvious victory, because he either hesitated t h r o u g h cow-
ardice or he enviously resented the other's fame. T h e s e loud and angrily shouted
reproaches were heard by the army standing around the tent, and it too now abused
Aemilius, w h o spoke in very conciliatory fashion to those in the tent but whose ef-
forts were in vain. All the others, except Servilius, agreed with Terentius, and so
finally Aemilius, too, gave in and on the next day, w h e n he had taken over the high
c o m m a n d from T e r e n t i u s , he led the army out in battle formation. Hannibal saw
this, of course, but he did not m o v e out on that day, because he was not yet com-
pletely prepared for the battle. Not until the third day did both sides form up d o w n
on the plain.
T h e R o m a n s were drawn up in three battle groups, each of which was f o r m e d at
a little distance from the next. Each had the infantry in the middle, the light infan-
try and the cavalry on both flanks. Aemilius c o m m a n d e d in the center, Servilius on
the left flank, and T e r e n t i u s on the right. Each of the three had a thousand selected
cavalry at his immediate disposal, whose mission was to hasten to help at any spot
where necessity d e m a n d e d . T h i s was the battle formation of the Romans.
Hannibal, w h o knew that toward n o o n there usually sprang up in this area a
southeasterly wind that caused the sky to be c l o u d e d over, occupied primarily those
spots where he had the wind at his back. He then placed his cavalry and his lightly
armed m e n (light troops) on a m o u n t a i n in a withdrawn position, with w o o d e d
growth all a r o u n d it and cut through with ravines, with the order to attack the rear
of the e n e m y as soon as the battle e c h e l o n s of the infantry had committed them-
selves in the attack and the wind had risen. Finally, 5 0 0 Celtiberians, in addition to
their long swords, were also to strap on shorter swords beneath their underclothing,
and they were o r d e r e d to await the signal as to w h e n they should make use of the
short swords. He then divided his entire army likewise into three g r o u p s for battle;
the cavalry, however, was placed on the flanks at wide intervals, in order, where
possible, to e n v e l o p the e n e m y . He entrusted the c o m m a n d of the right flank to his
brother Mago, that of the left flank to his n e p h e w A n n o . He himself c o m m a n d e d in
the middle, in o r d e r to be in position opposite Aemilius, for whose military skill he
had great respect. He was s u r r o u n d e d by 2,000 selected cavalrymen, and a unit of
1,000 m o r e , c o m m a n d e d by Maharbal, was designated to speed at a moment's notice
to any spot w h e r e he might see a d a n g e r o u s situation. T h e s e arrangements taken,
he delayed until the second hour of the day, so that the attack would not take place
too long before the rising of the wind.
W h e n all the forces on both sides were ready for the battle, the c o m m a n d e r s rode
about and e n c o u r a g e d their m e n . T h e R o m a n s r e m i n d e d their m e n of their parents,
their children, their wives, and the earlier defeat. T h e y said that the c o m i n g battle
would be decisive for their situation. Hannibal, on the other hand, r e m i n d e d his
m e n of the earlier successful actions against this e n e m y and how shameful it would
be to be d e f e a t e d by m e n w h o themselves had already been defeated. T h e n the
trumpets rang out, and the infantry p h a l a n x e s raised a shout. T h e preliminary
skirmishing was carried out by the archers, the slingmen, and the stone throwers,
w h o r u s h e d into the m i d d l e a n d attacked each other. After that the p h a l a n x e s
strode forward into the attack, and both sides fought so courageously that the battle
was fierce and the b l o o d s h e d extensive. In the m e a n t i m e , Hannibal gave his cavalry
the signal to e n v e l o p the e n e m y ' s flanks. B u t the R o m a n cavalry, a l t h o u g h less
n u m e r o u s than the e n e m y , offered them strong resistance and, e v e n t h o u g h they
had to deploy in a thin line, nevertheless fought with great courage, in the course of
which the left flank, on the sea, distinguished itself particularly. Now Hannibal and
Maharbal simultaneously led against t h e m the cavalrymen w h o m they had with
them, uttering an i m m e n s e barbarian shout in o r d e r to terrify their e n e m i e s . But
even this attack was withstood by the Romans with unshakable coolness.
Because Hannibal had also failed in this attempt, he gave the prearranged signal
to the 5 0 0 Celtiberians. Suddenly these m e n a b a n d o n e d their ranks, went over to
the Romans, and, as deserters, offered t h e m their shields, spears, and swords, which
they were carrying openly. Servilius praised them, immediately took their weapons
from them, and lined them up, wearing only their clothing, as he thought, behind
his o w n ranks. For he did not consider it g o o d to have the deserters tied up within
view of the e n e m y , was not suspicious, since he saw them there with nothing more
than their clothing, and under any circumstances had no time in such a heated bat-
tle to do anything further about it. In the meantime, a few o t h e r units of Libyans
pretended that they were fleeing and ran with m u c h shouting to the mountains.
T h i s shout was the signal for those w h o were h i d d e n in the mountain ravines to
charge on the p u r s u i n g e n e m y . S u d d e n l y the light infantry and the cavalry ap-
peared from their concealed positions. At the same time, the strong wind arose, ob-
scuring the sky, and it blew so much dust into the faces of the Romans that they
could no longer see the e n e m y at a distance. All the missiles of the Romans, too,
were slowed by the o p p o s i n g wind, whereas those of the e n e m y , reinforced by the
wind, flew m u c h m o r e successfully toward their targets. T h e R o m a n s c o u l d no
longer see the missiles c o m i n g and therefore could not avoid them; they could not
fire off their own effectively and were e v e n hitting each other, so that they were
already beginning to fall into great disorder.
T h i s was the m o m e n t at which the 5 0 0 Celtiberians had already been instructed in
advance to draw their shorter swords from u n d e r their clothing and to strike d o w n
first those Romans in the ranks immediately in front of them. T h e r e u p o n they took
from the R o m a n s their l o n g e r swords, shields, and spears and threw themselves
against all the others, cutting them d o w n mercilessly. A n d the bloodbath which this
unit carried out was the most important o n e , precisely because they were in the rear
of the entire (enemy) army. N o w the plight of the R o m a n s was critical and c o m p l e x ,
as they were hard pressed by the e n e m y in front, e n v e l o p e d by the ambushers, and
being cut d o w n by the unit which had b e c o m e mixed with their o w n ranks. T h e y
were unable to turn about against these last, since they were simultaneously beset by
the others from the front. Moreover, it was no longer easy to recognize them, since
they had R o m a n shields. Most of all, however, they were so hindered by the dust
that they no longer had any idea of what was g o i n g on around t h e m . Consequently,
as is normally the case with a unit that is in disorder and bewilderment, they im-
agined everything as much worse, did not realize that the size of the enveloping
g r o u p was not so great and that the n u m b e r of "deserters" was only 5 0 0 , but they
thought that their entire army was s u r r o u n d e d by cavalry and "deserters." T h i s
caused them to turn around and flee in disorder, at first on the right flank, where
T e r e n t i u s was the first to take flight, and then on the left, from which Servilius, w h o
was in c o m m a n d there, m o v e d quickly to j o i n Aemilius. A r o u n d these two m e n
there gathered a mass of brave m e n , both cavalry and infantry, about 10,000 in
number.
N o w the c o m m a n d e r s , a n d f o l l o w i n g their e x a m p l e all t h o s e w h o w e r e still
m o u n t e d , sprang from their horses and fought on foot against the cavalry of Han-
nibal which s u r r o u n d e d them. As seasoned warriors and partly through real courage
and partly from despair they still accomplished many a brilliant d e e d , pressing furi-
ously against the e n e m y . But they were cut d o w n from all sides. For Hannibal rode
around them, now e n c o u r a g i n g his m e n and asking them to finish up this last, small
task thoroughly, a c h i e v i n g a c o m p l e t e victory, now abusing t h e m a n d calling it
shameful if they could not finish off this small g r o u p after their victory over the
mass. Nevertheless, the R o m a n s held fast in their ranks as long as Aemilius and Ser-
vilius were with them, and they sold their lives dearly. After these leaders had fallen,
however, they penetrated with great force t h r o u g h the e n e m y a n d , breaking their
ranks, fled, some toward the two camps in which those who had fled before them
had found refuge—all together, they a m o u n t e d to 15,000 men, w h o m Hannibal had
surrounded by o n e of his units—and others, about 2 , 0 0 0 in number, toward Can-
nae. Later these last 2,000 surrendered to Hannibal. Only a few escaped toward
Canusium. T h e rest spread out individually into the forests.
A n d thus e n d e d the battle of Cannae between Hannibal and the Romans, after it
had lasted from the second h o u r of the day until two hours before nightfall. A m o n g
the Romans it still lives in infamy because of the great defeat they suffered there.
For within these few hours 5 0 , 0 0 0 Romans were killed, and a large number of them
were captured in the evening. Many from the Senate, too, w h o had participated in
this campaign, were killed, and in addition to them all the superior officers and cap-
tains and the two bravest of the top c o m m a n d e r s . Only the cowardly creator of this
defeat had fled at the start of the battle. In the two years d u r i n g which the Romans
had been fighting with Hannibal in Italy, they had already lost almost 100,000 m e n ,
partly from their o w n troops, partly from the allies.
A n d so it was that Hannibal, on o n e day, had used four stratagems: his taking
into account of the favorable wind; the feigned desertion of the Celtiberians; the
apparent flight of several units; and the hiding of a reserve in the d e p t h s of the
ravines. After the brilliant, unusual victory that he had won in this way, he m o v e d
around immediately after the battle, looking at the d e a d . A m o n g these he also saw
the bravest of his friends lying on the field. He lamented and said with tears in his
eyes that he wished for no such victory. T h e same statement is supposed to have
been m a d e earlier by Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, w h e n he in the same m a n n e r , with
similar losses, had defeated the R o m a n s in Italy.
Late on the same e v e n i n g those of the R o m a n s w h o had fled from the battle w h o
were in the larger c a m p chose Publius S e m p r o n i u s as their c o m m a n d e r , broke out
with force t h r o u g h the dead-tired g u a r d s of Hannibal and escaped, 1 0 , 0 0 0 m e n
strong, at midnight in the direction of C a n u s i u m . On the other hand, the 5,000 m e n
in the smaller c a m p were taken prisoner by Hannibal on the following day. T e r e n -
tius then assembled the remainder of his army, attempted to renew the vanished
courage of his soldiers, gave them o n e of the tribunes, Scipio, as leader, and has-
tened to Rome.
Here e n d s Appian's account.
A D D E D I N T H I R D E D I T I O N
I have left this chapter u n c h a n g e d , even t h o u g h my concept on o n e point has
been shaken. Up to now, it was generally believed that Polybius' account was d e -
rived in its principal features directly from a first-rate source from the Carthaginian
camp, and this source was believed to be the Greek Silenos, w h o m we know to have
been in Hannibal's entourage. Now H. Dessau, in "On the Sources of our Know
ledge of the S e c o n d Punic War" ("Uber die Quellen unseres Wissens vom zweiten
punischen Kriege," Hermes, Vol. 5 1 , 3d issue, 1916), has pointed out that this idea
rests on very shaky foundations. In two respects Dessau misses the mark, in my
opinion. He constantly considers the source that stems from the Carthaginian c a m p
as tantamount to a Carthaginian-biased o n e , which is, after all, not necessarily so,
and absolutely refuses to believe that Hannibal had had Greek scholars with him
from the very start. According to him, Hannibal had not established such relation-
ships until he had b e c o m e master of a n u m b e r of Greek cities in lower Italy. But
that is certainly not true. Greek was at that time the general international language
for c o m m e r c e and culture. Even the Roman Senator Fabius wrote his historical work
in the Greek language. We would have to picture Hannibal as a completely uncul-
tured person if he had not spoken and read Greek perfectly, and for this he must
have had cultured Greeks around him, even in his camp. I cannot imagine that he
did not study Alexander's deeds, and for that purpose he had a need for Greek
teachers and readers. A n d he also n e e d e d Greeks for diplomatic negotiations and
intelligence services. He therefore u n d o u b t e d l y also had in his retinue from the start
scholars, as A l e x a n d e r had had, w h o were s u p p o s e d to recount his d e e d s . But I do
not want to fall into the same error as Dessau by viewing as provable things that, in
the present condition of the material, we can at best speculate about, and so I do not
consider it as proven, but in any case as possible, that actually, as Dessau believes,
the generally valuable descriptions and figures in Polybius, which we have thought
up to now came from Silenos, stem from Fabius Pictor. T h e y would then be only
indirectly Carthaginian. Fabius would have drawn them from Carthaginian prisoners
or deserters. Dessau points o u t especially that in 2 1 0 B . C . the c o m m a n d e r of a
N u m i d i a n unit, Muttines, deserted to the Romans, w o n a very important position in
R o m e , and as late as the year 190 B . C . took part u n d e r the Scipios in the campaign
against Antiochus. T h i s Punic general could have b e e n that e m i n e n t military source
from the Carthaginian side w h o m we take note of and admire in the account of
Polybius.
If this conjecture should be accurate, then with it several difficulties with respect
to the battle of Cannae are solved very simply. Polybius describes the horseshoe
formation of the Punic infantry as "moon-shaped" and conceives of this half-moon
as a curved line (Kyrtoma: curved front"*). Researchers are now agreed that that is a
tactical impossibility. Such a dilettantish m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g cannot possibly stem from
Polybius himself; he must have taken it from his source. T h e r e must therefore have
b e e n between the original military source and Polybius a middle link on which we
can blame such a misunderstanding. T h i s would fit very well with the concept that
we have before us the account of an important N u m i d i a n general as repeated by the
completely unmilitary Senator Fabius. With Silenos, too, w h o b e l o n g e d to Hannibal's
o w n staff, this m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is certainly not o u t of the q u e s t i o n , but it is
nevertheless m u c h less probable.
A n o t h e r striking point in Polybius' account of the battle is the fact that the effect
of the cavalry's attack from the rear is given relatively little importance in compari-
son with the flanking e n v e l o p m e n t by the infantry and in the same connection the
too strongly stressed squeezing together of the R o m a n infantry toward the middle. I
have attempted above to explain this distortion psychologically from the viewpoint
of the headquarters. At least as g o o d , however, and probably better, is the explana-
tion that the account stems from Fabius and that he had received it from o n e of the
leaders of the African infantry, precisely that same Muttines, w h o was intelligent
e n o u g h militarily to characterize the importance of the cavalry attack correctly in his
reasoning, but who, in his account, praised so greatly the d e e d s of his o w n unit that
a certain contradiction resulted.
Dessau's investigation receives strong support from the fact that even before him
Beloch, in a study of the battle on the Trebia, proved (Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 114,
1915) that Polybius' report did not stem from Silenos but from Fabius. All the many
uncertainties c o n c e r n i n g the crossing of the Alps, the battle on the Trebia, the cross-
ing of the A p e n n i n e s , the battle of Lake T r a s i m e n o , which have caused m o d e r n
investigators so m u c h trouble, would therefore be explainable t h r o u g h the fact that
Polybius had at his disposal not the report of a man from Hannibal's staff, but only
the account of a Carthaginian general that passed t h r o u g h Fabius.
Dessau, too, o n c e again establishes the fact that Polybius was m u c h m o r e d e p e n -
d e n t on his sources than is usually believed. Kromayer, in his estimate of Polybius'
authoritativeness, swings f r o m o n e e x t r e m e to the other. Whereas he initially ap-
peared as his d e f e n d e r , then in the second v o l u m e of Battlefields (Schlachtfelder) was
not willing to credit either his military reasoning or his actual statements of fact (see
below "Military Aspects of the battle of Magnesia" ("Kriegerisches zur Schlacht bei
Magnesia"]), he again clothed his account of the battle of C a n n a e in the garment of
a d h e r e n c e to Polybius, in opposition to my criticism, and Kahrstedt (p. 434) explains
that, for anybody to undertake "to reject and correct the clear words of the greatest
ancient military author up to Caesar, g o e s b e y o n d my c o m p r e h e n s i o n . " O n e might
well accept this. Insofar, however, as the controversy between Kromayer and me
with respect to Cannae is c o n c e r n e d , it is primarily a question not of the acceptance
or rejection of Polybius, but of how the concept of the curved front of the Carthagin-
ians reported by him and rejected by us all, Kromayer as well as me, can logically be
corrected. I have translated the "half-moon" into what we call today "horseshoe-
shaped." Kromayer conceives of it as a step-shaped formation, which tactically is just
as impossible as a curved line. T h e second controversy concerns the squeezing to-
gether of the R o m a n s , in which I admittedly recognize an actual fact but detect a
strong e x a g g e r a t i o n , as e x p l a i n e d above. A c c o r d i n g to my concept, the R o m a n s
based the battle from the start on a d e e p mass pressure, which they could not at all
have d o n e in any other way in view of their numerically very superior but tactically
untrained infantry. Kromayer gives t h e m a completely slack front, which, giving up
the traditional R o m a n style of battle, b u n c h e d together toward the middle after the
forward m o v e m e n t had started (we would have to assume that they were seized by a
kind of mass madness). Let it be noticed, they were not s u p p o s e d to have been pressed
together by s o m e action of the Carthaginian e n v e l o p i n g columns, but they are
said to have s h o r t e n e d the front voluntarily so very m u c h d u r i n g the a p p r o a c h
march that the Carthaginians were able to m o v e against their flanks. Foolish as this
picture is in itself, it is completely explained by the fact that, u n d e r the a g r e e d pre-
requisites, the R o m a n flank files would have had to shift sideways no less than 7 0 0
meters; since the simultaneous m o v e m e n t forward can only be very short, it really is
a question principally of a sideward m o v e m e n t , and one can well imagine what 7 0 0
meters of sideward m o v e m e n t by rather large masses within a few minutes would
mean.
I have d e v o t e d a study of my o w n , "The Battle of Cannae" ("Die Schlacht bei
Cannä"), in Historische Zeitschrift 109: 4 8 1 , to refuting this dance tactics, since it ap-
peared to be supported by g o o d source evidence, or at any rate referred to such
sources. Furthermore, Kromayer, in his booklet published in 1912, Rome's Struggle
for World Hegemony (Roms Kampf um die Weltherrschaft), c a m e very close to my o w n
reconstruction of the battle, in that he too now stresses very m u c h that the R o m a n s ,
from the very beginning, had stayed "as close together as possible." With him, as
with m e , the later, additional narrowing of the front therefore b e c o m e s s o m e t h i n g
of secondary importance. Seriously considered, there is in fact no longer any differ-
ence between us, since a formation "as close together as possible" obviously excludes
the possibility of fighting with quincunx intervals and, too, the step-shaped formation
of the Carthaginians has b e c o m e superfluous.
TICINUS. TREBIA. TRASIMENO.

4. We n e e d not study in detail the battles and e n g a g e m e n t s of this war that pre-
c e d e d and followed the battle of Cannae, but we only n e e d to establish that they are
in a g r e e m e n t with the conclusions on the R o m a n and Carthaginian tactics that we
have derived from Cannae.
On the Ticinus the Carthaginian cavalry defeated the Roman cavalry. T h e R o m a n
light infantry that accompanied their cavalry did not e v e n manage to get o f f o n e
discharge of their missiles but took flight, because they feared being ridden d o w n by
the charging e n e m y h o r s e m e n .
5. On the Trebia, in a very similar way to that at Cannae, the R o m a n s were e n -
veloped on both flanks by the Carthaginian cavalry and light infantry and were fi-
nally attacked from the rear. An a m b u s h that Hannibal is supposed to have laid is
believed to have strengthened this rear attack still further. Such an a m b u s h is a tac-
tical impossibility; either it lay just about on the route on which the R o m a n s were
m o v i n g — a n d in that case these 2 , 0 0 0 m e n , in the very likely case that the R o m a n s
discovered t h e m , were lost. Or, on the other hand, the a m b u s h lay considerably o f f
to the side, in which case it was useless, since the Carthaginians m a d e their encir-
clement m o v e m u c h faster by e n v e l o p i n g the R o m a n flank. I therefore consider it
certain in this case that Polybius fell prey to a R o m a n fable. At Cannae the R o m a n
pride tried to console itself t h r o u g h a very similar little story (which is still repeated
by quite a n u m b e r of historians). T h e principal point is that the R o m a n s , although
they were entirely s u r r o u n d e d as later at Cannae, succeeded in breaking out in sev-
eral directions and in saving the greater part of the army. Why they escaped so
m u c h more successfully here than at Cannae afterward cannot be recognized with
any certainty from the sources. T h e general circumstances were not more favorable
for the R o m a n s but were, in fact, considerably less advantageous than at Cannae. At
Cannae they had a significant numerical superiority, on the Trebia little or n o n e . At
Cannae they had 6,000 h o r s e m e n against the 10,000 Carthaginians, on the Trebia
only 4 , 0 0 0 . F u r t h e r m o r e , at that time the Carthaginians also had a n u m b e r of
elephants, which supported the attack of the cavalry. A n d in addition, if o n e is to
believe the a c c o u n t , t h e r e w a s also the a m b u s h by t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s . Finally,
Polybius describes in detail how the Romans, as a result of their crossing of the
winter-cold, swollen Trebia, d u r i n g which they walked t h r o u g h c h e s t - d e e p water
without having eaten in advance, went into the battle physically weakened from the
start.
T h a t the R o m a n s in this battle finally escaped more successfully seems only to
trace back to the fact that Hannibal here assigned only cavalry and light infantry for
the envelopment. His o w n phalanx was therefore all the stronger, but it was still
penetrated at the spot where the Celts and the Africans were placed.
For the very difficult individual questions on the battle I invite the reader's atten-
tion to the excellent work by J o s e p h Fuchs, The Second Punic War and its Historical
Sources, Polybius and Livy (Der zweite punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und
Livius), which will be m e n t i o n e d below (Chapter III). Against Fuchs's viewpoint,
however, recently, is B e l o c h , writing in the Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 114, 1915;
moreover, he established again also that Kromayer corrects Polybius' account by con-
tradicting, in the most flagrant m a n n e r , his o w n c o n c e p t as e x p r e s s e d in o t h e r
places.
6. T h e battle on Lake T r a s i m e n o is a surprise attack d u r i n g a march. It shows the
sureness with which the Carthaginian cavalry leaders understood how to command
their troops independently, while the R o m a n s were helpless. On the Trebia 10,000
m e n had broken out of the Carthaginian e n v e l o p m e n t , by Lake T r a s i m e n o 6,000,
but they did not find a way, on their own initiative, to c o m e to the aid of those units
of the Roman army still e n g a g e d in battle, whereas we see how the Punic c o m m a n d -
ers acted independently.
T h e q u e s t i o n a s t o h o w H a n n i b a l really m o v e d f r o m u p p e r Italy t o L a k e
T r a s i m e n o formerly s e e m e d very obscure, but it has now b e e n definitively solved, in
my opinion, as a result of the study by J o s e p h Fuchs, "Hannibal in Central Italy"
("Hannibal in Mittelitalien"), Wiener Studien, Vol. 26, Book 1, 1904. I do not, how-
ever, agree with Fuchs's account of the battle itself, which he d o e s not consider as a
surprise attack but as a battle in the o p e n field accepted deliberately by Flaminius.
(Added in the third edition.) A m o n g the more recent writings on this battle I also
i n v i t e a t t e n t i o n to: G a r t n e r , Berliner Dissertation, 1 9 1 1 ; G r ö b e , Zeitschrift fur
österreichische Gymnasien 7 (1911): 5 9 0 ; Caspari, English Historical Review, July 1910;
Reuss, Rheinisches Museum, 1910; Fuchs, Zeitschrift für österreichische Gymnasien, 1911;
Sadé, Klio, 1909; Konrad L e h m a n n , Jahresbericht des Philologischen Vereins, Vol. 4 1 ,
1915.
T h e r e is no reason for g o i n g into the controversy itself here. I simply mention the
fact that, as K. L e h m a n n particularly has proved, Kromayer here once again places
himself in strong contradiction to Polybius. T h a t is, of course, no reproach, but it
only serves to establish again that Kromayer may not be considered as the d e f e n d e r
of the authoritativeness of Polybius.
1 . T h e a v e r a g e d e p t h was n a t u r a l l y considerably smaller, since

t h e intervals, which h a d b e c o m e i r r e g u l a r d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h
m a r c h , h a d to be filled up b e f o r e the impact with the e n e m y by

having r e a r w a r d t r o o p s s p r i n g f o r w a r d . In earlier editions I still
a d m i t t e d the possibility of a d o u b l e d l e n g t h with c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y
lesser d e p t h . B u t I h a v e n o w b e c o m e c o n v i n c e d t h a t a front of
nearly 2 kilometers would no l o n g e r h a v e b e e n capable of f o r w a r d
m o v e m e n t in o r d e r l y fashion. O n e can g r a s p this m o r e clearly by
imagining a street like " U n t e r d e n L i n d e n " in Berlin, which is al-
most 1 kilometer long a n d a b o u t 90 paces wide. T h e R o m a n infan-
try front at C a n n a e would t h e r e f o r e have r e a c h e d a b o u t from t h e
m o n u m e n t o f Frederick t h e G r e a t t o t h e Wilhelmstrasse a n d w o u l d
have overflowed to some e x t e n t in its d e p t h t h e width of this street.
2. Polybius says that the I b e r i a n a n d Gallic cavalry w e r e on t h e
left flank, t h e N u m i d i a n s on the right, a n d he later characterizes
t h e fighting of the latter as simple skirmishing. In the battle on the
T r e b i a he m a k e s a distinction b e t w e e n the heavy cavalry a n d the
N u m i d i a n s . B y t h a t a c c o u n t , t h e n , t h e I b e r i a n cavalry w e r e t h e
heavy units—a fact that d o e s not necessarily eliminate t h e possibil-
ity of H a n n i b a l ' s also having h a d African cuirassiers, only a potiori
may the light cavalry have b e e n called the N u m i d i a n .
Chapter II
The Basic Strategic Problem
of the Second Punic War
A basis for c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e s t r a t e g y can o n l y be g a i n e d
t h r o u g h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e tactical relationships on b o t h sides.
T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s w e r e u n q u e s t i o n a b l y t h e tactically s u p e r i o r side.
T h e y h a d a military c o m m a n d e r , w h e r e a s t h e R o m a n s each year
elected two g o v e r n i n g m a y o r s w h o also c o m m a n d e d t h e a r m y . T h e
m a y o r s h a d so little u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the principles of large-scale
c o m m a n d that they e i t h e r h a d t h e consuls divide u p t h e legions be-
tween t h e m or, if they w e r e t o g e t h e r , t h e two of t h e m b o r e the
c o m m a n d alternately, a day at a time. S o m e have tried to soften t h e
m o n s t r o u s n e s s of such a situation face-to-face with a H a n n i b a l by
saying that t h e a l t e r n a t i o n only m e a n t daily c h a n g e s of t h e chair-
m a n s h i p of t h e council of war. Actually, t h a t w o u l d be a s h a r p e r
c h a r g e , for in t h a t case t h e c o m m a n d w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n by an
individual at all, b u t by a council. We a r e m o r e a c c u r a t e if we r e -
main with the idea of the expression "alternating
c o m m a n d " — a l t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , t h e r e w e r e councils of war, too.
T h e situation of t h e c o m m a n d e r s was also reflected in t h e officer
corps. On the C a r t h a g i n i a n side, professional officers t r a i n e d in the
school of H a m i l c a r Barca; on t h e R o m a n side, citizen w a r r i o r s of
m o r e o r less n a t u r a l ability. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n g e n e r a l s m a n e u v e r ,
a s n e c e s s a r y , with t h e v a r i o u s c o r p s , i n f a n t r y a n d c a v a l r y ; t h e
R o m a n legions can only m a r c h straight a h e a d side by side. Finally,
t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n c a v a l r y i s also far s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e R o m a n
cavalry numerically.
Against all these a d v a n t a g e s of t h e e n e m y the R o m a n s can b r i n g
to b e a r only t h e single a d v a n t a g e of an almost inexhaustible mass
1
o f militarily c o m p e t e n t a n d reliable m e n .
T h i s diversity of the s t r e n g t h s on the two sides creates a situation
that offers a certain analogy to t h e relationship of A t h e n i a n s a n d
336
The Basic Strategic Problem of the Second Punic War 337
Spartans in t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r . F o r a long, long time it was

impossible to arrive at a definitive decision, because t h e A t h e n i a n s
were t h e m o r e powerful a t sea, t h e S p a r t a n s o n land, a n d n e i t h e r
was able to c o m e to grips with t h e o t h e r in his own e l e m e n t . In t h e
Second Punic W a r t h e contrast was n o t so s h a r p a n d it was only
very g r a d u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e R o m a n s . A t f i r s t t h e y b r a s h l y
challenged t h e e n e m y to battle in t h e o p e n field, only finally to
learn t h r o u g h a series of frightful defeats t h a t they s h o u l d t u r n to
o t h e r areas. B u t H a n n i b a l knew from t h e start his weakness as well
as his s t r e n g t h .
W h o e v e r i n t e n d s to wage war on t h e basic principle of defeating
the e n e m y m u s t be capable, after he has s o u g h t o u t a n d d e f e a t e d
the e n e m y forces in t h e o p e n field, of p u r s u i n g his victory relent-
lessly, to the point of laying siege to a n d c a p t u r i n g t h e e n e m y capi-
tal; a n d finally, if even that d o e s not yet lead to peace, he m u s t fol-
low t h r o u g h to t h e total defeat of t h e e n e m y . H a n n i b a l was too
weak for that, a n d he was a w a r e from t h e start of t h e fact that, d e -
spite t h e greatest victories, he w o u l d n o t be capable of besieging
a n d c a p t u r i n g R o m e itself.
A t C a n n a e , t h e n , h e h a d b e a t e n a n d wiped o u t only t h e smaller
half of the R o m a n legions (8 of 18), a n d t h e R o m a n s soon r e p l a c e d
their losses t h r o u g h new levies; they d i d n o t even have t h e legions
t h a t w e r e s t a t i o n e d o v e r s e a s — i n Sicily, S a r d i n i a , S p a i n — r e t u r n
h o m e . T o have m o v e d against R o m e immediately after the battle
with a view t o w a r d t h e t e r r o r i z i n g effect w o u l d t h e r e f o r e h a v e
served no p u r p o s e for H a n n i b a l a n d , passing as a negative d e m -
o n s t r a t i o n , w o u l d h a v e nullified t h e o t h e r m o r a l e effects o f t h e
victory a t C a n n a e . I f t h e w e l l - k n o w n s t a t e m e n t b y t h e c a v a l r y
l e a d e r , M a h a r b a l , t h a t H a n n i b a l u n d e r s t o o d h o w t o win b u t n o t
how to exploit his victories, was actually said, it only proves that t h e
brave g e n e r a l w h o said it was a simple fighter r a t h e r t h a n a t r u e
strategist. D u r i n g t h e lengthy b u t c h e r y of the encircled legionaries
t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y h a d itself sacrificed 5,700 killed, a n d conse-
q u e n d y in a d d i t i o n at least 20,000 w o u n d e d , w h o w e r e n o t capable
o f m a r c h i n g again until days a n d weeks h a d passed. H a d h e started
o u t i m m e d i a t e l y after t h e battle, H a n n i b a l would have a r r i v e d be-
fore R o m e with h a r d l y 2 5 , 0 0 0 m e n , a n d t h e R o m a n s w o u l d n o t
have given in to such a small force, even at t h e h e i g h t of t h e i r ter-
ror.
Later, after his a r m y h a d h a d time for its w o u n d s to heal a n d
r e p l a c e m e n t s t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d , H a n n i b a l m a y have h a d e n o u g h
s t r e n g t h to allow h i m to consider besieging R o m e with, say, 50,000
or 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . B u t R o m e was a very large, well-fortified city; the

so-called Servian wall, p r o b a b l y built at t h e t i m e of the S a m n i t e
W a r s , h a d a c i r c u m f e r e n c e of m o r e t h a n 5 miles. L a r g e o p e n areas
within the walls could a c c o m m o d a t e t h e refugee i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e
c o u n t r y s i d e . As a large t r a d i n g c e n t e r a n d capital, R o m e was richly
p r o v i d e d with supplies of all kinds. If H a n n i b a l h a d controlled the
sea, h a d first t a k e n Ostia a n d t h e n b e e n able to supply himself by
sea, t h e n it m i g h t n o t a p p e a r impossible for h i m to h a v e t h o u g h t of
besieging R o m e with 50,000 to 60,000 m e n . B u t h e r e we m u s t not
lose from sight t h e fact t h a t the R o m a n s w e r e t h e s t r o n g e r at sea;
in o r d e r not to divide his s t r e n g t h , H a n n i b a l h a d c o n c e n t r a t e d all
his forces in his land a r m y . T h e siege a r m y would, t h e r e f o r e , have
h a d to be s u p p l i e d by l a n d . Gigantic supply lines would have h a d
to be organized a n d m a d e to function t h r o u g h a completely hostile
c o u n t r y s i d e a n d passing by i n n u m e r a b l e cities a n d s t r o n g h o l d s that
blocked t h e r o u t e s . A very l a r g e p o r t i o n of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n troops
would have h a d to be assigned to this d u t y , a n d every isolated unit
would have b e e n e x p o s e d at every t u r n to t h e legions a n d cohorts,
b o t h R o m a n a n d allied, which w e r e still stationed in the c o u n t r y or
w e r e newly o r g a n i z e d . T h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e a r m y which would
have b e e n available for t h e siege, divided by the T i b e r River, would
have withstood only with g r e a t difficulty t h e sorties of t h e n u m e r i -
cally far s u p e r i o r g a r r i s o n . T h e principal a r m o f t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s ,
their cavalry, could not h a v e b e e n of any assistance.
H a n n i b a l knew very well what he was d o i n g w h e n , after t h e vic-
tory at Lake T r a s i m e n o as well as after C a n n a e , he did not m a r c h
on R o m e . F r o m the very b e g i n n i n g he had conceived a n o t h e r
means of defeating the enemy.
N o t in a position to o v e r c o m e t h e R o m a n s completely, to destroy
t h e m as a world p o w e r , he based his c o n d u c t of t h e war on the
goal o f w e a r i n g t h e m d o w n a n d e x h a u s t i n g t h e m t o t h e p o i n t
w h e r e they would be willing to a g r e e to a n e g o t i a t e d peace.
Strategy becomes politics a n d politics strategy. After t h e a p p a r e n t l y
decisive victory a t C a n n a e , t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n l e a d e r n e v e r t h e l e s s
h a d i t said t o t h e R o m a n s t h a t i t was n o t a w a r o f c o m p l e t e
d e s t r u c t i o n — a m a t t e r of national survival—that he was waging with
t h e m (non internecivutn sibi esse cum Romanis bellum—Livy 22. 58),
a n d h e offered t o discuss peace t e r m s . T h e R o m a n s rejected the
offer, b u t to p e r s u a d e an e n e m y to accept a mutually a g r e e d peace
is even possible w i t h o u t g r e a t decisive actions, to which the R o m a n s
now n o longer w e r e e x p o s i n g themselves, a n d from t h e start H a n -
nibal h a d had this in m i n d .
As soon as H a n n i b a l h a d first a p p e a r e d in Italy, he a n n o u n c e d

that he h a d not c o m e to fight against t h e peoples of the peninsula
but to liberate t h e m from R o m a n d o m i n a t i o n . After every battle he
released without r a n s o m those allies w h o h a d b e e n t a k e n p r i s o n e r
so that they would s p r e a d the w o r d in their native regions c o n c e r n -
ing t h e political goal a n d the generosity of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n leader.
R o m a n citizens m a d e up hardly a t h i r d of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Italy;
the r e m a i n d e r consisted o f m o r e o r less i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n i t i e s
a n d c a n t o n s that could d e c i d e to w i t h d r a w from t h e R o m a n leader-
ship to which they h a d subjected themselves. T h e y p r o v i d e d i n d e -
p e n d e n t c o n t i n g e n t s to t h e c o m m o n a r m y of the allied forces. Even
c o m m u n i t i e s t h a t h a d b e e n established a s R o m a n colonies could
p e r h a p s find it a d v a n t a g e o u s to s e p a r a t e t h e i r destiny from that of
the m o t h e r city.
After C a n n a e defection started on a large scale. C a p u a — a f t e r
R o m e t h e largest city of Italy, which even h a d R o m a n citizenship
sine suffragio (without suffrage)—and a l a r g e n u m b e r of c a n t o n s
a n d smaller cities, a n d finally also t h e t h i r d city of Italy, T a r e n t u m ,
went over to H a n n i b a l ; a n d , j u s t as the Gauls h a d given their s u p -
p o r t to t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s in the n o r t h , on Sicily Syracuse, too, went
over to their side. If H a n n i b a l had b e e n able to maintain t h e
m o m e n t u m o f this m o v e m e n t t h r o u g h u n r e l e n t i n g p r e s s u r e a n d
threats, t h e m o m e n t would inevitably have c o m e w h e n the R o m a n s ,
w o r n out, would have m a d e peace or w h e n H a n n i b a l ' s base in Italy
would have b e c o m e s o b r o a d a n d s u r e t h a t h e could u n d e r t a k e the
siege of R o m e .
After Polybius h a d r e c o u n t e d t h e events up to t h e battle of C a n -
nae, he i n t e r r u p t e d his account, spoke first of things from G r e e k
history, a n d , b e f o r e t a k i n g up t h e Punic W a r again, he inserted a
discussion o f t h e R o m a n constitution. T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t shows t h e
truly g r e a t historian. H o w little interest t h e abstract forms of a con-
stitution a n d t h e usages of an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n hold in a n d of t h e m -
selves! W i t h Polybius, however, they answer the question: H o w was
it possible for a state to withstand a defeat like t h a t at C a n n a e , fol-
lowing on t h e heels of those at T i c i n u s , on t h e T r e b i a , a n d at Lake
Trasimeno? T h e extreme suspense that those events must have
p r o d u c e d is c a r r i e d over to the r e a d e r . T h i s question a n d this an-
swer form the masterpiece of Polybius' art, for it is no superficial
artifice that p r o d u c e s the tension, b u t t h e very n a t u r e o f t h e t h i n g
itself, which in this case, t h r o u g h its f o r m , is so ingeniously e x p r e s s e d .
We wish to try to imitate Polybius by b r e a t h i n g life into the d e a d
statistical figures by m e a n s of t h e s a m e reflection. H o w g r e a t was
t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f R o m e which p e r m i t t e d h e r t o c o u n t e r b a l -
ance t h e g e n i u s o f H a n n i b a l a n d t o hold h e r o w n with u n b r e a k a b l e
s t r e n g t h despite all t h e defections of h e r allies? Let us give t h e d e -
tailed estimates later, b u t t h e principal figures, as they can be d e -
rived from t h e historic a c c o u n t s — n o t with c o m p l e t e certainty, it is
t r u e , b u t with sufficient a s s u r a n c e n e v e r t h e l e s s — a r e as follows:
T h e R o m a n state (leaving aside t h e allies) h a d , a t t h e b e g i n n i n g
of the Second Punic W a r , a c c o r d i n g to t h e evidence available to us
t h r o u g h t h e official c e n s u s figures, a b o u t a million free p e r s o n s
a n d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e w a r mobilized s o m e 34,000 m e n for
t h e l a n d a r m y . T o this m u s t b e a d d e d a s u p p l e m e n t a r y n u m b e r for
t h e fleet, w h i c h w e c a n n o t e s t i m a t e , h o w e v e r , since b y far t h e
l a r g e r p o r t i o n of all t h e crews consisted of allies a n d slaves.
T h e 7 to 8 legions of t h e first year h a d increased in 2 1 6 B.C. to
18, despite t h e losses o n t h e T r e b i a a n d Lake T r a s i m e n o , a n d t h e
s t r e n g t h of those in t h e principal a r m y was raised to 5,000 infantry.
Eight legions w e r e assigned to t h e principal a r m y facing H a n n i b a l ,
2 in Spain, 2 in Sicily, 1 in Sardinia, 2 against t h e Cisalpine Gauls,
2 in R o m e as g a r r i s o n t r o o p s a n d r e p l a c e m e n t s , a n d 1 with t h e
fleet. T h e last 8 of t h o s e listed m u s t be r e g a r d e d as very m u c h
u n d e r s t r e n g t h . If we estimate 4 , 8 0 0 m e n for e a c h of t h e legions at
C a n n a e , 4 , 0 0 0 each for t h e 2 legions in Spain, 2,500 for each of
t h e o t h e r 8, t h e total is a b o u t 6 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , or easily 6½ p e r c e n t of
t h e free p o p u l a t i o n . If we also consider those killed in 2 1 8 a n d 2 1 7
2
B . C . , w e arrive a t 7 ½ p e r c e n t .
Since 2 new legions w e r e f o r m e d from t h e r e m n a n t s of t h e C a n -
n a e a r m y , we can c o n s i d e r 6 as h a v i n g b e e n lost; shorty t h e r e a f t e r
2 m o r e legions w e r e d e s t r o y e d by t h e Gauls. T h e y w e r e not capable
of replacing this loss completely, especially w h e n e n t i r e large com-
m u n i t i e s ( C a p u a ) of cives sine suffragio w e r e g o i n g o v e r to t h e
e n e m y . By g o i n g so far as to e m p t y t h e prisons a n d levy y o u t h s n o t
yet seventeen years old, they f o r m e d 2 legions, a n d 2 additional
o n e s w e r e o r g a n i z e d with slaves, w h o w e r e p r o m i s e d their f r e e d o m .
R o m e t h e r e f o r e o n c e a g a i n h a d 1 4 legions, which g r a d u a l l y in-
creased to 22 in t h e n e x t few years as 2 new legions w e r e f o r m e d
each year o f t h e y o u t h s w h o h a d j u s t c o m e o f age. T h e highest
s t r e n g t h , 2 2 legions, was r e a c h e d i n t h e years 212 a n d 211 B . C . T h e
total n u m b e r of individuals, however, r e m a i n e d considerably smal-
ler t h a n t h a t o f t h e year 2 1 6 B . C , since t h e actual s t r e n g t h o f each
legion was m u c h lower. U p t o 2 1 6 B . C . t h e p r i s o n e r s w e r e r a n -
s o m e d in a c c o r d a n c e with a specific a g r e e m e n t t h a t h a d a l r e a d y
b e e n in existence in t h e First Punic W a r . B u t t h e Senate, in o r d e r
The Basic Strategic Problem of the Second Punk War 341
to establish an e x a m p l e , declined H a n n i b a l ' s offer to sell t h e pris-

o n e r s of C a n n a e back for r a n s o m , p r e f e r r i n g to form t h e slave le-
gions. T h e p r i s o n e r s w e r e t h e r e f o r e sold a b r o a d , a n d as long as half
a g e n e r a t i o n later the R o m a n s f o u n d so m a n y of t h e i r c o m p a t r i o t s
as slaves in G r e e c e that, w h e n t h e Consul Flaminius in 194 B.C. of-
fered t o r a n s o m t h e m from the G r e e k s , t h e Achaians alone h a d
3
1,200 of t h e m to r e t u r n , a n d six years later a n o t h e r large n u m b e r
of t h e m w e r e said to h a v e b e e n freed in C r e t e a n d r e t u r n e d to
4
their native c o u n t r y .
A l t h o u g h , t h e r e f o r e , t h e state d u r i n g t h e war r e n o u n c e d its citi-
zens, o n c e they h a d fallen into t h e p o w e r of t h e e n e m y , a n d left
t h e m to their fate, we may very well a s s u m e that, even t h o u g h not
t h r o u g h official g o v e r n m e n t a l m e a n s , nevertheless m a n y p r i s o n e r s
w e r e individually r a n s o m e d by their families. T h e slave t r a d e r s w h o
took o v e r t h e p r i s o n e r s f r o m t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p h a d n o
f u r t h e r interest, after all, t h a n to d i s p o s e of t h e m for t h e best pos-
sible p r i c e , a n d i n 2 1 0 B . C . R o m a n c i t i z e n s c o m p l a i n e d o f t h e
prices, which they could not afford, saying that they d i d not h a v e
left even e n o u g h m o n e y for a r a n s o m p r i c e (Livy 26. 35). T h e fact
of private r a n s o m i n g from war p r i s o n e r status was t h e r e f o r e a con-
tingency that o n e took into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Even t h o u g h in this way
t h e losses of Lake T r a s i m e n o a n d C a n n a e may be r e d u c e d by sev-
eral t h o u s a n d s , t h e effort of t h e R o m a n p e o p l e still r e m a i n s with-
o u t parallel. Even t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of Prussia in 1813 is e s t i m a t e d
at only 5½ p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , a n d it was not required for
even a full y e a r r u n n i n g . F r o m t i m e to time t h e A t h e n i a n s p r o b a -
bly h a d a l a r g e r p e r c e n t a g e of t h e i r citizens u n d e r a r m s t h a n did
R o m e , b u t always for only a very s h o r t time. B u t h e r e it h a p p e n e d
that y e a r after year a n d in very distant t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n s al-
most t h e e n t i r e service-qualified m a n p o w e r was u n d e r a r m s . Even a
very large p e r c e n t a g e of t h e slaves w e r e requisitioned e i t h e r for t h e
legions or for service at sea. It is a s t o n i s h i n g t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c life
a n d t h e f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n could b e m a i n t a i n e d d u r i n g this
p e r i o d . Besides taxes, credits payable after a p e a c e treaty w e r e d e -
m a n d e d , especially f r o m p u r v e y o r s ; Sicily is s u p p o s e d to h a v e b e e n
strongly p r e s s e d for s u p p o r t , a n d a lowering of the value of t h e
c u r r e n c y b r o u g h t relief t o d e b t o r s a n d m a d e m o n e y m o r e liquid.
O n l y t h e efforts o f t h e G e r m a n p e o p l e i n t h e W o r l d W a r from
1914 to 1918 e x c e e d e d those of the R o m a n s .
While t h e R o m a n constitution in this way p u t t h e full p o w e r of
its o w n p e o p l e at t h e disposition of t h e state, t h e w e l l - t h o u g h t - o u t
construction of t h e treaty of alliance, at t h e h e a d of which stood
the city on the T i b e r , also p r o v e d itself. T r u e e n o u g h , a large por-

tion of the allies defected, went over to the e n e m y , or at least be-
c a m e very lax in their c o n t r i b u t i o n s . But all t h e R o m a n colonies, all
t h e Latins, a n d a large n u m b e r of G r e e k cities r e m a i n e d loyal to
5
R o m e , a n d it was precisely the progress realized by H a n n i b a l that
c h a n g e d t h e conditions o f t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e war. Even before t h e
battle o f C a n n a e , after t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e T r e b i a a n d Lake
T r a s i m e n o , t h e d i c t a t o r Q u i n t u s Fabius M a x i m u s h a d w a n t e d t o
wage w a r by avoiding a tactical decision. B u t he stood almost alone
in this concept, a n d basically o n e c a n n o t b l a m e t h e o t h e r side too
m u c h for w a n t i n g to b r i n g to t h e test for o n c e t h e possibility of de-
feating t h e terrible e n e m y by attacking h i m with R o m e ' s d o u b l e
superiority. Now the defeat not only led back to the C u n c t a t o r ' s
strategy but also gave to it what was missing b e f o r e C a n n a e a n d be-
cause of which it h a d not b e e n possible to see it t h r o u g h : a positive
goal. It lies in t h e n a t u r e of war t h a t every success, if it does not
lead to the total defeat of t h e e n e m y a n d t h e restoration of peace,
forms a basis for c o u n t e r a c t i o n s a n d r e t r i b u t i o n . H a n n i b a l arrived,
a c c o r d i n g to Clausewitz's e x p r e s s i o n , at t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point of
6
victory. T h e R o m a n s n o l o n g e r accepted large o p e n battles; H a n -
n i b a l was t o o w e a k t o u n d e r t a k e l a r g e - s c a l e s i e g e s a s l o n g a s
n u m e r o u s R o m a n legions w e r e still in t h e field a n d could cut off
his supply lines. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , however, he was himself not
capable of p r e v e n t i n g t h e R o m a n s , on t h e i r side, from laying siege
to t h e defected cities, subjecting t h e m again, a n d p u n i s h i n g t h e m .
F r o m this time on these sieges w e r e t h e central p o i n t of Rome's
c o n d u c t of the war. To take by s t o r m a fortified R o m a n c a m p in
w h i c h t h e c o n s u l s t o o k c o v e r d u r i n g t h e i r s i e g e o f a city was
b e y o n d the capabilities of the military superiority of the C a r t h a g i n -
ian a r m y . In this kind of situation, cavalry shock action a n d t h e
tactical c o o r d i n a t i o n of various units a n d a r m s w e r e not i m p o r t a n t ,
7
a n d the t o u g h c o u r a g e o f the R o m a n legionaries held the f i e l d .
T h e siege a n d r e c a p t u r e of C a p u a by the R o m a n s was virtually the
critical point of the war. T h i s is a completely u n i q u e event in mili-
tary history: the o n e side was able to carry out a large-scale, w e a r i n g
siege, even t h o u g h the o t h e r side possessed the u n q u e s t i o n e d
superiority in the o p e n field. We can explain it only t h r o u g h t h e
u n u s u a l division of forces, t h e fact t h a t t h e a r m i e s w e r e not simi-
larly c o m p o s e d b u t t h a t e a c h side h a d its c h a r a c t e r i s t i c forces:
cavalry on t h e o n e side, t h e mass of infantry on t h e o t h e r .
Hannibal is supposed to have m a d e an attempt to storm the
R o m a n circumvallation, while t h e C a p u a n s m a d e a sortie. T h i s in-
formation, however, stems from t h e t r e a s u r y of t h e R o m a n victory

bulletin! An actual, large-scale, r e p u l s e d attack w o u l d necessarily
have h a d s t r o n g e r aftereffects, a n d Polybius r e p o r t s n o t h i n g a b o u t
it. H a n n i b a l r e c o g n i z e d f r o m t h e s t a r t t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f
success—the R o m a n s probably h a d s o m e 4 0 , 0 0 0 to 50,000 m e n in
the siege w o r k — a n d w h e n he failed to l u r e t h e e n e m y o u t for a
battle, he tried to attain his goal t h r o u g h a purely m o r a l e effect.
H e m a r c h e d d i r e c t l y o n R o m e a n d c a m e r i g h t u p t o the gates o f
the city. B u t t h e R o m a n s refused to be i n t i m i d a t e d , a n d H a n n i b a l
had to leave L a t i u m again. T h e only results of this move w e r e a
p l u n d e r i n g m a r c h a n d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n , a n d C a p u a fell.
F r o m this p o i n t on, it was no l o n g e r possible for H a n n i b a l to
c o n q u e r R o m e . T h e R o m a n s h a d already o v e r c o m e Syracuse be-
fore C a p u a ; soon T a r e n t u m fell to t h e m again. Instead of a w i d e r
a n d wider, s p r e a d i n g defection of the Italian states, on which H a n -
nibal h a d c o u n t e d for his final victory, a r e n e w e d e x p a n s i o n a n d
reinforcing of R o m a n h e g e m o n y set in. H a n n i b a l ' s fighting forces,
however, insufficiently r e i n f o r c e d from t h e h o m e l a n d , g r a d u a l l y
d w i n d l e d ; s o m e o f his N u m i d i a n a n d S p a n i s h t r o o p s e v e n went
over to t h e e n e m y . In t h e s e c o n d a r y t h e a t e r s of operations—Sicily,
Sardinia, S p a i n — w h e r e t h e r e was no fear of t h e military g e n i u s of
H a n n i b a l a n d t h e m a i n s t r e n g t h of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , their cavalry,
was in p a r t less n u m e r o u s a n d in p a r t n e v e r p r o v e d very effective,
the f o r t u n e s of war s w u n g back a n d forth. After t h e largest p a r t of
Spain h a d a l r e a d y b e e n taken o n c e by t h e R o m a n s , they suffered,
in the same year in which they w o n back C a p u a (211 B . C . ) , a c r u s h -
ing defeat, from which, however, they r e c o v e r e d again, b r o u g h t u p
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , a n d again went over to t h e offensive. It was still
impossible to foresee h o w t h e final decision w o u l d fall, b u t t h e
superiority which t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d won in t h e first years of
the war in t h e g r e a t field battles gradually slipped away from t h e m ,
a n d t h e o p p o s i n g forces w e r e again in e q u i l i b r i u m . N e i t h e r of t h e
two sides was in a position to force a decision. T h e R o m a n s would
not risk an o p e n battle, a n d H a n n i b a l was not s t r o n g e n o u g h to be
able to lay siege to R o m e .
After we h a v e u n d e r s t o o d t h e strategic-political relationships, it is
a p p r o p r i a t e for u s t o c o m p a r e h o w t h e p o p u l a r m e m o r y o f t h e
p e o p l e e x p l a i n e d these things. Q u i t e rightly it connects t h e swing
of t h e p e n d u l u m with the n a m e of C a p u a , b u t with what a motiva-
tion! A c c o r d i n g to t h e story, in this s e n s u o u s a n d dissipated city t h e
t o u g h w a r r i o r s of H a n n i b a l b e c a m e soft a n d lost their s t r e n g t h a n d
c o u r a g e . (Livy 2 3 . 18). T h e l e g e n d d o e s not c o n c e r n itself with t h e
question why t h e R o m a n s nevertheless tolerated this now u n w a r l i k e

a n d u n d i s c i p l i n e d a r m y for twelve m o r e years i n Italy. F o r t h e
legend, objective relationships do n o t m a t t e r ; it works exclusively in
t h e r e a l m of personalities a n d p e r s o n a l motives a n d in d o i n g so
completely distorts t h e real relationship. " C a p u a " as a byword for a
softened a r m y has e n t e r e d t h e vocabulary of all e n l i g h t e n e d peo-
ples, as has " X e r x e s " for a mass a r m y , a n d it will e n d u r e t h e r e . In
t h e Second Punic W a r , w h e r e we have Polybius for a source, it is
easy to distinguish b e t w e e n the various mentalities. We have been
able to r e p e a t his r e p o r t a b o u t what really gave t h e n a m e C a p u a its
g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e i n this war, a n d w h a t w e h a v e r e l a t e d i n this
c h a p t e r has long been t h e c o m m o n p r o p e r t y of historians in its im-
p o r t a n t points. For t h e Persian W a r s , w h e r e H e r o d o t u s r e p o r t s t o
us n o t h i n g b u t t h e l e g e n d , it was naturally m o r e difficult to sepa-
r a t e t r u t h from l e g e n d .
EXCURSUS
1. T h e accounts of Hannibal's march on Rome differ greatly, but they are in gen-
eral of but little credibility. Like Livy, Polybius attributes to Hannibal the actual be-
lief that he could take R o m e by surprise. It is natural that Hannibal should not have
said from the start that he considered the capture of R o m e impossible. If he had not
created the appearance of a serious attempt, he could not have achieved any effect
at all, and chance, after all, sometimes works wonders. But Hannibal can not possi-
bly have d e l u d e d himself into thinking he could take a city like Rome by surprise,
and when he arrived, he did not even make the effort. Since a large army always
moves slowly, the news of his approach had naturally already reached Rome long
before he did, and there was in any case time e n o u g h to organize the d e f e n s e of the
walls. Even if no field troops at all had been in the city, the seniores would neverthe-
less have sufficed for the time being.
W h e n Polybius tells us, then, that he appeared before R o m e totally unexpectedly
and the city was saved only through the fact that fortuitously just at that m o m e n t
the m e n of two newly levied legions were formed u p , this is a natural exaggeration
through which the terrible fear of the R o m a n s found its e x p r e s s i o n and in which it
continued to be reflected. Cantalupi has pointed out the probability that also the two
older legiones urbanae (garrison legions) were still in the city, so that there were in all
8
4 field legions, 2 of t h e m untrained, at hand for the d e f e n s e of the city. T h e re-
9
proach that Streit, in his otherwise accurate s t u d y , directs against the R o m a n Senate
for having left the capital without a garrison while Hannibal was not far distant, is
therefore not justified.
Further, Livy reports that the Romans, i n f o r m e d in a timely way of Hannibal's
m o v e , had a corps u n d e r Fulvius m o v e d up from the army laying siege to Capua
and that it arrived at the same time as the Carthaginians; I see no reason for ques-
tioning this report.
According to both these authors, the Roman troops not only garrisoned the walls
but also m o v e d out in front of the gates and formed up against the Carthaginians
for o p e n battle. T h i s is a patent Roman fiction. An o p e n battle, of the kind he had
never failed to win, waged directly before the gates of R o m e , would not only have
offered the Carthaginian general the highest laurels but also a real opportunity to
press t h r o u g h the gates simultaneously with the beaten R o m a n s and to take R o m e
against all rational o d d s . A n d Hannibal supposedly did not accept such a battle? Ac-
cording to Livy, the armies stood facing each other twice, and each time the eager
warriors were separated by a heavy rain. In this sign Hannibal realized that the g o d s
were o p p o s e d to the battle. According to Polybius, however, Hannibal was intimi-
dated in the face of the unsuspectedly large n u m b e r of Roman warriors and held
back from his planned attack. Polybius d o e s not concern himself with miracles, but
he should have g o n e o n e step further in his critique of the R o m a n l e g e n d and
eliminated the w h o l e formation in front of the walls. Of course, he d o e s not ex-
pressly say that it was a formation for battle; we could possibly imagine that it was
also an advanced defensive work.
Fulvius' corps, which the Romans had m o v e d up from the siege army at Capua,
had not left that army so w e a k e n e d as to invite an attack. A n d so Hannibal was
forced to fall back and leave Capua to its fate.
2. T H E ROMAN EFFORT
With what forces Rome waged the Second Punic War can be estimated to a certain
degree t h r o u g h our having at hand in Livy figures on the n u m b e r of available le-
gions over a period of years, figures bearing the stamp of an official accounting.
What strength the legions had, how greatly the actual strength differed from the
authorized strength, how many allies or mercenaries were also involved, how many
sailors are to be i n c l u d e d — o n all these points we have little of a definite nature.
Furthermore, the n u m b e r of legions reported often d o e s not agree with the n u m -
bers at which we arrive w h e n we add up those which are n a m e d individually, so that
errors must have crept in d u r i n g the estimating. Nevertheless, t h r o u g h careful c o m -
parison and w e i g h i n g of all the individual data, a result that is approximately correct
can probably be arrived at. T h e best basis is o n c e again offered by Beloch, not only
in his book but also in the postlude he a d d e d to the treatise of Cantalupi (Studi di
Storia antica, I: 42), by which the older study of S c h e m a n n , History of the Legions dur-
ing the Second Punic War (De tegionum per alterum helium Punicum historia, ( B o n n disser-
tation, 1875) has been superseded.
To the 6 legions with which, according to Livy, Rome began the war are to be
added garrison troops in Sicily, Sardinia, and Illyria, which, together, can be esti-
mated at 1 to 2 legions, so that there were altogether s o m e 3 4 , 0 0 0 m e n u n d e r arms
on land.
T h e sources contain contradictory material c o n c e r n i n g the reconstitution of the
army after Cannae. T h e error, however, can be recognized and eliminated.
Livy, 2 2 . 5 7 , recounts first that 4 legions were raised, partly of under-age youths,
and then speaks of the levying of 8 , 0 0 0 slaves. In 2 2 . 14 he reports further that
6,000 criminals and imprisoned debtors had been enlisted. T h a t would make a total
of 7½ legions, in addition to the 10 already in existence. In the following year, how-
ever, he tells us (26. 11) that, in order to attain 18 legions, 6 new o n e s had to be
formed. T h e question arises: H o w did the R o m a n s m a n a g e this, when in the preced-
ing year they had already had to resort to slaves, criminals, and youths?
If, however, these legions, had actually b e e n f o r m e d , there would have b e e n not
1 8 but 2 3 o r 2 4 . T h e s e l e g i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , a r e e i t h e r partially o r c o m p l e t e l y
duplicates—that is, they include all the units that were f o r m e d after Cannae in 2 1 6
and 2 1 5 B . C . T h e s e q u e n c e was probably as follows: first, 2 legions were f o r m e d of
criminals, the remnants of the preceding levy, and under-age youths, and 2 legions
of slaves. A n d the 2 last o n e s were not organized until the following year, 2 1 5 B . C . ,
w h e n the next year-group had b e c o m e somewhat older. T h e s e legions formed of the
very y o u n g m e n are the urbanae (city legions), which spent their first year in the city,
simultaneously being trained and acting as garrison for the capital.
O f the r e p o r t e d n u m b e r s o f l e g i o n s , B e l o c h believes that the f o l l o w i n g o n e s
should b e eliminated: ( 1 ) 1 legion o n Sardinia after 2 1 5 B . C , w h e n the island was n o
longer threatened and 2 legions would have b e e n too many; (2) 2 legions on the
Gallic border, as duplicates; the same nonexistent legions also appear in front of
Capua; (3) the legiones urbanae (city legions). I agree with Beloch on the first two
points, and especially the second o n e , but not with respect to the legiones urbanae.
Beloch bases his belief on the fact that the account of Polybius (9. 6. 6) c o n c e r n i n g
the threat to Rome by Hannibal in 211 B . C . eliminates the assumption that the city
had a standing garrison. T h a t is correct, but this account itself is of a legendary
character and cannot be regarded as conclusive in comparison with the repeated and
very definite statement of Livy. T h e r e is a very g o o d treatment by Steinwender in
Philologus 39: 5 2 7 , c o n c e r n i n g the legiones urbanae in their triple character as re-
placement, garrison, and recruit legions, of which aspects now o n e and now the
other p r e d o m i n a t e d .
After the capture of Syracuse and Capua (211 B . C . ) a small reduction of the army
took place. T h e oldest year-groups were discharged and a few legions disbanded.
W h e n Hasdrubal a p p r o a c h e d from Spain, in 2 0 7 B . C . , slaves were once again incor-
porated in the legions, and after the victory on the Metaurus reductions were again
made.
For the mass of R o m a n citizens we have the reported c e n s u s figures and the
n u m b e r s of service-qualified m e n from the year 2 2 5 B . C . , as recorded by Polybius.
Of the various interpretations to which these n u m b e r s have been e x p o s e d , I agreed
in my first edition with that of Beloch and on that basis came to the conclusion that
the military levy a m o u n t e d to no less than 9½ percent of the population. Eduard
Meyer reached the same result in Conradsche Jahrbücher 70 (1897): 59, and in the
article "The Population in Antiquity" ("Die Bevölkerung im Altertum") in the Pocket
Dictionary of Political Sciences (Handwörterbuch der Staalswissenschaften). In the latter it is
stated: "In the war against Hannibal, more than 20 legions, or at least 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ,
without counting allies, were maintained u n d e r arms for years, that is, almost 30
percent of the adult male inhabitants and almost 10 percent of the total free popula-
tion."
More recently Nissen in Study of Italy (Italienische Landeskunde), Vol. 2, Introduc-
tion, para. 9, again took up the study of this point and c a m e back to Mommsen's
o p i n i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the r e p o r t e d c e n s u s figures reflect not the entire
citizenry but only the tabulae juniorum (registers of the young). This, as well as a few
other corrections, leads Nissen to an estimate of the population of Italy at the time
of Hannibal as about twice as high as that of Beloch—that is, at 7 million. In an
essay in Klio 3 (1903): 4 7 1 , Beloch answered this contention in detail and d e f e n d e d
his concept with reasons that were very telling, in my view; he agrees to a figure up
to 5 million souls, at the highest, for the peninsula. T h e weak point in Nissen's ar-
g u m e n t is that he cannot reconcile the difference between the last available Republi-
can census, that of the year 7 0 - 6 9 B . C . — 9 1 0 , 0 0 0 individual citizens—with the census
o f Augustus o f the year 2 8 B . C . , which results i n 4 , 0 6 3 , 0 0 0 .
Nissen c o n t e n d s (p. 118) that there were included in the 4 million, first of all, all
the m e n from the age of majority, second, all i n d e p e n d e n t w o m e n , and third, or-
phans possessing property. But it is clear that this modification of the m a n n e r of
c o u n t i n g could not possibly have c o m e close to d o u b l i n g the n u m b e r s of juniores
(young people); likewise, it is just as unlikely that the difference is accounted for by
the natural increase of the population and the granting of citizenship to others.
T h e r e is no other possible explanation than that of Beloch, according to which, since
10
the time of Augustus, not only the m e n but all individuals were c o u n t e d , and if
this was the case, then the old census figures give not only the juniores, but all the
men.
My further investigation into the controversy has led m e , nevertheless, to an im-
portant modification of my estimate on o n e point, where I had already expressed a
certain a m o u n t of doubt in my first edition and where Beloch, too, now makes a
concession. T h i s has to do with the numerical strength of the R o m a n army levy,
which, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the n u m b e r of legions, which were regarded as almost full-
strength, I estimated for 2 1 6 B . C . at 8 3 , 0 0 0 m e n in the land army, a strength which
was almost reached again a few years after the battle of C a n n a e by virtue of con-
The Basic Strategic Problem of the Second Punk War 347
tinuous enlisting of the youths. In 2 1 6 B . C . R o m e had 18 legions u n d e r arms, in

2 1 2 - 2 1 1 B . C . , 21 (or e v e n possibly 23).
Even Beloch earlier agreed (Population [Bevölkerung], p. 383) with the o p i n i o n "that
between 2 1 4 and 2 0 3 B . C . something like 20 R o m a n legions were on active duty is a
fact that cannot be disputed in any way." N o w he c o n t e n d s , supported by Polybius 8.
3, that the 20 (or e v e n 22 to 23) legions are to be explained as boasting by the
Roman writers, and he believes that Rome had no m o r e than 8 legions in the field,
only 4 of which were in Italy. N o w this is a patent error. U n d e r no circumstances
does Polybius say that R o m e had 8 legions in the field, but he says that she had two
armies in Italy u n d e r the c o m m a n d of the consuls, and the possibility that he might
have understood in this connection armies of 2 legions each is not only not said but
is c o m p l e t e l y e l i m i n a t e d by the fact that he also a p p l i e s the w o r d stratopedon
("army"*) to the fleet c o m m a n d of Publius Scipio in Spain. Further, how would it
have been possible for the R o m a n s to recapture Capua with only 4 legions, since
Hannibal certainly still had at his disposal in the years following the battle of Cannae
an army of 4 0 , 0 0 0 to 5 0 , 0 0 0 men? Moreover, the n u m b e r of legions given by Livy
obviously goes back to an official account, and the account of the levy of the year
212 B . C . , which we shall discuss very shortly, very definitely has the stamp of credi-
bility. Nevertheless, Beloch's instinct was right and his opinion, with a few small cor-
rections, can be accepted and can further be s u p p o r t e d by m e a n s of o t h e r very
weighty evidence.
If the legions really n u m b e r e d 22, Beloch asks, why did not Polybius give the
number of legions in his Chapter 8. 3, where, after all, he purports to describe the
totality of R o m a n arms, precisely in these years? He probably did not do so because
a large part of these so-called legions were small units of garrison troops that were
dignified with the proud name of legion only because of the Romans' love for im-
posing words. I have no doubt that in this sentence there is o p e n e d up to us a solu-
tion that simultaneously banishes a whole series of difficulties. We can base the strict
proof for this on the legiones urbanae (city legions).
During the years from 2 1 5 B . C t o 2 1 2 B . C . R o m e f o r m e d 2 new legions annually,
which were trained in R o m e itself and simultaneously formed the garrison for the
capital, and in this way she gradually b r o u g h t the n u m b e r from 14 legions, the
number existing a t the start o f 2 1 5 B . C , u p t o 2 2 . I n f i l l i n g u p the army after the
battle of Cannae the totality of available m a n p o w e r was completely e x h a u s t e d , so
that it was necessary to take the step of enlisting imprisoned debtors and slaves. If
now they continued to form two new legions in each of the next four years, there
was available for this purpose only the a g e - g r o u p that had just entered its eight-
eenth year. C o m p a r e d with our m o d e r n concepts, the Romans in d o i n g so went
back to an age that is not yet generally considered as strong e n o u g h for military
duty, m u c h less for combat. From a practical viewpoint it was probably not this way.
T h e R o m a n s maintained no birth registers; the age of y o u n g m e n could therefore
not be so easily d e t e r m i n e d , and it may have h a p p e n e d often e n o u g h that unwilling -
candidates placed their age too low in o r d e r to escape service for o n e or two years
longer. T h i s possibility was blocked w h e n they d e c i d e d that e v e n seventeen-year-olds
were liable to drafting, for that meant in other words that the draft authorities c o u l d
take anybody w h o s e e m e d to them to be sufficiently d e v e l o p e d physically and did
not have to worry about the objection that the drafted youth was not yet of the legal
age, which would have been easy for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.
T h e n u m b e r of adult male citizens a m o u n t e d at that time to s o m e t h i n g over
2 7 0 , 0 0 0 , of w h o m s o m e 2 5 , 0 0 0 are to be c o u n t e d a m o n g the defected Capuans. T h e
year-group of seventeen-year-olds a m o u n t s in the G e r m a n Empire to 3.13 percent
1 1
of all m e n over seventeen years old, and in France to 2.45 percent of that g r o u p .
T h e age distribution of the R o m a n citizenry was supposedly m o r e similar to that of
France than to the G e r m a n ; assuming the a g e - g r o u p of seventeen-year-olds as 2¾
percent, it a m o u n t e d to 6 , 7 4 0 persons, or, in o r d e r to be on the safe side, let us say
7,000 to 7,500. From that n u m b e r the physically disqualified individuals must be
d e d u c t e d . In Germany at present the percentage of those w h o are qualified at the

time of induction varies between 52.7 percent (1898) a n d 5 9 . 9 percent (1896). In
addition, however, we must include the great n u m b e r of those w h o have only quite
minor disabilities, are assigned to the replacement reserve, and would be inducted in
time of war. In the last d e c a d e the n u m b e r of completely unqualified m e n has var-
ied only between 8.5 percent (1903) and 6.9 percent (1904). Transferred over to the
R o m a n situation, this would m e a n a year-group of a r o u n d 6 , 5 0 0 qualified recruits,
or probably fewer. From that n u m b e r those deferred for special reasons must be
deducted. Livy recounts (24. 18) how in 2 1 4 B . C . the lists of juniores were reviewed
and 2,000 men were found w h o had not served in the last four years, without being
able to cite authorized dispensation or illness (qui quadriennio non militassent, quibus
neque vacalio iusta militae neque morbus causa fuisset). T h e r e f o r e , e v e n at that time, in
addition to illness, there were legal dispensations, and the addition of quadriennio in
conjunction with the later prescription that a man was obligated for 16, and in case
of emergency, 2 0 , campaigns leads to the conclusion that there was a certain diver-
sity of enforcement; in o t h e r words, dispensation for e c o n o m i c reasons, as Nissen
correcdy pointed out, played a considerable role in the levying of troops, a more
important o n e than even I had earlier estimated.
To lead into battle a n y w h e r e near the totality of m e n b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n and
forty-six would never be possible for m o r e than a few days. On the small farms on
which, after all, the great mass of the R o m a n population lived, it was necessary to
leave a m a n capable of working, or at the very least there had to be s o m e relative on
a neighboring farm w h o could lend a hand, if there was not to be famine and a
complete economic breakdown. T h i s situation, of course, also worked to the special
advantage of the seventeen-year-olds, since often o n e w o u l d have had to let the
father, w h o was a trained soldier, go h o m e , if o n e took from the farm wife her
growing son w h o was helping h e r and in w h o m the army would have gotten a raw
recruit in place of a seasoned warrior. From the economic and family points of view,
such an e x c h a n g e might e v e n have been desirable, of course; but it was not in the
best interests of the pursuit of the war. T h i s concept is attested to by the account in
Livy (25. 3) that in 2 1 2 B . C . , in addition to the 2 new city legions that were to be
f o r m e d , replacement levies were also d e c i d e d on for the older legions stationed in
Italy. Such a decision could only be reached if a g o o d portion of the available re-
cruits from the p r e c e d i n g years had been left over. Livy d o e s , of course, report to us
further on that the n u m b e r of recruits did not suffice for the implementation of this
decision and that consequently youths not yet seventeen (that is, those w h o said they
were not yet seventeen), w h o s h o w e d sufficient strength, were inducted. B u t since
the replacement levy for the old legions, which had been o p p o s i n g the e n e m y for
years, required, after all, at least 5,000 to 8 , 0 0 0 m e n if it was to have any signifi-
cance, the n e e d was so great that in every case they must have c o u n t e d on very con-
siderable carryovers from the last previously inducted year-group. Consequently,
from the approximately 6 , 5 0 0 service-qualified recruits w h o were available, we have
to make a very considerable reduction for the actual n u m b e r called, and since 2 le-
gions with cavalry normally required 9 , 0 0 0 m e n , it follows, that these legions were or-
ganized at a strength far below the normal o n e and since, because of the e x t r e m e
y o u t h of the recruits, they h a d large discharge rates, they probably n u m b e r e d
hardly e v e n half of the normal figure w h e n they m o v e d out on a campaign.
T h i s situation is also reflected in the other legions. O n c e the R o m a n s had b e c o m e
accustomed to designating as legions units that n u m b e r e d perhaps only 2 , 0 0 0 men,
e v e n at the start of a campaign, we are no longer c o m p e l l e d to assume that the field
legions always had a strength a p p r o a c h i n g the normal; on the contrary, we feel
called on from the start, especially with respect to those troops that had already been
in the field for a rather l o n g time, to make a very c o n s i d e r a b l e d e d u c t i o n , and
Polybius knew what he was d o i n g w h e n he flatly declined to accept the n u m b e r of
legions as the measure of the R o m a n army strength.
T h e army Hasdrubal led over the Alps to the aid of his brother in 2 0 7 B . C . was
certainly only moderately large. Further, Hannibal's fighting strength was surely al-
ready greatly shrunken. Why would the R o m a n s have been in such great fear of
these two armies if they had had s o m e t h i n g like 20 actual legions in the field? Why
did N e r o have to make his famous secret march to reinforce the northern army, if
the Romans had had 2 real legions in Etruria, 2 in R o m e , 1 near Capua, and, in
addition to the field army, 4 m o r e in Lower Italy?
Whereas I assumed earlier that the 22 legions had been about 8 0 , 0 0 0 strong, I
now believe that I can and must reduce that figure to between 5 0 , 0 0 0 and 6 0 , 0 0 0 .
T h e question is whether also the 18 legions of the year 2 1 6 B . C . , c o n c e r n i n g which it
was specifically reported that the strength of those in the main army had increased
to 5,000 m e n , must suffer a larger reduction than we had formerly assumed neces-
sary for them. Of course, they were considerably closer to normal strength than
were the legions of the later armies, and particularly the 8 legions that fought at
Cannae and the 2 in Spain were probably almost at full strength; for the 8 others,
however, we no longer n e e d to make that assumption, since the missions that were
assigned to t h e m actually required only moderately strong garrison troops. If we as-
sume, then, a strength between 4 5 , 0 0 0 and 4 7 , 0 0 0 for the 10 main legions, the total
strength still probably did not a m o u n t to more than s o m e 6 6 , 0 0 0 m e n .
Consequently, o u r estimate now brings us to s o m e 6½ percent of the population,
and with the inclusion of casualties, 7½ percent, as the measure of the military ef-
fort, whereas we previously arrived at the figure of 9½ percent. I confess, however,
that I had always felt dubious about this n u m b e r d e e p inside me, and I only ac-
cepted and passed it on simply because there s e e m e d to be no reason for o p p o s i n g
the estimates. Even 5 percent year in, year out, after the e n o r m o u s combat losses, is
already such a gigantic effort that we could be completely satisfied with it and could
well understand the complaints of the R o m a n citizenry, which have been passed on
to us quite fully.
Insofar as the R o m a n citizenry is concerned, we are, as has been seen, quite accu-
rately informed of the war levy. But the R o m a n citizens f o r m e d only a third of the
free inhabitants of the entire alliance. T h e military b u r d e n was distributed in such a
way that the allies furnished for the land army a somewhat stronger contingent than
did Rome, as well as providing the principal part of the fleet (socii novates). At this
point o u r k n o w l e d g e c o m e s to an e n d : how m u c h of this obligation was actually car-
ried out and how m u c h not? After Cannae a portion of the allies went directly over
to the Carthaginians; but e v e n those w h o remained loyal to the R o m a n s can hardly
have striven with all their strength in the same m a n n e r as the R o m a n s themselves;
and at any rate, with the defection of so many, the policy that a half of that army
was supposed to be c o m p o s e d of allies could not be sustained. H o w large, then, the
Roman armies actually were after Cannae we do not know, since the sources do not
include figures c o n c e r n i n g the strength of the contemporary allies, and this is an
important lacuna for an analysis of the later campaigns, especially the o n e of 2 0 7
B.C.
ADDED I N T H I R D E D I T I O N
Since the f o r e g o i n g was written, the problem has been e x p l o r e d in many ways,
especially by Beversdorff in The Armed Forces of the Carthaginians and the Romans in the
Second Punic War (Die Streitkräfte der Karthager und Römer im 2. pun. Kriege), Berlin
dissertation, 1910; by Kromayer, Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder, 3: 4 7 6 ; by
E. Meyer, Sitzungsberichte der Akademie, 1915, p. 9 4 8 . Kromayer believes that the
number of R o m a n citizens should be significantly increased because of the assump-
tion that m e n o v e r sixty years of age were e x c l u d e d in the census figures and as a
result of a few o t h e r corrections of the historical accounts. Nevertheless, he agrees
with me in believing that very many of the legions reported in Livy were, to be sure,
in existence, but were also far below the normal strength. If in doing so he states the
opinion that I make too sharp a distinction between consular legions and garrison
legions, this point is based on a misunderstanding; in this respect I concur fully with
his explanation. On the o t h e r h a n d , I would not agree with his assumption that the
m e n over sixty years of age were not included in the census figures, and I would
hold fast to the concept that in 2 1 6 B . C . the n u m b e r of inductable citizens had been
completely exhausted for all practical purposes. For, e v e n if a certain number of
service-qualified m e n between seventeen and forty-six years of age were actually
available, nevertheless the majority of them were probably so indispensable that they
could not be inducted, e v e n in this e x t r e m e e m e r g e n c y , and it was preferable to
form slave legions. I should therefore like to stick to my estimates and only lessen
them a bit in accepting Kromayer's p r o o f that there were many furloughs in winter,
even for entire legions.
E. Meyer has modified his earlier estimates (1915) by lowering the land army
strength to s o m e extent, but at the same time he assumes a m o n g the crews of the
fleet something like a third, that is, some 18,000 Roman citizens. Since I assume that
this estimate is m u c h too high and that in the fleet at that time not much m o r e than
the high c o m m a n d was of national Roman origin, then I may be permitted to retain
my estimates that the total levy of R o m a n citizens a m o u n t e d to 6 6 , 0 0 0 in 2 1 6 B . C .
and to 5 0 , 0 0 0 to 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n in the following years.
T h e English United Service Gazette published in 1905 (No. 3 7 8 7 ) an estimate of the
strength of the English armed forces d u r i n g the Napoleonic period. According to
this study, in 1805, with a population of less than 17 million, they n u m b e r e d about
8 0 0 , 0 0 0 men. C o n c e r n i n g the performances of the nations in the World War of
1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 we do not yet have official accounts. T h e effort of the German people
undoubtedly a m o u n t e d to at least the double of the effort of Prussia in the year
1813.
1. Polybius 3. 89. 9.
2. I am not a d d i n g any for t h e fleet, since at this time they would
have left very few R o m a n citizens a b o a r d ship. Since t h e r e was no
real sea war t a k i n g place, they w e r e able to p r o v i d e the crews from
allies a n d slaves (except for the o n e fleet legion).
3. Livy 34. 50.
4. Livy, 37. 60.
5. I do n o t see fit to a g r e e with the idea t h a t fear of t h e wild
Gauls, w h o f o r m e d s u c h a l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e of t h e Punic a r m y ,
caused t h e Italians to a d h e r e to R o m e ; for t h e defections increased
continuously in t h e years 2 1 0 a n d 211 B . C . , a l t h o u g h that fear, to
w h a t e v e r e x t e n t it existed, m u s t h a v e b e e n g e t t i n g s t r o n g e r a n d
stronger.
6 . T h e n u m e r o u s victories that the R o m a n s a r e s u p p o s e d t o have
w o n from H a n n i b a l from 216 to 2 0 3 B . C . a c c o r d i n g to Livy, were,
as is so excellently e x p l a i n e d by W. Streit in On the History of the
Second Punic War in Italy after the Battle of Cannae (Zur Geschichte des
zweiten punischen Krieges in Italien nach der Schlacht bei Canna, Berlin,
1887), patriotic R o m a n fantasies—frankly, p u r e lies. V e r y nicely
was Streit able to a d d up t h a t H a n n i b a l is s u p p o s e d to have lost
120,000 killed in all these battles from C a n n a e on. W h e r e it was a

question of larger battles, as at H e r d o n i a e a n d N u m i s t r o , victory still
went to t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s . T h e alleged victories of Marcellus at
Nola t u r n out to be very insignificant e n g a g e m e n t s .
7. It is precisely this way t h a t Polybius describes t h e situation (9.
3-4).
8. Studies of Ancient History published by Jules Beloch (Studi di Storia
antica pubblicati di Giulio Beloch), I: 34.
9. On the History of the Second Punic War (Zur Geschichte des zweiten
punischen Krieges), p. 3 5 .
10. In my first edition I rejected with m o r e detailed d o c u m e n t a -
tion t h e objections of K o r n e m a n n in Conradsche Jahrbücher, new
series, 14 (1897): 2 9 1 , which I h a v e not r e p e a t e d h e r e .
11. A c c o r d i n g to the census of 1 D e c e m b e r 1900 the n u m b e r of
y o u n g m e n o v e r s e v e n t e e n a n d u n d e r e i g h t e e n i n the G e r m a n
E m p i r e a m o u n t e d t o 525,582, a n d t h e n u m b e r o f all m e n above
seventeen was 16,806,581 (see also Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 150:
118 ff.). A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c e n s u s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1901 i n
F r a n c e , the n u m b e r o f m e n b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n a n d e i g h t e e n o n
1 J a n u a r y 1901 a m o u n t e d to 3 3 0 , 3 1 8 , a n d the n u m b e r of all m e n
over s e v e n t e e n years of age to 13,456,430 (see also Résultats statis-
tiques du recensement de 1901, 4: 58).
Chapter III
The Strategic Prelude
to the War in Retrospect
F r o m t h e position of k n o w l e d g e t h a t we h a v e n o w attained let us
o n c e again t u r n back t o t h e p r e l u d e t o t h e w a r o n b o t h sides. Re-
cently J o s e p h F u c h s has published on this subject excellent studies,
1
with which I c o n c u r in their i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s .
H a n n i b a l took t h e land r o u t e because this r o u t e led h i m to t h a t
p e o p l e that was r e a d y t o j o i n h i m i m m e d i a t e l y against t h e R o m a n s ,
t h e Gauls. If he h a d , for e x a m p l e , first crossed over from Africa to
Sicily, he would have h a d to rely for a l o n g t i m e solely on his own
r e s o u r c e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , such a n e x p e d i t i o n b y sea w o u l d h a v e
b e e n e x p o s e d to attack by t h e s u p e r i o r R o m a n sea power, a n d it
was also practically impossible to create a c a r g o fleet large e n o u g h
to m o v e the army's 10,000 horses. T h i s was p r o b a b l y t h e final, d e -
cisive factor; for on t h e c o n c e p t of g o i n g in f r o m t h e very start
with unquestionably s u p e r i o r cavalry a n d w i n n i n g t h e first battle
with it e v e r y t h i n g else was based.
C o n f i d e n t that he w o u l d be able to establish for himself a new
base in Italy itself, H a n n i b a l gave up a c o n t i n u o u s c o n n e c t i o n with
t h e h o m e l a n d , limited his fleet to t h e barely essential, d e v o t e d all of
his m e a n s , instead, to t h e l a n d a r m y , a n d also p r o v i d e d himself
from the start with a well-filled war treasury. If he did not possess
an actual superiority at sea, it was of less use to h i m to have a fleet
of m e d i o c r e s t r e n g t h t h a n the cash with which he could pay his
m e r c e n a r i e s regularly a n d could show up in t h e a r e a of t h e Gauls,
as in Italy, w i t h o u t at t h e s a m e time b e i n g too m u c h of a b u r d e n
for the allies w h o m he e x p e c t e d to j o i n h i m . Polybius is correct in
m a k i n g a p o i n t of t h e fact ( 3 . 17. 10) t h a t H a n n i b a l also took
m o n e y a l o n g with h i m on his e x p e d i t i o n .
T h e concept of t h e R o m a n s strikes us as less clear t h a n t h e logic
352
The Strategic Prelude to the War in Retrospect 353
of H a n n i b a l , so t h a t t h e g e n e r a l feeling, even to i n c l u d e Fuchs, has

been to see in t h e R o m a n viewpoint h a r d l y a n y t h i n g else t h a n an
i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d completely u n - R o m a n indecisiveness a n d a
purposeless hesitation.
Why did t h e R o m a n s n o t seize t h e offensive from t h e start a n d
carry the war t o Spain, preferably d u r i n g t h e time w h e n H a n n i b a l
was still o c c u p i e d with t h e siege of S a g u n t u m ?
J u s t as t h e tactical superiority of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s later s h o w e d
itself at C a n n a e , so would any a r m y , e v e n t h o u g h as large as his,
which t h e R o m a n s m i g h t h a v e sent against h i m in S p a i n , easily
have fallen p r e y to h i m t h e r e . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s w e r e , after all,
m u c h s t r o n g e r in Spain t h a n in Italy.
If the R o m a n s had, instead, m o u n t e d at once a great attack
against C a r t h a g e itself, H a n n i b a l , crossing over from Spain or even
possibly s e n d i n g only a p a r t of his a r m y , would have b r o u g h t to
this R o m a n a r m y the s a m e fate t h a t befell R e g u l u s in the first war.
It w o u l d h a v e b e e n worse yet if t h e R o m a n s h a d divided t h e i r
forces a n d attacked Spain a n d Africa simultaneously, e x p o s i n g b o t h
expeditions, in t u r n , to the attack of the unified C a r t h a g i n i a n
forces. It was, of c o u r s e , o u t of t h e question to think t h a t C a r t h a g e
could possibly be t a k e n while H a n n i b a l was still fighting with t h e
R o m a n force in Spain. C a r t h a g e was a m i g h t y fortress t h a t w o u l d
r e q u i r e years to be taken by siege, a n d H a n n i b a l would have m a d e
short shrift of the R o m a n force sent against h i m .
O n e is t h e r e f o r e obliged, a l o n g with Fuchs, to a g r e e completely
with t h a t p a r t y in the R o m a n S e n a t e that, a c c o r d i n g to Livy, 2 1 . 6 ,
believed "non temere movendam rem tantam" ("such serious m a t t e r s
should not be hastily acted u p o n " ) . C o m p a r e d with the C a r t h a g i n -
ian a r m y t h a t t h e Barcas h a d o r g a n i z e d i n Spain, t h e R o m a n s
w e r e n o t in a position to seize t h e offensive, a n d t h e i r hesitation,
their l o n g p e r i o d o f indecisiveness, t h e s u r r e n d e r o f S a g u n t u m — a l l
of this is very easily e x p l a i n e d , even t h o u g h , as we shall establish
b e l o w , t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y i n S p a i n was n o t 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n
strong, as has previously been assumed, based on the word of
Polybius, b u t r a t h e r only s o m e 82,000 m e n .
It w o u l d a p p e a r now t h a t t h e r e is a contradiction b e t w e e n this
idea a n d t h e m a n n e r i n which t h e R o m a n s , after they h a d f i n a l l y
e n t e r e d t h e war, actually p r o c e e d e d , a n d what they p l a n n e d . T h e y
t h o u g h t they could carry on t h e w a r with 6 legions; in fact, at t h e
start, b e f o r e they b e c a m e o c c u p i e d with an u p r i s i n g of t h e Cisal-
p i n e Boii, they seem to have i n t e n d e d to get a l o n g with t h e i r n o r -
mal s t r e n g t h of 4 legions. Of t h e 4, they sent two u n d e r t h e C o n s u l
S e m p r o n i u s to Sicily, so that they could cross over to Africa, a n d

t h e o t h e r consul, Scipio, was s u p p o s e d to lead 2 legions to Spain. If
they believed that they would be able to m a k e o u t against H a n n i b a l
in Spain with 2 legions, or a total of 2 2 , 4 0 0 infantry a n d 2,000
cavalry (Livy 2 1 . 17), t h e n it was, of c o u r s e , inexcusable on their
p a r t not to have g o n e to the aid of t h e S a g u n t i a n s .
Fuchs has c l e a r e d up the m a t t e r by d r a w i n g t h e following in-
t e r p r e t a t i o n from t h e sources. T h e R o m a n s suspected a n d knew
Hannibal's w a r plan from t h e start. T h e n a t u r a l difficulties of the
gigantic m a r c h t h r o u g h n o t h i n g but e n e m y p e o p l e s from the Ebro,
across the Pyrenees, to the Alps, s e e m e d to t h e m , of course, still
m u c h g r e a t e r t h a n they did to H a n n i b a l . T h e y c o u n t e d on t h e fact
that his s t r e n g t h would already have s h r u n k very greatly before he
even arrived at the foot of the Alps. T h e i r idea, t h e r e f o r e , was not
to o p p o s e him until this point, p e r h a p s on t h e R h o n e , a n d to or-
ganize the opposition of t h e natives of the a r e a against him. F r o m
t h e b e g i n n i n g , Scipio's e x p e d i t i o n was i n t e n d e d for this area, a n d
Spain was only a s e c o n d a r y objective. S e m p r o n i u s ' expedition was
only being r e a d i e d in Sicily a n d was not s u p p o s e d to move on to
Africa until it was definitely established that H a n n i b a l was e n g a g e d
with his a r m y in Gaul a n d could not s u d d e n l y fall on t h e R o m a n
forces in front of C a r t h a g e .
Even in view of these plans, however, the weakness of t h e two
c o n s u l a r a r m i e s is still n o t e w o r t h y . If s o m e t h i n g like twice t h e
s t r e n g t h , or 4 legions, h a d been set in motion for each of t h e two
u n d e r t a k i n g s , t h e n it would a p p e a r perfectly clear that t h e s t r e n g t h
of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s was k n o w n to t h e R o m a n S e n a t e a n d that this
body t h e r e f o r e chose a defensive-offensive strategy, left t h e initia-
tive to H a n n i b a l , sacrificed S a g u n t u m , a n d e n t e r e d t h e war with
cautious hesitation.
T h e e x p l a n a t i o n for the fact that each of the two consuls was given
only 2 legions probably is that it was a question of overseas e x p e d i -
tions. To send o u t large a r m i e s by sea r e q u i r e s h u g e resources, a n d
the large fleets can h a r d l y be controlled afterwards. T h e r e a r e not
e n o u g h ports t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m all; t h e wind drives t h e m o u t
of formation a n d leaves those t h a t a r e s h a k e n loose from t h e for-
mation easy prey to t h e e n e m y . T h e R o m a n s did not yet have the
r e m o t e s t idea of the r a g i n g p o w e r u n l e a s h e d by H a n n i b a l in battle,
a n d so while very well k n o w i n g that they could not o p p o s e him di-
rectly in Spain or Africa, they m i g h t nevertheless have b e e n confi-
d e n t that a full c o n s u l a r a r m y on t h e R h o n e , based on t h e be-
f r i e n d e d city of Massilia a n d allied with t h e Gallic tribes, which
could not tolerate t h e passage of t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , could carry on

successful c o m b a t .
Seen in this light, the c o n d u c t of the R o m a n s loses its a p p e a r a n c e
of w e a k n e s s , of indecisive, c o n t r a d i c t o r y h a l f - m o v e s . It d e r i v e s
quite naturally from t h e attitudes that g o v e r n e d t h e way the Senate
directed t h e f o r t u n e s of the R o m a n state, b o t h before a n d after-
ward.
In the first place, H a n n i b a l t h w a r t e d t h e R o m a n estimates by
o v e r c o m i n g t h e obstacles o n his m a r c h m u c h m o r e quickly t h a n
had b e e n e x p e c t e d . W h e n Scipio with his 24,400 m e n l a n d e d n e a r
Marseilles, t h i n k i n g H a n n i b a l was still held up in the Pyrenees, t h e
latter was already on t h e R h o n e , a n d he c o m p l e t e d his crossing be-
fore Scipio could do a n y t h i n g to stop him.
At this point o n e m i g h t well raise the question why H a n n i b a l ,
apparently w o r r i e d , avoided an e n g a g e m e n t with the R o m a n s in-
stead of welcoming the arrival of Scipio as good news. With his far
superior a r m y , b o t h numerically a n d qualitatively, he would only
have h a d to e n v e l o p Scipio in o r d e r to c u t him d o w n ; t h e finest,
most certain victory was offered him by t h e u n s u s p e c t i n g R o m a n s .
This shows the full genius of t h e y o u n g C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r ,
the c o m b i n a t i o n of the highest c o u r a g e with the calmest calculation,
in that he did not p u r s u e t h e t e m p t a t i o n of this prize. N a p o l e o n ' s
saying "une victoire est toujours bonne a quelque chose" ("a victory al-
ways serves s o m e good p u r p o s e " ) , h o w e v e r indisputable it may a p -
pear, is nevertheless still subject to e x c e p t i o n s a n d limitations. If
Hannibal h a d held up his a d v a n c e for e v e n only a few days for a
victory over Scipio, he would not have b e e n able to cross t h e Alps
that year. H o w e v e r certain the victory was, the R o m a n s still w e r e
accustomed to selling t h e i r lives dearly in every e n c o u n t e r . T h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n s could have t a k e n t h e losses in themselves, b u t they
could n e i t h e r have given up t h e g r e a t mass of their w o u n d e d in
this e n e m y t e r r i t o r y n o r s u c c e e d e d i n u r g i n g t h e m t h r o u g h t h e
m a r c h over t h e Alps that i m m e d i a t e l y faced t h e m . It was a l r e a d y
late a u t u m n , a n d in a few weeks the snow would block the passes.
If, however, t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y h a d s p e n t the winter in Gaul,
in o r d e r to d e s c e n d into Italy t h e following spring, it could be ex-
pected that t h e R o m a n s , w a r n e d a n d f r i g h t e n e d by t h e defeat of
the first a r m y , would be waiting in greatly s u p e r i o r n u m b e r s for
the C a r t h a g i n i a n s as soon as they m o v e d o u t of the Alpine passes.
T h a t was t h e most d a n g e r o u s weak spot in H a n n i b a l ' s strategic
plan. If t h e R o m a n s h a d from t h e start held their defensive action
for this point a n d h a d fallen on the C a r t h a g i n i a n s j u s t as they c a m e
o u t of the passes, while t h e i r cavalry was half o u t of action, partly

because of fatigue a n d partly because of t h e t e r r a i n , it is difficult to
see how H a n n i b a l could h a v e c a r r i e d o u t his invasion. B u t with his
p e n e t r a t i n g , psychologically o r i e n t e d perspicacity, he h a d foreseen,
as Fuchs masterfully explains, that the old bold offensive spirit of
t h e R o m a n s would n o t allow t h e m to await t h e arrival of the e n e m y
within their b o r d e r s . If they did not m o v e o u t to o p p o s e him as far
away as Spain, s o m e t h i n g he p e r h a p s h o p e d for at t h e start, they
would certainly go as far as Gaul.
H a n n i b a l m a y also h a v e h a d positive i n f o r m a t i o n at his disposi-
tion. We may a s s u m e t h a t he was not w i t h o u t contacts in R o m e ,
w h e r e p e o p l e of all nationalities s t r e a m e d in, a n d that he h a d or-
ganized an intelligence service. Even with all the R o m a n virtues,
decisions t a k e n by a b o d y as large as t h e S e n a t e w e r e h a r d to k e e p
completely secret, a n d t h e c o n c e a l m e n t o f practical p r e p a r a t i o n s
was even h a r d e r . In 2 1 6 B.C. t h e R o m a n s claimed to have discov-
e r e d in their city a C a r t h a g i n i a n spy w h o h a d b e e n t h e r e for two
years, a n d as a fear-inspiring e x a m p l e they sent him o u t with his
h a n d s c h o p p e d off (Livy 22. 33).
H a n n i b a l t h e r e f o r e h a d good reason t o e x p e c t t o f i n d t h e Ro-
m a n s s o m e w h e r e a l o n g his r o u t e , a n d if he t h e n avoided an en-
g a g e m e n t or m o v e d immediately after t h e battle to cross the Alps,
he would find on t h e o t h e r side, at the exit from t h e passes, still no
p r e p a r e d defenses, p e r h a p s e v e n if he f o u g h t t h e battle in Spain.
F o r t h e fame a c q u i r e d by this victory would have greatly facilitated
for h i m the m a r c h t h r o u g h the Celtic p e o p l e s . T h e m a r c h H a n n i -
bal m a d e , f r o m t h e E b r o into t h e Po valley, a m o u n t s to a b o u t 550
miles as the crow flies, a n d he would t h e n p e r h a p s have b e e n able
to m a k e it in t h r e e m o n t h s r a t h e r t h a n five. B u t we do not have to
e x h a u s t every c o m b i n a t i o n of possibilities; suffice it to say that
H a n n i b a l , with good r e a s o n , c o u n t e d on b e i n g able to carry o u t his
crossing over t h e Alps w i t h o u t being s t o p p e d by t h e R o m a n s a n d
that, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , he eschewed with logical r e a s o n i n g a vic-
tory on the R h o n e , in o r d e r to c a r r y o u t with c o m p l e t e certainty his
e n t r a n c e into t h e Po r e g i o n , without w e a k e n i n g himself by sacrific-
ing several t h o u s a n d w o u n d e d m e n , a n d to c r e a t e a new base for
himself t h e r e , in alliance with the Cisalpine Gauls.
Hannibal's estimates all p r o v e d valid, w h e r e a s those of the Ro-
m a n s w e r e not. B u t we s h o u l d not be too critical of t h e m ; they
h a p p e n e d to be d e a l i n g with H a n n i b a l , a n d in those circumstances
it was n o t easy to c o m e o u t on t o p . A senate c a n n o t arrive at deci-
sions t h r o u g h g e n i u s - i n s p i r e d intuition; it c a n n o t act differently or
come to decisions in any way except in t h e m a n n e r of its forebears,

and that is what t h e R o m a n s did in this case, fearlessly a n d in k e e p -
ing with t h e dictates of c o m m o n sense. In m a n y a historical m o -
ment, however, t h a t is not e n o u g h .
EXCURSUS
ESTIMATE OF S T R E N G T H S
Before Hannibal left Italian soil in 2 0 3 B . C , he had erected in the ancient, highly
revered T e m p l e of Hera Lacinia near Croton a brass tablet on which his d e e d s and
triumphs in the peninsula were engraved. Polybius tells us that he saw this tablet
himself and that he took from it the entire e n u m e r a t i o n of the troops left back in
Spain and in Africa by Hannibal, as well as the army's strength on arrival in Italy (3.
33 and 56).
Although there have always been great c o m m a n d e r s w h o were inclined to u n d e r -
state their strength after winning a victory—Caesar, Frederick, and N a p o l e o n e v e n
did that to an e x t r e m e degree—nevertheless, we may first of all give full credence to
the figures stated by Hannibal. T h e r e is a question, however, whether Polybius' ex-
tract is correct and w h e t h e r all his n u m b e r s c o m e from this source.
Polybius, taking his figures from the Lacinian tablet, states that Hannibal had left
b e h i n d a s g a r r i s o n t r o o p s i n Africa 1 9 , 9 2 0 m e n (with the m i s s i n g n u m b e r o f
Balearics filled in from Livy), and in Spain 15,200 m e n (3. 33). Somewhat further
on he recounts that Hannibal marched off with 102,000 m e n . He would therefore
have had an army of some 137,000 m e n .
Of the 102,000 m e n , he left 11,000 behind for the region north of the Ebro, and
he released 1 1 , 0 0 0 Spaniards in their h o m e l a n d . He crossed the P y r e n e e s with
59,000 m e n . T h e subjection of the Spaniards north of the Ebro had cost him, then,
21,000 m e n . For a short campaign against a few barbarian peoples that is an abso-
lutely unbelievable number.
He arrived at the R h o n e with 4 6 , 0 0 0 m e n (38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry). T h e
move up to that point had therefore cost him 13,000 m e n .
After the crossing of the Alps the Carthaginian army n u m b e r e d a bare 2 0 , 0 0 0 in-
fantry and 6 , 0 0 0 cavalry, and for this figure Polybius again d e p e n d s on the Lacinian
tablet. T h e crossing of the Alps, then, apparently cost the Carthaginians 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n
more.
T h e s e h u g e losses have not been considered improbable, since it is well known how
greatly marches t h r o u g h e n e m y territory, e v e n without large battles, can cause attri-
tion in armies, a n d we are r e m i n d e d of the losses Napoleon's army suffered d u r i n g
its advance on Moscow. T h i s analogy, however, is not valid. Napoleon's army, and
especially the French r e g i m e n t s , were c o m p o s e d in their great majority of very
young m e n and unwilling draftees, w h o were held in the service only through force.
Hannibal's army undoubtedly consisted of warriors who were capable of withstand-
ing every kind of fatigue. A l t h o u g h it is true that the opposition furnished by the
Celtic peoples did delay the march to the extent that security measures had to be
taken, it cannot possibly have caused very m u c h bloodshed, since, in view of the
overwhelming numerical and qualitative superiority of the invaders and the strength
of their cavalry, the barbarians could hardly afford to allow themselves to be drawn
into combat. We hear n o t h i n g of any battle of importance or of any c o m b i n e d resis-
tance of many tribes that might have c o m e close to rivaling the strength of the
C a r t h a g i n i a n s . O n l y o n very f a v o r a b l e s p e c i a l o c c a s i o n s i n l i m i t e d l o c a l i t i e s
—consequently, especially in the Alps—were the local inhabitants able to exercise a
d a m a g i n g effect of any considerable proportions on the progress of the march. If
u n d e r such circumstances a seasoned army is to sacrifice as a matter of course far
2
more than half of its strength on a march of about two months' duration, t h e n the
marches of Caesar, which were carried out for the most part over the same routes as
t h o s e of Hannibal, from Italy to Spain and from Spain to Italy, as well as the
marches of Alexander in Asia, b e c o m e completely inconceivable, and it also b e c o m e s
incomprehensible that the strength of the Carthaginian army in the following cam-
paigns in Italy was so well maintained.
Consequently, there is no other possibility but that the Lacinian tablet did not con-
tain an accounting of the strength of the Carthaginian army as it marched out, that
Polybius combined information from o t h e r sources with that of the Lacinian tablet
and arrived at the huge march losses through the differences. In just the same way,
of course, he also arrived at the exaggerated loss of 7 0 , 0 0 0 m e n by the Romans at
Cannae. Consequently, we do not know how large Hannibal's army actually was
w h e n it crossed the Ebro. T h e r e is nothing to prevent our assuming, however, that
the overall march casualty figures did not e x c e e d , say, 10,000 men—surely in fact,
they must have been even m u c h smaller, for in n o n e of the sources is there the
slightest evidence to force us to assume losses of m o r e than a few h u n d r e d men.
Precisely for this reason we can assume that Hannibal listed on the Lacinian tablet
only those troops that he left behind in Spain and Africa and those with which he
arrived in Italy.
My sharp challenging of the estimates that up to now have unhesitatingly been
copied from Polybius concerning the original strength of Hannibal's army and his
march casualties e v o k e d contradiction by O. Hirschfeld in Festschrift fur T. Comperz
(Vienna: Alfred Holder, 1902), p. 159. From this controversy I have accepted a cor-
rection as to detail, but I repeat insofar as the rest of my a r g u m e n t is concerned the
d e f e n s e of my viewpoint, which I copy here from V o l u m e II [German-language] of
the first edition (p. 242).
First of all, Hirschfeld challenges my d o u b t i n g of the figures of Polybius on a
moral basis, as if I were raising "a serious complaint" and were "insulting" that great
old historian. In the abstract, it is difficult to argue over an evaluation of this type. I
believe, however, that we can very easily c o m e to a g r e e m e n t as soon as Hirschfeld
decides to take a position on the analogies that I a d d u c e d from the works of Moltke,
Sybel, Droysen, and Treitschke in Vol. I [original G e r m a n edition], pp. 2 1 , 3 8 7 and
Vol. II [original G e r m a n edition], pp. 67, 2 9 4 . As soon as o n e approaches the sub-
ject m o r e closely through such an analogy, o n e sees at o n c e that an objective doubt
in no way constitutes a moral complaint, and then it becomes immediately clear how
d a n g e r o u s it is, even in the case of such highly respected authors, to invest every
figure with a kind of infallibility.
In the present case it should have been all the less permissible for Hirschfeld to
take this point of departure, since I did not, after all, limit my criticism to this o n e
figure but supported it by m e a n s of Polybius' figures on Cannae. In this case it is
quite clear that the author d o e s not only repeat the figures from his sources, but
that he also establishes new o n e s t h r o u g h his calculations, and that these calculations
are cursory and false. T h e s e facts are, I believe, u n d i s p u t e d and undisputable and
o b v i o u s l y very i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f o t h e r f i g u r e s o f this a u t h o r .
Hirschfeld did not devote a single word, however, to o p p o s i n g this argument, which
for me is a very important one. I have considered it superfluous to introduce in this
matter still other evidence that Polybius, in his estimates, was in no way very careful
but rather went over them quickly. Since this point now s e e m s to be disputed, how-
ever, I shall also make reference to his account of the battle of Issus. Since it is a
question here of the critical rejection of another author, Callisthenes, o n e would
suppose that Polybius would have been doubly careful. B u t it is generally acknowl-
e d g e d that his calculations contain errors. I may be allowed to stress this point all
the m o r e , since I believe that in this situation I have successfully d e f e n d e d the
reasoning of Polybius in the matter, e v e n against the sharp attacks that it has elic-
ited; but his figures are patently incorrect in part and in contradiction with o n e
another. Finally, it is now probably also generally recognized that his figures on the
Roman fleet in the First Punic War were greatly exaggerated and likewise rest on
false calculations, that is, the inclusion of all the ships, e v e n the small ones, as pen-
teremes. See also Beloch, Population (Bevölkerung), p. 379.
Hirschfeld seeks to support the figures of Polybius by a note in Livy ( 2 1 . 38), ac-
cording to which Hannibal himself is supposed to have said to Cincius Alimentus,
who had been taken prisoner by him, that he had lost 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n after his crossing
of the Rhone. Like all the earlier scholars of this period, I too have left this passage
out of consideration, since it s e e m e d worthless to me. Hirschfeld now gives it a new
interpretation. T h e passage reads: "Ex ipso a u t e m audisse Hannibale, postquam
R h o d a n u m transient, triginta sex milia h o m i n i u m i n g e n t e m q u e n u m e r u m e q u o r u m
et aliorum j u m e n t o r u m amisisse." ("From Hannibal himself, moreover, he learned
that Hannibal, after he had crossed the Rhone, had lost 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n and vast n u m -
bers of horses and other beasts of burden.") Up to now that has been understood to
mean that after his crossing over the Rhone—consequently principally on his pas-
sage of the Alps—Hannibal lost 3 6 , 0 0 0 men. Hirschfeld also admits that Livy him-
self probably also meant it this way, but he believes nevertheless that he is justified
in interpreting as the original sense that it was not the march from the R h o n e on
that was meant, but the march up to the Rhone. N o w since Polybius' figures for the
losses of this first march phase lead to 3 5 , 0 0 0 m e n , the two figures appear to sup-
port and corroborate each other.
I cannot concur in any way with this evidence. In the first place, the remaining
difference of 1,000 m e n , though objectively unimportant, is still, however, quite sig-
nificant from the critical point of view, since, if the two estimates could really be
followed back to a c o m m o n source, they would also have to agree exactly. In addi-
tion, however, the relationship to the first march phase is completely excluded both
by the context and by the particular reference to the loss of cattle and horses. Livy
inserts this note after Hannibal has just arrived in Italy and has the costly crossing
of the Alps, with all its terrors, behind him. At this point should there be some spe-
cial m e n t i o n of the losses up to the Rhone, but no m e n t i o n of those in the passage
of the Alps? Hannibal, if indeed he honored Cincius Alimentus with information of
his great losses, supposedly m e n t i o n e d neither the overall losses of the march nor
the special losses on the crossing of the Alps, but only and particularly the losses up
to the Rhone? A n d at that with special emphasis on the loss of horses and cattle?
Personally, I place no value at all on these kinds of figures; but if o n e insists, after
all, in purging this estimate and s o m e h o w eliminating the obvious errors by means
of guesses, it s e e m s to me that the only rational conclusion is that the reference is to
the losses for the entire period from the crossing of the Rhone up to the m o m e n t of
the conversation. Cincius was praetor in about 2 0 9 B . C . and apparently was not
taken prisoner and given the h o n o r of a personal conversation with Hannibal until
some time later.
Instead of losing ourselves in similar hypotheses, we would probably do best to
point out that in that very same passage Livy also reports that, according to Cincius
Alimentus, Hannibal had led 9 0 , 0 0 0 m e n over the Alps, counting the Gauls and the
Ligurians, and t h e r e u p o n to add that we attribute no validity at all to n u m b e r s given
by this author.
It is also a wholly inadequate explanation of the huge losses of Hannibal on the
march w h e n Hirschfeld presumes there were "massive desertions" of the Spanish
troops. Neither in the sources nor by the nature of things d o e s this assumption have
the slightest support. It is completely arbitrary. After all, where would these desert-
ers have gone? W o u l d they have penetrated directly through strange, and often
hostile, tribes, w a n d e r i n g and begging their way homeward? In the first place we
can assume that, a m o n g the peoples of the peninsula, Hannibal found e n o u g h war-
like elements that were fully inclined, just as were the Africans, to follow his banner
in the expectation of pay, booty, fame, and adventure, and that he did not find it
necessary to press unwilling m e n into service; and second, it is clear that, o n c e they
had crossed the Ebro, any return was completely out of the question. In this respect
Hannibal enjoyed the advantage for which the Russian armies were noted in the
eighteenth century, that is, that they had no desertions, because, o n c e over the bor-
der, the private soldier could not make out by himself in a foreign country.
A n d in like m a n n e r it is also inadequate w h e n Hirschfeld states that we have
heard so little about Hannibal's combat actions on the march only because they were
not reported, and not because there were so few of t h e m . Let us realize that it is a
question of 13,000 m e n from an army reportedly of 5 9 , 0 0 0 , and consequently 22
percent, just on the march from the Pyrenees to the R h o n e . Let us recall from the
entire span of ancient military history, and especially from Caesar, how small the
losses were for a well-organized and well-led army against barbarians, as long as the
former was victorious, and let us imagine then what frightful battles those must have
been w h e n no word about them has c o m e d o w n to us, although the massive losses
w e r e not c o n c e a l e d ! A n d with all of this, the e n t i r e m a r c h d i s t a n c e f r o m the
Pyrenees to the Rhone is no longer than 160 miles. If Hannibal had lost 13,000 men
on this short march, that would have been many m o r e than in all his great victories
over the Romans, on the Trebia, at Lake T r a s i m e n o , and at Cannae taken together.
And the historians supposedly took care of such battles with the brief explanation
that he o p e n e d the way partly by force, partly by bribery?
All of these completely arbitrary insinuations have been made simply because it is
supposed to be impossible for Polybius to have ever carelessly followed an unreliable
source! T h e same Polybius of w h o m it is quite clear in three other passages that
s o m e t h i n g h u m a n c o u l d very well h a p p e n t o h i m i n n u m e r i c a l e s t i m a t e s and
computations—just as, i n d e e d , in the case of historians in general, attention to the
validity, the significance, and the range of figures is a rare characteristic.
Polybius informs us (3. 33) which troops Hannibal left in Spain and in Africa; two
chapters later (3. 35), Polybius tells with how many troops he started out and with
how many he crossed the Pyrenees. Much later (3. 56), we learn with how many he
arrived in Italy, and again, four chapters later (3. 60), how many he still had at the
m o m e n t of crossing the R h o n e . In the first and third passages Polybius indicates the
Lacinian tablet as his source. From this, Hirschfeld concludes that this tablet was also
the source for the other passages, since otherwise the author "can hardly escape the
reproach that, by the twice-mentioned reference to the Lacinian source, he instilled
in his readers a completely unjustified confidence, e v e n in the other figures that
have e m e r g e d from, as Delbrück believes, other, c o m p l e t e l y unreliable sources."
T h i s conclusion is methodologically false. Polybius himself considered his source as
sufficiently reliable—otherwise he w o u l d not have used it. T h a t m o d e r n criticism
with its sharper eyes casts doubt on this cannot be fought out as a struggle over
Polybius' morality. In fact, the matter has to be t u r n e d c o m p l e t e l y a r o u n d : if
Polybius had taken all of these figures from o n e and the same source, then it would
hardly be comprehensible why he scattered t h e m so m u c h . By their nature, they be-
long in two groups: for the start of the march, and for the arrival in Italy. For the
start, however, the n u m b e r of those left behind is separated from the n u m b e r that
marched away by an entire chapter. Even if the s e q u e n c e of the account justifies this
separation, it is still most unusual that the n u m b e r of troops that reached Italy is
reported first, whereas the strength of the army while it was still at the R h o n e is not
given until four chapters later. Instead of concluding that, because Polybius on both
occasions took the first n u m b e r from the Lacinian tablet (which he expressly says),
he must therefore also have d o n e the same thing each time for the second figure
(which he d o e s not say), we should turn this about; we can be quite sure that the
second figures are not derived from the Lacinian tablet.
Finally, Hirschfeld reproaches me for "correcting according to my o w n discretion
good source evidence. I h o p e that, the further my work progresses, the more this
h o n o r e d o p p o n e n t will gradually c o m e to admit that my criticism rests in no way on
my "discretion," but on k n o w l e d g e of the subject.
Since then Konrad L e h m a n n , in The Attacks of the Three Barcas Against Italy (Die
Angriffe der drei Barkiden auf Ilalien), pp. 131 ff., has also spoken up in support of my
concept with further arguments.
If I believe, for these reasons, that the initial strength of Hannibal's army must be
reduced quite drastically, I also believe that there are g o o d reasons for significantly
raising the arrival strength of the army in Italy as given by Polybius.
Hannibal is said to have arrived in northern Italy with 12,000 Africans, 8,000
Iberians, 6,000 cavalry. T h e s e figures were taken by Polybius from the Lacinian tab-
let; his repetition of the figures contains, however, an obvious gap.
In the battle on the Trebia (Polybius 3. 72) there is mention of 8,000 Balearics
3
and "lance-bearers" (logchophoroi: peltasts), which Hannibal had with him, and in
Livy 22. 37, there is a reference in a speech by the ambassador of King H i e r o to
Moorish and o t h e r sharpshooters that Hannibal had with him (see also 2 3 . 26 and
27. 18). T h e latter are missing in the note of Polybius taken from the Lacinian tab-
let. It is entirely out of the question that Hannibal should not have provided his
army with a significant force of light infantry precisely for the battles that he had to
fight while on the great march, and especially in the mountains.
It is also impossible, however, that the 8,000 light infantry should be included, as
Konrad L e h m a n n believes was the case, in the total of barely 2 0 , 0 0 0 infantry. In
that case, Hannibal would have arrived in Italy with only 12,000 hoplites, of w h o m
only some 9 , 0 0 0 to 10,000 could have been left at the time of Cannae. In that battle
he mixed the Iberians in units a m o n g the Celts in the center, and with the Africans
he made the e n v e l o p m e n t s on the right and the left, but it is impossible to see how
either the 3 , 0 0 0 to 4 , 0 0 0 Iberians mixed a m o n g the 2 2 , 0 0 0 Celtic hoplites or the
5,000 to 6,000 Africans assigned to the two flanks could have accomplished the mis-
sions that were d e m a n d e d of t h e m and that they reportedly achieved. T h e battle
does not take on a logical appearance unless we assume that of the 3 2 , 0 0 0 hoplites,
about 11,000 were Africans, 7,000 Iberians, and 14,000 Celts. Only with this as-
sumption is it understandable that in 2 0 3 B . C . there still remained such an important
portion of the African-Iberian nucleus of the army as to be able to o v e r c o m e the
rebellious Celts.
Now this calculation seems to be contradicted by the fact that Polybius (3. 72)
gives the strength of the Carthaginian infantry in the battle on the Trebia, including
the Celts w h o had j o i n e d them in the meantime, as only 2 1 , 0 0 0 hoplites and 8,000
light infantry. Konrad L e h m a n n points out (p. 134) that Hannibal was already rein-
forced in this battle with no fewer than s o m e 7,000 Celtic cavalry. We must, how-
ever, assume, he believes, that the reinforcements in Celtic infantry were certainly
not smaller, but somewhat larger still. T h i s a r g u m e n t d o e s not hold water. What
Hannibal n e e d e d was not infantry in general, but disciplined infantry; the tactical
maneuvers with which he planned to c o n q u e r the R o m a n s and in which he suc-
ceeded in d o i n g so were feasible only with well-organized tactical units w h o were
under the direct control of their c o m m a n d e r s . He was able to form such infantry, as
his success shows, d u r i n g the course of the winter of 2 1 8 - 2 1 7 B . C . from the Celtic
mercenaries w h o rallied to him. In the battle on the Trebia he did not yet have
them, or at any rate did not have m o r e than some 2,000. It is definitely not only
possible but very highly probable that the Carthaginian leader declared to his Celtic
friends at the time of his arrival that he did not n e e d any massive reinforcements of
their infantry, that they might better protect their h o m e l a n d on all sides from the
Romans; and that, if incorporated into his army, they would complicate the problem
of rations too greatly. What he would like to request of t h e m was the addition to his
army of their so outstandingly c o u r a g e o u s cavalry, and provisions. Only after the
battle on the Trebia were Celtic infantrymen also, in large numbers, organized for
the offensive into the A p e n n i n e peninsula.
T h i s also takes care of the concern that Cantalupi had, that Hannibal's army at
Cannae could probably not have been 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n strong, since in that case m o r e
than half of its strength would have consisted of Gauls; that this was quite improb-
able, and that in view of the unreliability of these allies it would have been a mistake,
one that Hannibal would not have made.
If Hannibal brought 3 4 , 0 0 0 m e n across the Alps, he probably started out with
about 3 6 , 0 0 0 . He left some 2 0 , 0 0 0 in Africa and 2 6 , 0 0 0 in Spain. All together, then,
he had at his disposal not 137,000, but only some 8 2 , 0 0 0 , but even this number is
completely adequate to serve as a basis for the strategic conditions d e v e l o p e d above.
If o n e is inclined to mistrust Polybius in general because he was not definite on
the point of including or excluding the light infantry and overlooked the 8,000 m e n
in his extract from the Lacinian tablet, there still remains the possibility that Hanni-
bal himself actually omitted them, just as Caesar, Frederick, and N a p o l e o n often
stated in their bulletins and m e m o i r s figures that were smaller than their actual
army strengths.
ADDED IN T H I R D E D I T I O N
T h e n u m e r o u s objections that have b e e n raised against the calculations given
above have no doubt shown me that there are all kinds of factors in the historical
accounts that contradict these Figures, but they have not forced me to abandon my
concept. T h e decisive point remains that Hannibal must necessarily have had con-
siderably more than 12,000 heavily armed Spaniards and Africans; Cannae proves
this. T h e o p p o s i n g figures have less and less weight the m o r e o n e agrees with
Dessau's hypothesis on the Punic source of Polybius.
STRATEGY OF A N N I H I L A T I O N AND OF A T T R I T I O N
IN T H E SECOND P U N I C WAR
In his work Rome's Struggle for World Hegemony (Roms Kampf um die Weltherrschaft),
Kromayer raised the interesting question as to the extent to which the conduct of
the Second Punic War should be classified under the strategy of annihilation or that
of attrition. As with so many historians, however, he d o e s not understand this con-
cept, which is studied in the fourth v o l u m e of my work. He believes that, up to the
battle of Cannae, Hannibal's strategy was one of annihilation and that Hannibal then
shifted to a strategy of attrition. Since Hannibal continuously sought battle in the
o p e n field, this concept seems the obvious o n e ; but it is incorrect. If the desire for
decisive battles marked the annihilation strategist, then Frederick the Great, too,
would have been in this category, and Hannibal would have been likewise not only
up to the year 2 1 6 B . C . , but continuing until a m u c h later time. For even after Can-
nae he definitely did not stop seeking o p e n battle, and the fact that he did not suc-
ceed in bringing this about was not of his o w n d o i n g but rather of the Romans'.
Hannibal, then, did not carry out a c h a n g e in his strategy, but he was and remained,
from the start, a strategist of attrition. If he had followed a strategy of annihilation
at the start, he would have had to try, after the defeat of the R o m a n army, to attack
and take the city of Rome itself—that is, he would have had to have self-confidence
in his power to do so. He apparently never had this in mind and, in fact, could not
have had it in mind. With telling effect Kromayer himself points o u t — a n d I myself
became aware of the significance of these passages only t h r o u g h him, a point which
I gratefully a c k n o w l e d g e — t h a t after the victory of C a n n a e H a n n i b a l s o u g h t a
negotiated peace with the Romans, and also that his treaty with Philip of Macedon
(Polybius 7. 9) presumes the continuation of Rome as a p o w e r — w e might e v e n say
as a great power. Accordingly, Hannibal's strategy was directed toward forcing
Rome, by means of the heaviest possible blows, loss of her allies, and laying waste of
her countryside, to make certain cessions of territory to Carthage and to limit her
o w n size. His strategy was, consequently, bipolar, just like that of Frederick, but
never set up as its goal the c o m p l e t e military subjection of the e n e m y as did Alexan-
der and N a p o l e o n .
It is therefore also incorrect, however easy it may be, to set up Hannibal and
Fabius Cunctator as representatives of the two types of strategy. If Hannibal had
been able to be an annihilation strategist, then all of the maneuvering of the Cunc-
tator would have been in vain; Hannibal would simply have besieged and taken
Rome, and the war would have been over. T h e difference between Hannibal and
Fabius is not o n e of principle, but a purely practical o n e , going back to the dissimi-
larity of their arms. Hannibal based his actions on deriving the greatest advantage
from his strength, that is, his cavalry and his tactical maneuverability, and this in-
clined him toward the o p e n battle. Fabius recognized the inferiority of the R o m a n s
in this area a n d s o u g h t to bring d o w n the e n e m y by m e a n s of the s e c o n d a r y
methods of c o n d u c t i n g war. Both of them, however, sought not to annihilate the
enemy, but to force him, through attrition, to be willing to make peace or to aban-
don his foe's territory.
1. The Second Punic War and its Historical Sources, Polybius and Livy,
Explained from Strategic-Tactical Viewpoints. The years 219 and 218
B . C , exclusive of the Crossing of the Alps. An Essay by J o s e p h Fuchs,
I m p e r i a l a n d R o y a l P r o f e s s o r in W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t . (Der zweite
punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und Livius nach strategisch-
taktischen Gesichtspunkten beleuchtet. Die Jahre 219 und 218, mit Aus-
schluss des Alpenüberganges. Ein V e r s u c h von J o s e p h F u c h s , k. k.
Professor in W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t . ) W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t , 1894. In R o m -
mission bei: Carl B l u m r i c h , W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t ; M. Perles, W i e n ; T.
T h o m a s , Leipzig.
Hannibal's Crossing of the Alps. C o n c l u s i o n s from R e s e a r c h a n d
Travel, by J o s e p h Fuchs, I m p e r i a l and Royal Professor in
W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t . With two m a p s a n d o n e illustration. {Hannibal's
Alpenübergang. Ein Studien- u n d Reiseergebnis von J o s e p h Fuchs,
k. k. Professor in W i e n e r - N e u s t a d t . Mit zwei K a r t e n u n d einer Abbil-
d u n g . ) V i e n n a , Carl K o n e g e n , 1897.
T h e question of which pass H a n n i b a l used for his crossing of t h e
Alps d o e s not b e l o n g in the f r a m e w o r k of this book, since no im-
p o r t a n t strategic or tactical conclusions result from t h e variety of
r o u t e s . F u c h s has d e c i d e d o n t h e M o n t G e n e v r e Pass. K o n r a d
L e h m a n n in The Attacks of the Three Barcas Against Italy (Die Angriffe
der drei Barkiden auf Italien), 1 9 0 5 , h a s o n c e a g a i n , with a very
t h o r o u g h a r g u m e n t , p o i n t e d t o t h e Little Saint B e r n a r d . Subse-
quently, F r e n c h Captain of E n g i n e e r s Colin, too, has a p p e a r e d in
this a r e n a with a work entitled Hannibal in Gaul {Annibal en Gaule),
1904. To d a t e , n o n e of the various theories has been able to win
general acceptance.
2. H a n n i b a l is s u p p o s e d to have left New C a r t h a g e at the start of
May, but not to h a v e crossed the P y r e n e e s until t h e b e g i n n i n g or
the m i d d l e of A u g u s t ; at t h e m i d d l e of O c t o b e r at t h e latest, a n d
p e r h a p s even at t h e e n d of S e p t e m b e r , he d e s c e n d e d into t h e Po
valley.
3 . B e v e r s d o r f f , p . 16, criticizes m e for c o n c e i v i n g o f j a v e l i n -
t h r o w e r s as peltasts. I still wish to h o l d to t h a t idea; since t h e
n u m b e r of javelins that a m a n can carry is m u c h smaller, for in-
stance, t h a n t h e n u m b e r of a r r o w s or lead balls for slings, which
t h e actual s h a r p s h o o t e r s have, the f o r m e r m u s t t h e n to a certain
e x t e n t be e q u i p p e d for close c o m b a t — t h a t is, they m u s t be peltasts.
Chapter IV
Rome Wins
the Upper Hand
T h e Second Punic W a r had c o m e into a sort of equilibrium
t h r o u g h t h e fact t h a t H a n n i b a l d o m i n a t e d t h e o p e n f i e l d , w h e r e a s
t h e R o m a n s p r e v e n t e d t h e f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f his s p h e r e o f
power t h r o u g h t h e fortified cities that r e m a i n e d loyal to t h e m or
were won back. T h e n t h e balance gradually sank m o r e a n d m o r e i n
favor of t h e R o m a n s as they completely w o n t h e u p p e r h a n d in t h e
secondary t h e a t e r s of w a r a n d even in Italy wrested back m o r e a n d
m o r e cities f r o m t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H a n n i b a l m a d e o n e f i n a l m a g -
nificent a t t e m p t to force destiny by giving up Spain a n d h a v i n g the
t r o o p s t h a t w e r e stationed t h e r e led by his b r o t h e r H a s d r u b a l on
t h e ancient r o u t e over t h e P y r e n e e s a n d Alps t o Italy. B u t b e f o r e
this a r m y could j o i n up with h i m , it was attacked by the R o m a n s on
1
t h e M e t a u r u s (207 B . C . ) , a n d was b e a t e n a n d d e s t r o y e d , a n d i t
must be said that, even if H a s d r u b a l h a d b e e n victorious on t h e
M e t a u r u s , this victory w o u l d n o t yet h a v e sealed t h e defeat of t h e
R o m a n s . Even if u n i t e d with his b r o t h e r , H a n n i b a l would not have
b e e n able to u n d e r t a k e t h e siege of R o m e , in view of t h e possibility
that t h e R o m a n fleet could b r i n g h o m e t h e victorious legions from
Spain, Sardinia, a n d Sicily. W o u l d t h e R o m a n s t h e n have b e e n will-
ing to seek a negotiated peace? W h o can tell?
N o m a t t e r how favorable, however, t h e situation o f t h e R o m a n s
h a d now b e c o m e , they could not win a final decision by following
t h e s a m e old m e t h o d s . F o r that, it was necessary t h a t t h e m a i n
C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y , too, be d e f e a t e d in o p e n battle a n d its p o w e r
b r o k e n . As long as they w e r e unwilling to attack H a n n i b a l himself
a n d he r e m a i n e d in Italy, t h e r e could be no question of s u b d u i n g
C a r t h a g e . T h e r e was always t h e possibility of a s u d d e n swing of t h e
p e n d u l u m , a s for e x a m p l e t h r o u g h a g e n e r a l u p r i s i n g o f t h e
365
Spanish peoples against the R o m a n d o m i n a t i o n , the i n t e r v e n t i o n of

K i n g Philip of M a c e d o n , or t h e c o m p l e t e financial collapse of the
R o m a n state. If R o m e did not o v e r c o m e such an eventuality, she
could, it is t r u e , possibly finally force C a r t h a g e to an unfavorable
peace b u t still could not completely b r e a k h e r i n d e p e n d e n c e as a
g r e a t power, a n d if C a r t h a g e h a d held h e r o w n in this condition of
i n d e p e n d e n c e , it w o u l d have b e e n completely impossible for the
ancient world t o b e c o m e unified u n d e r R o m a n d o m i n a t i o n . I n t h e
n e x t g e n e r a t i o n R o m e defeated M a c e d o n a n d Syria a n d in d o i n g so
essentially established h e r w o r l d h e g e m o n y , a s Polybius a l r e a d y
correctly u n d e r s t o o d . If C a r t h a g e h a d still b e e n able to i n t e r v e n e in
favor of those two e m p i r e s , t h e r e would h a v e b e e n established a
sort of balance of power, reminiscent of m o d e r n conditions
— b e f o r e 1914—which was, after all, m a i n t a i n e d only t h r o u g h t h e
fact that, at critical m o m e n t s , all the weak p o w e r s stood t o g e t h e r
against t h e strongest o n e . T h e decisive factor of ancient history,
t h e r e f o r e , is to be f o u n d in the fact that t h e R o m a n s , in the course
of the Second Punic W a r , finally d e v e l o p e d a m e t h o d of warfare
that was capable of d e f e a t i n g H a n n i b a l in o p e n battle, completely
b r e a k i n g t h e p o w e r of C a r t h a g e in t h e process. T h e r e is no m o r e
i m p o r t a n t study in world history t h a n t h e question: W h a t c h a n g e
took place in the R o m a n military system in the f o u r t e e n years be-
tween C a n n a e a n d Zama?
O u r best m e t h o d of p r o c e e d i n g , o n c e again, is not to assemble
c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d still u n c e r t a i n t r a c e s a s t h e y
c o m e t o o u r attention h e r e a n d t h e r e from the sources, b u t r a t h e r
that we k e e p squarely in view a n d analyze t h a t event in which t h e
c h a n g e stands b e f o r e us c o m p l e t e a n d clear, t h e last c a m p a i g n , in
which H a n n i b a l s u c c u m b s to Scipio, t h e battle of Zama. T h e indi-
vidual i n t e r m e d i a t e steps we can t h e n e i t h e r leave aside, w h e r e t h e
sources a r e not clear e n o u g h , or they will clarify themselves.
T h e first difference t h a t comes to view w h e n we c o m p a r e t h e
R o m a n s at Z a m a with t h e R o m a n s at C a n n a e is—and we may be
allowed to use this e x p r e s s i o n — o n e r e l a t e d to political law. T h e
R o m a n a r m y at C a n n a e was c o m m a n d e d by t h e two m e n w h o w e r e
at t h e m o m e n t t h e h i g h e s t officials of t h e R e p u b l i c , w h e r e a s at
Z a m a it was c o m m a n d e d by a g e n e r a l . H a r d e x p e r i e n c e h a d t a u g h t
t h e R o m a n s that, w h e n faced with a H a n n i b a l , t h e old m e t h o d of
r o t a t i n g t h e a r m y c o m m a n d like o t h e r offices yearly a m o n g t h e
most o u t s t a n d i n g s e n a t o r s could not succeed. T h e solution o f n a m -
ing a dictator, which h a d been tried after the defeat of Lake
T r a s i m e n e , was not to be r e p e a t e d . T h i s position was, by law a n d
Rome Wins the Upper Hand 367
the n a t u r e of things, o n e of s h o r t d u r a t i o n , six m o n t h s at most. If

the same m a n h a d b e e n e n t r u s t e d with a constantly r e n e w e d or
p e r m a n e n t dictatorship, that would have led directly to a m o n a r -
chy. I n s t e a d , an alternative h a d b e e n f o u n d t h r o u g h t h e process of
electing as consuls t h e most successful c o m m a n d e r s , like Q u i n t u s
Fabius M a x i m u s , M. Claudius Marcellus, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, as fre-
quently as possible, against the proscriptions of the law a n d c u s t o m ,
and of t u r n i n g over c o m m a n d positions to t h e m as proconsuls a n d
p r o l o n g i n g t h e i r p e r i o d of c o m m a n d after the expiration of their
time in office.
But this c o m p r o m i s e was not e n o u g h . M e n w h o a r e capable of
leading a r m i e s a r e r a r e , a n d w h e n o n e of t h e m is at h a n d , it is a
good idea n o t simply to place h i m in s o m e rotation or o t h e r or on
a year-to-year basis, but to give h i m c o m m a n d on a lasting basis.
W h e n the r e p o r t c a m e in 211 B . C . t h a t the R o m a n armies in Spain
h a d s u f f e r e d a n a n n i h i l a t i n g d e f e a t , t h e p e o p l e elected P u b l i u s
Cornelius Scipio as g e n e r a l with consular powers for that t h e a t e r of
war, a n d they left h i m in that position until his final victory a n d
complete expulsion o f the C a r t h a g i n i a n s from Spain. T h e b r e a c h
of the constitution was all the m o r e serious in that Scipio h a d only
been an aedile a n d he did not even h a v e t h e legal age for this posi-
tion. We can consider as a p r e c e d e n t for this innovation the fact
that t h e p e o p l e after C a n n a e h a d bestowed consular p o w e r s o n t h e
2
P r a e t o r Marcellus. T h i s irregularity was inevitable, if C a r t h a g e was
to be d e f e a t e d , b u t it m e a n t t h e a b a n d o n i n g of the republican con-
stitution. T h e o n e p e r s o n whose genius i s indispensable stands u p
above t h e crowd. T h e field c o m m a n d e r Scipio is the p r e c u r s o r of
the c o m m a n d e r a n d sole r u l e r Caesar. T h e complaint that t h e old
C u n c t a t o r raised against h i m in the Senate s o u n d s like a prediction,
3
that is, t h a t he h a n d l e d discipline in the m a n n e r of k i n g s . T h e de-
v e l o p m e n t s of a c e n t u r y a n d a half also f o r m e d p a r t of this p r o -
cess. T h e f r a m e w o r k o f the R o m a n constitution was s t r o n g e n o u g h
to b e a r tension for a long time a n d to give effectiveness to g r e a t
personalities within t h e legal forms. W h e n Scipio c a m e back from
Spain, he was elected consul a n d was invested with the c o m m a n d in
Africa as p r o c o n s u l , b u t a new spirit lived in the old f o r m ; no
longer can o n e call this consul or p r o c o n s u l a b u r g o m a s t e r , a n d the
R o m a n S e n a t e i n 2 0 3 B . C . e x p r e s s l y d e c i d e d that his c o m m a n d
status in Africa would not be of limited d u r a t i o n , b u t w o u l d last
4
"donec debellatum foret" ("until the war should be finished").
J u s t as it c r e a t e d a c o m m a n d e r , t h e long war also f o r m e d an of-
ficer corps, a n d t h e a r m y itself was t r a n s f o r m e d .
T h e soldiers w h o w e n t d o w n to defeat at C a n n a e still h a d t h e

characteristics of citizens w h o w e r e called to b e a r a r m s . Up to that
t i m e t h e Republic h a d seldom h a d m o r e t h a n 4 legions, or 18,000
m e n (aside from the allies) in the field, a n d often only 2 legions.
T h e m e n w h o w e r e called u p for service i n 217 a n d 2 1 6 B . C .
probably m a r c h e d o u t o n c a m p a i g n with t h e impression that they
would soon again be able to r e t u r n h o m e . B u t 14 years later t h e
n u c l e u s of Scipio's a r m y was still f o r m e d of t h e 2 legions that h a d
b e e n o r g a n i z e d from t h e survivors o f the a r m y o f C a n n a e a n d h a d
5
twice b e e n reinforced by l a r g e g r o u p s of r e p l a c e m e n t s , in 214 B . C .
6
a n d 209 B . C . , by recruits or the r e m n a n t s of o t h e r legions. In a d d i -
tion to t h e m , t h e r e w e r e units of v o l u n t e e r s .
T h e r e exists, it is t r u e , t h e suspicion t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t i e s that
p r o v i d e d these v o l u n t e e r s h a d offered t h e m less t h r o u g h goodwill
t h a n for the p u r p o s e o f g a i n i n g back t h e favor o f t h e R o m a n s ,
which they h a d lost d u r i n g t h e war t h r o u g h indifference a n d hesi-
tation; b u t that does n o t e x c l u d e t h e possibility t h a t these t r o o p s
w e r e c o m p o s e d , after all, for the most p a r t of recruits w h o s o u g h t
service for the sake of t h e service itself a n d t h e booty, o n c e t h e war
h a d m a d e w a r r i o r s o f t h e m a n d h a d w e a n e d t h e m away f r o m
civilian life.
Scipio's a r m y , t h e n , h a d t h e characteristics of any a r m y of p r o -
fessional soldiers, not only in its virtues, b u t also in its vices as well,
7
in its insolent m i s t r e a t m e n t of its own civilian p o p u l a t i o n .
If t h e R o m a n military o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d still b e e n in 2 0 4 B . C . t h e
s a m e as it was in 216 B . C . (that is, citizen soldiers, citizen officers,
citizen generals), R o m e w o u l d n e v e r have b e e n able to risk s e n d i n g
a n y a r m y across t o Africa a n d f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t H a n n i b a l t h e r e .
T h e y w o u l d finally h a v e c o n c l u d e d a peace in which R o m e m a d e
s o m e kind of concession to the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d H a n n i b a l , in r e -
t u r n , a b a n d o n e d Italian territory. T h e significant result of t h e Sec-
o n d Punic W a r from t h e point of view of w o r l d history, however, is
that Rome had u n d e r g o n e an internal change that immeasurably
increased h e r military potential. T h e account o f t h e battle o f Z a m a
will clarify this new situation for us.
1. R a i m u n d O e h l e r , The Last Campaign of Hasdrubal Barca and the

Battle on the Metaurus. An historical-topographical Study. (Der letzte
Feldzug des Barkiden Hasdrubal und die Schlacht am Metaurus. Eine
historisch-topographische Studie.) 1897. T h e significant aspects of
Rome Wins the Upper Hand 369
its c o n c l u s i o n s w e r e r e j e c t e d b y K o n r a d L e h m a n n , Deutsche
Literaturzeitung, 1897, N o . 2 3 , C o l u m n 9 0 2 .
L e h m a n n himself later t r e a t e d t h e battle in detail in his book The
Attacks of the three Boreas {Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden), 1905, a n d
sought to r e c o n s t r u c t t h e battle, b u t t h e result r e m a i n s subject to
serious d o u b t s . I d o u b t that, in view of t h e sources available, it will
ever be possible to gain a positive insight into t h e battle. Even the
a r m y s t r e n g t h s a r e very u n c e r t a i n . L e h m a n n estimates t h a t H a n n i -
bal still h a d 15,000 m e n a n d H a s d r u b a l 12,000, w h e r e a s t h e r e w e r e
150,000 R o m a n s u n d e r a r m s in Italy. With n u m b e r s such as these,
the R o m a n s ' c o n d u c t would be i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . See also t h e cri-
tique of K r o m a y e r , Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 169, N o . 2 ( J u n e
1 9 0 7 ) : 4 5 8 . B e v e r s d o r f f gives H a s d r u b a l 1 5 , 0 0 0 m e n o n t h e
M e t a u r u s , w h e r e a s K r o m a y e r estimates s o m e 30,000.
2. M o m m s e n , Political Law {Staatsrecht), Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 652.
3. Livy 29. 19.
4. Livy 30. 1. 10.
5. Livy 24. 18.
6. Livy 27. 7.
7. T h e Locrians m a d e such a c o m p l a i n t on this score that t h e Sen-
ate c o n d u c t e d an investigation. Livy 29. 8 - 2 2 .
Chapter V
The Battle of Zama-
Naraggara and the
Echelon Tactics
Scipio h a d crossed over to Africa with only a m o d e r a t e l y sized
a r m y , b u t as in H a n n i b a l ' s case earlier in Italy, he h a d s o u g h t a n d
f o u n d r e i n f o r c e m e n t s for it in Africa. D u r i n g the first two years,
while H a n n i b a l was still in Italy, he h a d o p e r a t e d very cautiously,
a n d his principal a c c o m p l i s h m e n t lay in t h e fact t h a t a p o r t i o n of
t h e N u m i d i a n s h a d d e s e r t e d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d h a d g o n e over
to the side of t h e R o m a n s . T h e most powerful sheik of the N u m i d -
ians w h o w e r e friendly to C a r t h a g e , S y p h a x , was t a k e n p r i s o n e r
by t h e R o m a n s , a n d his rival Masinissa took over his position of
l e a d e r s h i p . Scipio did not allow himself to be d r a w n into a decisive
battle with H a n n i b a l until Masinissa h a d b r o u g h t over to h i m 6,000
infantry a n d 4 , 0 0 0 N u m i d i a n cavalry. F o r this r e a s o n , a t Z a m a -
N a r a g g a r a t h e R o m a n s w e r e far s u p e r i o r to t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s in
this latter a r m . Even the R o m a n r e p o r t s , t h e only o n e s available to
us, state that H a n n i b a l h a d only 2,000 to 3,000 cavalry.
T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s w e r e probably s o m e w h a t s t r o n g e r i n infantry,
a n d m o r e o v e r , they h a d a n u m b e r of e l e p h a n t s , w h e r e a s the Ro-
m a n s h a d n o n e . But in this battle, too, the e l e p h a n t s played no
really significant role; in g e n e r a l , these w e r e t h e s a m e k i n d s of
t r o o p s , b u t allocated in an opposite m a n n e r to that at C a n n a e . T h e
internal s t r u c t u r e , however, was completely different.
As at C a n n a e , b o t h a r m i e s h a d cavalry on both infantry flanks.
T h e cavalry started t h e battle, a n d t h e s t r o n g e r side—in this case,
the R o m a n s — s w e p t t h e weaker, t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , from the field.
I n o r d e r t o win t h e victory o f C a n n a e , i t h a d n o t only b e e n
necessary at t h e t i m e that t h e 10,000 C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry p u s h
370
The Battle of Zama-Naraggara and the Echelon Tactics 371
back and defeat t h e 6,000 R o m a n s , but also that, immediately after

their victory, they should assemble again a n d ride into the attack in
the r e a r of the R o m a n phalanx. Such an action is unusually dif-
ficult. We have already b e c o m e familiar with the n u m b e r of battles
in which a cavalry wing, even u n d e r t h e personal c o m m a n d of t h e
s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r , was victorious, b u t w h e r e t h e c o n q u e r i n g
cavalry, instead of t h e n attacking t h e e n e m y infantry, c h a r g e d off
in pursuit of t h e defeated e n e m y cavalry a n d in d o i n g so nullified
their success insofar as the overall o u t c o m e of the battle was con-
cerned. T h a t is what h a p p e n e d at Ipsus u n d e r Demetrius, at
Raphia u n d e r Antiochus, at Mantinea u n d e r Machanidas; a n d so it
c o n t i n u e d in later centuries, for e x a m p l e even with the Austrian
cavalry at Mollwitz. To r e a s s e m b l e brave c a v a l r y m e n calls for a
state of military training that is n o t easily r e a c h e d a n d certainly not
accomplished overnight. Consequently, the victory at C a n n a e was
not only a function of n u m e r i c a l superiority but also of the t r a i n e d
officer corps of Hamilcar Barca, which was able to k e e p t h e t r o o p s
u n d e r control even in the midst of battle. T h e N u m i d i a n s w h o m
Masinissa b r o u g h t over to Scipio c a m e directly o u t of t h e Atlas
M o u n t a i n s a n d from t h e oases. A c c o r d i n g to the R o m a n r e p o r t s ,
H a n n i b a l h a d , in addition to his cavalry, 80 e l e p h a n t s , a n d since we
know that e l e p h a n t s a r e used most effectively against cavalry, we
could p e r h a p s imagine that H a n n i b a l might very well have s o u g h t
to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the R o m a n superiority by c o m b i n i n g his cavalry
with the e l e p h a n t s . But he did not do this; p e r h a p s the n u m b e r of
e l e p h a n t s was m u c h smaller t h a n the R o m a n s stated, b u t at any
rate it was too small for H a n n i b a l to have based his h o p e s on t h e m .
Rather, he h a d the cavalry battle start o u t in t h e usual m a n n e r on
the two flanks, without s u p p o r t i n g it, as he h a d d o n e on t h e T r e -
bia, with his e l e p h a n t s , a n d the R o m a n s easily won—with such ease,
in fact, t h a t we may assume that the C a r t h a g i n i a n from the start
h a d not p l a n n e d it any differently; H a n n i b a l h a d given his m e n the
o r d e r not primarily to fight, but, m o r e i m p o r t a n t , by fleeing to
d r a w the e n e m y away from the battlefield in p u r s u i t . A n d so it
h a p p e n e d . On both flanks the N u m i d i a n as well as the I t a l o - R o m a n
cavalry c h a r g e d away in t h e e n t h u s i a s m of t h e i r victory b e h i n d
their e n e m i e s a n d left the point of decision farther a n d farther be-
hind them.
At the start the light infantry of t h e two sides h a d skirmished

with each o t h e r in the center, a n d the battle h e r e h a d b e c o m e m o r e
serious t h a n normally, since H a n n i b a l h a d placed his e l e p h a n t s at
this point this time. Since we know that e l e p h a n t s accomplish noth-
ing against g o o d infantry in close formation, a n d w h e n w o u n d e d ,
m a d e wild, a n d p u s h e d back, could b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s for t h e i r
own infantry, we c a n n o t avoid asking h o w H a n n i b a l d e t e r m i n e d to
use this f o r m a t i o n h e r e . I believe that he w a n t e d to gain some time,
i n o r d e r t o p o s t p o n e t h e start o f t h e infantry battle. T h e m a n e u v e r
with which he h o p e d to win t h e battle could n o t take place until the
cavalry h a d m o v e d away. If t h e e n e m y cavalry r e m a i n e d close by, it
was impossible for t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s to win t h e battle. We may be
allowed to a s s u m e t h a t H a n n i b a l ' s c a m p was fortified a n d so laid
o u t t h a t i t c o u l d n o t i m m e d i a t e l y b e e n c i r c l e d . H a n n i b a l would
t h e r e f o r e have b e e n able, if he c o n s i d e r e d it necessary, as long as
t h e e l e p h a n t s w e r e still r a m p a g i n g a b o u t in front of t h e m a i n line,
to b r e a k off t h e battle a n d w i t h d r a w again into his c a m p . At Can-
n a e h e h a d p u s h e d his c e n t e r forward i n o r d e r t o c o m e t o h a n d -
t o - h a n d c o m b a t as soon as possible, from which t h e r e no l o n g e r ex-
ists t h e possibility of any o r d e r l y withdrawal. At N a r a g g a r a he in-
geniously p r o l o n g e d t h e combat of t h e outposts by m i x i n g in the
e l e p h a n t s , in o r d e r to k e e p control as long as possible of t h e deci-
sion w h e t h e r h e s h o u l d p r o c e e d with t h e a c t u a l b a t t l e o r n o t .
T h e r e was o n e m e t h o d that could b e a p p l i e d against t h e d a n g e r
t h a t w o u n d e d e l e p h a n t s , t u r n e d wild, w o u l d t u r n a b o u t a n d t r a m -
ple their own t r o o p s : t h e m a h o u t s h a d a p o i n t e d steel w e d g e which
they d r o v e into t h e neck of t h e animal if it could no l o n g e r be con-
1
trolled, t h u s causing it to d r o p d e a d .
T h e overture had corresponded to the master's concept. T h e
cavalry on b o t h sides w e r e off a n d away, while t h e c o m b a t of t h e
s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d the e l e p h a n t s was t a k i n g place. T h e p h a l a n x e s
m o v e d forward, a n d a r o u n d their flanks o r t h r o u g h their intervals
t h e outposts d r e w back.
Now we would s e e m to have the simple old p h a l a n x battle, w h e r e
t h e mass a n d its c o u r a g e decides t h e o u t c o m e , n o t the c o m m a n d e r .
T h e n t h e r e h a p p e n e d s o m e t h i n g new, u n h e a r d of.
H a n n i b a l d r e w up his heavy infantry in two echelons; in t h e first
stood t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n citizens, w h o w e r e p e r s o n a l l y d e f e n d i n g
their very existence against their fearful rivals; in t h e second eche-
lon was t h e force t h a t H a n n i b a l h a d b r o u g h t back with h i m from
Italy, t h e O l d G u a r d , which h a d already followed h i m across the
Pyrenees a n d the Alps a n d h a d t u r n e d gray with him in t h e
twenty-year war.
N a r a g g a r a is t h e first battle in t h e history of t h e world in which
we find echelon tactics significantly a n d decisively applied in t h e
c o n d u c t of the battle as a great, newly discovered principle.
I n t h e e c h e l o n f o r m a t i o n t h e tactical units a r e placed o n e b e h i n d
the o t h e r , far e n o u g h a p a r t so t h a t each can move i n d e p e n d e n t l y ,

near e n o u g h so that they can directly s u p p o r t each o t h e r .
As we have seen, t h e n a t u r e of t h e p h a l a n x rests on t h e fact that
no m o r e t h a n t h e first few r a n k s or possibly even t h e very first
rank only really takes p a r t in the battle, a n d t h e r e f o r e at t h e most a
fourth, p e r h a p s only a fifteenth or a thirtieth or even fewer of the
troops. T h e value of this whole mass stems exclusively from t h e s e
factors: it facilitates t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of casualties, allows t h e con-
tinuity of t h e line to be m a i n t a i n e d , a n d provides for the b r i n g i n g
to b e a r of a physical a n d m o r a l e p r e s s u r e from t h e rear. If now the
r e a r m o s t half of this formation is r e m o v e d a n d d r a w n up at s o m e
distance from t h e f o r w a r d half, m u c h of the a d v a n t a g e of those
factors is lost; t h e physical p r e s s u r e , especially, is completely r e -
moved. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , however, t h e second e c h e l o n is in a
position t o m a k e i n d e p e n d e n t m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e r e f o r e t o fend
off possible flank or r e a r attacks a n d , by pulling o u t of its position,
to m a k e flank attacks itself.
H a n n i b a l h a d his s e c o n d e c h e l o n t a k e p o s i t i o n m o r e t h a n a
whole stadium (that is, over 300 paces) from t h e first, a n d he took
personal c o m m a n d of it. If t h e R o m a n cavalry, instead of p u r s u i n g
the fleeing C a r t h a g i n i a n h o r s e , h a d t u r n e d immediately against t h e
infantry, t h e second echelon w o u l d have covered the r e a r of t h e
first. T h e e n e m y cavalry would hardly have risked m o v i n g in be-
tween the two echelons. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y t h e n , f o r m i n g a
solid front on all sides without difficulty, while its e l e p h a n t s h e l d
up the R o m a n p h a l a n x , would, I a s s u m e , have t a k e n up a with-
drawal into its c a m p .
Now t h e e n e m y cavalry h a d d i s a p p e a r e d , however, a n d s o H a n -
nibal immediately set his second echelon in m o t i o n so that, divided
in two forces, it could quickly m o v e r i g h t a n d left to t h e flanks a n d
attack t h e R o m a n s on their flanks, while the first echelon closed
with t h e R o m a n hastati. It was t h e s a m e m o v e m e n t t h a t t h e Afri-
cans carried o u t at C a n n a e , with t h e difference that (1) it started
later, because this t i m e t h e t r o o p s h a d a l o n g e r distance to cover,
(2) t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s attack from t h e r e a r by t h e cavalry did not
take place, a n d (3) this time t h e R o m a n infantry was n o t n u m e r i -
cally s u p e r i o r b u t w e a k e r , p e r h a p s considerably w e a k e r t h a n t h e
C a r t h a g i n i a n infantry. A n d s o t h e f i r s t echelon, the C a r t h a g i n i a n
citizens, h e l d t h e i r o w n w i t h o u t difficulty, a n d if t h e y h a d n o w
been s u p p o r t e d by t h e d o u b l e flank attack of t h e "old-timers," t h e
R o m a n s w o u l d necessarily have s u c c u m b e d . Despite t h e superiority
of t h e e n e m y cavalry, H a n n i b a l would have won t h e battle.
B u t t h e g e n i u s o f R o m e , too, h a d b r o u g h t forth a m a n w h o u n -
d e r s t o o d t h e signs of t h e times a n d , as G n e i s e n a u did with

N a p o l e o n 2,000 years later, was able to o p p o s e t h e god of war with
his own art.
We a r e already familiar with the old division of the R o m a n le-
gion into the t h r e e y e a r - g r o u p s of hastati, principes, a n d triarii, which
w e r e d r a w n u p o n e b e h i n d t h e o t h e r . F o r the battle formation o f
N a r a g g a r a , Polybius r e p o r t s , Scipio d r e w up t h e maniples of the
principes a n d triarii "with an interval" (en apostasei). Consequently,
the R o m a n p h a l a n x , too, was divided into two echelons. At C a n n a e
t h e principes a n d triarii h a d still stuck closely to the hastati; now Sci-
pio, as soon as he noticed the m o v e m e n t of t h e second Punic eche-
lon, m o v e d his own in j u s t t h e same way to c o u n t e r it. A citizen
a r m y a n d citizen officers a r e not able to m a k e such a m o v e m e n t ;
b u t t h e w a r itself h a d d e v e l o p e d for t h e R o m a n s n o t only their
c o m m a n d e r , but also officers a n d soldiers w h o w e r e able to ma-
n e u v e r on the battlefield just as well as their o p p o n e n t s . Hannibal's
O l d G u a r d , instead of striking the flanks of the R o m a n p h a l a n x ,
m e t an e x t e n d e d battle line, a n d the battle r e m a i n e d j u s t what it
h a d been, a parallel battle.
Nevertheless, the R o m a n legions h a d a very difficult time against
t h e d e s p e r a t e c o u r a g e o f t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n citizens, the victory-
t e m p e r e d c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e v e t e r a n s , a n d p e r h a p s also
their n u m e r i c a l superiority, a n d it a p p e a r s that they w e r e close to
s u c c u m b i n g a t the m o m e n t w h e n the R o m a n cavalry r e t u r n e d from
t h e i r foolish p u r s u i t a n d fell on t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s in t h e i r rear.
W h a t a fateful t u r n in world history d e p e n d e d on these few m i n u t e s !
T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y was beaten a n d a n n i h i l a t e d in its flight.
2
Luckily, H a n n i b a l himself was able to escape to H a d r u m e t .
PRECURSORS OF ECHELON T A C T I C S
T h e system of e c h e l o n tactics is a discovery of such unusually

great i m p o r t a n c e in the history of t h e art of war t h a t o n e would
like to establish every single m o m e n t in its d e v e l o p m e n t . On this
point, however, the sources leave us in t h e lurch. S u d d e n l y , a n d on
b o t h sides simultaneously, t h e innovation is t h e r e . P r e c u r s o r s of
this a r e the angled f o r m a t i o n of Hannibal's Africans at C a n n a e a n d
t h e small t r o o p units b e h i n d A l e x a n d e r ' s two wings at G a u g a m e l a .
Still f a r t h e r back, we can point o u t t h e r e s e r v e that X e n o p h o n
held o u t in his c o m b a t against P h a r n a b a z u s (Book II, C h a p t e r V,
p. 150). On the o t h e r side, the R o m a n o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e p h a l a n x
in the t h r e e lines of hastati, principes, a n d triarii, a l t h o u g h n o t a di-
rect p r e d e c e s s o r of echelon tactics, was still a formation that a i d e d

Scipio a n d facilitated for him the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the new system.
But t h e r e is still a mighty leap from all these analogies to t h e or-
ganic principle. T h e R o m a n hastati, w h e n for t h e first t i m e they
were not followed directly by t h e principes, no d o u b t felt that they
were halfway betrayed, a n d only a c o m m a n d e r enjoying t h e highest
personal respect a n d s u r e of the u n q u e s t i o n a b l e trust of his soldiers
could risk such a r e f o r m . No m a t t e r how obvious t h e a d v a n t a g e s of
a second echelon a r e , we must still realize how m u c h was lost in
a d o p t i n g this f o r m a t i o n . Why t h e n did o n e p u t these h u g e masses
into t h e field? We have seen that they w e r e used m u c h less often to
extend the battle line t h a n to s t r e n g t h e n the formation in d e p t h .
T h e p r e s s u r e of the mass was s u p p o s e d to b r i n g victory. A n d so, if
the r e a r m o s t half was r e m o v e d , t h a t a p p e a r e d at first as a con-
tradiction o f t h e w h o l e p h a l a n x p r i n c i p l e . T h e f i l l i n g u p o f t h e
spaces that d e v e l o p e d d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h m a r c h — t h e p u r p o s e
for which t h e m a n i p u l a r formation h a d formerly been c r e a t e d — w a s
now m a d e difficult by the intervals b e t w e e n the t h r e e echelons, a n d
the decisive p r e s s u r e from the r e a r was r e d u c e d by m o r e t h a n half.
T h i s contradiction was c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by military t r a i n i n g . J u s t
as the R o m a n m a n i p u l a r formation h a d o n c e b e c o m e a possibility
because t h e individual m a n knew a n d believed that b o t h t h e neigh-
b o r i n g a n d following m a n i p l e s w o u l d d o t h e i r d u t y , b y now t h e
military t e m p e r h a d risen to such a p o i n t t h a t t h e first e c h e l o n
could get a l o n g w i t h o u t t h e physical p r o x i m i t y a n d t h e physical
p r e s s u r e of t h e r e a r m o s t half a n d was c o n t e n t with t h e m o r a l cer-
tainty that h e l p would not be missing in case of e m e r g e n c y . Citizen
soldiers c a n n o t have so m u c h i n n e r certainty; for this, o n e n e e d s
w a r r i o r s w h o have b e c o m e professional soldiers a n d officers with
years of e x p e r i e n c e . W h e t h e r t h e echelons of the hastati, principes,
a n d triarii—units already long in existence—were d r a w n up with an
interval of a h u n d r e d feet or of several h u n d r e d feet m i g h t seem
to be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , this i n t e r v a l calls for a c o m -
pletely d i f f e r e n t type of w a r f a r e , a completely different military
spirit, in t h e c o m m a n d e r as well as in t h e officers a n d in t h e sol-
diers. A citizen g e n e r a l would not be able to h a n d l e echelon tactics;
t h e greatest c o m m a n d e r would n o t b e able t o m a k e t h e m w o r k with
citizen soldiers.
A second e c h e l o n a n d a reserve a r e concepts which o v e r l a p . A
reserve r e m a i n s unconditionally at t h e disposition of t h e c o m m a n -
d e r ; a second echelon follows the first o n e so closely t h a t it can
e i t h e r entirely o r partially i n t e r v e n e o r b e d r a w n into t h e c o u r s e o f
t h e battle without special o r d e r . For this r e a s o n , we use the e x p r e s -

sion reserve w h e n it is a q u e s t i o n of t r o o p u n i t s t h a t a r e placed
s o m e w h a t f a r t h e r back a n d a r e c o n s e q u e n t l y smaller, which can,
m o r e o v e r , be f o r m e d in j u s t t h e same way as a second or t h i r d
echelon.
At any r a t e , N a r a g g a r a was not t h e first e n g a g e m e n t in which
Scipio tried out the new m e t h o d of combat. Of the p r e c e d i n g battle
o n the "Great Plains," w h e r e h e d e f e a t e d H a s d r u b a l a n d Syphax
(203 B . C ) , Polybius also r e p o r t s (14. 8. 11) t h a t t h e infantry of t h e
e n e m y c e n t e r was s u r r o u n d e d a n d h e m m e d in by the principes a n d
t h e triarii on b o t h f l a n k s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e s e u n i t s m a d e a
m o v e m e n t quite similar to that of N a r a g g a r a . T h e most likely pos-
sibility is t h a t Scipio d e v e l o p e d the new tactics in Spain, w h e r e we
a r e told that he h a d his soldiers drill very t h o r o u g h l y . W h e n , be-
cause of all kinds of c o m p l a i n t s that h a d c o m e back, the Senate sent
a commission to inspect his a r m y in Sicily, before they crossed over
to Africa, Scipio h a d a land a n d naval m a n e u v e r c a r r i e d out for the
3
inspectors n e a r S y r a c u s e , in o r d e r to show t h e t r a i n i n g a n d state
of p r e p a r e d n e s s of his soldiers. But we do not know a n y t h i n g m o r e
definite a b o u t how far t h e s e m a n e u v e r f o r m a t i o n s went t o w a r d
being real previews of t h e m a n e u v e r s on t h e battlefield.
It is not i m p r o b a b l e t h a t at this time t h e R o m a n s also i m p r o v e d
t h e javelin with which t h e first waves of t h e m a n i p l e s w e r e a r m e d
in imitation of a type t h a t they f o u n d in use by t h e I b e r i a n s . We
may t h e r e f o r e p e r h a p s say that the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e pilum also
4
belonged to t h e military system of Scipio.
EXCURSUS
1..I have perhaps presented the sequence of the battle of Naraggara in a some-
what m o r e definite form than the state of the sources actually permits. But I did not
want to interrupt the course of the account continuously with critical differences
with the sources, so that I could let the outline of the typical elements in the overall
event, which is o u r principal concern, stand out in the clearest possible way. But I
can also spare myself the trouble of establishing a critical basis here in detail, since
5
for this purpose I can refer the reader to an excellent study by Konrad L e h m a n n ,
who, using the same m e t h o d as Josef Fuchs did in the works named above, links
philological exactitude with military j u d g m e n t and completely clarifies the course of
the battle.
O u r information on the battle of Naraggara is m u c h less definite than on the bat-
tle of Cannae, because in this case Polybius no longer had the excellent source from
the Carthaginian c a m p but had to rely solely on R o m a n reports, and we already
know how very m u c h Polybius, in spite of his critical approach, is d e p e n d e n t on his
sources. No doubt, he eliminated from them that material that is completely fable,
and he did not, for e x a m p l e , accept the individual combat between Hannibal and
Scipio, which other Roman reports show as deciding the o u t c o m e of the battle. But
nevertheless a great deal of false and disturbing material did remain, which we must
make up our m i n d s to excise with a sharp knife, if we are not to limit ourselves to a
simple repetition of the events but are resolved, instead, to arrive at an acceptable
picture of the battle, understandable from the military history point of view. It is
always very difficult to c o m e to the conclusion that o n e must declare as objectively
incredible and impossible an event reported by Polybius, but I invite the reader's
attention to how little satisfaction there is in his Hellenic battle accounts and in what
he tells us about the Roman fleet construction and the Roman-Gallic battles. His fig-
ures on the strength of the Carthaginian army in Spain are extremely debatable; he
passes on to us the silly Roman fable that Hannibal was so afraid of his o w n Celtic
allies that he always disguised himself with different types of wigs; he halfway ac-
cepts and repeats the Roman boast that the legions had lined up before R o m e in
211 B . C . to offer the Carthaginians o p e n battle.
Despite all of this, Polybius certainly remains an authority of the first rank, but it
would be a distortion to put oneself completely in his hands. In the face of the great
certainty with which the R o m a n legend appeared, and in view of the d e e p inner
respect that he held for the Roman political system, he was not able to bring to his
critical study the unconditionally penetrating power that scholarship n e e d s in o r d e r
to arrive at c o m p l e t e truth. L e h m a n n has shown that it is highly probable that very
much of the Polybian report derives from the epic of Ennius. Not that Polybius
could have been so naive as to accept as historic reality the accounts of a heroic
poem, but in the circle of the Scipio family, in which he lived and gathered his in-
formation, the images of the poetic fantasy of Ennius had gradually been blended
with the truly historical tradition, so that the writers themselves probably could no
longer distinguish with certainty the e l e m e n t s from o n e another, and through this
link, from which undoubtedly, for e x a m p l e , also the individual combat of the two
c o m m a n d e r s as reported by Appian stems, a purely fictitious e l e m e n t also m a d e its
way into the account of the rational analyst Polybius.
2. T h e principal points that should be observed critically in the Polybian account
of Naraggara are as follows:
Polybius d o e s not give any reason for the interval between hastati and principes;
instead, he m e n t i o n s a n o t h e r c h a n g e that Scipio o r d e r e d in deviation from the
Roman custom—that is, that the maniples were not lined up, as they otherwise had
been, on the intervals, but on o n e another. T h i s was supposedly d o n e because of the
large n u m b e r of e n e m y elephants. T h i s point must be questioned in that, first of all,
the Romans could not know that Hannibal would form his elephants this time in
front of his infantry, instead of near his cavalry, and second, if there was an appreci-
able interval between waves, the aligning of the maniples o n e behind the other no
longer served any purpose. Even a s s u m i n g that the elephants would have d o n e the
Romans the favor of always r u n n i n g straight into the intervals, they were still not
bound to a straight line and would also have f o u n d the o p e n i n g s in the second eche-
lon if they were a few paces—it was not a question of any greater distance—to the
right or the left. It is clear that, into the both correct and important historical recol-
lection of the innovation of the interval between echelons, which was of little interest
to the minstrel Ennius, there had been b l e n d e d images from the combat of the
elephants, images which he had conjured up in k e e p i n g with the free laws of poetic
tactics.
Scipio is s u p p o s e d to have filled the intervals between the hastati maniples with
veliti, who were to charge forward from t h e m . T h e r e is no apparent reason what-
ever as to why in this particular battle the veliti should have b e e n placed initially in
the intervals. T h e advantage the intervals offered for an orderly approach march,
would, of course, have been lost in this way. L e h m a n n conjectures that it was only a
question of the position in the original formation, before the approach march was
taken up, where Scipio gave his speech to his troops and therefore n e e d e d as closed
a formation as possible.
T h a t Hannibal's first e c h e l o n (Ligurians, Celts, Balearics, Moors) consisted of
sharpshooters has been proved with certainty by L e h m a n n . In keeping with our

terminology, therefore, we do not term it a true "echelon."
T h e Romans, too, were lined up, as Lehmann has s h o w n to be extremely prob-
able, in two echelons, by having the principes and the triarii closed together. With the
normal strength of the maniples, there would have resulted from this an incongru-
o u s situation in which the second echelon was considerably stronger than the first,
whereas the nature of things preferably calls for the opposite. T h e sharpshooters,
w h o can be c o u n t e d in with the first echelon, do not, after all, equalize the two eche-
lons. T h e first e c h e l o n always has to be so strong that it can withstand the frontal
attack of the e n e m y u n d e r any circumstances. Scipio must have c o m p e n s a t e d for this
in some way or other.
T h e artificial delaying of the phalanx battle resulted, in the R o m a n legend, from
the Carthaginian citizen echelon's halting out of cowardice, instead of following up
the first wave, thus causing the skirmishers to believe that they had been betrayed.
T h e fact that the Roman hastati echelon more or less held its o w n against the
Carthaginian citizen echelon, as taken from the patriotic Roman fiction, is presented
by Polybius as follows: T h e Carthaginians were first of all attacked by their own
mercenaries, who faced about and intended to punish them for their cowardly be-
trayal. In this critical situation they took on new heart, and o n c e e n g a g e d , they even
threw into confusion the Roman hastati, w h o , strangely e n o u g h , had not taken ad-
vantage of the battle the Carthaginians were waging a m o n g themselves. Finally, they
were beaten by the Romans after all, but Scipio had his victorious hastati called back
by trumpet calls from the pursuit, because the field was so covered with d e a d ,
w o u n d e d , and weapons, and the g r o u n d had b e c o m e so slippery from the great
quantity of blood, that the troops were no longer able to pass through in orderly
fashion. That the hastati, if victorious, already had to be beyond this blood-covered,
slippery field and only a withdrawal would force them to pass t h r o u g h it again
naturally did not bother the poet, but it d o e s show us very clearly how little care
Polybius took as he trustingly repeated his sources.
Hannibal's decisive m o v e m e n t with his second e c h e l o n is not m e n t i o n e d directly at
all by Polybius—a clear indication that we are dealing here only with a Roman re-
port without any real understanding of the historical and tactical aspects. T h i s fact is
indirectly clarified for us, however, from Scipio's m o v e m e n t , in which he, too, pulls
out his second e c h e l o n on the right and the left and so clashes with Hannibal's vet-
erans, who therefore must have made a similar m o v e m e n t from their original posi-
tions. As a motive for Scipio's move, however, we are not given the m o v e m e n t of the
e n e m y — t h a t would be too sober, too prosaic—but rather that mass of corpses and
blood in the middle, which necessitated turning in a different direction.
3. With respect to the strengths of the armies, on neither side do we have any
s u r e a n d t r u s t w o r t h y i n f o r m a t i o n e x c e p t for t h e p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g the great
superiority of the R o m a n s in cavalry. L e h m a n n (pp. 5 3 2 , 574) has, with a certain
d e g r e e of probability, accepted the total strength of the R o m a n s as 3 5 , 0 0 0 m e n , in-
cluding 10,000 Numidians. That Hannibal was superior in infantry follows less from
the assertion of the R o m a n sources as from the plight into which he was able to
push the Romans. T h e claim that he had no fewer than 80 elephants is to be re-
jected as undoubtedly exaggerated.
4. T h e two battles of Baecula, the second of which is also called Elinga, Silpia, or
6
Ilipa, shows us highly ingenious maneuvers. On both occasions Scipio outflanked
the e n e m y on both sides, even though in the second battle he is supposed to have
had only 4 5 , 0 0 0 infantry and 3 , 0 0 0 cavalry against 7 0 , 0 0 0 infantry, 4,000 cavalry,
and 32 elephants. H e r e is undoubtedly another case where Polybius was not sharp
e n o u g h in his analysis and passed on Roman fables in as rational a way as possible.
Ihne, in Römische Geschichte 2: 3 5 0 , 3 6 9 , is of the o p i n i o n that probably both battles,
and in any event the first o n e , are pure fiction. In neither case did the battle have
any direct result. Hasdrubal is supposed to have broken off the first o n e at an ap-
propriate time and to have set out with his beaten army on the road to Italy. T h e
fearful thunderstorm that suddenly broke out prevented the Romans from taking
full advantage of the second battle (as such a storm had twice prevented the battle
before Rome in 211 B . C . ) . From the military history point of view, at any rate, noth-
ing is to be learned from these battles. A n d just as little from the e n g a g e m e n t s
reported in Livy 2 8 . 33 and Frontinus 2 . 3 . 1.
7
T h e accounts preserved in Livy, of the n u m e r o u s combats in Italy after Cannae,
quite often show an echelon-like formation of legions. N o n e of these reports, how-
ever, has the slightest credibility.
1. Livy 27. 4 9 .
2. Why he did not go directly to C a r t h a g e is not r e p o r t e d .
P e r h a p s he simply did not want to arrive in the capital with t h e few
survivors of t h e battle a n d may have h a d in H a d r u m e t s o m e t r o o p
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d supplies of w e a p o n s , which, if b r o u g h t along
with h i m , would still give h i m a position a n d the city a possibility to
d e f e n d itself.
3. Livy 29. 2 2 .
4. See also p. 276, above.
5. The Last Campaign of the War with Hannibal (Der letzte Feldzug des
hannibalischen Krieges), by K o n r a d L e h m a n n , special extract from
the 21st s u p p l e m e n t a l volume of Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie
(Leipzig: B. G. T e u b n e r , 1894).
6. Polybius 10. 38, 3 9 ; 11. 2 0 - 2 4 . Livy 27. 18, 19; 27. 1 2 - 1 5 .
7. Livy 27. 1, second e n g a g e m e n t of H e r d o n i a e ; 27. 2, N u m i s t r o ;
27. 1 2 - 1 4 , victory of Marcellus in Apulia; 3 0 . 18, Mago's defeat in
the region of t h e I n s u b r e s .
Chapter VI
Hannibal and Scipio

W h e n Scipio crossed over to Africa from Sicily, H a n n i b a l , still
u n d e f e a t e d , was in position with a moderate-sized a r m y in lower
Italy. O n e could raise t h e question why Scipio did not first attack
H a n n i b a l h e r e , w h e r e he could easily assemble a greatly s u p e r i o r
force, a n d t h u s b r i n g a n e n d t o t h e war. T h e answer can well b e
that H a n n i b a l would probably have avoided an attack by a truly
s u p e r i o r force a n d w o u l d finally h a v e m o v e d to Africa with his
a r m y . If he w e r e t h e r e a h e a d of Scipio, h o w e v e r , it would h a v e be-
c o m e very difficult for t h e latter to get a foothold in Africa a n d to
1
win t h e allegiance o f t h e N u m i d i a n s . W e can t h e r e f o r e preferably
t u r n t h e q u e s t i o n a b o u t , a s k i n g w h y H a n n i b a l d i d n o t willingly
leave Italy s o o n e r , a c o u n t r y w h e r e he could no l o n g e r h o p e for an
o u t r i g h t success. T h e a n s w e r very likely is t h a t H a n n i b a l was now
no l o n g e r aspiring to t h e c o n q u e s t of R o m e b u t r a t h e r to a tolera-
bly favorable peace, a n d he a s s u m e d that t h e R o m a n s w o u l d still be
willing to pay a price for t h e evacuation of Italy. Even w h e n Scipio
h a d l a n d e d in Africa, H a n n i b a l did not i m m e d i a t e l y follow h i m . He
knew that his R o m a n foe would not be able to accomplish so very
m u c h , that he w o u l d p l a n least of all to m o v e against t h e city of
C a r t h a g e itself, w h o s e fortifications h a d a c i r c u m f e r e n c e t h r e e
times as g r e a t as t h a t of t h e R o m e of t h a t t i m e (26,905 meters). If
his c o u n t r y m e n s h o u l d succeed in o v e r c o m i n g Scipio without h i m ,
while t h e R o m a n s , for t h e i r p a r t , could n o t d r i v e t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s
o u t of Italy, t h e n t h e relative s t r e n g t h s would be equal, so to speak,
a n d on this basis a peace treaty could be signed.
N o t until Scipio h a d already b e e n in Africa for two years a n d , by
virtue o f several f o r t u n a t e strokes a n d u n d e r t a k i n g s , h a d w o n a n
u n e x p e c t e d l y i m p o r t a n t position, especially b y b r i n g i n g S y p h a x
u n d e r his p o w e r a n d f i n d i n g in Masinissa a s t r o n g ally, did H a n n i -
380
Hannibal and Scipio 381
bal leave Italy with the rest of his t r o o p s a n d a p p e a r in Africa for

the last battle. His a p p e a r a n c e e n c o u r a g e d t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s t o
break an armistice a n d a peace treaty that h a d already b e e n con-
cluded, a n d it t h e n b e c a m e a question of w h o would d e v e l o p mili-
tary superiority. In addition to H a n n i b a l ' s veterans, t h e r e h a d ar-
rived also t r o o p s of his b r o t h e r M a g o , Balearics, L i g u r i a n s , a n d
Celts; r e c r u i t i n g was c a r r i e d o u t a m o n g t h e African tribes, a n d t h e
Carthaginian citizens themselves took up a r m s . W h a t was lacking
was the great majority, especially, of t h e N u m i d i a n tribes t h a t w e r e
c a m p e d nearby, which w e r e now s u m m o n e d by Masinissa to b e a r
a r m s for the R o m a n s .
On b o t h sides t h e greatest effort w e n t into p r e p a r a t i o n s . With
wise calculation H a n n i b a l set up his h e a d q u a r t e r s n o t in C a r t h a g e
itself, b u t in a small coastal city five to six days' m a r c h s o u t h of
C a r t h a g e — H a d r u m e t . H e r e h e p r o t e c t e d his veterans from t h e dis-
tracting contacts with the capital, h e r e he h a d better control over
his n e w t r o o p s w h o w e r e still b e i n g t r a i n e d , a n d f r o m h e r e h e
would have t a k e n from t h e r e a r any m o v e m e n t of Scipio against
C a r t h a g e itself, a n d was, for his p a r t , p r o t e c t e d by t h e flanking posi-
tion of C a r t h a g e against any attack by t h e R o m a n s b e f o r e his p r e -
parations w e r e complete. It a p p e a r s t h a t close to t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of
2
a year passed b e f o r e H a n n i b a l , still with a very weak cavalry force,
moved o u t against t h e R o m a n s . T h i s he d i d with good r e a s o n . Sci-
pio h a d not yet j o i n e d forces with Masinissa; if, t h e r e f o r e , he suc-
c e e d e d in c o m i n g to grips with Scipio b e f o r e this u n i o n of forces,
or in m o v i n g between the two a n d k e e p i n g t h e m a p a r t , t h e victory
of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s was a s s u r e d . Scipio did n o t yet have even o n e
h a r b o r in his possession, b u t instead he h a d installed on a p e n i n -
sula n e a r Uttica, which he h a d unsuccessfully b l o c k a d e d , a fortified
c a m p (castra Corneliana) as a base. M o v i n g o u t from t h e r e , he h a d
m a r c h e d for a few days up t h e fertile B a g r a d a s (Medjerdja) valley
into t h e i n t e r i o r a n d p l u n d e r e d a n d laid waste the c o u n t r y s i d e .
T h e r e he received the r e p o r t that Hannibal had moved out
a g a i n s t h i m f r o m his b a s e a t H a d r u m e t a n d h a d a r r i v e d n e a r
Zama, the m o r e westerly village of t h a t n a m e . Scipio's situation was
critical.
If he waited in the B a g r a d a s valley a n d was attacked by H a n n i b a l
before t h e N u m i d i a n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s arrived, his defeat was sealed.
I f h e r e t u r n e d t o his b e a c h c a m p , h e w o u l d b e cut off t h e r e ,
s e p a r a t e d o n c e a n d for all from Masinissa, a n d would have, in t h e
face of H a n n i b a l ' s l e a d e r s h i p , no p r o s p e c t of c h a n g i n g his fate.
T h e e x p e d i t i o n would be a failure, a n d he would have to be con-
Fig 3 BATTLE OF Z A M A - N A R A G G A R A
tent j u s t to be able to m o v e his a r m y back to Sicily reasonably in-

tact.
It is at this m o m e n t that tradition would have t h e f a m o u s per-
sonal discussion o c c u r b e t w e e n t h e two c o m m a n d e r s , i n w h i c h
H a n n i b a l a p p e a r s in t h e role of peace seeker. T h e r e is no d o u b t
that, as K o n r a d L e h m a n n has p o i n t e d out, this m e e t i n g is a fantasy
p a i n t e d b y E n n i u s . A t t h a t m o m e n t n o t h i n g lay f u r t h e r f r o m
H a n n i b a l ' s m i n d t h a n g o i n g to t h e R o m a n s to ask for peace, a n d
Scipio was p r e o c c u p i e d with c o n c e r n s quite different from a lofty
a n d u n q u e s t i o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y o f victory. T h r e e P u n i c spies w h o
w e r e c a p t u r e d in his c a m p w e r e r e p o r t e d l y not p u n i s h e d but w e r e
released by Scipio with p r o u d confidence, to r e t u r n to H a n n i b a l
after they h a d b e e n shown e v e r y t h i n g . T h i s account is t a k e n almost
3
v e r b a t i m by E n n i u s from H e r o d o t u s ' Persian Wars, passed from
h i m into t h e R o m a n tradition, a n d so c a m e to Polybius also a n d
into t h e definite status of historical writing. We recognize how care-
fully we m u s t e x a m i n e t h e accounts of the sources. We must seek
t o find t h e s t a n d a r d s for o u r j u d g m e n t m u c h m o r e i n t h e c h a r a c t e r
of t h e actual situation t h a n from t h e s e freely f o r m e d figures of
fantasy. In this process n e i t h e r Scipio n o r H a n n i b a l will lose. It is
the same situation that we w e r e already able to observe with respect
to the Persian W a r s : t h e heroism of t h e G r e e k s has not b e e n less-
ened as a result of o u r t r u e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which caused us to re-
duce so drastically the s t r e n g t h s of t h e Persian armies. L e g e n d a n d
poetry do not paint falsely w h e n they paint with o t h e r colors t h a n
does history. T h e y simply speak a n o t h e r l a n g u a g e , a n d it is a q u e s -
tion of translating correctly from this l a n g u a g e into that of history.
T h e g r e a t decision of Scipio—the decision that aligns him with
the greatest c o m m a n d e r s in the history of t h e world a n d bestows
the right of i n n e r t r u t h on all t h e poetic images that E n n i u s in-
vented in his h o n o r — w a s that Scipio, placing his h o p e in boldness,
gave up his contact with the sea a n d any r e t r e a t or possibility of
rescue in case of a defeat, a n d since he could no l o n g e r risk waiting
for Masinissa, he m o v e d f a r t h e r into t h e interior to j o i n h i m . He
must have m a r c h e d off w h e n H a n n i b a l was already close to him.
N e a r the town o f N a r a g g a r a , o n t h e b o r d e r o f m o d e r n T u n i s i a a n d
Algeria, his forces m a d e contact with those of Masinissa a n d h e r e
he awaited the arrival of H a n n i b a l , w h o h a d no choice b u t to follow
him, for t h e battle of decision.
We have seen how the p o i n t e r of the scale c o n t i n u e d to oscillate
in this battle up to t h e last m o m e n t . It is difficult to a p p r e c i a t e t h e
entire s t r e n g t h of spirit that went into t h e o r d e r for t h e m a r c h off
toward N a r a g g a r a as well as into t h e control of t h e details of t h e
following battle with u n w a v e r i n g coolness. We c a n n o t a p p r e c i a t e
such m a t t e r s until we h a v e m e a s u r e d b o t h aspects in relation to
each o t h e r — t h e battle within the strategic situation and the
strategic decision from t h e viewpoint of t h e razor's e d g e on which
the balance of the battle stood.
T h e d e s p e r a t e aspect o f the decision b y t h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r
has b e e n very interestingly reflected, up to the p r e s e n t day, in t h e
e r r o n e o u s n a m e t h a t has b e e n a d o p t e d i n l e g e n d for t h e battle
—Zama. Even after his victory Scipio did n o t d a r e to confess, in his
r e p o r t t o t h e h o m e l a n d , t h e e n t i r e strategic situation, t h e m a r c h
away from the coast into the interior; he d i d not n a m e t h e location
of the battle itself b u t only t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of H a n n i b a l at his last
halt, a n d so the battle c a m e to be n a m e d after the latter a n d in this
way the strategic situation b e c a m e so confused that t h e r e was good
cause for d o u b t as to w h e t h e r the westerly or the easterly Z a m a was
m e a n t . We may c o m p a r e this m a r c h of Scipio with the m a r c h i n g
away of t h e Silesian a r m y from t h e M u l d e across t h e Saale in Oc-
tober 1813 a n d t h e withdrawal from Ligny t o w a r d W a v r e in 1815,
two o p e r a t i o n s t h a t w e r e strategically responsible for the defeat of
N a p o l e o n . I f Scipio, i n s t e a d o f b o a s t i n g o f t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d
boldness o f his decision, p r e f e r r e d t o conceal a n d cover u p t h e
d a n g e r he h a d victoriously withstood, o n e is r e m i n d e d of Moltke,

w h o , in t h e face of t h e faultfinders, r e f e r r e d to his most ingenious
a n d boldest strategic act, the divided m a r c h i n t o B o h e m i a , as the
" r e m e d y for a n u n f a v o r a b l e situation."
Even after t h e victory of N a r a g g a r a , Scipio, with his m o d e r a t e
s t r e n g t h , could not c o n s i d e r besieging a n d c o n q u e r i n g C a r t h a g e it-
self. R o m e was so e x h a u s t e d economically a n d spiritually by t h e
long w a r that she was n e i t h e r able n o r willing to p r o v i d e r a t h e r
large resources, and there were already forming in the
M a c e d o n i a n - G r e e k g r o u p o f c o u n t r i e s conditions that m a d e a n in-
t e r v e n t i o n a n d a new war very likely. J u s t as t h e sages of R o m e h a d
not b e e n willing to a p p r o v e Scipio's e x p e d i t i o n to Africa a n d h a d
p r o p h e s i e d disaster, e v e n now, after his victory, they w e r e o n c e
again b e i n g h e a r d from, b u t with t h e o p p o s i t e t u n e , finding that
t h e victory h a d to be p u r s u e d to t h e point of c o m p l e t e c r u s h i n g of
t h e rival city. B u t t h e victor of N a r a g g a r a s h o w e d that, j u s t as he
was able to estimate his s t r e n g t h correctly, so too he could j u d g e
t h e limits o f his s t r e n g t h , a n d today o n e s h o u l d n o l o n g e r r e p e a t
the r e p r o a c h e s of those w h o i n t e n d e d to be c u t t i n g while they were
n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n envious, t o t h e effect t h a t h e h a d m a d e peace
so as n o t to b e q u e a t h to a successor the fame of this event. It would
have b e e n a long time before a successor of Scipio would h a v e been
able to gain fame by c o n t i n u i n g the fight against H a n n i b a l a n d the
i n s u p e r a b l e wall of C a r t h a g e . Scipio knew b e t t e r w h a t was to the
a d v a n t a g e of his h o m e city, a n d he a c c e p t e d t h e offer of peace that
was n o w b r o u g h t t o h i m o n behalf o f H a n n i b a l . T h e c o n d i t i o n s did
n o t e x t e n d so very significantly b e y o n d those t h a t Scipio h a d al-
r e a d y set up a year earlier, b e f o r e H a n n i b a l ' s arrival, a n d which the
R o m a n p e o p l e h a d a p p r o v e d . T h e significance o f t h e battle o f
N a r a g g a r a d o e s n o t lie, t h e r e f o r e , s o m u c h i n t h e positive, im-
m e d i a t e a d v a n t a g e g a i n e d by t h e R o m a n state, as it does negatively
in t h e fact t h a t C a r t h a g e was b r o k e n in its last u p w a r d s u r g e , a n d
its citizens lost h o p e in t h e f u t u r e . T h e most i m p o r t a n t condition
t h a t was a d d e d to t h e new peace treaty was that C a r t h a g e was not
p e r m i t t e d to wage any war w i t h o u t R o m e ' s a p p r o v a l , t h e r e b y giving
u p , in effect, h e r full sovereignty.
W h e t h e r this c o n d i t i o n w o u l d r e m a i n a n e m p t y letter o r would
really b r i n g a n e n d t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t C a r t h a g i n i a n policies was
not k n o w n with any certainty at t h e m o m e n t of t h e peace treaty.
W h e t h e r t h e c o n q u e r e d city would subject itself to this c o n d i t i o n on
a c o n t i n u i n g basis d e p e n d e d on world c o n d i t i o n s , on t h e policy of
M a c e d o n a n d Syria, o n t h e i n n e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f R o m e a n d o f
Carthage. History has shown that t h e d e f e a t of N a r a g g a r a b r o k e

the p o w e r of C a r t h a g e definitively. Six years later, in 195 B . C , after
the R o m a n s h a d in the m e a n t i m e also d e f e a t e d the M a c e d o n i a n s
without i n t e r f e r e n c e f r o m t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , t h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , a t
the d e m a n d of t h e R o m a n s , d r o v e H a n n i b a l o u t of his native city,
and this event now finally gave t h e peace its definitive confirma-
tion.
H a n n i b a l a n d N a p o l e o n a r e t h e two g r e a t c o m m a n d e r s o f world
history w h o w e r e finally d e f e a t e d w i t h o u t sacrificing, for t h a t
reason, their fame a n d t h e i r historical greatness. Yes, they a r e so
great t h a t h i s t o r y has always b e e n t e m p t e d t o j u d g e t h e i r c o n -
q u e r o r s m o r e sternly t h a n i t j u d g e d t h e m , j u s t s o t h a t t h e i d e a
would n o t arise t h a t t h e c o n q u e r o r was g r e a t e r t h a n the c o n q u e r e d .
If the R o m a n s wished to consider Scipio in t h e same way t h a t t h e
English c o n s i d e r e d W e l l i n g t o n , e v e r y w h e r e w h e r e n a t i o n a l p r i d e
did not e n t e r t h e picture t h e r e w e r e reservations as to their great-
ness; in fact, Wellington was no d o u b t s p o k e n of even with a cer-
tain lack of a p p r e c i a t i o n , a n d least of all has credit b e e n given to
that g e n e r a l w h o played t h e greatest role in t h e strategic defeat of
N a p o l e o n : G n e i s e n a u . T h e r e can h a r d l y be a question h e r e at all of
a c o m p a r i s o n with N a p o l e o n , since, of c o u r s e , not G n e i s e n a u b u t
Blücher was t h e c o m m a n d e r o f the P r u s s i a n s a n d i n t h e latter's
case, again, t h e claim of b e i n g on an equal level with N a p o l e o n as a
strategist was not raised at all.
Even if o n e wishes to favor t h e c o n q u e r e d g e n e r a l s with this
satisfaction in t h e writing of history, since t h e o t h e r s , of c o u r s e ,
have b e e n richly r e w a r d e d in t h e victory itself, a study like o u r s
must n e v e r t h e l e s s weigh all t h e aspects m o r e carefully. We shall
have occasion t o speak o f t h e m o r e m o d e r n c o m m a n d e r s later. O f
Scipio, however, it m u s t be expressly stated, as o u r e n t i r e a c c o u n t
has a l r e a d y s h o w n , t h a t h e d e s e r v e s t o b e p l a c e d , certainly n o t
above, b u t nevertheless, with c o m p l e t e justification, beside H a n n i -
bal. T h e sober R o m a n system with its strict, a u t h o r i t a t i v e g o v e r n -
mental forms d o e s n o t allow individualities to stand o u t with such
lifelike ebullience as d o e s G r e e c e . T h e c o m m o n trait of discipline
so d o m i n a t e s every single aspect t h a t o n e is almost afraid to speak
of a genius, w h o must, after all, always be absolutely individual. B u t
in t r u t h , o n e may not be stingy with this w o r d in t h e case of t h e
m a n w h o gave t h e R o m a n a r m y new tactical forms, w h o risked t h e
m o v e m e n t to Africa a n d t h e m a r c h off f r o m t h e B a g r a d a s valley to
N a r a g g a r a , w h o with sureness c o n d u c t e d t h e battle against H a n n i -
bal t h r o u g h t h e most d a n g e r o u s crisis, a n d f i n a l l y , nevertheless, d i d
n o t e x a g g e r a t e his d e m a n d s b u t c o n c l u d e d t h e r i g h t peace. B u t we
recognize in Scipio still m o r e t h a n the traits of abstract greatness, as
they a r e revealed to us by t h e events themselves. We a r e allowed
also to look at this c o m m a n d e r face to face, in t h e p i c t u r e that
M o m m s e n ' s descriptive p o w e r has c r e a t e d for us from the sources.
It is with this p i c t u r e that I s h o u l d like to r o u n d off this account of
t h e Second Punic W a r , after I have succeeded, of c o u r s e , as I h o p e ,
t h a n k s to this study, in c o m p l e t i n g it by the final decisive trait, the
p r o o f o f t h e c o m p l e t e g r e a t n e s s o f t h e c o m m a n d e r a n d t h e states-
m a n . M o m m s e n p o r t r a y s the c h a r a c t e r of Scipio w h e n t h e latter
steps u p i n front o f the R o m a n p e o p l e , after t h e R o m a n armies
w e r e beaten, to seek his a p p o i n t m e n t to t h e c o m m a n d in Spain.
T h e son w h o was g o i n g t o a v e n g e t h e d e a t h o f his father,

whose life he h a d saved n i n e years earlier at t h e Ticinus, the
manfully h a n d s o m e y o u n g m a n with the long hair, who,
blushing modestly, offered himself for the post of d a n g e r for
lack of a better m a n , the simple military t r i b u n e w h o m sud-
denly t h e votes of t h e centuries lifted to the highest official
position—all of this m a d e a wonderful, u n f o r g e t t a b l e i m p r e s -
sion on t h e R o m a n citizens a n d peasants. T h e r e rests a special
m a g i c o n this g r a c e f u l h e r o f i g u r e ; with t h e c h e e r f u l a n d
self-assured e n t h u s i a s m which Scipio r a d i a t e d a b o u t him, half
piously, half cleverly, this figure is absolutely e n v e l o p e d , as if
by a b l i n d i n g a u r e o l e . With precisely e n o u g h e n t h u s i a s m to
w a r m one's h e a r t , a n d e n o u g h calculation to d e c i d e for that
which was intelligent a n d not to lose sight of t h e c o m m o n -
place; not naive e n o u g h to s h a r e the belief of t h e masses in his
divine inspiration; still straightforward e n o u g h to p u s h it aside
a n d yet to be quietly convinced in his m i n d t h a t he was a m a n
especially favored of G o d — i n a w o r d , t h e n a t u r e of a t r u e
p r o p h e t ; s t a n d i n g above t h e p e o p l e a n d n o less o u t s i d e the
people; a m a n of r o c k b o u n d fulfillment of his w o r d a n d royal
m i n d , w h o believed that by accepting t h e royal title he would
be lowering himself b u t w h o could so little u n d e r s t a n d that
t h e constitution of t h e Republic was b i n d i n g on him, too; so
s u r e of his g r e a t n e s s t h a t he knew n o t h i n g of envy a n d h a t e
a n d cordially recognized t h e merits of o t h e r s , sympathetically
forgave t h e e r r o r s of o t h e r s ; an o u t s t a n d i n g officer a n d well-
t r a i n e d d i p l o m a t , w i t h o u t t h e d e t r a c t i n g special s t a m p o f
e i t h e r p r o f e s s i o n , j o i n i n g H e l l e n i c c u l t u r e with t h e fullest
R o m a n national b a c k g r o u n d , a c c u s t o m e d to speaking a n d of
graceful c u s t o m s , Publius Scipio won t h e h e a r t s of soldiers

a n d w o m e n , of his c o m p a t r i o t s a n d t h e S p a n i a r d s , of his rivals
in the Senate a n d of his g r e a t e r [according to M o m m s e n ; h e r e
I differ] C a r t h a g i n i a n o p p o n e n t . Soon his n a m e was on every
t o n g u e a n d he was t h e star w h o s e e m e d destined to b r i n g vic-
tory a n d peace to his c o u n t r y .
EXCURSUS
ADDED IN T H I R D E D I T I O N
1. At this point in the first two editions I copied Appian's c o m p l e t e report on the
battle, in order to give the reader the opportunity to compare my presentation with
this report and so to gain a direct appreciation of the fact that with the authors of
antiquity there are battle reports that have no similarity at all to the true events and
which must simply be completely discarded. N o b o d y denies that with respect to this
report by Appian, because we are in the fortunate position of being able to arrive at
the truth from another source. But that is not e n o u g h . We must have the courage to
reject obviously legendary accounts even u n d e r circumstances where we are not in a
position to substitute s o m e t h i n g better. It is not easy to arrive at this decision, and it
is only by a very gradual process that the scholarly world becomes accustomed to the
proper criteria. For this purpose I urgently r e c o m m e n d the reading of that account
by Appian, but I must omit it here in the interest of saving space.
2. Veith, in the volume (3: 2) of Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) prepared
by him, agreed tactically and strategically with the basic features of the campaign of
202 B . C . as d e v e l o p e d by me and Konrad Lehmann, and through a thoroughly pains-
taking geographical and topographical study, also d e t e r m i n e d the location of the
battle as nearly as possible. Specifically, he, too, places the battle not at Zama but at
Naraggara and considers the saving points for the R o m a n s to lie in the e c h e l o n tac-
tics d e v e l o p e d by Scipio in Spain and in the return of the cavalry after it had first
been lured away by the Carthaginians. I cannot agree, however, with what he goes
on to accept or to work out for himself from the account of Polybius.
Veith considers that L e h m a n n and I have taken too skeptical a view of the ac-
count of Polybius; he holds that the only significant error in it is the contradiction in
the report showing that the echelon of Carthaginian citizens was at one point cow-
ardly and at another courageous. But he considers this to be only an explanation for
their conduct and not a fact, and such an error is, after all, excusable. It seems to me
precisely the contrary, that an isolated false fact should be more excusable than an
explanation, which is b o u n d to be reflected on and is therefore so obviously absurd
that it eliminates itself. But be that as it may, the fact that Hannibal was supposedly
on the point of w i n n i n g the battle even t h o u g h his two echelons were fighting with
each other, and the withdrawal of the first R o m a n e c h e l o n because the battlefield
was covered with blood and corpses—these things are fables that evidently c o m e
from the same armory as the wigs of Hannibal, rowing on the land, the ebb tide that
occurs regularly at N e w Carthage in the afternoon, and so many other things that
Polybius, despite his critical viewpoint, has copied unthinkingly from his sources.
But the tactical m a n e u v e r s that Veith builds up from such source material are noth-
ing more than fantasy forms. All the more so must we regard them as such w h e n
we see that the d e f e n s e against the alleged 80 elephants of Hannibal plays such a
large role in this account, whereas Veith himself, in his numerical estimates (p. 681),
c o m e s to the conclusion that the Carthaginians did not have more than 15 to 20 of
those animals. A n d because of these few elephants Scipio is supposed to have drasti-
cally c h a n g e d the normal Roman battle formation. T h i s is all the less credible in that
the elephants were normally not used against the infantry but against the cavalry.
V e i t h b e l i e v e s (p. 6 9 1 ) that S c i p i o h a d b e e n able t o realize f r o m a d i s t a n c e
Hannibal's intention to use the elephants in this battle against the infantry, since the
elephants were drawn up in front and therefore had been f o r m e d up first. I cannot
attribute to Hannibal such a lack of caution. If he i n t e n d e d to do something un-
usual, it was clear that, if d o n e with surprise, it would be doubly effective. Hannibal
would therefore have had to order that the elephants be drawn up at first in the
usual way with the cavalry and that they trot out in front of the infantry only at the
last m o m e n t ; it was a question, after all, of only a few h u n d r e d paces to be covered.
If the whole structure d o e s not already reveal it, certainly this consideration would
clearly p r o v e that the e n t i r e e l e p h a n t story, with the p r e a r r a n g e d lanes in the
Roman battle formation for them to run through—lanes that the elephants also used
in a most obliging way—is a myth. H o w Hannibal actually used t h e m — a n d , by all
appearances, effectively—is recounted above.
That there is present here and there in the entire African campaign the conscious
invention of a fiction writer was directly pointed out, later, by Konrad Lehmann,
w h e n he uncovered as source of the spy story the parallel account of Herodotus
(Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie Vol. 153, N o . 6 8 , 1896). Polybius was critical
e n o u g h to omit the individual combat between Scipio and Hannibal, which naturally
s t e m m e d from the same source; but he did not realize that the spy anecdote, the
personal c o n v e r s a t i o n o f the two c o m m a n d e r s , the battle o f the Carthaginians
a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s , a n d t h e g r o u n d m a d e i m p a s s a b l e b e c a u s e o f b l o o d and
corpses—all of these points are just as incredible. Old Laelius himself, in whose
mind was a blurred mixture of actual recollection and pictures from the fictitious
account by Ennius, may have recounted this to him, and then his critical approach
was h u s h e d . But then, e v e n T h u c y d i d e s allowed himself to be deceived by his Spar-
tan host with the story of the treason of Pausanias.
A significant deviation of Veith's from my concept lies in the fact that he d o e s not
accept the belief that Scipio m o v e d from the area of Zama to Naraggara, in order to
reinforce his troops with those of Masinissa, but that he was already in this area be-
fore Hannibal's approach. If that were the case, then the strategic accomplishment,
not only of o n e but of both c o m m a n d e r s , would be distinctly lowered. Scipio's awe-
some decision to march off in a direction that offered no further withdrawal falls
away, and Hannibal can be reproached for m o v i n g out of H a d r u m e t without an
overriding reason and d e m a n d i n g the decisive battle before he had completed his
preparations. For if Scipio was in the Zama area at the time the Carthaginians
marched out of H a d r u m e t , Hannibal had the prospect of striking him with superior
forces, and his precipitate m o v i n g out is justified; but if Scipio were already in the
area of Naraggara, it was likely that he would be united with Masinissa, and there
was then no reason for Hannibal's not first completing the preparations before un-
dertaking the campaign.
T h i s would-be diminution of the prestige of these two great m e n of world history
is, of course, no basis for rejecting the facts, if they could otherwise be made to ap-
pear credible. Such, however, is not the case. T h e considerations Veith cites (p. 639)
are very vague and at any rate they have no kind of strength as proof. It is a similar
case to that of the battle on the Lechfeld, where the greatness of Emperor Otto in
world history d e p e n d e d very significantly on w h e t h e r the battle took place on the
right or left bank.
Veith (p. 641) states that he must reject as psychologically very improbable my be-
lief that Scipio himself later did not completely confess the u n p r e c e d e n t e d boldness
of his marching away toward Naraggara, since success justifies one's actions still more
in the eyes of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s than in following ages. I can support this alleged
psychological improbability with historical analogies. W h e n N a p o l e o n in 1800 had
marched up in the rear of the Austrians and sought to cut them off, he had the
boldness to divide his army up a m o n g the various roads that the Austrians could
use, in o r d e r to c o m e to grips with t h e m under any circumstances. T h e result was
that he fell into the most e x t r e m e d a n g e r of being beaten at Marengo before Desaix,
w h o had been on a separate mission, arrived. But it did not occur to N a p o l e o n to
boast of his boldness after his victory (in which he would have been completely jus-
tified) but on the contrary, he even had the battle reports intentionally falsified, in
order to substitute for his boldness the appearance of wise prescience. A n o t h e r ex-
ample: Moltke's greatest strategic action is u n d o u b t e d l y his march into B o h e m i a in
two separated armies, with the accompanying d a n g e r that o n e of them could be at-
tacked by the main body of the Austrians before the other arrived on the scene.
Although the m a r c h s u c c e e d e d brilliantly, the military criticism of the s e c o n d -
guessers did not at all bow to the success but again and again tried to prove that
only u n p r e c e d e n t e d luck or u n p r e c e d e n t e d stupidity on the part of the e n e m y had
thrown the victory in his lap, and the field marshal himself took up his pen (1867)
to defend himself against this charge.
Saan, in Studies on Scipio's Campaign in Africa (Untersuchungen zu Scipios Feldzug in
4
Afrika), p. 2 4 , refutes quite effectively the reasons for which Veith has Scipio m o v e
to Naraggara. But what he himself adduces in o r d e r to justify Scipio's formation at
Zama is no m o r e tenable. He believes, namely, that Scipio in this way wanted to
cover the approach of Masinissa. T h a t w o u l d have b e e n very distorted. Where then
was Masinissa c o m i n g from? Out of the west, after all. Instead of e x p o s i n g the
Roman army to the d a n g e r of being attacked itself by a superior force while holding
its covering position, Scipio would simply have o r d e r e d the N u m i d i a n s to m o v e up
to the Roman army on o n e of the cited m o r e northerly roads.
We shall have to state the controversy in this way. If the battle took place at
Naraggara, then Scipio's march into this area can be explained in no other way ex-
cept that, making a virtue of necessity and seeking salvation and victory in boldness,
he drew back before Hannibal to that point in order to join forces with Masinissa.
Veith's explanation, that he voluntarily marched there, is insufficient. If the battle
took place at Zama, it is hard to see why Hannibal fought there. He had the e x p e c -
tation of receiving a considerable force of cavalry u n d e r Vermina, which actually did
reach him a few weeks after the battle. His fighting at Naraggara, e v e n t h o u g h he
supposedly knew that Scipio and Masinissa had now j o i n e d forces, came naturally
after he had already m o v e d so far forward and had brought Scipio into the most
unfavorable imaginable strategic position. If, however, the two armies had faced
each other in the Zama region, Hannibal would have lost little and gained a great
deal by delaying the decision for a few m o r e weeks and being reinforced in the
meantime by the cavalry of Vermina, which was so urgently n e e d e d . Veith is right,
then, to the extent that he rejects Zama as the site of the battle; he is wrong, how-
ever, w h e n he suggests an insufficient motive for Naraggara (a plundering expedi-
tion into this region).
Veith m i s u n d e r s t a n d s me w h e n he states (p. 6 5 8 ) that Scipio's m a n e u v e r to
lengthen his front from the second (or third) e c h e l o n came, in my o p i n i o n , as a
surprise to the Carthaginians. I myself say that Scipio had already d e v e l o p e d his
echelon tactics in Spain and had used them in the battle on the "Great Plains."
Naturally Hannibal knew that and was consequently also prepared for the move-
ments m a d e by Scipio. Nevertheless, he c o u n t e d on victory and, to a certain extent,
had the right to do so, since he was superior in infantry, and he would, according to
the testimony of the R o m a n s themselves, have w o n the victory by virtue of this
superiority if the R o m a n - N u m i d i a n cavalry had not returned and fallen on his rear.
O n e of the most significant findings of my studies on ancient warfare is the verifi-
cation of the fact that the R o m a n s did not d e v e l o p e c h e l o n tactics until the Second
Punic War, u n d e r Scipio. T h e first person to agree, while M o m m s e n was still defi-
nitely rejecting this idea, was Fröhlich, in his work The Importance of the Second Punic
War for the Development of the Roman Military System (Die Bedeutung des zweiten punischen
Krieges fur die Entwicklung des römischen Heerwesens), 1884. Kromayer and Veith, too,
have now c o m e around to this point of view. "Scipio's dividing of the R o m a n battle
formation into three i n d e p e n d e n t e c h e l o n s , a r r a n g e d in d e p t h , and his brilliant
flank maneuvers, made possible only by this formation, were the things which grasped
5
victory from the h a n d s of his great adversary," writes Kromayer. T h a t is absolutely
correct, but it stands in contradiction to the c o n c e p t that Kromayer adopts else-

where, that the Romans had always u n d e r s t o o d the art of m a n e u v e r i n g in very small
tactical units, the maniples. W h o e v e r was familiar with this art would find flanking
m o v e m e n t s like those that Scipio e x e c u t e d at Naraggara not only nothing unusual,
but as simple as one's daily bread; in fact, it must even be said that the formation of
Scipio would have represented no progress at all but a step backward; not a refine-
ment, but a coarsening step. Neither Kromayer nor Veith was able to avoid the im-
pression that a fundamental c h a n g e had occurred between the helpless immobility
of the Roman tactics at C a n n a e and the maneuvers at Naraggara and that o n e of the
great d e e d s of Scipio had to be sought in this fact. But w h e n they hold fast at the
same time to the idea of the wonderful fineness of the supposed ancient Roman
quincunx tactics, they fall into an unsolvable inner contradiction.
W h e n I first published my discovery, as I may characterize it (in the Historische
Zeilschrift, Vol. 5 1 , 1883), a principal objection, which I raised myself, was that
Polybius not only did not report any change of R o m a n infantry tactics in the Second
Punic War, but also obviously knew n o t h i n g about it. T o d a y everything has been so
well explained that this objection will probably no longer be raised on any side; even
Kromayer has now a d o p t e d my idea on this decisive point. B u t whoever properly
reflects on the fact that a man like Polybius did not understand such a fundamental
h a p p e n i n g as the army r e f o r m of Scipio will not close his e y e s to the further
methodological conclusion that we must regard all detailed reports and expressions
concerning tactical events in the ancient authors with the most extreme scepticism.
To what little extent contemporaries can be aware of fundamental changes in tactics,
e v e n in the case of specific military authors, can be seen in the fourth v o l u m e of this
work (Book IV, Chapter VI) in the observations of the excellent, perceptive Hoyer
on the military system of the armies of the French Revolution. It may also be cited
here that a h u n d r e d years after Frederick his strategy was no longer familiar to the
Prussian General Staff (Vol. IV, Book III, Chapter VI).
1. In t h e speech t h a t Livy has t h e elderly Q u i n t u s Fabius Max-

imus a n d Scipio himself m a k e in t h e Senate c o n c e r n i n g t h e p l a n n e d
e x p e d i t i o n , this m o t i v e d o e s n o t a p p e a r with c o r r e c t e m p h a s i s .
If he p o i n t e d this o u t , Scipio w o u l d have b e e n placing too m u c h
stress o n t h e difficulty o f t h e w h o l e u n d e r t a k i n g , w h e r e a s his
speech was based, a n d necessarily so, on e m p h a s i z i n g t h e concept
of t h e offensive with u n c o n d i t i o n a l confidence.
2. We can a s s u m e t h a t H a n n i b a l r e t u r n e d to Africa in t h e fall of
2 0 3 B . C . a n d t h a t t h e battle of N a r a g g a r a took place in a b o u t Au-
gust o f 202 B.C. L e h m a n n , p . 5 5 5 .
3 . P r o v e d b y K o n r a d L e h m a n n i n J a h r b ü c h e r fur klassische
Philologie 153: 5 7 3 .
4. Berlin dissertation, 1914.
5. Rome's Struggle for World Hegemony (Roms Kampf um die
Weltherrschaft), p. 6 1 .
BOOK VI
The Romans
as World Conquerors
Chapter I
Romans and Macedonians
I m m e d i a t e l y after t h e Second Punic W a r c a m e the victory of t h e
R o m a n s o v e r t h e a r m i e s t h a t can be c o n s i d e r e d as the heirs of
Alexander the Great. Concerning the organization, m a n n e r of
fighting, a n d tactics of the t r o o p s that H a n n i b a l h a d led into the
field against the R o m a n s , little is r e p o r t e d to us. Since we a r e told
that he gave t h e m R o m a n w e a p o n s , it can be a s s u m e d that in gen-
eral, especially insofar as their a r m a m e n t was c o n c e r n e d , the o p -
1
posing a r m i e s w e r e quite similar.
H a n n i b a l , naturally, did not have the special m a n i p l e organiza-
tion of the p h a l a n x , since his a r m y was m a d e up of b a r b a r i a n m e r -
cenaries of various races with a few C a r t h a g i n i a n officers of h i g h e r
g r a d e , but he may from the start have h a d the beginnings of a sec-
o n d e c h e l o n o r have t a k e n o t h e r smaller m e a s u r e s t h a t h a d t h e
same effect a n d gave his p h a l a n x t h e same mobility as that of the
R o m a n s , or even a g r e a t e r o n e .
In t h e battles the R o m a n s now w a g e d against t h e M a c e d o n i a n s ,
the differences in a r m a m e n t a n d tactics a r e particularly noticeable.
T h e R o m a n s h a d f i r s t articulated the old hoplite p h a l a n x b y m e a n s
of the m a n i p l e formation, a n d t h e n h a d replaced it by the echelon
formation, c h a n g e d the s p e a r into t h e pilum, a n d fought in close
c o m b a t with t h e s h o r t , p o i n t e d s w o r d . O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s h a d t i g h t e n e d u p the old p h a l a n x even m o r e a n d h a d
c h a n g e d the spear into the long spear, the sarissa.
T h e world tensely waited to see which type of w a r f a r e w o u l d
prove the s t r o n g e r .
Since it s e e m e d doubtful to us w h e t h e r the sarissa a n d t h e u n i q u e
M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x , a s w e s e e t h e m i n t h e last b a t t l e s o f
A l e x a n d e r ' s d e s c e n d a n t s , w e r e already in use in his time, we de-
layed o u r investigation into this subject until this point. Let us first
of all acquaint ourselves with the M a c e d o n i a n m a n n e r of fighting,
393
as it is described for us by Polybius, w h o , as a c o n t e m p o r a r y , was a

classical witness of t h e battles of C y n o s c e p h a l a e a n d P y d n a (18.
2 8 - 3 2 ) . In addition to his account, we also have similar descriptions
in several m a n u a l s on tactics that have c o m e d o w n to us. N e v e r t h e -
less, t h e study was very difficult a n d went astray on a n u m b e r of
occasions, since t h e sources contain several irreconcilable contradic-
tions, a n d certain p r o b l e m s , a s for e x a m p l e t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e
length of the sarissa a n d its relationship with t h e width of t h e files
a n d t h e interval between r a n k s both with t h e M a c e d o n i a n s a n d the
R o m a n s , are intertwined. R ü s t o w a n d K ö c h l y have d e n i e d the p r e -
sence of the t r u e long s p e a r (24 or 21 feet) a m o n g the Macedo-
nians, a n d by r e a d i n g t h e G r e e k word as podes, "foot," instead of
pecheis, "ell," of which Polybius speaks, they have a s s u m e d t h a t the
sarissa, in actual practice, was no l o n g e r t h a n 14 feet. I confess that
I, t o o , l o n g h e l d this o p i n i o n , b u t a special s t u d y by E d m u n d
L a m m e r t , a c o m p a r i s o n with the Swiss a n d the l a n s q u e n e t pikes,
a n d finally a practical test carried o u t by t h e Berlin academic gym-
nastic clubs at my request, showed me that t h e larger figures h e r e ,
for once, have to be c o n s i d e r e d the correct ones, a n d so I have
f o r m e d the following p i c t u r e :
T h e sarissa was a s p e a r that, a c c o r d i n g to t h e r e g u l a t i o n s , ex-
t e n d e d up to 24 feet, b u t which in actuality went up to 21 feet,
which t h e soldier g r a s p e d with both h a n d s in such a m a n n e r as to
hold the point e x t e n d e d far forward. W h e n e v e r t h e p h a l a n x closed
up in tight formation, t h e sarissae of five r a n k s p r o t r u d e d b e y o n d
the front a n d w e r e all effective at the s a m e time, since those of the
2
first t h r e e r a n k s w e r e p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y s h o r t e r .
T h a t the foremost r a n k s h a d s h o r t e r spears is r e p o r t e d , it is t r u e ,
n e i t h e r by Polybius n o r by o t h e r sources in a specific m a n n e r , b u t
it follows indirectly from a note, a c c o r d i n g to which the c o u c h e d
spears would have f o r m e d a circular a r c h ; a n d f u r t h e r , from the
a p p a r e n t fact that t h e very long spear would" have b e e n useless for
the first r a n k ; finally, from the fact that it was r e p o r t e d t h a t the
soldiers of the p h a l a n x carried shields. A 21-foot-long sarissa—or
even only an 18-foot o n e — c a n n o t be controlled with o n e h a n d b u t
r e q u i r e s , as is also expressly stated, the use of b o t h h a n d s . W h o e v e r
wields his spear with b o t h h a n d s must do without t h e protection of
a shield. He c o u l d , of c o u r s e , p e r h a p s slip a small, light r o u n d
shield over his a r m , in o r d e r to use it in close c o m b a t with sword or
d a g g e r , after his sarissa was s h a t t e r e d , b u t in t h e fighting with t h e
sarissa itself the shield w o u l d be such a b u r d e n a n d , held almost
p e r p e n d i c u l a r to t h e body; would be of such little h e l p that we may
Romans and Macedonians 395
not assume t h a t t h e sarissa fighter even c a r r i e d a shield. T h e re-

ports fall into a g r e e m e n t , however, if t h e first r a n k or the first few
ranks carried a s h o r t e r spear, which they wielded with o n e h a n d . If
then, say, the fifth r a n k carried 21-foot-spears, t h e f o u r t h 18-foot
ones, the t h i r d 15-foot o n e s , the second 12-foot ones, a n d t h e first
rank 9-foot spears, the spears could form in front of the line an
almost u n i f o r m vertical plane or a slight a r c h inclined to the rear,
thus p r e s e n t i n g an i m p e n e t r a b l e wall of points.
T h e sarissa p h a l a n x is based completely on the mass effect a n d
not on t h e fighting of t h e individual m a n . T h e contact both with
the n e i g h b o r i n g file a n d with the p r e c e d i n g file can t h e r e f o r e be
m u c h closer t h a n in the R o m a n f o r m a t i o n , with its t h r o w i n g of pila
and its fighting with t h e sword. Polybius says specifically on this
point t h a t against each R o m a n , w h o n e e d e d an interval of 3 feet,
there c a m e 2 p h a l a n x soldiers a n d since, after all, 5 r a n k s of the
phalanx held their spears o u t in front simultaneously, 10 p h a l a n x
m e n against each R o m a n .
T h e g i g a n t i c w e i g h t o f t h e s h o c k o f t h e sarissa p h a l a n x was
further increased t h r o u g h the fact that it was d r a w n up twice as
d e e p as t h e old hoplite p h a l a n x , 16 m e n d e e p a c c o r d i n g to t h e
r e g u l a t i o n s . T h e r e a r m o s t 1 1 r a n k s h e l d t h e i r sarissae u p a n d
thereby f o r m e d for themselves a certain protection against a r r o w s
a n d javelins.
W h e n this e n t i r e mass, bristling with spears, m o v e d forward, it
f o r m e d , we a r e told, a frightful sight, a n d even t h e R o m a n com-
m a n d e r Aemilius Paullus t r e m b l e d w h e n he saw it roll forward at
Pydna.
C o n c e r n i n g the relative virtues o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n a n d R o m a n
tactics, Polybius says: " I n t h e front n o t h i n g can stand up to t h e
sarissa p h a l a n x ; the individual R o m a n with his sword can n e i t h e r
slash d o w n n o r b r e a k t h r o u g h the ten spears that simultaneously
press against h i m . B u t t h e R o m a n legionary is a d a p t a b l e to any
place at any time a n d for any p u r p o s e . T h e sarissa-bearer can fight
only as a m e m b e r of the e n t i r e p h a l a n x a n d not even in small units
a n d n o t a s a n i n d i v i d u a l fighter. F u r t h e r m o r e , the p h a l a n x c a n
move only on very level t e r r a i n ; every ditch, every hill, every hole,
every c l u m p of woods causes it to fall into d i s o r d e r . But if it has
fallen into d i s o r d e r at any place at all or if R o m a n maniples s h o u l d
fall u p o n it from the flank, which can be easily d o n e with the eche-
lon formation of the R o m a n s , t h e n it is lost."
T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n is so convincing a n d clear that o n e m u s t raise
the question how it was possible that t h e M a c e d o n i a n kings t h e m -
3
selves did not realize it from the start, a n d this leads to the f u r t h e r
question, since it is a l r e a d y clear that A l e x a n d e r ' s p h a l a n x could
not possibly have b e e n of such an inflexible n a t u r e — t h e question
of how a n d w h e n the later o n e d e v e l o p e d from t h e earlier o n e .
T h e sarissa p h a l a n x of Polybius can also hardly have existed yet
u n d e r the i m m e d i a t e successors of A l e x a n d e r . At any rate, it does
not a p p e a r in t h e battle accounts, a n d especially the history of Pyr-
r h u s testifies against it. T h e r e c a n n o t very well be any d o u b t that
P y r r h u s , w h o h a d such a close relationship with Macedonia, h a d
t h e idea of c o n q u e r i n g t h e West also with t h e tactics that e n a b l e d
A l e x a n d e r to o v e r c o m e t h e East. We a r e told expressly, however,
t h a t in Italy he i n c o r p o r a t e d into his a r m y Italians with Italian
a r m s , in such a way that t h e r e a p p e a r e d alternately a unit of Epi-
4
rotes a n d a unit of I t a l i a n s . T h i s is only possible with types of ar-
m a m e n t that, even if different a m o n g themselves, a r e still i n t e n d e d
for similar t y p e s o f c o m b a t ; i t w o u l d n o t m a t t e r , for e x a m p l e ,
w h e t h e r o n e unit was a r m e d with swords a n d the o t h e r with spears
a n d w h e t h e r t h e spears w e r e of different lengths, p r o v i d e d only
t h a t they all u n i f o r m l y m o v e d into i n d i v i d u a l c o m b a t with t h e i r
h a n d weapons.
Now it is possible, of course, as I l e a r n e d from t h e practical test,
for a small u n i t also to m a k e an attack at t h e d o u b l e with long
spears, but t h e r e naturally r e m a i n s a difference of esprit between a
unit with long spears a n d o n e with s h o r t s p e a r s , a n d in such an ac-
t i o n t h e sarissa-bearers lose w h a t is a b s o l u t e l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e to
t h e m , s e c u r e d flanks. As l o n g as t h e sarissa p h a l a n x r e m a i n s in
good o r d e r , it c r u s h e s d o w n e v e r y t h i n g b e f o r e it. B u t t h e e n e m y
can d r a w back in front of an i n d i v i d u a l sarissa u n i t in o r d e r to
drive with his full force on t h e alternate units a r m e d with short
w e a p o n s , a n d i f h e can d r i v e o n e o f t h e m o u t o f line, t h e n t h e
sarissa -bearers are also at his mercy, since he can t h e n take t h e m
from the flank.
T h e feeling of insecurity that m u s t have b e e n caused by this d e -
p e n d e n c e on the courage of foreigners who were their direct
n e i g h b o r s in t h e f o r m a t i o n would necessarily have t e n d e d to u n -
d e r m i n e such a battle f o r m a t i o n . T h e sarissa unit can as a basic
principle exercise its full effect only in the g r e a t closed mass, which
has to be covered on its flanks by o t h e r t r o o p s . T h e r e p o r t of t h e
mixing of units necessarily leads us t h e n to t h e conclusion that the
p h a l a n x soldiers o f P y r r h u s w e r e not a r m e d with t h e truly long
spear.
If, t h e n , P y r r h u s did not yet have the Polybian sarissa p h a l a n x ,
t h e r e r e m a i n s for us t h e choice of w h e t h e r it d e v e l o p e d gradually
and the sarissae, which w e r e p e r h a p s only a m a x i m u m of 12 feet

long u n d e r A l e x a n d e r , were l e n g t h e n e d m o r e a n d m o r e , o r
whether it was precisely only t h e i m p e n d i n g war with the R o m a n s
that p e r s u a d e d King Philip V to i n t r o d u c e t h e t w o - h a n d e d l o n g
spear in his p h a l a n x . King Philip V was a m a n of intelligence a n d
energy; at his c o u r t , in his military a m b i a n c e , t h e R o m a n victories
over H a n n i b a l must certainly have m a d e an impression. T h e y
probably w e i g h e d a n d c o m p a r e d the a d v a n t a g e s of the tactics cus-
tomarily used o n the two sides. T o a d o p t t h e R o m a n tactics w i t h o u t
further a d o was impossible for t h e M a c e d o n i a n s ; in fact probably
such a n idea hardly c a m e u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . O n e c a n n o t sud-
denly t h r o w aside t h e customs a n d viewpoints of a large s t a n d i n g
a r m y a n d a military tradition a n d replace t h e m with s o m e t h i n g new
and completely unrelated. T h e Macedonians understood how to
fight in close o r d e r with a very long s p e a r but not how to t h r o w t h e
spear a n d fight with the sword. W h e n it was now seen what g r e a t
successes this m e t h o d of fighting h a d achieved, they may very well
h a v e c o m e u p o n t h e i d e a o f c o p i n g w i t h i t b y i n c r e a s i n g still
f u r t h e r t h e s t r e n g t h of their o w n native m e t h o d , of b r i n g i n g it to
its highest potential, by l e n g t h e n i n g t h e spears to as m u c h as 21
feet a n d closing t h e formation in to 1½ feet p e r m a n , while disre-
g a r d i n g t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s r e s u l t i n g from such o n e - s i d e d n e s s . I f
this e x p l a n a t i o n is correct, t h e decision would offer a certain anal-
ogy to the d e e p f o r m a t i o n of t h e R o m a n maniples at C a n n a e ; t h a t
is, they could in no way m a t c h the e n e m y in maneuverability, a n d
so they s o u g h t to s u b d u e him t h r o u g h p r e s s u r e .
Strangely e n o u g h , it n e v e r c a m e to a completely fair test of t h e
battle validity of the two m e t h o d s of combat. T h e two battles in
which the M a c e d o n i a n s s u c c u m b e d to the R o m a n s , C y n o s c e p h a l a e
a n d P y d n a , w e r e so greatly influenced by fortuitous events that t h e
general validity of their results could be contested, a n d the t h i r d
battle, w h i c h m i g h t also b e c o u n t e d h e r e , M a g n e s i a , w h e r e t h e
Macedonian-Syrian e m p i r e lost to t h e R o m a n s , shows no p h a l a n x
formation at all, a c c o r d i n g to t h e admittedly completely fantasy-like
battle r e p o r t s we have.
CYNOSCEPHALAE
T h i s battle c o r r e s p o n d s in all respects with t h e overall p i c t u r e we
have f o r m e d , from Polybius, of t h e m e e t i n g of p h a l a n x with legion.
T h e battle was n o t p l a n n e d i n a d v a n c e , however, b u t d e v e l o p e d
from a reconnaissance skirmish. Philip, t h i n k i n g he was t a k i n g ad-
vantage of a favorable m o m e n t , accepted battle, even t h o u g h t h e
hilly, b r o k e n t e r r a i n was unfavorable for the sarissa p h a l a n x . Fur-

t h e r m o r e , t h e latter did not deploy uniformly, a n d while the right
wing m o v e d f o r w a r d victoriously, t h e left, still in the process of
f o r m i n g u p , was b r o k e n t h r o u g h by the e l e p h a n t s of t h e R o m a n s
a n d t h e n t h r o w n back by t h e legionaries without difficulty.
Since we find n o w h e r e else in history a verified victory of this
kind by e l e p h a n t s , it is i m p o r t a n t to stress that h e r e , too, it was not
a well-ordered force t h a t was b r o k e n up by t h e e l e p h a n t s b u t that
t h e soldiers of t h e p h a l a n x , as Polybius clearly r e p o r t s , were still in
m a r c h formation a n d w e r e i m p e d e d in f o r m i n g up by the t e r r a i n .
W h e n this flank of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s was beaten, instead of hav-
ing t h e m p u r s u e d , a t r i b u n e led 20 maniples of t h e victorious le-
gions, p r e s u m a b l y from t h e second echelon, against t h e r e a r of the
o t h e r M a c e d o n i a n wing a n d t h e r e b y b r o u g h t t h e R o m a n s the deci-
sion in the battle on this side too.
T h e history of tactics would be greatly confused if c h a n c e h a d
h a d it that we h a d received, instead of Polybius' account, only t h e
t o u c h e d - u p version of t h e battle of C y n o s c e p h a l a e by Livy. F o r
Livy, in 3 3 . 8, has translated Polybius' G r e e k passage r e p o r t i n g the
c o m m a n d of Philip to the p h a l a n x to attack with c o u c h e d spears as:
" M a c e d o n u m p h a l a n g e m h a s t i s positis, q u a r u m l o n g i t u d o im-
p e d i m e n t o erat, gladiis r e m g e r e r e j u b e t . " ("He o r d e r e d the
M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x to p u t d o w n their spears, whose length was an
i m p e d i m e n t , a n d t o e n g a g e with s w o r d s . " ) T h i s e x a m p l e i s e x -
tremely valuable in l e a d i n g us to practice, so to speak, critical deci-
siveness w h e n e v e r , as is so often the case, t h e w o r d i n g of the r e p o r t
is subject to question from a practical p o i n t of view. H o w m a n y
scholars would t h e r e be w h o would consider it as permissible to at-
tribute such a definite s t a t e m e n t to a simple m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , if
5
we w e r e not by c h a n c e able to c o m p a r e it with the original t e x t ?
PYDNA
On t h e battle of P y d n a we do not have the r e p o r t of Polybius

himself b u t only t h e slightly reliable a n d also i n c o m p l e t e accounts
of Livy a n d P l u t a r c h . T h i s battle, too, r e p o r t e d l y c a m e a b o u t by
chance, without having a p r o p e r battle f o r m a t i o n a s s u m e d in ad-
vance.
MAGNESIA
In Livy a n d A p p i a n we have only completely fantastic r e p o r t s on

t h e battle of Magnesia. T h e Syrian a r m y was said to be outfitted
with scythed chariots, camel r i d e r s , t h e levies of sixteen different

peoples, I n d i a n e l e p h a n t s far s u p e r i o r to t h e African ones. It was
m o r e t h a n twice as n u m e r o u s as the R o m a n s (according to Florus,
twenty times as s t r o n g ) , four times as s t r o n g in cavalry; a l t h o u g h it
was d r a w n up in a very d e e p formation, t h e front was still so long
that, in the foggy w e a t h e r , the flanks could not be seen from the
middle. Nevertheless, t h e r e was no question of an e n v e l o p m e n t by
the widely e x t e n d e d mass. Not even 4 0 0 of the R o m a n s a n d t h e i r
allies w e r e killed, whereas the Syrians lost 53,000.
T h e r e a p p e a r s as a special feature of this battle the division of
the sarissa p h a l a n x into 10 subunits, with 2 e l e p h a n t s placed in each
of the intervals. Probably this a r r a n g e m e n t , too, belongs a m o n g the
fantasies of t h e fiction writer to w h o m we are i n d e b t e d for t h e e n -
tire battle a c c o u n t . All foolishness has its limits, e v e n t h a t of a
Syrian king w h o has H a n n i b a l in his service a n d yet does not u n -
d e r s t a n d how to employ him. As we know, e l e p h a n t s a r e most ef-
fective against cavalry. T h e y do not drive in on infantry w h o a r e
a r r a y e d in close o r d e r ; on the c o n t r a r y , it can easily h a p p e n that
they a r e d r i v e n back by missiles. Or on t h e o t h e r h a n d they s t o r m
forward, a n d t h e n it is possible to let t h e m pass t h r o u g h t h e battle
line as t h e soldiers s p r i n g aside. In any case, t h e r e arises for the
soldiers of t h e p h a l a n x the worst t h i n g that they have to fear, a
wide g a p in t h e i r front, w h e r e t h e R o m a n maniples can drive in
a n d take t h e m from the flank. T h i s is all t h e m o r e s u r e to h a p p e n
because of the fact that t h e e l e p h a n t s have difficulty k e e p i n g pace
with t h e m a r c h i n g p h a l a n x unit, but, as soon as they begin to suf-
fer from t h e e n e m y missiles, they c h a r g e against the foe as fast as
possible (provided that they do not t u r n about).
To w h o e v e r still believes t h a t it is methodologically permissible
a n d p r o p e r to arrive at a historically presentable account from such
battle r e p o r t s by m e a n s of critical e x a m i n a t i o n , I would m a k e t h e
r e q u e s t that he try that, first of all, with the two battle accounts by
A p p i a n of C a n n a e a n d N a r a g g a r a , a n d if that has succeeded, t h e n
I shall h a v e no f u r t h e r objection to his trying it also with the ac-
c o u n t of Magnesia.
EXCURSUS
SOME CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING

T H E BATTLE OF MAGNESIA
ANCIENT STRATEGY OF KING A N T I O C H U S

Kromayer in Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder. Vol. 2) has tried to analyze the
battle rationally. He estimates for the Syrians 6 0 , 0 0 0 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and
for the Romans 2 7 , 6 0 0 infantry a n d 2,800 cavalry. To my question as to why the
Syrians, with such a great superiority, did not e n v e l o p , he replies that an e n v e l o p -

ment on both flanks was i n t e n d e d and did, in fact, actually take place on the o n e
flank, whereas on the other it was broken up and thwarted by a bold offensive blow
of the Romans, and because of this the battle was d e c i d e d in favor of the Romans.
T h i s battle account c o n d e m n s itself; it is not only incredible but absurd. If it were
possible to o v e r p o w e r a cavalry force m o r e than four times as large and by no
m e a n s of inferior quality by such a simple m e t h o d , the art of war would no longer
be an art, but a game.
As for the incorporation of the e l e p h a n t s — t o which Kromayer adds
s h a r p s h o o t e r s — i n t o the p h a l a n x , K r o m a y e r e x p l a i n s this by the fact that the
p h a l a n x was s u p p o s e d to maintain a d e f e n s i v e stance only, and the e n e m y
sharpshooters were s u p p o s e d to have been f e n d e d away from the phalanx by the
elephants and the light infantrymen in the intervals. T h e s e are concepts that are tac-
tically impossible in every respect. A defensive stance on o n e side d o e s not, after all,
prevent the other from attacking; but a phalanx with elephants and light infantry in
the intervals would have fully lost its character and would have been powerless
against an attack by the legions, which n e e d e d to entice or to drive the elephants
and light infantry out of the intervals at only a single spot in o r d e r to be able to roll
the phalanx up toward both sides from that spot. But the R o m a n s would doubtless
even have penetrated simultaneously into many intervals.
Kromayer leans for support on the fact that the reports of Livy and A p p i a n both
go back to Polybius. T h a t is still not at all the same as the report of Polybius himself;
we have just seen what kinds of errors are possible in Livy, and furthermore there
may very well have been e l e m e n t s from o t h e r sources m i x e d in with his. If it should
actually be exclusively the report of Polybius that serves as a base for this, o n e would
have to say that the master was just as lax here in his critical analysis as he was also
not infrequently in other cases (see also pp. 376, 3 8 7 , above). Even Kromayer, in his
description of the battle of Magnesia, eliminated a few of the fantastic features of
the Livian-Appian report, which would also be attributable to Polybius. T h e supposi-
tion that Polybius trusted t o o strongly an unreliable source and repeated its foolish-
ness may therefore in no way be arbitrarily rejected as inadmissible. It is a quite dif-
ferent situation with the military-political reasoning that springs from the historian's
o w n reflection; here the power of his intellect is at its height, and it would take very
strong a r g u m e n t s indeed for o n e to be willing to risk contradicting his j u d g m e n t . In
my o p i n i o n , that is the methodological principle o n e must follow w h e n utilizing
Polybius. What Kromayer really things about Polybius is hard to say. At times he
treats Polybius' factual statements in the way an o r t h o d o x interpreter d o e s the say-
ings of the Bible, tries to save things that are obviously w r o n g by the strangest in-
terpretations, and repulses doubters with hard w o r d s as slanderers of religion. (We
shall soon have occasion to treat still another of these cases.) At other places he re-
jects the positive statements and dismisses the military and political j u d g m e n t s of
Polybius without any hesitation. We have already seen e x a m p l e s of this (p. 2 4 4 ) , and
his presentation in the second volume of Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) is
based to a large extent on this, especially the wars against Antiochus and Perseus. In
the strategic analysis of these wars there are n u m e r o u s individual good and clarify-
ing observations, but, also leaving aside the fact that the vagueness that I have al-
ready d e p l o r e d c o n c e r n i n g the c o n c e p t of the strategy of attrition lies over the
whole question, it is for me, at least, impossible to escape from the suspicion that
Polybius' j u d g m e n t is not only put aside but on a n u m b e r of occasions is directly
reversed. If Polybius, in his j u d g m e n t of these wars, which he knew so well, is as
prejudiced as Kromayer indicates, then the authority that we have previously attrib-
uted to him, and justifiably so, despite n u m e r o u s factual errors of detail, is shaken
at its base. A strict, detailed p r o o f cannot be a d d u c e d either for or against—for ex-
ample, whether Perseus, w h e n he received the news of the e n v e l o p m e n t of his posi-
tion a t D i u n i n 169 B . C , was j u s t i f i e d i n retreating a n d e v a c u a t i n g T e m p e o r
whether this resulted from a simple lack of true strategic ability. Anybody w h o feels
c o n v i n c e d by Kromayer's critical analyses s h o u l d realize very clearly that he is
thereby rejecting the authority of Polybius, to which we have given credence up to
now.
At any rate, the idea of Kromayer that he presented on the so-called "Historians'
Day" in Dresden and d e v e l o p e d in an essay "Hannibal und Antiochus der Grosse"
(Neue Jahrbücher fur das klasstsche Altertum, 19 [1907]:681), that the contradiction be-
tween the strategy p r o p o s e d by H a n n i b a l a n d that f o l l o w e d by A n t i o c h u s r e p -
resented the o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n Carthaginian and Seleucidian policies and that
therefore Antiochus, if he had followed Hannibal, would have been serving foreign
interests—this concept is basically false. T h e opposition is rather the same o n e that
dominated the politics of Europe from 1805 on and still in the winter of 1 8 1 3 - 1 8 1 4
the headquarters of the Allies, where it is a well-known fact that there was also a
faction that considered it as completely superfluous to defeat N a p o l e o n completely
and reasoned in a m a n n e r quite similar to that of Kromayer now with respect to
King Antiochus, that it was sufficient if the e n e m y were deprived of certain areas
and provinces. T o d a y nobody any longer questions the fact that Czar Alexander, if
with Stein and Gneisenau he insisted on the Rhine crossing and pushing the march
toward Paris, was representing not only his Russian interest in freedom, but also
that of the European community. In precisely the same m a n n e r Hannibal, w h e n he
urged a general coalition against Rome and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g conduct of the war, was
not representing Carthaginian policy, but he stood for the general f r e e d o m of peo-
ples, that is a balance of power between the Mediterranean countries, and with it
also the future of the Syrian empire and its dynasty. T h e defeat of Carthage in 2 0 2
B . C . and Macedon i n 197 B . C . did not necessarily m e a n R o m a n world domination
any more than Jena and Wagram meant that of the French. Only by virtue of the
fact that the weaker nations never banded t o g e t h e r completely against the most
powerful one did the world power of antiquity attain victory. We should perhaps
not j u d g e King Antiochus too harshly for not understanding his task right away, on
the occasion of first clashing with the Romans; the Czar, too, only saw the subject in
its true light w h e n Moscow was in flames. To see in Hannibal's efforts at the Syrian
court a result of specific Carthaginian policy, however, is just about as justified as
the complaints with which Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau were greeted in 1812
by the wise and the doubting when they tried to w o o the European powers, to the
effect that they were agents of a special interest.
Since Kromayer's work is built completely on general arguments, we can easily
substitute in his writings N a p o l e o n for the n a m e Rome, Alexander for Antiochus,
Stein for Hannibal, Prussia and Austria for Macedonia and Carthage, and then any
doubt over the level of this method of observing events can quickly be eliminated.
Every historian r e m e m b e r s the delightful irony with which T h e o d o r von Bernhardi
presents the political-strategic wisdom of Lieutenant Field Marshal D u k a — p e r h a p s
Kromayer will also espouse the cause of the late Duka a n d on the next "Historians'
Day" (which has already patiently e n d u r e d many such talks) will d e f e n d this gallant
fellow against the malice of Bernhardi as he is now doing for King Antiochus the
Great against the anger of M o m m s e n . But I hasten to mention now, along with this
criticism, the fact that Kromayer, in his work Rome's Struggle for World Hegemony
(Roms Kampf um die Weltherrschaft), has presented in excellent fashion the political re-
lationships of this period.
CONCERNING T H E SARISSA AND T H E INTERVAL BETWEEN FILES

We find the long spear not only a m o n g the Macedonians but also quite often in
the barbarian tribes. X e n o p h o n (Anabasis, 4. 7. 16) recounts that the C h a l y b e s car-
ried spears 15 ells long, and that the Mosynoeci (5. 4. 25) had had spears that were
so l o n g and thick that a man could hardly carry them. T h e Aetolians, too, had
sarissae (Livy 3 8 . 7), and we shall have occasion to find them again a m o n g the Ger-
manic peoples, and finally a m o n g the Swiss and the lansquenets, and in the case of
the latter we shall again observe more exactly the use of this weapon.
Whether the word sarissa always had the m e a n i n g of a l o n g spear or originally
only the idea of "spear" in general, a m o n g the many o t h e r names (dory, lonche
aichme, kontos, xyston, akontion, saunion, hyssos, palton: spear-shaft, spear-head, spear-
point, pike, etc.), as we, of course, also have in G e r m a n Spiess, Speer, Lanze, Pike, Ger,
Gleve, Pinne, is not certain. Strabo 10. 1. 12 (XC 4 4 8 ) says, "For the employment of
spears is twofold: either for hand-to-hand fighting or for throwing, just as the pike
is used for both purposes. T h e latter, of course, can be used for close fighting as
well as for striking from a distance, as can both the sarissa and the javelin."* If this
statement is to be interpreted as meaning that the sarissa could also be used as a
missile, then it can not have been unduly long.
Diodorus (16.3) recounts that it was King Philip II w h o established the Macedo-
nian phalanx. As its unique quality, however, he points out only the tight formation,
not the long spear; but from the tighter formation of the phalanx we can accept the
lengthening of the spear as a necessary consequence. If Philip had given his soldiers
only the closer formation but with Greek arms, it is hard to see what kind of advan-
tage he would have gained. T h e Greeks had such long e x p e r i e n c e with hoplite com-
bat that they certainly had already arrived at the optimal density for this kind of
fighting. If the Macedonians formed up m o r e tightly, that is, too closely for indi-
vidual combat, then their intention must have been focused on a mass, close-order
shock or a passive d e f e n s e , and for those purposes they n e e d e d longer spears than
those of their enemies. We may assume that a spear of up to some 12 to perhaps 14
feet in length can still be manipulated with o n e hand, and it is possible that the
Greeks, too, at times had already used spears of such length. W h e n Cornelius Nepos
describes in Chabrias, Chapter 1, how the Athenian c o m m a n d e r "obnixo genu scuto
projecta hasta impetum excipere hostium docuit" ("instructed his soldiers to receive the at-
tack of the e n e m y with their shields at the knee, their spears held out forward"),
then we certainly must think of a longer spear than the usual hoplite arm of hardly
8 feet in length.
H o w long, however, they actually were made, and particularly at the times of
Philip and Alexander, we cannot say with certainty. Arrian never makes a clear-cut
reference to the sarissa as a long spear, and in his account of the death of Clitus he
uses the word in a sense that excludes the m e a n i n g "long spear." Alexander, he says,
seized, according to o n e account, the lance (logchen) of o n e of the aides-de-camp,
and according to another the sarissa of a sentry, and stabbed Clitus with it. T h e n , as
a few would have it, in despair he leaned the sarissa against the wall in order to
plunge into it himself. B o t h of these actions are hardly feasible with a long spear; an
18-to-21-foot pole is such a generally awkward instrument, o n e n e e d s so m u c h room
to manipulate it, so m u c h time to grasp it correctly at its center of gravity that one
can hardly manage it in a filled banquet hall.
W h e n , shortly before his death, Alexander accepted barbarians in his army, he
gave them, according to Arrian (3. 6. 5) "the spears of the Macedonians in prefer-
e n c e to the javelins of the barbarians."* That the source from which Arrian took this
information d o e s not here use the expression sarissa, but "Macedonian spear" does
not seem to me an indication that the difference between the various types of spears
was very great.
T h e only passage in Arrian that s e e m s to indicate that the sarissa was a long spear
is the description of the m o v i n g up of the phalanx in the battle of Gaugamela (3.
14): "And the Macedonian phalanx in close formation and shivering with sarissae,
had made its advance."* W h e n , however, we read of the infantry in the battle on the
Hydaspes, of which it is specifically said that they were hypaspists (5. 17. 7), "he
[Alexander] gave the signal for the infantry to lock shields, to press together into the
closest possible mass, and to attack as a phalanx,"* then the conclusiveness of the
first passage seems to be annulled. Polybius, in 4. 6 4 . 6 ff., e v e n uses of peltasts the
expressions "to lock shields"* and "to close ranks with their shields."* U n d e r King
Perseus there are, as Kromayer verifies in Antike Schlachtfelder, 2: 3 2 1 , peltasts a r m e d
with sarissae.
Very often (1. 27. 8; 3. 2 3 . 3; 4. 6. 3; 4. 2 8 . 8) Arrian speaks of the "lighter h o p -
lites" ("the l i g h t e r e q u i p p e d of the h o p l i t e s , " "the l i g h t e s t - a r m e d m e n of the
Macedonian phalanx," "choosing from the phalanx the lightest-armed but yet best
equipped men")* or, on the other hand (2. 4. 3), of the heavily armed ("with such
ranks of foot soldiers as were heavily armed").* Since the other differences of ar-
mament within the phalanx cannot, after all, have been so significant, perhaps that
is principally in reference to the shorter, handy spear of the foremost ranks as o p -
posed to the clumsy l o n g spear.
In the battle accounts of Diodorus we find nothing from which we may draw any
information concerning the peculiar character of the sarissa phalanx. In the battle on
the Hydaspes (16. 88) he recounts how the Macedonians with their sarissae felled the
Indian infantry stationed between the elephants. N o w , since we know from Arrian
(see above, the analysis of the battle on the Hydaspes) that there were only hypaspists
present here, and not pezetairoi, o n e c o u l d c o m e to the direct conclusion that the
spears of the hypaspists, too, were called sarissae.
Diodorus (17. 100) describes for us the individual combat between the Athenian
Dioxippos and the Macedonian Korragos. D i o x i p p o s was armed, in the m a n n e r of
Hercules, only with a club. Korragos first threw a lance at him; Dioxippos stepped
aside and avoided it: "Then the former leveled his Macedonian sarissa and charged,
but his o p p o n e n t shattered the sarissa with his club after his attacker got near him."*
Here the sarissa is undoubtedly conceived of as a long spear.
In the manual on plants written by the p h i l o s o p h e r T h e o p h r a s t u s , disciple of
Aristotle, we find the note (3. 12. 2): "The male cornel-cherry tree grows to a max-
imum height of 12 ells, the length of the longest sarissa." T h e o p h r a s t u s died in 287
6
B . C . ; he makes m e n t i o n of historical events as late as the years 307 and 3 0 6 B . C .
Therefore his book was written during the period of the Diadochi, between 3 0 6 and
287 B . C . If the largest sarissa at that time was 18 feet long, we may be permitted to
conclude that at the time of Alexander and Philip it was at any rate no longer than
that. It has not yet been said, however, that even at the time of T h e o p h r a s t u s the
p h a l a n x s o l d i e r s u s e d 1 8 - f o o t - l o n g sarissae. It m i g h t also be possible that the
philosopher had in mind, in speaking of the "longest sarissa," not a field w e a p o n ,
but one used in siege warfare, for the defense of the walls, or on shipboard. T h e
fact that the male cornel-cherry tree (from w h o s e w o o d the knotty "Ziegenhain
canes" are made) actually grows to a m a x i m u m height of 18 feet in those regions
has been confirmed for me by our botanists. T h e o p h r a s t u s proves f o r us, therefore,
that e v e n the closest successors of A l e x a n d e r still did not have the Polybian sarissa
phalanx with 21-foot-long spears.
T h e account Plutarch gives in Philopoemen, Chapter 9, of the introduction of the
sarissa a m o n g the Achaeans is not usable. It appears, according to him, as if the
Achaeans, up to P h i l o p o e m e n , had not had real hoplites at all.
A m o n g the Lacedaemonians, C l e o m e n e s is s u p p o s e d to have introduced the sarissa
(according to Plutarch, Cleomenes, Chapters 11 and 23). In what way they saw an ad-
vantage in this is not stated; the Lacedaemonians can, after all, hardly have f o r m e d
a Polybian phalanx. In the battle of Sellasia it is precisely the Macedonian phalanx
and its armament that are said to have o v e r c o m e C l e o m e n e s (Chapter 28).
T h e t h o r o u g h description that Polybius (18. 2 8 - 3 2 ) gave o f t h e M a c e d o n i a n
p h a l a n x has c a u s e d s o m u c h d i f f i c u l t y b e c a u s e t h e l e n g t h h e g i v e s f o r t h e
sarissa—that is, 16 ells according to the regulations, 14 ells in reality—seemed impos-
sible from a practical viewpoint and because, in the second place, Polybius indicated
both for the R o m a n s and the Macedonians 3 feet of width for each file but claims at
the same time that a legionary occupied twice the width of a phalanx soldier. T h e
answer, which is correct in its main points, is to be found in an article by Rudolf
Schneider in the Philologische Wochenschrift, N o . 2 0 , 15 May 1866, and in the treat-

ment by Dr. E d m u n d Lammert, "Polybius u n d die Römische Taktik," Programm des
Königlichen Gymnasiums zu Leipzig 1889.
As far as the breadth of each file is concerned, it is clear that o n e of the two fig-
ures given by Polybius has to be discarded. Previously it was the c o m m o n tendency
to assume that it was 3 feet for the phalanx soldiers and, for the legionaries, who
n e e d e d room for fighting with the sword, 6 feet. Even Stoffel, in his history of
Caesar, assumes this. Schneider and Lammert have, however, both through objective
observation and critical consideration of all the sources, proved quite clearly that
that is false, and if I m y s e l f earlier raised the objection that with 1½ feet per
man, there was no room left in which to hold the spears, since the man alone, of
course, is about 1½ feet wide, e x p e r i e n c e has taught me that this objection is unjus-
tified. T h e Berlin academic gymnastic societies were so a c c o m m o d a t i n g as to place
t h e m s e l v e s at my d i s p o s i t i o n for a sarissa drill. On the large e x e r c i s e field of
Schönholz we first drew up a phalanx e q u i p p e d completely with poles of some 20
feet in length and a t t e m p t e d to d e t e r m i n e in h o w closed a formation the mass
would still be able to march. It resulted that, with lances couched, m o v e m e n t was
still quite easily possible with each man having s o m e t h i n g less than 2 feet. It is true
that the poles were very difficult to handle, but they were m a d e of quite green,
strong spruce wood. T h e statement that the phalanx soldiers were aligned at 1½-foot
intervals n e e d not be taken, of course, as absolutely accurate mathematically, espe-
cially u n d e r field conditions. But if we should imagine trained m e n and lances of
seasoned wood, we could justifiably state that the f o r m i n g - u p and m o v e m e n t with
1½-foot intervals is quite possible.
T h e e x p e r i m e n t worked particularly well w h e n , following Lammert's proposal, we
armed the foremost ranks not with the full-length spears, but with shorter spears,
graduated by rank. Even the points of the sixth rank still protruded beyond the first
rank, and the entire mass was able to m o v e without difficulty, e v e n at double time.
T h r o u g h this e x p e r i m e n t we also eliminate definitively the contradiction that Sol-
tau raised in conjunction with his essay in Hermes 20: 3 6 2 , against Lammert's article
in the Deutsche Literarische Zeitschrift, Vol. 37, 1890. Soltau interprets the passage
from Polybius as m e a n i n g that the Romans originally lined up with a breadth of 3
feet for each file, but that they left wide intervals between the maniples during the
approach march and then filled them up shortly before the attack by having each
man take an interval of 5 to 6 feet. W h e n Polybius then speaks o n c e again about 3
feet, in this instance, according to Soltau, the man himself is not counted ("a slacken-
ing and a m o v i n g apart.")* According to the passage itself, this explanation would
perhaps not be completely impossible, if we had no further evidence but the writing
of Polybius. But o n e n e e d s only to have taken a g o o d look at such a formation and
to have e x a m i n e d it carefully in order to be convinced that it is completely impossi-
ble, from a practical point of view. A formation with widths of 3 feet per file is al-
ready so generally loose that it is quite out of the question to refer to it as a close
formation; but 6 feet w o u l d hardly permit the existence of even any cohesiveness,
and the m a n e u v e r of taking interval during the approach march in preparation for
the attack would be completely impossible of execution. We may therefore continue
to accept Lammert's interpretation, which was very carefully arrived at with due
consideration given to all the other pertinent passages. A n d Liers, too, in Military
Systems of the Ancients (Kriegswesen der Alten) p. 4 5 , pointed out well that also the de-
scription in T h u c y d i d e s 5. 71 leads to the conclusion of a close formation of the
Greek hoplites.
Lammert is of the o p i n i o n , incidentally, that the contradiction in Polybius' account
is not attributable to that historian, but that the excerpt that we have at hand was
worked over by somebody else. For the details, I refer the reader to this excellent
study.
In o r d e r to answer the objection of Rüstow and Köchly that the sarissae, as de-
scribed by Polybius, could not have been handled, since the center of gravity was too
far forward, Lammert m a d e the assumption that the rear e n d was counterbalanced
with a heavy metal piece, a n d at first that s e e m e d to m e , t o o , quite plausible.
Nevertheless, I have m o v e d away from this o p i n i o n as a result of a comparison with
the weapon that resembles the sarissa m o s t closely—is, in fact, the same thing—the
long pike of the Swiss and the lansquenets. D e m m i n , in The Historical Development of
Military Weapons (Die Kriegswaffen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung), 3d ed., p. 7 7 9 ,
states that these spears were 7 to 8 meters long, "consequently 2 to 3 meters longer
than the 5- to 6-meter-long Macedonian sarissa." T h e s e figures are almost certainly
incorrect. As we know, the sarissa was up to 24 feet long, and therefore m o r e than 7
meters, but there seem to have been no G e r m a n spears of this length. Wendelin
Boheim, on p. 3 1 9 of his Handbook of Weapons (Handbuch der Waffenkunde), gives as
the "average length" of G e r m a n long spears 4.5 meters (15 feet) and as a m a x i m u m
5 meters (not quite 17 feet). As we shall see very shortly, that is once again some-
what too little.
T h e s e old G e r m a n long spears are very rare today, and the Berliner Zeughaus
(Berlin O r d n a n c e M u s e u m ) formerly did not possess a single o n e of them. Director
von Ubisch was kind e n o u g h , however, to secure o n e at my request. Furthermore, I
requested information from the C a r o l i n o - A u g u s t e u m M u s e u m in Salzburg a n d the
Swiss National M u s e u m in Zurich, which have the largest n u m b e r s of long spears,
and have been given information in the most obliging manner by the m a n a g e m e n t s
of both institutions. Finally, I have received strong assistance in my study of wood
types from my local colleague in botany, Privatdozent Dr. Reinhardt.
T h e Berlin long spear is 17 feet long (more than 5 meters); of the 31 spears in
the holdings of Salzburg, the longest o n e is s o m e t h i n g over 17 feet l o n g (515 cen-
timeters); of the 18 spears in Zurich, the 4 longest are somewhat over 18 feet (540
to 544 centimeters). Even t h o u g h this length is still about 3 feet shorter than the
sarissa of 21 feet that, according to Polybius, was actually used, the w e a p o n s are
nevertheless similar e n o u g h to permit our drawing a conclusion.
Now Lammert informs us of a calculation by which a sarissa of seasoned ash w o o d ,
6.5 meters long (about 14 Greek ells or 21 feet), 5 centimeters in diameter below
and 3 centimeters above, would have a w o o d weight of 5.6 kilograms, to which must
be added 2 7 0 grams for an iron point. On such a spear he considers as probable a
counterweight of 2.4 kilograms at the foot.
In like m a n n e r I have had calculations m a d e for pine, ash, and cornel-cherry
wood, all of which agree with Lammert's calculation. T h e specific weight of ash
wood is 0.59, of the best pine w o o d 0.63, and of cornel-cherry 0 . 8 1 . T h e last-named
is, therefore, unusually heavy, but it d o e s not c o m e into consideration for the very
long spears. Pine w o o d varies according to the g r o u n d on which it grew; there are
some useful types that are lighter than ash. It is conjectured that the Greeks, like the
Swiss, grew satisfactory w o o d especially for the making of spears on barren, not too
moist, soil. Ash d o e s not normally grow entirely straight up to this length. Regard-
less of whether the Macedonians actually used ash or pine, the difference is not par-
7
ticularly significant. As far as the strength of the w o o d is c o n c e r n e d , the Berlin
spear has almost no taper at all and an average diameter of about 3.5 centimeters.
T h e Salzburg and Zurich spears are consistently strongest in the middle; the Salz-
burg o n e s have a circumference of 13 centimeters at that point, 8.5 at the foot, and
7.5 at the start of the iron; consequently they have a diameter of somewhat over 4
centimeters at their midpoint. A m o n g the Zurich collection, the strongest o n e is 4
centimeters in the middle, 3.1 at the point, and 3.2 at the foot. B o h e i m (p. 312)
gives the diameter as 4.5 centimeters. T h i s agrees, therefore, on the average with
Lammert's assumption. N o n e of the G e r m a n spears, however, has a counterweight,
not even a sleeve at the foot. Only a n u m b e r of short spears in the Zurich M u s e u m ,
which are attributed to the seventeenth century, have such a weight.
If, t h e r e f o r e , the G e r m a n s were able to h a n d l e their l o n g spears without any
c o u n t e r w e i g h t , w e may b e a l l o w e d t o a s s u m e that t h e M a c e d o n i a n s c o u l d d o
likewise, and the e x p e r i m e n t in S c h ö n h o l z , m e n t i o n e d above, also supports this
point.
In the course of this e x p e r i m e n t , furthermore, I was particularly impressed with
how uncomfortable the l o n g spears were to carry on the march; they caused more
trouble here than w h e n c o u c h e d for the attack.
( A d d e d in the second edition:) I have more recently personally studied the long
spears in Zurich and also in Vienna and have found everything above to be con-
f i r m e d . In like m a n n e r , r e p e a t e d little drills with the s p e a r s of the B e r l i n e r
Zeughaus, which I have had carried out by the participants in my seminar on mili-
tary history, have confirmed the results of the e x p e r i m e n t on the exercise field at
Schönholz.
Nevertheless, Kromayer has o p p o s e d my concept of the R o m a n and Macedonian
phalanxes with o n e differing from it in principle and has d e f e n d e d his in repeated
8
polemics. He interprets the passage from Polybius that was treated above as mean-
ing that the Macedonian phalanx soldiers fought with 3 feet of space each and the
Romans originally with 3 feet also, but that they then o p e n e d up their formation
after the first impact a n d , t h r o u g h a process of m o v i n g forward a n d backward,
fought with an interval of 6 feet. In his opinion, a formation with only 3 feet of
interval d o e s not allow the use of the sword. After the first shock, therefore, the
foremost rank spreads out into a thin chain of skilled individual fighters, which is
the only rank to carry out the active combat, while the m e n of the following ranks
intervene in the fight only by watching for the m o m e n t w h e n they can aim a lance
or a missile at the e n e m i e s through the gaps between their o w n foremost fighters, or
where they can spring forward beside their o w n m e n to protect them by fending off
blows or throwing back an e n e m y w h o has been able to penetrate too far forward,
or w h e n they c a n carry or d r a g back and away f r o m the fray t h e i r d e a d or
w o u n d e d , and finally by replacing those w h o are killed. (Historische Zeitschrift 9 5 : 17).
From time to time the individual fighting of the first rank with an average interval
of 6 feet per man alternates with the m o r e closed massing.
If this concept were correct, we would have in it a scholarly discovery of prime
importance. It is a question here of the very nucleus of ancient infantry tactics, not
of s o m e secondary technical feature.
It is the use of the w e a p o n s in conjunction with the pressure of the mass that con-
stitutes the character of the phalanx in the presentation of this work, and the de-
velopment lies in a gradually improved organization. T h i s picture of the develop-
ment is completely destroyed if Kromayer's theory of the width of the files and the
individual fighting of the first rank is correct, a c o n s e q u e n c e which the author him-
self, of course, did not appreciate, since he specifically agrees, after all, with my ac-
count of the battle of Cannae, which is of course completely based on the concept of
mass pressure. But the fact that the author did not himself recognize the conse-
quences of his idea d o e s not remove their potential impact from an objective view-
point. It is incumbent on us, therefore, not to avoid a t h o r o u g h investigation.
Kromayer's ideas are false and unrealistic for the following reasons:
1. He considers the interval of 6 feet to have b e e n necessary for the R o m a n s be-
cause it would have been impossible to fight with the R o m a n sword without such an
interval. By this theory, t h e n , the Romans would have been deprived of the use of
their w e a p o n s at the first shock, at which m o m e n t Kromayer, too, assumes they had
only 3 feet of interval—a very unusual m a n n e r of o p e n i n g a battle, especially if the
e n e m y were maliciously to form his m e n in such a way as to be able to use their
weapons.
2. T h e 6-foot interval that then results from a spreading out is s u p p o s e d to be
accepted as an "average," since, of course, no exact taking-up of intervals was possi-
ble in the fray. "Average" is a saving expression which is useless here. By this con-
cept, some have too m u c h , others too little. At the spots that are too wide the e n e m y
can penetrate, whereas at those which are too narrow the Roman soldier cannot use
his weapon. For this reason Polybius cannot possibly have been thinking of such an
"average" in his account.
3. T h e greater interval for the fighters of the first rank is supposed to be gained
by having "individual soldiers or several press m o r e deeply into the e n e m y , while at
another place their comrades are p u s h e d back somewhat." O n e w o n d e r s how the
supposedly necessary interval of 6 feet can be assured for the individual in this pro-
cess of pushing into the e n e m y and whether the squeeze resulting from e n e m y con-
tact does not restrict the fighting just as m u c h as that from the neighboring com-
rades in one's o w n line.
4. Least of all can o n e imagine this penetration of individuals into the e n e m y
front in a fight of R o m a n s against a phalanx armed with long spears, the type of
battle about which, after all, Polybius is speaking. For the legionary with his short
sword who has already passed between the l o n g spears is in such close contact with
the pikeman that the latter can no longer d e f e n d himself. Polybius reports to us
specifically that the sarissa front was impenetrable. How can Kromayer believe, then,
that on the average of every 6 feet there was nevertheless a Roman w h o was able to
pass through, drawing from this an estimate of the width of the files on both sides?
5. Kromayer imagines that the Roman warrior launched his blow with his arm
stretched horizontally toward the side. T h a t he would certainly have d o n e only very
seldom, since this kind of blow is very impracticable and ineffective; the most impor-
tant blow moves from rear to front with a bent arm that then stretches forward. We
learn this not only from the m o d e r n art of individual fencing but it is also clearly
indicated in Vegetius 1. 12, where the legionaries are told not to strike but to thrust,
since the latter action is more d a n g e r o u s for the e n e m y "and furthermore, while a
blow is being carried out, the arm and the right side are left uncovered, whereas a
thrust is e x e c u t e d with the body protected." For this thrust, during which the arm is
held close against the body, 3 feet of space are therefore completely sufficient. But
even for a thrust with the arm e x t e n d e d horizontally it is not necessary to have 6
feet, only 4.
6. Every c o m m a n d e r places his soldiers as close together as the manipulation of
their w e a p o n s possibly allows, for the closer they stand, the m o r e w e a p o n s there are
along the front. If it were true that fighters with the Roman sword n e e d e d 6 feet of
room, whereas the old Greek hoplite, for e x a m p l e , with his spear, n e e d e d only 3, it
follows that the sword would have b e e n a completely useless combat w e a p o n . It
would have b e e n possible to have two s p e a r m e n attack each man a r m e d with a
sword, and then no d e g r e e of individual skill w o u l d have h e l p e d the latter; he
would necessarily have succumbed. Consequently, d o i n g battle with the R o m a n short
sword and with the hoplite spear cannot have required any significant difference in
interval.
7. If the R o m a n phalanx had been based not on mass shock action but on the
individual fighting of the first rank, with secondary support from the second and
third ranks, then in a d e e p formation like that at Cannae, at least nine-tenths and
probably nineteen-twentieths of the army would have been practically superfluous.
8. Kromayer seeks to find a certain activity for the mass of Roman warriors to the
extent of picturing a kind of alternation b e t w e e n the individual fighting of the
foremost ranks a n d the pressure of the mass. T h e individual fighting is s u p p o s e d to
start after the first mass impact has e n d e d with a "natural recoil action" a n d the
masses have consequently been shaken up into a somewhat looser formation. T h e n ,
"when the e n e m y at s o m e point or other seems to be about to resume the mass at-
tack," then "the same living h u m a n wall" is s u p p o s e d to "throw itself against him
again, answering blow for blow" (Historische Zeitschrift 95: 17). A n d so the formation
supposedly shifts from closed to o p e n not just o n c e , but continuously. In opposition
to this concept is the fact that such actions, if they occur at all, would only be im-
aginable u n d e r the assumption that both sides e x e c u t e d both actions—taking interval
for individual fighting and pressing together without the possibility of using their
weapons—completely simultaneously, for that side which did not take up wider in-
tervals and carry out individual fighting at all, but went ahead with its mass action
continuously or even just a m o m e n t longer than the e n e m y , would have had the
victory. T h e thin chain of individual fighters at 6-foot intervals would not have been
capable—and Kromayer, too, realizes this—of withstanding, even for a m o m e n t , the
weight of the e n e m y mass with a depth of 10, 20, 3 0 , or perhaps e v e n 60 men. And
if the ranks behind the chain of individual fighters have drawn back, even for only a
very small distance, in o r d e r to give the first rank the necessary room for individual
fighting, how are they to be brought back into forward motion again? In the huge
melee there is neither c o m m a n d nor signal for the entire mass, and even if such a
control did exist, a mass formation that has once fallen back before the e n e m y , even
for only a m o m e n t , while the latter is pushing forward, is for all practical purposes
impossible to set in forward motion again—unless there be special circumstances
s u c h as t h o s e , for i n s t a n c e , in the battle of C a n n a e . In a battle b e t w e e n two
phalanxes, the first step backward is the decisive o n e ; it gives the advancing side a
morale advantage that increases with each passing second and will almost always
lead to victory, unless new forces intervene. Kromayer's concept of a "natural recoil"
is "natural" only for the inferior side, not equally for both o p p o n e n t s , and with this
idea we must also reject the possibility of a constant alternation between a looser and
a tighter formation.
9. For his c o n c e p t of individual fighting in the battle, K r o m a y e r (Historische
Zeitschrift, Vol. 17) relies on a description of the battle of Mutina by Appian in Civil
Wars (Bürgerkriege), 3: 6 8 . But this passage bears no evidence at all in favor of his
hypothesis. It is not a question here of a pitched battle but of three i n d e p e n d e n t
combats by fractions of legions side by side, which were not at all strong e n o u g h for
a true phalanx-type pressure, a n d the situation consequently devolved quite natur-
ally, because of the bravery of the veterans, into toughly fought individual combat
on a massive scale. T h e r e is no question of a repeated shifting between pressure and
individual fighting, and the long individual fight appears to the author so little like
the normal, larger-scale type of combat that, on the contrary, he bases his analogy
on that of wrestlers, who, in o r d e r to catch their breath, m o v e apart for a m o m e n t
and then have at o n e another again.
10. For the assumption that the phalanx soldiers had n e e d e d 3 feet of space (and
consequently, then, the R o m a n s 6 feet), Kromayer d e p e n d e d on the customs of the
Swiss and the lansquenets (Antike Schlachtfelder 1: 3 2 3 , a n d Historische Zeitschrift 95:
18). To the fourth v o l u m e of this work (Book II, Chapter III), I have a d d e d a spe-
cial investigation, from which it results that the cited passages provide no valid
proof. For o u r question, it is apparent that there is nothing at all to be c o n c l u d e d
from t h e m . T h e phalanx formation that Polybius contrasts with the Roman o n e is,
of course, not to be construed as the old Greek o n e or the Macedonian, but as a
formation whose tightness was brought artificially to its highest d e g r e e in that very
period and not earlier, and which did not prove itself. It is therefore not at all sur-
prising that the Swiss and lansquenets had a looser formation; even in their cases,
however, the close formation is also to be found
11. Kromayer takes as an e x a m p l e a situation where two phalanxes in close for-
mation are fighting against each other and derives therefrom the impossibility of
this whole tactical picture, since the two masses, capable only of pushing forward
and not able to parry and to fight individually, would have skewered each other. It
is very doubtful that two such phalanxes ever actually stood o p p o s e d to each other.
If it h a p p e n e d , or if it were to happen, then the various ranks, unable to do much
individual fighting, would indeed have pressed into each other's spears, or would
have been pressed into them by the following ranks as they pushed forward. T h e
foremost ranks, which had the shorter spears, might, it is true, have retained a cer-
tain possibility to parry, but it was very limited u n d e r any circumstances. T h i s is no
reason, however, for rejecting the whole concept. Even in this m a n n e r the stronger
and m o r e d e t e r m i n e d side c o u l d win, and necessarily w o u l d have. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
there has been specifically reported to us and confirmed in the writings of the tacti-
cians (Asclepiodotus, Chapter 4) a formation with 1½ feet of interval, consequently
without any possibility of actual individual combat, used for defense. Naturally it is
conceivable only in the case of troops armed with the long spear, which, held for-
ward in a mass formation, forms a defense, whereas not only the sword but also the
short spear would be almost useless without room for manipulation.
12. Finally, I include the fact that we have in Vegetius (3. 14) the definite proof
that the Romans fought with 3 feet of interval, because with such a formation the
battle line was uninterrupted and also it provided e n o u g h room for the use of the
weapons ("Singuli autem armati in directum ternos p e d e s inter se occupare consuev-
erunt, hoc est in mille passibus mille sescenti sexaginta sex pedites ordinantur in
longum, ut nec acies interluceat et spatium sit arma tractandi." ["Each and every
armed man was accustomed to occupy 3 feet of space in the rank—that is, in the
space of 1,000 paces 6 6 6 infantrymen were drawn u p , so that the line itself could
not be seen t h r o u g h and so that there w o u l d be e n o u g h r o o m to brandish the
weapons"]). T h e r e f o r e I trust that I may be allowed now to consider as disproven
once and for all the concept that Kromayer has put forth with the greatest certainty.
Kromayef's idea of the spreading out of the legion's front into a thin chain of
individual fighters b e c o m e s all the m o r e fantastic w h e n we later see that he e s p o u s e s
elsewhere (Antike Schlachtfelder, 2: 83) the theory of Veith, according to which the
Romans maintained wide intervals between the maniples (and cohorts), not only dur-
ing the approach march but also d u r i n g the battle. T h e battle line of legionaries,
which otherwise already resembles a very thin line of skirmishers, is now, therefore,
still much more weakly m a n n e d , since at repeated intervals that are generally as
long as the front of the fighters itself, there are no fighters at all. In these small
scattered g r o u p s , e v e n in the few m o m e n t s of initial shock action a d m i t t e d by
Kromayer, there can no longer be any question of pressure exerted by the mass.
It appears doubtful whether Kromayer u n d e r s t o o d that Veith's theory of the in-
tervals in battle and his o w n concerning the width of the files combined algebraically
in thinning the line and thereby completely nullify each other. It is also questionable
whether it was consciously or unconsciously that he d r o p p e d this theory in the sec-
ond volume of his Antike Schlachtf elder and a d o p t e d another one. For in the latter
case (p. 83) he speaks of the "custom" of the R o m a n s "to give way a little at the start
of the battle and then, t h r o u g h the t o u g h n e s s of their opposition, first to disabuse
the o n c o m i n g e n e m y of his illusion of victory, then to wear him d o w n , and finally to
overpower him." Instead of the "natural recoil" of the older theory, which was sup-
posed to occur in the same way on both sides in order to make room for the indi-
vidual fighters, there has now appeared "a custom" only on the Roman side. It is
obvious that this new theory is just as impossible as the old o n e , for if the R o m a n s
really had intentionally drawn back a short distance after the first clash and had left
only the loose chain of individual fighters in direct contact with the e n e m y , it is clear
that this loose chain could not have withstood the mass pressure of the e n e m y for a
single m o m e n t . Kromayer himself realized that earlier, for in Historische Zeitschrift
95: 17, he states as the mission of the rearward ranks of the phalanx "when the
e n e m y at s o m e point or other s e e m s to be about to resume the mass attack, to o p -
pose him at o n c e with the same living h u m a n wall, answering blow for blow."
It s e e m s remarkable that R u d o l f S c h n e i d e r , in the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen
169: 4 4 5 , explains that the question of the interval is still an unsolved problem for
him, since the phalanx soldier cannot get along with 1½ feet but can w h e n he is
given 3 feet, whereas the double, 6 feet, is apparently too m u c h for the legionary.
Why didn't he simply assemble 100 students, arm them with h o p poles, and form a
phalanx? W h o e v e r has o n c e seen and measured such a phalanx is immediately re-
lieved of any further tortures of doubt c o n c e r n i n g the interval between files. Scho-
lars are remarkable people. H e r e for o n c e we have the rare opportunity of solving a
historical problem through a very simple e x p e r i m e n t ; why doesn't o n e do it?
Kromayer seems to have been influenced toward his shift of concept from the
"natural recoil" to a simple special "custom" of the Romans by having b e c o m e aware
later of the account of the battle between the Romans and the Gauls in 2 2 3 B . C . , for
he supports the new theory with the following note: "This is how Polybius, in 2. 3 3 .
7, describes the m a n n e r of fighting of the Romans in an observation that is of the
utmost importance for their tactics. Flaminius," he says, "in a battle with the Gauls,
m a d e the Roman's peculiar style of fighting impossible by using a formation that
allowed no falling back ('ruined the tactic that was peculiar to the R o m a n s by not
leaving the cohorts room e n o u g h to fall back by foot, maniple by maniple')." T h e
passage, however, continues: "For if it h a p p e n e d that the m e n were pushed back
e v e n the slightest distance d u r i n g the battle, it would have been necessary for them
to hurl themselves into the river, because of their general's error."* T h e sense of the
passage, therefore, is that it was the Romans' custom, even in a battle that was going
poorly for them, not to flee, but only to withdraw step by step, but that Flaminius,
by drawing up the army with its rear on a river, had made such a withdrawal impos-
sible. If the Romans had had to draw back even a small distance, they would already
have fallen into the river, would consequently have b e c o m e disordered, and would
inevitably have suffered a c o m p l e t e defeat. T h i s passage d o e s not contain the slight-
est new information concerning any special tactics of the Romans.
1. Polybius 18. 28.

2. It was already u n d e r s t o o d in this way by J o h a n n von Nassau
a n d Montecucoli. Jähns I: 5 7 3 . Montecucoli, Writings (Schriften) 2:
225.
3. See also in this connection Livy 3 3 . 18.
4. Polybius 18. 28.
5. In the second v o l u m e of his Antike Schlachtfelder, K r o m a y e r has
placed the battle s o m e w h a t differently t h a n was earlier the case;
n o t h i n g new has r e s u l t e d from this c h a n g e insofar as the actual
events a r e c o n c e r n e d . W h e t h e r his account of t h e strategic relation-
ships of the e n t i r e war, which a r e t r e a t e d very t h o r o u g h l y on t h e
basis of specialized t o p o g r a p h i c a l research, is to t h e point, I have
not verified in detail.
6. Zeller, History of Philosophy (Geschichte der Philosophie) Vol 2, Part
2, p . 640.
7. In B l ü m n e r , Technology and Terminology of Arts and Crafts among
the Greeks and Romans (Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und
Künste bei den Griechen und Römern), 2: 2 5 2 , 2 6 3 , 2 8 5 , 289, source
passages a r e cited that indicate spears (and javelins) also m a d e of
b e e c h , oak, s t o n e - p i n e , a n d yew. S t r a n g e l y e n o u g h , t h e r e i s n o
m e n t i o n of t h e use of p i n e for spears, b u t fir is cited on p. 289.
C o n c e r n i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e various w o o d s in Ancient G r e e c e ,
see N e u m a n n a n d Partsch, Physical Geography of Greece (Physikalische
Geographie von Griechenland), p p . 365 ff.
8. "Comparative Studies of the History of Greek and R o m a n

Military S y s t e m s " ( " V e r g l e i c h e n d e S t u d i e n z u r G e s c h i c h t e d e s
griechischen u n d römischen H e e r w e s e n s , " ) Hermes, Vol. 35, Book
2. A n s w e r e d by me in History of the Art of War (Geschichte der
Kriegskunst), 2: 16 (not r e p e a t e d in this edition). K r o m a y e r , Ancient
Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) 1: 321 ff. In reply, " T h e o l o g i c a l
Philology" ("Theologische Philologie,") Preussische Jahrbücher, 116,
(May 1905): 2 0 9 ff. K r o m a y e r , " T r u e a n d False Objective Analysis"
("Wahre u n d falsche Sachkritik,") Historische Zeitschrift, 95 (1905): 1
ff. A n s w e r e d by me in Preussische Jahrbücher, 121 (July 1905): 158
ff.
Chapter II
The Professional Army:

Cohort Tactics
T h e military forces of t h e R o m a n s that h a d b e e n f o r m e d in the
Second Punic W a r h a d sufficed to c o n q u e r the Eastern p o w e r s ; two
of these, M a c e d o n a n d Syria, w e r e defeated, a n d t h e third, Egypt,
as well as most of t h e smaller c o u n t r i e s , voluntarily allied t h e m -
selves with t h e R o m a n s a n d a s s u m e d s u b o r d i n a t e roles. F r o m now
on t h e r e was no o t h e r c o u n t r y t h a t could have t a k e n t h e offensive
against Rome. But the g r a d u a l c o n s u m m a t i o n of direct R o m a n
world h e g e m o n y c o n t i n u e d to necessitate smaller a n d larger wars,
in which the military t r a d i t i o n was m a i n t a i n e d a n d e x t e n d e d . Fight-
ing went on against t h e Gauls in u p p e r Italy a n d in Spain; Mace-
d o n was f i n i s h e d off; G r e e c e was k e p t i n c h e c k , C a r t h a g e d e -
stroyed, a n d war c a r r i e d on with a N u m i d i a n king. It often h a p -
p e n e d that only after initial defeats a n d a long p e r i o d of alternat-
ing f o r t u n e s did t h e R o m a n s finally win t h e u p p e r h a n d in these
wars. T h e new military system, as c r e a t e d by Scipio, since it h a d
o v e r c o m e H a n n i b a l , w o u l d easily have subjected t h e orbis terrarum,
if it could have b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d as an o r g a n i c institution into t h e
b o d y of t h e R o m a n Republic. But, as we have seen, it stood as a
basic contradiction to t h e Republic, a n d from now on R o m a n mili-
tary history, a n d with it R o m a n history in g e n e r a l , m o v e d within the
f r a m e w o r k o f this i n n a t e c o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h e old constitution, b y
which t h e two m a y o r s for t h e year c o m m a n d e d t h e a r m i e s a n d the
legions w e r e levied a c c o r d i n g to n e e d from t h e citizenry a n d t h e n
again dissolved, still existed, but if it h a d b e e n applied literally, it
could n e i t h e r have fulfilled t h e missions of R o m a n policy n o r could
it h a v e b e e n tolerated. A system of universal military service c a n n o t
be a p p l i e d to a c o n t i n u o u s state of war such as R o m e now h a d to
m a i n t a i n , a n d the soldiers w h o h a d to Fight in Spain a n d in Asia, in
412
The Professional Army: Cohort Tactics 413
Africa a n d on t h e Alps, could not be citizens at t h e same time. It

can be estimated t h a t u n d e r t h e legal universal military obligation
only about a t e n t h of the service-qualified R o m a n y o u t h actually
1
served, b u t these gradually divested themselves m o r e a n d m o r e o f
the aspect of citizen a n d f o r m e d a real soldiery. T h i s professional
w a r r i o r h o o d h a d now b e c o m e , in effect, a fact, but it was not a
constitutional institution, a n d consequently t h e m a c h i n e functioned
with the most p r o n o u n c e d lack of regularity. T h e citizen a r m y time
and again infringed on t h e professional soldiery, especially in t h e
high c o m m a n d .
T h e y were, nevertheless, victorious, since with the gigantic
materiel superiority of R o m e over all the o t h e r nations occasional
defeats a n d r a t h e r l o n g - d r a w n - o u t c a m p a i g n s caused little d a m a g e
a n d the body of professionally t r a i n e d w a r r i o r s — g e n e r a l s , officers,
soldiers—remained large e n o u g h so that, finally, as soon as a really
c o m p e t e n t m a n took the situation in h a n d , a useful a r m y could be
organized a n d a decisive blow c a r r i e d t h r o u g h .
In the t h i r d century, d u r i n g the Punic W a r s , we may a s s u m e that
a third of the free inhabitants of Italy possessed R o m a n citizenship.
If, t h e r e f o r e , the R o m a n s c o m p r i s e d t h e s o m e w h a t smaller half of
the land a r m y , the socii (allies) t h e larger half, a n d the socii navales
(naval allies) the principal c o n t i n g e n t for t h e fleet, the military o b -
ligation was q u i t e evenly distributed. D u r i n g the Second Punic War,
however, the R o m a n s themselves h a d h a d to carry the p r i n c i p a l
b u r d e n , since a p o r t i o n of t h e allies defected a n d a n o t h e r p o r t i o n
became quite lax in r e p o r t i n g for service. So after the victory the
R o m a n s i n d u c t e d the allies all the m o r e frequently; now t h e smal-
ler p a r t of t h e a r m y by far consisted of citizens. Recruiting was car-
r i e d o u t i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , t o o , a n d all k i n d s o f m e r c e n a r i e s
— N u m i d i a n s , Balearics, Gauls, Iberians, C r e t a n s — w e r e t a k e n into
the service, while the G r e e k allies w e r e called on to furnish a u x -
iliaries. T h e truly R o m a n a r m y was as a rule only 4 legions s t r o n g ,
or some 18,000 to 20,000 m e n . W i t h all t h e contingents, however,
the Republic h a d some 50,000 m e n r a t h e r constantly u n d e r a r m s ,
whose n u m b e r was increased from time to time, w h e n e v e r an u p r i s -
ing b r o k e o u t in Spain or it was necessary for the p u r p o s e of sub-
d u i n g C a r t h a g e while fighting at t h e s a m e t i m e in M a c e d o n a n d
Greece.
T h e R e p u b l i c was faced with a s o m e w h a t m o r e difficult test
when a new b a r b a r i a n e n e m y a p p e a r e d on the b o r d e r and
t h r e a t e n e d to i n v a d e Italy—the G e r m a n i c tribes. T h e R o m a n s suf-
fered a series of defeats (113 B . C . , u n d e r Papirus Carbo, in
N o r i c u m ; 109 B . C . , u n d e r M . J u n i u s S i l a n u s , a g a i n s t t h e Allo-
broges; 107 B.C., u n d e r L. Cassius, on t h e u p p e r G a r o n n e ; a n d 105
B.C., u n d e r Mallius M a x i m u s , Caepio, a n d Aurelius Scaurus, n e a r
Arausio), until finally C. Marius, with a newly f o r m e d a r m y , de-
feated a n d d e s t r o y e d the T e u t o n e s a n d A m b r o n e s n e a r A q u a e Sex-
tiae in 102 B . C . , a n d t h e C i m b r i a n d T i g u r i n i n e a r Vercellae in
101 B . C . W e can realize h o w g r e a t t h e R o m a n s ' fear h a d b e e n
t h r o u g h the g r e a t fame a n d the position that Marius won t h r o u g h
his victory. For six consecutive times t h e p e o p l e h a d elected him, a
n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officer who h a d w o r k e d his way u p , as consul,
a n d after the victory he was hailed as t h e t h i r d f o u n d e r of R o m e ,
but all the details of the w a r that have b e e n r e p o r t e d t u r n out on
closer e x a m i n a t i o n to be g u a r d h o u s e stories a n d n o n c o m s ' gossip,
so that n o t h i n g of value for military history is to be derived from
t h e m . T h e w a r is very i m p o r t a n t for us, however, in that it m a r k e d
t h e g r a d u a l l y a c h i e v e d shift of the R o m a n a r m y f r o m a citizen
a r m y into a professional a r m y , b r i n g i n g formal a t t a i n m e n t of a new
o r g a n i z a t i o n . A l t h o u g h it is t r u e t h a t e v e n this p o i n t h a s b e e n
h a n d e d d o w n to us directly only in p a r t , nevertheless all indications
point to the fact t h a t Marius was the c r e a t o r of the organization
2
that we later see m o r e clearly.
T h e division of t h e legions into the t h r e e y e a r - g r o u p s , hastati,
principes, a n d triarii, m u s t already have b e c o m e a p u r e formality by
the time of the Second Punic W a r . T h e two legiones urbanae, which
were f o r m e d a n e w year after year, m u s t have consisted almost en-
tirely of y o u n g m e n w h o h a d j u s t r e a c h e d the age of service qual-
ification, a n d the triarii in these legions w e r e probably soldiers of
j u s t as little e x p e r i e n c e as the Y o u n g G u a r d of N a p o l e o n in 1814,
3
which consisted o f n o t h i n g b u t r e c r u i t s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n the
o l d e r R o m a n legions even the hastati w e r e no l o n g e r so very y o u n g ;
in fact, in t h e legions of C a n n a e that w e r e still fighting at N a r a g -
gara, even t h e y o u n g e s t m u s t have b e e n considerably o l d e r t h a n
the famous " g r u m b l e r s , " the O l d G u a r d o f N a p o l e o n .
Even t h e sense of t h e g r o u p i n g by age, t h e s p a r i n g of the o l d e r
y e a r - g r o u p s , h a d d i s a p p e a r e d since the units h a d b e c o m e echelons.
Since the triarii, w h o h a d s u p p o s e d l y b e e n favored, were now freely
o r d e r e d from the r e a r echelon to a flank or to face a b o u t to the
r e a r or to a d e t a c h e d force, it was possible that they might well be
sent to spots that w e r e t h r e a t e n e d with the greatest d a n g e r s a n d
t h e highest losses.
If t h e a r r a n g e m e n t in a triple f o r m a t i o n nevertheless r e m a i n e d
in force for a h u n d r e d years longer, t h a t can be explained by t h e

4
natural stability of any existing o r g a n i z a t i o n .
T h e d o u b l e role of t h e veliti, as supply train drivers a n d orderlies
on the o n e h a n d a n d light i n f a n t r y m e n on the o t h e r , was p e r h a p s
already modified, as we have seen, in the Second Punic War.
Marius now did away with all these distinctions. T h e train d r i v e r s
a n d orderlies w e r e no l o n g e r c o u n t e d at all as combatants a n d w e r e
5
r e m o v e d from t h e legion. Light infantry service was now assigned
completely to a special corps of a r c h e r s a n d slingers. T h e legion
was m a d e u p o f u n i f o r m l y a r m e d a n d e q u i p p e d h o p l i t e s . T h e
n u m b e r o f m a n i p l e s r e m a i n e d t h e s a m e , b u t e a c h m a n i p l e was
b r o u g h t uniformly to a s t r e n g t h of 200 m e n a n d every 3 m a n i p l e s
were g r o u p e d as a cohort.
T h e c o h o r t of 600 m e n , which t h e r e f o r e resembled to s o m e ex-
tent a m o d e r n battalion, f o r m e d the basic tactical unit from now
6
on. T h e legion h a d 1 0 cohorts, o r 6,000 m e n .
T h e new f o r m a t i o n was based on the past to the e x t e n t that a
c o h o r t of 3 m a n i p l e s a l r e a d y existed. T h e c o n t i n g e n t s of allies,
which of course w e r e not able to form e n t i r e legions b u t otherwise
h a d to have the same organization as the R o m a n s , h a d always b e e n
7
called c o h o r t s a n d w e r e divided into hastati, principes, a n d triarii.
But these c o h o r t s h a d no tactical significance. In c a m p they w e r e
p r e s u m a b l y c o m b i n e d into legions, a n d i n battle f o r m a t i o n they
were d e p l o y e d to the extent t h a t t h e hastati moved into the first
echelon, the principes a n d triarii into t h e second a n d t h i r d echelons,
respectively. T h e cohorts of Marius a r e s o m e t h i n g completely dif-
ferent. T h e y r e m a i n together, f o r m i n g a single, all-important tacti-
cal body.
T h e m a n i p l e s that were in existence up to this point still did not
form a tactical unit; they w e r e too small for that. T h e y d i d n o t
have any t r u e i n d e p e n d e n c e ; even if it may have h a p p e n e d in indi-
vidual cases t h a t a single m a n i p l e or several of t h e m t o g e t h e r m a d e
i n d e p e n d e n t m o v e m e n t s or c a r r i e d o u t an isolated action, it was, as
a rule, the e n t i r e echelon or a definite p a r t of the echelon that was
e x e c u t i n g t h e action. T h e old m a n i p l e h a d a s t r e n g t h of only 60, or
120, or at the most 150 m e n ; the new c o h o r t has 600. T h i s unit,
t h o r o u g h l y drilled, could now e x e c u t e any m o v e m e n t a n d a s s u m e
any form that was o r d e r e d . T h e echelons were f o r m e d by c o h o r t s .
T h e c o m m a n d e r could o r d e r t h e a r m y to form up in 1, 2, 3, or 4
echelons. H e could make o n e echelon s t r o n g e r , the o t h e r weaker.
H e could f o r m a n a n g l e d flanking u n i t o r have the cohorts f o r m
back-to-back, c r e a t i n g a d o u b l e front. He could have any cohort

m o v e o u t f r o m t h e place it was o c c u p y i n g a n d take position in
a n o t h e r location.
T h e legion c o n t i n u e d t o b e a n administrative unit; the original
tactical u n i t was the entire p h a l a n x , w h e t h e r it consisted of one or
several legions. In g e n e r a l , t h e G r e e k s a n d M a c e d o n i a n s retained
t h e p h a l a n x a s t h e tactical unit. T h e R o m a n s first p r o v i d e d the
p h a l a n x with joints, t h e n divided it into echelons, a n d finally broke
it up into a n u m b e r of small tactical units that w e r e capable now of
d r a w i n g t o g e t h e r into a c o m p a c t , i m p e n e t r a b l e unit, on a n o t h e r oc-
casion of c h a n g i n g f o r m a t i o n with c o m p l e t e flexibility, dividing up,
t u r n i n g t o w a r d o n e side o r t h e o t h e r . H o w anxiously t h e old Greek
hoplite p h a l a n x h a d to r e m a i n on g u a r d against a possible flank at-
tack, especially o n e by cavalry! After the time of Marius the Roman
c o m m a n d e r could o r d e r a few cohorts to take over the mission of
flank p r o t e c t i o n a n d could feel that he was s e c u r e . H o w simple
such an a r r a n g e m e n t a p p e a r s , b u t to m a k e this simple thing
p o s s i b l e — t h e f o r m a t i o n o f small m a s s e s t h a t h e l d t o g e t h e r s o
firmly that they f o r m e d tactical units—was u n e n d i n g l y difficult. It
r e q u i r e d a d e v e l o p m e n t over h u n d r e d s o f years a n d t h e R o m a n
discipline as well. O n l y this one nation of antiquity really succeeded
in this, a n d in d o i n g so it won h e g e m o n y over all t h e o t h e r s .
First it was discovered that a g r o u p of individual w a r r i o r s fought
with the greatest effect w h e n they j o i n e d t o g e t h e r in a unified a n d
effective mass. B u t this mass was slow a n d a w k w a r d a n d highly sen-
sitive on its flanks a n d r e a r . T h e majority of w e a p o n s in t h e mass
could not be b r o u g h t into play.
But in o r d e r to establish in t h e place of o n e large mass a n u m b e r
of small g r o u p s that could c o m p e n s a t e for t h e i r weakness by help-
i n g each o t h e r mutually, t h e r e was n e e d e d a new power, military
discipline, which b o u n d a n u m b e r of individual fighters into a unit
spiritually s t r o n g e r t h a n the s u m of its p a r t s , controlled by one will,
s t a n d i n g fast, so t h a t even the soul-shaking e x c i t e m e n t , the melee,
t h e noise, t h e fear, t h e d a n g e r of d e a t h in t h e b a t t l e — n o n e of these
things could b r e a k i t u p . T h e c o h o r t r e m a i n e d f i r m l y u n d e r t h e
c o n t r o l of its l e a d e r , a n d the leaders followed t h e o r d e r s of the
8
army commander.
T h e c o h o r t tactics m a r k e d t h e a p o g e e o f the d e v e l o p m e n t which
t h e fighting skill of a n c i e n t infantry could r e a c h . T h e task of the
artist, the c o m m a n d e r , from now on was n o t to find new forma-
tions, b u t to perfect a n d to use those he f o u n d already in existence.
T h e p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e c o h o r t tactics was t h e professional a r m y ,
which h a d now r e p l a c e d the citizen a r m y .
Up to the time of Marius the old f o r m s of levying the a r m y seem
to have b e e n m a i n t a i n e d , even t h o u g h t h e system h a d long since
changed. T h e o r i g i n a l g e n e r a l military o b l i g a t i o n h a d b e e n a d -
ministered in a very mild way e v e r since l o n g before the Second
Punic War. D u r i n g that war it h a d o n c e again functioned with the
greatest strictness a n d on the b r o a d e s t scope. F r o m that time o n , it
became obsolete. T h e a r m i e s that R o m e was p u t t i n g into t h e f i e l d
were so small with relation to t h e n u m b e r of citizens that only a
few y e a r - g r o u p s w o u l d have sufficed to fill t h e m . B u t instead of
repeatedly i n d u c t i n g a n d t r a i n i n g new r e c r u i t s , for t h e sake o f
equal justice, it was preferable to take e x p e r i e n c e d w a r r i o r s , even if
they showed little inclination in t h a t direction. Pay, booty, a n d gifts
associated with t r i u m p h s w e r e s o a b u n d a n t , h o w e v e r , t h a t often
many m e n enlisted voluntarily. W h e n the war against Perseus of
Macedon b r o k e o u t , according to Livy (42. 32), m a n y old soldiers
r e p o r t e d voluntarily for service, since they saw that those w h o h a d
previously b e e n in the field against Philip a n d A n t i o c h u s h a d be-
come rich. Theoretically the g e n e r a l military obligation r e m a i n e d in
force a n d was also u s e d from t i m e to t i m e e i t h e r by h a v i n g t h e
draftable m e n d r a w lots, o r t h r o u g h t h e m o r e o r less a r b i t r a r y
drafting of individuals by the a u t h o r i t i e s . We may a s s u m e that in
the lottery t h o s e w h o s e n a m e s w e r e d r a w n w e r e n o t p r e v e n t e d
from a r r a n g i n g for a suitable substitute, a n d with a system of dis-
cretionary d e s i g n a t i o n by the authorities, t h e well-to-do, w h o w e r e
h a r d to s p a r e from the c o n d u c t of t h e i r business, w e r e favored or
were able to escape service t h r o u g h bribery. To what a large e x t e n t
the concept of service obligation h a d already b e e n w e a k e n e d in t h e
second c e n t u r y B . C . can be r e c o g n i z e d particularly from t h e fact
that t h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s r e p o r t s to the effect that recruits could
not b e a s s e m b l e d for c a m p a i g n s t h a t w e r e d a n g e r o u s a n d gave
promise of little booty. T h e m e n w h o w e r e called up h a d all kinds
of excuses for e s c a p i n g i n d u c t i o n , a n d t h e r e was a g e n e r a l hesi-
tancy to delve into their reasons. Finally, however, t h e r e was n o t h -
9
ing else to do b u t attack t h e p r o b l e m s q u a r e l y .
R e p e a t e d efforts w e r e m a d e to b r i n g a certain d e g r e e of o r d e r
into this system of administrative arbitrariness. A l t h o u g h we r e a d
in Polybius of t h e d e c r e e t h a t the R o m a n citizen was obligated to
accomplish 16 c a m p a i g n s , a n d even 20 in case of necessity, at o n e
place in A p p i a n we find t h e observation t h a t w h o e v e r h a d partici-
p a t e d in 6 c a m p a i g n s was justified in d e m a n d i n g his d i s c h a r g e . It
a p p e a r s that Caius G r a c c h u s r e n e w e d these kinds of limitations on
service or instituted still o t h e r s , all of which, however, h a d to be
r e m o v e d w h e n t h e C i m b r i a n invasion c r e a t e d panic i n R o m e a n d
the nation was not able to dispense with the services of its tried and
10
t h o r o u g h l y t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s . T o b r i n g t r u e system a n d d e p e n d a b l e
o r d e r into a levy that d e m a n d s unlimited justice b u t has only a lim-
ited n e e d is impossible; we shall see this illustrated later in the
case of Frederick William I of Prussia. T h e military principle of
h a v i n g m e n o f l o n g s e r v i c e n a t u r a l l y always o v e r s h a d o w s the
h u m a n e o n e , which, for the sake of fairness, would divide the bur-
d e n m o r e or less evenly, a n d the inclination to r e m a i n completely
in military status s h o w n by m a n y soldiers w h o have b e c o m e es-
t r a n g e d from civil life t h r o u g h long service favors this tendency.
T h u s t h e r e d e v e l o p e d a contradiction of form a n d content, a pecu-
liar c a r i c a t u r e of a levy that was actually c o m p o s e d of administrative
arbitrariness a n d free recruiting, or " s h a n g h a i i n g , " as it is called in
English naval history. If the consuls a p p l i e d t h e formal law too
strictly, t h e citizens felt that that was t y r a n n y , a n d they called on
the people's t r i b u n e s for h e l p . Livy r e p o r t s on two different occa-
sions, for the y e a r 150 B.C. a n d for 138 B.C. (Epitome, C h a p t e r s 48
a n d 55), cases of such controversies w h e r e t h e people's t r i b u n e s
threw the consuls into prison. Marius now e n d e d all the antiquated
f o r m s a n d e s t a b l i s h e d a d i r e c t system o f r e c r u i t i n g . T h e m o r e
capitalism a n d slavery t e n d e d to g r i n d d o w n b e t w e e n t h e m the old
m i d d l e class a n d p e a s a n t classes, the m o r e material Italy p r o v i d e d
for the recruiting officer, a n d Marius supposedly did not even hesi-
11
tate to enlist slaves. Even t h e n the g e n e r a l military service obliga-
tion was in no way r e m o v e d legally, a n d later it again f o r m e d the
basis for levies, b u t j u s t as the a r m y o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d already long
b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by its m e r c e n a r y aspect, f r o m now on it also
h a d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g forms.
B e c a u s e of t h e g r a n t i n g of citizenship a few years later to all
Italians, the difference between the truly R o m a n legions a n d those
of the allies, too, was r e m o v e d . T h i s difference, of course, h a d al-
ways b e e n only a political, not a military o n e , s o m e w h a t like the
t r o o p s of t h e R h i n e Alliance, Italians, a n d Swiss in t h e a r m y of
N a p o l e o n . T h e r e was no significant difference in organization or
c o m b a t techniques. T h e auxilia (auxiliary troops), which a p p e a r e d
in the R o m a n a r m i e s after the e n d of t h e Second Punic W a r , w e r e
of a different kind; they w e r e special b r a n c h e s of t r o o p s , like arch-
e r s a n d s l i n g e r s , o r b a r b a r i a n s classified b y t r i b a l t y p e s . T h e
cavalry, especially, consisted exclusively of such elements.
EXCURSUS
1. My concept of the history of the R o m a n military obligation differs in important

aspects from that c o m m o n l y held up to the present. W h e r e a s I have taken as a point

of departure that this obligation was absolutely general in the strictest sense in the
small original canton, the prevailing concept holds that the obligation only spread on
a gradual basis and finally became general at the time of the Punic Wars. Whereas
originally all who possessed less than 12,500 (or 1 1,000) asses had been e x e m p t from
service, according to this concept, the limit was later lowered to 4 , 0 0 0 asses or even
less for army duty, and the lowest stratum was conscripted for sea duty. In my opin-
ion, since the military obligation was already general before this time, the introduc-
tion of sea duty did not constitute a new obligation, previously nonexistent, which
was initiated for the poorer m e n , but quite the contrary: there was created a saving
condition for the well-to-do. W h o e v e r had a fortune of m o r e than 4,000 asses was
liable for the draft only for land duty and not as a ship's crew member. In no way,
however, did this m e a n that the lower classes were e x e m p t e d from army duty. T h i s
point follows definitely from the fact that there were even formed after Cannae two
legions of slaves. T h e y would certainly not have resorted to this e x t r e m e e x p e d i e n t
if there had still been available a whole class of citizens that could have been levied.
In that case they would, after all, have preferred to give the equipment to the citi-
zens and to assign the slaves as oarsmen. T h e words of Polybius (4. 17. 1-3) con-
form very well to this concept. He says that everybody had a service obligation up to
the age of forty-six, "with the exception of those men whose worth is assessed at less
than 4 0 0 drachmas; all of these m e n are used in naval service."* In the second cen-
tury, at the time Polybius wrote those words, Rome n e e d e d only a part, usually only
a rather small part, of the service-obligated men. For army service, it is probable
that in most cases volunteers would suffice to fill the positions. T h e wealthy classes
were spared, or they were able to obtain favor for themselves. For the very u n p o p u -
12
lar seaman's and oarsman's service, the levy had to be stricter. For this service,
therefore, it was principally the proletarians that were selected. T h e limit of 4 0 0
drachmas (4,000 asses) given by Polybius, presumably was not based on the law but
was an administrative measure, a senate decree that was modified according to the
circumstances. A n d so it will h a p p e n that, whereas Polybius names 4,000 as the limit,
Gellius closes the class of proletarians and capite censi (those reckoned by the head)
with 1,500 and 3 7 5 asses. T h a t the aerarius (citizen of the lowest class) had a military
obligation in the period of the Second Punic War, as M o m m s e n had already cor-
rectly realized (Staatsrecht, 3: 252), is also directly proved by several accounts in Livy
(24. 18; 27. 11; and 29. 37). T h e s e accounts are completely convincing and they
necessarily eliminate the last possible doubt. It w o u l d be entirely impossible for us to
be told how people were classified as aerarii and simultaneously sent into the field,
or that a censor threatened to classify the entire citizenry as aerarii, if there had been
tied to this status the legal concept of e x e m p t i o n from service.
T h e prevailing o p i n i o n approaches mine to s o m e extent in that it c o n c e d e s that,

in cases of e m e r g e n c y and on exceptional occasions, levies were made without re-
gard to classes a n d census. As M o m m s e n expresses it, the reform of Marius con-
sisted of his c h a n g i n g the extraordinary procedure into the regular one. T h i s e x p e -
dient seems to me impracticable, (1) because I believe I have proven that, even in
the earlier period, there did not exist a limitation of service obligation based on
"classes"; (2) because in any event, after a general military service obligation had ex-
isted on a practical basis t h r o u g h o u t the entire Second Punic War and had b e c o m e a
part of the legal consciousness, it seems completely unthinkable that this duty or this
right, whichever way o n e wishes to express it, would have again been limited to the
upper classes. It is correct that the land army took on a certain somewhat higher
social status, because the proletarians were principally levied for the fleet, and possi-
bly the ability to provide one's w e a p o n s also played a certain role, so that a very
13
poor person could not directly b e c o m e a h o p l i t e . But if a proletarian first went
into the army as a veles and then applied again as already being a somewhat better-
trained and m o r e disciplined soldier, certainly we cannot assume that he was not
finally m a d e a hoplite.
If, then, a general military obligation existed in R o m e , it is nevertheless clear that

it must already have been administered very laxly t h r o u g h o u t the entire second cen-
tury. T h e census counts of the second century go from 2 4 3 , 7 0 4 up to 3 3 7 , 4 5 2 (in
the year 1 6 4 - 1 6 3 B . C . ) ; a y e a r - g r o u p o f recruits t h e r e f o r e n u m b e r e d at least
1 4
10,000 to 15,000 men. T h e army that was levied on a regular basis consisted of 4
legions, or some 18,000 to 2 0 , 0 0 0 men. Since we may surely assume that certainly
many, and probably most of those w h o became soldiers at all remained in the army
and served their 16, 2 0 , or even m o r e years, in normal times not m o r e than 1,000 to
2,000 recruits n e e d e d to be called up yearly—that is, instead of all the eligibles, only
about a tenth of their n u m b e r . T h e regulation that o n e n e e d e d to have served in 10
c a m p a i g n s i n o r d e r t o o c c u p y public office was c e r t a i n l y n o l o n g e r o b s e r v e d .
Nevertheless, in a country so militarily oriented it was necessary to have belonged to
the army if o n e wished to play a role in public life, and in addition to those w h o
were attracted by the military profession itself, there were no doubt also more than
a few y o u n g m e n w h o were ready, for this political reason, to bear arms for a few
s u m m e r s . A n d so it was easy to find sufficient n u m b e r s of the most willing and
militarily most useful elements. Of course, for the thankless war in Spain against
Numantia it was reportedly difficult to get either officers or m e n — a further proof
that it was no longer a question of a real, regular levy as a normal thing.
Polybius (6. 19) describes for us how the entire body of service-qualified Romans
assembled annually in Rome for the levy ("If they plan on making an enrollment of
soldiers, they a n n o u n c e in the assembly the day on which all the Romans of the
proper age will have to present themselves")* and the soldiers were chosen from
a m o n g t h e m by tribes and were allocated to the legions.
According to the description, that was an ideal, a p r o c e d u r e that in reality must
have appeared somewhat different. T h e entire g r o u p of service-qualified R o m a n s
would have been 150,000 to 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , and they could not possibly have c o n v e r g e d on
the capital each year from all of Italy.
We must therefore imagine that each tribe was responsible for providing e n o u g h
m e n so that the n e e d s could be filled. T h e r e was no check, t h e n , on those w h o were
absent, and the whole assembly passed for a muster of all the service-qualified m e n .
If at any time higher d e m a n d s had to be m a d e a n d there were not e n o u g h volun-
teers on hand, then there was a true drafting and a drawing of lots a m o n g the obli-
15
gated c a n d i d a t e s . In what m a n n e r that was d o n e , we do not know. At any rate not
in such a way that all the service-qualified m e n first assembled in Rome, with the
most appropriate o n e s and those who could be spared from other duties selected
out and a drawing of lots c o n d u c t e d a m o n g them, or in such a way that only pre-
cisely that g r o u p that h a p p e n e d to be the youngest year-group was inducted. Proba-
bly there took place ahead of time, in the tribe, a preliminary examination and a
designation of those who were qualified, so that at the m o m e n t of the real levy in
Rome only a manageable n u m b e r appeared.
T h e s e remarks could possibly be a c c o m m o d a t e d to the prevailing concept. But the
significant question remains whether in the second century the replacements for the
Roman army were basically limited to the sons of the m i d d l e class or whether it was
already in effect a professional army, which in fact retained (to the extent that the
proletarians e n t e r e d the navy, in case there was a levy for the latter) only a certain
citizen-peasant character. In the former case Marius' reform would have placed the
army on a completely different basis and would have created something completely
new; in the other case it would have given to s o m e t h i n g that already existed only a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g form, for that remnant of citizen-peasant characteristic was not com-
pletely eliminated, even with Marius, but only quite gradually d i e d off.
With this explanation of m i n e , based on the figures for the population and the
army h a n d e d d o w n to us, there is another source that cannot be reconciled, a source
on which the prevailing o p i n i o n is strongly based and which up to now has been
regarded as a real cornerstone and base for the history of the Roman military con-
stitution. T h i s is the account that Sallust (Bellum Iugurthinum, Chapter 86) gives of
the army reform of Marius: "Milites scribere, non m o r e majorum neque ex classibus,
sed uti cujusque lubido erat, capite censos plerosque." ("He enrolled soldiers, not
from the classes, in the m a n n e r of our forefathers, but at each man's pleasure—for
the most part from a m o n g those 'reckoned by their head.' ") By a natural and literal
interpretation, we would have to conclude that up to that point the levy took place
according to classes—that is, by the ancient Servian classes based on wealth—and the
proletarians (capite censi) had no service obligation. That this was not accurate has
now long been recognized. Polybius, who certainly must have known, reports noth-
ing of a levy according to classes, and he has only those evaluated u n d e r 4 , 0 0 0
asses going to the fleet. T h i s has been explained by claiming that the original Ser-
vian census of the fifth class had been lowered from 12,500 to 4 , 0 0 0 asses and that
Sallust did not m e a n a levy according to the 5 different classes, but he considered
the "classes" as a whole on the o n e side, the proletarians on the other.
I consider that to be a forced distortion of the sense of the passage. Sallust really
believed what he said, that up to the time of Marius there still existed some vestige
of the levy according to the Servian classes, but as small as the levy by the Servian
class system might have been, just as small, of course, was the levy by the system of
classes created in 179 B . C . We are c o n f r o n t e d here with nothing m o r e than the fact
that Sallust, just as did Cicero, lived u n d e r the illusion created by the " C o m m e n -
taries of King Servius" c o n c e r n i n g the older R o m a n constitution, and that he pon-
d e r e d the question of what had b e c o m e of this ancient a r r a n g e m e n t , w h e n and
u n d e r what circumstances it had been eliminated, and found no other answer than
that it must have h a p p e n e d u n d e r Marius, w h e n , of course, a great reform took
place. T h a t such errors are possible in the works of very important historians I can
d o c u m e n t at o n c e with very illustrious examples.
Everybody will believe that Heinrich von Sybel or Heinrich von Treitschke knew
the history of the d e v e l o p m e n t of the Prussian army, and w h e n e v e r the two say pre-
cisely the same thing, future generations will consider it as p r e s u m p t u o u s to doubt
such a statement. B o t h of them, however, place the idea of universal military service
in the regime of Frederick William I, a l t h o u g h it is known not to have b e e n intro-
d u c e d until the r e g i m e of Frederick William III, in the Wars of Liberation. Sybel
Founding of the German Empire (Begründung des Deutschen Reiches, 1: 32) calls the can-
t o n r e g u l a t i o n o f 1 7 3 3 the "first s t e p toward universal military service," a n d
Treitschke, German History (Deutsche Geschichte, 1: 7 5 ; see also 153), finds that as early
as in the regime of Frederick the Great "one of the pillars that support the national
structure, the concept of universal military service, had slowly started to waver." In
this case even the source of the error can be established. Max L e h m a n n , in his early
work Knesebeck und Schön (p. 284) had written that Frederick William I "had seen the
idea of universal service, e v e n if not in its full glow, at least in a half-light." T h i s
c o m m e n t m a d e a very strong impression at the time; Sybel and Treitschke certainly
believed they n e e d e d only to repeat it, but they made the mistake that it contains
much more serious still than it was originally, because of the expressions they use.
No other than Max L e h m a n n himself has recently d o n e the most to bring about a
better recognition of the situation. It is the basic concept of his Scharnhorst that the
universal military service obligation was not the continuation but the diametrical o p -
posite of the Old Prussian army constitution and of the entire Old Prussian nation.
What Frederick William I wanted was the sharpest possible distinction between the
status of citizen and soldier. In his eyes the universal military service obligation
meant absolutely nothing different from what likewise existed in all the other na-
tions of his time—France, Austria, Russia—namely, that the ruler had the right to
levy his subjects for military service according to his discretion. T o d a y , however, we
understand as universal military obligation not only an abstract principle, but a prac-
tical system such as Prussia, and Prussia alone a m o n g all nations, has possessed since
1813.
In the other sense of the expression we would have to say that France and Aus-
tria, too, had already had a universal military obligation before 1870, which would
a m o u n t to a play on words. It was obviously the possibility of this ambiguity, how-
e v e r , that d e c e i v e d two such great scholars as Sybel and T r e i t s c h k e into their
e r r o r — o n e that, if it had been called to their attention, they would naturally have
realized immediately themselves a n d would have admitted.
T h e reader will, I h o p e , e x c u s e the lengthy explanation of this analogy, but it is of
the greatest importance from the methodological viewpoint. Again and again in the
course of this study I have f o u n d myself in a position where I was forced, on the
basis of critical analysis, to reject definite statements of the ancient authors concern-
i n g p e r f o r m a n c e s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s o f t h e i r n a t i o n s , a s with
H e r o d o t u s ' 8-stadia r u n at M a r a t h o n , Livy's d e s c r i p t i o n of m a n i p u l a r c o m b a t ,
T h u c y d i d e s ' figure on the n u m b e r of Athenian citizens, and now Sallust's statement
c o n c e r n i n g R o m a n recruiting. H o w e v e r firmly tied t o g e t h e r my conclusions may
s e e m to m e , I can still at times hardly avoid c o n c e r n about w h e t h e r the high-
towered structure will be capable of withstanding all the storms of contradiction, and
I must consequently seek to give the Gothic walls of my building an unshakable
strength by means of buttresses f o r m e d on the firmest stone of the latest indisputa-
ble facts.
T h e concept of the later generation concerning the original classes has also given
rise to the account by Livy 10. 21 to the effect that, during the terror caused by the
Gauls in 2 9 5 B . C . , there was o r d e r e d before the battle of S e n t i n u m , "omnis generis
hominum dilectum haberi" ("that a levy be m a d e from every class of man"), or Orosius
4. 1 . 3 , from Livy, that, w h e n Pyrrhus was approaching in 2 8 0 B . C . , the legions were
brought up to strength with proletarians, w h o were actually always supposed to have
remained in the city in o r d e r to provide offspring.
2. T h e transition from citizen status to soldier status seems to have been provided
by the evocati (veterans recalled to the colors), concerning whose nature it is difficult
to c o m e to a clear understanding. T h e solution probably is that the name had vari-
o u s m e a n i n g s in the different periods. Such m e n supposedly already existed in 455
B . C . (Dionysius 10. 43). Historically, we find them, as o n e might expect, from the
e n d of the Second Punic War o n ; they are former soldiers w h o voluntarily returned
to active duty. W h e n , however, was a former soldier an evocatus?
T h e legal service obligation lasted, of course, up to one's forty-sixth year and cov-
ered, for the infantryman, 16 years—in case of e m e r g e n c y , 20. According to this,
an evocatus, e v e n with u n i n t e r r u p t e d service, w o u l d have always b e e n a man of
thirty-three, at the very least, and normally m o r e like a m i n i m u m of forty years old.
In this case, however, their n u m b e r could have b e e n only very small.
We may therefore picture in the second century the evocatus as a man w h o m , even
t h o u g h still legally obligated to serve, the replacement authorities would really no
longer have been allowed to take, for reasons of fairness, but w h o voluntarily signed
up for duty. W h e n in 2 0 0 B . C . the R o m a n people d e c i d e d on the war against Philip
of Macedon, it was at the same time definitely established that nobody from the
ranks of the veterans w h o had served in the Second Punic War could be forced into
service, a n d that only v o l u n t e e r s might be taken (Livy 3 1 . 8). Such volunteers,
"rengagés" (reenlistees), "Kapitulanten," f o r m e d the nucleus of the new army. In the
following year, however, they mutinied, saying they had b e e n embarked for Mace-
d o n against their will, and d e m a n d e d their discharge. W h e n , later o n , there existed
for a while the provision that 6 years of service gave o n e the right to request dis-
charge, all those w h o served l o n g e r than 6 years w o u l d have b e e n considered as
evocati.
As a purely mercenary status now gradually p e r m e a t e d the system, recognizing no
other limitation on length of service than that i m p o s e d by fitness, there was no
longer any place for evocati in the previous sense of the w o r d , and w h e n e v e r and
however we find t h e m m e n t i o n e d , it is always a question either of temporarily levied
16
troops, or they are of another type. Now they form a unique t r o o p , " they have
18 19
their own c o m m a n d e r , they have h o r s e s : a man w h o has been primus pilus (cen-
20
turion of the first maniple of the triarii) is later an evocatus. For this reason I prefer
to assume that it was a question of a kind of staff guard into which the oldest and
21
those with the best records of service were t r a n s f e r r e d . W h e n Caesar reports that
at Pharsalus P o m p e y had 2 0 0 0 evocati w h o m he distributed along the entire line of
battle, this n u m b e r may be strongly exaggerated; for the indicated purpose, how-
ever, it would be quite appropriate. T h e evocati were no longer, as in the second
century, the veterans w h o formed the framework of every maniple, but a small elite
unit that no longer n e e d e d to perform ordinary service but took their places in the
formation on the day of battle. At T h a p s u s , not only the generals (legati) but also the
evocati were gathered a r o u n d Caesar, d e m a n d i n g that he give the order for the bat-
tle. Later, Octavian is supposed to have assembled 10,000 veterans around h i m as a
22
b o d y g u a r d , obviously a stratagem to persuade old soldiers to reenter the service,
so that they could be called to the colors in a different form from that of the ordi-
nary legionary service, with granting of the privileges that were normal for the
evocati.
T h e passages where evocati are mentioned in the sources have been assembled in
M a r q u a r d t ' s w o r k , 2: 3 8 7 , a n d in F r ö h l i c h , Caesar's Method of Waging War
(Kriegswesen Cäsars), p. 4 2 , where also the indication as "staff guard" is articulated.
3. T h e essay by G. Veith, "Tactics of the Cohort Legion" ("Die Taktik der Kohor-
tenlegion") in Klio 7 (1907): 3 0 3 and in Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) 3:
701, is based, in its polemics against me as well as in its positive conclusions, on noth-
ing m o r e than m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . T h e a u t h o r e x p l a i n s (p.
312) that a long, c o n t i n u o u s front is the opposite of a mobile, elastic body and is the
most c u m b e r s o m e formation in existence. T h e presentation of p r o o f is superfluous,
however, since it is, after all, the same that I, too, presented by developing the value
of the intervals between the maniples and the cohorts. T h e difference is that, by my
concept, the intervals are filled up at the m o m e n t of impact, the beginning of the
fight, by having individual m e n of the same maniple springing forward from the
rear into the small gaps, while whole units (centuries, maniples, cohorts) m o v e up
from the second e c h e l o n into the larger intervals, whereas, according to Veith's idea,
rather large intervals remain b e t w e e n cohorts even d u r i n g the fight, for the sake of
maneuverability. At the same time, however, Veith himself remarks (p. 328) that
"dangerously large intervals" were not to be permitted; (p. 324) that, once troops
are e n g a g e d in hand-to-hand combat, o n e can no longer control their m o v e m e n t ,
and (p. 328, note) that the closer the battle came to the decisive point, the m o r e
limited the intervals b e c a m e (by having m e n m o v e up from behind) and the m o r e
cohesive the whole front became.
One n e e d not reflect long to realize that what Veith postulates for the decisive
moment of the battle—the cohesive front—is necessary for the battle in general. For,
wherever there was a g a p in the front at any time d u r i n g the battle, the side that
had a continuous front had the capability of attacking the o p p o n e n t s from both
front and flank. Or are we to imagine that those warriors w h o as they came u p o n a
gap in the enemy's line as they drove forward, came to a standstill in front of it?
T h e enemy's penetration into the gaps could not be prevented from the s e c o n d
echelon, for before h e l p could arrive, the d a m a g e was already d o n e , both the physi-
cal and, even m o r e importantly, the spiritual. A n d afterward there was not m u c h
that could be d o n e to help the situation, since obviously the soldiers w h o had pene-
trated straight into the line could hold toward the front, whereas the flanking files
behind them sufficed to cut off from the flanks the e n v e l o p e d ranks of the e n e m y ,
which, of course, had to d e f e n d themselves from the front. T h o s e who were at-
tacked in this way from their right, the unshielded side, were particularly defense-
less. Veith believes that those, too, who had penetrated into the gaps were, for their
part, attacked from three sides. To what extent? T h o s e w h o up to that point had
been fighting toward their front could, after all, not suddenly ignore the enemy
there and turn toward the flank? T h e r e is a great difference in whether a unit
penetrates the enemy front and thereby drives into the midst of e n e m y troops or
whether a unit is e n v e l o p e d on both sides and thereby b e c o m e s s u r r o u n d e d by the
e n e m y on three sides. T h e first-mentioned unit pushes forward and the following
ranks naturally follow up precisely at that point; the s e c o n d - m e n t i o n e d unit, how-
ever, is being pushed and within a very short time it is crushed. Veith is right when
he concludes that a penetration into a gap that has intentionally been left o p e n is
not as d a n g e r o u s as w h e n the e n e m y has created the g a p by putting a unit to flight.
That is quite obvious, for that would already amount to a partial defeat. But that
d o e s not eliminate the fact that any g a p occurring during a battle between two front
lines fighting with close-combat w e a p o n s is highly d a n g e r o u s and can become deci-
sive. Even if the aid that the second e c h e l o n is s u p p o s e d to bring d o e s not arrive too
late to do any g o o d at all, it can at best only succeed in throwing back the soldiers
who have made the penetration and in filling the gap—that is, in establishing the
condition that Veith has told us is disadvantageous! In so doing, the creator of these
astonishing battle scenes constantly refers to the fact that he is an e x p e r i e n c e d mili-
tary m a n !
In order to prove his thesis, Veith even goes to the extent of claiming (p. 313)
that the various units, if they had taken advantage of the terrain during the ap-
proach march, would not have been capable at the m o m e n t of impact of suddenly
j o i n i n g together in a continuous line and closing all the intervals. T h e r e is no reason
in the world why not, as soon as o n e realizes that the second e c h e l o n is following at
a slight distance b e h i n d the first, and the third closely behind the second. T h e legati,
for w h o m Veith has trouble finding a battle assignment, have the mission, as obvious
as it is important, of seeing to it that, w h e n e v e r gaps o p e n up in the first echelon
d u r i n g the approach march that are too large to be filled by individual soldiers from
this same e c h e l o n , the appropriate unit from the second, or, if necessary, even from
the third echelon is alerted and led forward to fill the g a p .
T h e r e is, naturally, no question of Veith's producing documentary source proof.
Everything that s e e m s to prove his point is based on the constant confusing of inter-
vals in the approach march with intervals in battle. Or on the other hand, for exam-
ple, w h e n the author draws for this purpose on the battles that Caesar describes in
5. 15, and 5. 34, he loses sight of the fact that in Caesar's account it is not at all a
question of pitched battles.
Consequently, I repeat: I am completely in a g r e e m e n t with Veith that there were
intervals between the maniples (or, as appropriate, the cohorts) a n d that such inter-
vals have to exist, because the colonels and generals cannot otherwise control the
individual tactical units. A n d , on the other hand, Veith is also completely of the
same opinion as I, that, o n c e the troops are e n g a g e d in hand-to-hand combat, they
can no longer be controlled. So, w h e n Veith concludes from Polybius 15. 15. 7 that
intervals did exist, he is correct; but w h e n he concludes that the intervals were also
present during the hand-to-hand combat, this conclusion is inadmissible.
4. ( A d d e d in the third edition.) It is generally accepted that the R o m a n citizen
cavalry disappeared after the S e c o n d Punic War and was replaced by barbarian
mercenaries. Nevertheless, in the Zeitschrift fur österreichischen Gymnasien 22 (1911):
3 8 5 , 4 8 1 , 5 7 7 , Soltau has p o i n t e d out that o n e must be more careful in making dis-
tinctions in this area. As actual cavalry, the citizen m o u n t e d g r o u p s were i n d e e d re-
placed by foreign mercenaries; they continued to exist on a modest scale, however,
as units for the sons of senatorial a n d well-to-do citizen families and served as Horse
Guards, couriers, a n d in o t h e r similar duties. (See below, Book V I I , Chapter I,
C o m m e n t 3.)
5. Oehler, in his "New Studies on the Battle of Muthul" ("Neue Forschungen zur
Schlacht bei Muthul") Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Instituts 12 (1909):
327 and 13 (1910): 2 5 7 , describes a combat situation from which I can only con-
clude that the sources present nothing which might have any military history value.
6. On the question of the individual load carried by the Roman soldier, I simply
accepted, in the First editions of this volume, the findings of Stoffel, and only in the
second volume (Book IV, Chapter IV), in discussing feudalism, did I treat this sub-
ject more thoroughly. Stoffel rejects as impossible the suggestion that the legionary
carried provisions for 16 or even possibly 30 days. More recently there has appeared
the very significant study by Stolle. The Roman Legionary and his Equipment (Der
Römische Legtonär und sein Gepäck) (Strasbourg, 1914), in which the author seeks again
to prove that, a l t h o u g h the 30-day figure was i n d e e d false, the 16-day estimate was
definitely corroborated by the sources, and not as an exceptional situation nor on
the basis that the load became smaller each day, but simply as the normal thing.
He reduces somewhat the weight of the flour that was carried by showing that the
soldier had some of it in cracker form. His estimate is as follows:
Bread, crackers, flour 11.369 kilograms

Meat 1.910
Cheese 0.436
Salt 0.327
Wine or l e m o n a d e 0.327
Total provisions 14.369 kilograms

Equipment 5.278
Tools 7.149
Total baggage 2 6 . 7 9 6 kilograms

W e a p o n s (minimum weight) 14.463 "
Total load ( m i n i m u m ) 4 1 . 2 5 9 kilograms
Stolle does not overlook the fact that this load is a very heavy o n e , and he seeks to
explain it by showing that the R o m a n s m a d e only short daily marches. (See below,
Book VII, Chapter III, Conclusion.)
One must c o n c e d e , of course, that u n d e r special circumstances the soldier can
carry 41¼ kilograms, and even more; but it is a question here of the normal load. In
my discussion in the second volume, which, unfortunately, Stolle was not familiar
with, I have pointed out how drastically a load of more than 31 kilograms reduces
the soldier's march capabilities. Is it to be s u p p o s e d that, in order to eliminate the
need for 3 0 0 mules for a legion, the R o m a n s actually deprived their armies of the
possibility of making longer marches—say over 15 kilometers? Statements by Cicero
and A m m i a n are not sufficient to make this point credible—in Cicero's case because
he can be suspected of rhetorical exaggeration, and in Ammian's case, even t h o u g h
he was militarily knowledgeable, because by his time the disciplined troops had long
since disappeared and barbarian mercenaries were the least willing of all to have
themselves heavily b u r d e n e d . Consequently, I consider as completely worthless any
evidence from the period following the fall of the Severians. Even at the time of the
Roman Republic, w h e n the discipline had already b e c o m e lax, the legionaries were
so anxious to lighten their load that they privately secured an orderly or a pack
animal (Sallust, Beltum Iugurthinum 4 5 . 2; Plutarch, Marius, Chapter 13). T h e evi-
dence of Cicero and A m m i a n is all the less convincing in that it is directly con-
tradicted by the e v i d e n c e in J o s e p h u s , History of the Jewish War 3. 5. 5, according to
which the soldier himself carried provisions for only three days. Stolle did not see fit
to ignore this evidence, e v e n if he did interpret it falsely. Even with only three days
of provisions, the legionary was already quite heavily b u r d e n e d .
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R II
1. J. J. Müller, in Philologus 34 (1876): 125, has already observed

that t h e four r e g u l a r legions could not possibly have a b s o r b e d the
e n t i r e mass of service-obligated y o u n g m e n . He believes t h e r e f o r e
t h a t , d e p e n d i n g o n n e e d , t h e y o u n g e s t y e a r - g r o u p s — e . g . , ten
— w e r e i n d u c t e d . B u t e v e n t h a t w o u l d give m u c h t o o l a r g e a
number.
2. Fröhlich, in Caesar's Method of Waging War (Kriegswesen Cäsars)
p p . 13-14, effectively raises d o u b t s w h e t h e r the definitive i n t r o d u c -
tion of the c o h o r t tactics s h o u l d really be ascribed to Marius. Mad-
wig believed that it did n o t o c c u r until t h e W a r with the Allies. On
t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is p e r h a p s possible to p r o v e its existence as early
as the J u g u r t h i n e W a r . It is my o p i n i o n , however, that every p r o b -
ability points to the fact t h a t Marius was t h e r e f o r m e r . T h e cohorts
t h a t a r e r e f e r r e d to in t h e J u g u r t h i n e W a r (Sallust 5 1 . 3; 100. 4)
n e e d not be c o n s i d e r e d as tactical units b u t merely as parts of the
legion, a n d if, a c c o r d i n g to a Sisenna f r a g m e n t , t h e r e was still on
o n e occasion in t h e W a r with t h e Allies a battle by maniples, t h e r e
is little to be c o n c l u d e d from that, since, after all, t h e r e w e r e mani-
ples in existence both before a n d after t h a t event.
3. Nitzsch, in History of the Roman Republic (Geschichte der römischen
Republik) (published by T h o u r e t ) , 1: 181, has already d r a w n atten-
tion to the fact t h a t if, after C a n n a e , legions a p p e a r e d f o r m e d up
o n e b e h i n d the o t h e r , t h a t was related to the fact t h a t in the newly
f o r m e d legions the differences of age did not play the s a m e role as
in earlier days.
4. W h e n we r e a d in Livy 7. 34 (for t h e year 340 B.C.) t h a t the
hastati a n d principes of a legion were d e t a c h e d , or in 10. 14 (for t h e
year 2 9 7 B.C.) the hastati of a legion, t h a t point has, of c o u r s e , no
historical value, b u t it m a y be cited h e r e as a reflection of t h e ex-
p e r i e n c e of the second c e n t u r y B.C.
5. In the Livy Epitome, Book 6 7 , it is stated that in t h e battle of
A r a u s i o 8 0 , 0 0 0 soldiers, 4 0 , 0 0 0 s u p p l y t r a i n d r i v e r s a n d c a m p -
followers (calones et lixae) w e r e killed. T h e s e figures a r e certainly
very e x a g g e r a t e d , b u t it is p e r h a p s w o r t h y of note that at this time
a s t r e n g t h a m o u n t i n g to 50 p e r c e n t of t h a t of t h e c o m b a t a n t s was
a t t r i b u t e d to t h e supply train. We could c o n c l u d e from this that
even before t h e time of Marius the veliti h a d d i s a p p e a r e d for t h e
most part, or at times p e r h a p s completely, o u t of the legions, a n d
t h e orderly a n d supply train system h a d b e e n o r g a n i z e d differently,
on a practical basis.
6. Stolle, in The Romans' Camp and Army (Das Lager und Heer der
Römer) (1912) o p p o s e s t h e idea t h a t t h e n u m b e r 6,000 is to be r e -
g a r d e d as n o r m a l for t h e legion, a n d t h e r e f o r e 600 for t h e cohort,
and we m u s t a g r e e with him that it is not as well f o u n d e d as h a d
been believed up to now. Nevertheless, it seems q u i t e plausible to
me, a n d the differences can, at least for o u r p u r p o s e s , be i g n o r e d .
7. Of c o u r s e , t h a t has not b e e n p r o v e d directly, b u t as M a r q u a r d t
has r e m a r k e d (2: 339), it is very p r o b a b l e . See also Polybius 11. 2 3 ,
w h e r e it is stated t h a t t h r e e m a n i p l e s w e r e called a cohort.
8 . T h e p a s s a g e w h e r e P o l y b i u s d e s c r i b e s this q u a l i t y o f t h e
R o m a n battle f o r m a t i o n — t h a t it was at t h e same time i m p e n e t r a b l e
(consequently in close o r d e r ) a n d capable in all its individual units
of t u r n i n g in any d e s i r e d direction (15. 15. 7)—is u n f o r t u n a t e l y
somewhat o b s c u r e in its w o r d i n g , but a c c o r d i n g to t h e sense quite
clear a n d very valuable. T h e two characteristics of impenetrability
and mobility can only be u n i t e d by having intervals between t h e
cohorts a n d k e e p i n g these intervals as small as possible. T h e large
intervals that Veith (in Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 701) uses this passage to
s u p p o r t are n o t only not p r o v e d by it, b u t are in fact c o n t r a d i c t e d ,
since a battle f o r m a t i o n with intervals in its front is not i m p e n e t r a -
ble. T h e small intervals, as I conceive t h e m , do not r e m o v e t h e
quality of impenetrability, since they a r e closed up at the m o m e n t
of impact by t h e press from t h e r e a r .
9. Livy 4 3 . 14. Polybius 3 5 . 4.
10. See the s o u r c e citations in M o m m s e n , Roman History (Römische
Geschichte) 2: 1 0 7 a n d 1 7 5 ; M a r q u a r d t , The Roman National
Constitution (Römische Staatsverfassung), 2: 3 8 1 .
11. Plutarch, Marius, C h a p t e r 9.
12. T h a t it was a question of this kind of service, a n d not that of a
m a r i n e i n f a n t r y m a n , is correctly p o i n t e d o u t a n d d o c u m e n t e d in
Marquardt, The Roman National Constitution (Römische
Staatsverfassung), 2: 380, n o t e 10.
13. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius 6. 39. 15, t h e nation p r o v i d e d clothing
a n d w e a p o n s if necessary b u t d e d u c t e d their cost from the soldier's
p a y . T h i s was s u p p o s e d l y d i s c o n t i n u e d b y T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s
( M o m m s e n , Roman History (Römische Geschichte) 2: 107); b u t accord-
ing to T a c i t u s (Annates 1. 17), it o c c u r r e d again also u n d e r t h e e m -
pire, a n d the soldiers c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t it.
14. T h e figures 3 9 4 , 7 3 6 a n d 3 9 4 , 3 3 6 for t h e years 125 a n d 115
B.C. have b e e n q u e s t i o n e d by Beloch, with good reason.
15. A p p i a n , De Rebus Hispanorum, C h a p t e r 4 9 , for t h e year 149 B . C .
16. Caesar, Bell. Gall. 3. 20. 2.
17. Cicero, Ad familiares 15. 4. 3.

18. Cicero, Ad familiares 3. 6.-5.
19. Caesar, Bell. Gall. 7. 6 5 .
20. Bell Civ. 3. 9 1 .
2 1 . Nevertheless, I do n o t believe that t h e v o l u n t e e r s w h o offered
t h e i r services to t h e consul a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Polybius 6. 3 1 . 2, had
their own a r e a in c a m p , w e r e m e a n t u n d e r t h e t e r m evocati, but
r a t h e r that the f o r m e r w e r e m o r e i m p o r t a n t m e n . T h e evocati of
t h a t p e r i o d w e r e not yet a privileged g r o u p in t h e sense in which
M a r q u a r d t (2: 3 3 8 , footnote 1) conceives of t h e m .
22. Appian, Bell. Civ. 3. 4 0 .
Chapter III
The Centurions
T h e real key m a n of t h e new R o m a n military system was the cen-
turion. In reality, t h e status of each p e r s o n h a d c h a n g e d , from the
a r m y c o m m a n d e r t o the private soldier a n d t h e train o r d e r l y , a n d
in the final analysis o n e position is as i m p o r t a n t as a n o t h e r , but in
the new a r m y system it was t h e c e n t u r i o n s w h o f o r m e d the truly
Roman aspect of the organization. T h e g e n e r a l s a n d h i g h e r officers
of R o m e w e r e similar to those we see in o t h e r nations, a n d the sol-
diers w e r e n o t significantly different from o t h e r m e r c e n a r i e s . B u t
the c e n t u r i o n s w e r e a completely individual p h e n o m e n o n .
To d a t e , n o b o d y has succeeded in establishing a completely clear
picture of t h e social s t r u c t u r e of t h e R o m a n p e o p l e in t h e last cen-
tury of the Republic. We may see clearly e n o u g h in o u r m i n d ' s eye
t h e aristocracy, possessing g r e a t riches, w h o r e s e m b l e t h e G r e e k
p a t t e r n a n d r u l e the c o u n t r y t h r o u g h t h e Senate a n d the offices
they hold. T h i s g r o u p d o e s n o t form a closed caste; it is not i m p o s -
sible for a p e r s o n of m a r k e d talent of o n e or a n o t h e r kind from
t h e c o m m o n p e o p l e t o m o v e u p into t h e r u l i n g circle a n d e v e n
eventually to find a warm welcome a n d high position there.
Nevertheless, this kind of u p w a r d mobility r e m a i n s very i n f r e q u e n t .
T h e spirit of t h e r u l i n g aristocracy is t h a t of an i n h e r i t e d status.
No less clear to us is t h e status of a class of rich m e r c h a n t s , w h o ,
as such, a r e e x c l u d e d from t h e h i g h offices a n d the Senate a n d a r e
filled with a certain political envy of t h e r u l i n g aristocracy. D a t i n g
from t h e t i m e of t h e class division a c c o r d i n g to p r o p e r t y , t h e s e
m e r c h a n t s a r e called the " r i d e r s , " a title that, since it h a d b e c o m e a
status symbol, has t e n d e d to be t r a n s l a t e d as "knight," a designation
by which, o n e must a d d , we s h o u l d be careful not to let ourselves
be deceived.
Finally, we can recognize at t h e o t h e r e n d of the social scale a
large u r b a n a n d r u r a l proletariat, m i n o r citizens a n d small f a r m e r s .
429
In the m i d d l e lie t h e positions t h a t a r e n o t clear to us: how large,

how f o r m e d , how situated economically, h o w articulated class-wise,
a n d how e d u c a t e d w e r e those social levels t h a t we designate today
as the real m i d d l e class? It is this m i d d l e g r o u p , still m o r e t h a n the
highest a n d t h e lowest g r o u p s of t h e free citizenry, that was dislo-
cated socially by t h e institution of slavery a n d which, consequently,
is t h e h a r d e s t to c o m p a r e with m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s . H o w e v e r this
m a y be, a n d regardless of what m a y be discovered in future re-
search, it is sufficient for us to establish this point, because this
g r o u p , socially weak as it was u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , h a d no
place at all in the o r g a n i z a t i o n we a r e discussing, the R o m a n a r m y .
Up to a certain point, this situation is i n h e r e n t in the n a t u r e of
every m e r c e n a r y a r m y : e i t h e r t h e a r m y has no special social distinc-
tions at all, or t h e lowest a n d highest layers of society are b r o u g h t
t o g e t h e r i n it, b u t t h e m i d d l e class, t h e social l a y e r w h i c h , o f
course, may be b r o a d e r or n a r r o w e r or may be c o n s i d e r e d to be
b r o a d e r or n a r r o w e r , is completely missing.
T h e m a r k e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n officer c o r p s a n d m e n t h a t
characterizes m o d e r n a r m i e s ( u p to 1914) a n d which we did not yet
find in a n c i e n t G r e e c e first a p p e a r s with t h e R o m a n s , b u t with a
different system of levels from t h a t which seems n a t u r a l to us today
in G e r m a n y . T h e officer corps, in t h e m o d e r n sense, was c o m p o s e d
in R o m e only of g e n e r a l s (legati) a n d field-grade officers (tribuni
militum). T h e s e field-grade officers, however, w e r e t h e y o u n g gen-
t l e m e n o f t h e two aristocracies, t h e h e r e d i t a r y a n d the " k n i g h t s '
g r o u p , " w h o h a d c h o s e n the military profession. O n the average,
1
their military capabilities w e r e s m a l l , b u t their aristocratic e d u c a -
tion h a d nevertheless p r o v i d e d t h e m with so m a n y of the p r e r e q -
uisites for their profession that they could b e c o m e g o o d officers,
a n d w h e n e v e r o n e of t h e m was gifted with n a t u r a l military talents,
he could easily r e a c h h i g h c o m m a n d positions while still in the best
years of youthful elasticity a n d could d e v e l o p into an excellent gen-
e r a l . T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f all p e r i o d s t e a c h e s u s t h a t t h e r e i s a
psychological r a p p o r t b e t w e e n aristocracy a n d military c o m m a n d ,
that t h e f o r m e r is a particularly favorable soil for t h e g r o w t h of the
latter.
T h e r e was only a g r a d u a l d e v e l o p m e n t of a firm relationship be-
tween t h e R o m a n senior officers a n d the tactical units of the a r m y ;
the g e n e r a l s (legati) first took c o m m a n d of a legion because of a
special mission, a n d t h e t r i b u n e s did likewise with t h e cohorts. T h e
t r i b u n e s , in r o t a t i o n as d e t e r m i n e d by lot, simultaneously exercised
supervision over t h e laying o u t a n d the policing of the c a m p a n d
The Centurions 431
the g u a r d d u t y a n d p r o v i d e d for military justice a n d the execution

2
of the h i g h e r p u n i s h m e n t s .
Of a completely different type from these aristocrats were t h e
m e n w h o c a r r i e d o u t t h e duties o f the p r e s e n t - d a y c o m p a n y - g r a d e
officers, the c e n t u r i o n s . T h e y came from t h e r a n k s of the c o m m o n
soldiers, w h o , in t u r n , w e r e r e c r u i t e d principally from the lowest,
u n e d u c a t e d layers o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e c e n t u r i o n s received n o
m o r e t h a n twice t h e pay of a private, which Caesar raised from 120
denarii (90 marks) to 225 (165 marks) p e r a n n u m . T h e c e n t u r i o n s ,
t h e r e f o r e , c o r r e s p o n d e d in status to o u r n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers,
but their functions w e r e those of o u r captains. T h e y exercised dis-
cipline; the m a n i p l e s a n d the m e n w e r e in their h a n d s .
P o l y b i u s m a k e s t h e specific p o i n t (6. 24) t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t
selected simply because of their c o u r a g e , but especially on t h e basis
of their l e a d e r s h i p ability a n d t h e i r steadfastness ("as leaders, stead-
fast a n d d e e p of mind").*
T h e i r situation should be clearest for o u r p u r p o s e s if we com-
p a r e t h e m with o u r first sergeants. T h e closest analogy is offered
by those F r e n c h captains w h o have b e e n commissioned from the
r a n k s o f n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers, always with t h e d i f f e r e n c e ,
however, that t h r o u g h their p r o m o t i o n into t h e officer corps they
move up to a h i g h e r social level, m a n y of t h e characteristics of
which they naturally a s s u m e . T h e R o m a n c e n t u r i o n , o n the o t h e r
h a n d , r e m a i n e d socially w h a t h e h a d always b e e n , a n d i t was
against this b a c k g r o u n d that this p a r t i c u l a r position f o r m e d a n d
m a i n t a i n e d its u n u s u a l character. He h a d a p r o u d awareness of his
ability b u t still laid no claim to b e l o n g i n g to the r u l i n g g r o u p . T h e
c e n t u r i o n was a R o m a n patriot, brave a n d strict, but his field of vi-
sion was limited. He n e e d e d a h i g h e r c o m m a n d e r above him, a n d
he realized this. A c c o r d i n g to tradition, he was s u b o r d i n a t e to the
constitutionally elected m a g i s t r a t e — a n election in which h e , too,
played a r o l e — a n d the Senate. B u t the m o r e he ceased to be a citi-
zen a n d c o n s i d e r e d himself only a soldier, the m o r e this concept of
constitutional a u t h o r i t y m u s t have d i s a p p e a r e d from his t h i n k i n g ,
being r e p l a c e d by t h e a r m y c o m m a n d e r , w h o h a d himself g r o w n
away from t h e forms of t h e old constitution.
T h e closest analogy to the a r m y of the w o r l d - c o n q u e r i n g R o m a n
Republic is probably p r o v i d e d by t h e English a r m y of the eight-
e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e senior officers c a m e from the aristocracy, a n d
after a s h o r t p e r i o d of study, started their careers as field officers;
Wellington was a lieutenant colonel at the age of twenty-four. T h e
mass of the a r m y was r e c r u i t e d a n d was held t o g e t h e r u n d e r t h e
sternest discipline, b u t t h e basis was a national English o n e . Foreign-

e r s , w h o w e r e e n l i s t e d i n l a r g e n u m b e r s t o fill u p t h e r a n k s ,
f o r m e d t h e i r o w n units. T h e difference b e t w e e n this a r m y a n d the
R o m a n o n e lay in t h e c o m p a n y - g r a d e officer corps, which in Eng-
l a n d was r e c r u i t e d from g e n t l e m e n , the p o o r e r nobility a n d the
h i g h e r b o u r g e o i s , a n d which was clearly distinct f r o m t h e n o n -
c o m m i s s i o n e d officer corps, w h e r e a s the R o m a n c e n t u r i o n simul-
taneously fulfilled the functions of both of these corps.
We h e a r r e m a r k a b l y little of the n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers, who
( t o g e t h e r with first-class privates) w e r e d e s i g n a t e d as principales.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officer i s t h e optio, w h o
seems, however, n o t to have b e e n involved in actual front-line ser-
3
vice b u t was used for a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p a p e r w o r k . T h e s q u a d lead-
4
ers w e r e the decani, later called caput contubernii, w h o m we never
find m e n t i o n e d , h o w e v e r , i n the battle accounts. T h e b u r d e n o f
c o m p a n y c o m m a n d rested on the c e n t u r i o n , whose c e n t u r y was, it
i s t r u e , s o m e w h a t s m a l l e r t h a n a G e r m a n c o m p a n y b u t still
a m o u n t e d to 100 m e n . But we should k e e p in m i n d that the sol-
diers, except in t h e case of newly f o r m e d legions, w e r e almost all
e x p e r i e n c e d v e t e r a n s w h o only h a d t o b e k e p t i n o r d e r a n d n o
l o n g e r n e e d e d t r a i n i n g a n d instruction.
Besides the optio, we also r e a d of t h e tesserarius, the m a n w h o re-
ceived the c o u n t e r s i g n , a n d the signifer ( s t a n d a r d b e a r e r ) . We a r e
n o t told, h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r t h e s e m e n played any role a s t r o o p
5
leaders.
T h e Second Punic W a r h a d , for practical p u r p o s e s , given R o m e
a professional a r m y , b u t it was n o t simply as a m a t t e r of form that
it r e m a i n e d a citizen a r m y ; t h e actual transition c o n t i n u e d for a
very long time.
T h e i n t e r m e d i a t e position between citizen a r m y a n d professional
a r m y in the second c e n t u r y B.C. is also e m p h a s i z e d by the fact that,
in the c o n t i n u i n g f o r m a t i o n of new legions a n d their officer corps,
the individual was always assigned anew each time to a position;
consequently, t h e r e still did not exist the concept of r e g u l a r p r o m o -
tion. No doubt, t h e c e n t u r i o n s were r a n k e d a m o n g themselves in a
well-defined o r d e r : the second c e n t u r i o n of the t e n t h m a n i p l e of
t h e hastati was the lowest, a n d the first c e n t u r i o n of the first m a n i -
ple of the triarii, t h e primus pilus, was t h e highest, but assignment to
such a position h a d no p e r m a n e n t character. T h e consuls a n d w a r
tribunes, who w e r e also constantly a l t e r n a t i n g , assigned positions
anew with each r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with their discretion-
ary j u d g m e n t . As long as t h e citizen c h a r a c t e r of t h e legion was
The Centurions 433
p r e d o m i n a n t , t h e r e was n o t h i n g d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t that; e v e n t h e
consul for this year h a d , after all, to obey a n o t h e r o n e n e x t year,
and in the case of the A t h e n i a n s a citizen could serve o n e year as
army c o m m a n d e r a n d m i g h t find himself the following year a pri-
vate again.
T h e R o m a n c e n t u r i o n s , however, gradually became too militarily
sensitive not to r e g a r d as a grievance a d e m o t i o n , which of course
was often dictated by p u r e c h a n c e or w h i m . On o n e occasion they
o p p o s e d this system, a n d t h e a c c o u n t t h a t Livy (42. 33 ff.) h a s
given us is so characteristic of the R o m a n state a n d of t h e life a n d
viewpoint of the c e n t u r i o n s that I want to insert it h e r e verbatim.
W h e n , i n 171 B . C . , w a r was d e c l a r e d a g a i n s t P e r s e u s o f
Macedon, t h e Senate o r d e r e d that as m a n y veteran c e n t u r i o n s as
possible be called to active d u t y , a n d m a n y of t h e m also v o l u n -
teered. T w e n t y - t h r e e f o r m e r c e n t u r i o n s of primus pilus r a n k , how-
ever, a p p e a l e d to the people's t r i b u n e s a n d d e m a n d e d that, if they
were to be called up again, they be given their f o r m e r status. Since
each legion h a d only o n e primus pilus a n d at first only four legions
were to be o r g a n i z e d , to be followed by four m o r e reserve legions,
it is h a r d to see how their d e m a n d could be fulfilled. It a p p e a r s
that, with this call, even a limitation of t h e levy itself was i n t e n d e d .
But h o w e v e r that may have b e e n , t h e most interesting t h i n g for us
is the account itself, which r e a d s as follows:
T h e consuls carried out the levy with m u c h g r e a t e r care t h a n

usual. Licinius also called up m a n y veteran soldiers a n d cen-
turions, a n d many v o l u n t e e r e d , for they saw that those w h o
had served in the earlier Macedonian W a r or against An-
tiochus in Asia h a d b e c o m e rich. Since the war t r i b u n e s saw fit
to call up those w h o h a d b e e n c e n t u r i o n s , twenty-three primi
pili a p p e a l e d to t h e p e o p l e ' s t r i b u n e s after r e c e i v i n g t h e i r
s u m m o n s . T w o o f t h e latter, M a r c u s Fulvius N o b i l i o r a n d
Marcus Claudius Marcellus, r e f e r r e d t h e m to the consuls, say-
ing that those w h o h a d responsibility for t h e levy a n d p r o s e c u -
tion of the war would have to d e c i d e . T h e o t h e r s e x p l a i n e d
that they would look into the q u e s t i o n of why these m e n h a d
b e e n called u p , a n d , i f a n y injustice h a d b e e n d o n e , t h e y
would h e l p their fellow citizens.
T h e m a t t e r was h e a r d b e f o r e the people's t r i b u n e s . T h e r e
a p p e a r e d the f o r m e r consul M a r c u s Popillius, w h o was called
as a legal adviser, the c e n t u r i o n s , a n d t h e consul. Since t h e
consul t h e n d e m a n d e d that the m a t t e r be b r o u g h t before a
citizens' assembly, the p e o p l e w e r e called t o g e t h e r . Speaking

for the c e n t u r i o n s , M a r c u s Popillius, who h a d b e e n consul two
y e a r s e a r l i e r , said: " S o l d i e r s w h o h a v e a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e i r
n o r m a l service a n d whose physical capacities have b e e n dulled
by age a n d constant e x e r t i o n still do not refuse to give their
services for t h e c o m m o n g o o d ; they only wish to r e q u e s t that
they not be given a lower g r a d e t h a n that which they h a d d u r -
ing t h e i r previous service."
C o n s u l Publius Licinius o r d e r e d that the Senate's decrees be
r e a d : first, t h e o n e d e c l a r i n g war against P e r s e u s a n d t h e n the
second o n e , in which t h e Senate h a d o r d e r e d t h a t as m a n y
f o r m e r c e n t u r i o n s as possible be levied for t h e w a r a n d h a d
n o t e x e m p t e d from service a n y o n e w h o was not o l d e r t h a n
fifty. T h e n he r e q u e s t e d that in this new war, so close to Italy,
they n e i t h e r h i n d e r t h e w a r t r i b u n e s in t h e i r c o n d u c t of the
levy n o r p r e v e n t the consul from assigning to each m a n the
r a n k which w o u l d best serve the interests of the Republic.
After the consul had spoken, Spurius Ligustinus, one of
those w h o h a d a p p e a l e d t o the people's t r i b u n e s , asked t h e
consul a n d t h e people's t r i b u n e s that he be allowed to a d d r e s s
a few w o r d s to t h e p e o p l e . W i t h p e r m i s s i o n from all con-
c e r n e d , he is said to h a v e s p o k e n as follows: " C i t i z e n s , I,
S p u r i u s Ligustinus, c o m e from t h e C r u s t u m e r i u m district o f
Sabine province. My father left me an acre of land a n d a small
h u t , in which I was b o r n a n d b r o u g h t u p , a n d t h e r e I still live
today. As soon as I was of the p r o p e r age, my father gave me
his b r o t h e r ' s d a u g h t e r as my wife, a n d she b r o u g h t with h e r
n o t h i n g b u t f r e e d o m , chastity, a n d a fertility w h i c h w o u l d
have b e e n e n o u g h even for a rich h o m e . We have six sons a n d
two d a u g h t e r s , b o t h o f t h e m a l r e a d y m a r r i e d . F o u r o f o u r
sons a r e already w e a r i n g t h e toga of m a n h o o d , two still wear
t h e boy's skirt. I b e c a m e a soldier u n d e r Consuls Publius Sul-
picius a n d Caius A u r e l i u s . In t h a t a r m y , which was sent to
M a c e d o n , I was a p r i v a t e s o l d i e r for t w o y e a r s , f i g h t i n g
against King Philip. In t h e t h i r d year, as a r e w a r d for my
bravery, T i t u s Q u i n c t i u s Flaminius gave me t h e t e n t h hastati
m a n i p l e . Since, after t h e d e f e a t o f Philip a n d t h e M a c e d o -
nians, we w e r e b r o u g h t back to Italy a n d d i s c h a r g e d , I im-
m e d i a t e l y v o l u n t e e r e d a n d was s e n t t o S p a i n w i t h C o n s u l
M a r c u s Porcius C a t o . T h o s e w h o c a m e t o know h i m a n d o t h e r
c o m m a n d e r s t h r o u g h l o n g s e r v i c e i n t h e field k n o w t h a t ,
a m o n g all t h e living c o m m a n d e r s , n o n e was a s h a r p e r o b -
The Centurions 435
server a n d j u d g e o f bravery. T h i s c o m m a n d e r c o n s i d e r e d m e
worthy e n o u g h to be assigned the first hastati c e n t u r y . F o r my
third p e r i o d of service I was o n c e again a volunteer, for t h e
a r m y that was sent against t h e Aetolians a n d K i n g A n t i o c h u s .
I was given t h e position of first c e n t u r i o n with the principes by
Manius Acilius. After King A n t i o c h u s h a d b e e n d r i v e n away
a n d t h e Aetolians d e f e a t e d , we w e r e b r o u g h t back to Italy,
a n d after t h a t I served twice in t h e legions that d i d o n e year
of service. T h e n I s e r v e d twice again in Spain, o n c e u n d e r
Q u i n t u s Fulvius Flaccus a n d o n c e a g a i n u n d e r t h e P r a e t o r
T i b e r i u s S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s . I was b r o u g h t along by Flac-
cus with the o t h e r s from his province w h o m he took to his
t r i u m p h b e c a u s e of t h e i r b r a v e r y . I was a s k e d by T i b e r i u s
G r a c c h u s to go with h i m to the province assigned him to gov-
e r n . F o u r times within a few years I was primus pilus; thirty-
four times I was r e w a r d e d by my c o m m a n d e r s for bravery; I
was given six civic crowns. I s p e n t twenty-two years of service
in t h e a r m y , a n d I am o l d e r t h a n fifty. Even if I h a d n o t
c o m p l e t e d all these years of service a n d were not e x e m p t be-
cause of my age, it w o u l d still be easy for me to avoid service,
since I can p r o v i d e four soldiers in my place. B u t I want to
m a k e this point clear: I will n e v e r seek e x e m p t i o n as long as
any c o m m a n d e r who is forming an army considers me a
w o r t h y soldier. It is up to the war t r i b u n e s to d e c i d e what pos-
ition they consider me w o r t h y of. I will do my best to see that
n o b o d y in t h e a r m y excels me in bravery; t h a t I have always
d o n e so can be testified to by my c o m m a n d e r s as well as by
those w h o served with m e . You, too, c o m r a d e s , even if you
succeed in having y o u r rights r e c o g n i z e d t h r o u g h this a p p e a l ,
must, since as y o u t h s you n e v e r d i d a n y t h i n g against the au-
thority of the officials a n d t h e S e n a t e , justly subject yourselves
now to the p o w e r of the Senate a n d t h e consuls a n d consider
as h o n o r a b l e any position in which you can be useful to t h e
common good."
After he h a d s p o k e n t h u s , Consul Publius Licinius p r a i s e d
h i m extensively a n d led him from t h e assembly into t h e Sen-
ate. T h e r e , too, he was t h a n k e d with t h e full a p p r o v a l of t h e
Senate, a n d because of his c o u r a g e t h e war tribunes gave h i m
the f i r s t m a n i p l e o f the f i r s t legion. T h e o t h e r c e n t u r i o n s gave
up t h e i r a p p e a l a n d obediently followed the call to service.
U n e x p l a i n e d in this little story is t h e r e a s o n why Ligustinus, w h o

at t h e start seems to speak very forcefully in favor of t h e centuri-

o n s , Finally comes o u t against their d e m a n d . T h e situation seems
to place t h e c h a r a c t e r of Ligustinus in a q u e s t i o n a b l e light. But
w h e t h e r t h e event took place in this way or s o m e w h a t differently,
Ligustinus' speech—sincere or feigned—is at any rate an expression
o f t h e a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e r u l i n g R o m a n aristocracy w a n t e d t o see
among the centurions.
1. Correctly n o t e d a n d solidly d o c u m e n t e d b u t e x p r e s s e d some-

w h a t too s t r o n g l y by Fröhlich in Caesar's Method of Waging War
(Kriegswesen Cäsars), p. 19.
2. Polybius 6. 34. O n e would expect that, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the 10
c o h o r t s of the legion, 10 t r i b u n e s would be assigned; however, even
u n d e r t h e e m p i r e , t h e r e w e r e o n l y 6 . V e g e t i u s 2 . 12, s t a t e s ,
"Cohortes a tribunis vel a praepositis regebantur" ("the c o h o r t s o u g h t to
b e c o m m a n d e d b y t r i b u n e s o r o t h e r s set over t h e m " ) . T h e con-
tradiction in t h e fact that t h e c o h o r t a p p e a r s as the basic tactical
u n i t b u t t h e c e n t u r i o n is t h e key l e a d e r stems from t h e develop-
m e n t of t h e a r m y from a g e n e r a l citizen levy. F o r a long time al-
ready, t h e t r i b u n e s h a d h a d t h e c h a r a c t e r o f magistrates, whereas
t h e c e n t u r i o n s h a d b e c o m e soldiers p u r e a n d simple.
3. See also t h e passages in M a r q u a r d t , 2: 5 4 5 ; Festus, p. 198, says
that he h a d m o v e d into the position of t h e old accensus (orderly)
a n d on p. 184 that t h e c e n t u r i o n h a d c h o s e n h i m "rerum privatarum
ministrum" ("the o n e w h o a t t e n d s to private affairs").
4. Vegetius 2. 7.
5. D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of t h e E m p i r e we see m a n y titles of m e n
with special functions w h o , in o u r system, w o u l d probably be des-
ignated as privates first-class or as n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers with
administrative functions. See I. H. D r a k e , The principalis of the Early
Empire, 1905, a n d D o m a s z e w s k i , The Rank Structure of the Roman
Army (Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres) 1908.
Chapter IV
Mithridates
Fierce conflicts a m o n g t h e different parties, the defection of al-
lies, a n d a civil war that r a g e d back a n d forth t h r o u g h all of Italy
seemed to be b r e a k i n g up the R o m a n E m p i r e before it was e v e n
completed a n d gave a C a p p a d o c i a n p r i n c e the c o u r a g e to rise up
against R o m e in o r d e r to wrest the G r e e k O r i e n t away from h e r
and u n i t e it u n d e r his h e g e m o n y . Mithridates was by origin a Per-
sian, p e r h a p s a relative of the Persian royal line of A c h a e m e n i d a e ,
by e d u c a t i o n a n d m a n n e r a Greek, a t r u e p r o d u c t of t h e b l e n d i n g
of nationalities by A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t . T h r o u g h wise a n d p o w e r -
ful politics he h a d e x t e n d e d his e m p i r e b e y o n d t h e shores of t h e
Black Sea, a n d the Greeks, d r i v e n to d e s p a i r by the R o m a n officials
a n d tax collectors, shifted for t h e most p a r t over to his side, notably
the A t h e n i a n s .
T h e R o m a n nation s e e m e d to be in c o m p l e t e d i s o r d e r , w h e r e a s
Mithridates was u n i t i n g a n d controlling t h e strengths of his c o u n -
tries with royal a u t h o r i t y . Economically a n d financially the O r i e n t
was u n d o u b t e d l y s t r o n g e r t h a n the Occident; t h e G r e e k world a n d
even t h e body of R o m a n e m i g r a n t s m a d e available to t h e Pontic
King military a n d political talents a n d wise m i n d s in a b u n d a n c e .
T h e a r m i e s o n b o t h sides h a d essentially t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f
m e r c e n a r y units. F r o m all of these points it w o u l d seem t h a t Mith-
r i d a t e s , w h o was h i m s e l f u n d o u b t e d l y a significant p e r s o n a l i t y ,
might well have b e e n a match for t h e R o m a n s .
Nevertheless he was defeated. After all, only p a r t of t h e G r e e k s
went over to his side; a few states, particularly R h o d e s a n d also t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s , stood b y the R o m a n s , a n d the base o f t h e R o m a n
p o w e r was t o o m u c h b r o a d e r a n d t o o m u c h m o r e m i l i t a r i l y
o r i e n t e d t h a n was the King's. Even t h o u g h the G r e e k s gave h i m
c o m m a n d e r s a n d he was able to r e c r u i t m e r c e n a r i e s not only from
his o w n subjects b u t also, as far as his finances allowed, f r o m war-
437
like b a r b a r i a n peoples, he still lacked that o n e t h i n g that was at the

base of Rome's power, t h e military position with the concept of dis-
cipline resting on t h e national-political base of the R o m a n citizen
concept, t h e c e n t u r i o n . With all its internal confusion, the R o m a n
state still h a d e n o u g h solidity to k e e p it from falling a p a r t . A m a n
of genius, Sulla, b e c a m e the c o m m a n d e r of t h e army, a n d with that
step the superiority of t h e R o m a n a r m s was a s s u r e d . We do not
know in detail how t h e war was fought out, since o u r sources have
no m o r e validity t h a n t h e r e p o r t s of A p p i a n on H a n n i b a l ' s battles
o r t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e w a r with t h e C i m b r i a n d t h e T e u t o n e s .
T h e m e m o i r s of Sulla himself, which were used by Plutarch a n d
others, must have been boastful and vague. In the battle of
C h a e r o n e a Sulla is s u p p o s e d to have d e f e a t e d 120,000, or, to take
t h e m o r e m o d e s t figure, 60,000 Asiatics with only 15,000 infantry
a n d 1,500 cavalry of his o w n . E i t h e r 100,000 or 5 0 , 0 0 0 of t h e
e n e m y w e r e r e p o r t e d to have b e e n killed, w h e r e a s only 14 R o m a n s
w e r e missing, 2 of w h o m w e r e f o u n d later. P r e s u m a b l y the entire
account of the battle is a fantasy a n d t h e battle itself a m o u n t s (as
1
o n e of t h e sources r e p o r t s ) to a s u r p r i s e attack, for a short time
later, at almost the same place, n e a r O r c h o m e n u s , Sulla again h a d
to m e e t a n d defeat an Asiatic a r m y of 70,000 or 80,000 m e n , s u p -
p o s e d l y s e n t by M i t h r i d a t e s by s h i p , a l o n g with 10,000 cavalry,
2
after he received the news of t h e first d e f e a t .
Later t h e a r m i e s of Mithridates increased to 500,000 m e n . It is
very possible, however, that t h e R o m a n s h a d not only qualitative
b u t also n u m e r i c a l superiority. It goes without saying that a m a n
like Mithridates was wise e n o u g h n o t to lead into t h e field incom-
p e t e n t masses, which would have to be s u p p l i e d a n d would accom-
plish n o t h i n g worthwhile o n the battlefield. T o maintain e x p e r i e n c e d
m e r c e n a r i e s in t h e field for m a n y years is, however, e x t r e m e l y ex-
pensive, a n d Mithridates h a d to s u p p o r t n o t only a land a r m y b u t
also an i m p o r t a n t fleet. Sulla crossed over with an a r m y of 30,000
m e n a n d first lay siege to A t h e n s . If it a p p e a r s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e
that t h e g r e a t royal a r m y , which was supposedly stationed in Mace-
d o n , m a d e no a t t e m p t to relieve the city, which was d e f e n d i n g itself
with e x t r e m e s t u b b o r n n e s s , t h e e x p l a n a t i o n p r o b a b l y is t h a t t h a t
a r m y existed only in t h e fantasy of o u r sources a n d that in reality
only a very small force was at h a n d , a force t h a t would not risk en-
g a g i n g t h e R o m a n s until the arrival of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s . In view of
the kind of source materials we have, t h e r e is n o t h i n g to be gained
from going into t h e details of these wars.
It m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e to raise at this point t h e striking similar-
ity between t h e a c c o u n t of Marius' war against the C i m b r i a n d
Mithridates 439
T e u t o n e s a n d that of Sulla against Mithridates. C e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of

the two accounts a r e completely parallel. In both cases the soldiers
suddenly b e c a m e afraid at t h e view of t h e g r e a t masses of t h e
enemy; in each account a particularly descriptive r e p o r t is given of
how the e n e m y w a r r i o r s filled t h e air with their noise a n d shouts
and m o c k e d t h e R o m a n s b e h i n d their c a m p fortifications. M a r i u s
had his soldiers dig a canal in o r d e r to h a r d e n t h e m ; Sulla h a d his
m e n deflect t h e c o u r s e o f t h e C e p h i s u s s o t h a t t h e h a r d w o r k
would drive t h e m to p r e f e r fighting. M a r i u s ' soldiers finally d e -
m a n d e d a battle, after they h a d b e c o m e accustomed to t h e terrify-
ing sight of the b a r b a r i a n s ; Sulla's m e n s o u g h t the battle because
they h a d b e c o m e fed up with their digging. Why Archelaus, Mith-
3
ridates' field c o m m a n d e r , did not attack t h e R o m a n s while they
were busy digging receives no m o r e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a n does the inac-
tivity of Marius, w h o allowed the T e u t o n e s to m a r c h by in front of
his c a m p for six days without taking a d v a n t a g e of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
to destroy a sixth of t h e m each day.
W h e n t h e C i m b r i w e r e d e f e a t e d a n d w e r e p o u r i n g back into
their c a m p , they w e r e m e t a n d killed by their o w n wives wielding
axes. W h e n t h e Asiatics w e r e fleeing, A r c h e l a u s o r d e r e d the gates
of the c a m p closed in o r d e r to force t h e m to t u r n back into t h e
battle, a n d , helplessly squeezed t o g e t h e r , their mass was cut d o w n
by the R o m a n s . In o r d e r to h e i g h t e n t h e impression, t h e Cimbri
w o m e n even f o u n d t i m e to p u t on black clothes; the soldiers of
Mithridates h a d so m u c h gold a n d silver on their clothing t h a t the
fear the R o m a n soldiers felt w h e n facing t h e m was increased all the
m o r e . Not only a hugely s u p e r i o r force was c o n q u e r e d by t h e Ro-
m a n s , b u t also a n o u t s t a n d i n g l y c o u r a g e o u s e n e m y ; t h e C i m b r i
chained t o g e t h e r the m e n c o m p o s i n g their f i r s t r a n k , a n d t h e arch-
ers of M i t h r i d a t e s k e p t fighting to t h e very e n d , using t h e i r ar-
rows as swords.
T h e parallel aspect of these accounts is not to be traced back to
some possible imitation of o n e source by t h e o t h e r , b u t r a t h e r it
stems from a psychological process. For t h e sake of attaining t h e
g r e a t e s t possible d e g r e e of glorification t h e writers h a v e almost
completely s u p p r e s s e d the truly historical events a n d so finally ar-
rived at such g e n e r a l types a n d descriptions as to m a k e t h e o n e
leader a n d the o n e war look almost exactly like t h e o t h e r leader
a n d t h e o t h e r war. O n l y a t times t h e r e comes t h r o u g h t h e i m p r e s -
sion t h a t we a r e h e r e dealing with Marius, t h e coarse t r o o p e r , a n d
t h e r e with t h e blase aristocrat, Sulla; h e r e with t h e r o u g h sons of
t h e N o r t h , t h e r e with the Asiatic king, Mithridates.
It is t h e same psychological process t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e Swiss ac-
c o u n t of the B u r g u n d i a n W a r s with precisely t h e same scenes a n d

c h a r a c t e r s as a r e f o u n d in the G r e e k accounts of the Persian Wars,
but with t h e difference that in these latter cases we have a p o p u l a r
fantasy that, with all its f r e e d o m , is still c o m p l e t e e n o u g h a n d basi-
cally truthful a n d interested e n o u g h in the events themselves not to
let t h e actual facts d i s a p p e a r , even t h o u g h they are t r a n s f o r m e d
a n d embellished. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e R o m a n accounts o f the
victories of Marius a n d Sulla w e r e the p r o d u c t s of the i n a d e q u a t e
fantasy of vain rhetoricians w h o w e r e completely indifferent to the
events themselves.
T h e sources o n t h e c a m p a i g n s i n which Lucullus a n d P o m p e y ,
after the war h a d b r o k e n o u t anew, finally c o n q u e r e d first Mithri-
d a t e s a n d t h e n King T i g r a n e s o f A r m e n i a a r e o f entirely t h e same
4
type a n d for o u r p u r p o s e , a t any r a t e , a r e w i t h o u t v a l u e . T h e
King of A r m e n i a , w h o , as he looked at t h e R o m a n a r m y , m a d e the
famous s t a t e m e n t " T o o m a n y for a diplomatic mission, too few for
an a r m y , " was himself t h e ruler of only a medium-sized area, which,
mostly m o u n t a i n o u s , could not provide food for a large p o p u l a t i o n
a n d t h e r e f o r e could not have raised a large a r m y , a n d the A r m e -
nians have rarely b e e n k n o w n for particularly warlike qualities.
1. M e m n o n , who also says not a w o r d a b o u t t h e second battle.

Episodes of the History of Greece (Fragmenta historiae Graeciae) (ed.
C a r o l u s Müller), 3. 5 4 2 .
2. K r o m a y e r , Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) Vol. 2, has
tried to r e c o n s t r u c t at C h a e r o n e a a full-fledged battle, s o m e t h i n g
that has j u s t as little c o r r o b o r a t i o n in t h e sources a n d is objectively
j u s t as impossible as t h e same a u t h o r ' s battle of Magnesia. It would
be s u p e r f l u o u s to give detailed p r o o f for this.
3. T h a t the largest p a r t of the a r m y h a d s p r e a d o u t to plunder is
not a sufficient reason, for if t h e r e m a i n d e r was m u c h weaker t h a n
t h e R o m a n s , we must ask ourselves again why Sulla did n o t take
a d v a n t a g e of this o p p o r t u n i t y to attack.
4. K. E c k h a r d t , Die armenischen Feldzüge des Lucullus, Berlin disser-
tation 1909, Klio, Vols. 9 a n d 10. T h e military-objective analysis is
not incisive e n o u g h . N o r does G r ö b e , in Deutsche. Literaturzeitung,
Vol. 4 7 , 1910, a g r e e with h i m .
Chapter V
1
Romans and Parthians
T h e c a m p a i g n against t h e P a r t h i a n s u n d e r t a k e n b y C r a s s u s a s
g o v e r n o r of Syria forms a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e wars against Mithri-
dates a n d T i g r a n e s . T h e P a r t h i a n s w e r e a p e o p l e closely related to
the Persians, a n d t h e i r m e t h o d s of fighting w e r e precisely those of
the ancient Persians. T h e y f o u g h t as cavalry a n d a r c h e r s , b u t as t h e
Persians h a d d o n e , these m o u n t e d m e n also c a r r i e d close-combat
weapons, principally spears, in a d d i t i o n to their bows.
On t h e basis of certain e x p r e s s i o n s in t h e sources, writers h a v e
tried to establish the distinction t h a t t h e g r e a t mass of P a r t h i a n
warriors was c o m p o s e d of lightly a r m e d b o n d s m e n , w h e r e a s a quite
small n u m b e r o f f r e e m e n w e r e a r m o r e d knights. T h i s c o n c e p t m a y
not be completely without a t h r e a d of fact, but t h e r e is really n o t h -
ing specific o n this p o i n t , a n d t h e r e a r e n o f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g t h e events that m i g h t be d r a w n from this.
T h e R o m a n a r m y h a d a s t r e n g t h of seven legions, 4,000 cavalry,
a n d 4,000 light infantry. T h e s e a p p e a r to be very significant n u m -
bers, b u t since t h e legions w e r e not at full s t r e n g t h , t h e total esti-
mate m u s t b e limited t o 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , w h e r e a s A l e x a n d e r ' s a r m y
is said to h a v e n u m b e r e d 47,000 m e n . F u r t h e r , A l e x a n d e r ' s a r m y
was m o r e favorably c o m p o s e d for the i m p e n d i n g battle t h a n was
t h e R o m a n a r m y : i t h a d 7,000 c a v a l r y m e n w h e r e a s t h e R o m a n s
h a d only 4 , 0 0 0 . We c a n n o t establish with certainty how m a n y of t h e
M a c e d o n i a n infantry a r e to be c o n s i d e r e d as lightly a r m e d m e n .
In Plutarch's Crassus we have a quite t h o r o u g h , t h o u g h a n e c d o t a l ,
description of t h e events of the R o m a n c a m p a i g n , a n d t h e r e is also
an account in Dio Cassius. T h e following basic facts can t h e r e f o r e
be established with a certain d e g r e e of probability.
It is not clear from the sources j u s t w h e r e Crassus eventually in-
t e n d e d t o c o n d u c t his m a r c h ; p e r h a p s t o Seleucia. T h e P a r t h i a n s
did not await the R o m a n s on t h e o t h e r side of t h e Tigris b u t c a m e
441
o u t t o meet t h e m o n the M e s o p o t a m i a n plain, a n d the e n c o u n t e r

took place after a few days' m a r c h . T h e P a r t h i a n s succeeded in lur-
ing a p o r t i o n of the R o m a n cavalry into an a m b u s h a n d destroying
t h e m . T h i s force was u n d e r the c o m m a n d of the y o u n g e r Crassus,
son of t h e a r m y c o m m a n d e r , w h o h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself in
Gaul u n d e r Caesar a n d h a d b r o u g h t 1,000 Gallic cavalry to j o i n his
father. T h e R o m a n a r m y was now no l o n g e r in a position to con-
tinue its offensive but h a d to t u r n back. If we c o m p a r e its situation
with that of t h e 10,000 G r e e k s after the battle of C u n a x a , t h e Ro-
m a n s do not yet seem to have b e e n in so m u c h d a n g e r . M o u n t e d
a r c h e r s c a n n o t really do so m u c h d a m a g e to a closed infantry for-
mation with g o o d protective w e a p o n s , a n d the plaintive accounts in
o u r sources c o n c e r n i n g t h e a w e s o m e s h o o t i n g b y the P a r t h i a n s ,
w h o were a c c o m p a n i e d by whole camel loads of reserve arrows so
that they w o u l d not r u n o u t of a m m u n i t i o n , s h o u l d not be allowed
to deceive us into t h i n k i n g that these m o u n t e d a r c h e r s were any-
t h i n g o t h e r t h a n those w h o m we already know from o u r study of
military history a n d principally from the ancient Persian-Greek bat-
tles. To o p p o s e t h e m the R o m a n s still h a d , after all, a certain mass
of light infantry, w h o could shoot m u c h m o r e accurately on foot
t h a n the P a r t h i a n s o n horseback, a n d also t h e r e m a i n d e r o f their
cavalry, which c o u l d m a k e sorties i f t h e e n e m y p r e s s e d i n too
closely.
In addition, it was r e p o r t e d of the P a r t h i a n s j u s t as it h a d b e e n
of the Persians that in the e v e n i n g they m o v e d off to a position far
from their foe, so as not to be e x p o s e d to a night attack, t h u s giv-
ing the R o m a n s the possibility of m a k i n g u n d i s t u r b e d night
m a r c h e s . Finally, the withdrawal that the R o m a n s h a d to m a k e was
quite short, certainly not to be c o m p a r e d with the m a r c h of the
T e n T h o u s a n d . T h e i r e n c o u n t e r with t h e P a r t h i a n s took place o n e
day's m a r c h south of C a r r h a e , southeast of Edessa, only some 45
2
miles from the E u p h r a t e s .
If, nevertheless, the G r e e k s h a d escaped while the R o m a n a r m y
was almost wiped o u t d u r i n g its retreat, t h e r e a s o n should not be
s o u g h t in any special c o u r a g e of the P a r t h i a n s , for the Persians,
too, h a d not b e e n lacking in p e r s o n a l c o u r a g e . A n d we a r e also not
inclined to attribute l a r g e r n u m b e r s to the P a r t h i a n s t h a n to the
P e r s i a n s (even after r e d u c i n g greatly t h e e x a g g e r a t e d n u m b e r s
given by the Greeks). T h e sources m a k e m u c h of the treachery of a
ruling prince of this r e g i o n ; it is not clear, however, j u s t what h a r m
h e really c a u s e d t h e R o m a n s e x c e p t for r e p o r t e d l y giving t h e m
false advice a n d fleeing with his troops b e f o r e the battle. At the
Romans and Parthians 443
particular place w h e r e we w o u l d expect it, the account of the d e -

feat o f t h e R o m a n cavalry, t h e r e i s n o m e n t i o n o f h i m o r his
treachery, so t h a t the R o m a n loss c a n n o t be a t t r i b u t e d to this be-
trayal. I p r e f e r to believe t h a t t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g factor is to be
found in t h e fact that, in t h e earlier situation, the Persians u n d e r
T i s s a p h e r n e s did not consider it necessary to o v e r p o w e r the G r e e k
army t h r o u g h t h e i r o w n b l o o d s h e d ; they h o p e d that the invaders
would be completely wiped out in t h e C a d u s i a n M o u n t a i n s , a n d if
the Cadusii h a d to suffer losses in the process, so m u c h the b e t t e r
from t h e Persian viewpoint. T h e P a r t h i a n s , however, h a d to base
their actions n o t only on driving the R o m a n s back b u t also on mak-
ing it impossible for t h e m to r e n e w t h e i r a d v a n c e later, a n d their
success in d o i n g this is attributable to the g r e a t mass of the R o m a n
army. X e n o p h o n ' s G r e e k s n u m b e r e d 13,000, or, with all their or-
derlies, p r o b a b l y n o t m o r e t h a n 2 0 , 0 0 0 , w i t h o u t a l a r g e s u p p l y
t r a i n . T h e R o m a n s , e v e n a f t e r t h e d e f e a t o f t h e i r cavalry, still
n u m b e r e d 3 0 , 0 0 0 c o m b a t a n t s , with very large supply trains, for a
total certainly a m o u n t i n g to between 50,000 a n d 70,000 individuals.
T h i s great mass was u n a b l e to escape from the e n e m y by m e a n s of
fast m a r c h e s , particularly night m a r c h e s , which h a d b e e n so helpful
for the G r e e k s .
T h e R o m a n s d i d split their forces, it is t r u e , after r e a c h i n g Car-
r h a e a n d t a k i n g u p the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f their m a r c h from t h e r e .
O n e corps, with the a r m y c o m m a n d e r himself, instead of m o v i n g
westward t o w a r d the E u p h r a t e s , t u r n e d t o w a r d the n o r t h i n o r d e r
to seek cover in t h e A r m e n i a n m o u n t a i n s , but its situation was wors-
ened by s p r e a d i n g demoralization. T h e final c a t a s t r o p h e was not
b r o u g h t on by a g e n e r a l battle b u t by negotiations, in which C r a s -
sus s h o w e d the weakness of allowing himself to participate p e r s o n -
ally a n d i n w h i c h , w h e t h e r b e c a u s e suspicion c a u s e d m i s u n d e r -
standings or t h e P a r t h i a n s c a r r i e d o u t an intentional betrayal, he
was killed.
T w o legions which w e r e f o r m e d from t h e r e m n a n t s of Crassus'
a r m y f o u g h t later at Pharsalus u n d e r P o m p e y against Caesar.
ANTONY
It is a p p r o p r i a t e at this point to follow up the account of the d e -

feat of Crassus by o u r observations of t h e c a m p a i g n in which A n -
tony u n d e r t o o k seventeen years later (36 B.C.) to avenge t h e dis-
h o n o r of C a r r h a e . It a p p e a r s that he p r e p a r e d his c a m p a i g n very
c a r e f u l l y . H i s a r m y was m o r e t h a n t w i c e a s l a r g e a s t h a t o f
3
C r a s s u s , i n c l u d i n g no less t h a n 10,000 cavalry, a n d it h a d slingers
whose shots c a r r i e d f a r t h e r t h a n t h e P a r t h i a n a r r o w s a n d could

4
even p e n e t r a t e a r m o r .
A n t o n y crossed the E u p h r a t e s at the same point as Crassus (near
Z e u g m a ) a n d took t h e s a m e direction a n d even a p p r o x i m a t e l y the
same r o u t e that A l e x a n d e r h a d once followed, directly from west to
east, w h e r e t h e A r m e n i a n - C a d u s i a n M o u n t a i n s level off into the
p l a i n , t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h t h e cities o f E d e s s a , Nisibis, T i -
g r a n o c e r t a lie (or used to lie). T h e P a r t h i a n s did not risk attacking
this a r m y . A n t o n y crossed t h e Tigris, a n d , h o l d i n g his easterly di-
rection, he d r o v e into Media ( A t r o p a t e n e ) , which f o r m e d a Parthi-
a n vassal state u n d e r K i n g A r t a v a s d e s . H e r e t h e R o m a n s w e r e
s u p p o s e d to be j o i n e d by their ally, the king of A r m e n i a , w h o was
also n a m e d Artavasdes, with an i m p o r t a n t force. A n t o n y ' s plan a p -
p a r e n t l y was to d e p e n d on A r m e n i a as a base a n d first of all to win
Media over from the P a r t h i a n side to the R o m a n . T h e question has
b e e n raised: W h y d i d n ' t h e move d o w n along t h e E u p h r a t e s into
t h e fertile a r e a of central Mesopotamia, w h e r e the large G r e e k city
of Seleucia was awaiting t h e R o m a n s as liberators? T h e P a r t h i a n
kings lived in C t e s i p h o n , a s u b u r b of Seleucia, so driving t h e m o u t
w o u l d already have constituted a g r e a t success. T h e answer p r o b a -
bly is that it was no easy m a t t e r for a large a r m y to c o n t i n u e the
offensive from Seleucia o v e r t h e m o u n t a i n s to P a r t h i a . If Media
was successfully p e r s u a d e d , h o w e v e r , t o j o i n t h e R o m a n s , t h e
P a r t h i a n s would have b e e n forced to give up M e s o p o t a m i a anyhow,
a n d t h e R o m a n s would h a v e b e e n in a g o o d position to c o n t i n u e
t h e war in any direction. A n t o n y t h e r e f o r e took t h e r o u t e to t h e
M e d i a n capital, P h r a a s p a , t o d a y p r o b a b l y T a c h t i S u l e i m a n (190
miles east of G a u g a m e l a ) , w h e r e King Artavasdes kept his family
a n d his t r e a s u r e . T h e R o m a n s probably e s t i m a t e d that, o n c e they
h a d t a k e n this city, Artavasdes, to w h o m they could offer favorable
c o n d i t i o n s , w o u l d subject h i m s e l f t o t h e m j u s t a s his n a m e s a k e
f r o m A r m e n i a h a d d o n e . In o r d e r to carry o u t t h e siege with im-
posing s p e e d , the R o m a n a r m y was c a r r y i n g a l o n g its siege engines,
i n c l u d i n g an 80-foot b a t t e r i n g r a m , for no h a r d w o o d grew in At-
r o p a t e n e . T h e s e e n g i n e s , which could be m o v e d only very slowly,
w e r e p r o t e c t e d by two legions, while A n t o n y himself moved a h e a d
with t h e m a i n b o d y in o r d e r to a p p e a r quickly b e f o r e the fortress
a n d initiate the siege.
T h e n i t h a p p e n e d that the following train, u n d e r the c o m m a n d
of O p p i u s Statianus, allowed itself to be attacked by surprise by the
P a r t h i a n s , a n d i t was w i p e d o u t a n d t h e siege e n g i n e s w e r e d e -
stroyed. We do n o t know the details of this e n g a g e m e n t , b u t it is
u n i m a g i n a b l e t h a t this could h a v e h a p p e n e d without the R o m a n

general's having c o m m i t t e d the most serious e r r o r s . T o d e f e n d his
long w a g o n t r a i n s with two legions against the P a r t h i a n cavalry
a r m y was of c o u r s e impossible, a n d an attack by the Parthians mov-
ing up from the s o u t h was to be foreseen, since the R o m a n s w e r e ,
in fact, m a k i n g a k i n d of flanking m a r c h across their front. It is
impossible, h o w e v e r , t h a t A n t o n y d i d n o t assign some cavalry to
this force, which would have b e e n b o t h able a n d also obliged to ob-
serve a n d r e p o r t p r o m p t l y the a p p r o a c h o f the P a r t h i a n s . T h e n the
R o m a n s would necessarily have p r e p a r e d a fortified c a m p , in which
they would have b e e n able to d e f e n d themselves very well against
the e n e m y cavalry until A n t o n y c a m e to relieve t h e m . But r e g a r d -
less of w h o b o r e the b l a m e for this carelessness, t h e b a c k b o n e of
Antony's c a m p a i g n plan was b r o k e n by this defeat—all the m o r e so,
in fact, w h e n t h e A r m e n i a n King Artavasdes, f r i g h t e n e d by this
news b u t p r e s u m a b l y , d e e p in his h e a r t , not so very u n h a p p y over
it, t u r n e d a b o u t with his a r m y , which h a d not yet j o i n e d up with
the R o m a n s , a n d r e t u r n e d into his o w n c o u n t r y in o r d e r to d e f e n d
it a n d to save himself.
A n t o n y h a d e n o u g h t o u g h n e s s , however, not t o give u p yet, a n d
he tried to take P h r a a s p a with i m p r o v i s e d siege e n g i n e s a n d also
moved a bit f a r t h e r into t h e c o u n t r y , h o p i n g to lure the P a r t h i a n s
into a battle. O n e m i g h t well ask why he did not divide up his still
mighty a r m y , which t h e P a r t h i a n s did not d a r e to face. T h e cir-
c u m f e r e n c e of T a c h t i - S u l e i m a n is only 1,330 paces; a m o d e r a t e -
sized corps would t h e r e f o r e have sufficed to s u r r o u n d the fortress
a n d carry o u t the siege. It could have d e f e n d e d itself against t h e
Parthian cavalry with a circumvallation while the main b o d y con-
tinued o n t o w a r d Ecbatana o r t o H y r c a n i a . B u t p r e s u m a b l y n o t h -
ing would have b e e n accomplished by d o i n g that. E v e r y t h i n g d e -
p e n d e d o n w h e t h e r they took A t r o p a t e n e away from the P a r t h i a n s .
F r o m that base they would have b e e n able to c o n t i n u e the war; to
c o n t i n u e pressing f o r w a r d into e n e m y territory without that base
would have b e e n e x t r e m e l y d a n g e r o u s . After t h e brilliant victory of
the P a r t h i a n s against O p p i u s Statianus, certainly t h e King of At-
r o p a t e n e would not have b e e n p e r s u a d e d to c h a n g e sides by any-
t h i n g less t h a n t h e c a p t u r e o f P h r a a s p a . B u t A n t o n y h a d t h e
f u r t h e r u n h a p p y e x p e r i e n c e , after h e h a d m o v e d away from the
city o n c e , of having the b e l e a g u e r e d g a r r i s o n m a k e a successful sor-
tie a n d b u r n u p his a p p r o a c h causeway (Annäherungsdamm). E n -
r a g e d , the c o m m a n d e r s e n t e n c e d two cohorts, which w e r e b l a m e d
for n o t having fought well e n o u g h , to the ultimate p u n i s h m e n t , dec-
i m a t i o n . Finally, w h e n f o r a g i n g p r o d u c e d n o f u r t h e r provisions
from the s u r r o u n d i n g a r e a a n d t h e r e s e e m e d t o b e n o prospect for
the early c a p t u r e of t h e fortress, t h e r e was n o t h i n g left to do but
take u p the withdrawal.
Probably less because his a r m y would have b e e n no l o n g e r capa-
ble of fighting t h a n because he could no l o n g e r h o p e to find provi-
sions a l o n g t h e invasion r o u t e which he h a d followed, A n t o n y took
a n o t h e r r o u t e . I n s t e a d of crossing the M e s o p o t a m i a n plain, he took
t h e r o a d into the m o u n t a i n s , t o w a r d t h e n o r t h , t h r o u g h A r m e n i a ,
5
w h e r e the King, his ally, would have to p r o v i d e him with victuals.
On this r e t r e a t the P a r t h i a n s still c a u s e d h i m considerable losses,
a n d even t h o u g h t h e R o m a n s w e r e victorious in each actual battle,
r e p u l s i n g a n d d r i v i n g off the P a r t h i a n s , the a r m y ' s m o r a l e was still
strongly s h a k e n , a n d A n t o n y c o n s i d e r e d it advisable not to break
c a m p in the m o r n i n g , as was c u s t o m a r y , b u t at m i d d a y , in o r d e r to
gain as m u c h time as possible for an u n d i s t u r b e d m a r c h toward
6
evening.
T h e c a m p a i g n s o f Crassus a n d A n t o n y direct o u r attention both
to t h e future a n d the past. We shall have occasion to refer back to
t h e m w h e n we e x p l o r e , in the next v o l u m e , the r e a s o n s why
M e s o p o t a m i a c o n t i n u e d to be t h e limit of the R o m a n a r e a of influ-
e n c e a n d n o R o m a n c o m m a n d e r was able t o r e p e a t A l e x a n d e r ' s
expedition.
But h e r e again we ask how it was possible for t h e King of the
small c o u n t r y o f M a c e d o n t o s u b d u e all o f Asia t o t h e I n d u s ,
w h e r e a s R o m a n a r m i e s j u s t a s l a r g e a n d m u c h l a r g e r t h a n his
failed in the a t t e m p t a n d were wiped o u t . A l e x a n d e r ' s genius is not
a sufficient e x p l a n a t i o n ; in the m e a n t i m e t h e occidental art of war-
fare h a d b e e n d e v e l o p e d so greatly in the R o m a n c o h o r t tactics a n d
the military o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e R o m a n s h a d b e c o m e so m u c h m o r e
massive t h a n that of t h e M a c e d o n i a n s t h a t A l e x a n d e r ' s personality
alone can not have c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d these d e v e l o p m e n t s .
T h e strategic f o r m o f A n t o n y ' s c a m p a i g n has a n even g r e a t e r
similarity to A l e x a n d e r ' s G a u g a m e l a c a m p a i g n t h a n is at first a p -
p a r e n t . After a certain p e r i o d of time following the P a r t h i a n s ' d e -
feat of Crassus, they h a d g o n e over to t h e offensive again, b u t they
were finally beaten by one of Antony's lieutenants in northern
Syria. T h i s defeat can be c o m p a r e d with t h a t of Issus: a b o u t the
s a m e provinces that Darius still held after Issus f o r m e d t h e Parthi-
a n e m p i r e o f K i n g P h r a a t e s IV, against w h o m A n t o n y took t h e
field. As we h a v e seen, t h e R o m a n took almost t h e same r o u t e as
A l e x a n d e r t h r o u g h u p p e r M e s o p o t a m i a , also probably crossed t h e
Tigris in the s a m e a r e a , a n d , like A l e x a n d e r , h a d no e n e m y en-

c o u n t e r s b e f o r e this c r o s s i n g . W h a t w o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d i f
Darius, instead of taking up a battle position n e a r G a u g a m e l a , h a d
avoided battle as P h r a a t e s did a n d h a d limited himself to the d e -
fense of his fortified places, c u t t i n g off t h e supply of provisions to
the Macedonians?
In o r d e r to be able to carry o u t this kind of strategy, a p e o p l e
and a state must have a s t r o n g will to resist. Even after their defeat
at G a u g a m e l a t h e Persians could have d e f e n d e d themselves in t h e
m a n n e r of t h e P a r t h i a n s , b u t all the l a r g e cities—Babylon, Susa,
Persepolis, E c b a t a n a — o p e n e d their gates to t h e M a c e d o n i a n s with-
out any o p p o s i t i o n ; in fact, t h e local c o m m a n d e r s e v e n invited
t h e m to c o m e , a n d soon the fugitive K i n g was d e t h r o n e d a n d m u r -
d e r e d by o n e of his satraps. D a r i u s C o d o m a n n u s himself s t e m m e d
from a s e c o n d a r y b r a n c h of the A c h a e m e n i d a e a n d h a d only c o m e
to the t h r o n e t h r o u g h a palace revolution, o n e of m a n y . We m u s t
not overlook this i n n e r weakness of the Persian E m p i r e w h e n we
consider t h e i n c o m p a r a b l e successes o f A l e x a n d e r . T h e P a r t h i a n
e m p i r e r e p r e s e n t e d a n Asiatic r e a c t i o n against t h e H e l l e n i c -
Macedonian h e g e m o n y but still not o n e o f p u r e b a r b a r i s m ; r a t h e r ,
it was m a r k e d by a certain b l e n d i n g of Hellenic cultural e l e m e n t s .
On t h e day t h e victory at C a r r h a e was c e l e b r a t e d , a t r a g e d y of
Euripides was p r e s e n t e d at t h e c o u r t of t h e P a r t h i a n King. W h e n
Antiochus I I I of Syria e x t e n d e d his e m p i r e o n c e again as far as
India (209 B . C ) , h e was nevertheless u n a b l e simply t o s u b d u e t h e
Parthians a n d Bactrians b u t h a d t o g r a n t t h e m the status o f semi-
i n d e p e n d e n t vassal nations. W h e n A n t i o c h u s V I I again u n d e r t o o k
t o restore t h e G r e a t e r Syrian K i n g d o m a n d h a d d r i v e n victoriously
into Media, his soldiers, divided up a m o n g various winter q u a r t e r s
for convenience in s u p p l y i n g t h e m , w e r e attacked a n d killed by t h e
inhabitants (129 B . C . ) . N o w h e r e did A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t e n c o u n t e r
this k i n d o f resistance. T h e P e r s i a n E m p i r e which h e d e s t r o y e d
was, to be s u r e , very large, b u t it was internally decayed a n d unsta-
ble. T h i s observation is in no way to be i n t e r p r e t e d as a belated d e -
traction of the p e r s o n a l i m p o r t a n c e of A l e x a n d e r , j u s t as N a p o l e o n
loses n o n e of his laurels w h e n we recognize how weak t h e m o n a r -
chy of Frederick the G r e a t h a d b e c o m e in 1806. Persia was a l r e a d y
u n d e r g o i n g a sort of internal dissolution w h e n t h e M a c e d o n i a n at-
tack a p p r o a c h e d . T h i s u n q u e s t i o n a b l e fact makes all t h e G r e e k ac-
counts of the a r r o g a n c e a n d the confidence of t h e Persian c o u r t
a p p e a r very d o u b t f u l , a n d from this point of view it is also most
i m p r o b a b l e t h a t Darius would have b e e n able to raise two s t r o n g
armies, o n e after t h e o t h e r . T o accomplish that o n e m u s t have not

only a tight national o r g a n i z a t i o n , an efficient a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to as-
s u r e t h e supply of provisions, b u t also g o o d will f r o m below. All of
these things w e r e already lacking in t h e Persian E m p i r e ; a n d so we
also h a v e h e r e a n a d d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t t o t h e effect t h a t Darius'
armies w e r e not only n o t large b u t w e r e even n u m e r i c a l l y smaller
t h a n the M a c e d o n i a n a r m i e s .
EXCURSUS
I have established a significantly different picture of Antony's campaign from that

which has been painted up to now, especially by Gutschmidt in his History of Iran
(Geschichte Irans) (1888) and Gardthausen in Augustus and his Times (Augustus und seine
Zeit) (1891).
We assume that all our reports go back to a single source, a c o m p a n i o n of An-
tony, Dellius. From this source some historians have taken this, others have taken
that, and each has colored his account with his o w n subjective treatment. T h e point
of view in Plutarch is favorable to Antony, whereas that in D i o Cassius and in the
lesser Latin writers w h o refer back to Livy is hostile toward h i m (Gutschmidt, p. 97,
footnote 3). T h e basic point, however, is that Dellius, a l t h o u g h he was quite well in-
f o r m e d concerning the events themselves, apparently either knew n o t h i n g or under-
stood nothing of the real relationship of these things. His principal interest lay in
anteroom gossip about the c o m m a n d e r w h o forgot the principles of warfare because
he was pining for Cleopatra and in rhetorical embellishments. T h e Parthians' horses
were s u p p o s e d to have b e e n f r i g h t e n e d by the clanking of the w e a p o n s of the
Roman legions and therefore took to flight. W h e n Antony was about to start out on
his withdrawal, a wise man had to c o m e to him, a former soldier of Crassus w h o had
been a prisoner of the Parthians for seventeen years, and i n f o r m the R o m a n com-
m a n d e r that the Parthian cavalry was less d a n g e r o u s in the m o u n t a i n s than on the
plain. T h e R o m a n s formed an overhead cover of j o i n e d shields against the Parthian
arrows, and the Parthians took that for a sign that the R o m a n s were finished, but
suddenly the Romans stormed out on them again. All of these stories as well as all
the figures given for the army strengths of the Parthians m u s t naturally be com-
pletely rejected.
C o n c e r n i n g Antony's march forward at the start of the c a m p a i g n , Gardthausen
(Vol. 2, Part 11, p. 153) says that the route cannot be u n d e r s t o o d but that there is
also no doubt of it, since the sources indicate that A n t o n y m a r c h e d t h r o u g h Ar-
menia. Armenia, however, like Arabia, is a m u c h too indefinite geographical expres-
sion and our sources are e x p o s e d in such details to m u c h t o o many misunderstand-
ings for us to ascribe to a c o m m a n d e r like A n t o n y s o m e t h i n g completely nonsensi-
cal, simply on the basis of a few such words in the accounts; a n d least of all w h e n we
consider that the report in Plutarch (Antony, Chapter 37) r e a d s as follows: Antony
marched (from Zeugma) "through Arabia and Armenia." F r o m the objective point
of view, however: why should he have avoided the plain? He was certainly strong
e n o u g h in all arms to offer the Parthians battle, and he s o u g h t to do so.
Gardthausen himself (Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 295) points out quite correctly that Antony
crossed the Euphrates near Zeugma and marched t h r o u g h O s r h o e n e and Mygdonia
to the Tigris and then continued south of Lake Urmia. That is the straight line that
continues on to Phraaspa. Armenia cannot be p u s h e d into that area, and it is either
to be eliminated completely or to be considered in its broadest interpretation, which
includes u p p e r Mesopotamia.
A n d with this there d i s a p p e a r s , too, the idea that A n t o n y p l a n n e d to invade
Parthia f r o m the n o r t h ; further, this c o n c e p t is c o n t r a d i c t e d by the s t a t e m e n t
(Gardthausen, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 295) that he marched south of Lake Urmia.
We must also eliminate the idea that Antony deceived and surprised the Parthians
with his campaign plan; the route he followed was the quite normal o n e , and further-
more the approach of such a huge army can be noticed so long in advance that
King Phraates did not have to take any particular pains to learn of this in plenty of
time.
T h e retreat was, of course, not without its difficulties and losses, but with the
strong cavalry and the excellent slingers that the R o m a n s still had available, the
Parthians cannot possibly have h a r m e d them so very m u c h . T h e descriptions of the
suffering and dangers, as well as that of the despair of the c o m m a n d e r , are rhetori-
cal exaggerations.
(Added in the s e c o n d edition.) T h e study of this c a m p a i g n by K r o m a y e r , in
Hermes, Vol. 3 1 , 1896, was not yet known to me w h e n I wrote the foregoing. I can-
not agree with it e v e n now, however, but consider it as e r r o n e o u s in its decisive
point. Kromayer believes that Antony did not feel strong e n o u g h with the army he
had assembled at Zeugma to confront the Parthians on the Mesopotamian plain and
therefore took the route t h r o u g h Armenia, making a h u g e circle toward the north,
in order to be able to find protection from the mountains while on the march and to
draw in reinforcements: the R o m a n troops u n d e r Crassus, who had fought in the
Caucasus in the previous year, and the army of the A r m e n i a n Artavasdes. T h e
source-based proof, however, that he seeks to cite for this march fails to make the
point—one only n e e d s to read again in context the passages he cites—and from the
objective viewpoint it is completely incredible that Antony, who, e v e n if a few corps
had not yet j o i n e d him, still had a huge army at hand, should have avoided a battle
with the Parthians. In the p r e c e d i n g years his lieutenant Ventidius had already de-
feated the Parthians a n u m b e r of times in large battles, and Antony had no less than
10,000 cavalry. Of course, the account of the 16,000 heavy cavalrymen that the
Armenian Artavasdes was s u p p o s e d to add to the R o m a n numbers is pure fable.
T h e reinforcements that Antony would have gained on his northern march in the
form of Artavasdes' contingent and perhaps Crassus' corps would have been largely
counterbalanced just by the march losses in m e n and materiel which would have re-
sulted from the d e t o u r o f m o r e than 4 5 0 miles t h r o u g h m o u n t a i n o u s country.
When Kromayer points out that Caesar, too, intended to march against the Parthi-
ans through Little A r m e n i a , he d o e s not consider that Caesar c a m e from Rome,
whereas Antony's army c a m e from Syria; consequently, what would have been the
direct route for Caesar was a d e t o u r for Antony.
1. T h e c h a n g e s I h a v e m a d e in this c h a p t e r a r e based on t h e
painstaking w o r k of Francis Smith in t h e Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.
115, 1916.
2. Regling, "Crassus' W a r Against t h e P a r t h i a n s " "Crassus' P a r t h -
erkrieg," Klio, Vol. 7, 1907.
3. A c c o r d i n g to G a r d t h a u s e n , Vol. II, P a r t 1, p. 150, footnote 6,
the figures for the s t r e n g t h of t h e R o m a n a r m y vary between 13
a n d 18 legions. T h e A r m e n i a n r e i n f o r c i n g t r o o p s should also be
a d d e d t o that n u m b e r .
4. Dio Cassius 4 9 . 2 6 .
5. P l u t a r c h , Antonius, C h a p t e r 4 9 , conclusion. Dio 49. 3 1 .
6. T h i s is how F r o n t i n u s , Stratagemetos 2. 13. 7, is to be u n d e r -
stood.
BOOK VII
Caesar
Chapter I
Introduction
Up to this point we h a v e p r e f e r r e d to follow t h e m e t h o d of set-
ting aside the strict c h r o n o l o g y of events in o r d e r to gain, e i t h e r
systematically or t h r o u g h the t r e a t m e n t of a particular battle, a firm
concept of the tactics of t h e p e r i o d a n d only t h e n , p r o c e e d i n g from
this definite base, to go into o u r study of t h e strategy. With Caesar
it is n o t necessary to p r o c e e d in this way. All t h e individual ele-
ments of his art of g e n e r a l s h i p a r e a l r e a d y k n o w n to us; we have
only to show how t h r o u g h his application of t h e m he b r o u g h t t h e
art of ancient w a r f a r e to its a p o g e e a n d m u s t t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d
as t h e greatest military artist of antiquity.
A s t h o r o u g h l y a n d excellently a s w e a r e i n f o r m e d o f Caesar's
c a m p a i g n s t h r o u g h his own writings, however, we still suffer from
the lack of s o u r c e material on t h e o t h e r side. Even in t h e case of
the civil war, t h e r e p o r t s from P o m p e y ' s a n d t h e Senate's side a r e
insignificantly m e a g e r a n d v a g u e in c o m p a r i s o n with the b r o a d ac-
c o u n t o f C a e s a r a n d his s u p p o r t e r s , a n d o n t h e G a l l o - G e r m a n i c
wars we have simply n o t h i n g except the r e p o r t s of the victorious
R o m a n s . We m u s t not forget that for a m o m e n t , a n d we c a n n o t say
the scholars have f o r g o t t e n it in t h e past, b u t they could do n o t h -
ing, so to s p e a k ; t h e y w e r e helpless. I m m e a s u r a b l e as t h e c o m -
pleteness of descriptive writings is on t h e wars of Caesar, critical
analysis has still n o t really b r o k e n t h r o u g h . S u c h studies lacked
m e a n s of c o m i n g to grips with t h e g r e a t c o m m a n d e r , w h o was his
own historian a n d no less a great o n e for that, a n d of c o m i n g to
the r o o t o f t h i n g s t h r o u g h their u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f him. T h a t r e -
q u i r e d tools that could only be c r e a t e d gradually, in long, successive
steps: a k n o w l e d g e of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d tactics of the t r o o p s , of
the m e a n i n g o f technical expressions, g e o g r a p h i c a l a n d t o p o g r a p h i -
cal s t u d i e s , a n d t h e e s t a b l i s h i n g o f d e f i n i t e s t a t i s t i c s o n t h e
s t r e n g t h s of t h e armies. T o d a y all of t h e s e prerequisites have b e e n
453
so broadly d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h the work of generations o

philologists, archaeologists, historians and military men and
t h r o u g h travels, excavations, a n d methodical c o m p a r i s o n s that criti-
cal scholars may risk t a k i n g up t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the titan,
looking him in the eye a n d forcing him to reveal his real self.
EXCURSUS
1. Of the older works on Caesar's methods of warfare the two most important
o n e s , which are still of value today, are W. Rüstow's C. Julius Caesar's Military Organi-
zation and Conduct of War (Heerwesen und Knegführung C. Julius Cäsars) 2d ed. (1862),
and that of Baron August von Göler, Major General of the Grand Duchy of Baden,
Caesar's Gallic War and Parts of his Civil War (Cäsars gallischer Krieg und Teile seines
Bürgerkrieges) 2d ed., edited by E. A. von Göler (1880). A new working over of all
the material, with careful consideration of the entire body of newer publications, is
offered by Franz Fröhlich in Caesar's Method of Waging War (Das Kriegswesen Cäsars)
(1889 and 1890). A few criticisms of this book, t h o u g h not very important ones,
have been made by F. Cauer in the Historische Zeitschrift 64: 123 and 6 6 : 2 8 8 . Colonel
Stoffel, in the Revue de Philologie, Vol. 15, 1891, made some thorough and sharply
critical observations against a series of points in Fröhlich's work.
The Life of Caesar, by N a p o l e o n III, got no further in its two v o l u m e s than the
Gallic War, e n d i n g with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon. Even if it d o e s not rate
particularly high as a literary accomplishment, it is still valuable from the scholarly
viewpoint and it has contributed greatly through the geographical research, the ex-
cavations, and the e x p e r i m e n t s to which it led. Of much higher quality, however, is
the sequel, History of Julius Caesar, Civil War by Colonel Stoffel (Histoire de Jules Cesar,
guerre civile, par le colonel Stoffel) 2 vols, in large quarto (1887). As aide-de-camp to
the Emperor, Colonel Stoffel had already participated extensively in the preparatory
work that the E m p e r o r had carried out, and from 1866 to 1870, during his stay in
Berlin, he had continued to work on this project. After the events of the war had
interrupted the work and had brought an e n d to the official life of the colonel as
well as that of his imperial master, Stoffel took up the work o n c e again in 1879 and
saw it through to completion, visiting every theater of operations and every bat-
tlefield of Caesar's. Step by step this work represents the most significant progress.
Stoffel is just as m u c h a true scholar, untouched by the slightest tinge of dilettan-
tism, as he is a c a m p a i g n - h a r d e n e d soldier. If, nevertheless, I differ with him quite
often, these points of contention probably all go back to a single basic difference,
namely. the degree of skepticism and of criticism which I feel bound to apply to
Caesar's o w n accounts and which I hope to base on a factor neglected by Stoffel, the
statistical o n e .
In addition to the civil war Colonel Stoffel also published as a further sequel to
the Emperor's work a very valuable m o n o g r a p h on the First two campaigns of the
Gallic War, The War between Caesar and Ariovistus and Caesar's First Operations in the
year 702 by Colonel Stoffel (Guerre de Cesar et d'Arioviste el premieres operations de Cesar
en l'an 702 par le colonel Stoffel) (Paris, 1890), 164 p p .
Just as I was putting the finishing touches on this chapter before sending the
manuscript off to the printer, there came into my hands Caesar's Conquest of Gaul by
T. Rice H o l m e s , ( L o n d o n : 1899), 8 4 5 pp. It is a book that is just as scholarly as it is
perceptive and which also has the additional advantage of blending charming h u m o r
with its criticism and which brings together everything in any way relating to the
bellum Gallicum. I am in a g r e e m e n t with H o l m e s on the high esteem we both have
for Stoffel's works and j u d g m e n t . In those places where I differ from h i m — a n d , as
Introduction 455
in Scoffer's case, that is quite frequently—I shall take particular pains to justify my
position.
For further literature on this subject I refer the reader not only to Jähns's History
of Military Science (Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften) but also the same author's very
thorough study Caesar's Commentaries and their Literary and Military Science Consequences
(Cäsars Kommentarien und Hire literarische und kriegswissenschaftliche Folgewirkung) Vol. 7,
Supplement to Militärisches Wochenblatt (1883), to which 1 am indebted for several
important citations and observations.
In 1906 there was added to the literature on Caesar the work of the Imperial-
Royal First Lieutenant G. Veith. History of C. Julius Caesar's Campaigns (Geschichte der
Feldzüge C.Julius Cäsars) (Vienna: L. W. Seidel). Impressive as the layout of the work
is, it still d o e s not represent any scholarly progress. T h e writer is still convinced that
the Roman cohorts in the front line left intervals of a cohort's width between them,
and he finds his " p r o o f for this point (pp. 4 8 , 4 8 6 ) in the "military technical term
quincunx," a military terminus technicus that stems, however, not from Livy but from
Lipsius. (Sec also the review by R. Schneider in the Göttingische gelehrle Anzeigen 169
[June 1907]: 419.) T h e statement of the author (p. 4 8 3 ) that he "goes back exclu-
sively to the o r i g i n a l s o u r c e s on all i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s " t h e r e f o r e rests on self-
delusion, no less so than his belief that his position as a first lieutenant qualifies him
to enter the field of military history as an expert.
2. For the details and the source writings related to Caesar's m e t h o d of warfare,
German readers would do best to rely on Fröhlich's book (276 pp.). While I recom-
mend this work in general, I should like to m e n t i o n briefly here a few points on
which, principally in agreement with Stoffel, I differ from Fröhlich. In addition to
Stoffel's criticism already referred to above, we s h o u l d also take into consideration
principally the "Remarques générales" that Stoffel a d d e d to his life of Caesar.
On page 9 Fröhlich doubts that the Thirteenth Legion, with which Caesar crossed
the Rubicon, was 5,000 men strong, as reported by Plutarch, since it had been in the
war for many years and had n e v e r received any r e p l a c e m e n t s . In the Revue de
philologie, (p. 140) Stoffel correctly o p p o s e s that point of view by saying that Caesar
undoubtedly brought in replacements to keep his legions up to strength. If on o n e
occasion we read of a "supplementum" that was not incorporated but, rather, had a
special organization (Bell. Gall. 7. 57), that was only a transitory situation. N o w if,
despite this system of gradually replacing the losses, there was always a distinction
made between old and y o u n g legions and finally the old legions, instead of simply
releasing the older men in their ranks, were completely disbanded, that point can be
explained by the fact that the losses in killed in ancient battles were, as a rule, quite
small—except in case of a defeat, where the entire body of troops could easily be
wiped out. In old legions, therefore, the number of veteran soldiers was so large, or
at any rate the n u m b e r of very y o u n g m e n so small, that a potiori the legions t h e m -
selves could be distinguished as old or y o u n g ones.
Nevertheless, Stoffel would place the strength of Caesar's legion very low and he
even rejects the concept of the "normal strength of the legion," which, according to
him, has no m o r e justification than if o n e wished to speak today of the "normal
strength of a division." A division is s o m e t h i n g different, however, from a legion of
Caesar's times. T h e older Roman legion, which still had its definite allocation of
cavalrymen and light infantry, can well be c o m p a r e d with a m o d e r n division, to the
extent that it consisted of a blend of the various arms. In Caesar's time, however,
that situation had long since ceased to exist; consequently, o n e can compare this le-
gion m o r e readily with the m o d e r n infantry brigade, in that it has about the same
strength, or with the regiment through the fact that it forms an administrative unit.
But all of these comparisons do not really help. T h e decisive point is that, according
to a definite s c h e m e , the legion was made up of 10 cohorts, each consisting of 3
maniples of 2 centuries each. T h e s e smallest units must necessarily have had a defi-
nite strength. Drill, camp, supply, and the transmission of c o m m a n d s would all be-
c o m e unbearably complicated if the subordinate tactical units were not approxi-

mately equal in size. If, then, the centuries and maniples had a prescribed strength,
the legion, too, had a definite size, and the passages q u o t e d in Fröhlich leave no
doubt that this normal strength for the legion was 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , for the cohort 600
for the maniple 2 0 0 , and for the century 100.
T h e principal objection that can be raised against this assumption will be elimi-
nated in the c o m p u t a t i o n of the strengths for the battle of Pharsalus.
On page 17 Fröhlich says that the centurions are to be c o m p a r e d with modern
first sergeants, not captains. T h a t is true, as e x p l a i n e d above, only with respect to
their social status; with respect to their functions, however, they do correspond to
m o d e r n captains, and it is of decisive importance precisely for Caesar's history that
the fundamental function of the "captain and c o m p a n y c o m m a n d e r " in the Roman
army was in the hands of m e n having the social status of n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers.
On page 19 Fröhlich points out the low military ability of Caesar's war tribunes.
T h e nucleus of this idea is correct, but it is too strongly colored, as Rice Holmes
p r o v e s o n his p a g e 5 7 0 , w h e r e h e s h o w s how m a n y i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s these
tribunes did in fact carry out.
In his War between Caesar and Ariovistus (Guerre de Cesar et d'Arioviste) (p. 127) Stof-
fel states that in the course of the Gallic War, the legates, w h o of course originally
were only high officers at the disposal of the c o m m a n d e r , had been brought into a
m o r e definite relationship with the individual legions and had b e c o m e their regular
c o m m a n d e r s . H o l m e s (p. 568) believes, and very probably correctly so, that this was
not the case. U n d e r Caesar the relationship of the legates to the individual units re-
mained just as it had been in the Roman army up to that time; accordingly, the
sphere of activity of the tribunes was not narrowed by Caesar.
C o n c e r n i n g the antesignani (those in front of the standard), discussed by Fröhlich
(p. 29), I have already m a d e the necessary observations on p. 2 7 5 , above.
On page 38 Fröhlich a g r e e s with the o p i n i o n of S c h a m b a c h that Caesar once
a g a i n , as in e a r l i e r t i m e s , a s s i g n e d a d e f i n i t e u n i t of cavalry to e a c h l e g i o n .
Schambach's explanations do not appear very convincing to me. That point is not,
however, very important. H o l m e s , too (p. 583), rejects the o p i n i o n of Fröhlich.
Fröhlich's chapter on the evocati (starting on p. 42) s h o u l d be s u p p l e m e n t e d , in
k e e p i n g with my discussion on p. 4 1 5 above, with the fact that o n e must distinguish
between the evocati of the second century B . C . , w h o were simply reenlisted veterans
and were very n u m e r o u s , a n d those of the first century, w h o f o r m e d an honor
guard or life guard for the c o m m a n d e r s . From this there follows also a simple and
clear interpretation of the controversial chapter of Bell. Civ. 3. 91 (from R. Menge,
Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift, 1890, p. 273). T h e chapter reads as follows:
Erat Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui

superiore a n n o apud e u m p r i m u m pilum in legione
X duxerat, vir singulari virtute. Hie signo dato:
Sequimini me, inquit, manipulares mei qui fuistis,
et vestro imperatori, quern constituistis, o p e r a m
date. U n u m hoc proelium superest; q u o confecto et
ille suam dignitatem et n o s nostram libertatem
recuperabimus. Simul respiciens Caesarem: Faciam,
inquit, hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut m o r t u o
gratias agas. Haec cum dixisset, primus ex d e x t r o
cornu procucurrit, atque e u m electi milites circiter
C X X voluntarii e i u s d e m centuriae sunt prosecuti."
("There was in Caesar's army an evocatus n a m e d Crastinus,

a man of remarkable courage, w h o , in the previous year,
had served u n d e r Caesar as the first centurion of the
Introduction 457
T e n t h Legion. W h e n the signal was given, Crastinus

addressed the men w h o had been his c o m p a n i o n s , and
said, 'Follow m e , a n d give me as your c o m m a n d e r the
kind of service which you normally d o . There's only
one battle left; w h e n it's over, we shall recover both
his [Caesar's] dignity and our liberty.' At the same time, he looked at Caesar and
said, 'General, today I'll present you the opportunity to thank me, whether I'm
alive or dead.' W h e n he had thus spoken, he ran forward
out of the right wing and about 120 picked m e n from the
same cohort ran out voluntarily with him.")
T h e century which Crastinus is addressing here is a century of the life guard,

formed of evocati, that was stationed on the right wing. We may assume that, at the
start of the civil war, Caesar had, as a spur for the entire army, named as evocati the
men with the longest service, principally those of the T e n t h Legion. Since Crastinus
had been primus pilus in this legion, most of them had been in his maniple, and he
could therefore address them as his former manipular comrades. As evocati they
were considered as m e n whose period of service had actually expired, w h o had vol-
untarily reenlisted o n c e more, for this war only, and had recognized Caesar as their
c o m m a n d e r , but w h o were released from their obligation at the e n d of the war and
"won their f r e e d o m again."
On page 72 Fröhlich states the opinion that the legions had kept on their armor
while they were d i g g i n g fortifications. T h a t point has been rejected, quite properly,
by Stoffel in the Revue de Philologie, p. 142.
Likewise, Stoffel correctly rejects the opinion (Fröhlich, pp. 75 and 127) that the
soldier himself carried e n o u g h flour for sixteen days.
With respect to the Romans' marching (Fröhlich, p p . 104 and 200), see Chapter
III below.
We cannot accept Fröhlich's opinion (p. 105) that the legionaries also used the
bow, a point that is not proved by the passage he cites.
Stoffel criticizes the passage on page 121, where Fröhlich speaks of a pilum with
amentum; the pilum was never thrown with an amentum (strap); the latter was only
used with lighter missiles.
T h e interval between towers in the contravallation line around Alesia was 80 feet.
Fröhlich (p. 145) regards this as the width of a manipular front. Stoffel explains it
better as related to the range of the R o m a n missiles.
On p a g e 169 Fröhlich takes from V e g e t i u s certain false ideas c o n c e r n i n g the
cuneus (wedge formation), which we shall discuss in o u r next volume.
On page 183 Fröhlich describes the m a n e u v e r that Caesar had the Seventh and
Twelfth legions carry out in the battle with the Nervii as if the legions had fought
back to back. Giesing has more correctly u n d e r s t o o d this as meaning that the rear
ranks of the two legions faced about. (Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie, 145 [1892]: 493.)
3. THE MOUNTED TROOPS

A special chapter should really be devoted to Caesar's cavalry, or more properly, a
history of the cavalry, parallel to the d e v e l o p m e n t of infantry tactics, should have
been carried through from the start. As early as the Persian Wars, then with Philip
and Alexander, a n d from Hannibal on in the course of R o m a n history, the cavalry
proved itself of the utmost value or e v e n the decisive factor. In the case of the in-
fantry we have observed a systematic d e v e l o p m e n t of the battle forms; should not
something of a similar type be established for the cavalry?
It is a matter principally of two questions: to what extent did the ancients d e v e l o p
the actual shock action, the closed attack carried out at high speed? A n d secondly,
how are we to conceive of the m i x e d battle of cavalry and light infantry?
Despite a carefully worked out m o n o g r a p h by Schambach, The Cavalry in Caesar's
Army (Die Reiterei bei Cäsar) M ü h l h a u s e n Program 1881, which can be c o m p a r e d

with Fröhlich, Book 3, Chapter 5, there still remains many an uncertain point, and
we ourselves shall not go into this particular study at this point but shall take it up
later, after we have g a i n e d e n o u g h material for c o m p a r i s o n s from m u c h later
periods.
Chapter II
The Helvetian Campaign
W e can assume t h a t Caesar's a c c o u n t o f his c a m p a i g n against the
H e l v e t i i i s w e l l k n o w n a n d p r o c e e d a t once t o a t e s t i n g o f t h e i m -
p r o b a b l e p o i n t s , t h e gaps, t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , a n d t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s
it c o n t a i n s .
A c c o r d i n g t o Caesar, t h e H e l v e t i i d e c i d e d t o e m i g r a t e , w i t h w i f e
and c h i l d , bag and baggage, in o r d e r to w i n f o r themselves the
mastery o f all G a u l ( 1 . 3 0 . 3 ) ; t h e i r o w n c o u n t r y was t o o s m a l l f o r
them.
W e can d i s r e g a r d the e r r o n e o u s estimates Caesar m a d e c o n c e r n -
i n g t h e size o f the H e l v e t i a n r e g i o n , b u t w e ask h o w t h e m o t i v e t h a t
Caesar ascribes t o t h e e m i g r a n t s c a n b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h t h e m a n n e r
i n w h i c h they c a r r i e d i t o u t . I f t h e H e l v e t i i i n t e n d e d t o subject t h e
rest o f t h e G a u l s , i t was n o t necessary f o r t h e m t o m o v e o u t w i t h
f a m i l i e s , h e r d s , a n d h o u s e h o l d g o o d s ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t neces-
sarily l i m i t e d drastically t h e i r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
T h e a r e a on w h i c h t h e H e l v e t i i h a d cast t h e i r eyes as a s u b s t i t u t e
f o r t h e i r o w n was t h a t o f the S a n t o n e s , l y i n g a l o n g t h e A t l a n t i c
O c e a n b e t w e e n L a Rochelle a n d t h e m o u t h o f t h e G i r o n d e . N e i t h e r
is this r e g i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e to serve as a base f o r t h e
c o n q u e s t o f G a u l , n o r was i t necessary, i f t h e H e l v e t i i w e r e s e e k i n g
a new a r e a i n w h i c h t o live because o f o v e r p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e p r e v i -
ous o n e , f o r t h e e n t i r e p e o p l e t o e m i g r a t e a n d leave e m p t y t h e
s p l e n d i d r e g i o n they h a d b e e n o c c u p y i n g . A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e H e l -
v e t i i , i n s t e a d o f e x t e n d i n g t h e i r c o n t r o l o f t h e i r h o m e l a n d some-
w h e r e i n t o n e i g h b o r i n g areas, actually d i d have the p l a n t o m o v e t o
t h e o c e a n , d r i v e o u t o r d e s t r o y t h e peoples a l r e a d y l i v i n g t h e r e ,
a n d settle a n e w , this i n t e n t i o n , d i f f i c u l t e n o u g h t o c a r r y o u t i n it-
self, c a n n o t possibly have b e e n c o m b i n e d w i t h a p l a n to seek at t h e
same t i m e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r h e g e m o n y o v e r a l l t h e o t h e r G a l l i c
p e o p l e s . T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n o f p l a n s i s all t h e m o r e i m p o s s i b l e i n
that Gaul, as we do not yet know in this c o n n e c t i o n b u t learn soon

afterward from C a e s a r himself, already h a d a r u l e r , t h e G e r m a n i c
p r i n c e Ariovistus, w h o h a d c o n q u e r e d t h e Gauls a n d h a d forced
t h e m to send h i m hostages a n d pay him t r i b u t e . It is t r u e that we
do not get a very clear idea as to how broadly t h e h e g e m o n y of
Ariovistus really e x t e n d e d , since at times it seems to be only the
A e d u i a n d t h e S e q u a n i with t h e i r vassals w h o w e r e s u b j e c t e d ,
w h e r e a s at o t h e r times it is envoys from almost all of Gaul ( C h a p t e r
30) w h o ask Caesar for h e l p against h i m — b u t h o w e v e r that situa-
tion might have b e e n , any plan of the Helvetii to win t h e mastery
of Gaul h a d to take into account first a n d foremost Ariovistus a n d
would necessarily collide with him. Caesar m e n t i o n s not a w o r d on
this subject. As long as he is r e c o u n t i n g the Helvetian W a r , it is as
if Ariovistus did n o t exist.
A m o n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s that the Helvetii m a d e for their great
war of c o n q u e s t w e r e i n c l u d e d peace a n d f r i e n d s h i p alliances with
their n e i g h b o r i n g states. O u r question is: With which ones? T h o s e
in t h e west would have b e l o n g e d to those to be c o n q u e r e d , Ariovis-
tus was in t h e n o r t h , t h e east does not c o m e into the picture, a n d
the south b e l o n g e d to t h e R o m a n s .
O n l y by two r o u t e s , C a e s a r c o n t i n u e s , could t h e Helvetii leave
t h e i r c o u n t r y : e i t h e r o n t h e n o r t h b a n k o f t h e R h o n e , t h r o u g h the
region of the S e q u a n i , or on t h e s o u t h b a n k , passing by Geneva,
t h r o u g h the R o m a n province. T h i s s h o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d b y a d d i n g
t h e clause "if they i n t e n d e d to m a r c h in t h e direction of the region
of t h e S a n t o n e s , " for o t h e r w i s e q u i t e a n u m b e r of o t h e r r o u t e s a-
cross t h e J u r a o r n o r t h o f t h e J u r a would have b e e n available t o t h e
Helvetii if they w a n t e d to c o n q u e r Gaul.
A l t h o u g h , a c c o r d i n g t o Caesar, t h e Helvetii h a d a l r e a d y b e e n
m a k i n g their plans for two years, which m u s t t h e r e f o r e have b e e n
widely k n o w n , it n e v e r t h e l e s s a p p e a r s t h a t t h e R o m a n s n o t only
knew n o t h i n g a b o u t a n i n t e n d e d m a r c h t h r o u g h t h e i r province but
also h a d no c o n c e r n a b o u t it. F o r in this e n d a n g e r e d b o r d e r terri-
tory only o n e legion was stationed w h e n C a e s a r a r r i v e d , a n d he h a d
to gain time t h r o u g h a r u s e to lay o u t hastily a defensive line s o m e
e i g h t e e n miles long from G e n e v a to F o r t l'Ecluse, w h e r e the R h o n e
is fordable at a few spots, a n d to garrison t h e defensive line with
his legion a n d t h e h o m e g u a r d levied from t h e local inhabitants.
T h e Helvetii a r e r e p o r t e d t o have m a d e vain a t t e m p t s t o b r e a k
t h r o u g h this line.
W e m u s t look o n this assertion with t h e s t r o n g e s t d o u b t . T h e
Helvetii were a very warlike p e o p l e , a n d t h e i r a r m y , even if, as we
The Helvetian Campaign 461
shall see, it was not 92,000 m e n s t r o n g , was nevertheless certainly

quite significant in size. Militarily, t h e h o m e g u a r d which Caesar
h a d levied h a r d l y c a m e into consideration. H o w could it have b e e n
possible to d e f e n d an 18-mile line with t h e forces of a single legion?
F r o m t h e military point of view, that is absolutely impossible. A
hastily c o n s t r u c t e d , 18-mile-long field fortification attacked simul-
taneously at t h r e e places by a force several times larger t h a n t h e
defenders would (before the most m o d e r n developments in
weapons) always a n d u n d e r all circumstances be p e n e t r a t e d , if t h e
attacker was in e a r n e s t . Caesar states t h a t after his victory over t h e
Helvetii tablets w e r e f o u n d in t h e i r c a m p listing t h e n u m b e r of p e r -
sons b e l o n g i n g to each tribe; these gave a total of 3 6 8 , 0 0 0 . Since we
can arrive at an a p p r o x i m a t e estimation of t h e size of t h e region
1
occupied by t h e Helvetian tribes (18,000 s q u a r e kilometers), it fol-
lows from these figures that t h e r e was a p o p u l a t i o n density of 20
per s q u a r e kilometer. Beloch has correctly d e c l a r e d that to be im-
possible. But Caesar gives us still a second figure; w h e n he sent t h e
Helvetii back to their region, he h a d a census t a k e n that resulted in
110,000 p e r s o n s . Now since, by Caesar's o w n account, t h e losses of
this p e o p l e d u r i n g t h e i r m i g r a t i o n a n d in the battles c a n n o t have
b e e n so very great, Beloch took this figure as a point of d e p a r t u r e ,
a d d e d 40,000 for losses, a n d a r r i v e d at a p o p u l a t i o n density of 7.5
p e r s q u a r e kilometer.
T h e r e would be no i m p o r t a n t objection to this conclusion, if we
could fully d e p e n d on t h e fact t h a t C a e s a r actually c a r r i e d o u t t h e
census a n d that all the Helvetii really h a d left their c o u n t r y . In this
case, since t h e loss figure of 40,000 still seems to be very high, o n e
m i g h t even arrive at a s o m e w h a t smaller n u m b e r t h a n Beloch's. In
view of the u n c e r t a i n t y of o u r basic figures, however, a b o u t which
we shall have f u r t h e r occasion to speak, let us d r o p this line of in-
vestigation. We m u s t d e t e r m i n e m o r e definitely only t h e negative
aspect, t h a t t h e original total c a n n o t h a v e a m o u n t e d t o a n y t h i n g
a p p r o a c h i n g 368,000 p e r s o n s , a n d w e have t h e m e a n s t o d o so.
Caesar states that t h e move of t h e Helvetii was m a d e by a total of
368,000 individuals, w h o carried along with t h e m provisions for 3
m o n t h s . Estimates which N a p o l e o n I I I caused t o b e m a d e resulted
in a figure of 6,000 wagons, each d r a w n by 4 animals, which would
h a v e b e e n necessary t o t r a n s p o r t f l o u r a l o n e ; a n d a s s u m i n g 1 5
kilograms of b a g g a g e p e r p e r s o n , 2,500 additional wagons would
h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d . A total of 8,500 w a g o n s on o n e r o a d , 15 m e -
2
ters to the w a g o n , w o u l d cover s o m e 77 or 78 miles. T h e s e figures
a r e based on an a s s u m e d load of 500 kilograms p e r draft animal. I
have m o r e recently b e c o m e convinced, however, a n d have stated

my p r o o f for this point in Vol. II, Book I V , C h a p t e r IV, Excursus,
"Provisions a n d T r a i n , " that this load is b e t w e e n two a n d t h r e e
times too high for the conditions existing in ancient times. T h e as-
s u m e d wagon train would t h e r e f o r e have b e e n not 77 or 78 miles
long, b u t some 180 miles. As we imagine t h e r o a d s in the Gaul of
those days, it would have b e e n very seldom that t h e wagons could
travel in several parallel lines abreast of each o t h e r . If t h e r e w e r e a
n a r r o w stretch at just o n e place along the r o u t e , t h e c o l u m n would
necessarily be held u p , even if it were possible elsewhere to s p r e a d
o u t across t h e fields. M a r c h discipline was certainly m i n i m a l , ac-
c o r d i o n action frequently caused j a m s a n d e x t e n d e d intervals, a n d
the wagons were d r a w n principally by o x e n . Such a m o v e m e n t cer-
tainly requires at least from 40 to 55 m i n u t e s to cover a mile. Even
in m i d s u m m e r , w h e n it would be possible to start t h e m a r c h at 3
A.M. a n d the e n d of the c o l u m n would not n e e d to arrive in c a m p
b e f o r e 9 P . M . , a n d even if t h e day's m a r c h is limited to about 414
miles, not m o r e t h a n 2,500 wagons could m a k e that m a r c h . Fifteen
h o u r s would be available (from 3 A.M. until 6 P . M . , when the last
wagons would have to start the m a r c h ) , a n d in each 3 - h o u r period
500 wagons would move o u t . Even if we r e c k o n e d with only slightly
over 25 m i n u t e s to t h e mile, still only 250 w a g o n s could start out
each h o u r , so that with a total m a r c h time of 16 h o u r s (from 3 A.M.
3
until 7 P.M.) 4,000 wagons could move a b o u t 4½ miles f o r w a r d .
Now o u r c o l u m n , however, does not consist merely of w a g o n s — a n d
surprisingly N a p o l e o n d o e s not speak of this—but we also have the
e n t i r e mass of p e r s o n s , including w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , a n d in addi-
tion to the draft animals also the h e r d s , the y o u n g animals, a n d the
smaller domestic animals.
A c c o r d i n g to Caesar's account, t h e m a r c h c o l u m n of t h e Helvetii,
d e c r e a s e d s o m e w h a t b y t h e splitting off o f t h e T i g u r i n i a t t h e
4
Sâone, moved in some 15 days from t h e i r crossing point (some-
w h e r e between 9 a n d 18 miles n o r t h of Lyons, n e a r T r é v o u x or
M o n t m e r l e ) to t h e vicinity of B i b r a c t e ( n e a r A u t u n ) . T h a t is a
straight-line distance b e t w e e n 63 a n d 72 miles a n d consequently
m e a n t a daily m a r c h r a t e between 5 a n d 7 miles. O n l y at the start
did the r o u t e follow the b r o a d Sâone valley; t h e r e a f t e r the move-
m e n t was t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n o u s region o f the Maconnais a n d
the C h a r o l a i s , w h e r e certainly t h e carts w o u l d often h a v e b e e n
forced to travel in single file. Even if some of the provision wagons
w e r e already e m p t i e d , the Helvetii u n d o u b t e d l y still did not d r o p
t h e m off; wagons a r e valuable articles, a n d they n e e d e d t h e m for
the booty that they were g a t h e r i n g a n d for r e p l e n i s h i n g their p r o -

visions. Since the c o l u m n was m o v i n g t h r o u g h e n e m y territory, it
was not possible, for e x a m p l e , to send the w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n a
day's m a r c h a h e a d , thus dividing u p the c o l u m n . Caesar's descrip-
tion leaves no d o u b t that the mass r e m a i n e d as a unit a n d m a r c h e d
along t o g e t h e r , b u t this leads to t h e conclusion that it c a n n o t possi-
bly be a question of an original mass of 368,000 souls. Even re-
d u c e d to a half, to a q u a r t e r — t o an e i g h t h — t h e wagon train with
the a c c o m p a n y i n g p e o p l e a n d animals would still be m u c h too long
to move in a single c o l u m n on a single r o a d . Caesar's figures, t h e n ,
like those of H e r o d o t u s c o n c e r n i n g X e r x e s ' a r m y , are not simply to
be r e d u c e d b u t absolutely rejected.
While Caesar was m o v i n g up five additional legions, two of which
were newly levied, from N o r t h e r n Italy, the Helvetii were m a r c h i n g
across the J u r a to the Sâone a n d crossing this river above Lyons.
After Caesar h a d attacked a n d b r o k e n up t h e i r r e a r g u a r d as it was
crossing, the o t h e r s m o v e d n o r t h w a r d along the river.
C a e s a r gives no kind of r e a s o n for t h e i r taking this d i r e c t i o n .
After all, they i n t e n d e d , as he tells us, to go to the region of the
Santones, that is, t o w a r d the west. Scholars have filled this g a p in
various ways. M o m m s e n , Göler, a n d N a p o l e o n I I I believed t h a t
C a e s a r d r o v e t h e Helvetii away from t h e i r i n t e n d e d r o u t e , a n d
N a p o l e o n I I I a d d e d that t h e r e would have been almost impassable
m o u n t a i n s on t h e direct r o u t e t o w a r d the Santones, via R o a n n e ,
p o i n t i n g out t h a t even in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e post r o u t e
from Lyons to La Rochelle still w e n t by way of A u t u n a n d Nevers.
T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , however, is simply not sufficient. A c c o r d i n g to
the generally accepted a s s u m p t i o n , C a e s a r was in the region of the
Segusiavi n e a r L y o n s , i n t h e a n g l e b e t w e e n t h e R h o n e a n d t h e
Sâone, w h e n with t h r e e legions he attacked the Helvetii as they
were crossing the Sâone s o m e w h e r e in t h e T r é v o u x - V i l l e f r a n c h e
area. He h a d left the o t h e r t h r e e legions b e h i n d . Even if we a s s u m e
that the latter w e r e on the right b a n k of the Sâone, from t h e r e they
w o u l d i n n o way h a v e c u t off t h e r o u t e o f t h e Helvetii e i t h e r
s o u t h w a r d into the province o r westward into t h e m o u n t a i n s . T w o
of the t h r e e legions w e r e the r e c r u i t o r g a n i z a t i o n s that h a d j u s t
been levied; u n d e r no conditions could t h e R o m a n s afford to go
into battle against the Helvetii with t h e m . T h e Helvetii could not
have wished for a n y t h i n g b e t t e r t h a n to be able to attack a p a r t of
the R o m a n a r m y h e r e , j u s t as C a e s a r h a d fallen u p o n a p a r t of
theirs t h e p r e c e d i n g day. Probably that p o r t i o n of Caesar's a r m y
was not on the o t h e r bank at all, a n d if it was, it was certainly in
position b e h i n d a fortification from which it could not d a r e move

5
o u t . T h e Helvetii h a d at least o n e day's lead on the legions of
Caesar himself, while he was o c c u p i e d b u i l d i n g a b r i d g e over the
Sâone. T h e m o u n t a i n s directly to t h e west may well be steep, but
they a r e not impassable, c o n t r a r y to what N a p o l e o n I I I stated.
In his book Chemins de la Gaule (p. 289 f f ) , Bial believes it possi-
ble to show several r o u t e s leading across t h e C é v e n n e s , a n d Mais-
siat in his Jules Cesar en Gaule ( 1 : 349) points o u t t h a t o n e can very
easily c r o s s t h e C é v e n n e s t h r o u g h t h e valley o f t h e A z e r g u e s ,
which flows into the Sâone n e a r T r é v o u x - V i l l e f r a n c h e , a n d that to
d e s c e n d into t h e Loire valley o n e has n o t only o n e valley b u t a
c h o i c e o f t h r e e t r i b u t a r y valleys (via C h a u f f a i l l e , T a r a r e , a n d
Sainte-Foy). T h i s r o u t e w o u l d have h a d the d o u b l e a d v a n t a g e of al-
lowing t h e Helvetii t o cross t h e Loire a n d t h e Allier n e a r t h e i r
sources a n d of avoiding from t h e start any possible R o m a n attack.
O n c e they w e r e in t h e m o u n t a i n s , a small r e a r g u a r d would be able
to hold off the R o m a n s . I n s t e a d of this they m o v e d a l o n g t h e con-
v e n i e n t S â o n e valley, w h e r e C a e s a r c o u l d easily o v e r t a k e t h e i r
slow-moving c o l u m n , d i d n o t reach the p r o t e c t i o n of the m o u n t a i n s
until c o n s i d e r a b l y later, a n d shortly t h e r e a f t e r again h a d b r o a d
s t r e a m s to cross.
Even if we are willing to a s s u m e that the Helvetii did not r e a c h a
decision a s t o t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l quickly e n o u g h a n d left C a e s a r
e n o u g h time to cross t h e Sâone d o w n s t r e a m a n d block the e n t r a n c e
to the valley of t h e A z e r g u e s , t h e r e still r e m a i n s no e x p l a n a t i o n of
why they did n o t move d o w n directly from the M o n t s du Charolais
into t h e Loire valley a n d seek to cross n e a r B r i e n n o n or Digoin.
We can, in fact, c o n c l u d e definitely that C a e s a r himself e x p e c t e d
n o d i f f e r e n t m o v e b y t h e Helvetii t h a n t h a t t h e y w o u l d m a r c h
a l o n g t h e river, since, as we h e a r later, he m o v e d his provisions by
ship a n d h a d not p r o v i d e d a w a g o n pool.
J u d g i n g from all of this, we can reasonably d o u b t that the Hel-
vetii h a d the serious i n t e n t i o n of m o v i n g into t h e region of t h e
Santones.
W h e n Caesar h a d d e n i e d the Helvetii t h e possibility of m a r c h i n g
t h r o u g h the province, D u m n o r i x , prince o f t h e A e d u i , m a d e possi-
ble for t h e m a peaceful m o v e t h r o u g h the a r e a of the S e q u a n i .
From the Sequani the Helvetii reached the territory of the
A e d u i — a n d from the foregoing we would have to assume as
friends. B u t they actually a p p e a r e d as e n e m i e s a n d laid waste the
land, a n d the A e d u i a p p e a l e d t o the R o m a n s for h e l p against t h e m .
In this situation t h e r e must have t a k e n place certain b a c k g r o u n d
incidents which C a e s a r does not relate to us.
Caesar goes on to tell us that, after t h e i r partial defeat on the
Sâone, t h e Helvetii offered peace a n d said they were ready to move
into any a r e a that Caesar might indicate to t h e m . T h e negotiations
broke up over the fact that the Helvetii refused to t u r n over the
hostages C a e s a r d e m a n d e d . A r e we to a s s u m e that Caesar did not
give t h e m any reply, however, to the principal question? He must,
after all, probably have said to t h e m : "Since you p r o m i s e to move
into t h e area which I assign to you, I call u p o n you to r e t u r n to
y o u r o w n f o r m e r r e g i o n . " T h e fact t h a t this sentence is missing
makes t h e whole negotiation, or the context in which it is placed,
highly suspect.
Caesar d o e s n o t specifically tell us in which direction the Helvetii
t h e n m o v e d off; we can only c o m e to a conclusion on it t h r o u g h
Caesar's s t a t e m e n t that he was not able to supply himself via the
Sâone because t h e Helvetii, w h o m he was following, t u r n e d away
from t h e river, a n d from the fact that the battle was finally fought
in the vicinity of Bibracte ( M o n t B e u v r a y , 20 kilometers west of
A u t u n ) . At o n e point Caesar m a d e an a t t e m p t , by m e a n s of a d e -
tour, to attack the Helvetii from two sides, a n d w h e n that failed be-
cause of a fortuitous incident, he b r o k e off in o r d e r to move on to
Bibracte. He says that he h a d to do t h a t because of the supplies
that the A e d u i h a d p r o m i s e d h i m w h e n they called for his h e l p
a g a i n s t t h e Helvetii b u t w e r e n o t d e l i v e r i n g . His t u r n i n g away
b r o u g h t o n t h e b a t t l e , h o w e v e r , since t h e Helvetii e i t h e r i n t e r -
p r e t e d this as fear on his p a r t or w a n t e d to cut off the R o m a n s
from their provisions, a n d so they went over to the attack t h e m -
selves.
A r e we really s u p p o s e d to believe that t h e Helvetii could have in-
t e r p r e t e d the m o v e of the R o m a n s t o w a r d Bibracte as p r o m p t e d by
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n fear? A n d that this same p e o p l e , w h o a short
time previously h a d offered to accept from Caesar's h a n d a new
h o m e l a n d a n d who had sought to escape from him t h r o u g h a
15-day m a r c h , w e r e now so e m b o l d e n e d by this t u r n of events that
they s u d d e n l y faced a b o u t a n d attacked him? A n d o n the o t h e r
h a n d , how are we to u n d e r s t a n d t h e o t h e r motive, that of c u t t i n g
the R o m a n s off from their supplies? If the Helvetii w a n t e d to cut
Caesar off from his previous line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d his base,
n e i t h e r an attack n o r a battle was necessary for that p u r p o s e . Did
they want to cut him off from Bibracte? C u t t i n g off supplies a n d
waging a battle a r e mutually exclusive concepts in this situation: if

t h e Helvetii w e r e victorious, n o R o m a n w o u l d n e e d any m o r e sup-
plies; if they w e r e d e f e a t e d , t h e n n o t h i n g was any l o n g e r cut off
from t h e R o m a n s . Why h a d the Helvetii c o n t i n u e d to m a r c h on? If
they w e r e i n t e n d i n g to m o v e to t h e territory of the Santones, we
m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e i r m a r c h u p t o this p o i n t h a d b e e n i n a
northwesterly direction a n d that they w e r e already quite close to
the Loire, so that now, as t h e R o m a n s t u r n e d eastward, they could
c o n t i n u e t h e i r m o v e u n m o l e s t e d . If they wished to a v e n g e their de-
feat on t h e Sâone, why only at this late p o i n t ? W h y h a d they not
selected a good defensive position along t h e way a n d waited to see
if t h e R o m a n s would attack?
T h e s h o r t r e p o r t s a n d piecemeal s t a t e m e n t s o n these campaigns
which we find in t h e works of o t h e r R o m a n a u t h o r s a d d no clarifi-
cation, a n d it m i g h t a p p e a r hopeless to try to gain a correct picture
of the events if we h a d to rely exclusively on an account in which
t h e t r u t h is s h a d e d over in m a n y passages, a p p a r e n t l y intentionally.
B u t after all we c a n n o t simply s t o p o u r s t u d y by t h r o w i n g out
Caesar's account without r e p l a c i n g it with s o m e t h i n g else. It is a
r e c o g n i z e d fact t h a t w e c a n n o t simply a c c e p t a n d r e p e a t w h a t
Caesar has said. N a p o l e o n I once said that the Helvetian c a m p a i g n
6
was simply i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , a n d even those historians w h o place
the greatest trust in Caesar still feel it necessary to fill in a n d correct
his accounts in s o m e very i m p o r t a n t points. M o m m s e n a d d s as a
m o t i v e for t h e m i g r a t i o n t h e fear of A r i o v i s t u s , a p o i n t t h a t is
probably not compatible with the desire of w i n n i n g h e g e m o n y over
Gaul; f u r t h e r m o r e , C a e s a r states, as if Ariovistus d i d not exist, the
exact opposite: t h e Helvetii, h e m m e d in by m o u n t a i n s a n d streams,
h a d f o u n d it painful not to be able to i n v a d e t h e i r n e i g h b o r s ' ter-
ritory. M o m m s e n , m o r e o v e r , simply omits any m e n t i o n of peace
negotiations on t h e Sâone. N a p o l e o n I I I , for his p a r t , treats the
m i g r a t i o n a n d t h e d e s i r e t o subject G a u l n o t a s chronologically
s i m u l t a n e o u s b u t r a t h e r as successive plans, a n d he omits from the
peace negotiations the offer of t h e Helvetii to let C a e s a r assign a
region to t h e m . Finally, H o l m e s believes, as d o e s M o m m s e n , that
the Helvetii, p r e s s e d by t h e G e r m a n i c tribes, h a d d e c i d e d to seek a
new h o m e l a n d , a n d he p i c t u r e s t h e plan for the subjection of Gaul
merely as an i n t r i g u e of Prince O r g e t o r i x . T h i s is exactly the o p p o -
site of what Caesar tells us. B u t all of these corrections still a r e not
satisfactory. T h e r e is still missing an e x p l a n a t i o n of what stance the
Helvetii i n t e n d e d to take vis-a-vis Ariovistus in the course of their
conquest of Gaul. T h e r e also r e m a i n s the impossible situation of
trying to d e f e n d a hastily built field fortification line 18 miles long

with a single legion a n d simple h o m e g u a r d against a large a r m y .
T h e r e is missing a motive for the m a r c h off t o w a r d the n o r t h from
the Sâone crossing a n d for the s u d d e n t u r n i n g a b o u t for the battle.
We must seek also to eliminate these e r r o r s a n d fill in these g a p s in
o r d e r to arrive at a picture that, even if not provable, at least has
the a d v a n t a g e of b e i n g conceivable a n d possible.
Let us try to do this with the following o u t l i n e :
C e n t r a l G a u l was u n d e r the m a s t e r y o f t h e G e r m a n i c p r i n c e
7
Ariovistus. Only g r u d g i n g l y did the Gauls e n d u r e this yoke a n d
pay their a n n u a l t r i b u t e . In complete secrecy a prince of the A e d u i ,
Divitiacus, h a d already t u r n e d to t h e R o m a n s a n d h a d asked for
their h e l p , as C a e s a r tells us—not in his first book, to be s u r e , but
incidentally, in a later book (6. 12). In R o m e they w e r e not inclined
to go a l o n g with this but h a d , on t h e contrary, s o u g h t to get along
well with Ariovistus; d u r i n g Caesar's own consulate they h a d hailed
him as king a n d h a d bestowed on h i m the h o n o r a r y title of F r i e n d
a n d Ally of the R o m a n People. Nevertheless, the A e d u i refused to
give u p t h e idea o f b e i n g liberated. A n o t h e r faction, u n d e r the
leadership of D u m n o r i x , a b r o t h e r of Divitiacus, h a d conceived the
8
idea of freeing Gaul t h r o u g h the p o w e r of t h e Gauls t h e m s e l v e s .
T h e r e was still a powerful a n d warlike p e o p l e in this region who
were not u n d e r the d o m i n a t i o n of Ariovistus, the Helvetii. An al-
liance was m a d e with t h e m . A simple u p r i s i n g , with the h o p e that
the Helvetii would send help, was not possible, since almost all of
the p r o m i n e n t families of the A e d u i as of t h e Sequani a n d o t h e r
peoples were tied by the hostages in Ariovistus' h a n d s . A r u s e was
to h e l p t h e situation. T h e Helvetian leader O r g e t o r i x p r o p o s e d to
his p e o p l e that they migrate. P e r h a p s he s p o k e of o v e r p o p u l a t i o n ,
or p e r h a p s he p o i n t e d out that in their own land they would soon
have to subject themselves, like t h e o t h e r Gauls, to t h e G e r m a n i c
peoples. U n d e r t h e p r e t e n s e of a m i g r a t i o n to the ocean, to the
9
area of the S a n t o n e s , t h e Helvetian a r m y was to a p p e a r in the ter-
ritory of the A e d u i before the suspicions of Ariovistus were
a r o u s e d , a n d , with the s u p p o r t of the Helvetii, the patriotic faction
h o p e d to o v e r c o m e all hesitation a n d to b r i n g a b o u t the g e n e r a l
uprising against the G e r m a n i c peoples. Naturally, w o m e n a n d chil-
d r e n also a c c o m p a n i e d t h e m a r c h , as was later the case with the
peasant a r m i e s , a n d in this case t h e r e w e r e p e r h a p s still m o r e t h a n
usual for such c o l u m n s , in o r d e r to increase the deception. Even
the s u d d e n d e a t h of O r g e t o r i x did not stop the move.
Caesar was accurately i n f o r m e d of all these things in R o m e by
Divitiacus a n d the R o m a n faction a m o n g t h e A e d u i . U n d e r n o cir-

cumstances d i d he w a n t this s c h e m e to be c a r r i e d o u t , for it was his
plan that the Gauls s h o u l d be freed from t h e y o k e of the G e r m a n i c
tribes not by t h e i r o w n s t r e n g t h b u t with t h e h e l p of R o m e , so
as to e x c h a n g e t h a t yoke for t h e R o m a n o n e . An inquiry by the
Helvetii a b o u t w h e t h e r they could m o v e t h r o u g h the province was
e n o u g h to cause h i m to s t r e n g t h e n his a r m y a n d move it to the
b o r d e r . T h e Helvetii h a d only m a d e t h e r e q u e s t i n o r d e r t o main-
tain as long as possible t h e fiction that they i n t e n d e d to m o v e to the
region of the S a n t o n e s . In k e e p i n g with t h e s a m e plan, they still
took t h e m o s t s o u t h e r l y possible r o u t e a f t e r C a e s a r h a d t u r n e d
t h e m away, in o r d e r to h e a d for their real goal, t h e r e g i o n of the
A e d u i , o n c e they h a d crossed t h e S â o n e . U n d e r the p r e t e n s e that
they h a d violated t h e b o r d e r , Caesar attacked t h e i r r e a r g u a r d as it
was crossing t h e S â o n e . I n t h e m e a n t i m e t h e R o m a n faction a m o n g
the A e d u i , p r e s u m a b l y s u p p o r t e d financially by the R o m a n s , h a d
w o n t h e u p p e r h a n d a n d p e r s u a d e d t h e A e d u i t o call for Caesar's
h e l p a g a i n s t t h e i n v a d e r s i n s t e a d o f w e l c o m i n g t h e Helvetii a s
liberators. T h e Helvetii now f o u n d themselves in a very e m b a r r a s s -
ing situation a n d they sent to Caesar, asking h i m to assign t h e m an
a r e a , t h a t is, t o r e t u r n t o their own t e r r i t o r y . T h e a g r e e m e n t , j u s t
as Caesar explains it, fell t h r o u g h only because of t h e question of
t u r n i n g over hostages. Caesar, however, insisted on this condition,
n o t so m u c h because t h e Helvetii w e r e n o t to be trusted, b u t be-
cause, after all, this u n d e r t a k i n g was to be for h i m the start of the
subjection of all of Gaul. T h e Helvetii w e r e n o t willing to accept
t h e d i s h o n o r a n d s o they m o v e d n o r t h w a r d i n o r d e r t o m o v e back
in a b r o a d circle across t h e u p p e r Sâone a n d into their o w n land.
T h e y did n o t r e m a i n , however, in t h e river valley, w h e r e the
R o m a n s could have m a d e s h o r t shrift o f t h e m , o v e r t a k i n g their
c o l u m n a n d attacking from all sides, b u t r a t h e r they m o v e d as soon
as possible into t h e m o u n t a i n s , w h e r e a s t r o n g r e a r g u a r d could
hold u p t h e R o m a n s from defile t o defile. C a e s a r followed t h e m ,
reinforcing his o w n t r o o p s with t h e A e d u i cavalry. B u t in t h e first
e n g a g e m e n t , while still in t h e plain, this cavalry failed to carry o u t
its mission, t a k i n g flight in t h e face of t h e Helvetii, a n d Caesar
suspected t h a t this was n o t only d u e to u n f a v o r a b l e terrain b u t that
ill will was also involved, since D u m n o r i x was in c o m m a n d .
A l t h o u g h C a e s a r could have attacked t h e Helvetian r e a r g u a r d
daily a n d involved it in combat, he d i d n o t do that b u t only fol-
lowed at a certain distance, exercising t h e greatest caution a n d re-
m a i n i n g alert for any o p p o r t u n i t y to deliver a heavy blow.
Finally this occasion s e e m e d to be at h a n d ; an e n v e l o p m e n t of
the Helvetii by two legions u n d e r L a b i e n u s was successful, b u t a

c h a n c e i n c i d e n t , a false r e p o r t , c a u s e d t h i n g s to go w r o n g a n d
saved t h e e n e m y . C a e s a r t h e r e u p o n m o v e d away from the Helve-
tian c o l u m n a n d h e a d e d directly for t h e capital of t h e A e d u i , Bi-
bracte, which was by now not far away. As he himself says, he was
forced to this by supply difficulties. We m a y p e r h a p s also a s s u m e
that it was distrust of t h e A e d u i that forced h i m to m a k e this m o v e .
T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r could n o t c o n t i n u e t o move f a r t h e r into
the c o u n t r y w i t h o u t a s s u r i n g himself of a firm base of o p e r a t i o n s .
This t u r n , however, b r o u g h t o n the decision.
T h e Helvetii could, o f c o u r s e , h a v e c o n t i n u e d o n u n d i s t u r b e d
and have r e t u r n e d into their own c o u n t r y by passing t h r o u g h the
territory of t h e Sequani, with w h o m they w e r e on friendly t e r m s .
But if they h a d d o n e that, they w o u l d have left Bibracte a n d the
Aedui, a n d with t h e m all of central Gaul, at the mercy of the Ro-
mans. T h e patriotic faction of the A e d u i , which itself h a d called in
the Helvetii a n d was p r e s u m a b l y in c o n s t a n t secret c o n t a c t with
them, u n d o u b t e d l y b r o u g h t the strongest p r e s s u r e t o b e a r o n t h e m ,
implored their h e l p , possibly even h e l d u p the p r o s p e c t o f g o i n g
over to t h e m d u r i n g the battle. Since Caesar, even t h o u g h he h a d
stayed so close to t h e Helvetii day after day, h a d n o t yet initiated
an attack himself, t h e Helvetian leaders m a y have e n t e r t a i n e d t h e
h o p e that he w o u l d finally move off a n d leave t h e m alone. As they
learned from t h e i r A e d u i friends, his supply of provisions w o u l d
soon be e x h a u s t e d , a n d t h e A e d u i w e r e n o t delivering any to h i m .
But now his t u r n t o w a r d Bibracte d a s h e d all these h o p e s . A n d at
any rate, t h e r e may very well have b e e n from t h e start a m o n g t h e
Helvetii a faction that h e l d it to be shameful to r e t u r n to their own
country w i t h o u t h a v i n g a v e n g e d t h e i r b r o t h e r s w h o h a d b e e n in-
sidiously attacked a n d s l a u g h t e r e d by the R o m a n s on t h e Sâone.
This faction now prevailed, a n d it was d e c i d e d to t u r n a b o u t a n d
attack the R o m a n s o n t h e m a r c h .
T h e point t h a t Caesar wished to conceal in this a c c o u n t is t h e
p u r p o s e the Helvetii h a d in m i n d on this u n d e r t a k i n g , t h e struggle
against A r i o v i s t u s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e n a m e of A r i o v i s t u s is n o t
m e n t i o n e d by h i m a n y w h e r e in this e n t i r e c a m p a i g n . He i m p u t e s to
the Helvetii t h e desire of b e c o m i n g m a s t e r s of Gaul, as if G a u l did
not a l r e a d y h a v e a m a s t e r in t h e f o r m of t h e frightful G e r m a n
w a r r i o r p r i n c e , a n d c o u p l e d p a r a d o x i c a l l y with this c o n c e p t o f
h e g e m o n y t h e r e a p p e a r s again the i n n o c e n t m i g r a t i o n with w o m e n
and c h i l d r e n to t h e r e g i o n of the Santones. C a e s a r has to give as a
p r e t e n s e a violation of t h e b o r d e r , has to s u p p r e s s the shift of al-
liance of t h e A e d u i , has to leave the p e a c e negotiations in shadowy
form, has to leave the Helvetii's m a r c h t o w a r d the n o r t h with no

plausible motivation, a n d he searches in vain for t h e i r motives for
the s u d d e n decision to fight—all of this because of t h e single point,
that he does not want to state the t r u e intention of t h e whole mili-
tary o p e r a t i o n of the Helvetii. O n c e we have s t r a i g h t e n e d o u t this
point, however, e v e r y t h i n g else falls automatically into place.
H e r e let me r e p e a t o n c e m o r e : I am not claiming that things
took place exactly as I h a v e j u s t r e c o u n t e d t h e m . I am simply claim-
ing that Caesar's a c c o u n t does not stand up u n d e r critical appraisal
a n d is in itself impossible, a n d I have wished to p r o p o s e in its place
a n o t h e r account, possible a n d imaginable, which also differs basi-
cally less from Caesar's account of events t h a n do the i n t e r p r e t a -
tions by M o m m s e n , N a p o l e o n I I I , a n d H o l m e s . In d o i n g this we
have h a d to go m o r e deeply into the truly political aspects t h a n o u r
mission in itself r e q u i r e s , b u t that was necessary because in this case
the military is inseparably related to the political a n d because we
wished to show from the start t h e d e g r e e of caution that History
must apply in using Caesar's Commentaries.
T H E BATTLE OF BIBRACTE
We have a l r e a d y h a d to c o n c l u d e from g e n e r a l considerations

that the n u m b e r of 368,000 individuals that C a e s a r gives for the
Helvetian m i g r a t i o n is e x t r e m e l y e x a g g e r a t e d . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the
political c h a r a c t e r o f t h e u n d e r t a k i n g s t i m u l a t e s f u r t h e r d o u b t
a b o u t w h e t h e r it was really the e n t i r e Helvetian p e o p l e , with their
allies, that m o v e d out. Surely a certain n u m b e r of w o m e n a n d chil-
d r e n went a l o n g — t h a t was r e q u i r e d by the p l a n — b u t it is very
h a r d to believe that the Helvetii actually loaded up their families
a n d all their h o u s e h o l d e q u i p m e n t a n d b u r n e d t h e i r hamlets and
villages b e h i n d t h e m . T h e daily m a r c h e s which they m a d e were, to
10
be s u r e , not unusually s h o r t , but they w e r e also not long, and
they seem to indicate the p r e s e n c e of a certain w a g o n train; the ac-
c o u n t of the battle shows that it can not have b e e n so very large.
Caesar, who h a d c a m p e d some 2 to 3 miles b e h i n d the Helvetii,
gave up the idea of c o n t i n u i n g to follow t h e m closely a n d t u r n e d in
the direction of Bibracte. A few d e s e r t e r s b r o u g h t this news to the
Helvetii, who faced a b o u t a n d started the battle t o w a r d t h e seventh
h o u r , that is between n o o n a n d 1 P . M . T h e Helvetii were followed
by all their carts, with which they f o r m e d a w a g o n b a r r i c a d e . Con-
sequently, the Helvetii h a d first started their m a r c h , with all their
carts, in o n e direction a n d t h e n faced a b o u t a n d followed Caesar in

the other direction. T h e wagon train must nevertheless have
traveled s o m e 7 to 9 miles that m o r n i n g ; we know what that m e a n s ,
even if Caesar naturally d o e s not say that all t h e w a g o n s w e r e o n c e
again in place w h e n the battle b e g a n . We c a n n o t estimate specifi-
cally, but it is clear that a g r o u p that m a k e s such m o v e m e n t s can-
not, after all, be of m o r e t h a n m o d e r a t e size.
Caesar had 6 legions a n d native auxiliaries, including 4,000
cavalry ( C h a p t e r 15). N o r m a l l y 6 legions w o u l d be 3 6 , 0 0 0 m e n
strong; of that n u m b e r , Caesar may have h a d 30,000 on h a n d , in-
cluding 2 legions of recruits, which he placed in a r e a r position a n d
did not use in t h e battle. C a e s a r t h e r e f o r e h a d , including his native
11
auxiliaries, b e t w e e n 36,000 a n d 4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , a n d consequently a
considerable n u m e r i c a l superiority on the spot.
As soon as C a e s a r noticed that t h e Helvetii w e r e a p p r o a c h i n g , he
sent his cavalry against t h e m to hold t h e m up as long as possible,
had his 4 v e t e r a n legions form up in 3 echelons on t h e slope of a
hill, a n d u s e d t h e 2 legions of r e c r u i t s , with all the native a u x -
iliaries, to establish a n d occupy a fortified c a m p b e h i n d the line of
12
battle, into which the entire train was d r i v e n .
T h e Helvetii d r o v e up against t h e very favorably selected posi-
tion o f t h e R o m a n s a n d w e r e t h r o w n back. W h e n t h e R o m a n s
p u s h e d forward in p u r s u i t , they w e r e attacked on the flank by t h e
Boii a n d t h e T u l i n g e r i , e i t h e r because the latter forces w e r e only
j u s t a r r i v i n g o n t h e battlefield o r b e c a u s e the R o m a n s h a d h a d
their flanks p r o t e c t e d by the terrain in t h e i r initial position, from
which they h a d intentionally b e e n l u r e d o u t by t h e Helvetii. T h e
flank attack also e n c o u r a g e d the front of the Helvetii to move for-
ward again, a n d t h e situation w o u l d have b e c o m e p r e c a r i o u s for
the R o m a n s , in view of t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o u r a g e with which the
Gauls were fighting, if the R o m a n e c h e l o n tactics h a d not p r o v e d
themselves against the d o u b l e attack. Caesar h a d the t h i r d echelon
swing a r o u n d against the Boii a n d t h e T u l i n g e r i a n d on both sides
he m o v e d o v e r to t h e offensive ("Romani conversa signa bipartite
intulerunt" [ " T h e R o m a n s w h e e l e d a b o u t a n d a t t a c k e d i n t w o
divisions"]). T h e Gauls slowly gave way, a n d not until nightfall d i d
the R o m a n s succeed in s t o r m i n g t h e w a g o n b a r r i c a d e . Caesar did
not o r d e r a p u r s u i t but r e m a i n e d on t h e battlefield for t h r e e days,
because of the w o u n d e d , as he says, a n d to b u r y t h e d e a d . T h e
Helvetii fled to the east (northeast) into the r e g i o n of t h e L i n g o n e s
and s u r r e n d e r e d a few days later.
It is c u r i o u s t h a t Caesar did not use his two recruit legions at all
b u t h a d t h e flank attack of t h e Boii a n d T u l i n g e r i t h r o w n back

only by the t h i r d echelon. He tells us with g r e a t e m p h a s i s how h a r d
t h e Helvetii contested the victory of the R o m a n s a n d that they h a d
only b e e n pressed back, t h a t not a o n e of t h e m h a d t u r n e d his back
a n d fled. Why t h e n d i d he not move his reserve into t h e battle?
T h e e x p l a n a t i o n probably is that Caesar, on seeing the Helvetii
m o v i n g up so s u d d e n l y , suspected that the A e d u i w e r e p l a n n i n g a
betrayal a n d that, while he was fighting t h e Helvetii, he m i g h t sud-
denly be attacked in the r e a r by a force of A e d u i . He d i d not wish
to say that, not only because it did not occur, b u t also because he
was, after all, trying to o b s c u r e as m u c h as possible the Aedui's en-
tire relationship to t h e Helvetii. He c o n t i n u e s to tell us only a b o u t
D u m n o r i x , w h o misled t h e p e o p l e . A c c o r d i n g t o o u r concept, how-
ever, this faction was m u c h s t r o n g e r , a n d we find f u r t h e r c o r r o b -
o r a t i o n of this idea in t h e fact that it also p r o v i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n
f o r t h e o t h e r w i s e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e h o l d i n g b a c k o f all t h e
s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d a full t h i r d of t h e hoplites.
EXCURSUS
1. According to o u r concept of the nature of the whole campaign, the Helvetii

must have m o v e d by on the east of Bibracte, whereas those scholars who maintain
that the goal of the migration was the region of the Santones would place the bat-
tlefield to the west of the A e d u i capital. T h a t the Helvetii, if they intended to return
to their h o m e l a n d , still m o v e d so close to Bibracte—that is, so far westward—does
not contradict our concept, since they no doubt c o n t i n u e d to count on a political
shift on the part of the A e d u i . A very strong argument in favor of the correctness of
o u r reconstruction, h o w e v e r , is Caesar's statement that they took up their with-
drawal in the direction of the Lingones, that is, eastward. How are they supposed to
have g o n e there if, as other scholars assume, they had fought the battle facing east-
ward? A fully defeated army flees in the direction of its defeat and u n d e r no cir-
cumstances in the exactly opposite direction. If the Helvetii, however, as I believe,
fought the battle facing westward, they cannot have been on the way toward the
Loire, and, beyond that, the region of the Santones.
N a p o l e o n III and Stoffel, in Guerre de Cesar et d'Arioviste (p. 78), seek to show the
possibility of this situation by having the Helvetii, after the battle near Luzy, south-
west of A u t u n , had been fought with their front toward the south, take up their
w i t h d r a w a l via M o u l i n s - E n g i l b e r t , L o r m e s , A v a l l o n t o T o n n e r r e , c o n s e q u e n t l y
northward. To make this plausible, however, o n e has to assume that near T o n n e r r e
they were already in the region of the Lingones, a point which hardly s e e m s credi-
ble, since the latters' territory reached southward as far as the Sâone and their prin-
13
cipal town was L a n g r e s . T h i s assumption also stands in direct contradiction to
Caesar's statement that the Helvetii arrived in the area of the L i n g o n e s on the
fourth day of their withdrawal. From Luzy to T o n n e r r e it is a distance of 120
kilometers as the crow flies, a stretch that the Helvetii could not have covered in
14
four days under any circumstances, even if they marched day and n i g h t .
From the fact that Caesar still had to make a rather long march to Besançon after
the capitulation of the Helvetii (Bell. Gall. 1. 38) we cannot conclude anything of a
definite nature, since it is possible that in the meantime he had made a further
m o v e m e n t that was not reported by him.
Stoffel believes that, through excavations, he definitely found traces of the bat-
tlefield between Montmort and T o u l o n - s u r - A r r o u x , about nine miles southeast of
Luzy, directly south of Mont-Beuvray. But the objects found there do not show any
kind of direct relationship to this period or, in fact, e v e n to a battle, so that no p r o o f
can be drawn from this. According to H o l m e s (p. 6 1 9 ) , there were later f o u n d in the
area of the excavated fortifications remains of swords, javelins, and helmets, but that
still d o e s not constitute real proof.
A direct counterproof, however, is provided by a passage in Caesar's text. He says
that the Boii and Tulingeri had e n v e l o p e d the R o m a n s "a latere aperto." A c c o r d i n g to
the normal concept, "latus apertum" means the right side, the o n e not protected by
the shield. But it is clear that, if the c o l u m n of the Helvetii p r o c e e d e d westward and
finally turned its front toward the south, as Stoffel claims, their rear guard could
only have struck the Romans in their left flank. Stoffel therefore produces very d e -
tailed evidence to the effect that latus apertum d o e s not necessarily m e a n the right
flank, but, in general, the unprotected o n e . H o l m e s , however, has vitiated this evi-
dence t h r o u g h reference to the passages in Bell. Gall. 5. 35. 2 and 7. 4, where "latus
apertum" obviously is used as a technical expression for "right flank." H o l m e s him-
self, since Stoffel's explanations otherwise appear to him to be so convincing, is still
unwilling to speak out with absolute certainty on this point. I myself would like to
say just the opposite, namely, that with this point we have definite p r o o f that the
battle was fought east of Bibracte. For if the Helvetii retired westward and finally
made their withdrawal toward the north, then they must have d e p l o y e d toward the
left flank and must have had their front facing southward during the battle. T h e
Boii and Tulingeri, then, w h o m o v e d up from the west, could only fall u p o n the
Romans' left flank. If the battle took place east of Bibracte, however, and the Hel-
vetii fled approximately toward the northeast, then the Helvetii had their front fac-
ing southwest or south, and consequently the Boii a n d Tulingeri, as they m o v e d u p ,
could attack the right flank of the Romans. T h i s w o u l d be conclusive if H o l m e s had
not established that Caesar's manuscript reads only "latere aperto" and not "a latere
aperto" which can perhaps be interpreted as "while their flank was uncovered."
Nevertheless, "latere aperto" applies with much greater probability to an attack by the
Boii into the Roman right flank and therefore supports a determination of the posi-
tion of the battlefield as east of Bibracte as well as the concept that the Helvetii were
not on their way toward the region of the Santones.
2 . Many o f t h e n e c e s s a r y o b j e c t i o n s t o Caesar's a c c o u n t h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n
brought forth quite correctly in the rather crude pamphlet The Struggles of the Hel-
vetii, Suebi, and Belgae against C. Julius Caesar: N e w Looks at Old Stories, by Max Eich-
heim (Die Kämpfe der Helvetier, Sueben und Belgier gegen C. J. Cäsar: N e u e Schlaglich-
ter auf alte Geschichten, von Max Eichheim.) ( N e u b u r g A. D. Selbstverlag, 1866), but
in view of the obvious scholarly dilettantism of the author and his wild sallies to
right and left these points have either been ignored or rejected by the scholarly
world. Later H. Rauchenstein attempted, in a J e n a dissertation, Caesar's Campaign
against the Helvetii (Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen die Helvetier) 1882, to present Eichheim's
analysis in a logical light, so to speak, and to reformulate the latter's objections,
pointing out their value in a scholarly and methodical manner. Nevertheless, he did
not win any supporters either, since he attempted to manipulate the external facts in
too bold a manner. T h e logical conclusion of his concept of events forces h i m in the
e n d to assume that Caesar was not victorious at Bibracte but, on the contrary, was
driven back into his camp. T h e fight at the w a g o n barricade, as he sees it, was not at
the Helvetii's train but rather at Caesar's, and since the Helvetii were not strong
e n o u g h to defeat the Romans, they finally came to an agreement with t h e m .
T h e point where Rauchenstein goes astray is right at the start, with respect to the
purpose of the Helvetian march. Probably every student of the Gallic War, without
exception, has felt that the two purposes stated by Caesar, migration and the win-
ning of h e g e m o n y over all the Gallic p e o p l e s , are incompatible with each other.
Rauchenstein recognizes that but, like all the others, he takes the w r o n g direction in
arriving at his correction; he disregards the aspect of conquest and concentrates on

the migration.
It is true, of course, that Caesar himself also d o e s this, although he expressly says
that the Helvetii, even after the death of Orgetorix, a d h e r e d to the decision they
had formerly made (migration and conquest), but nevertheless, from that point on,
he speaks only of the migration. He could not avoid leaving this lacuna, since of
course he d o e s not want to admit to us the real reason for the Helvetian march, the
intended fight against Ariovistus, which would have m a d e the intervention of the
Romans in these Gallic affairs unnecessary and impracticable. If we read his account
with this true purpose in mind; that is, if, of the two purposes that he gives and one
of which must under any circumstances be eliminated, we d r o p the migration—or
rather, reduce it to a simple politico-military pretense—everything becomes com-
pletely clear.
Rauchenstein emphasizes the point that, despite his victory, Caesar neither pur-
s u e d the Helvetii nor m o v e d to Bibracte, whereas he had told us earlier that his sol-
diers had no more provisions. T h e explanation is that Caesar's victory already gave
him everything that he n e e d e d . He did not pursue the Helvetii because he had no
desire to destroy them but, on the contrary, wanted to spare t h e m after they were
defeated. After all, he now i n t e n d e d to appear on the scene as the c h a m p i o n of all
the Gauls against Ariovistus. T h i s agrees very well with the fact that the Roman
c o m m a n d e r — a point he d o e s not m e n t i o n but which M o m m s e n points out in Hermes
16: 4 4 7 — g r a n t e d the Helvetii a very favorable treaty. On the other hand, to have
marched off immediately in the opposite direction, to Bibracte, would have been
unwise, for it could have given the impression that the victory had not been so very
clear-cut. As for provisions, the Aedui undoubtedly brought them to the Romans on
the spot right after the victory.
3. T h e study by H. Klövekorn, Caesar's Battles against the Helvetii in 68 B.C. (Die
Kämpfe Cäsars gegen die Helvetier im Jahre 68) (Leipzig, 1889), I know only through
Ackermann's review in the Wochenschrift fur klassische Philologie, 1889, Section 1392.
I have heard of a study on the same subject by Bircher but have not been able to
obtain it.
4. T h e attitude of N a p o l e o n III and Stoffel toward Caesar's reports of numerical
strengths forms a remarkable p r o o f of how hard it is to free oneself from the au-
thority of the written word. N a p o l e o n gives us an estimate of the length of terrain
over which the Helvetian w a g o n train would have had to stretch if Caesar's figures
were correct. But neither he nor even Stoffel carried this process out to its logical
conclusion and rejected Caesar's figures, and, basing his position on theirs, Holmes
too explains (p. 224) that Caesar's figures could not be challenged, since, after all,
Stoffel was a man w h o knew what he was writing. But here it is not a question of
authoritativeness but rather of the nature of things that forces the decision, and the
single objective explanation that H o l m e s found is unusable. He refers to the fact
that the Helvetii did not n e e d to have all their wagons travel in a single column but
were able to form several columns. That can certainly be d o n e , but only as long as
the march is crossing smooth terrain. If there is but a single narrow spot along the
way, such as a bridge, a ford, a narrow pass, that has the same effect as if the whole
route were narrow. With very g o o d e q u i p m e n t and t h o r o u g h discipline o n e could
possibly m a n a g e to have the wagons pass the narrow spot at double s p e e d and
thereby neutralize the effects of the obstacle. But this m e t h o d is not feasible for a
train c o m p o s e d of carts drawn by o x e n and occupied principally by w o m e n and
children. T h i s recourse also breaks down at every spot where soft, or rain-soaked, or
uneven g r o u n d prevents the carts from moving temporarily at a trot. We can there-
fore assume that the migrations of the peoples (Völkerwanderungen) in cases where
they really occurred, were carried out principally with a single line of wagons and
were limited to very short daily m o v e m e n t s .
5. That Caesar's figures were too high was also recognized in Rome at that same
time by thoughtful individuals. We may draw that conclusion from the fact that we
find in Orosius 6. 7. 6 another report, according to which the c o l u m n making the
move had a strength of only 157,000, of w h o m 4 7 , 0 0 0 died on the way. T h i s infor-
mation probably stems from Asinius Pollio, o n e of Caesar's generals in the civil war.
But although Pollio apparently accepted the figure of 110,000 as the strength that
the Helvetii were s u p p o s e d to have had on their return to their o w n land, neverthe-
less this figure, too, must still be too high. T h i s count is presumably m o r e an esti-
mate or an overall reckoning based on the statements of the aldermen (Altermänner:
the leaders of the hundreds), w h o did not go about it as accurately as in the case of
a real census. W h e n I think of all the m o v e m e n t s the column made, I cannot im-
agine that it ever a m o u n t e d to anything even approaching 110,000 individuals, and
I therefore suspect that this total also includes those w h o remained in the h o m e l a n d .
In Strabo 4. 3. 3 we find the report that the number of survivors was 8,000. Should
we assume that this figure is taken out of thin air? If we relate this n u m b e r only to
the warriors themselves and assume that, in view of the heavy losses and of the
breaking away of the Boii, w h o remained in the territory of the Aedui, the n u m b e r
was originally half again as large, it would then seem to be basically very probable. A
total of 12,000 c o u r a g e o u s barbarians might very well have felt themselves capable
of e n g a g i n g four Roman legions, and with a c o l u m n of this order of strength, which
perhaps c o u n t e d a total of 2 0 , 0 0 0 individuals, the reported m o v e m e n t s would no
longer evoke skepticism on o u r part.
T h e study by Wachsmut in Klio 3 (1903): 2 8 1 , is based on an acceptance of the
credibility of the m o v e m e n t s of the h u n d r e d s of thousands as related by the ancient
authors.
6. Veith, in Caesar's Campaigns (Feldzüge Cäsars), repeats Caesar's account in the
text of his work a n d s u p p l e m e n t s it with my concept, with the reservation that
Caesar did not intentionally distort the facts but failed to perceive all the relation-
ships of the overall picture.
7. In contradiction to my concept, several newer studies have sought to d e f e n d
the credibility of the main points of Caesar's report, particularly holding to the mi-
gration plan of the Helvetii, and, as a result, placing the battle not to the east but to
the southwest or south of Bibracte. S o m e of these, specifically, are Ziehen, The Latest
Attack on Caesar's Credibility (Der neueste Angriff auf Cäsars Glaubwürdigkeit) Berichte des
freien deutschen Hochstifts zu Frankfurt a. M (1901); F. Fröhlich, Caesar's Credibility in his
Report on the Campaign against the Helvetii (Die Glaubwürdigkeit Cäsars in seinem Bericht
über den Feldzug gegen die Helvetier) (Aarau, 1903); H. Bircher, Bibracte (Aarau, 1904).
T h e critical point is whether the Helvetii really intended to migrate to the m o u t h
of the Garonne or whether this plan was only a pretense for bringing up a reinforc-
ing army for the Aedui patriotic faction against Ariovistus.
If we accept the second assumption, the turning off of the column northward
after the Sâone crossing as well as the facing about for the battle can be very simply
explained; with the first assumption, both of these points remain plainly inexplica-
ble.
Ziehen says, "I must now say first of all that in the year 1900 advice concerning
routes which o n e can choose can be given very easily on the basis of excellent maps;
for the poor Helvetii 2,000 years ago, however, this knowledge was not so easy to
obtain, particularly since they had the R o m a n s behind them. Furthermore, how d o e s
Delbrück know w h e t h e r the routes that have been discovered by the French scholars
were at that time already really usable? But e v e n if we assume that they were and
that the Helvetii knew about t h e m , it is still entirely possible that their use was
blocked by the m o u n t a i n e e r s living in the area. We know from the negotiations with
the Sequani at the start of the move how important the Helvetii considered it to
avoid difficult defiles, and Delbrück himself says precisely on this point that the
Helvetii could easily have held up the Romans with a small rear guard on those
mountain roads. But what works to the advantage of the Helvetii can also work
against them; consequently they could only risk taking this route if the local popula-
tion caused t h e m no difficulty, and the possibility that this did occur, after all, can
be disputed by nobody."
My answer to this: It g o e s completely without saying that there were roads leading
t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n valleys in this well populated region, which was in no way
lacking i n t o w n s a n d m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , the Helvetii were
familiar with t h e m . T h e y had p l a n n e d their m o v e for a l o n g time and were not so
careless as to march o f f into the blue. T h e i r a n n o u n c e d intention was undoubtedly
to take the direct route toward the Santones; otherwise, why would they have cross-
ed the Sâone so far to the south a n d not already have turned toward the northwest
m u c h sooner, either from G e n e v a or as soon as they e n t e r e d the plain? What pur-
pose was served by their right-angled detour? It appears conceivable that the m o u n -
taineers might u n e x p e c t e d l y have s o u g h t to close the passes to t h e m . T h i s motive is
not strong e n o u g h , however, to justify such an important measure as the drastic
c h a n g e in the direction of the march. T h e occupation of passes in m o u n t a i n o u s
country of such m o d e r a t e altitudes d o e s , of course, cause delays, but it is possible to
m o v e a r o u n d t h e m , and the resulting difficulty is not to be c o m p a r e d with the
d a n g e r to which the Helvetian c o l u m n was e x p o s e d in the river valley, as it was
being followed by the R o m a n s . Most important of all in this context, however, is the
fact that the animosity of the m o u n t a i n e e r s , which is considered so possible in this
a r g u m e n t , is a c o m p l e t e l y g r o u n d l e s s p r e s u m p t i o n ; Caesar d o e s not say a word
about it. N o t only d o e s he give us no reason for the surprising c h a n g e of direction
by the e n e m y c o l u m n , but it is also clear that he himself had from the start expected
n o t h i n g other than the m a r c h northward along the Sâone. For the reprovisioning of
his army that he had arranged was to follow him on the river, and w h e n he turned
away from the Sâone, he did not have the necessary w a g o n train to m o v e his provi-
sions up b e h i n d him. If the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r had initially foreseen the campaign
as g o i n g over the m o u n t a i n s into the Loire valley, he w o u l d necessarily have had to
provide for an adequate train. Caesar gives us no reason for the turning o f f to the
north of the Helvetii because he himself never believed in the march to the region
of the Santones, a n d the shift of the Helvetii toward the north was the m o r e natural
and obvious m o v e .
T h e same points apply to the Helvetii's s u d d e n facing about for the battle. If they
i n t e n d e d to m o v e to the Santones, why in the world did they b e c o m e involved in a
battle with the R o m a n s just at the m o m e n t w h e n the latter were turning away from
their pursuit a n d h e a d i n g o f f in another direction? Up to now, n o b o d y has under-
taken to answer this question in e v e n a partially logical m a n n e r .
On the o t h e r h a n d Fröhlich has eliminated the last remaining doubtful point in
the report by Caesar itself. I have written above that the attack by the Boii and the
T u l i n g e r i "latere aperto" must be the decisive point if this Latin e x p r e s s i o n , e v e n
without the addition of the preposition "a," means "the right flank." Now Fröhlich
cites (p. 29) two passages from the Bellum Alexandrinum (20. 3 and 4 0 . 2), from which
it is clear that the addition of the preposition is, in fact, meaningless. If then the
Boii and T u l i n g e r i attacked the right flank of the Romans, the withdrawal of the
Helvetii must, in k e e p i n g with the positions of the armies, logically have taken place
toward the east or northeast, a n d therefore on the right of Bibracte, a n d Stoffel's
interpretation has b e c o m e impossible, since he has to have the attack c o m i n g from
the left. It is true, of course, that Bircher o p p o s e s this a r g u m e n t by having both
armies make such a drastic w h e e l i n g about as they took position (the R o m a n s facing
southwest) that the flanking attack could, after all, still take t h e m from the right. I
consider that to be fully impossible; principally also for the reason that the main
body of the Helvetii could not t h e n have taken up their withdrawal toward the Lin-
g o n e s . Bircher himself adds that the events following the battle remained "extremely
vague," especially the clashing flight, 30 kilometers a day. All vagueness disappears,
however, if the battle took place east of Bibracte, that is, not very far from the bor-
ders of the Lingones' region.
8. A. Klotz, in " T h e Migration of the H e l v e t i i " ("Der H e l v e t i e r z u g , " ) Neue

Jahrbücher fur das klassische Altertum, Vol. 35 and 36, N o . 10, 1915, seeks again to
rescue Caesar's report by simply skimming over the difficulties.
9 Konrad L e h m a n n , in Sokrates 6 9 , N o . 10/11, 1915: 4 8 8 , d e f e n d s Caesar, agree-
ing in general with my concept, against the attacks of Ferrero.
1. A c c o r d i n g to Beloch. H u b o , in Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie

147 (1893): 707, estimates 25,000 a n d seeks to justify Caesar's o w n
figure by eliminating a " C " from t h e latter's n u m b e r for t h e width.
2. Clausewitz, too, estimates in this way (10: 66). A useful com-
parison is p r o v i d e d by " T h e W a r J o u r n a l of Albrecht von B r a n -
d e n b u r g " ("Das Kriegsbuch Albrechts v. B r a n d e n b u r g " ) in Jähns's
History of Warfare (Geschichte des Kriegswesens) 1: 5 2 1 .
3. T h e trains t h a t followed t h e Prussian a r m y at O l m ü t z in 1758
were m a d e up of almost 4,000 wagons, most of t h e m d r a w n by 4
horses, a n d h a d a l e n g t h of almost 2 days' m a r c h . General Staff
Publication (Generalstabswerk) 7: 9 3 .
4. N o t by a full f o u r t h , as is often said; t h e q u a r t e r of which
Caesar speaks refers only to t h e Helvetii in t h e n a r r o w e r sense.
T h e allies w e r e already across, a n d C a e s a r also does not say that
the q u a r t e r was still t h e r e w h e n he attacked, b u t r a t h e r , w h e n his
scouts o b s e r v e d it. See also Stoffel, The War between Caesar and
Ariovistus (Guerre de Cesar et d'Arioviste) p. 7 5 .
5. If Maissiat s h o u l d be r i g h t in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n the
"Segusiavi" a n d t h e "Sebusiani," placing t h e latter in the s o u t h e r n
J u r a , n o r t h o f t h e R h o n e , o n t h e Ain, a n d t h e r e b y having C a e s a r
not c a m p n e a r Lyons b u t follow t h e Helvetii from F o r t l'Ecluse
t h r o u g h B o u r g - e n - B r e s s e , with t h e result t h a t L a b i e n u s with his
t h r e e legions was waiting o n e day's m a r c h to t h e east d u r i n g t h e
battle on the Sâone, t h e n t h e Helvetii w o u l d i n d e e d h a v e h a d full
f r e e d o m o f m o v e m e n t from M o n t m e r l e , w h e r e they w e r e attacked,
to take the r o u t e either directly westward or s o u t h w e s t w a r d .
6. Las Cases, Memoirs from Saint Helena (Memorial de Sainte-Hélene)
2: 4 4 5 .
7. H. B e n d e r , in "Caesar's Credibility on t h e W a r with Ariovistus"
("Cäsars G l a u b w ü r d i g k e i t ü b e r d e n K r i e g m i t Ariovist,") (Neue
Korrespondenzblätter fur die Gelehrtenschulen Württembergs, 1894),
shows h o w very e x a g g e r a t e d C a e s a r ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e h e g e m o n y
that Ariovistus exercised in Gaul actually is, b u t t h e fact itself that
Ariovistus was m a s t e r of a p a r t of c e n t r a l Gaul is not to be
doubted.
8. C a e s a r has this t h o u g h t e x p r e s s e d specifically by Liscus (1. 17)

in the form t h a t they w o u l d p r e f e r to obey o t h e r Gauls r a t h e r than
R o m a n s — w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e s e o t h e r G a u l s h a d first
broken/the mastery of the Germans.
9. T h e fact t h a t t h e Helvetii a n n o u n c e d precisely this a r e a as the
goal of t h e i r m i g r a t i o n has b e e n e x p l a i n e d very brilliantly by O.
Hirschfeld in his study " A q u i t a n i a in the R o m a n Period" ("Aquita-
nien in d e r römischen Zeit") (Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie,
1896, p. 453), w h e r e it is s h o w n to be highly p r o b a b l e that the Hel-
vetii, a n d p e r h a p s also t h e Boii, who w e r e a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e m ,
were related to tribes a l r e a d y settled on the lower G a r o n n e . In that
connection Hirschfeld, too, makes the observation that such a mi-
gration was n o t so easy to imagine. With only o n e step farther along
this train of t h o u g h t we arrive at t h e hypothesis p r e s e n t e d above in
the text.
10. T h e long time they a r e s u p p o s e d to have t a k e n crossing the
Sâone is no proof, since we c a n n o t know to what e x t e n t Caesar ex-
a g g e r a t e d h e r e also.
11. I c o n s i d e r it as impossible that, as is often a s s u m e d , Caesar had
with h i m , in a d d i t i o n to cavalry, a considerable force of o t h e r Gallic
allies, e i t h e r from t h e p r o v i n c e or from the A e d u i or o t h e r tribes.
His six legions w e r e s t r o n g e n o u g h to o p p o s e the Helvetii in battle,
a n d allies w h o s e reliability is questionable a r e of no use but only
create p r o b l e m s t h r o u g h t h e difficulties they cause in the m a t t e r of
rations. T h e auxilia of which Caesar speaks a r e mainly the N u m i d -
ians, Balearics, a n d C r e t a n s w h o m he has with him (2. 7).
12. T h e p a s s a g e d e s c r i b i n g the f o r m a t i o n has not b e e n passed
d o w n very clearly in h a n d w r i t i n g a n d has b e e n r e a d a n d corrected
in a variety of ways by the different editors. All, however, have in-
t e r p r e t e d its m e a n i n g in the s a m e way.
13. Strabo 4. 1. 11. In the n o r t h the region of t h e Lingones is sup-
posed to have e x t e n d e d still f a r t h e r t h a n that of the Mediomatrici.
Strabo 4. 2. 4.
14. Scholars h a v e d i s a g r e e d as to how Caesar's expression "nullam
partem noctis itinere intermisso" ("the m a r c h was n o t i n t e r r u p t e d for
a n y p a r t of t h e n i g h t " ) is to be i n t e r p r e t e d . M e u s e l p u t s it in
p a r e n t h e s e s , a n d it d o e s , in fact, look very m u c h like a side com-
m e n t . T h e m e a n i n g can n e i t h e r be that they m a r c h e d only at night
n o r that they m a r c h e d continuously, day a n d night, for four days,
but this can only be a hyperbolic expression for the fact that, in
their haste a n d fear, they also took a d v a n t a g e of d a r k n e s s for some
of their m a r c h i n g .
Chapter III
Ariovistus
After the subjection of t h e Helvetii C a e s a r h a d delegations from
the Gallic princes a p p e a r before h i m , a n d they asked him to liber-
ate t h e m from Ariovistus' h e g e m o n y . C a e s a r moved out a n d c a m e
upon the G e r m a n i c a r m y in the region of Belfort or in u p p e r Al-
sace.
It is not possible to d e t e r m i n e the definite location. Ariovistus did
not move directly into t h e decisive battle b u t m a r c h e d a r o u n d the
Roman c a m p a n d set up his wagon b a r r i c a d e a b o u t two miles away,
in conformity with the m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n , so that he could send
his cavalry out from t h e r e a n d cut t h e r o a d along which the Ro-
mans w e r e b r i n g i n g up their provisions. Since Ariovistus c a n n o t
have t h o u g h t of taking care of t h e situation without fighting a bat-
tle a n d also c a n n o t h a v e h a d in m i n d m a n e u v e r i n g C a e s a r back
p e r h a p s some fifteen or twenty miles, t h e p u r p o s e of his m a n e u v e r
must have b e e n to force Caesar into a withdrawal because of his
supply situation a n d t h e n attack him o n t h e m a r c h . T h e s t r e n g t h o f
his a r m y lay in t h e c o o r d i n a t e d f u n c t i o n i n g of his cavalry a n d
lightly a r m e d foot s o l d i e r s , w h o w e r e well d r i l l e d a n d g r e a t l y
feared. T h e Gallic cavalry that Caesar h a d with him was afraid to
move o u t against this force.
T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e fighting a r m s , t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e
Germanic a r m y in its own special m i x t u r e of w e a p o n s , must also
serve as an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e success of Ariovistus' m a n e u v e r .
Otherwise it w o u l d be difficult to i m a g i n e (unless we c o n c l u d e d
'hat Caesar as a strategist was greatly inferior to Ariovistus) how
Ariovistus succeeded in setting up his wagon defensive position so
close to the R o m a n c a m p , a n d in d o i n g so, m a r c h e d by a n d a r o u n d
the c a m p . Even if Caesar's account is very e x a g g e r a t e d , if it was not
really whole G e r m a n i c tribes with their w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n w h o
made this m o v e m e n t but a relatively m u c h smaller g r o u p of mobile
479
w a r r i o r s with a small train of supplies a n d w o m e n following, even a

few h u n d r e d carts a r e still a heavy b u r d e n a n d c a n n o t be exposed
to an o r d e r l y e n e m y attack while on t h e m a r c h or f o r m i n g up the
wagon defenses. T h i s action only b e c o m e s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e if we as-
s u m e that Ariovistus was able to cover his circling m o v e m e n t simul-
taneously by clever utilization of t h e t e r r a i n a n d his light infantry.
After this passing m o v e m e n t was successful, Ariovistus d o m i n a t e d
t h e p l a i n a n d i n t e r c e p t e d t h e s u p p l i e s c o m i n g u p , a n d i f the
R o m a n a r m y started to m a r c h in any direction whatever, it could
not help being h a r d p u t to d e f e n d itself a n d its train against the
s u d d e n attacks, now from this d i r e c t i o n a n d now from that, by
these b a r b a r i a n s w h o s c o r n e d d e a t h . Ariovistus h a d m a n e u v e r e d
with c o m p l e t e d e x t e r i t y , b u t C a e s a r was s u p e r i o r t o h i m . First
Caesar r e p e a t e d l y c h a l l e n g e d him to c o m e o u t for battle by having
his a r m y deploy on t h e plain. Ariovistus warily declined to move
o u t from his w a g o n defenses, a n d that raised t h e m o r a l e of the
R o m a n soldiers, w h o i n t e r p r e t e d the r e l u c t a n c e of the Germanic
a r m y as cowardice. But the most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g was to o p e n up
the supply r o u t e again. Caesar m o v e d with his a r m y in battle for-
mation to a position that blocked off t h e G e r m a n i c troops' e n t r a n c e
to t h e plain in t h e direction of Caesar's supply r o a d a n d had his
two forward echelons r e m a i n in battle o r d e r while the t h i r d eche-
lon, b e h i n d t h e m , established a fortified c a m p large e n o u g h for two
legions, t h e force which was t h e n assigned to occupy it. As soon as
the main body of t h e R o m a n s h a d m o v e d back into their principal
c a m p , Ariovistus tried in vain to take t h e smaller c a m p by storm in
a d a s h i n g attack. Caesar was so confident of his fortification a n d its
garrison that he did not even b o t h e r to move his main body out to
their relief. On the following day, however, he d e p l o y e d his entire
a r m y again for battle a n d moved up close to t h e G e r m a n i c wagon
defenses. Ariovistus finally d e c i d e d to accept t h e challenge. Caesar
was now in a better position to hold o u t t h a n h e ; he had secured
his supplies, a n d t h e G e r m a n i c a r m y h a d n o t h i n g m o r e to gain by
delaying. Certainly Ariovistus must h a v e been p r e p a r e d for many
weeks or even m o n t h s for the start of t h e war, a n d he h a d surely
g a t h e r e d all the available forces before m o v i n g against the R o m a n s .
Otherwise, he could, of c o u r s e , have w i t h d r a w n a long distance a n d
d r a w n Caesar along b e h i n d him without difficulty or any significant
losses. But certainly that possibility lay far from his t h o u g h t s . On
the o t h e r h a n d , t h e R o m a n s would surely not have allowed t h e m -
selves to be l u r e d into an attack on t h e w a g o n d e f e n s e s , a n d a
l o n g e r p e r i o d of waiting would have h e i g h t e n e d their m o r a l e , since
Ariovistus 481
they w e r e t h e side laying d o w n t h e c h a l l e n g e , w h e r e a s it w o u l d

have w e a k e n e d t h a t o f t h e G e r m a n i c a r m y . Ariovistus t h e r e f o r e
moved o u t of his wagon defenses a n d d r e w up his w a r r i o r s for bat-
tle in tribal g r o u p s .
O n c e again t h e e c h e l o n tactics of the R o m a n s p r o v e d their w o r t h .
When their left flank b e c a m e h a r d - p r e s s e d , y o u n g Crassus, w h o ac-
tually c o m m a n d e d t h e cavalry, led the t h i r d e c h e l o n t o w a r d this
side a n d t h r o u g h this reinforcing action won t h e u p p e r h a n d t h e r e ,
just as Caesar h a d already d o n e on t h e o t h e r flank.
In Caesar's account we find no m e n t i o n of the position or the ac-
tion o f t h e cavalry. W h e r e w e r e t h e d r e a d e d G e r m a n i c d o u b l e
fighters? Why, after they h a d d r i v e n off the Gallic cavalry, did they
not fall on t h e flanks a n d r e a r of t h e R o m a n legions, as Hannibal's
cavalry did at C a n n a e ? It is completely impossible that s o m e u n -
usual situation might have caused t h e m not to be on h a n d , since in
that case Ariovistus would not have m o v e d o u t of his w a g o n d e -
fenses on that same day.
Everything d e p e n d s , of c o u r s e , on the a n s w e r to this question.
Caesar is silent on t h e subject. I believe that the answer is to be
found in the writings of his most highly qualified c o m m e n t a t o r ,
Napoleon I, w h o , in his dictation on St. H e l e n a c o n c e r n i n g Caesar's
wars, states, against all t h e concepts of his time, that the G e r m a n i c
army c a n n o t have been numerically s u p e r i o r to Caesar's. We take
the liberty of g o i n g o n e step f a r t h e r : For the failure of the Ger-
manic cavalry in t h e battle t h e r e can be only one e x p l a n a t i o n : that
Ariovistus was so weak in infantry a n d he had to i n c o r p o r a t e with
his r e g u l a r infantry t h e lightly a r m e d foot soldiers w h o normally
a c c o m p a n i e d t h e cavalry. T h i s r e d u c t i o n in s t r e n g t h m a d e it possi-
ble for the Gallic cavalry to stand up to the G e r m a n i c to a certain
extent a n d to p r e v e n t t h e m f r o m a t t a c k i n g the flanks of the le-
gions. C a e s a r has told us n o t h i n g a b o u t this because he d i d not
want to r e p o r t e i t h e r the n u m e r i c a l superiority of his a r m y over
that o f t h e G e r m a n i c a r m y o r t h e c o o p e r a t i o n a n d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s
of the allied Gallic cavalry.
A welcome c o r r o b o r a t i o n of the a s s u m p t i o n that Ariovistus' a r m y
was only very small is to be f o u n d in Caesar's r e p o r t ( 1 . 40) on the
m a n n e r in which t h e G e r m a n i c King h a d g a i n e d his mastery over
the Gauls. F o r m o n t h s , C a e s a r says, Ariovistus r e m a i n e d in a c a m p
protected by s w a m p s ("cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuis-
s
?t neque sui potestatem fecisset" ("he h a d k e p t his forces in t h e i r
camps a n d in t h e m a r s h e s for m a n y m o n t h s a n d did not offer the
Gauls a c h a n c e to fight him"]). Even if these m o n t h s s h o u l d only
have been weeks, this point still conclusively eliminates the possibil-
ity that the a r m y m i g h t have n u m b e r e d several tens of t h o u s a n d s ,
all the m o r e so in that, of course, t h e r e w e r e w o m e n a n d children
a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e a r m y a n d , in a d d i t i o n to t h e horses, certainly
also h e r d s of cattle to be fed. We can imagine, i m p r o b a b l e as it
m i g h t seem, that t h e G e r m a n i c a r m y c a r r i e d a l o n g with it even
m u c h m o r e grain t h a n the Helvetii c a r r i e d on their carts, for the
Helvetii w e r e on the move a n d took their forage from t h e coun-
tryside, w h e r e a s the G e r m a n i c warriors, in t h e i r c a m p , h a d to feed
their horses from t h e i r a c c u m u l a t e d supplies. It is certain that the
a r m y that Ariovistus led against the R o m a n s was larger than the
o n e with which he first g a i n e d his h e g e m o n y , b u t the nucleus was
nevertheless still t h e s a m e ; we can p e r h a p s imagine a d o u b l i n g of
t h e original s t r e n g t h , but certainly not a tenfold expansion.
T h e c o r r o b o r a t i o n of the fact that t h e R o m a n s probably enjoyed
a very c o n s i d e r a b l e n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y now enables us, as we
look back, also to u n d e r s t a n d better Ariovistus' m a n e u v e r i n g a n d
clarifies a n o t h e r well-known episode of this war.
W h e n Caesar h a d g o n e as far as Besançon on his a d v a n c e against
Ariovistus, his t r o o p s m u t i n i e d a n d refused to follow him farther
against the fearful G e r m a n i c a r m y . Caesar s p o k e to t h e m reassur-
ingly, told t h e m a b o u t t h a t e a r l i e r c a m p a i g n o f Ariovistus a n d
closed his speech with the a n n o u n c e m e n t that, if the o t h e r s were
unwilling to do so, he would c o n t i n u e the m a r c h with the T e n t h
Legion alone.
If the G e r m a n i c a r m y h a d really b e e n s t r o n g e r in n u m b e r s t h a n
an a r m y of six legions, Caesar's a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t he would wage
the war with one legion would, after all, h a r d l y have m a d e a good
i m p r e s s i o n o n the soldiers; they w o u l d have h a d t h e impression
that t h e i r c o m m a n d e r was a miles gloriosus ( b r a g g a r t soldier). Caesar
probably a d d e d o n e m o r e s e n t e n c e , h o w e v e r , which h e did not
m e n t i o n in his c o m m e n t a r i e s : t h a t is, t h a t t h e G e r m a n i c forces
were so small in n u m b e r s that he was confident of b e a t i n g t h e m
with the T e n t h Legion alone. T h a t was probably c o n f i r m e d for the
R o m a n soldiers b y t h e Gauls, a n d the R o m a n s t h e n s u m m o n e d u p
their c o u r a g e a n d c o n s e n t e d to follow their c o m m a n d e r into the
distant, u n k n o w n wilderness to fight against the u n c o u t h G e r m a n i c
warriors.
W e w o u l d b e a b l e t o discuss this c a m p a i g n a t m u c h g r e a t e r
length a n d with g r e a t e r certainty if we w e r e in a position to deter-
m i n e with any d e g r e e of accuracy the m a r c h e s of the two armies
a n d the battlefield. T h a t would be desirable not only for Caesar's
Ariovistus 483
sake a n d that of the R o m a n art of war, b u t also for the sake of his
o p p o n e n t . Ariovistus must have b e e n not only a s t r o n g personality
but also o n e e n d o w e d with strategic genius. He e n c o u n t e r e d o n e
s t r o n g e r t h a n he a n d went d o w n to defeat, but in the period half-
way between the Cimbri a n d A r m i n i u s he is a s t r o n g witness for
the original warlike qualities of t h e G e r m a n i c p e o p l e . We know
practically n o t h i n g of the C i m b r i except that they defeated
R o m a n a r m i e s a n d in the e n d were themselves defeated. It would
be i m a g i n a b l e that they possessed no o t h e r quality but raw
s t r e n g t h , b u t since we see how cleverly a n d boldly, even ingeni-
ously, Ariovistus m a n e u v e r e d a n d how soon after Ariovistus Ar-
minius comes to o u r attention, we c a n n o t d o u b t that from the very
b e g i n n i n g the G e r m a n i c spirit possessed not only the savage factor
of warfare, so to speak, but also its h i g h e r , intellectual aspects, a n d
we can only r e g r e t that we c a n n o t gain a m o r e complete a n d m o r e
definite p i c t u r e of Ariovistus' l e a d e r s h i p .
EXCURSUS
1. In Dio Cassius there appear now and then expressions that are in agreement
with the concept of the Helvetian and Germanic campaigns presented above. They
cannot, however, be valued as true source material, since J. Melber pointed out con-
vincingly in a Munich program (1891), The Report of Dio Cassius on Caesar's Gallic
Wars (Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über die gallischen Kriege Cäsars), that this report is
nothing more than a rhetorically exaggerated excerpt from the commentaries. But
even this author, in his reworking of the original, did not completely overlook the
gaps and contradictions in Caesar's account, and from time to time he filled them in
in the right direction from his o w n concept.
2. Even back in his time N a p o l e o n I d e p l o r e d in his precis the fact that Caesar's
battles in Gaul "without names" cannot be fixed topographically and consequently
cannot be fully j u d g e d .
Countless attempts have been made to establish the location of the battle against
the Germanic army, but n o n e of them has won general acceptance. T h e possibility
of varying combinations is multiplied especially in this case through the fact that o n e
of the most important passages is indefinite. Caesar's manuscripts agree in stating
that the R o m a n s pursued the defeated Germanic army 5 , 0 0 0 paces (passus), up to
the Rhine, that is, between 4 and 5 miles. Plutarch, w h o took his information from
Caesar, says, however, that it was 4 0 0 stadia, which would be 5 0 , 0 0 0 paces, and we
read this same n u m b e r in Orosius, w h o also used Caesar as his source. It is there-
fore possible, in fact probable, that the n u m b e r in Caesar's manuscripts was cor-
rupted and that the flight of the Germanic forces did not cover 4 to 5 miles but
some 45 miles to the Rhine. T h i s is all the m o r e probable in that the m a n e u v e r s of
Caesar and Ariovistus, if they took place only 4 or 5 miles from the Rhine, a n d
therefore in the middle of the Alsatian plain, would not be at all understandable;
what is n e e d e d here is an area that is in some respects limited and narrowed by the
mountains.
This would be convincing if the Rhine River Control experts had not coinciden-
tally c o m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that in f o r m e r times an arm of the Rhine flowed
through the area of the present-day Ill River. On the basis of this determination,
Fig 4 BATTLE BETWEEN CAESAR A N D ARIOVISTUS
Göler has held fast to the 5 , 0 0 0 paces and has sought the battlefield on the southern
e d g e of the Vosges near S e n n h e i m (Cernay), northeast of Belfort.
N a p o l e o n III placed the battle in the same region, but with the maneuvering of
the two sides turned about.
Colonel Stoffel places the battlefield 40 kilometers farther to the north, at the foot
of the Vosges between Colmar a n d Schlettstadt (Sélestat), near Rappoltsweiler. Ac-
c o r d i n g to the d e s c r i p t i o n of this perceptive soldier a n d o u t s t a n d i n g scholar of
Caesar's military actions, there is an area near the village of Zellenberg in which the
maneuvers recounted by Caesar fit perfectly. T h e Germanic w a g o n train could have
been m o v e d by at s o m e 3 kilometers' distance from the R o m a n c a m p over the foot-
hills of the Vosges, where the legions, m o v i n g uphill, could have attacked it only with
great difficulty, and again the small R o m a n camp finds its position somewhat to the
south, where it blocks the Germanic forces from entering the plain.
Against this hypothesis W i e g a n d has stressed the point that the Germanic army
could not have m a d e a withdrawal to the Rhine from a battle in which it was facing
Ariovistus 485
1
eastward. T h e objection is justified, but it can be clarified. It is very possible that
the Germanic army did not accept battle directly in front of its wagon d e f e n s e s near
Zellenberg but rather m a d e a m o v e m e n t in advance so that its front faced toward
the south. While Caesar d o e s not make any direct mention of such a m o v e , it can
nevertheless be i n f e r r e d from the s t a t e m e n t that the Germanic troops had sur-
rounded their battle formation with their wagons and carts; they did therefore actu-
ally make s o m e kind of m o v e m e n t with their wagon d e f e n s e s before the battle. T h e
p u r p o s e of this, as stated by Caesar, "so that there w o u l d remain no h o p e for
flight," belongs in the same category of reports as that of the ranks b o u n d together
with chains in the battle with the Cimbri. and furthermore, as we learn later, the
Germanic troops did nevertheless take flight.
2
Not so easily eliminated is another objection, raised by C o l o m b and Stolle. Caesar
says that on the seventh day of his march from Vesontio he received a report of the
approach of Ariovistus and set up the c a m p near which the battle later took place.
He did not, however, take the direct road but, in o r d e r to march through o p e n ter-
rain, made a swing (circuities) of 5 0 , 0 0 0 paces, that is, about 45 miles. Now Stoffel,
like most other scholars, considers the circuitus to have been only a part of the entire
route, and he believes that the Roman army marched in the 7 days up to the region
of Rappoltsweiler, which means an average daily march of 27 kilometers. T h a t is
certainly not an out-and-out impossibility, but it is still such a strenuous accomplish-
ment that we would at least have to be able to find s o m e special motive for such an
effort. But there d o e s not appear to be such a reason. It is impossible that Caesar
can have driven his troops on in the h o p e that by gaining 2 or 3 days of marching
time he would be able to fall u p o n Ariovistus while the latter was still unprepared. If
Ariovistus was waiting for reinforcements, he would only have n e e d e d to remain in
place or at most to m o v e back a day's march, instead of g o i n g forward to meet
Caesar, in order to put the situation back in balance. If Caesar had had such an
idea, it would also be incomprehensible why, w h e n he was informed that Ariovistus
was still 36 kilometers away, he halted and established a camp instead of driving on
against the e n e m y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , C o l o m b and Stolle are right in believing that
under the prevailing circumstances Caesar cannot have m o v e d from Besançon to
Rappoltsweiler in 7 days.
Nevertheless, I should not like to give up Stoffel's hypothesis. We have been rely-
ing on the fact that Caesar's statement that he marched for 7 days was absolutely
correct. But is this really so certain? T h e account was not written out until 8 years
after the events. It is possible, of course, that he referred to s o m e kind of written
notes made at the time of the campaign; but it is also possible that no such notes
were used or that they did not contain a specific statement about the time element.
When we have occasion in a later v o l u m e to discuss the memoirs of Frederick and
N a p o l e o n on their campaigns, writings that we can corroborate through original
documents, we shall see how many and how serious errors have crept into t h e m ,
even without a biased intent. It is not at all impossible that Caesar was mistaken in
his recollection and that the march had lasted not 7 but 9 or 10 days, and that
would remove the objection to Stoffel's concept.
I place even less weight on the other objection, that the pursuit could not have
e x t e n d e d some 45 miles from Rappoltsweiler to the Rhine. T h e direct, nearest route
to the Rhine would, of course, have a m o u n t e d to only s o m e 11 miles, but if the bat-
tle was fought with the Germanic army facing s o u t h w a r d , it could arrive at the
Rhine only by m o v i n g off at a very acute angle, and it is also not impossible but is,
in fact, highly probable that once again Caesar's statement is greatly exaggerated.
In the face of such extensive skepticism there will be some perhaps w h o bring up
the question as to how we could risk explaining anything at all about the Persian
Wars. In Caesar's case we have the account of an individual w h o was perhaps pre-
judiced and one-sided but was a professionally skilled and participating witness of
the highest o r d e r — i n the other case the account of a writer completely lacking in
professional k n o w l e d g e w h o repeats what was being said by people half a century
after the events. Certainly Caesar is an infinitely better source than H e r o d o t u s , and
I should like first of all, turning the situation about, to emphasize for those who
believe that they may repeat what H e r o d o t u s has written that, if even in Caesar's
case such great caution is called for, H e r o d o t u s must still appear much m o r e sus-
pect. Nevertheless, we n e e d not despair about attaining historical knowledge of the
Persian Wars, for it is precisely here that we possess a tool of objective analysis that
is so painfully lacking in Caesar's case: the battles of the Persian Wars can be defi-
nitely established topographically, and the terrain forms such an important part of
every battle that, w h e r e we have reliable testimony in this respect, many vague
points of the accounts h a n d e d d o w n to us can thereby be eliminated.
T h e earlier hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g the location of the battle with Ariovistus all
had the w e a k n e s s of o f f e r i n g inexplicable objective difficulties. Göler's concept,
which also requires the injection of a march by the legions that was not reported by
Caesar, especially fails to provide a suitable location for the smaller R o m a n camp
and its purpose. N a p o l e o n III has the Germanic army making its march by the Ro-
mans through the Alsatian plain, where the terrain would have provided it no pro-
tection whatever against a R o m a n flanking attack. Stoffel's hypothesis removes all
objective difficulties. It is also entirely understandable that Ariovistus, knowing that
his strength lay in his cavalry-light infantry combination, first allowed the Romans to
m o v e completely into the Alsatian plain before he confronted them. But it cannot be
d e n i e d that the specifying of the location of the battle simply cannot be reconciled
with the wording of the text of the commentaries as we know it.
3
T h e latest hypothesis by C o l o m b and Stolle, according to which the battle was
fought near Arcey, 10 kilometers east of M ö m p e l g a r d , has the advantage of corre-
s p o n d i n g exactly to the two definite space and time indications of Caesar (more than
5 0 , 0 0 0 passus with the circuitus from Besançon and 5 0 , 0 0 0 passus from the Rhine).
On the circuitous route approximately via Voray, Pennesieres, and Villersexel, Arcey
is s o m e t h i n g over 45 miles from Besançon and j u s t the same distance from the
Rhine in a straight line. T h e objection that just a little over 45 miles is too short a
distance for a march of 7 days is justifiably rejected. T h e Romans had to make their
march with great caution and fortify their c a m p each evening; they had no reason
for unusual haste, a n d it is of course also imaginable that bad weather deteriorated
the roads and delayed the march.
Nevertheless, the points to be made against this hypothesis are as follows:
First: We cannot understand why Caesar halted, w h e n he received the word near
Arcey that Ariovistus was 36 kilometers away. If he were already d e e p in Alsace, this
halt would be understandable and natural; the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r did not want to
o v e r e x t e n d his line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s unnecessarily and complicate his resupply. A
halt near Arcey, still in the m i d d l e of the Sequani's area, far from the e n e m y , would
have given the impression of fear; at Rappoltsweiler they w o u l d already have pro-
gressed so far toward the e n e m y that there could no longer be any such question.
Second: In the vicinity of Arcey we can understand neither the purpose nor the
feasibility of the Germanic circling maneuver. Stolle did not push his study this far,
and Colomb's conclusions are tenable neither from the critically analytical point of
view nor from that of source interpretation. He assumes that Caesar's camp was be-
tween S e s m o n d a n s and D é s a n d a n s and that Ariovistus, c o m i n g from Mömpelgard,
blocked his supply route near Arcey. T h i s , however, would neither have really cut
off the Romans' supplies, since they could have t h e m c o m e up from the Lingones
and the Leuci, nor would the Germanic army have b e e n able to pass a r o u n d the
Roman camp t h r o u g h the plain, for in d o i n g so they would have been attacked not
only by the Gallic cavalry but also by the legions.
Fröhlich, in Caesar's Method of Waging War (Cäsars Kriegswesen), p. 2 0 6 , has already
rejected as being considerably too high the o p i n i o n of Rüstow, based on Vegetius,
that a normal R o m a n day's march "justum iter" ("an appropriate march") was 30
kilometers. Colomb and Stolle, the latter in a very painstaking and scholarly study,
now seek to show that such a march in wartime in e n e m y country a m o u n t e d to not
Ariovistus 487
more than 12 to 14 kilometers. Stoffel assumes 25 kilometers, a distance that would

still be greater than what has been considered normal up to o u r time, even though
the Roman soldier still has to establish the fortified c a m p each evening. In a more
recent study. The Camp and Army of the Romans (Das Lager und Heer der Römer, Stras-
bourg, 1912), Stolle successfully d e f e n d e d his opinion.
3. W i n k l e r , in The Location of the Battle between Caesar and Ariovistus (Der
Cäsar-Ariovistsche Kampfplatz, Colmar, 1907), believes that he has established the fact
that the area d e t e r m i n e d by Stoffel cannot be reconciled in some of its points with
Caesar's description, and he seeks to place the battlefield 23 kilometers still farther
northward. Fabricius, in Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins, checked on the var-
ious topographical studies and found that a g o o d deal was confirmed but that other
portions were not.
4. C. Ebert, in On the Origin of the Bellum Gallicum (Ueber die Entstehung des Bellum
gallicum, 1909), attempts to prove that Caesar wrote and published each of his books
immediately after the events. He has not succeeded in convincing me; but even if he
should be right, my k n o w l e d g e of military history memoirs leads me to the belief
that an error such as the o n e I have assumed and pointed out above (p. 4 8 5 ) , that a
march lasted not 7 but 9 days, is in no way impossible.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R III
1. Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Erhaltung der geschichtlichen

Denkmäler im Elsass, Vol. 16, 1893.
2 . G . C o l o m b , " C a e s a r ' s C a m p a i g n a g a i n s t Ariovistus" ("Cam-
pagne de Cesar c o n t r e Arioviste") in Revue archéologique), Series 3,
Vol. 3 3 , 1898. Franz Stolle, Where did Caesar Defeat Ariovistus? (Wo
schlug Cäsar den Ariovist?), (Strasbourg, 1889). C o l o m b carried o u t
t h e t o p o g r a p h i c a l s t u d i e s t h a t led h i m t o A r c e y ; Stolle c o m -
p l e m e n t e d his work, in the philological a r e a . His t r e a t m e n t is ex-
tremely p a i n s t a k i n g a n d in m a n y respects valuable, but u n f o r t u -
nately it is r e n d e r e d almost u n r e a d a b l e by a contrived system of
formulas a n d abbreviations. At the e n d he gives an overall tabula-
tion of the various concepts that have b e e n f o r m u l a t e d a n d a com-
plete b i b l i o g r a p h y , w h i c h I s h o u l d like to r e f e r t h e r e a d e r to.
Winckler's works were not available to m e . O n e should c o m p a r e
Stolle's w o r k with t h e review by K o n r a d L e h m a n n in Deutsche
Literaturzeitung, N o . 44, 1899, para. 1682.
3. Stolle h a s now d r o p p e d this p i n p o i n t i n g of t h e battlefield
(Camp and Army of the Romans [Lager und Heer der Römer], 1912, In-
troduction).
Chapter IV
The Subjection of the Belgae
As liberator of the Gauls f r o m the G e r m a n i c h e g e m o n y and as
t h e i r l e a d e r , Caesar h a d c o n q u e r e d A r i o v i s t u s a n d h a d t h e r e u p o n
e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e l a t t e r ' s place his o w n m a s t e r y t h r o u g h o u t t h e
c o u n t r y . I n t h e v e r y n e x t year h e m o v e d o n f a r t h e r i n o r d e r t o sub-
j e c t also t h e n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s , whose i n h a b i t a n t s h e h i m s e l f collec-
tively d e s i g n a t e d u n d e r t h e n a m e o f Belgae.
T h e Belgae h a d a p r e m o n i t i o n o f t h e i r i m p e n d i n g d a n g e r , u n i t -
e d t h e i r forces, a n d w h e n Caesar crossed t h e i r b o r d e r s , m o v e d
o u t against h i m w i t h a l a r g e a l l i e d a r m y .
B u t c i v i l i z a t i o n has m e a n s o f w a r f a r e t h a t a r e l a c k i n g t o b a r -
b a r i a n s . T h e Belgae w e r e n o d o u b t capable o f a s s e m b l i n g a l a r g e
a r m y b u t n o t o f h o l d i n g i t t o g e t h e r a n d f e e d i n g it. Just a s t h e C i m -
b r i a n d T e u t o n e s h a d h a d t o split u p o n t h e i r c a m p a i g n i n t o I t a l y
a n d t h e n w e r e d e f e a t e d i n d i v i d u a l l y b y M a r i u s , Caesar, instead o f
m o v i n g i m m e d i a t e l y i n t o a decisive battle against a n a r m y o f the
same size as his or p e r h a p s c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r , f o u n d t h e means of
s p l i t t i n g u p t h e a l l i e d a r m y s o t h a t h e c o u l d t h e n deal w i t h o n l y
i n d i v i d u a l t r i b e s . I n t h e m e a n t i m e Caesar h a d o r g a n i z e d 2 new le-
g i o n s , s o t h a t h e n o w h a d a t o t a l o f 8 ; w i t h his a u x i l i a r y t r o o p s o f
N u m i d i a n s , C r e t a n s , B a l e a r i c s , a n d G a l l i c c a v a l r y , his a r m y m a y
w e l l have n u m b e r e d 5 0 , 0 0 0 c o m b a t a n t s a n d a g r a n d t o t a l o f 80,000
to 100,000 souls. In o r d e r to f e e d such a mass in o n e place f o r a
r a t h e r l o n g t i m e , o n e m u s t have a very s t r o n g a n d reliable o r g a n i -
z a t i o n , t r a n s p o r t , s u p p l i e r s , a n d f i n a n c e system. T h e R o m a n s h a d
such m e a n s , w h e r e a s t h e Belgae d i d n o t .
B u t Caesar h a d s t i l l o t h e r m e a n s a t his d i s p o s a l . H e set u p a
c a m p o n t h e n o r t h b a n k o f t h e A i s n e , a n d his a r m y was s o well
e q u i p p e d w i t h tools a n d his s o l d i e r s s o w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d a n d s o well
t r a i n e d i n t h e i r t e c h n i q u e s t h a t w i t h i n t h e shortest possible t i m e a n
488
The Subjection of the Belgae 489
i m p r e g n a b l e fortress stood t h e r e . N a p o l e o n I I I h a d excavations

m a d e at a spot indicated by Göler a n d found a n d confirmed n e a r
the village of Berry au Bac, a crossing point that also played a role
in the events of 1814, very significant r e m a i n s of a military installa-
tion. T h e moats were 18 feet wide a n d 9 to 10 feet d e e p ; the r a m -
part, a c o m b i n e d palisades a n d breastwork, was 12 feet high, a n d
consequently 21 to 22 feet above t h e b o t t o m of the moat. A l o n g the
front of the c a m p , which lay on a long ridge, ran a marshy brook,
the Miette.
Up to this point everything fits into the picture. But the descrip-
tion that Caesar gives in detail of the direction of the moats a n d the
relationship of t h e d e p l o y m e n t for battle to the c a m p c a n n o t be re-
conciled with the excavation. A n u m b e r of scholars have t h e r e f o r e
assumed that Caesar himself, w h e n he wrote his account, no l o n g e r
1
had the situation clearly a n d definitely in m i n d , w h e r e a s o t h e r s
have indicated as the c a m p a n d battle location a place some 5 miles
2
d o w n s t r e a m (westward), n e a r t h e village o f C h a u d a r d e s , w h e r e ,
however, no excavations have yet been c a r r i e d out either to con-
firm or to contradict this p r e s u m p t i o n . Basically, the question has
no real i m p o r t a n c e . T h e i m p o r t a n t points r e m a i n : (1) Caesar took
up his position on the n o r t h s h o r e of the river; (2) he covered the
c r o s s i n g b e h i n d h i m ( a n d s o m e w h a t off t o t h e s i d e ) w i t h a
b r i d g e h e a d ; a n d (3) he also established a s t r o n g h o l d on the south
side of t h e river that was o c c u p i e d by six c o h o r t s a n d served to
cover the supply r o a d s .
Caesar took up his position on the side of the river facing t h e
enemy. In case of a battle he would have h a d the river b e h i n d h i m ,
but the fortified c a m p gave him such great security that he could
afford to risk that, a n d from this point he himself was in a position
to go over to the offensive at any m o m e n t .
T h e R o m a n c a m p was in the territory of the Remi, a tribe of the
Belgae that h a d , however, already g o n e over t o t h e R o m a n s . T h e
allied a r m y of the Belgae at first invested the Remi b o r d e r town of
Bibrax (Vieux-Laon or Bievres), no d o u b t with the h o p e of t h e r e b y
luring Caesar out of his c a m p , since the c o n q u e r i n g of this small
town would, in itself, have b e e n no great task for a large a r m y n o r
would it have had any p a r t i c u l a r significance. Caesar s u c c e e d e d ,
however, in reinforcing the garrison with s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d sling-
ers from his a r m y , so that t h e town held fast a n d the Belgae gave
up the siege. Now they moved up directly against the R o m a n c a m p
itself, a n d C a e s a r h a d his a r m y m o v e o u t a n d d e p l o y i n b a t t l e
490 H i s t o r y o f the A r t o f W a r
o r d e r . B e y o n d this d e m o n s t r a t i o n , however, n o t h i n g happened

since j u s t i f i a b l y n e i t h e r o f t h e t w o sides was w i l l i n g t o d e c i d e t o at-
tack t h r o u g h t h e s w a m p y valley.
T h e B e l g a e t h e n a t t e m p t e d t o cross t h e A i s n e f a r t h e r d o w n -
s t r e a m w i t h a s m a l l b o d y o f l i g h t l y a r m e d t r o o p s i n o r d e r t o cut o f f
t h e R o m a n s ' s u p p l y l i n e , b u t Caesar h a d t h e r i v e r b a n k w e l l pa-
t r o l l e d a n d o n r e c e i v i n g t h e f i r s t r e p o r t o f this a t t e m p t h e was able
t o s e n d his o w n c a v a l r y a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s back across his b r i d g e and
t h u s p r e v e n t e d t h e c r o s s i n g . I f t h e B e l g a e h a d crossed w i t h the
main body o f their a r m y , the R o m a n lightly a r m e d troops w o u l d o f
c o u r s e h a v e b e e n u n a b l e t o p r e v e n t t h e m o v e , b u t t h a t was too
m u c h f o r t h e s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e B e l g a e . I n this event they
w o u l d , i t i s t r u e , a c t u a l l y have c u t o f f t h e l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o f
t h e R o m a n s a n d i n t e r r u p t e d t h e i r s u p p l i e s , b u t t o t h e same extent
t h e y t h e m s e l v e s w o u l d have b e e n c u t o f f f r o m t h e i r t e r r i t o r y a n d
w o u l d have l a i d i t o p e n t o attack b y t h e R o m a n s . W h a t t h e n s h o u l d
t h e y do? Since t h e R o m a n s d i d n o t m o v e o u t f o r a battle i n the
o p e n f i e l d , t h e B e l g a e w o u l d have h a d t o s u r r o u n d t h e i r c a m p o n
all sides a n d s t a r v e t h e m . Since t h e a r e a was crossed by t h e Aisne
a n d t h e s w a m p , t h e y w o u l d h a v e h a d t o f o r m a very w i d e circle.
A c c o r d i n g t o Caesar's f i g u r e (he gives t h e B e l g a e 3 0 6 , 0 0 0 m e n ) , 3
t h e i r n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y w o u l d have s u f f i c e d f o r this p u r p o s e . I t
i s possible t h a t t h e y h a d n o s u c h s u p e r i o r i t y a t a l l , b u t e v e n i f they
d i d h a v e , t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f f e e d i n g such a l a r g e a r m y surpassed
t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s . T h e y h a d r e a c h e d t h e e n d o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y skill,
a n d w h e n t h e y n o w also r e c e i v e d the news t h a t t h e A e d u i , allied
with the R o m a n s , had invaded their land at another point at
Caesar's b e h e s t a n d w e r e l a y i n g i t waste, t h e y d e c i d e d t o r e t u r n
h o m e . T h e r e was n o t h i n g else t h e y c o u l d d o . T h e i r p r o m i s e t o
c o m e t o t h e m u t u a l a i d o f o n e a n o t h e r i f Caesar i n v a d e d t h e i r ter-
r i t o r y was n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a f a c e - s a v i n g d i s g u i s e f o r t h e i r c o m -
plete d e f e a t . Caesar's m i l i t a r y s k i l l h a d e n a b l e d h i m t o a p p l y the
s u p e r i o r o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e R o m a n a r m y o v e r t h e mass levy o f the
b a r b a r i a n t r i b e s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e mass was f i r s t o f all split u p
almost w i t h o u t any b l o o d s h e d a n d then the i n d i v i d u a l parts were
easily d e f e a t e d . H i s success was so g r e a t t h a t Caesar h i m s e l f was at
first t a k e n b y s u r p r i s e a n d t h o u g h t that the w i t h d r a w a l o f the
e n e m y h o r d e s was o n l y a r u s e . T h e Belgae h a d s t a r t e d t h e i r r e t r e a t
d u r i n g t h e n i g h t , a n d i t was n o t u n t i l m o r n i n g t h a t t h e R o m a n -
Gallic cavalry took up the p u r s u i t a n d b r o u g h t h a r d pressure to
bear on the fugitives.
E v e n the f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s o f t h e Belgae n o w s u r r e n d e r e d t o the
Romans as soon as the latter b r o u g h t up their elaborate siege en-

gines.
A single g r o u p consisting of t h r e e tribes, the Nervii, the V e r o -
m a n d u i , a n d t h e Atrebates, c o m b i n i n g c o u r a g e with a s t r a t a g e m ,
made o n e last effort to save their f r e e d o m . T h e y fell u p o n the Ro-
mans, whose patrols h a d not been alert e n o u g h , j u s t at the m o m e n t
when they w e r e setting up their c a m p in a w o o d e d area on the
Sambre. T h e allied Gallic cavalry, the lightly a r m e d t r o o p s , a n d the
train took to flight, but the R o m a n legionaries had e n o u g h disci-
pline not to allow themselves to be c a u g h t up in the panic, a n d they
quickly took up an orderly formation again. As soon as the fight
was b r o u g h t to a deadlock, it was already won, since the R o m a n s
were dealing with only t h r e e Gallic tribes a n d t h e r e f o r e , even with-
out t h e allied t r o o p s that h a d fled, still enjoyed a large superiority
u n d e r any circumstances, p e r h a p s even a twofold p r e p o n d e r a n c e .
4
T w o legions, which were for a while in a dire situation, w e r e soon
disengaged by the o t h e r s , which h a d already b e e n victorious, a n d
by the two last ones, which were still on the m a r c h a n d h a s t e n e d
forward.
First in the battle with the Helvetii, again in the battle against the
G e r m a n i c army, a n d now for the third time in t h e battle with the
Nervii, we have r e a c h e d the o p i n i o n that the numerical superiority
lay on t h e side of the R o m a n s . In t h e case of the Helvetii we ar-
rived at that conclusion from t h e m o v e m e n t s of the a r m y before
the battle; with the G e r m a n i c a r m y the indication c a m e from its
earlier c a m p a i g n against the Gauls a n d from the events of t h e bat-
tle itself; for the Nervii, it is t h e p o p u l a t i o n statistics that will give
us this proof. W h o e v e r might wish to r e g a r d these bits of evidence
only as probabilities must nevertheless recognize the ever-increasing
weight of the probability t h r o u g h the fact that it is not each time
simply a repetition of the s a m e kind of evidence but r a t h e r a com-
pletely different relationship each time that leads us to the same re-
sult. At the same time we have now c o m e to o n e of Caesar's n u m e r -
ical s t a t e m e n t s which, as n o b o d y has failed to recognize for a long
time now, can be shown t h r o u g h his own s t a t e m e n t to be a m o n -
strous e x a g g e r a t i o n . W h e n the Nervii s u r r e n d e r e d , they s u p p o s e d l y
r e p o r t e d that only 3 of their 600 captains were left a n d only 500 of
their 6 0 , 0 0 0 service-qualified w a r r i o r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h r e e years
later Caesar has t h e m a p p e a r i n g on t h e scene o n c e again with an
i m p o r t a n t a r m y (5. 39), a n d two years after that they send 5,000
m e n to Alesia, not as their whole levy b u t simply as a partial de-
t a c h m e n t of t h e i r a r m y . If it is methodologically false to believe
unquestioningly the s t r e n g t h figures given us by the a u t h o r who

r e p o r t s to us obviously false loss figures, we a r e in a position h e r e
to o p p o s e those figures with a positive c o u n t e r e s t i m a t e .
T h r o u g h the R o m a n census we have an excellent, reliable basis
for estimating t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Italy at the time of Caesar. T h e
peninsula itself, without any of the islands, h a d at that time some
3½ to 4 million i n h a b i t a n t s , or b e t w e e n 25 a n d 28 p e r s q u a r e
kilometer, U p p e r Italy (Gallia cisalpina) h a d l½ to 2 millions, or be-
tween 14 a n d 18 p e r s q u a r e kilometer. T h e R o m a n Province must
have h a d a s o m e w h a t lesser density of p o p u l a t i o n t h a n Cisalpine
Gaul, since it h a d not participated as long in the civilized economic
life, a n d free Gaul, w h e r e the tribes w e r e continuously at w a r with
each o t h e r , would have h a d still fewer i n h a b i t a n t s . T h e u p p e r limit
of p o p u l a t i o n density for free Gaul must t h e r e f o r e have b e e n some
9 to 12 p e r s o n s p e r s q u a r e kilometer.
A lower limit can be d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h a c o m p a r i s o n with
G e r m a n i a . T h e g r e a t military a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f the G e r m a n i c
tribes necessarily postulate a certain mass, not too small in size. As
we shall point o u t m o r e specifically in t h e n e x t v o l u m e , we c a n n o t
g o below s o m e 5 p e r s o n s p e r s q u a r e k i l o m e t e r (13 p e r s q u a r e
mile). U n d e r any circumstances, Belgium was already m o r e densely
p o p u l a t e d t h a n G e r m a n i a , a n d central Gaul m o r e s o t h a n Belgium.
T h e lower limit for the average p o p u l a t i o n density of Gaul would
t h e r e f o r e be f o u n d s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 7 a n d 8 individuals p e r
s q u a r e kilometer. T h e region of the t h r e e tribes which fought on
the S a m b r e can b e e s t i m a t e d b e t w e e n 18,000 a n d 22,000 s q u a r e
kilometers (8,250 s q u a r e miles), of which some 11,000 b e l o n g e d to
t h e Nervii; c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i r total p o p u l a t i o n at t h e most was
150,000 souls o r 4 0 , 0 0 0 a d u l t m e n , o f w h o m , after s u b t r a c t i n g
slaves, t h e a g e d , t h e ill, a n d the h a n d i c a p p e d , t h e r e could have
b e e n at h a n d at the very most 30,000, a n d p r e s u m a b l y very m a n y
fewer, whereas the R o m a n a r m y n u m b e r e d at least 40,000 m e n in
its legionaries alone.
EXCURSUS
1. It could appear curious that the A p e n n i n e peninsula should have had only 25
to 28 inhabitants per square kilometer toward the e n d of our period of reckoning,
whereas we have already estimated a r o u n d 60 for the R o m a n canton in the year 5 1 0
B . C . If, however, there should be an error in these figures, it would necessarily be
that the second o n e was too high rather than the first too low, since the latter, be-
cause of its relationship to the completely reliable numbers of the Roman census,
can absolutely be regarded as true, and if we had to show above that R o m e cannot
have had more than 6 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants in the year 5 1 0 B . C . , then we must also at-
tempt here to show that it is credible that there really can have been so many. But
this actually is the case, since we may assume that: (1) in the half-millennium between
Tarquinius and Caesar there was no very important increase in the population of
Italy; (2) almost the entire slave population and also between a fourth and a third of
the entire population of the canton of R o m e lived in the city in 5 1 0 B . C . a n d re-
ceived their provisions from outside; (3) the countryside, too, was relatively very
thickly populated, not only because of its fertility but also because it stood u n d e r the
mighty protection of the great city and enjoyed a relatively high d e g r e e of security
in comparison with other regions.
2. T h e bases for o u r estimates are o n c e again taken from Beloch, w h o has some-
what modified the figures of his book and thoroughly d e f e n d e d them in an essay in
the Rheinisches Museum, New Series, 54 (1899): 4 1 4 , to which I refer the reader for
the details. See also p. 346, above. His evaluation of the n u m b e r s that Caesar gives
for the large relieving army before Alesia I can, however, agree with only partially.
That is, he estimates according to the strength of the individual tribal contingents,
since Caesar, after all, presumably had his figures agree to a certain extent with the
relative sizes of the different peoples, a density of population gradually decreasing
with increasing distance toward the north from the Roman province. T h a t is a very
valuable statistical confirmation of a fact that we could o t h e r w i s e establish o n l y
through the general relationships. N o t h i n g further, however, is to be derived from
these numbers, since we of course have no clue at all about how the strength of the
levy was related to the total number of available m e n or about the d e g r e e of care or
negligence with which Caesar made his estimates. Only in the opposite way, since we
have of course gained an idea of the population of Gaul, can we arrive at the prob-
ability that the stated strength of the Alesia army a m o u n t e d to something like a
third of all m e n qualified for military service, a twelfth of the entire population.
In the final analysis I am inclined, on the basis of a comparison with the Germanic
tribes, to accept a somewhat higher estimate of the total population of Gaul than
Beloch gives, that is, between 7 and 12 individuals to the square kilometer instead of
6.3, which would then give for all of free Gaul ( 5 2 3 , 0 0 0 square kilometers) 4 to 6
million persons.
3. Beloch, Rheinisches Museum, estimates the region of the Nervii (southern half of
the "Nord" département, A n t w e r p , H e n n e g a u , half of Brabant) at 1 1 , 0 0 0 square
kilometers; the area of the Atrebates and Morini together (Pas-de-Calais département)
he puts at 7,000 square kilometers. T h e V e r o m a n d u i (County Vermandois, Aisne
département) receive no particular mention in Beloch, since they are not n a m e d by
Caesar at Alesia. It is not to be assumed that precisely these three peoples should
have had a density of population significantly e x c e e d i n g the average, e v e n t h o u g h
their territory was very beautiful and fertile. T h e Nervii were considered to be the
most savage, "maxime feri" ("extremely ferocious") of the Belgae and had no towns at
all (when the Romans approached, they hid their families in places protected by
swamps). T h e s e are sure signs that their e c o n o m i c life was still very u n d e r d e v e l o p e d
and therefore that their production of crops and their population density were also
small.
4. On the basis of the information that we have now gained let us take another
look at the Helvetii, whose migration c o l u m n is given a total strength of 3 6 8 , 0 0 0 by
Caesar, supposedly according to a census.
T h e territory of the Helvetii and their allies has been estimated, as we have seen
on p. 461 above, at 18,000 to 2 5 , 0 0 0 square kilometers. If we take the smaller of
these figures, which includes less m o u n t a i n o u s area, their density of population can
have been greater than that of the Belgae. By this reckoning the Helvetii could have
n u m b e r e d between 180,000 and 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 souls.
T h e i r army column cannot possibly have been that large; consequently not the
whole nation but only a part of that people took part in the march. But if only a
part of the population went on the march, this gives us a supplementary confirma-
tion of the assumption that it was not at all a question of the migration of a whole
nation but rather a military c a m p a i g n followed by a certain n u m b e r of families in
order to maintain the political pretense.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R IV
1. D i t t e n b e r g e r in t h e n e w e d i t i o n of K r a n e r ' s p u b l i c a t i o n of
Caesar.
2. K o n r a d L e h m a n n , Neue Jahrbücher fur das klassische Altertum 7,
N o . 6 (1901): 5 0 6 , a n d Klio 6, N o . 2 (1906): 2 3 7 .
3. Strictly s p e a k i n g , C a e s a r does not say—and K o n r a d L e h m a n n
has called a t t e n t i o n to this p o i n t — t h a t the 3 0 6 , 0 0 0 m e n w e r e actu-
ally on h a n d , b u t he only says that the R o m a n s h a d r e p o r t e d to
him that they knew exactly how m a n y each tribe at t h e i r assembly
had promised to provide.
4. C o n c e r n i n g t h e m a n e u v e r t h a t they c a r r i e d o u t , see p. 457,
above.
Chapter V
Vercingetorix
Caesar c o n q u e r e d Gaul in a bold a n d rapid s e q u e n c e of events,
but his m o v e m e n t s were a c c o m p a n i e d by g r e a t care, in fact d o w n -
right caution. Strategy a n d politics went h a n d in h a n d . F r o m t h e
very start he was allied with a part of the Gauls themselves, a n d he
was able to divide up the others b e f o r e he fought with t h e m . In the
three battles that m a d e him the m a s t e r of t h e whole great area, he
u n d o u b t e d l y had at his disposal each time—against t h e Helvetii as
well a s a g a i n s t A r i o v i s t u s a n d a g a i n s t t h e N e r v i i — a significant
numerical superiority.
After his first victories, not only did he not r e d u c e the s t r e n g t h
of his forces but he c o n t i n u e d to increase it very considerably. He
had led out 6 legions against the Helvetii; in c o n q u e r e d Gaul he
1
eventually h a d 10 legions, a n d in addition he h a d 2 legions a n d 2
cohorts for the defense of the province a n d p r e s u m a b l y in Cisal-
2
pine Gaul 8 m o r e c o h o r t s , for a g r a n d total of 13 legions.
We do not n e e d to follow t h r o u g h e i t h e r with the partial battles
that e n s u e d o r with t h e d a r i n g m o v e s t o B r i t a i n a n d o v e r t h e
Rhine, but instead we now t u r n directly to the decisive battle, which
did not take place until the seventh year of his g o v e r n o r s h i p , w h e n
all the Gallic tribes rose up t o g e t h e r a n d u n i t e d against him u n d e r
the l e a d e r s h i p of the A r v e r n i a n V e r c i n g e t o r i x .
O n e would think that, since Gaul certainly c o n t a i n e d a million
m e n fit for battle, it could not have b e e n very difficult for Vercin-
getorix to assemble a h u g e a r m y a n d c r u s h the R o m a n s with it in
o n e decisive battle. But that did not occur. Rather, Vercingetorix
r e c o m m e n d e d to his c o m p a t r i o t s t h e use of t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y in
cavalry to cut off the R o m a n s ' flow of s u p p l i e s a n d e v e n to lay
waste t h e i r own land all a r o u n d , in o r d e r by this m e t h o d to force
the R o m a n s to withdraw. H a d that b e e n t h e total of V e r c i n g e t o r i x '
strategic wisdom, we would have to c o n s i d e r him a very i n a d e q u a t e
495
intellect—for, after all, what would the a d v a n t a g e have been to the

Gauls if the R o m a n s h a d w i t h d r a w n t e m p o r a r i l y into their province
because of the p r o b l e m of provisions? T h e y w o u l d have r e t u r n e d
very soon. T h e l i b e r a t i o n o f G a u l c o u l d n o t b e a t t a i n e d simply
t h r o u g h m a n e u v e r i n g ; if they really w a n t e d to get rid of the Ro-
m a n s , they would have to defeat their a r m y so decisively that they
would lose any desire to r e t u r n , or, if possible, destroy it, j u s t as the
Cherusci did later in t h e T e u t o b u r g e r Forest. As a m a t t e r of fact,
Vercingetorix, too, h a d this in m i n d . Caesar tells us t h a t — n o t the
first time, it is t r u e , but the second time that he has occasion to
speak of the Gallic war plan (7. 6 6 ) — a n d since he himself describes
Vercingetorix to us as an extremely r e m a r k a b l e personality, we may
a n d m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e Gallic n a t i o n a l h e r o h a d t h e p r o p e r
strategic insight from t h e start, that is, that e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e d
not on forcing the R o m a n s to withdraw but on defeating t h e m . We
should u n d e r s t a n d the action to cut off the supplies only as a pre-
paratory m e a s u r e , i n t e n d e d to create favorable conditions for the
battle.
T h e s e favorable conditions for which Vercingetorix was striving
were two in n u m b e r : first, the winning over to the national cause of
those Gallic tribes that w e r e initially still on the side of the R o m a n s ,
especially the A e d u i , a n d second, the o p p o r t u n i t y for a surprise
blow, an attack against the R o m a n a r m y on t h e m a r c h .
T h e first goal was attained. Since t h e Gauls did not assemble to
offer him battle, Caesar h a d to resort to sieges, first taking the capi-
tal of the Bituriges, A v a r i c u m (Bourges), with a full-scale attack,
a n d t h e n dividing up his a r m y in o r d e r to subject t h e tribes indi-
vidually a n d to c o n q u e r their towns. He sent L a b i e n u s with 4 le-
gions against Paris, a n d with 6 legions he himself m o v e d o u t to be-
siege the principal c e n t e r of the A r v e r n i , Gergovia. But these forces
w e r e too weak for their missions. Caesar himself, in a t t e m p t i n g a
surprise attack in front of Gergovia, suffered a setback, a n d only
with difficulty did Labienus succeed in fighting his way t h r o u g h the
Gauls who w e r e blocking his r o u t e , in o r d e r to j o i n up again with
Caesar (in the area of t h e Seine), w h o was m o v i n g toward him. En-
c o u r a g e d by this success, almost all of t h e Gallic tribes now j o i n e d
the A r v e r n i .
A l t h o u g h Caesar reinforced his r e u n i t e d a r m y still further with
newly r e c r u i t e d G e r m a n i c cavalry, he was nevertheless still not ca-
pable of m a i n t a i n i n g himself in central Gaul b u t was forced to seek
to base himself on t h e R o m a n province to assure his provisions. He
d i r e c t e d his m a r c h t h r o u g h t h e t e r r i t o r y o f t h e L i n g o n e s ( n e a r
Vercingetorix 497
Langres), w h o r e m a i n e d allied with him, t o w a r d the region of t h e
Sequani. Göler believes, as did N a p o l e o n I I I , that he i n t e n d e d to
m a r c h to Besançon to use that town as a fortified base.
From t h e r e , Göler believes, he could m o r e easily have g o n e to
the assistance o f t h e R o m a n p r o v i n c e t h a n i f h e h a d r e m a i n e d
farther to the n o r t h in the territory of the Senones, a n d in this way
h e w o u l d a t least n o t c o m p l e t e l y h a v e e v a c u a t e d all o f G a u l .
N a p o l e o n a d d s that he could not have c o n s i d e r e d taking the direct
route t h r o u g h t h e area of the A e d u i , t h e focal point of t h e insur-
rection. If that were correct, t h e n we would have before us the re-
m a r k a b l e spectacle o f t h e two o p p o s i n g a r m i e s b o t h a t t e m p t i n g
equally a n d directly to avoid battle.
Was t h e s i t u a t i o n really s o b a d t h a t C a e s a r not only h a d t o
evacuate G a u l b u t also, w i t h o u t h a v i n g suffered a defeat in t h e
o p e n field, avoided the e n e m y ? Even if he had to move back to the
b o r d e r s of t h e province, it would still have b e e n a quite different
situation if he m a d e his m a r c h right t h r o u g h the e n e m y ' s territory
a n d , while t h e e n e m y a v o i d e d t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h u s a s s e r t e d his
s u p e r i o r m o r a l e , t h a n if he stole away, so to speak, as Göler a n d
Napoleon would have it.
T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Göler a n d N a p o l e o n , however, is u n d o u b t -
edly incorrect. T h e region of t h e S e q u a n i was j u s t as hostile to t h e
R o m a n s as that of t h e Aedui, a n d t h e r e is absolutely no s t a t e m e n t
to the effect that Caesar i n t e n d e d to move directly to Besançon.
T h a t town was by its location very well protected, a n d we c a n n o t
assume that it h a d a R o m a n garrison. It would t h e r e f o r e first have
had to be laid siege to a n d c a p t u r e d , if Caesar i n t e n d e d to establish
his strong point t h e r e , a function, m o r e o v e r , for which it offered
no particularly favorable conditions, b u t would, in fact, have been
particularly unfavorable.
Caesar's m a r c h to t h e Sequani's area, t h e n , has to be e x p l a i n e d in
some o t h e r way. He himself says that he took this direction so that
he could all t h e m o r e easily have b r o u g h t assistance to t h e p r o -
vince. F o r V e r c i n g e t o r i x h a d n o t b e e n c o n t e n t with o p e r a t i n g
against the R o m a n a r m y directly but h a d also h a d raids m a d e into
the province, h o p i n g in this way to m a n e u v e r Caesar o u t of Gaul.
For Caesar, however, still m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e h e l p that he
was to b r i n g to the province was t h e h e l p that the province was to
provide h i m , that is, r e g u l a r r e s u p p l y , which the few Gallic tribes
that h a d r e m a i n e d loyal to him could n o t possibly c o n t i n u e to p r o -
vide for his large a r m y in the long r u n . W h a t Caesar n e e d e d now
was a position w h e r e he could feed his t r o o p s a n d protect t h e p r o -
vince while exercising at the same time c o n t i n u i n g p r e s s u r e on the

Gauls. C o n s e q u e n t l y , he directed his m a r c h n o t on Besançon but
on the Sâone, a n d specifically across t h e m o r e o p e n t e r r a i n east of
t h e C o t e d ' O r across the p l a t e a u o f L a n g r e s , w h e r e a n a m b u s h
could not easily be laid for h i m . On t h e Sâone he would be able to
r e p e a t the m a n e u v e r that h a d enabled h i m to subject the Belgae. If
he established a fortified c a m p on this river, s o m e w h e r e n e a r Au-
x o n n e o r f a r t h e r d o w n s t r e a m , w h e r e t h e D o u b s flows i n t o the
Sâone, the Gauls w o u l d not be capable of driving h i m o u t of it.
Situated on t h e right bank, he could k e e p t h e n e i g h b o r i n g tribes,
a n d especially the A e d u i , in constant fear of a s u d d e n invasion,
while a few d e t a c h e d legions again subjected t h e tribes on the left
bank, the Sequani a n d Helvetii. Vercingetorix could not have
b r o u g h t t h e m any h e l p , since he could not have risked e i t h e r sac-
rificing the t e r r i t o r y of the A e d u i or of crossing the Sâone a n d
D o u b s a n d t h u s e x p o s i n g himself on the o t h e r side to an attack by
the entire R o m a n a r m y . If t h e n the e n t i r e left b a n k was o n c e again
pacified, Caesar would have a secured r o a d for his line of com-
munications with t h e province; i n d e e d , he would have b e e n able,
with a few security m e a s u r e s , to move up his provisions in the most
convenient possible way, by water on t h e Sâone, which is navigable
as far as Gray.
I believe t h e r e can be no d o u b t that this was Caesar's strategic
intention, a n d Vercingetorix h a d a p r e m o n i t i o n of this, feeling that
the m o m e n t was now at h a n d w h e r e he h a d to b r i n g on the deci-
sion b y a t t a c k i n g C a e s a r o n t h e m a r c h , b e f o r e h e r e a c h e d the
Sâone. He believed that he could b r e a k up t h e e n e m y ' s m a r c h col-
3
u m n with cavalry attacks. But these attacks failed because Caesar
used his closely f o r m e d infantry to s u p p o r t his cavalry, which had
b e e n recently r e i n f o r c e d by the a d d i t i o n of t h e newly r e c r u i t e d
G e r m a n i c units, w h e r e a s Vercingetorix kept his infantry o u t of the
battle. T h e Gauls w e r e completely d e f e a t e d . I n s t e a d of c o n t i n u i n g
its m a r c h to t h e Sâone, the R o m a n a r m y now t u r n e d to pursuit.
Vercingetorix was able to stem the flight of his t r o o p s in no o t h e r
way t h a n by t a k i n g cover in a fortified place, the town of Alesia
(Alise Sainte Reine, on M o n t A u x o i s , b e t w e e n Nuits a n d Dijon).
Caesar immediately encircled the place, in o r d e r to besiege it. Since
the Gauls h a d evacuated the c o u n t r y s i d e , he h a d space a n d time to
4
secure provisions for t h e siege army, even if only with difficulty.
T h e r e now c a m e a b o u t a great assembling of all the Gallic tribes
in o r d e r to relieve the a r m y u n d e r siege in Alesia. T h e g r e a t battle,
without which t h e r e can be no great decisions, h a d to be fought
Vercingetorix 499
now. But if Vercingetorix h a d not b e e n willing earlier to pit his in-
fantry against the legions in t h e o p e n field, victory now for t h e
Gauls would be all the m o r e difficult.
Caesar h a d used the interval of five to six weeks between the e n -
circling of the garrison a n d the arrival of the relieving a r m y to es-
tablish fortifications on both sides. N a p o l e o n I I I h a d excavations
m a d e that u n c o v e r e d almost the e n t i r e trace of these fortifications
a n d a r e in c o m p l e t e accord with the account in Bellum Gallicum.
T h e contravallation line was some 16 kilometers long, the circum-
vallation line 20 kilometers. W h e r e it e x t e n d e d over the o p e n field,
any possible attack was m a d e difficult by artificial obstacles of all
kinds: caltrops, pitfalls with 8 rows of s h a r p stakes a r r a n g e d in
c h e c k e r b o a r d fashion, a n d finally fallen trees.
For o u r j u d g m e n t o f the decisive battle w e a r e u n f o r t u n a t e l y
lacking h e r e even m o r e so t h a n in earlier battles t h e i m p o r t a n t fac-
tor of relative strengths. Caesar h a d 11 legions, N u m i d i a n a n d C r e -
tan s h a r p s h o o t e r s a n d G e r m a n i c cavalry a n d light infantry, for a
total of p e r h a p s 70,000 m e n . F o r the Gauls, Caesar says t h e r e w e r e
80,000 in Alesia a n d 250,000 infantry plus 8,000 cavalry in the re-
lieving army. Since we are already familiar with his exaggerations
in stating e n e m y strengths, h e r e again we c a n n o t trust the accuracy
of his figures, a n d m a n y scholars have a l r e a d y e x p r e s s e d d o u b t ,
especially o v e r t h e 8 0 , 0 0 0 s u p p o s e d l y u n d e r siege; 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n
were sufficient for the defense of the place, a n d it would have b e e n
very unwise of Vercingetorix to have k e p t m o r e t h e r e , since he h a d
relatively few food supplies. Since Caesar tells us, m o r e o v e r , that
Vercingetorix, in his reliance on the superiority of his cavalry, h a d
not by any m e a n s assembled all the available infantry a n d that, be-
fore t h e completion of the R o m a n fortifications, he still h a d r o o m
to send his cavalry o u t of Alesia, we may t h e r e f o r e a s s u m e with
certainty that, in the m a t t e r of infantry, too, he h a d kept with h i m
only the necessary n u m b e r , consequently some 20,000 m e n at the
most.
At first a p p e a r a n c e the n u m b e r s given for the relieving a r m y ,
250,000 infantry a n d 8,000 cavalry, do not s e e m to be u n r e a s o n a -
ble. Almost all of Gaul, f o r m i n g a total mass of at least 4 million
souls, a n d p e r h a p s even 8 million, with from 1 to 2 million m e n ,
was involved in this struggle. For t h e final, decisive battle for na-
tional liberation they could well have p u t 250,000 warriors in the
field.
But let us j u s t consider what an a r m y of a q u a r t e r of a million
men m e a n s . It would have b e e n t h r e e times as large as the largest
a r m y ever previously assembled a n d c o n f i r m e d for us in world his-

tory up to that time, that is, the R o m a n a r m y at C a n n a e . If a Gallic
c o m m a n d e r h a d b e e n capable of o p e r a t i n g with an army of
2 5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , i t w o u l d r e m a i n a n u n p a r d o n a b l e , completely in-
c o m p r e h e n s i b l e e r r o r on the p a r t of V e r c i n g e t o r i x not to have as-
sembled this a r m y from the start a n d with such superiority to have
s o u g h t the o p e n battle.
We feel obliged, however, to go o n e step f a r t h e r a n d say that not
only would 250,000 m e n have b e e n an a r m y so large that no Gallic
c o m m a n d e r could have o p e r a t e d with it, b u t also that the idea that
such a large mass of p e o p l e s as the Gauls could easily have called
up 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 w a r r i o r s is false. F o r t h e n u m b e r of w a r r i o r s that a
p e o p l e can assemble d e p e n d s — a n d we h a v e a l r e a d y noticed this
point in t h e case of the Persian a r m i e s — n o t only on the n u m b e r of
available m e n b u t also on the nation's military a t t i t u d e a n d its social
conditions. In t h e medieval k i n g d o m s , w h o s e history is now quite
well k n o w n to us, we can no longer establish any relationship be-
tween the s t r e n g t h s of their a r m i e s a n d t h e i r n u m b e r s of service-
qualified m e n . T h e s t r e n g t h of an a r m y is d e t e r m i n e d not by the
overall p o p u l a t i o n b u t by a special w a r r i o r class. B u t it is precisely
this military tradition a n d organization for war t h a t Caesar r e p o r t s
to us in t h e case of t h e Gauls. He tells us (6. 13) t h a t the c o m m o n
p e o p l e lived in a condition a p p r o a c h i n g slavery; t h e w a r r i o r g r o u p
was c o m p o s e d of t h e knights with t h e i r followers. We should as-
s u m e that that did n o t apply equally to all t h e Gallic tribes. A m o n g
t h e Helvetii a n d all t h e Belgae the mass of c o m m o n m e n h a d p r o b -
ably n o t yet lost t h e w a r r i o r spirit to such a g r e a t d e g r e e . In o t h e r
respects, too, we s h o u l d n o t p u s h too far t h e analogy between the
attitude toward war of the medieval countries a n d that of the
Gauls, but we m u s t r a t h e r k e e p in m i n d t h a t very i m p o r t a n t differ-
ences, t h o u g h n o t always clearly recognizable in their details, p r e -
vailed. T h e basic fact, however, of a special w a r r i o r g r o u p d o m i n a t -
ing the mass of the p e o p l e , w h o w e r e t h e r e f o r e u n a c c u s t o m e d to
the use of w e a p o n s , c a n n o t be d o u b t e d .
In o r d e r to raise t h e gigantic Gallic a r m y r e p o r t e d by Caesar, we
m u s t t h e r e f o r e imagine that the local g u a r d forces (Landsturm) were
called u p . But such local levies c o m p o s e d of m e n u n a c c u s t o m e d to
battle a r e worthless for full-scale war, u n u s a b l e in battle a n d a de-
finite h i n d r a n c e in t h e m a t t e r of t h e i r n e e d for provisions. For this
r e a s o n t h e medieval a r m i e s , as we shall see later, were very small,
even in the most decisive battles.
Vercingetorix 501
But at Alesia t h e situation was now s o m e w h a t different in that

here e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e d o n a n i m m i n e n t decision. T h e p r o b l e m s
of p r o v i d i n g supplies over an indefinite p e r i o d , t h e r e f o r e , as well
as the control of a variety of o p e r a t i o n s , were eliminated, as w e r e
the tactical m a n e u v e r s of the battle. A certain mass levy, even of
Landsturm, could t h e r e f o r e a p p e a r to be of use h e r e . B u t t h e se-
q u e n c e of events of the battle d o e s not reveal in any way a n u m e r i c a l
superiority on the p a r t of the Gauls. T h a t point has already been
m a d e by N a p o l e o n I, with his s h a r p p e r s p e c t i v e for e v e r y t h i n g
practical; h e too a s s u m e s t h a t V e r c i n g e t o r i x h a d n o m o r e t h a n
20,000 m e n in Alesia, a n d he says that t h e relieving a r m y did not
c a m p a n d m a n e u v e r like o n e that greatly o u t n u m b e r e d its foe, but
r a t h e r like o n e of equal s t r e n g t h . F r o m t h e course of t h e battle it-
self, t h e n , we m u s t also try to gain an idea of the probable s t r e n g t h
of the Gauls.
On the day of the arrival of the relieving a r m y , which established
c a m p to the southeast, a cavalry battle took place in which, accord-
ing t o C a e s a r , o n c e a g a i n his G e r m a n i c cavalry, s u p p o r t e d b y
R o m a n c o h o r t s , was victorious. P r e s u m a b l y the i n t e n t i o n of t h e
Gauls in this battle was simply to cover the a p p r o a c h of their infan-
try.
T h e n , after they h a d spent a day in p r e p a r a t i o n s , they a t t e m p t e d
a night surprise attack against the R o m a n works on the plain of
Laumes, which is some t h r e e kilometers wide. W h e n this attack was
t h r o w n back, on t h e next night they sent a c o l u m n up M o u n t Réa,
which lay on the n o r t h side, w h e r e the R o m a n circumvallation h a d
had to be e x t e n d e d along the d o w n w a r d slope a n d was t h e r e f o r e
particularly e x p o s e d to attack from above. T h e n at n o o n the assault
began simultaneously from both sides, while Vercingetorix, as on
the p r e c e d i n g days, s t o r m e d the contravallation at the same time
from his interior position. On M o u n t Réa the Gauls p u s h e d for-
ward so strongly that the R o m a n s s e e m e d to be on the verge of de-
feat; t h e n L a b i e n u s , on Caesar's o r d e r s , led a n u m b e r of cohorts
a n d a cavalry force from the fortified a r e a farther up the m o u n -
tain, p e r h a p s a l o n g Rabutin Brook, a n d attacked the assaulting col-
5
u m n s i n t h e i r flank a n d r e a r . T h i s p u s h c a r r i e d t h e day. T h e
Gauls first took flight in this a r e a a n d t h e n also on the plain of
L a u m e s . V e r c i n g e t o r i x t u r n e d back into the town with his force
and surrendered.
T h e c i r c u m f e r e n c e o f the contravallation a n d the circumvallation
t o g e t h e r a m o u n t e d , as we have seen, to some 36 kilometers. If t h e n
Caesar's a r m y was 70,000 m e n strong, the o c c u p a t i o n of the entire

breastworks with a m a n to every half-meter would have taken up
the entire a r m y to the last m a n .
T h e first time the Gauls attacked only on t h e plain of L a u m e s ,
which is 3 kilometers wide. If they h a d really b e e n 250,000 m e n
s t r o n g , they would probably have m a d e the assault with a front of
2,000 m e n a n d a d e p t h of 120, covered on the right a n d left by
their cavalry. If we could in any way imagine such a mass as being
at all capable of m o v e m e n t , they would probably have been able to
take any e n t r e n c h m e n t , for the following r a n k s , h a r d l y t o u c h e d by
the e n e m y missiles, would press the front r a n k s forward, fill up any
m o a t with t h e m , flow over every obstacle, a n d w o u l d eventually
p e n e t r a t e the defenses over a causeway of corpses. T h i s fantasy,
however, c a n n o t be accomplished; a closed mass of a q u a r t e r of a
million m e n simply would be u n a b l e to move. T h e n a t u r a l , logical
use of such a mass is r a t h e r t h r o u g h multiple, divided attacks, a n d
that is particularly the a p p r o p r i a t e m a n e u v e r at night, since the
e n e m y c a n n o t distinguish between an attack in force a n d a m e r e
demonstration.
Not until the second day did the Gauls hit u p o n t h e idea of di-
viding their forces, but even t h e n they limited themselves to two
points instead of s t o r m i n g in simultaneously from all sides of the
p e r i p h e r y , w h e r e v e r t h e r e was a possible a p p r o a c h , or at least con-
ducting demonstrations.
T h i s is the p r o o f b e y o n d any d o u b t that they did not enjoy a
superiority of n u m b e r s b u t were, in fact, probably the considerably
weaker of the two forces. If they h a d only h a d an additional 10,000
m e n available to employ in the Rabutin valley, they would have cov-
e r e d the flank of their attack on M o u n t Réa, a n d Labienus would
n o t have been able to strike the decisive blow. It was in no way
simple negligence that was to be b l a m e d for this a p p a r e n t over-
sight, for Caesar himself r e p o r t s that the Gauls h a d finally b r o k e n
off t h e i r first night attack at s u n r i s e , since they f e a r e d that t h e
R o m a n s would move out a n d attack t h e m in the flank.
N a p o l e o n ' s observation that the foes m u s t have b e e n of a b o u t
equal s t r e n g t h is very probably correct, unless it be that this puts
the Gauls' s t r e n g t h s o m e w h a t too high. We must always k e e p in
m i n d the fact that Caesar could not risk leaving a single point of
his miles-long lines completely u n g u a r d e d a n d without having a re-
serve within easy reach. He h a d no o t h e r choice but to split up his
troops, whereas the e n e m y could choose the points where he
w a n t e d t o c o n c e n t r a t e his massive attacks, a n d w h e r e v e r h e at-
Vercingetorix 503
Fig. 5 SIEGE OF ALESIA
t a c k e d t h e r e was c e r t a i n to be a c o r r e s p o n d i n g sortie by t h e be-

l e a g u e r e d f o r c e f r o m t h e o t h e r side, s o t h a t t h e R o m a n soldiers
s t o o d u n d e r t h e m e n t a l p r e s s u r e o f t h r e a t e n e d attack f r o m t h e i r
r e a r . T h e d e f e n s e o f a siege a r m y against a r e l i e v i n g a r m y t h e r e -
f o r e belongs a m o n g t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t strategic missions, e v e n w i t h
e q u a l f o r c e s , a n d m a n y f i e l d c o m m a n d e r s have r e j e c t e d t h e i d e a o f
a c c e p t i n g battle u n d e r these c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s b e i n g basically w r o n g .
I n t h e later v o l u m e s o f this w o r k w e shall have m a n y m o r e occa-
sions t o speak o f this.
I f i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e o p p o s i n g forces a t A l e s i a w e r e o f a p p r o x i -
mately e q u a l s t r e n g t h , that c o n s e q u e n t l y , i f Caesar h a d 7 0 , 0 0 0
m e n , some 20,000 men were besieged in the town and 50,000

Gauls moved up to relieve t h e m , we are still a t t r i b u t i n g to the a r m y
of the Gauls a size that the actual warrior class even of such a large
region can certainly not possibly assemble. B u t we may assume that
the knightly class h a d s t r e n g t h e n e d its forces in this final, most ex-
t r e m e e m e r g e n c y , j u s t as the Saxons did in their struggle against
H e n r y IV, by recruiting brave y o u n g m e n from a m o n g the com-
m o n p e o p l e , the serflike peasantry. Many knights d i s m o u n t e d a n d
fought a m o n g the infantry, as we may c o n c l u d e from Caesar's fig-
u r e of 15,000 cavalry b e l o n g i n g to V e r c i n g e t o r i x b u t only 8,000
cavalry for the relieving a r m y . T h e military history of the Middle
Ages gives us many e x a m p l e s of cases w h e r e knights d i s m o u n t e d to
lead the infantry or the p e o p l e into battle.
If this is an a p p r o p r i a t e description of the s t r e n g t h a n d composi-
tion of the Gallic relieving a r m y , t h e n Vercingetorix' c o n d u c t in the
p r e c e d i n g c a m p a i g n now becomes completely u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . We
have now solved the a p p a r e n t contradiction that at Alesia the Gallic
infantry went into action, s t o r m i n g the R o m a n e n t r e n c h m e n t s with
t h e most e x t r e m e c o u r a g e , w h e r e a s V e r c i n g e t o r i x d i d not risk
s e n d i n g his infantry against the R o m a n legions in the o p e n field.
We can r e g a r d t h e a r m y at Alesia as r e p r e s e n t i n g the largest
n u m b e r o f t r o o p s t h a t t h e G a u l s w e r e able t o a s s e m b l e a t o n e
point. It only a p p r o a c h e d or, at most, e q u a l e d the R o m a n a r m y in
s t r e n g t h . But the R o m a n s w e r e s u p e r i o r to the loosely o r g a n i z e d
b a n d s of the Gauls in every kind of m a n e u v e r i n g , as well as in their
6
battlefield m o v e m e n t s . T h e i r t h o r o u g h l y t r a i n e d , well-organized
units a n d their strict discipline also enabled t h e m to maintain their
supply of provisions, w h e r e t h e poorly o r g a n i z e d masses c o m p o s i n g
the Gallic a r m y h a d soon dissipated their supplies. Vercingetorix
t h e r e f o r e h a d to r e n o u n c e any idea of r e a c h i n g a decision t h r o u g h
an o p e n battle. He did not have at h a n d a n u m e r i c a l superiority
that might have g u a r a n t e e d victory for him, a n d if he h a d achieved
such superiority for a m o m e n t , Caesar would not immediately have
accepted a decisive battle any m o r e t h a n he h a d d o n e in the second
year of the war in the case of the Belgae, b u t he would first have
obliged the large Gallic a r m y to split up again, t h r o u g h his o w n
t e m p o r i z i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , Vercingetorix did not initially assemble
the overall, reinforced Gallic levy but limited himself to p e r h a p s
from 20,000 to 30,000 infantry a n d placed his principal h o p e in
the assembled Gallic k n i g h t h o o d , which was both n u m e r o u s a n d ef-
fective. Even w h e n the o p p o r t u n i t y came for the s u d d e n attack he
h a d been p l a n n i n g , he still did not b r i n g up his infantry, not wish-
Vercingetorix 505
ing to e x p o s e it to an attack by t h e far s u p e r i o r R o m a n s . T h i s
whole concept was not at all b a d , but the excellent o r d e r of the
R o m a n a r m y , w h i c h u n d e r s t o o d how to p r o t e c t its t r a i n in its
m a r c h c o l u m n a n d at t h e same time to give its cavalry the s u p p o r t
a n d active c o o p e r a t i o n of the infantry, b r o u g h t the plan of Ver-
cingetorix to n a u g h t . Now t h e r e was n o t h i n g else for him to do b u t
m a k e a last d e s p e r a t e a t t e m p t to succeed t h r o u g h the c o m b i n a t i o n
of the siege a n d the action of the relieving a r m y , a course that did
have the a d v a n t a g e of allowing the Gauls to b r i n g larger masses to
b e a r while C a e s a r could n o l o n g e r m a n e u v e r , necessarily h a d t o
give the Gauls the choice of places to attack, a n d was himself t a k e n
between two attacks, in r e t u r n for which, however, he established
the a w e s o m e fortifications against which their c o u r a g e o u s assault
broke d o w n .
1. C a e s a r himself says (7. 34) t h e r e w e r e 10 legions, t h a t is, the

Seventh to the Fifteenth, a n d the First. In addition, after the siege
of Alesia, the Sixth a p p e a r s . In this connection, see the c o m m e n t
by N a p o l e o n I I I (in Uebersicht, 2: 282). Göler, p. 3 3 3 , rejects the
"Sixth L e g i o n " a n d n a m e s instead t h e " T h i r d . " Both Meusel a n d
Kübler, however, have correctly accepted the " V I " version (8. 4).
See also Domaszewski, Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher 4 (1894): 158. In
this connection, see also C h a p t e r V I I , below, first p a r a g r a p h .
2. Bell. Gall. 7. 6 5 .
3. After careful e x a m i n a t i o n of all the various h y p o t h e s e s that
have b e e n a d v a n c e d c o n c e r n i n g the location of this battle, H o l m e s
decided (p. 780) that it was impossible to arrive at a definite answer
but that the most likely possibility was the concept of G o u g e t , w h o
seeks to place the battlefield n e a r Dijon, on the O u c h e . U n d e r any
circumstances, t h e place favored by N a p o l e o n I I I , some 25 miles
farther toward the northeast between the Vingeanne and the
Badin, s o u t h of L a n g r e s , is incorrect.
4. See also Bell. Civ. 3. 47. It is not easy to imagine how an a r m y
that n u m b e r e d all t o g e t h e r surely 100,000 souls, a n d probably con-
siderably m o r e , could have fed itself a n d all its horses for almost
six weeks in o n e location in the m i d d l e of e n e m y territory (see also
Ilerda). G r e a t quantities of supplies necessarily h a d to be b r o u g h t
up over long distances. How did they m a n a g e to get t h r o u g h the
e n e m y areas? My concept is that supplies were already stocked in
V i e n n e a n d were t r a n s p o r t e d up the Saône to a point only some 45

miles o v e r l a n d from Alesia. Later we find the Sixth Legion j o i n e d
up with the main a r m y ; p e r h a p s this legion, escorting the supply
t r a n s p o r t , p u s h e d its way t h r o u g h d u r i n g the siege. It may already
have started on its m a r c h w h e n Caesar m o v e d d o w n t o w a r d it from
t h e n o r t h . In the p e r i o d immediately following his victory, while
the Gauls were still o c c u p i e d with their p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d the as-
sembling of their a r m y , this legion, m a r c h i n g a l o n g t h e left b a n k of
t h e Saône, was u n d o u b t e d l y able to b r i n g up the supply train with
relatively little d a n g e r , a n d on the final stretch C a e s a r may have
sent o u t t r o o p s a n d vehicles to meet t h e m . But of course it is still
s u r p r i s i n g that, even if t h e supply train was p r o t e c t e d to a certain
e x t e n t against the main force of the Gauls by the river, the Sequani
in league with the Helvetii d i d not a t t e m p t to i n t e r c e p t the s u p -
plies. After all, up to that point the whole strategy of the Gauls h a d
b e e n directed toward c u t t i n g off the R o m a n s ' food supplies. Could
it possibly be that the S e q u a n i , c o n t r a r y to what C a e s a r r e p o r t e d ,
did not take p a r t in the rebellion at all? H o w e v e r that may be, no
a r m y as large as t h e R o m a n o n e b e f o r e Alesia c o u l d feed itself
simply from the immediately s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e execu-
tion of the siege of Alesia is inconceivable without envisaging that
large supply trains of food a n d forage m a d e t h e i r way t h r o u g h
successfully, a n d t h e s e t r a i n s m u s t h a v e b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y
t r o o p s w h o p r o t e c t e d t h e m . T h e r e a d e r is r e m i n d e d of t h e diffi-
culty of supplying rations for the G e r m a n a r m y that was besieging
Metz in 1870—despite the close proximity of the G e r m a n b o r d e r
a n d the availability of the railroad net. T h i s situation is p r e s e n t e d
in my lecture " M i n d a n d Mass in History" ("Geist u n d Masse in d e r
Geschichte"), Preussische Jahrbücher 174 (1912): 193.
5. A c c o r d i n g to the m a n u s c r i p t s , Labienus carried o u t his sortie
with 39 or 40 cohorts. As has long b e e n recognized, this n u m b e r is
too large; it is impossible that m o r e t h a n o n e - t h i r d of the e n t i r e
force of heavy infantry could have been available at o n e spot for a
sortie. For this r e a s o n it has b e e n c o n j e c t u r e d that " X L " s h o u l d
read " X I , " a n d the m o r e recent editors, Meusel as well as Kübler,
h a v e placed " X I " in t h e text. If this n u m b e r w e r e definite, we
could conclude from it that the Gallic assault c o l u m n s c a n n o t have
been as s t r o n g as Caesar r e p o r t s ; but since this n u m b e r is based
only on conjecture, we c a n n o t go any f u r t h e r in evaluating it.
6. Veith, p. 177, r e c o u n t s that Vercingetorix s p a r e d n e i t h e r time
n o r e f f o r t i n c o n t i n u o u s l y t r a i n i n g his a r m y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
R o m a n p a t t e r n . Not only d o e s Caesar m a k e no m e n t i o n of this, but
Vercingetorix 507
also this r e p o r t is based on a false concept of the n a t u r e of the

training. Closely associated with t r a i n i n g is a discipline that c a n n o t
be improvised, even by m e a n s of the most e x t r e m e strictness, but
which can only be d e v e l o p e d very g r a d u a l l y , t h r o u g h habit a n d
tradition. W h a t Caesar says (7. 4) is that Vercingetorix assembled
a n d dealt with his a r m y with the most e x t r e m e severity a n d cruelty
a n d (7. 2 9 - 3 0 ) that he forced t h e m , against their custom, to fortify
their c a m p in the R o m a n m a n n e r .
Chapter VI
The Roman Art of War
Against the Barbarians
Caesar's strategy in G a u l was based on the fact that he knew how
to avoid m e e t i n g the Gauls in their full s t r e n g t h a n d always knew
how to match the s t r e n g t h of the R o m a n s against t h e weakness of
the Gauls. T h e s t r e n g t h of t h e Gauls lay in their g r e a t n u m b e r of
m o r e or less militarily c o m p e t e n t peoples. If Caesar h a d divided up
his legions in o r d e r to fight t h e m all at the same t i m e a n d t h e n to
p r o v i d e t h e i r f o r t r e s s e s a n d capitals with g a r r i s o n s , i n o r d e r t o
k e e p t h e m u n d e r control, t h e R o m a n s would certainly have g o n e
d o w n to defeat. O n c e in t h e f o u r t h year, w h e n Caesar, as a result
of a p o o r harvest, h a d split his a r m y up into various winter q u a r -
ters out of c o n c e r n for supplies of food, 1½ legions w e r e s u d d e n l y
attacked by t h e E b u r o n e s , a n d since their leaders could not a g r e e
a n d c o n d u c t e d themselves i n c o m p e t e n t l y , these t r o o p s were com-
pletely d e s t r o y e d . With their auxiliaries a n d cavalry, this force of
1½ legions was probably some 9,000 c o m b a t a n t s s t r o n g .
In the war against Vercingetorix, w h e n Caesar saw that the Gauls
w e r e avoiding an o p e n battle, he once again s o u g h t a solution by
d i v i d i n g up his t r o o p s ; a n d o n c e again t h e result was a defeat.
Caesar himself, with the principal a r m y , was not s t r o n g e n o u g h to
besiege t h e Gauls in G e r g o v i a , a n d a s u d d e n attack failed with
h e a v y losses. T h e b e s i e g i n g o f Alesia was o n l y m a d e p o s s i b l e
t h r o u g h the fact that the e n t i r e R o m a n a r m y was u n i t e d .
After Alesia h a d fallen, however, it was not difficult in t h e course
of t h e following year to subject t h e individual tribes that were still
offering resistance. T h e masterpiece of Caesar's strategy, however,
was probably the c o n q u e r i n g of the Belgian a r e a , in t h e second
year. If the Nervii had not a t t e m p t e d their s u d d e n attack, all of
these warlike tribes would have submitted to the heavy h a n d of the
508
The Roman Art of War Against the Barbarians 509
R o m a n s practically without a f i g h t — n o t so m u c h because C a e s a r

would have avoided battle as such, but because, before accepting
battle, he c r e a t e d for the R o m a n s , t h r o u g h the splitting up of the
e n e m y forces, such a d v a n t a g e o u s conditions, that is, such a great
n u m e r i c a l superiority on the spot, that t h e Belgian tribes no longer
d a r e d to let t h e situation d e v e l o p into a battle.
W h e n m o d e r n p e o p l e s c o m e into conflict with b a r b a r i a n s , t h e
o u t c o m e is d e t e r m i n e d from the start by t h e differences in w e a p o n
technology. In antiquity this relationship was not so simple.
H e r e we may w o n d e r in what m a n n e r t h e R o m a n military system
was really s u p e r i o r to that of t h e b a r b a r i a n s . Vis-a-vis civilized peo-
ples, b a r b a r i a n s have t h e a d v a n t a g e of having at their disposal t h e
warlike p o w e r of u n b r i d l e d a n i m a l instincts, of basic t o u g h n e s s .
Civilization refines the h u m a n b e i n g , m a k e s h i m m o r e sensitive,
a n d in d o i n g so it decreases his military w o r t h , not only his bodily
s t r e n g t h b u t also his physical c o u r a g e . T h e s e n a t u r a l s h o r t c o m i n g s
must be offset in some artificial way. S c h a r n h o r s t was p e r h a p s t h e
first o n e to state that t h e main service of the s t a n d i n g a r m y con-
sisted of m a k i n g civilized p e o p l e s , t h r o u g h discipline, capable of
h o l d i n g t h e i r o w n against t h e less civilized. If a given g r o u p of
R o m a n s n o r m a l l y living as citizens or p e a s a n t s h a d b e e n p u t up
against a g r o u p o f b a r b a r i a n s o f t h e s a m e n u m b e r , t h e f o r m e r
would u n d o u b t e d l y have b e e n d e f e a t e d ; in fact, they would p r o b a -
bly have taken flight without fighting. It was only the formation of
the close-knit tactical body of the c o h o r t s that equalized the situa-
tion.
F r o m Caesar we c a n n o t learn directly with certainty the stage of
1
d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e Gauls d u r i n g his t i m e . For g e n e r a t i o n s they
h a d n o t b e e n a n exclusively warlike b a r b a r i a n p e o p l e . T h e y h a d
cities, industry, t r a d e , a n d c o m m e r c e . T h e national p r i e s t h o o d o f
the D r u i d s h a d b e c o m e a kind of hierarchy. T h e p e o p l e , Caesar
says (6. 13), w e r e t r e a t e d like slaves: t h r o u g h i n d e b t e d n e s s , taxes,
a n d h a r a s s m e n t those in p o w e r b r o u g h t the c o m m o n m a n to re-
g a r d himself as a serf. T h e s e m e n in p o w e r were the w a r r i o r class,
the knights with their vassals, a n d a special w a r r i o r class s t a n d i n g
a p a r t from t h e masses c a n n o t raise a mass army. But what we have
taken away in n u m b e r s we must credit in quality. Caesar d r a w s dis-
tinctions between the various peoples; he n a m e s the Helvetii, the
Nervii, a n d t h e Bellovaci as o u t s t a n d i n g l y c o u r a g e o u s . Certainly
such distinctions did exist, but t h e warlike virtues h a d not disap-
p e a r e d a m o n g the A r v e r n i , the Bituriges, o r the C a r n u t e s , either,
a n d those forces that finally o p p o s e d t h e R o m a n s in the field must
undoubtedly be r e g a r d e d as personally irreproachable warriors,

forming a w a r r i o r h o o d that was based partially on t h e concept of
h o n o r of a special warrior class but also in p a r t on t h e still surviv-
ing warlike instincts of the b a r b a r i a n condition.
N o r did the R o m a n a r m y , either, consist of those e l e m e n t s of the
body of R o m a n citizens that h a d b e c o m e t h e most refined t h r o u g h
t h e i r c u l t u r e . Caesar's legions, levied or r e c r u i t e d principally in
Cisalpine Gaul a n d the N a r b o n n e s e province, surely consisted for
the most p a r t of r o m a n i z e d Celts. If the a r m y h a d formerly been
c o m p o s e d of R o m a n citizens, this situation h a d by now practically
b e e n completely r e v e r s e d ; entry in the a r m y was t h e way to attain
R o m a n citizenship, a n d the R o m a n army, for its p a r t , was also not
d e p r i v e d of contact with t h e basic source of u n i n t e r r u p t e d n a t u r a l
strength.
B u t this was still only a point of contact, e x c e p t w h e r e purely
b a r b a r i a n e l e m e n t s , principally for e x a m p l e the feared G e r m a n i c
cavalry, were a t t a c h e d to the R o m a n a r m y ; in c o m p a r i s o n with the
legionaries, t h e Gauls w e r e still c o m p l e t e b a r b a r i a n s , a n d as an in-
dividual the R o m a n legionary was not s u p e r i o r to these warriors.
T h e r e is no r e a s o n to a s s u m e that a R o m a n c o h o r t of 600 m e n
would have c o n q u e r e d a Gallic g r o u p of t h e same s t r e n g t h u n d e r
otherwise similar circumstances. We have seen how Caesar avoided
fighting against a numerically s u p e r i o r force, m a k i n g sure, on the
c o n t r a r y that h e himself enjoyed n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y . T h e re-
f i n e m e n t s o f t h e R o m a n c o h o r t a n d e c h e l o n tactics w e r e conse-
quently not so significant in c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g the fierce boldness of
t h e b a r b a r i a n h o r d e s w h e n e v e r t h e latter w e r e also numerically
s u p e r i o r . T h i s is a point of f u n d a m e n t a l significance for t h e im-
m e d i a t e l y following p e r i o d , a n d we shall h a v e occasion to r e f e r
back to it again in completely different p e r i o d s of world history.
T h i s p r i m a r y point is t h a t the superiority of the R o m a n art of
warfare was based on the a r m y organization as a whole, a system
that p e r m i t t e d very large masses of m e n to be c o n c e n t r a t e d at a
given point, to move in o r d e r l y fashion, to be fed, a n d to be kept
t o g e t h e r . T h e Gauls could do n o n e of these things. It was n o t so
m u c h t h e c o u r a g e of the R o m a n s , which was in no way g r e a t e r
t h a n t h e i r o w n , b u t t h e R o m a n mass p o w e r t h a t s u b d u e d t h e m
— a n d again, not that t h e i r own mass, of itself, w o u l d not have b e e n
m u c h g r e a t e r , but their mass was an inert o n e , incapable of m o v e -
m e n t . It was the R o m a n civilization which c o n q u e r e d b a r b a r i s m ,
for i m p a r t i n g the capability of m o v e m e n t to a large mass is a work
of art that only a h i g h e r civilization can achieve. B a r b a r i s m c a n n o t
do it. T h e R o m a n a r m y was not simply a mass, b u t an o r g a n i z e d

mass, a n d it could be a mass only because it was o r g a n i z e d a n d
f o r m e d a c o m p l e x a n d living entity. Not only soldiers a n d w e a p o n s
went into its m a k e u p , cavalry a n d infantry, a n d not only legates,
t r i b u n e s , c e n t u r i o n s , legions, cohorts, m a n i p l e s , centuries, discipline
from below, l e a d e r s h i p from above, a d v a n c e g u a r d s , r e a r g u a r d s ,
patrols, r e p o r t s , the laying o u t of c a m p s — b u t also the q u a e s t o r a n d
his a r m y of officials, controllers, e n g i n e e r s with their tools, capable
o f skillfully b u i l d i n g b r i d g e s , r a m p a r t s , b l o c k h o u s e s , b a t t e r i n g
r a m s , e n g i n e s t o h u r l missiles, s h i p s ; q u a r t e r m a s t e r s with t h e i r
pools of w a g o n s ; a r m y s u p p l i e r s with t h e i r a g e n t s ; d o c t o r s with
field hospitals; magazines, o r d n a n c e d e p o t s , portable forges; a n d
finally t h e h e a d of the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n , the c o m m a n d i n g gen-
eral, in w h o m i n h e r e n t f u n d a m e n t a l s t r e n g t h must be b l e n d e d with
the flexibility a n d the r e f i n e m e n t of a m i n d d e v e l o p e d in t h e at-
m o s p h e r e of t h e highest c u l t u r e so that he m i g h t intellectually e m -
brace e v e r y t h i n g a n d provide direction for the whole from a single
point a n d t h r o u g h a single will.
T h e recognition of all of these factors is h i d d e n a n d o b s c u r e d by
the idea that the Gallic a r m i e s t h a t C a e s a r c o n q u e r e d w e r e always
several times l a r g e r t h a n his own. T h e fact that C a e s a r himself p r e -
sents his victory to us in this light s h o u l d not, to r e p e a t again h e r e
a point we have already m a d e , be held too strongly against h i m , for
victory of a small force against a vastly s u p e r i o r o n e is simply t h e
basic m a n n e r i n which t h e c r o w d p i c t u r e s h e r o i c d e e d s a n d
strategic g e n i u s . It is t h e task of scientific k n o w l e d g e to b r e a k
t h r o u g h this o u t e r shell to t h e h e a r t of the m a t t e r , a n d t h e result is
in no way a d i m i n u t i o n of the g r e a t n e s s of R o m a n a n d o t h e r his-
torical a r m y c o m m a n d e r s , but r a t h e r it is only in this way that this
greatness c o m e s to be truly recognized. As long as we have 70,000
m e n d e f e a t i n g 300,000, we may a r o u s e in t h e public a v a g u e con-
cept of b r a v e r y a n d g e n e r a l s h i p , but a rational recognition of the
situation still d o e s not exist. N o t until we tell ourselves that t h e in-
dividual G a u l was fully capable of s t a n d i n g up to the i n d i v i d u a l
R o m a n a n d even 10,000 Gauls to 10,000 R o m a n s do we arrive at
an idea of the immensity of the strategic mission that C a e s a r faced,
a n d now we also see o n c e again t h a t not only did Caesar c o n q u e r
Ariovistus a n d Vercingetorix, b u t R o m e c o n q u e r e d the G e r m a n i c
peoples a n d the Gauls, a n d civilization c o n q u e r e d b a r b a r i s m .
In o r d e r to arrive at this realization, Caesar's own authority as a
r e p o r t e r h a d first to be limited, a n d t h e r e will be m a n y a scholar
who will be even less willing to accept this criticism t h a n that con-
c e r n i n g H e r o d o t u s a n d w h o would like with mistrust to o p p o s e as a

m a t t e r of principle t h e critical analysis that brings such results to
light. C o n s e q u e n t l y we m u s t consider as a kind of good luck the
fact that we have at h a n d at least one passage in which Caesar him-
self gives away t h e t r u e n u m e r i c a l relationship a n d t h e r e b y helps
the cause of critical analysis. In the case of t h e worst defeat that his
a r m y suffered in Gaul, the destruction of the 1½ legions by the
E b u r o n e s , he himself a d d s the s t a t e m e n t t h a t the two o p p o n e n t s
w e r e equal i n c o u r a g e a n d n u m b e r s but that the R o m a n s h a d b e e n
left in the lurch by their l e a d e r s h i p a n d by f o r t u n e (5. 34). Scholars
have long felt that this sentence stands in irreconcilable contradic-
tion to all his o t h e r battle accounts. Heller (in Philologus 31 (1872):
p. 512) calls this s t a t e m e n t "senseless." " H o w ? " he exclaims, "how?
T h e Romans were supposed to be numerically as strong as the
Gauls? A n d the E b u r o n e s , without p u t t i n g a considerably s t r o n g e r
a r m y in the field, w e r e s u p p o s e d to have attacked a most strongly
fortified c a m p , they w e r e s u p p o s e d to have d a r e d attack a R o m a n
a r m y of the same s t r e n g t h as theirs, in spite of t h e i r u n h a p p y ex-
periences in five years of war? No military m a n can be p e r s u a d e d
of that; only schoolboys can be deceived in such a m a t t e r . "
I n s t e a d of "erant et virtute et numero pugnando pares nostri; tametsi ab
duce et a fortuna deserebantur" ("they w e r e o u r equals in c o u r a g e a n d
in n u m b e r s of c o m b a t a n t s ; nevertheless, o u r m e n w e r e d e s e r t e d by
t h e i r leader a n d by f o r t u n e " ) , Heller, basing his a r g u m e n t on the
fact that the m a n u s c r i p t s show "pugnandi" ("for fighting"), prefers
to r e a d "virtute et studio pugnandi" ("in c o u r a g e a n d in zeal for fight-
ing"), a n d in t h e latest edition Meusel could find no b e t t e r solution
t h a n to eliminate completely "erant et virtute et numero pugnandi."
F o r o u r p a r t , we now recognize that it is precisely this sentence that
contains the t r u t h , that is, t h a t the E b u r o n e s w e r e able to b r i n g u p ,
with cavalry, h o m e g u a r d , a n d s o m e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , a total of
a b o u t 9,000 m e n , c o n s e q u e n t l y a b o u t t h e s a m e s t r e n g t h a s t h e
R o m a n corps, a n d that we now a r e no l o n g e r faced with the p r o s -
pect of simply t h r o w i n g o u t Caesar's s t r e n g t h figures b u t r a t h e r of
choosing between his own conflicting estimates. We accept Heller's
a r g u m e n t s b u t t u r n t h e point in the o t h e r direction: since Caesar
himself r e p o r t s h e r e t h a t a numerically equal b a n d of Gauls was
able to defeat the R o m a n s , as soon as the latter's l e a d e r s h i p failed,
t h e n t h e R o m a n s c a n n o t i n o t h e r battles always have c o n q u e r e d
forces that w e r e from two to four times as n u m e r o u s as they. If
C a e s a r himself has e x p l a i n e d it to us in this way, he was actually
writing for his compatriots, a n d t h e R o m a n s were accustomed to

receiving r e p o r t s of victories like those of Sulla, w h o claimed to
have d e f e a t e d at C h a e r o n e a an e n e m y force of 120,000 m e n with
16,500 of his o w n , losing only 12 m e n , or Lucullus, w h o at T i -
g r a n o c e r t a supposedly defeated a force of 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , including 55,000
2
cavalry, with his 14,000 m e n , suffering losses of 5 d e a d a n d 100
w o u n d e d . Of course, that is still very m o d e s t c o m p a r e d with the
900,000 Persians, w h o , a c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n or his i n t e r p o l a t o r ,
were defeated by t h e 13,000 G r e e k s at C u n a x a , b u t it nevertheless
shows that the R o m a n s , like the G r e e k s b e f o r e t h e m , lived in a
kind of n u m e r i c a l hypnosis insofar as b a r b a r i a n armies w e r e con-
c e r n e d , a c o n d i t i o n t h a t o b s c u r e d t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o w e r s of
even the wisest. If in this case Caesar likewise lived m o r e or less
u n d e r the spell of this c o n c e p t or consciously m a d e concessions to
it, at any r a t e , of all his figures for t h e s t r e n g t h s of Gallic a n d
G e r m a n i c armies, only those c o n c e r n i n g the E b u r o n e s can be ac-
cepted, a n d the relationship b e t w e e n R o m a n a n d b a r b a r i a n military
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s can be j u d g e d on the basis of a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal
military qualities of the individual soldiers.
T h e point t h a t we have discovered is so i m p o r t a n t that I s h o u l d
like to f o r m u l a t e it once again, with t h e o p p o s i t e a p p r o a c h .
T h e concept h a n d e d d o w n in the sources is that b a r b a r i a n armies
were mass armies. We have f o u n d t h a t , on the c o n t r a r y , b a r b a r i a n s
were not capable of assembling mass a r m i e s . Even w h e r e a mass of
militarily qualified m e n was u n d o u b t e d l y available, as in Gaul, it
was impossible to m a r s h a l a large a r m y . T h e y were u n a b l e to m o v e
it or to o p e r a t e with it. T h e capability of m o v i n g large masses of
m e n is a p r o d u c t of civilization. Masses of m e n a r e not a lifeless
material that raw power can assemble at will. In o r d e r to form mass-
es, m e n n e e d articulation, organization. Victory by a mass, which
at first glance seems to m e a n victory t h r o u g h p u r e n a t u r a l p o w e r
a n d can a c t u a l l y m e a n this u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , m u s t
m e a n , q u i t e t o t h e c o n t r a r y , victory t h r o u g h a n o r g a n i z i n g a n d
leading mentality, w h e n the mass b e c o m e s very large.
EXCURSUS
Since writing the above I have d e v e l o p e d these ideas still somewhat further and
supported t h e m with m o r e recent e x a m p l e s in an academic lecture, "Mind and Mass
in History," ("Geist u n d Masse in der Geschichte") which appeared in the Preussische
Jahrbücher 147 (1912): 193; and I continued this t h e m e in a series of lectures in the
English language given at L o n d o n University in 1913, which were published u n d e r
the title Numbers in History ( L o n d o n : H o d d e r a n d S t o u g h t o n , Warwick Square).
1. T h e description by D i o d o r u s , in 5. 28 ff., is also colorful, to be

s u r e , b u t it is nevertheless of no significance for us.
2. T h e o d o r Reinach, Mithridates Eupator, trans, by Goetz, p p . 355
a n d 358.
Chapter VII
The Civil War
in Italy and Spain
S t r a t e g y , a s w e have c o m e t o k n o w i t i n G a u l t h r o u g h Caesar,
consists o f a v o i d i n g t h e e n e m y ' s s t r e n g t h a n d p i t t i n g one's o w n
s t r e n g t h against t h e e n e m y ' s weakness. Caesar d i d t h e same t h i n g
i n t h e C i v i l W a r , b u t t h e same p r i n c i p l e s called f o r a n o t h e r k i n d o f
e x e c u t i o n , since t h e m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s w e r e d i f f e r e n t . L a y i n g o u t
f o r t i f i e d c a m p s , p r o v i d i n g systematically f o r r e s u p p l y , o c c u p y i n g
favorable positions, m a n e u v e r i n g — C a e s a r ' s R o m a n opponents u n -
d e r s t o o d all these activities j u s t a s w e l l a s h e d i d . T h e m a t e r i e l
superiority of the existing g o v e r n m e n t over the autonomous gen-
e r a l was s o g r e a t t h a t t h e r u l e r s i n R o m e c o u l d n o t really accept t h e
idea o f t h e w a r u n t i l the last m i n u t e . O f his 1 3 l e g i o n s , Caesar h a d
g i v e n 2 o v e r to P o m p e y , a n d so he still h a d 1 1 . ' P o m p e y h a d 7 vet-
e r a n , c o m p e t e n t , w a r - h a r d e n e d legions i n S p a i n ; i n I t a l y , i n a d d i -
t i o n t o t h e 2 h e h a d r e c e i v e d f r o m Caesar, h e h a d a t h i r d i n t r a i n -
i n g ; a n d b e h i n d these f o r c e s , w h i c h i n t h e m s e l v e s w e r e a l m o s t
e q u a l t o Caesar's, h e h a d t h e w h o l e mass o f t h e R o m a n E m p i r e
w i t h all its r e s o u r c e s , so t h a t it was possible to f o r m new legions at
w i l l , s o t o speak. T h e single a d v a n t a g e t h a t Caesar h a d o n his side
(apart f r o m the lively s y m p a t h y a m o n g b r o a d segments o f the
p o p u l a t i o n for h i m a n d the democratic principles that he rep-
r e s e n t e d ) was t h a t t h e e n e m y forces w e r e n o t yet u n i t e d . O n c e they
had j o i n e d their forces, there w o u l d be no hope of separating t h e m
b y m a n e u v e r i n g , a s h e h a d p r e v i o u s l y d o n e w i t h t h e Belgae. A n d
even less c o u l d h e c o u n t o n P o m p e y ' s n o t b e i n g able t o assemble
his s u p e r i o r forces a t a g i v e n p o i n t , i f h e w e r e g i v e n e n o u g h t i m e
t o d o so. Caesar's o n l y c h a n c e f o r v i c t o r y , t h e r e f o r e , was b y s t r i k i n g
t h e e n e m y f o r c e s b e f o r e t h o s e a l r e a d y available c o u l d b e u n i t e d
a n d b e f o r e t h e n e w l y f o r m e d ones w e r e capable o f m e a s u r i n g u p t o
515
t h e existing legions. If in Gaul the strategic art h a d consisted of
k e e p i n g the e n e m y forces s e p a r a t e d from the viewpoint of space,
now it was a question of s e p a r a t i o n in time.
C a e s a r carried out negotiations while he was at t h e h e a d of but a
single legion in n o r t h e r n Italy, so that P o m p e y did not yet see any
u r g e n t n e e d t o p r e p a r e himself. But i n s h o r t o r d e r C a e s a r h a d
b r o u g h t up 2 additional legions, a n d with this force he l a u n c h e d
his c a m p a i g n . T h e s e 3 legions, which, with their auxiliary troops,
n u m b e r e d some 20,000 m e n , w e r e sufficient for the time being to
give C a e s a r t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e of s t r e n g t h in Italy. To be s u r e ,
P o m p e y also had 3 legions on t h e peninsula, but they included the
2 that w e r e previously u n d e r Caesar's c o m m a n d , which P o m p e y
could not risk pitting directly against their f o r m e r c o m m a n d e r , a n d
a newly f o r m e d l e g i o n h a r d l y r e a d y for c o m b a t . C a e s a r d r o v e
t h r o u g h Italy almost without opposition. Pompey's newly f o r m e d
c o h o r t s b r o k e up a n d went over to Caesar or, having been taken as
p r i s o n e r s , later e n t e r e d his service. T h e O p t i m a t e s e n a t o r s , with
P o m p e y at their h e a d , fled to G r e e c e .
P o m p e y has been b l a m e d for not having g o n e to t h e relief of an
O p t i m a t e force u n d e r Domitius A h e n o b a r b u s that was besieged by
Caesar in C o r f i n i u m . Colonel Stoffel has p o i n t e d o u t very nicely
a n d effectively t h a t t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e s a m e e r r o r t h a t
M a c M a h o n c o m m i t t e d i n 1870 w h e n h e t r i e d w i t h insufficient
forces to relieve Bazaine at Metz. In d o i n g so, he only succeeded in
b r i n g i n g disaster on himself. P o m p e y had e n o u g h strategic u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g a n d sense of consistency to recognize this situation, a n d so
he left Domitius A h e n o b a r b u s to his fate a n d t h e r e b y saved t h e
n u c l e u s of the a r m y for t h e final decisive battle.
Now C a e s a r t u r n e d to Spain. He could also have followed Pom-
pey directly a n d could have b r o u g h t up his legions from Gaul over-
land t h r o u g h Illyria. T h e n , without any significant opposition, he
w o u l d h a v e b r o u g h t u n d e r his p o w e r t h e e n t i r e O r i e n t , w h e r e p r e p -
a r a t i o n s for the war w e r e only j u s t b e g i n n i n g . I n t h e m e a n t i m e ,
however, he would have sacrificed the Occident to t h e republican
legions in Spain. P o m p e y u n d o u b t e d l y would have fled t h e r e him-
self, w o u l d h a v e placed himself at t h e h e a d of t h e t r o o p s , a n d
would have taken up the offensive. By the time C a e s a r would have
a r r i v e d i n A n t i o c h , P o m p e y w o u l d p e r h a p s h a v e b e e n back i n
R o m e . Caesar followed t h e basic principle that t h e first a n d most
i m p o r t a n t task was t o seek o u t a n d d e s t r o y t h e e n e m y a r m y ,
w h e r e v e r it was.
Several legions newly f o r m e d in Italy w e r e sent to Sardinia, Sic-
The Civil War in Italy and Spain 517
ily, a n d Africa; o t h e r s stood ready to d e f e n d Italy p r o p e r . Of t h e 9

veteran legions accustomed to victory in Gaul, 3 w e r e assigned to
the siege of Marseilles, which had g o n e over to the side of t h e gov-
e r n m e n t , a n d 6 w e r e sent to Spain.
P o m p e y h a d 7 legions in Spain, but u n d e r 3 different legates.
T w o o f t h e m , A f r a n i u s a n d P e t r e i u s , j o i n e d forces i n n o r t h e r n
Spain against t h e attack that was t h r e a t e n e d from the n o r t h ,
whereas the t h i r d , V a r r o , n o o t h e r t h a n t h e famous historian a n d
philologist, r e m a i n e d in the s o u t h e r n p a r t of the c o u n t r y with his 2
legions. G u i s c h a r d has expressed the suspicion that V a r r o , w h o was
l a t e r r e c o n c i l e d with C a e s a r a n d was h i g h l y h o n o r e d b y h i m ,
p e r h a p s intentionally a v o i d e d t h e decisive c o n f r o n t a t i o n . At any
rate, it is impossible to find a military r e a s o n for his not having
u n i t e d his forces with t h o s e o f t h e o t h e r two legates. S o u t h e r n
Spain could not h a v e b e e n b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d t h a n by a successful
defense against Caesar's forces at t h e Pyrenees.
F r o m t h e very start Afranius a n d Petreius, with their 5 legions,
felt themselves to be w e a k e r t h a n t h e attackers. Even t h o u g h at
first only 3 of Caesar's legions w e r e a p p r o a c h i n g , the P o m p e i a n
generals still envisaged a purely defensive stance. P e r h a p s the 5 le-
gions, which h a d in fact h a d little to do in Spain, h a d not exactly
b e e n carefully k e p t up to s t r e n g t h . Caesar speaks of 80 c o h o r t s of
S p a n i a r d s that the P o m p e i a n s w e r e also s u p p o s e d to have h a d ; we
may r e g a r d this figure, like those for the s t r e n g t h of the Gauls, as
very e x a g g e r a t e d . It is certain t h a t Caesar's a r m y , with a s t r o n g
force of G e r m a n i c a n d Gallic cavalry a n d o t h e r Gallic auxiliaries,
was the significantly s t r o n g e r of the two.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , the strategy of the P o m p e i a n s could not be based
on a decisive battle but only on h o l d i n g C a e s a r up a n d gaining time
until P o m p e y himself could have c o m p l e t e d his p r e p a r a t i o n s in the
East a n d likewise a p p e a r e d in the Spanish t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s or
caused C a e s a r to t u r n back t h r o u g h an attack on Italy.
In t h e passes of t h e P y r e n e e s Caesar's forces e n c o u n t e r e d b u t lit-
tle opposition. Probably the P o m p e i a n s did not even have e n o u g h
time to occupy t h e m ; b u t even if they h a d h a d e n o u g h time, we
a l r e a d y know f r o m the battle o f T h e r m o p y l a e how u n p r o m i s i n g
a n d how d a n g e r o u s it is to try to block m o u n t a i n passes. T h e Ro-
m a n s , too, w e r e familiar with this principle; o n c e w h e n the Cim-
bri w e r e m o v i n g d o w n from t h e B r e n n e r Pass, t h e R o m a n gen-
eral C a t u l u s h a d , as Plutarch r e p o r t s to us (Marius, C h a p t e r 23),
r e n o u n c e d from t h e start any idea of o c c u p y i n g the passes, because
in d o i n g so he would have split up his forces, a n d he p r e f e r r e d to
await the e n e m y in t h e plain. Afranius a n d Petreius, too, showed
that they u n d e r s t o o d t h e a r t of war.
S o m e 90 miles (150 kilometers) south of the P y r e n e e s passes, be-
tween 22 a n d 27 miles n o r t h of the E b r o , on t h e right b a n k of the
powerful Sicoris (Segre) River, t h e r e stands on a r i d g e the city of
I l e r d a , with a stone b r i d g e over the river. A short distance s o u t h of
the city t h e r e rises, beside t h e river, a n o t h e r r i d g e , which was very
well suited for a R o m a n c a m p site. Afranius a n d Petreius took up
their position t h e r e . It was such a naturally s t r o n g position that no
attack in force could h o p e to o v e r c o m e it. To bypass it was not pos-
sible for Caesar, since in d o i n g so he w o u l d h a v e left the r o u t e
o p e n for the e n e m y a r m y t o w a r d Massilia a n d Italy. Finally, it was
very difficult to lay siege to t h e position, since t h e Sicoris was a very
t r e a c h e r o u s s t r e a m that w o u l d s u d d e n l y rise a n d sweep away the
b r i d g e s in its savage swirling. In that way a besieging a r m y would
be pulled a p a r t into two s e p a r a t e forces, while t h e besieged a r m y
with its firm stone b r i d g e could move its forces from o n e b a n k to
the o t h e r as n e e d e d . A large stock of supplies was assembled in
o r d e r to assure provisions for a long time.
T h e y could p e r h a p s also have f o u n d a similar position on the
E b r o itself, on the n o r t h bank, from which they w o u l d have b e e n
able to seize the offensive at any m o m e n t , with a firm b r i d g e be-
h i n d t h e m , so that they could also have d o m i n a t e d t h e o t h e r bank,
j u s t a s C a e s a r h a d o n c e d o n e o n the Aisne. B u t Afranius a n d Pet-
reius p r e s u m a b l y did n o t c o n s i d e r it necessary to m o v e back quite
so far. At I l e r d a they w e r e still covering a considerably larger por-
tion of their province; a n d if they s h o u l d eventually be forced to
d e c i d e on a f u r t h e r w i t h d r a w a l , it c o u l d be a s s u m e d t h a t t h e y
w o u l d be able to o p e n up a r o u t e on o n e side or t h e o t h e r of the
Sicoris. T h e y d o m i n a t e d t h e s o u t h b a n k o f t h e E b r o a n d could
e r e c t a floating b r i d g e at any t i m e they w a n t e d to. T h e e n e m y
could n o t possibly react so quickly, a n d t h e r e f o r e they would im-
mediately gain a new s e c t o r on the E b r o a n d a cover that would
g u a r a n t e e t h e m free m o v e m e n t .
Since A f r a n i u s a n d P e t r e i u s took up the position at Ilerda after
an emissary from P o m p e y , Vibullius Rufus, h a d c o m e to t h e m , it is
quite possible t h a t P o m p e y himself, w h o of c o u r s e knew Spain in
detail, specified the c a m p a i g n plan a n d the c a m p location.
T h e position at Ilerda gave the P o m p e i a n s e v e r y t h i n g that can be
e x p e c t e d of a position. After the first 3 legions to arrive, u n d e r
Fabius, h a d already b e e n t h e r e for 4 weeks, Caesar's entire a r m y
c a m p e d before the position for almost 6 weeks (from a b o u t 17 May

2
to 24 J u n e , 49 B.C.) without accomplishing a n y t h i n g .
Fabius h a d laid o u t his c a m p a b o u t 2½ miles n o r t h of Ilerda, on
the same bank, a n d h a d built two b r i d g e s across the river, 6
kilometers a p a r t . On o n e occasion t h e river swept the lower b r i d g e
away, j u s t at a time w h e n 2 legions were foraging on the o t h e r side.
Afranius a n d Petreius immediately led 3 legions across a n d w e r e
t h r e a t e n i n g to o v e r p o w e r t h e m w h e n Fabius c a m e to their aid j u s t
in time with 2 additional legions over t h e o t h e r b r i d g e , which h a d
held fast, a n d he was able to d i s e n g a g e t h e m .
A n o t h e r time, after Caesar himself h a d already taken over the
c o m m a n d , the river tore away b o t h b r i d g e s simultaneously. Now
the P o m p e i a n s occupied the left b a n k a n d , aided by t h e high water,
p r e v e n t e d C a e s a r f r o m r e p l a c i n g t h e b r i d g e s . C a e s a r was j u s t
expecting a large supply train from Gaul, which was now u n a b l e to
cross t h e river, was cut off a n d was d r i v e n back again into t h e
m o u n t a i n s by t h e P o m p e i a n s . T h e resources of the a r e a s u r r o u n d -
ing the c a m p w e r e e x h a u s t e d a n d no f u r t h e r foodstuff was to be
f o u n d t h e r e ; f a r t h e r westward the crossings of the rivers w e r e also
destroyed by the floods a n d so C a e s a r was h e m m e d in as if on a
kind of island. His t r o o p s b e g a n to suffer very serious s h o r t a g e s
whereas t h e P o m p e i a n s enjoyed plentiful rations from the supplies
that h a d b e e n stocked in Ilerda l o n g in a d v a n c e .
Since t h e P o m p e i a n legates did not d a r e , however, to move o u t
too far from t h e i r c a m p a n d to p u r s u e Caesar's supply train into
the m o u n t a i n s to destroy it, C a e s a r finally succeeded in b r i n g i n g it
u p . M o r e t h a n 18 miles u p s t r e a m , at a position b e y o n d any e n e m y
outposts, he e r e c t e d a new b r i d g e , which e n a b l e d h i m to reestablish
contact with his base of o p e r a t i o n s , Gaul.
T h i s link was too distant to allow Caesar to besiege the P o m p e i a n
c a m p on b o t h b a n k s . A bold a t t e m p t that Caesar h a d m a d e im-
mediately after his arrival, to drive b e t w e e n the e n e m y c a m p a n d
the city of I l e r d a itself by m e a n s of t h e b r i d g e , h a d failed. T h e
P o m p e i a n s still s e e m e d t o b e e x p o s e d t o n o d i r e c t d a n g e r .
Nevertheless, they now d e c i d e d to move o u t . As distant as Caesar's
new b r i d g e was, it still e n a b l e d him to send his s u p e r i o r cavalry
over to t h e left b a n k of the Sicoris a n d to p r e v e n t t h e P o m p e i a n s
from foraging. Several Spanish tribes, including the Iacetani a n d
the Illurgavonensi on t h e two banks of the lower E b r o , went over
to Caesar. Finally, it could be foreseen that, w h e n the flood condi-
tions h a d subsided, a ford across t h e Sicoris j u s t above Ilerda would
b e c o m e passable a n d w o u l d allow Caesar's t r o o p s to m o v e directly

from o n e b a n k to the o t h e r , t h u s facilitating t h e c o m p l e t e encir-
cling of the position. C a e s a r even m a d e an a t t e m p t , by m e a n s of
wide ditches that he h a d his m e n dig, to lower t h e surface of the
water artificially in o r d e r to m a k e t h e ford passable.
Very calmly, without a n y special p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e s except
t h a t they started d u r i n g t h e n i g h t , i n t h e t h i r d n i g h t watch (be-
tween m i d n i g h t a n d 3 A . M . ) , with their e n t i r e train, t h e P o m p e i a n s
took up t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l to the E b r o , across which they h a d h a d a
f l o a t i n g b r i d g e built n e a r O c t o g e s a , a t t h e c o n f l u e n c e with t h e
Sicoris. N o d o u b t the c o l u m n was a t t a c k e d a n d h a r a s s e d b y the
e n e m y cavalry, so that it m o v e d forward only at a slow pace; b u t
once the m o r e o p e n , rolling t e r r a i n was left b e h i n d t h e m a n d the
m o u n t a i n o u s a r e a of t h e E b r o , some 23 miles s o u t h of Ilerda, was
r e a c h e d , this p l a g u e , t o o , w o u l d s t o p , a n d n o t h i n g w o u l d a n y
l o n g e r be able to p r e v e n t the crossing over t h e E b r o . T h e y h a d al-
ready m a r c h e d some 18 miles w h e n they s u d d e n l y saw the e n e m y
legions m o v i n g up on a forced m a r c h .
T h e water of the Sicoris h a d fallen to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it was still
h i g h e r t h a n a m a n ' s chest at the I l e r d a ford. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the
ford was not yet really passable for infantry. But as C a e s a r tells us,
he h a d , at the r e q u e s t of his soldiers themselves, risked m a k i n g the
c r o s s i n g ; h o r s e m e n s t a t i o n e d below t h e f o r d f i s h e d o u t t h o s e
legionaries w h o w e r e swept off t h e i r feet by t h e s t r e a m , so that n o -
b o d y was lost. A r r i v e d on t h e o t h e r side, t h e legions took up the
m a r c h a n d , without a t r a i n a n d t a k i n g no b r e a k to p r e p a r e for bat-
tle, they s u c c e e d e d in o v e r t a k i n g the e n e m y late in t h e a f t e r n o o n .
If Afranius a n d Petreius d i d not want to sacrifice a large p a r t of
t h e i r force in a r e a r - g u a r d action, their only alternative was to halt
the e n t i r e a r m y a n d h a v e it take position. As it was, of course, the
day's m a r c h h a d already b e e n a very long o n e .
T h e situation still did n o t seem d e s p e r a t e ; after all, they h a d only
4 ½ m o r e miles t o c o v e r b e f o r e r e a c h i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f the
m o u n t a i n s a n d t h e n only 454 m o r e t o the river a n d the b r i d g e .
T h e y gave up the idea of a t t e m p t i n g a n i g h t m a r c h , for fear of
b e i n g attacked en r o u t e . Finally, it was not necessarily impossible to
cover t h e r e m a i n i n g s h o r t distance even in t h e view of the e n e m y .
T h e n Caesar's t r o o p s , as a result of their e x t r a o r d i n a r y zeal, suc-
c e e d e d i n m a r c h i n g a r o u n d the P o m p e i a n forces, crossing almost
impassable t e r r a i n , a n d beating t h e latter, w h o w e r e again held u p
by t h e attacks of t h e cavalry, to the defile a n d the c o m m a n d i n g ter-
rain features, t h u s blocking their r o u t e to the E b r o .
Fig 6 SIEGE OF ILERDA
Caesar's e n e r g y a n d s p e e d , t o g e t h e r with the goodwill a n d the

o u t s t a n d i n g capabilities of his troops, h a d accomplished what would
a p p e a r to be impossible by n o r m a l military estimates. T h e Pom-
peian a r m y , which i n t e n d e d to move back from o n e i m p r e g n a b l e
position to a n o t h e r , was b r o u g h t to a standstill in the course of this
short move a n d was blocked off from its goal. Now it h a d either to
fight or to s u r r e n d e r within a short time. T h e constant, d e t e r m i n e d
offense h a d s h o w n itself s u p e r i o r to a d e f e n s e t h a t was j u s t as
strongly based. T h e P o m p e i a n a r m y , n o d o u b t t h e weaker o f the
two b u t after all not so very m u c h weaker, h a d kept the e n e m y oc-
cupied for a few m o n t h s b u t only at the price of its final complete
defeat. T h e r e still r e m a i n m a n y doubtful points c o n c e r n i n g the de-
tailed m a n e u v e r s , a n d it is no d o u b t possible that in the e n d a dif-
ference of o p i n i o n b e t w e e n A f r a n i u s a n d P e t r e i u s facilitated
Caesar's victory. In such a crisis, w h e r e e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d s on the
decision of t h e m o m e n t , t h e n e e d for c o o r d i n a t i o n between two
generals has a particularly d e t r i m e n t a l effect. It is particularly curi-
ous that, w h e n they w e r e o v e r t a k e n by Caesar, the P o m p e i a n s re-
m a i n e d motionless for an entire day a n d only sent o u t reconnais-
sance patrols. If they believed at all that they could still carry out
m o v e m e n t s within view of t h e e n e m y , it is h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why
they did not try to move directly forward on the r o a d to Octogesa.
T h e y no d o u b t could not expect that Caesar would allow t h e m to
3
b r e a k a w a y ; h e h a d m o v e d o u t without b a g g a g e a n d rations, but
the c o l u m n s w e r e naturally already on the m a r c h to b r i n g up the
most necessary supplies. It was this o n e day's halt that p l u n g e d the
P o m p e i a n s into disaster, a n d it can hardly be e x p l a i n e d by a n y t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n indecisiveness a n d a difference of o p i n i o n in the Pom-
p e i a n h e a d q u a r t e r s . B u t t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f C a e s a r a n d his
t r o o p s is barely d i m i n i s h e d by this point. T h e e r r o r that the P o m -
peians m a d e was, after all, already a result of the m o r a l e superior-
ity of the e n e m y , which was e x e r t i n g its p r e s s u r e . In such a situa-
tion a general w h o would not have m a d e any mistake would have
h a d to be a very great c o m m a n d e r i n d e e d .
W h e n the e n e m y t u r n e d back again t o w a r d I l e r d a , Caesar felt so
certain of the final c o m p l e t e victory that he no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d a
battle to be necessary. His soldiers d e m a n d e d a battle, in which vic-
tory could not escape t h e m , but Caesar c o n t e n t e d himself with de-
ploying his a r m y in t h e o p e n field a n d leaving it up to the e n e m y
as to w h e t h e r he w a n t e d to attack. Even the brave Petreius, who
was d e t e r m i n e d to hold o u t to the e n d , h a d to realize that the bat-
tle itself would be a purposeless slaughter, a n d so finally t h e r e was

n o t h i n g else to do but capitulate.
T h i s victory of Caesar's u n d o u b t e d l y stands alone in world his-
tory t h r o u g h the fact that absolute success, the complete d e s t r u c -
tion of the e n e m y a r m y , was accomplished without a battle, simply
t h r o u g h m a n e u v e r a n d a few m o d e r a t e - s i z e d s k i r m i s h e s . T h e
R o m a n a r m y at Lake T r a s i m e n o a n d at C a n n a e , the Prussian a r m y
in 1806, a n d t h r e e F r e n c h armies in 1870-1871 were all completely
destroyed, b u t only after stubbornly fought battles. Nevertheless,
o n e s h o u l d not confuse Caesar's strategy with that of Pericles, for
e x a m p l e . T h e latter, fully a w a r e of t h e inferiority of the A t h e n i a n
land a r m y , avoided from the start a n d as a m a t t e r of principle any
large l a n d battle, a n d since the e n e m y , on the o t h e r h a n d , declined
to accept a decisive sea battle, he s o u g h t to e n d the war t h r o u g h a
process of attrition. N o t h i n g w o u l d have pleased Caesar m o r e t h a n
to have Pompey's legates immediately accept a tactical decision, so
that, having finished t h e m off, he could t u r n as quickly as possible
against P o m p e y himself. It was only because the legates, for their
part, avoided a tactical decision that t h e war b e c a m e a war of ma-
n e u v e r a n d that, only at the very e n d , w h e n a battle h a d b e c o m e
unnecessary, C a e s a r himself also r e n o u n c e d such action—but let it
be n o t e d that it was the battle itself that he forwent, a n d not t h e
p u r p o s e of the battle, the destruction of the e n e m y forces.
Battles would hardly ever be fought if the c o m m a n d e r s w e r e able
to estimate with certainty the o p p o s i n g s t r e n g t h s , the physical a n d
the spiritual as well. He w h o is certain from the start of b e i n g d e -
feated (unless it be a situation like that of Leonidas) seeks to avoid
battle. In the c a m p a i g n of I l e r d a we have t h e r a r e e x a m p l e of a
situation w h e r e the decision could be r e a c h e d without a battle, be-
cause both sides analyzed the situation so well a n d correctly that
t h e r e was no necessity for testing their estimate.
T h e two legates, a w a r e of t h e i r n u m e r i c a l inferiority, avoided
battle a n d selected a position w h e r e they could not be attacked a n d
could be besieged only with great difficulty. Recognizing the im-
pregnability of the e n e m y position, Caesar p r e p a r e d for the siege.
T h e legates slipped away from it, a n d they w e r e already on t h e
m a r c h w h e n C a e s a r won a position that in effect a m o u n t e d to a
closed siege. Since once again b o t h sides recognized the situation,
the o n e realizing that he no l o n g e r n e e d e d a battle, the o t h e r that
t h e r e was no l o n g e r a c h a n c e of success, the o u t c o m e was the d e -
struction of t h e w e a k e r side without any f u r t h e r bloodletting.
EXCURSUS
1. T h e campaign of Ilerda has already been treated very thoroughly by Guischard

in Critical and Historical Commentaries on Several Points of Ancient Military History
(Mémoires critiques el historiques sur plusieurs points d'antiquités militaires), Vol. 1. T h e n it
was studied by Göler and in a special research project by Rudolf Schneider, Ilerda
(Berlin, 1886). All of these works, however, have been overtaken and made obsolete
by the work of Colonel Stoffel, w h o p r o d u c e d a m a p that was very significantly dif-
ferent from the previous o n e s a n d w h o also personally studied the terrain. Stoffel
(Guerre civile, 1: 256) states that N a p o l e o n III in 1863 asked the Spanish g o v e r n m e n t
to have general staff maps drawn up of the region of Ilerda and M u n d a , a n d that
by 1865 these maps, of excellent quality, were turned over to him. He says that his
o w n maps are reduced reproductions of them. T h e s e Spanish maps must have re-
m a i n e d u n k n o w n in Germany, since e v e n the m a p that S c h n e i d e r placed in his
book, c o m i n g from Heinrich Kiepert, did not take t h e m into consideration.
U n d e r these circumstances it is unnecessary to go into the discrepancies between
Göler and Schneider on the o n e hand, and Stoffel on the other; we are inclined to
go along completely with Stoffel, w h o is in every respect the most outstanding ex-
pert. Nevertheless, I am unable to brush aside a few points of hesitation and for that
reason, as in the campaign against Ariovistus, I have limited my account to the more
general features.
It can hardly be d o u b t e d that Octogesa is the present town of Mequinenza. I
should like to risk adding one more point to Stoffel's reasons. If the legates had had
their floating bridge built near Almatret (Göler) or Flix (Schneider), they would
have had to take the chance that Caesar would immediately m o v e his entire army to
the left bank of the Sicoris and w o u l d block their route. If then they had wished to
withdraw along the right bank, they would first have had to m o v e the bridge up-
stream to a point above the confluence with the Sicoris. T h e position selected for
building the bridge was therefore just slightly downstream from the mouth of the
Sicoris, which allowed t h e m f r e e d o m of action, e v e n at the last minute, d e p e n d i n g
on Caesar's course of action, to withdraw from Ilerda along either the right or the left
bank. If, however, Octogesa was situated at the mouth of the Sicoris, it is not suffi-
ciently clear why the P o m p e i a n s did not march along the left bank of the river. Stof-
fel a s s u m e s that they had a v o i d e d the level terrain a l o n g the river, since they
foresaw that the e n e m y cavalry would harass them on the march. Of course, the
route via Sarroca d o e s lead t h r o u g h hilly terrain, but as the o u t c o m e proved, it was
still o p e n e n o u g h not to prevent the action by the cavalry. If they had taken the
route along the river, at least o n e flank would always have b e e n covered, and fur-
thermore this route was considerably shorter, a point that took on great importance.
Are we perhaps to assume that the Pompeians feared that, if they were to march
directly along the river, they would be e x p o s e d to the arrows and slungshot of the
sharpshooters from the other bank?
It is also not clear why the legates, w h e n they were overtaken by Caesar, decided
to take the route t h r o u g h the defile of Rivarroja, as Stoffel assumes they did. We
can suppose that at the same time they sent an order to the officer in charge of the
bridge to move the bridge to Rivarroja. But we cannot discern a reason for the
c h a n g e of the march route, and all the less so in that, after all, at the last minute the
march was s u p p o s e d to be r e s u m e d once more toward Octogesa. T h e route along
Mont Maneu, too, must have had s o m e stretches with the characteristics of a defile,
where they could have f o u n d cover against Caesar's troops.
Finally, it is particularly curious that the legates, w h e n the apparent withdrawal of
Caesar toward Ilerda began, and especially w h e n they saw that the march was on the
Rivarroja road, did not immediately take up their march via Mont Maneu toward
Octogesa.
All of these uncertainties w o u l d be r e m o v e d if we could assume that Caesar had
in m i n d the actual front and not the momentary position of those who were looking
at the front, w h e n he wrote, "ubi paullatim relorqueri agmen ad dextram conspexerunt"
(Chapter 29) ("where they caught sight of the c o l u m n gradually turning back to the
right"), which would m e a n that the c o l u m n of Caesar was turning to the left, or
westward. After studying this situation again, I no longer have any doubt that such
was the case and that, consequently, the whole series of details in the middle of the
account, telling of the Pompeians' turning toward Rivarroja, is to be eliminated.
T h e y n e v e r h a d any o t h e r objective t h a n O c t o g e s a ( M e q u i n e n z a ) , a n d C a e s a r
blocked this route to t h e m by m o v i n g in b e t w e e n their march camp and the Sicoris,
in the direction of Mont Maneu.
2. Caesar's account of his efforts to create an artificial ford in the Sicoris seems
very strange. First of all, o n e w o n d e r s why he did not preferably build a bridge.
Even if the flood waters had swept away his bridges on several occasions, a ford
would still be m u c h m o r e vulnerable, and the work that went into the ford was, by
Caesar's o w n description, greater than that which would have been required to con-
struct many bridges. Since Caesar already d o m i n a t e d the left bank with his cavalry,
the e n e m y could not have prevented construction of a bridge.
We can find no o t h e r reason except perhaps an absolute lack of w o o d , but this
would again prompt the question whether it would not have been possible to float
the w o o d down from the Pyrenees on the Sicoris.
T h e main question, however, is w h e t h e r it is, in fact, at all possible to create a
ford in the m a n n e r i n t e n d e d by Caesar. T h e r e are greatly varying opinions as to
just how the ditch-digging p r o c e d u r e is to be u n d e r s t o o d . Schneider, basing his con-
cept on that of Guischard, assumes a full-fledged diversion of the river, a work of
such gigantic proportions that it seems impossible to me, since, after all, hardly m o r e
than ten days could be devoted to the project. Stoffel's idea is m u c h simpler. He
takes as a starting point the fact that, 2 kilometers above Ilerda, the river splits and
forms islands; he w o u l d have Caesar's m e n d i g g i n g several 30-foot-wide ditches
through these islands, thus w i d e n i n g the bed of the river to that extent and thereby
l o w e r i n g the surface. To what e x t e n t this is technically possible a n d correct is
b e y o n d my j u d g m e n t .
1. See also p p . 4 9 5 a n d 499 above. Even if these n u m b e r s have

n o t b e e n directly h a n d e d d o w n to us in the sources, I believe that
o n e can still give t h e m with certainty. Domaszewski, in his valuable
essay " T h e A r m i e s of the Civil W a r s in t h e Years 49 to 42 B . C . "
("Die H e e r e d e r B ü g e r k r i e g e in d e n J a h r e n 49 bis 42 v. C h r . " ) ,
Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, Vol. 4, 1894, has p o i n t e d o u t t h a t
C a e s a r h a d 11 legions at t h e o u t b r e a k of the civil war. Since, how-
ever, only 10 are m e n t i o n e d in the c a m p a i g n against Vercingetorix
a n d 11 in t h e following winter q u a r t e r s , b u t Caesar h a d given up 2
legions, he could really only have h a d 9 r e m a i n i n g . Domaszewski
explains the difference by saying that Caesar, as soon as he saw t h e
conflict c o m i n g on, immediately f o r m e d 2 new legions as replace-
m e n t s for those he h a d given u p . B u t it seems to me that t h e r e is a
still b e t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n . I n t h e y e a r 5 2 B . C , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d 10 legions, C a e s a r also h a d 22 cohorts that were
d e f e n d i n g the province (7. 65) a n d that h a d b e e n levied in the p r o -

vince itself, so that they w e r e not all c o m p o s e d of R o m a n citizens.
T h e Fifth Legion, A l a u d a , was such a legion of noncitizens. Ac-
c o r d i n g t o S u e t o n i u s (Caesar, C h a p t e r 24), C a e s a r h a d a l r e a d y
f o r m e d it d u r i n g t h e Gallic W a r a n d not, as Domaszewski believes,
as late as the year 50 B . C . T h e r e is n o t h i n g m o r e n a t u r a l t h a n for
us to assume that it b e l o n g e d to those 22 c o h o r t s of the year 52
B.C., a n d the same for the Sixth Legion, a l t h o u g h of course
S u e t o n i u s speaks of only one such b a r b a r i a n legion. If we consider,
however, that the Sixth Legion now a p p e a r s in t h e Commentaries for
the first time; that, as N a p o l e o n I I I has already r e m a r k e d , it ar-
rived before Alesia as p a r t of the m a i n a r m y ; that Caesar c a n n o t
possibly have still h a d a v e t e r a n legion in Cisalpine Gaul at t h a t
time; that n o t h i n g would be m o r e n a t u r a l t h a n for Caesar, after he
h a d d e f e a t e d V e r c i n g e t o r i x a n d t h e p r o v i n c e was n o l o n g e r i n
n e e d of p r o t e c t i o n , to o r d e r up to his m a i n force a p a r t of the gar-
rison t h e r e , in p r e p a r a t i o n for the decisive b a t t l e — u n d e r these cir-
c u m s t a n c e s we can h a r d l y r e a c h any o t h e r conclusion t h a n that this
legion was also a p a r t of those 22 cohorts "praesidia ex ipsa coacta
provincia" ("the garrisons d r a w n from the province i t s e l f ) .
I n o p p o s i t i o n t o this i t c o u l d b e a r g u e d t h a t i n t h e Bellum
Alexandrinum, C h a p t e r 6 9 , it is said that the Sixth Legion h a d b e e n
r e d u c e d to 1,000 m e n as a result of h a r d s h i p s a n d battle losses
("crebritate bellorum" ["the frequency of the wars"]) a n d that it was
d e a c t i v a t e d in 45 B . C . as a v e t e r a n l e g i o n . E v e n if it was n o t
f o r m e d , however, until t h e w i n t e r of 5 3 - 5 2 B.C. (but p e r h a p s also
earlier), it h a d still p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e battles in d e f e n s e of t h e p r o -
vince, t h e battle against the relief of Alesia, a n d later t h e entire civil
w a r a n d t h e r e f o r e h a d at least six years of intensive battle experi-
ence b e h i n d it w h e n it followed C a e s a r from Egypt against P h a r -
naces. In a f o o t n o t e on his p a g e 171 Domaszewski, even on t h e
a s s u m p t i o n that the Fifth, A l a u d a , Legion was not f o r m e d until 50
B.C., cites it as a v e t e r a n legion in 48 B.C.
( A d d e d in t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n . ) G r ö b e (Festschrift fur Otto
Hirschfeld, 1903, r e p r i n t e d in the 2d ed, of D r u m a n n ' s Römische
Geschichte, 3: 702), in a study c o n c e r n i n g Caesar's legions, likewise
c a m e t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e Fifth L e g i o n h a d b e e n f o r m e d
from the cohorts that h a d b e e n m e n t i o n e d as b e i n g in the province
in 52 B.C. But he fixes t h e organization of this unit as not o c c u r r i n g
until 51 B.C. T h e Sixth L e g i o n that participated in t h e civil war was
supposedly not f o r m e d until 5 0 B . C , after t h e o l d e r Sixth Legion
h a d b e e n t r a n s f e r r e d to P o m p e y (and was designated as the First

Legion in his a r m y ) .
T h e 8 cohorts that I assume to have b e e n in Cisalpine Gaul a r e
not c o n s i d e r e d by G r ö b e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , he gives C a e s a r only 10
legions in the year 52 B.C. T h e difference, however, is smaller t h a n
it a p p e a r s , since it is o n l y a q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r l e g i o n s w e r e
f o r m e d from the 22 c o h o r t s s o m e w h a t earlier or later a n d w h e t h e r
the 8 c o h o r t s in Cisalpine Gaul were already in existence in 52 B.C.
Cicero's l e t t e r to Atticus in D e c e m b e r 50 B . C . , cited by Gröbe,
seems to point to the formation of a considerable n u m b e r of new
u n i t s in 50 B . C . : (7. 7. 6) "Imbecillo r e s i s t e n d u m fuit et id e r a t
facile; n u n c legiones XI, e q u i t a t u s t a n t u s , q u a n t u m volet, T r a n s p a -
d a n i . " ("Resistance was weak, a n d the task was easy; now t h e r e
were 11 legions a n d as m u c h cavalry as he might wish, levied from
the region n o r t h of the Po.") B u t t h e r e is not really a n y t h i n g to be
l e a r n e d from this passage, since u n d e r any circumstances C a e s a r
h a d h a d in 52 B.C., in addition to his 10 legions, t h e 22 c o h o r t s .
2. T h e cited dates a r e in a c c o r d a n c e with Stoffel's calculations,
based on the estimates of t h e a s t r o n o m e r Leverrier, which w e r e re-
q u e s t e d by N a p o l e o n I I I . A c c o r d i n g to Ideler, M o m m s e n , Matzat,
Soltau, a n d U n g e r , the events o c c u r r e d s o m e t h r e e weeks earlier.
3. W h e n C a e s a r m o v e d o u t on the following day a n d initially took
t h e r o u t e back t o w a r d Ilerda, the P o m p e i a n soldiers naturally be-
lieved that a lack of provisions was forcing the e n e m y to r e t i r e .
T h i s does not contradict t h e sentence above, however.
Chapter VIII
The Campaign in Greece

T h e v i c t o r y i n S p a i n g a v e C a e s a r t h e u p p e r h a n d o v e r his
e n e m i e s on land. Besides t h e 11 legions with which he started the
war, he had g r a d u a l l y f o r m e d 17 new o n e s , principally from
1
Pompey's soldiers, w h o , after being defeated, c a m e into his service.
T w o of t h e new legions u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of C u r i o he had lost
on a m o v e to Africa, a n d a n o t h e r 1½ legions u n d e r C. A n t o n i u s in
the Adriatic Sea, on t h e coast of Illyria. Of his r e m a i n i n g forces he
assembled a b o u t half, 12 legions a n d 10,000 cavalry, n e a r B r u n -
disium in o r d e r to cross over to E p i r u s a n d carry the war to P o m -
pey; t h e rest o f his forces w e r e d i v i d e d u p a m o n g Italy, Sicily,
Gaul, a n d Spain.
At first P o m p e y h a d available to o p p o s e the a r m y that was to sail
across to E p i r u s only 9 legions, which w e r e to be j o i n e d by 2 addi-
tional o n e s from Syria u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Scipio. T h e s e troops
w e r e not a match for Caesar's either in n u m b e r s or in quality. T w o
of the legions w e r e those t h a t h a d formerly b e l o n g e d to Caesar's
a r m y , a n d they w e r e not absolutely d e p e n d a b l e ; t h e o t h e r s w e r e
e i t h e r newly f o r m e d units or o l d e r cadres that h a d b e e n filled o u t
with levies in G r e e c e a n d Asia. After the d e s t r u c t i o n of his actual
main a r m y in Spain, P o m p e y would have h a d to give up any h o p e
of success if he h a d n o t h a d absolute s u p e r i o r i t y at sea, j u s t as
C a e s a r h a d it on land. To t h e available R o m a n ships he h a d j o i n e d
those of the e a s t e r n subject nations. Caesar h a d , to be sure, also
o r d e r e d the construction of ships, but he lacked the nucleus of a
fleet. T h e most i m p o r t a n t s e a p o r t of his original a r e a , Massilia, h a d
g o n e over to his e n e m i e s a n d h a d h a d to be c o n q u e r e d again, but
only after a h a r d siege. T h e fleet in the Adriatic Sea was d e f e a t e d
a n d d e s t r o y e d b y t h e P o m p e i a n s . T h e a d v a n t a g e that P o m p e y won
t h r o u g h these circumstances a n d events was so g r e a t that Caesar
528
The Campaign in Greece 529
could not o v e r t a k e him. W h e n h e c a m e t o B r u n d i s i u m , t h e r e w e r e
not even e n o u g h ships on h a n d to t r a n s p o r t in a single voyage the
a r m y with which he i n t e n d e d to take the offensive.
T o d a y it is c o n s i d e r e d strategically impossible for an a r m y to
m o v e o v e r s e a s w i t h o u t c o n t r o l l i n g t h e sea a t least t e m p o r a r i l y .
Caesar d e c i d e d to m a k e t h e move even t h o u g h his t r a n s p o r t ships
were not even sufficient. If he h a d waited long e n o u g h to assemble
sufficient ships to m o v e the e n t i r e a r m y across, their g r e a t mass
would still h a v e m a d e the move very difficult; even m o r e i m p o r -
tant, in the m e a n t i m e the e n e m y fleet, which was still quietly lying
at a n c h o r in the h a r b o r s , would have b e e n alerted. P o m p e y himself
h a d n o t yet a r r i v e d in E p i r u s with his a r m y ; t h e coastal cities,
w h e r e g r e a t stocks of supplies h a d b e e n stored, w e r e without t h e
protection of l a n d forces. S p e e d p r o m i s e d the greatest successes.
By r e d u c i n g t h e supply train, Caesar was able to e m b a r k a b o u t half
of his a r m y , 7 legions a n d a cavalry force, a n d they m a d e t h e cross-
ing successfully, since at that t i m e , in m i d w i n t e r , t h e e n e m y was
2
not p r e p a r e d to cope with it. It has b e e n observed that a c h a n g e
of wind direction from south to n o r t h regularly o c c u r r i n g at this
time of year, which was normally followed by several days of quiet
weather, m u s t have w o r k e d very favorably for Caesar's u n d e r t a k -
ing. T h e n o r t h wind b r o u g h t his fleet in 12 to 15 h o u r s to a p a r t of
t h e coast t h a t is well p r o t e c t e d precisely a g a i n s t this w i n d a n d
which o f f e r e d an excellent b e a c h for the quickest possible
3
debarkation.
Only now did they e n c o u n t e r the real difficulty. It is t r u e that a
few of t h e coastal cities of Epirus, particularly O r i c u m a n d Apol-
lonia, were quickly c a p t u r e d , b u t the principal town, D y r r h a c h i u m ,
h a d b e e n r e a c h e d a n d secured by P o m p e y with his a r m y j u s t be-
fore Caesar arrived, a n d the P o m p e i a n naval vessels overtook a n d
b u r n e d a p a r t of Caesar's t r a n s p o r t fleet on its r e t u r n t r i p a n d
t h e r e a f t e r t h r o u g h increased alertness p r e v e n t e d the crossing o f
the second p a r t of Caesar's a r m y . C u t off from his base, C a e s a r
with half of his a r m y was paralyzed in Epirus. Nevertheless, this
did not yet b r i n g h i m into any direct d a n g e r . A l t h o u g h P o m p e y
was s t r o n g e r in i n f a n t r y by 2 legions a n d very c o n s i d e r a b l y
s t r o n g e r in cavalry, he still d i d not d a r e to attack directly Caesar's
veterans with his inferior t r o o p s or to besiege t h e m in t h e i r for-
tified c a m p .
A n d so the two c o m m a n d e r s stood fast, c o n f r o n t i n g each o t h e r
without fighting. P o m p e y was waiting for Scipio's legions in o r d e r
to gain a sure superiority a n d for the s u m m e r in o r d e r to m a k e use

of his fleet. Caesar h o p e d that his generals w o u l d b r i n g over to him
the second half of his a r m y from B r u n d i s i u m .
O n e might well ask why Caesar did not b r i n g up the necessary
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s b y l a n d , t h r o u g h Illyria, a n d this l e a d s t o t h e
f u r t h e r question of why he did not have his legions take this r o u t e
in the first place, w h e n they c a m e from Spain a n d Gaul, which
would have avoided the d a n g e r o u s sea crossing a n d was actually
shorter. T h e answer probably is that the m o v e m e n t of a large a r m y
t h r o u g h t h e m o u n t a i n o u s a n d hostile c o u n t r y s i d e o f Illyria i n
w i n t e r w o u l d h a v e p o s e d i n s u p e r a b l e s u p p l y difficulties. At t h e
least it would have b e e n necessary to m a k e very extensive p r e p a r a -
tions, w h e r e a s t h e m a r c h t h r o u g h Italy t o B r u n d i s i u m could b e
m a d e with security a n d without delay. Even the sea crossing was, as
we have seen, no d o u b t a bold a n d d a r i n g act b u t in no way an
u n r e a s o n a b l e o n e . It does seem astonishing, however, that Caesar
risked o r d e r i n g t h a t p a r t of t h e a r m y that h a d b e e n left b e h i n d to
p r o c e e d with the crossing a n d that t h e latter succeeded. We must
u n d e r s t a n d that the ancient warships with their massive a n d tightly
packed crews of o a r s m e n w e r e not able to stay at sea continuously
for a very long time.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y c o u l d n o t , for e x a m p l e , b l o c k a d e B r u n -
disium. T r u e e n o u g h , t h e P o m p e i a n a d m i r a l , Libo, m a d e a n at-
t e m p t to do this, a n d for this p u r p o s e he o c c u p i e d a small island
situated in front of the h a r b o r . B u t the island did n o t have e n o u g h
w a t e r , a n d M a r k A n t o n y , w h o was i n c o m m a n d i n B r u n d i s i u m ,
t h r o u g h the use of widely s p a c e d cavalry p a t r o l s p r e v e n t e d t h e
ships' crews from g o i n g a s h o r e on t h e m a i n l a n d to obtain water.
A n d s o the P o m p e i a n s h a d t o give u p t h e blockade a n d content
themselves with k e e p i n g a close watch on the sea from their ports
in E p i r u s , in o r d e r to attack, if the situation a r o s e , Caesar's a p -
p r o a c h i n g fleet of t r a n s p o r t s . If, however, a s t r o n g wind favorable
to Caesar's forces was blowing, t h e o a r - p r o p e l l e d warships could
not do m u c h against the sailing t r a n s p o r t vessels. T h e voyage still
r e m a i n e d very risky, since it was completely at the mercy of the
w h i m s of the wind. A full two m o n t h s passed before A n t o n y a n d
the o t h e r generals d e c i d e d , after receiving r e p e a t e d o r d e r s from
C a e s a r himself, t o u n d e r t a k e t h e v e n t u r e ; a n d f o r t u n e was s o
favorable to t h e m that not only d i d their e n t i r e fleet cross over
w i t h o u t loss b u t i t e v e n h a p p e n e d t h a t t h e e n e m y fleet, which
h o p e d t o i n t e r c e p t t h e m , was d r i v e n o n t h e r o c k s b y a s u d d e n
c h a n g e o f the wind.
It a p p e a r s t h a t C a e s a r , in view of t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of t h e sea
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , h a d also started r e i n f o r c e m e n t s m o v i n g t o w a r d h i m
via Illyria, but, h e l d up by t h e hostile m o u n t a i n tribes, they did n o t
4
arrive in time for the decisive b a t t l e .
A n t o n y b r o u g h t over to Caesar 4 legions a n d cavalry, so that he
now h e l d u n q u e s t i o n e d superiority. B u t w h a t was he to do with it?
By o n e of his s u d d e n forced m a r c h e s he succeeded in m o v i n g his
a r m y b e t w e e n P o m p e y a n d D y r r h a c h i u m , b u t h e g a i n e d little i n
d o i n g so. P o m p e y d u g in directly on t h e beach, a n d t h a n k s to his
ships he was able to m a i n t a i n c o n t i n u o u s contact with his m a i n
supply point, t h e richly stocked D y r r h a c h i u m , a n d with the rest of
the world. He could feed his a r m y without difficulty via the sea
r o u t e , w h e r e a s C a e s a r h a d t o rely o n supplies b r o u g h t u p with
g r e a t difficulty o v e r l a n d from a n a r e a w h o s e r e s o u r c e s w e r e al-
ready partially e x h a u s t e d . Despite his s u p e r i o r s t r e n g t h , Caesar was
not in a position to force a decision.
He d e c i d e d to divide up his a r m y . Almost all of the reinforce-
m e n t s that h a d finally j o i n e d h i m , 3½ legions, he sent into the in-
terior of the c o u n t r y . T w o legions went in search of Scipio, with
the mission of p i n n i n g h i m d o w n , if possible, a n d defeating h i m .
O n e a n d a half legions t u r n e d t o w a r d Hellas in o r d e r to subject or
to win over to Caesar's side as m a n y cities a n d c o u n t r y regions as
possible. With the m a i n body of his a r m y , Caesar u n d e r t o o k to be-
siege t h e a r m y of P o m p e y . T h e t e r r a i n favored this o p e r a t i o n so
that, for the time being, it was only necessary to steepen s o m e w h a t
the n a t u r a l slopes of the hills by digging a n d to lay out individual
r e d o u b t s . B u t t h e work was still a massive u n d e r t a k i n g , a n d the ex-
pected gains w e r e small. Caesar himself states that he h a d t h r e e
goals in m i n d t h r o u g h t h e siege: He w a n t e d to p r o t e c t his own
supply r o u t e from t h e s u p e r i o r cavalry of P o m p e y ; he w a n t e d to
h a r m a n d weaken this cavalry by cutting it off from the possibility
of foraging; a n d finally he w a n t e d to e x e r t p r e s s u r e on t h e m o r a l e
of t h e e n e m y side by letting it be widely k n o w n that P o m p e y was
besieged a n d d i d not d a r e j o i n battle. C a e s a r himself does n o t state
the belief that he could have b r o u g h t P o m p e y to capitulate t h r o u g h
the siege or could even have forced him to treat for peace, a n d
these possibilities w e r e also completely o u t of t h e question. N o t h i n g
c o u l d p r e v e n t P o m p e y f r o m e m b a r k i n g his a r m y w h e n e v e r h e
w a n t e d to a n d m o v i n g it s o m e w h e r e else.
T h e question is why P o m p e y did not simply m o v e over to Italy,
as a n u m b e r of his friends advised. He h a d a good reason for not
d o i n g so. In that case C a e s a r would also have led his a r m y back to
Italy, t h r o u g h Illyria, w h i c h h e w o u l d h a v e s u c c e e d e d i n d o i n g
s o o n e r or later with at least a p o r t i o n of the a r m y , a n d t h e n , even
if Italy h a d fallen into P o m p e y ' s h a n d s in t h e m e a n t i m e , it would
be n e c e s s a r y at o n c e to fight t h e decisive b a t t l e , which o f f e r e d
P o m p e y no p r o s p e c t of success, for he h a d only 9 legions with h i m ,
w h e r e a s Caesar h a d 11 a n d m o r e t h a n as m a n y as t h a t again in
Italy, Gaul, Spain, a n d t h e islands.
T h e best p l a n for P o m p e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e b e e n n o t t o
move o u t at o n c e directly back to Italy a n d R o m e , b u t first, with
the h e l p of King J u b a of N u m i d i a , to take back Sicily, Sardinia,
a n d Spain from Caesar, a n d only t h e n , after significantly increasing
his forces from those in these provinces, to accept t h e decisive bat-
tle. With t h e h e l p of his fleet all of these u n d e r t a k i n g s could be
carried o u t simultaneously or in very quick succession. T h e 4 le-
gions t h a t Caesar h a d in Spain consisted primarily of f o r m e r soldiers
of P o m p e y ; p e r h a p s it was possible to win t h e m back to his side.
W e d o not know w h e t h e r P o m p e y c o n s i d e r e d such plans. W e d o
not have any s o u r c e that provides us with a reliable insight into the
5
m o r e intimate estimates of his h e a d q u a r t e r s . Since it is r e p o r t e d
on all sides, however, that P o m p e y wished to avoid a battle a n d we
have no r e a s o n to a s s u m e t h a t his strategy was p u r e l y negative, we
a r e justified in a t t r i b u t i n g to him ideas a p p r o x i m a t e l y of the kind
d e v e l o p e d above.
Caesar's actions, however, probably gave P o m p e y t h e idea t h a t
t h e r e w e r e still g r e a t e r c h a n c e s of success offered h i m h e r e . T h e
a r m y with which C a e s a r was c a r r y i n g o u t the siege was smaller t h a n
Pompey's a r m y . With t h e h e l p of his ships, the latter could attack
the besiegers in t h e i r r e a r at any time. We may give such an ex-
p e r i e n c e d c o m m a n d e r as P o m p e y credit for recognizing what a d -
vantages w e r e offered h i m by Caesar's excessively d a r i n g v e n t u r e
a n d for deciding, instead of that o t h e r far-reaching plan, to m a k e
the most, first of all, of t h e p r e s e n t situation a n d k e e p his a r m y
a n d fleet t o g e t h e r . All t h e ability of Caesar's v e t e r a n s still did n o t
finally p r e v e n t a large-scale attack by the P o m p e i a n s with the h e l p
of t h e i r ships from succeeding. Caesar's a r m y was attacked simul-
taneously o n t h r e e sides, from P o m p e y ' s c a m p , from t h e beach,
a n d from t h e rear, suffering a defeat with heavy losses, a n d its for-
tifications o n t h e s o u t h side, w h e r e t h e y e x t e n d e d d o w n t o t h e
beach, w e r e b r o k e n t h r o u g h .
T h i s result seems so n a t u r a l that o n e is inclined to consider as a
serious e r r o r Caesar's a t t e m p t to besiege from the l a n d a larger,
u n d e f e a t e d a r m y t h a t h a d control of t h e sea. U n d e r the best cir-
cumstances he h a d but little to win b u t very m u c h to lose. But in
war b o t h c h a n c e a n d fortune play a role, a n d C a e s a r left the out-
c o m e up to fate, not t h r o u g h a r r o g a n c e , b u t because t h e r e was no
alternative for h i m . F u r t h e r m o r e , he also h o p e d , t h r o u g h connec-
tions that he h a d m a d e in the city, to h a v e D y r r h a c h i u m fall into
his power. If, instead of c o n d u c t i n g the siege, he h a d m a r c h e d into
the interior with his whole army, he w o u l d not have accomplished
any m o r e t h a n his d e t a c h e d legions w e r e able to d o . N e i t h e r would
t h e seaports have s u r r e n d e r e d to h i m n o r would he have defeated
Scipio, w h o naturally would have kept a safe distance between him-
self a n d the m a i n e n e m y army. In the m e a n t i m e , however, P o m p e y
would have b e e n able to send his legions on expeditions with the
fleet that p r e s u m a b l y would have resulted in g r e a t e r successes t h a n
Caesar's m a r c h e s with his a r m y . T h e e n e m y ' s superiority at sea,
w h i c h e n a b l e d h i m to avoid a decisive b a t t l e , w o u l d t h e n h a v e
p r o v e n itself to be still m o r e valuable by far.
T h e siege of P o m p e y ' s a r m y led, it is t r u e , to n o t h i n g at all, a n d
in fact to s o m e t h i n g even worse, a defeat. But it was precisely this
blow that b r o u g h t on the desired c o u n t e r b l o w .
Puffed up by this success, the P o m p e i a n s would now have b e e n
ready to accept the decisive battle on the spot, b u t Caesar, wisely
estimating t h a t he must give his troops s o m e time to recover from
this blow to t h e i r m o r a l e , a v o i d e d the battle. T h r o u g h a clever
m a n e u v e r he got a h e a d start a n d took up the m a r c h t o w a r d T h e s -
saly in o r d e r to j o i n up again with his d e t a c h e d t r o o p s . T h e latter
h a d w o n for h i m a large p o r t i o n of t h e i n t e r i o r ; the p r i n c i p a l
force, u n d e r Domitius, was m a n e u v e r i n g a r o u n d Scipio, b u t with-
6
o u t success, since he avoided a battle.
T h e safest t h i n g now for P o m p e y would still have b e e n not to
move directly into a decisive battle but r a t h e r , on the s t r e n g t h of
t h e m o r a l e success of his victory at D y r r h a c h i u m , first of all to win
o v e r t h e w e s t e r n p r o v i n c e s a g a i n a n d only t h e n , with d o u b l e d
s t r e n g t h , to attack Caesar himself. But even if P o m p e y did think
a l o n g these lines, as i n d e e d Caesar r e p o r t s , saying that he was still
inclined to avoid a decisive battle, nevertheless he was still not suf-
ficiently in control of his party to force its acceptance of such a
l o n g - d r a w n - o u t plan. Caesar r e p o r t s that, for his p a r t , he consid-
e r e d t h r e e possible e n e m y courses of action: that P o m p e y would
move over to Italy; that he would besiege the ports in E p i r u s w h e r e
Caesar h a d garrisons a n d which f o r m e d his d e p o t s ; a n d that he
would p u r s u e C a e s a r directly. Of these t h r e e possibilities, the sec-
o n d o n e w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y h a v e b e e n t h e best f o r P o m p e y .
C a e s a r says that in that case h e , for his p a r t , w o u l d have besieged

Scipio, t h u s forcing P o m p e y to come to his relief. B u t Scipio h a d
the possibility of w i t h d r a w i n g to a seaport, p e r h a p s Thessalonica,
or to B y z a n t i u m , w h e r e C a e s a r , w i t h o u t a fleet, c o u l d n o t have
caused him any h a r m , whereas Pompey could have attacked
Caesar's fortresses by land a n d by sea. T h e s t r e n g t h s of the two
sides w e r e consequently similar in no way. B u t the P o m p e i a n s w e r e
now m u c h too self-confident to work up to victory gradually by
such devious ways. First of all they tried to see if they could cut off
Domitius' corps, which was m a n e u v e r i n g against Scipio in Mace-
d o n , a n d w h e n t h a t a t t e m p t failed j u s t a t t h e last m i n u t e a n d
Domitius with his 2 legions m a n a g e d to escape a n d j o i n Caesar,
they followed him o n t o t h e plain of Thessaly a n d offered battle.
Each of the c o m m a n d e r s now h a d at his disposal in the t h e a t e r of
o p e r a t i o n s a total of 11 legions; Caesar h a d left b e h i n d 8 cohorts in
the ports of Epirus that he occupied, whereas Pompey had 15
c o h o r t s in D y r r h a c h i u m . But Caesar did not yet have back the d e -
t a c h e d force of l½ legions that he h a d sent to Hellas, so that the
P o m p e i a n a r m y , j u s t as it enjoyed s t r e n g t h e n e d m o r a l e from its re-
cent victory, also h a d a considerable superiority in n u m b e r s .
C a e s a r himself states t h a t he h a d only 22,000 infantry a n d 1,000
cavalry, w h e r e a s P o m p e y o n t h e o t h e r h a n d h a d 4 5 , 0 0 0 infantry a n d
7,000 cavalry. If we immediately a d d to this t h e point that Caesar
claims to have won his victory with a loss of only 2 0 0 m e n , whereas
15,000 P o m p e i a n s a r e s u p p o s e d to have r e m a i n e d on t h e battlefield,
t h e n o n e could give c r e d e n c e to such strengths, as long as o n e is still
willing in general simply to r e p e a t t h e n u m b e r s in t h e sources without
q u e s t i o n i n g t h e m ; it is s o m e w h a t astonishing, however, that these
n u m b e r s even today are still zealously d e f e n d e d . Impossible as they are
in a n d of themselves, they also stand in contradiction to Caesar's
f u r t h e r s t a t e m e n t that P o m p e y , up to the last m i n u t e , actually did not
want the battle a n d that it was only t h r o u g h the blind trust in victory
a n d t h e constant p r e s s u r e of his r e t i n u e that he was finally d r i v e n to it.
W h a t kind of personality m u s t P o m p e y have been, if with m o r e t h a n
twice as m a n y infantry a n d seven times as many cavalrymen as his
e n e m y , he wanted to avoid t h e decision? How could he h o p e ever again
to e n c o u n t e r Caesar u n d e r such favorable circumstances, w h e n we
know, of course, that C a e s a r was greatly s u p e r i o r to him in the total
n u m b e r o f his land troops? T o j u d g e from the m o v e m e n t s that Pom-
pey m a d e , we may a s s u m e that he enjoyed a certain superiority of
n u m b e r s but that this a d v a n t a g e was still not significant e n o u g h to give
him the confidence to e n g a g e in an o p e n battle against t h e qualitative
superiority of Caesar's veterans right in the D y r r h a c h i u m a r e a . N o w

for the first time, after t h e m o r a l e of his t r o o p s h a d b e e n increased
greatly by the successful attack on the e n e m y c a m p n e a r D y r r h a c h i u m ,
a n d that of t h e e n e m y , as he could easily believe, had been w e a k e n e d ,
he c a m e to the decision to risk the decisive battle, but he still s o u g h t up
to the last m i n u t e to gain f u r t h e r small a d v a n t a g e s for himself in t h e
terrain, a n d he t h e r e b y delayed the battle. If we take into consideration
the o t h e r r e p o r t s that have come d o w n to us, which p e r h a p s go back to
Caesar's general, Asinius Pollio, who also wrote a work on the civil war,
t h e n we may—with t h e reservation that it is not very definite—estimate
Pompey's a r m y at p e r h a p s 40,000 legionaries a n d s o m e t h i n g like 3,000
cavalry, a n d Caesar's at a good 30,000 legionaries a n d p e r h a p s 2,000
cavalry. P o m p e y was also probably s t r o n g e r in light infantry forces,
which were p r e s e n t on both sides.
We c a n n o t give any c r e d e n c e to t h e point that P o m p e y even now still
h a d reservations a b o u t g o i n g into the battle. O n c e he h a d followed
Caesar into the interior, any hesitation could b r i n g no f u r t h e r a d v a n -
tage. He could not p r e v e n t Caesar from m a r c h i n g t h r o u g h t h e fertile
countrysides from t h e Black Sea to t h e i s t h m u s a n d having these areas
furnish provisions for his t r o o p s . T h e supply a d v a n t a g e that t h e P o m -
peian a r m y h a d in being able to b r i n g up ships from a distance t h r o u g h
its close contact with the seaports was still not g r e a t e n o u g h to c o u n t e r -
balance the disadvantage that a long delay would cause by nullifying
the gain in m o r a l e p r o v i d e d by the c a m p a i g n to d a t e . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
Caesar could t h e n expect to be j o i n e d by t h e 1½ legions from Hellas
7
a n d probably also t h e 2 legions that were c o m i n g from Italy via Illyria.
If P o m p e y actually did e x p r e s s any reservations, that must have b e e n
while he was still in the D y r r h a c h i u m area, before deciding to follow
Caesar, or at t h e latest w h e n the blow against Domitius' corps h a d
failed—and no l o n g e r at the time w h e n he finally stood facing Caesar
in Thessaly. T h a t the battle still did not d e v e l o p at once, w h e n the two
armies were again in sight of each o t h e r , was d u e only to the fact that
each side, t h i n k i n g that t h e e n e m y was now at last ready for battle, was
seeking for itself a favorable position a n d h o p i n g that the e n e m y would
8
allow himself to be d r a w n into battle t h e r e .
Finally P o m p e y moved out from his c a m p so far o n t o the plain that
he no longer h a d any terrain a d v a n t a g e , a n d Caesar, who was already
about to m a r c h off, t h e r e u p o n decided to await his r e i n f o r c e m e n t s no
longer b u t to accept t h e challenge, a n d so he m o v e d in on the e n e m y .
Let us try to establish a picture of this fateful day of decision. It will
differ in a not u n i m p o r t a n t way from t h e accounts that have b e e n
accepted up to now, since I believe that Caesar's own account, which
has normally b e e n accepted, r e q u i r e s r a t h e r incisive corrections, on the

basis of the descriptions of t h e o t h e r sources, j u s t as in the case of his
numerical strengths.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R V I I I
1. P e r h a p s even a few m o r e . Gröbe, in D r u m a n n ' s Roman History

(Römische Geschichte), 2d ed., 3: 710.
2. 28 N o v e m b e r 49 B . C , a c c o r d i n g to Stoffel; 5 N o v e m b e r , according
to M o m m s e n .
3. T h e s e observations a n d the c o n f i r m a t i o n of these points h a d al-
ready b e e n m a d e by a commission sent o u t by N a p o l e o n I I I in 1861 in a
work published by L. Heuzay, Julius Caesar's Military Operations, studied
on the Terrain by the Macedonian Commission (Les operations militaires de
Jules Cesar, étudiees sur le terrain par la mission de Macédoine) (Paris, 1886),
which was c o n f i r m e d by Stoffel in Life of Caesar (Vie de Cesar) 1:
138.
4. Domaszewski, in Armies of the Civil Wars (Heere der Bürgerkriege) p p .
1 7 1 - 1 7 2 , considers it impossible for legions to have c o m e from Italy to
Illyria, since the P o m p e i a n s controlled the sea. T h i s reason is not
convincing, since the land r o u t e was o p e n .
5. Up to the p r e s e n t this point has probably not been sufficiently
e m p h a s i z e d . R a n k e , in his World History (Weltgeschichte), even states the
opinion that we have descriptions of the battle of Pharsalus that stem
from s u p p o r t e r s of the S e n a t e a n d of P o m p e y . Such is t h e case only to
the extent that Livy wrote from the P o m p e i a n point of view a n d
L u c a n u s , particularly, p r e s e n t e d t h e civil war with this bias. B u t these
two w e r e already significantly d e p e n d e n t on written sources, a n d since,
despite their bias, they have practically n o t h i n g that d o e s not go back to
e i t h e r Caesar or Pollio, t h a t is a s u r e p r o o f that a truly P o m p e i a n
original source c o n t a i n i n g u n i q u e i n f o r m a t i o n e i t h e r d i d not exist or
h a d already d i s a p p e a r e d at that time. L u c a n u s a p p a r e n t l y did do his
best to find such a source but it is d o w n r i g h t astonishing how little of a
positive n a t u r e his work contains which would not be k n o w n from
o t h e r sources. P l a t h n e r , in On the Credibility of the History of the Civil War
(Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Geschichte des Bürgerkrieges) ( B e r n b u r g Pro-
g r a m m , 1882), has compiled these points very well a n d has shown that
L u c a n u s used Livy as a s o u r c e . A n d so the two of t h e m w e r e able to
e x p r e s s their s y m p a t h y for Pompey's cause only t h r o u g h t h e material
h a n d e d d o w n from the e n e m y side.
6. A p p i a n a n d Dio Cassius write of i m p o r t a n t defeats suffered, in
t u r n , by these d e t a c h e d corps. T h e s e r e p o r t s probably have to stem

from Asinius Pollio, but if they were t r u e , t h e r e would have h a d to be in
some way or o t h e r m o r e significant c o n s e q u e n c e s . We m u s t t h e r e f o r e
p r e f e r Caesar's r e p o r t ; Pollio must have b e e n taken in by the exagger-
ated accounts of p e r s o n s who took p a r t in those battles.
7. Plutarch, Caesar, C h a p t e r 4 3 .
8. T h a t is t h e sense of Bell. Civ. 84. 2 a n d 8 5 . 1.
Chapter IX
The Battle of Pharsalus
Pompey's right flank rested on a d e e p ravine with a b r o o k flowing
t h r o u g h it. With this base the c o m m a n d e r d e c i d e d to vary his battle
f o r m a t i o n in an i m p o r t a n t point from the usual plan. T r u s t i n g that the
brook would p r o v i d e his legions sufficient flank protection on that
side, he moved almost his e n t i r e cavalry force with his light infantry,
u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of his best g e n e r a l , L a b i e n u s , w h o h a d g o n e over
from Caesar to the aristocratic party, to the o t h e r , the left, flank. If the
cavalry got t h e u p p e r h a n d h e r e a n d d r o v e from t h e field those of
Caesar's t r o o p s that w e r e directly o p p o s i n g t h e m , t h e n they w e r e
immediately to fall on the e n e m y legions in t h e i r flank a n d rear; a n d in
o r d e r to hold off t h e infantry battle as long as possible b e f o r e this
m o m e n t , Pompey's legions w e r e not to c h a r g e f o r w a r d at the assault
pace against t h e e n e m y in t h e usual way b u t w e r e to await t h e e n e m y ' s
attack. In this way P o m p e y p r e s u m a b l y also h o p e d to gain a particular
a d v a n t a g e in that Caesar's t r o o p s , e x p e c t i n g the e n e m y to c o m e o u t
a n d meet t h e m halfway, would take u p the r u n too soon a n d would
arrive at the point of h a n d - t o - h a n d contact o u t of b r e a t h a n d in
disorder.
Caesar does not specifically r e p o r t w h e t h e r he too assigned all or
almost all of his cavalry to t h e flank on the plain, but we can probably
a s s u m e so, since he could of c o u r s e already see the e n e m y formation
from a distance a n d cavalry on the flank by t h e s t r e a m , w h o would only
have infantry to attack in front of t h e m , w o u l d not be able to accom-
plish a n y t h i n g .
In view of t h e superiority of the e n e m y cavalry, C a e s a r had assigned
to his o w n cavalry selected soldiers from the y o u n g e r m e n of his legions
a n d from the most agile of the antesignani (men before the s t a n d a r d ) , in
light e q u i p m e n t , w h o f o u g h t in c o o r d i n a t i o n with t h e cavalry in the
m a n n e r of the hamippen, as was also c u s t o m a r y a m o n g the G e r m a n i c
tribes, a n d w h o a few days before the battle h a d already e n g a g e d in a
538
The Battle of Pharsalus 539
successful skirmish using these c o o r d i n a t e d tactics. B u t he went still
further. While the 2 armies were still e n g a g e d in the a p p r o a c h m a r c h ,
he pulled 6 s t r o n g cohorts, totaling 3,000 m e n , from his t h i r d echelon,
moved t h e m to an a n g l e d position on his right flank in s u p p o r t of his
cavalry, a n d instead of having the rest of his third echelon move up
with t h e two leading ones, he held this force back as a general reserve.
P o m p e y ' s 3 echelons w e r e each 10 m e n d e e p , for a total d e p t h of 30
m e n , a n d it was against this formation that Caesar's m e n , initially only
a b o u t half as d e e p in their formation without their t h i r d echelon,
clashed. B u t Caesar was justified in t r u s t i n g his tried legions, even
u n d e r these circumstances, to stand up to the e n e m y for a r a t h e r long
time, a n d P o m p e y ' s a r r a n g e m e n t to delay t h e infantry battle s o m e w h a t
was of direct assistance to him.
W h e n P o m p e y ' s cavalry with its s h a r p s h o o t e r s , somewhat in a d v a n c e
of the p h a l a n x , moved into t h e attack, t h e G e r m a n i c a n d Gallic horse-
m e n , following their instructions, did not accept t h e attack b u t m o v e d
back. B u t w h e n t h e P o m p e i a n forces t h e n followed t h e m u p , they w e r e
attacked in t h e i r flank by the 6 c o h o r t s from the angled flanking
position. Caesar's cavalry t h e n s w u n g a r o u n d a n d moved in on t h e
P o m p e i a n s with its light infantry; t h e P o m p e i a n s w e r e t h r o w n back,
a n d Caesar's t r o o p s p u r s u e d t h e m .
A l t h o u g h n o n e of the sources r e p o r t s it specifically, we may be
p e r m i t t e d to a s s u m e that generals like P o m p e y a n d Labienus knew
what they h a d to do against the e n v e l o p m e n t with which they w e r e now
t h r e a t e n e d b y Caesar's cavalry. T h e y m o v e d u p s u p p o r t i n g t r o o p s
from t h e t h i r d echelon of infantry a n d a t t e m p t e d to f o r m a
flanking angle against t h e e n v e l o p m e n t . B u t t h e situation was
d e v e l o p i n g too quickly; t h e r e is a difference between having t h e
s u p p o r t from the t h i r d echelon foreseen, a s Caesar h a d d o n e , a n d
o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , not having i t o r d e r e d until the m o m e n t w h e n
t h e fleeing mass a n d b e h i n d it t h e p u r s u i n g e n e m y a r e a l r e a d y
p o u r i n g back, at which time the difficult c h a n g e of front is
s u p p o s e d to be carried out. At this time, too, t h e p h a l a n x e s h a d
j u s t m a d e contact with each o t h e r , a n d the h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t o f
t h e first echelons h a d started.
U n d e r these circumstances t h e P o m p e i a n s ' s t r e n g t h was not suffi-
cient to m o u n t against t h e e n v e l o p i n g cavalry a n d cohorts a c o u n t e r a t -
tack t h a t would have t h r o w n t h e m back again. Despite t h e flight of
their cavalry a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s , t h e P o m p e i a n s were still numerically
equal o r even s u p e r i o r t o their o p p o n e n t s , b u t t h e m a n n e r i n which t h e
latter w e r e now fighting, with their e n v e l o p m e n t a n d their c o m b i n a -
tion of a r m s , was t h e m o r e effective. C a e s a r reinforced his p h a l a n x
from the r e a r with his t h i r d echelon, a n d u n d e r the p r e s s u r e of the

d o u b l e attack from front a n d flank, d e p r i v e d of the s u p p o r t of their
own cavalry a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s , at first the left flank of the P o m p e i a n s
gradually gave way a n d finally the whole a r m y .
T h e battle was set up in a c c o r d a n c e with the old, well-known plan for
the flank battle, b u t it was i m m e a s u r a b l y refined t h r o u g h the combina-
tion with the a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e echelons a n d the defensive-offensive
action. Both generals d e s i g n a t e d their c o r r e s p o n d i n g flanks for the
offensive. P o m p e y very a p p r o p r i a t e l y m a d e his flank as s t r o n g as
possible t h r o u g h t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of all his cavalry with the light
infantry a n d , a c c o r d i n g to t h e n o r m a l c o u r s e of t h i n g s , would necessar-
ily have b e e n s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e o p p o s i n g force. B u t Caesar, foreseeing
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of events, gave his cavalry wing an e x t r a o r d i n a r y
d e g r e e of r e i n f o r c e m e n t a n d at t h e same time held t h e cavalry back
until t h e favorable m o m e n t . If he h a d simply h a d his 3,000 legionaries
m o v e forward with his cavalry, they would not have b e e n of m u c h h e l p
a n d would p e r h a p s have b e e n swept back with t h e cavalry as the latter,
as m i g h t be foreseen, was p u s h e d to the r e a r . For this reason Caesar
d r e w t h e m up in an a n g l e d position, in an a m b u s h , as o n e of the
sources expresses it; from this position they first let their own cavalry
m o v e back by t h e m a n d t h e n finally fell u p o n t h e e n e m y cavalry in its
flank while their own cavalry wheeled a b o u t again a n d took up the
battle.
T h i s s u p p o r t of cavalry by heavy infantry t h a t moves forward offen-
sively against the e n e m y cavalry is t h e highest imaginable accomplish-
m e n t of c o h o r t tactics. O n l y completely t r a i n e d tactical units led with
absolute c o n f i d e n c e — n o t e n t i r e p h a l a n x e s b u t only c o h o r t s , which are
flexible because of their small size—are capable of o p e r a t i n g in this
way.
C a e s a r h a d previously c o n q u e r e d the cavalry of V e r c i n g e t o r i x ,
which h a d no infantry e c h e l o n with it, by using t h e s a m e c o m b i n a t i o n
of a r m s , but at P h a r s a l u s t h e partial victory immediately d e v e l o p e d
into a c o m p l e t e victory over t h e e n e m y infantry as well. As complicated
as the e n t i r e a r m y o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d become, nevertheless the sentence
t h a t Polybius h a d o n c e written (35. 1) still held t r u e — a single factor
decides t h e o u t c o m e of battles.
Like H a n n i b a l ' s c e n t e r a t C a n n a e , Caesar's p h a l a n x h a d b o r n e
t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e far l a r g e r e n e m y p h a l a n x until relief c a m e
t h r o u g h t h e flanking action; but this a c c o m p l i s h m e n t was even great-
er t h a n that at C a n n a e because t h e flanking action d i d not start at
once but h a d to d e v e l o p gradually from the initial defensive over
into the offensive.
Like the legions, Caesar's cavalry a n d its a c c o m p a n y i n g light in-

fantry m u s t also have h a d excellent m o r a l e a n d b e e n filled with
complete confidence in the leadership of their c o m m a n d e r and
their officers. T h i s is evident in t h e fact that, after they h a d given
way d u r i n g the initial attack, it was possible to have t h e m swing
a r o u n d again at once, as soon as t h e intervention of the c o h o r t s
h a d r e v e r s e d t h e balance. T h e c a v a l r y m e n w e r e Gauls a n d Ger-
manic warriors.
A n d so a smaller force d e f e a t e d a considerably s t r o n g e r o n e of
essentially similar troops by virtue of their b e t t e r quality, which t h e
l e a d e r s h i p of t h e i r c o m m a n d e r knew how to utilize in the most bril-
liant m a n n e r .
Pompey's o r d e r that delayed the start of the infantry battle was
of itself not badly conceived, but it necessarily t u r n e d to the a d v a n -
tage of the e n e m y c o m m a n d e r w h e n the latter took his c o u n t e r -
m e a s u r e s , facilitating for h i m t h e f o r m a t i o n of a f o u r t h e c h e l o n
a n d t h r o u g h it victory in the cavalry battle.
A battle like that at Pharsalus is a m a t t e r of life a n d d e a t h , surviv-
al or d e s t r u c t i o n . Of what good would it be to t h e P o m p e i a n s if
they t h e n m a d e a n o r d e r l y withdrawal a n d d e f e n d e d their c a m p ?
T h e y w o u l d have b e e n besieged in it, as was Vercingetorix at Alesia
or Afranius a n d Petreius at I l e r d a , a n d since t h e r e was no relief
possible, they would s o o n e r or later have b e e n forced to capitulate.
Such was the situation for the a r m y , b u t not for the leaders. T h e
cause of the aristocratic party was not yet finally lost as a result of
this battle; t h e r e w e r e still in m a n y places s t r o n g forces o p p o s e d to
a m o n a r c h y , a n d Caesar still h a d to fight two great battles to m a k e
his mastery c o m p l e t e . T h e sources a r e u n a n i m o u s in b l a m i n g Pom-
pey for b r e a k i n g d o w n completely u n d e r the p r e s s u r e of t h e d e -
feat, r u n n i n g away from the battle p r e m a t u r e l y a n d r u s h i n g to his
c a m p b u t taking no steps t h e r e for its d e f e n s e . Caesar only r e p o r t s
that P o m p e y r e t i r e d to his tent, awaited the o u t c o m e t h e r e , a n d
w h e n the e n e m y soldiers were pressing into the c a m p , h e d i s c a r d e d
t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s s t a n d a r d s a n d left t h e c a m p o n h o r s e b a c k .
Plutarch a n d A p p i a n paint a m o r e detailed picture, showing him
sitting silent a n d d a z e d in his tent until the a p p r o a c h of the e n e m y
soldiers s w a r m i n g in over the c a m p p a r a p e t f r i g h t e n e d h i m away.
It may p e r h a p s have h a p p e n e d that way, b u t it is also necessary to
point o u t that, as soon as the battle was d e c i d e d , t h e r e was n o t h i n g
m o r e for P o m p e y to d o . T h e a r m y could no l o n g e r be saved, but
t h e leaders, by saving themselves, still h a d t h e possibility of continu-
ing the conflict in o t h e r places. F r o m the purely military point of
view, Pompey's c o n d u c t , as described by Plutarch, seems to indicate

that he h a d forgotten that he was P o m p e y the G r e a t a n d that Zeus
h a d c o n f o u n d e d his senses, as he h a d once d o n e with Ajax. Politi-
cally his c o n d u c t is explainable t h r o u g h the fact that t h e interests of
the a r m y a n d of its leaders no l o n g e r coincided. A p p i a n r e p o r t s
that Caesar sent o u t h e r a l d s a m o n g the c o m b a t a n t s , calling o u t that
his soldiers s h o u l d s p a r e their fellow c o u n t r y m e n a n d should t u r n
only against the allies. T h i s a c c o u n t c a n n o t be literally accurate,
since it is impossible to s p r e a d s u c h o r d e r s in t h e midst of the
melee and f u r t h e r m o r e , o n e could not distinguish a m o n g the
P o m p e i a n legionaries (since it was now a question only of t h e m ) be-
tween those who were R o m a n citizens a n d t h e foreigners w h o were
m i x e d in with t h e m . B u t even if this point c a n n o t be accepted as
realistic, it is a valid indication of the n a t u r e of t h e situation. Some-
t h i n g like a t h i r d of P o m p e y ' s legionaries was f o r m e d of soldiers
w h o a short time earlier h a d h o n o r e d C a e s a r as their c o m m a n d e r ,
a n d even the o t h e r two-thirds h a d no i n n e r tie to the faction for
which they were fighting. Loyal to their o a t h a n d in k e e p i n g with
t h e law o f m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , t h e y f o u g h t t h e b a t t l e t h r o u g h
bravely; t h e r e was n o t h i n g in their situation, however, that called
for a further, hopeless resistance.
T h u s e n d e d the battle, with P o m p e y fleeing, his c a m p given up
after a brief defensive action, the defeated a r m y at first fleeing into
the m o u n t a i n s to save itself, w h e r e , relentlessly p u r s u e d a n d encir-
cled by Caesar's t r o o p s , it s u r r e n d e r e d on t h e same night without
any f u r t h e r resistance.
EXCURSUS
1. For the army strengths in the campaign of 48 B . C . we have greatly varying re-
ports, two groups of which c o m e into consideration: that of Caesar himself, and a
second o n e that includes Plutarch, Appian, Eutropius, and Orosius and which goes
back to Asinius Pollio. Up to now it has been customary to give the preference to
2
Caesar's Figures and simply to accept them, but that cannot be justified.
If we have seen in the Gallic War that Caesar exaggerated the strengths of the
defeated o p p o n e n t s to a massive d e g r e e , that still d o e s not allow us to draw any con-
clusion about the unreliability of his Figures for the civil war. T h e public for which
he was describing the Gallic War would not have u n d e r s t o o d h i m at all if he had
given the correct Figures; these were barbarian armies which he had conquered and,
according to both Greek and R o m a n concepts, barbarian armies had to be mass ar-
mies. We must therefore see if there are figures given in the account of the civil war
itself that will allow us to check on the reliability of the author.
In the Spanish War Caesar gives Afranius and Petreius 80 cohorts of allies, in ad-
dition to their legions (Bell. Civ. I. 39). Stoffel has already pointed out (1: 265) that
that cannot possibly be correct, and he p r o p o s e d that the figure "XXX" be read in
the account instead of "LXXX."
In Bell. Civ. 3. 37. 7, we hear of a fight in which the Pompeians lost 80 killed,
Caesar's forces 2.
In 3. 4 5 - 4 6 , there is an account of a very hard-fought battle, with alternating suc-
cess on the two sides, involving the Ninth Legion in front of Dyrrhachium, in which
that legion finally lost a total of 5 m e n while the e n e m y lost "complures" ("several").
In 3. 5 4 , we are told how six different combat actions took place on o n e and the
same day a r o u n d Dyrrhachium. O n e portion of the account of these fights has been
lost; the manuscripts of the Bell. Civ. have a g a p here that, however, can be filled in
to a certain extent from the other sources. At any rate, it was a bloody day and,
according to Caesar, the total losses of the Pompeians a m o u n t e d to 2,000, whereas
his own troops lost no more than 20 men.
At Pharsalus, according to Caesar's o w n account, his cavalry was initially p u s h e d
back, the legions had a tough fight in the hand-to-hand melee, and it was only the
moving in of Caesar's third echelon in coordination with the flanking m o v e m e n t
that forced the Pompeians to give way. Finally, too, the c a m p was courageously de-
fended for a while, although it is true that this was less by the Pompeian legionaries
than by the Thracian and other barbarian allies, and it was finally taken by storm.
Nevertheless, Caesar claims after the battle that he had no m o r e than 2 0 0 soldiers
missing, whereas the Pompeians are supposed to have had 15,000 killed.
It is impossible to clarify all these figures in the m a n n e r in which Stoffel sought to
do so in the case of the Spanish cohorts, t h r o u g h corruptions in the text. But it is
just as impossible to accept them. I myself have pointed out several times (pp. 3 5 9 ,
455) how small the losses of the victors usually were in ancient battles, but what we
are told here goes completely too far b e y o n d the realm of probability. T h e troops
fighting on both sides, even if they were not of equal quality, were still as Roman
legions of such a similar type that we are obliged to reject the great differences in
the loss figures as simply impossible.
We are not the first o n e s to do that. As we already observed above, in the case of
the figures for the Gauls, Caesar's contemporaries in R o m e knew very well that the
figures he gave were not to be trusted. T h e principal source, from which the major-
ity of reports by far which have c o m e d o w n to us, except for Caesar's own accounts,
have s t e m m e d , was undoubtedly the work of Asinius Pollio, which we have already
m e n t i o n e d several times, I do not have the impression that Pollio was a truly critical
and objective historian, although o n e is inclined to believe so when o n e sees that,
even t h o u g h he was o n e of Caesar's generals, he often contradicts Caesar and rejects
his exaggerations. Rather, it appears to me that these contradictions are attributable
not so m u c h to objectivity but m o r e likely to a certain supercilious attitude of envi-
ous rebelliousness against the great man, of a type not infrequently found in the
retinue of such heroes and which also c o m e s to light in the memoirs of several of
Napoleon's and Frederick's generals.
We may therefore not conclude that w h e n e v e r Pollio, as o n e of Caesar's generals,
says something unfavorable about Caesar, this point is a guaranteed fact; similarly,
there is just as little reason to believe that w h e n e v e r he agrees with Caesar, the reli-
ability of the report is confirmed by that fact. W h e n we find, however, that Pollio
consistently refuses to accept the numerical estimates given by Caesar, then the criti-
cism that we have arrived at through objective analysis at any rate receives from this
fact a very important corroboration, even w h e n we find that on o n e occasion Pollio
himself overshot the mark. I believe that we have such a case at hand. Caesar states
as his losses in the last defeat in front of Dyrrhachium 9 6 0 m e n and 32 officers; in
Orosius—that is to say, undoubtedly Pollio—we read 4 , 0 0 0 m e n and 22 (erroneously
copied for 32) officers. For any army of some 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , a figure of 4 , 0 0 0 killed
w o u l d (since we w o u l d after all also have to figure on from 1 2 , 0 0 0 to 2 0 , 0 0 0
w o u n d e d ) m e a n a lack of battle readiness for a rather long time. T h e figure of al-
most 1,000 killed, which Caesar gives, is already such a large loss that I should not
like to raise any objection to it from an objectively critical viewpoint. Apparently in
this case Pollio's general suspicion that Caesar was unreliable in his statement of
strength figures ran away with him, so to speak, and he repeated some exaggerated
rumor or other without giving it any further thought.
Let us turn now to the strength estimates.
A c c o r d i n g to his o w n statement, Caesar had 80 cohorts at the front at Pharsalus
while 2 g u a r d e d the camp. Since he had detached 23 cohorts (15 in Greece, 4 in
Apollonia, 3 in Oricum, 1 in Lissus), there were missing 5 cohorts from his total
c o m m a n d of 11 legions or 110 cohorts. Stoffel e m e n d e d the text at this point, as
Heller had already d o n e before him, and probably with g o o d reason; he f o u n d that
2 cohorts were not e n o u g h for the d e f e n s e of the c a m p , and he chose to read 7
instead.
According to Caesar, the 80 cohorts at the front accounted for 2 2 , 0 0 0 m e n , so
that the c o h o r t s a v e r a g e d 2 7 0 m e n e a c h . F u r t h e r m o r e , C a e s a r had a s s i g n e d a
n u m b e r of antesignani to his cavalry. T h e overall infantry strength of the legions
would therefore have been, by his account, some 2 4 , 0 0 0 , and the cohorts could then
be estimated around 3 0 0 m e n on the average.
Orosius (6. 15) and Eutropius (6. 20), however, give Caesar's infantry as some-
thing u n d e r 3 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , and A p p i a n (2. 76) and Plutarch (Pompey, Chapter 71) es-
timate Caesar's fourth e c h e l o n , which by his figures was 6 cohorts strong, at 3 , 0 0 0
m e n , which would give each cohort not 3 0 0 , but 5 0 0 m e n . To draw a general con-
clusion on the whole army from this and to estimate the legions at 5 0 0 times 8 0 , or a
total of 4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , would be unreliable, since of course it is possible that Caesar
took from his third echelon the 6 largest cohorts, which may well have been very
unequal in strength. But even if we may not simply multiply, it is still clear that,
e v e n if there were only 6 cohorts in the third echelon with as many as 5 0 0 m e n , the
average can still not have fallen below 3 0 0 . F u r t h e r m o r e , we read in Plutarch's
Antony (Chapter 3) that the 4 legions that Antony brought over to Caesar, along with
8 0 0 cavalry, were 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n strong (in hoplites). Even if we deduct considerable
losses for the fighting around Dyrrhachium, not only in killed but also w o u n d e d ,
who probably remained behind in Apollonia and Lissus, and we assume that the le-
gions that c a m e up later were numerically stronger, it is still impossible that 80
cohorts at Pharsalus would have been only 2 4 , 0 0 0 m e n strong w h e n 4 m o n t h s ear-
lier 40 cohorts were 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n strong.
Since we have now sufficiently d e t e r m i n e d the unreliability of Caesar's strength
figures in other passages and we have here not, for instance, the estimate of an o p -
p o n e n t but of o n e of his o w n generals w h o was present in the battle, we shall not
hesitate to give our preference to his own general. W h e t h e r it be that Caesar pulled
his figure quite arbitrarily out of the air or whether instead of using an average
strength figure he based his multiplication on the lowest figure that he had in m e m -
ory at the time, under any circumstances we must raise his figure considerably, and
I do not doubt that e v e n the "less than 3 0 , 0 0 0 " figure from Pollio is still too low and
that this latter figure should at least be increased by the n u m b e r of antesignani w h o
were pulled out of the cohorts and assigned to the cavalry.
Caesar states that the Eighth and Ninth Legions were so weak that together they
would actually only have formed o n e legion. If we take this expression literally, it
m e a n s that together they n u m b e r e d about 6 , 0 0 0 m e n , that is, that each cohort was
s o m e 300 men strong.
With this point we have now found cues for the numerical strengths of both the
strongest and the weakest cohorts in Caesar's army: 5 0 0 m e n and 3 0 0 men. If we
accept as the average for the w h o l e army 4 0 0 m e n , the 80 cohorts at the front n u m -
bered 3 2 , 0 0 0 m e n , from which perhaps 2 , 0 0 0 may be subtracted to account for the
antesignani assigned to the cavalry. T h i s estimate gains a certain credibility through
the fact that it is in agreement with the total that goes back to Pollio, 3 0 . 0 0 0 .
We arrive at a somewhat higher n u m b e r still if we go along with M. Bang, who in
The Germanic Warriors in the Service of Rome (Die Germanen im römischen Dienst), 1906,
p. 27, states as "completely b e y o n d doubt" that Caesar also had at Pharsalus a strong
contingent of Germanic foot troops at the front. He bases this belief on Bell. Civ. 1.
83 and 3. 5 2 . T h e s e passages, however, do not provide complete p r o o f of the point.
In the first o n e there is specific m e n t i o n of G e r m a n i c "levis armaturae" ("lightly
armed troops"); these are presumably the infantry assigned to coordinated fighting
with the cavalry (see also Book VII, Chapter III, above). T h e s e same m e n may also
be meant in the second passage, the interpretation of which is not quite clear.
Caesar states the strength of the P o m p e i a n infantry as 110 cohorts totaling 4 5 , 0 0 0
m e n ; in addition, 2 , 0 0 0 evocati are specifically m e n t i o n e d , and a further 7 cohorts
guarded the camp.
Orosius-Pollio gives only 88 cohorts at the front, and there can be no d o u b t that
this n u m b e r is the correct o n e .
Caesar himself tells us (3. 4) that P o m p e y initially had 9 legions, to which were
added the 2 u n d e r Scipio. In accordance with these calculations, he gives P o m p e y
110 cohorts at Pharsalus. He forgot to subtract, however, the 15 cohorts that P o m -
pey had left behind as garrison for Dyrrhachium u n d e r Cato, and he himself says
that 7 cohorts remained in the camp. T h e r e have b e e n various proposals for filling
in these numbers. Stoffel (1: 343) assumes that it was not legion cohorts of R o m a n
citizens that were left in Dyrrhachium; Göler (2: 163) claims that the 15 cohorts of
Caesar's troops that were captured in the Adriatic a n d were t h e n incorporated in
the P o m p e i a n army are to be a d d e d to the 11 legions. Both of t h e m explain the
additional 7 cohorts as those that had m a d e their way to P o m p e y after the army in
Spain had been dissolved. But all of these details fail to ring true. A c c o r d i n g to
Caesar's o w n specific statement (3. 4. 2), the 15 cohorts taken as prisoners were not
formed as individual troop units but were divided up a m o n g other units, a n d it is
completely impossible that 7 complete cohorts m o v i n g on their o w n s h o u l d have
m a d e their way t h r o u g h Italy to P o m p e y without being s t o p p e d by Caesar's c o m -
manders. If a few h u n d r e d m e n undertook such a venture and succeeded, that is
already very many.
If we did not have Pollio's testimony, we could still believe that at least o n e or two
individual cohorts were f o r m e d out of these veterans, since Caesar states it so posi-
tively and e v e n makes particular m e n t i o n of t h e m in the battle formation, and that
the rest of them, too, had b e e n brought to the army in s o m e m a n n e r or other possi-
bly m e n t i o n e d by Caesar in some passage that has b e e n lost. Since Pollio knew the
figures given by Caesar, however, and consciously stated his o w n in opposition to
them, and his n u m b e r agrees with the situation if we subtract from the overall army
of 110 cohorts the 22 that we know to have b e e n d e t a c h e d , t h e n there can be no
doubt that P o m p e y never had m o r e than those 110 cohorts and that of that total 88
stood in the battle formation at Pharsalus.
To be consistent, we shall also prefer for the strength of the cohorts, as we did for
their number, the figure that goes back to Pollio (in Eutropius and Orosius), that is,
4 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , in p r e f e r e n c e to Caesar's figure. Pompey's cohorts, t h e r e f o r e , were
somewhat stronger on the average (some 4 5 5 m e n ) than Caesar's. T h a t is only
natural, since, as Caesar reports (3. 4), a n d we may believe him. P o m p e y had filled
up his legions by m e a n s of levies in Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaea, and Epirus a n d had
incorporated all of the 15 captured cohorts into his army.
A p p i a n states (2. 70) that, according to the lowest estimate, P o m p e y had half again
as m u c h infantry as his o p p o n e n t and that, according to some, 7 0 , 0 0 0 Italians par-
ticipated on the two sides in this battle, whereas according to others it was fewer
than 6 0 , 0 0 0 . We can allow this statement to stand by itself.
Everything c o n s i d e r e d , the numerical relationship was probably s o m e 4 0 , 0 0 0 to a
g o o d 3 0 , 0 0 0 , and consequently, e v e n if not 4 7 , 0 0 0 against 2 2 , 0 0 0 , as Caesar w o u l d
have it, still a very great superiority.
Most difficult of all is the question of the cavalry. Caesar himself states that he
had only 1,000 h o r s e m e n , whereas P o m p e y had 7,000.
Of the 7,000 P o m p e i a n cavalry, Caesar (3. 4) e n u m e r a t e s the following contin-

gents:
600 Gauls u n d e r Dejotarus

500 Cappadocians
500 Thracians
200 Macedonians
500 Gallic and Germanic troops from Egypt
800 S h e p h e r d slaves
300 Galatians
200 Syrians
Besides these 3 , 6 0 0 , also Dardani, Bessi, Macedonians, Thessalians, and other peo-
ples. What other kinds of p e o p l e s are those supposed to be w h o formed a full half
of the cavalry and still could not be named?
Even to assemble a cavalry force of 7,000 m e n was a very difficult matter in those
times. Of course, A l e x a n d e r the Great had crossed the Hellespont with 5,100 caval-
r y m e n and had still left 1,500 at h o m e . T h r e e years later, at Gaugamela, he even
had 7,000 horsemen. At the time of the Diadochi, too, a n d later, up to the dis-
appearance of the i n d e p e n d e n t nations of the East, we find important masses of
cavalry. But in the meantime m o r e than a h u n d r e d years had passed, and peoples
e m e r g i n g from a state of c o n t i n u o u s warfare lose very quickly the capability of ac-
tivating a cavalry force. We n e e d only r e m e m b e r of what significance it was to the
R o m a n s at Cannae that their cavalry was so weak; they had prepared themselves
with the most massive effort and had mustered an u n p r e c e d e n t e d mass of infantry,
but they were still able to put into the field only 6 , 0 0 0 h o r s e m e n against Hannibal's
10,000. In the second century B . C . the R o m a n citizen cavalry gradually faded away
completely, whereas the legions were constantly d e v e l o p i n g greater technical skill
and effectiveness. In order to have cavalry it was necessary to recruit a m o n g the
barbarians, w h o were not always so easily and quickly available in sufficient num-
bers. Proof for this is to be f o u n d in Crassus' Parthian campaign, which, as we have
seen, failed because of his weakness in cavalry. A l t h o u g h Caesar had sent him 1,000
Gallic cavalry u n d e r the c o m m a n d of his son Publius, Crassus still had only slightly
o v e r 4,000 cavalry all together. It is impossible that this arm was allowed to b e c o m e
so weak simply as a matter of negligence and c o n v e n i e n c e ; they knew very well, of
course, that they were w a g i n g war against a p e o p l e of h o r s e m e n and that their
march would be crossing broad plains. Crassus also had e n o u g h time to organize his
army; it was not until the s e c o n d year of his c o m m a n d that he crossed the Eu-
phrates. If, in spite of all of this, he had no m o r e than 4 , 0 0 0 cavalry in an army total-
ing 4 5 , 0 0 0 m e n , there can be no o t h e r reason than that usable h o r s e m e n were sim-
ply extremely hard to find. Caesar had his Germanic and Gallic cavalry; P o m p e y did
not have similar sources available to him. It is characteristic of the situation that he,
w h o had the remainder of Crassus' army a m o n g his troops, sent to the Parthian
3
King to request his support, that is, to seek cavalry.
Caesar himself claims to have had only 1,000 cavalry and in o r d e r to be able to pit
these 1,000 against Pompey's 7,000, he tells us (3. 84), he attached to them specially
selected y o u n g m e n and antesignani on foot with light e q u i p m e n t , and they worked
together with such excellent coordination that the 1,000 were not afraid to stand up
to the 7,000 in the o p e n field, and shortly before the general battle they waged a
successful skirmish against t h e m .
In the battle itself, to be sure, Caesar's h o r s e m e n are said to have fallen back be-
fore the mass of their o p p o n e n t s , but then 6 cohorts, which, according to Caesar's
further statement of strengths, n u m b e r e d hardly 1,800 infantrymen, reportedly not
only repelled the P o m p e i a n cavalry but, by taking up the offensive against t h e m , put
them to flight and drove them completely from the battlefield. To anybody with any
understanding of military history this account is incredible, e v e n if the 6 cohorts had

a total of 3 , 0 0 0 m e n rather than 1,800. N o r is it imaginable that a general like
Labienus would have led a cavalry force so lacking in any kind of fighting spirit or
that e v e n a mediocre cavalry—and in this force were, after all, Gallic and Germanic
warriors, Thracians, Macedonians, Thessalians—would have fled into the mountains
(altissimos montes) w h e n faced with a relatively small mass of heavy infantry. A n d
Caesar d o e s not e v e n indicate that his o w n cavalry, which was initially pushed back,
turned around and participated in the attack.
After all of this we are undoubtedly already inclined to consider the 7,000 figure
for Pompey's cavalry as a very gross exaggeration. But we are confronted with a pic-
ture that is not only c h a n g e d but completely different when we read in Eutropius (6.
20) and Orosius (6. 15), that P o m p e y had 5 0 0 cavalry on his right flank and 6 0 0 on
his left.
If these figures were actually reported by Asinius Pollio, that would destroy not
only our whole previous understanding of the n u m b e r s involved but also the entire
concept of the tactical d e v e l o p m e n t that we have had until now, for the latter was
based on the concentration of the cavalry of both o p p o n e n t s on a single flank.
T h e problem that the sources present to us here has long occupied my attention
and, I must say, irritated me. T h e statements are so far apart that they can in no
way be reconciled, but o n e of the two must s o m e h o w be rejected. It is impossible
simply to ignore the reports in Eutropius and Orosius, as has been d o n e until now,
especially since u n d e r any circumstances there is still some grain of truth in them.
Caesar himself and Plutarch, in his Caesar, expressly state, it is true, that the entire
cavalry of both sides was placed on the one flank. But Appian has the P o m p e i a n
cavalry stationed on the flanks (Chapter 75) a n d he later (Chapter 76) has the
b e s t — a n d t h e r e f o r e not a l l — m o v e o v e r to the left flank, a n d in like m a n n e r
Plutarch reports in Pompey (Chapter 69) that "almost all" of Pompey's cavalry was
assigned to the left flank. It is therefore b e y o n d doubt that Pompey also had a unit
of cavalry on his right flank that Caesar did not consider deserving of particular
mention but which Pollio specifically recorded.
T w o solutions s e e m possible to me. O n e of them is to assume that there is a cor-
ruption in the text. A l t h o u g h it is true that the figures are d o u b l y attested to,
nevertheless neither Eutropius nor Orosius drew directly on Livy (who, for his part,
4
used Pollio) but rather on o n e and the same lost e p i t o m e . It would therefore be
thinkable that in this e p i t o m e the digit for t h o u s a n d s in front of the "600" on the
left flank had been d r o p p e d or the n u m b e r was corrupted in some other way and
that both authors passed on the same error. Pollio, for e x a m p l e , perhaps wrote:
"Pompey had on his right flank only 5 0 0 h o r s e m e n , on his left X t h o u s a n d 600."
From this, A p p i a n and Plutarch, in his Pompey, expressed it in such a way as to show
that he had "almost" all of his cavalry on the left flank, without actually giving the
n u m b e r s ; Livy's epitomist took over these same n u m b e r s but corrupted t h e m in
d o i n g so.
T h e s e c o n d possibility is that Pollio really did attribute to P o m p e y only 1,100
cavalry, and c o n s e q u e n t l y only a minimal numerical superiority; a n d that these
h o r s e m e n were initially assigned to the two flanks in g r o u p s of 5 0 0 and 6 0 0 and
only later, as A p p i a n reports, was the great bulk of the cavalry m o v e d to the left
flank, but that this shift was lost in the account s o m e w h e r e between Pollio and Livy's
epitomist.
T h i s s e c o n d solution is difficult to accept because the e x a g g e r a t i o n of which
Caesar would have been guilty in the relative strengths (7,000 against 1,000 instead
of 1,100 against 1,000) would be m u c h too monstrous, but from the objective point
of view it is not impossible. U n d o u b t e d l y we must assume that the P o m p e i a n s did
have a significant numerical superiority; but a superiority of 10,000 m e n in heavy
infantry, s o m e p r e p o n d e r a n c e in the sharpshooters, and a still noticeable p r e p o n -
derance in cavalry would still be sufficient to explain the decision of the P o m p e i a n s
to accept battle, especially in view of their raised morale resulting from success in
the battle of Dyrrhachium.
My principal objection to this solution really lies on the o t h e r side; the mere 1,000
h o r s e m e n that Caesar claims to have had do not seem to me to be a very credible
figure, e v e n t h o u g h all the sources, including those s t e m m i n g from Pollio, give this
number.
Caesar h i m s e l f tells us that he had had his w h o l e cavalry force a s s e m b l e d at
B r u n d i s i u m , and A p p i a n gives their n u m b e r as 10,000. Caesar reportedly trans-
ported only 6 0 0 of t h e m overseas with the first convoy and 8 0 0 in the second. Since
he had lost a few from this total of 1,400, and had d e t a c h e d others, and since a few
had g o n e over to the e n e m y , it seems very consistent that 1,000 should appear at
Pharsalus. We must ask, however, why Caesar had not yet had still m o r e of the large
number at Brundisium cross over to j o i n him. T h e r e had, after all, been months
and m o n t h s in which to do this, and if it had been too d a n g e r o u s at Brundisium,
individual units, e m b a r k i n g at any n u m b e r of ports, c o u l d have crossed the sea
either to the north or south, landing on the coast of Illyria or Epirus, and could
have m o v e d to j o i n their c o m m a n d e r while he had the P o m p e i a n army surrounded.
Even if many transport ships were destroyed, new o n e s could be obtained from
T a r e n t u m or Syracuse or the Adriatic ports; Caesar had two squadrons of consider-
5
able strength at anchor at Messina and at Vibo in B r u t t i u m . If Antony had previ-
ously succeeded in crossing over with his large convoy despite the e n e m y ships, then
all the m o r e easily could small units of cavalry risk it. It e v e n n e e d e d to be only
individual ships that, to be safe, could land at any point on the eastern shore, since
Pompey's entire army was fixed in place at Dyrrhachium. Even if the transportation
of horses is always difficult, there can be no question of its impossibility.
Finally, the situation of the light infantry is also unclear. Caesar d o e s not name
t h e m a t all. A p p i a n ( 2 . 7 0 ) says that C a e s a r h a d D o l o p e s , A c a r n a n i a n s , a n d
Aetolians. T h e tendency has b e e n to conclude from this that he had not brought
any light infantry at all with h i m overseas but had filled this n e e d through recruiting
in the neighboring regions. B u t d u r i n g the storming of Pompey's camp after the
battle, against the energetic d e f e n s e of Thracians and barbarian auxiliaries, Caesar
tells us that the d e f e n d e r s were driven from the breastworks by the hail of missiles.
A m o n g these missiles (tela) we must understand primarily the pila, or heavy javelins
of the legionaries, since at this large c a m p it was a question of very large masses of
m e n . T h e range of these w e a p o n s was short, however, a n d the barbarian d e f e n d e r s
of the c a m p were certainly sharpshooters, whether archers or slingers, w h o would
necessarily have caused very heavy losses a m o n g the assaulting legionaries before the
latter came close e n o u g h to throw their javelins, unless the assaulting troops t h e m -
selves were accompanied by n u m e r o u s sharpshooters w h o e v e n from a distance sup-
pressed and held d o w n the fire of the d e f e n d e r s . For this reason Caesar uses the
g e n e r a l e x p r e s s i o n tela a n d n o t pila. C o n s e q u e n t l y , e v e n if the e v e n t s at Dyr-
rhachium show that the P o m p e i a n s were considerably stronger in sharpshooters, it is
still hardly believable that Caesar had only the recruited Greeks and had brought
n o n e at all overseas with him. In this connection, he did not identify the cavalry,
either, that crossed in the first convoy; we know their n u m b e r , 6 0 0 , only through
Plutarch and Appian.
Finally it becomes decisively important to consider the fact that P o m p e y was so
hesitant in deciding to join battle. Up to the last m o m e n t he sacrificed still a few
m o r e days in h o p e s of g a i n i n g a small a d v a n t a g e f r o m the terrain, a n d in the
speech, too, that Caesar has h i m give at the last m o m e n t , there is no kind of refer-
ence to an o v e r w h e l m i n g superiority. If P o m p e y had actually had 4 5 , 0 0 0 infantry
against 2 2 , 0 0 0 , 7,000 cavalry against 1,000, and also a superior n u m b e r of
sharpshooters, his conduct w o u l d have b e e n absolutely incomprehensible. N o t even
the cavalry sergeant, w h o s e attributes M o m m s e n would still ascribe to h i m , would
remain of the m a n w h o m R o m e had nevertheless called the "Great Pompey," be-
cause of his military deeds.
To all these calculations o n e could offer the objection that, if Caesar's figures real-
ly varied from the truth so very m u c h a n d especially in the case of the decisive
arm, the cavalry, a rather strong protest w o u l d have b e e n raised on the Pompeian
side and s o m e trace of it would have c o m e d o w n to us, as for e x a m p l e in Cicero's
letters or in the work of Lucanus. Even if, as is pointed out above, no account really
s t e m m i n g from the P o m p e i a n side has b e e n known, such a fundamental fact would
still have been retained for a long time in the oral tradition. We have here, however,
o n e of those rare cases where on both sides the interest in hiding the truth for vari-
ous reasons coincided, or at least did not mutually conflict. If the Pompeians had
blamed their defeat on the excessively small size of their fighting force, then the
reproach would have fallen with double weight on the leadership, not only on Pom-
pey alone but on the w h o l e g r o u p of leaders, that they had accepted the battle w h e n
it was not necessary. T h e qualitative superiority of Caesar's veteran legions was
b e y o n d any question. Even the P o m p e i a n s therefore n e e d e d for self-justification the
statement that they were numerically superior and presumably explained, as is usu-
ally the case, that the defeat was d u e only to false leadership or to treason.
With such uncertainty and unreliability in our sources, we must either completely
abandon the idea of arriving at accurate n u m b e r s , or, in o r d e r to make the account
and the description of the battle clearer, we establish a n u m b e r that seems to cor-
respond best with the train of events, with the reservation that, as such, it has b e e n
arrived at according to subjective impressions, and therefore arbitrarily. On the basis
of such a computation, I have adjusted the n u m b e r s above to s o m e t h i n g approach-
ing 2 , 0 0 0 cavalry for Caesar and approximately 3 , 0 0 0 for P o m p e y . O n e can disagree
with this by p o i n t i n g o u t that, in Caesar's case at any rate, the figure of 1,000
cavalry is also attested to by Pollio. But first of all, it is not really so completely sure
that Pollio is repeating Caesar's figure here without any reservation, that possibly
some original deviation from Caesar's figure has not disappeared in the works of
those using h i m as a source, and in the s e c o n d place, after all, not even Pollio's tes-
timony would in any way be completely final. In such statements of figures, acciden-
tal errors and misunderstandings play a role often e n o u g h , as we learn from the
military history of m o r e m o d e r n times. Against the n u m b e r of 1,000 for Caesar's
cavalry, however, we must weigh not only the very strong influence that it had on
the battle in any e v e n t but also Caesar's habit, which we have already sufficiently
established, of understating his o w n strength.
2. T h e question of the strength of the cavalry on both sides leads us to the prin-
cipal point c o n c e r n i n g which I believe that Caesar's account of the course of the bat-
tle must be corrected. A c c o r d i n g to his account, the Pompeian cavalry was d e f e a t e d
solely by the 6 cohorts of the fourth e c h e l o n . T h e s e cohorts then slaughtered the
light infantrymen w h o had accompanied the cavalry a n d finally fell on the flank a n d
rear of the infantry a n d d e c i d e d the o u t c o m e of the battle. According to the account
I have given, based on A p p i a n (2. 78), it was the cavalry, on the other hand, which,
together with its attached light infantry a n d the cohorts, fought to victory and m a d e
the flanking attack on the e n e m y legions.
M o d e r n scholars have up to now accepted Caesar's account to the extent that the
editors of Appian's works have e v e n inclosed the word "hippeis" ("mounted men") in
parentheses, taking into consideration the fact that there is no further word of t h e m
in Plutarch, either. T h e nature of things, however, so clearly calls for the participa-
tion of the cavalry that it w o u l d have to be a s s u m e d , e v e n if A p p i a n did not e x -
pressly speak of it.
Caesar himself tells us how, by assigning antesignani to the cavalry, he m a d e the
latter capable of standing up to their o p p o n e n t s . T h i s account would be beside the
point if the cavalry had d o n e n o t h i n g in the battle but take flight.
Caesar himself recounts how the d e f e a t e d sharpshooters w h o accompanied the
P o m p e i a n cavalry were all slaughtered. W h y did they not flee? Certainly the heavily
e q u i p p e d legionaries could not overtake them? T h i s account makes sense only if
Caesar's cavalry a n d light i n f a n t r y t u r n e d a b o u t a n d o n c e a g a i n fell o h their
enemies.
Finally, the o v e r p o w e r i n g of the P o m p e i a n legions themselves requires the par-
ticipation of these troops. A flank attack by only 6 cohorts would not have been able
to exert such a strong effect on the far larger mass of P o m p e i a n infantry. Even the
time that the 6 cohorts n e e d e d to accomplish their wheeling m o v e m e n t would have
been too long; the e n e m y generals would in the m e a n t i m e have taken their c o u n -
t e r m e a s u r e s . T h e s i t u a t i o n w a s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i f i t was t h e cavalry a n d t h e
sharpshooters w h o first quickly c o m p l e t e d the m o v e m e n t and were followed by the
closely formed cohorts.
But Caesar had a g o o d reason for attributing the credit for the decision not to the
cavalry but to the cohorts. In the battle against Ariovistus we have already noticed
the lack of m e n t i o n of the part played by the Gallic cavalry in the victory. N o w pub-
lic o p i n i o n i n R o m e was r e p r o a c h i n g h i m for l e a d i n g b a r b a r i a n s against t h e
6
Republic. Should he also be obliged to t h e m for the decisive victory? T h e origin of
these barbarians is revealed to us only too clearly in a little story that Appian has
provided for us. W h e n the army marched into Thessaly, the small town of G o m p h i
was taken by storm and p l u n d e r e d , a n d the soldiers had taken full advantage of the
wine supplies; to this account A p p i a n adds (2. 65): ". . . the most laughable of all,
however, were the G e r m a n s in their drunkenness." It was the Germanic cavalry,
which had already played the decisive role in the victory of the R o m a n s o v e r Ver-
cingetorix. Still a n o t h e r bit of evidence—still legible e v e n t h o u g h half eradicated
— h a s b e e n preserved for us on this point. Florus (2. 13. 48) says, " G e r m a n o r u m
cohortes tantum in effusos equites (Pompei) fecere i m p e t u m , ut illi esse pedites, hi
venire in equis viderentur." ("The G e r m a n cohorts m a d e so violent an assault on his
[Pompey's] cavalry, which was then rushing out, that the latter looked as if they were
m e r e infantry, the former as if they had arrived on horseback.") Did Caesar ever
have Germanic cohorts? H a d he incorporated G e r m a n s into his legions? Hardly. It
can hardly be anything e x c e p t the fact that here Caesar's account that his 6 cohorts
had beaten the e n e m y cavalry has s o m e h o w run t o g e t h e r with another account to
the effect that it was his Germanic warriors that had secured this victory. By separa-
ting o n c e again this false mixture into its two parts, we restore the picture of how the
joint attack of the cohorts a n d the Gallic a n d Germanic cavalry and the "double
fighters" w o n the e n g a g e m e n t .
We can recognize from still a n o t h e r point how greatly Caesar's account was gov-
e r n e d by political motives. In his Commentaries Caesar gives the laurels exclusively to
the 6 cohorts. In A p p i a n 2. 7 9 , however, we read that Caesar had written in his
letters that the T e n t h Legion, which was stationed on his e x t r e m e right flank, had
e n v e l o p e d the e n e m y wing, which had been left u n c o v e r e d by the cavalry, and had
attacked it from the flank. ("The T e n t h Legion u n d e r Caesar himself s u r r o u n d e d
Pompey's left wing, which had lost its cavalry, and from all sides assailed its flank,
where the m e n remained u n m o v e d ; until, at last, the attackers threw it into confu-
sion by force, and so began to win their victory.")* T h i s is, at any rate, a very u n -
usual deviation, the origin of which, however, has already b e e n g u e s s e d by
Schweighäuser. W h e n Caesar wrote and published his Commentaries on the civil war,
in the fall of 47 B . C . , before he went from R o m e to Africa, the T e n t h Legion had
mutinied and had thereby most seriously o f f e n d e d its c o m m a n d e r . N o w it was no
longer the unit that had d e c i d e d the victory at Pharsalus but was replaced by the
fourth e c h e l o n , c o m p o s e d of the cohorts of 6 different legions. But we conclude
from this that it was not until later that the c o m m a n d e r c a m e to this particular pres-
entation, that the main role in the decision cannot possibly have b e e n played by
these troops but was artificially attributed to t h e m because the c o m m a n d e r , for g o o d
reasons, did not want to a c k n o w l e d g e to w h o m he principally o w e d the victory, that
is, the brave barbarian cavalry.
T h e longer I have spent studying Caesar, the m o r e definite has my o p i n i o n be-
c o m e that his Commentaries are not to be evaluated historically any differently than
the Memorial de Sainte-Hélène. Like the latter, they are a w o n d e r f u l fabric of interwo-
ven realistic, penetrating truth a n d fully deliberate and i n t e n d e d deception. Who-
ever is familiar with the Napoleonic writings knows that precisely the trait of giving
the fame for a victory to this or that t r o o p unit or general, according to the political
motives of the m o m e n t , e v e n w h e n there was no basis for it, was characteristic of the
great Corsican.
3. A l o n g with the shifting of the accomplishments of the various troop units there
is also a very important temporal shifting in the account in the Commentaries. Caesar
first has the two infantry phalanxes clashing, a n d then he recounts the cavalry c o m -
bat, starting with the expression "eodem tempore" ("at the same time").
But A p p i a n says expressly (2. 78) that the cavalry m o v e d out somewhat before the
infantry, and it follows from Pompey's battle plan, in which, of course, he intention-
ally held back his infantry, that it must have occurred in this way. Caesar, however,
could not tell it that way, because then the heroism of the evocatus Crastinus, which
now introduces the battle so effectively and gives such a splendid picture of the rela-
tionship of these old soldiers to their c o m m a n d e r , would not have had its full effect.
In his Caesar Plutarch follows the latter's account; in Pompey, where he used Pollio as
a source, he explains the situation by following each author with half of the army; in
accord with Caesar, he has the battle start with the infantry, and following Pollio's
account he has P o m p e y hold back his right wing, since it cannot be the w h o l e line
that is withheld.
4. If P o m p e y had an interest in delaying the clash of the phalanxes until his
cavalry had been victorious, we could believe the same thing of Caesar, w h o , of
course, also h o p e d to win by means of a flanking m o v e m e n t , and this would have
applied all the m o r e strongly to Caesar, w h e n he c o u n t e d on w i n n i n g the victory on
the cavalry flank only through the counterattack. Nevertheless, we do not hear that
Caesar held his legions back, and with g o o d reason. For Caesar, e v e r y t h i n g d e -
p e n d e d on Pompey's not developing, for his o w n part, a c o u n t e r m o v e m e n t from his
third e c h e l o n after his cavalry was thrown back, a m o v e that would again disengage
his flank a n d w o u l d resist Caesar's e n v e l o p i n g m o v e m e n t . T h a t could have hap-
p e n e d all the m o r e easily in that, of course, the decision in the cavalry battle took
place at quite s o m e distance from Pompey's infantry. It would be made m o r e dif-
ficult, h o w e v e r , if in the m e a n t i m e the battle had already broken out a l o n g the
whole line, d e m a n d i n g Pompey's attention and also involving the third e c h e l o n in
the melee. As we know, Caesar had taken the precaution of also holding back the
rest of his third e c h e l o n , to have it ready for any eventuality. P o m p e y , trusting
firmly in the victory of his cavalry, had presumably not d o n e that. For this reason,
the mass of the Pompeian infantry, u n d e r any circumstances m u c h m o r e n u m e r o u s ,
was at the start probably twice as strong as Caesar's two forward echelons, which
o p e n e d the battle. But Caesar trusted his veterans to withstand for a l o n g time
under all circumstances e v e n the pressure of a force twice as strong as his, and in
the m e a n t i m e he carried out the e n v e l o p m e n t .
After m e , Veith and Kromayer have treated the battle of Pharsalus, both with
sharp polemics against my version of the battle but without presenting any reasons
that could have p e r s u a d e d me to c h a n g e anything (with the exception of the consid-
erations concerning the strength of the cavalry). Most of their objections are of such
a nature as to make it appear superfluous to offer for the careful reader any specific
rebuttal. I discuss below the points that perhaps still n e e d a special explanation.
Kromayer doubts whether the conflicting strength estimates go back to Asinius
Pollio, since it is not shown that Livy, the link b e t w e e n the events and Orosius, Eu-
tropius, Lucanus, and Dio Cassius, actually u s e d Pollio. T r u e , they c o u l d by no
means stem from Pollio, since the sources that definitely go back to Pollio, that is,
A p p i a n and Plutarch, bring us Caesar's numbers. I cannot see in what way a conclu-
sion can be reached from this. But even assuming that Plutarch and Appian had not
used Caesar himself, that they had taken their figures from Pollio, that the latter
therefore had Caesar's Figures, and that the conflicting figures, g o i n g back to Livy,
had s t e m m e d from s o m e o t h e r source that he regarded as trustworthy—what would

have been c h a n g e d by all of this? I have, after all, in no way cited Pollio as a very
special authority (a point Kromayer accuses me of); on the contrary, I have esti-
mated his authority on this point as quite mediocre. T h e only important point is that
the second, conflicting, account d o e s actually exist. But since we know (Appian 2.
82) that Pollio gave strength estimates on the battle differing from those of Caesar,
then it is very probable that the questionable variants are to be attributed to him.
For, as I have specifically pointed out, the i n d e p e n d e n t reports that we have in addi-
tion to Caesar's are so scanty and are so particularly lacking in any kind of informa-
tion from Pompey's c a m p that a significant source of this kind no longer existed
e v e n at the time of Livy and Lucanus, and e v e n Livy, for w h o m of course a certain
possibility still existed, can no l o n g e r have sought out and r e c o r d e d a significant oral
tradition.
In this matter my two o p p o n e n t s are not willing to consider Caesar capable of the
false figures for which I reproach him. T h e r e is a very certain m e t h o d of c o m i n g to
the realization that I have in no way b e e n unjust to Caesar with my objections. Just
as o n e finds the correct approach to H e r o d o t u s with the greatest certainty by mak-
ing a critical study of Bullinger's history of the B u r g u n d i a n Wars, in the same way it
is an infallible m e a n s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g Caesar correctly if o n e studies the m e m o i r s
of his great colleagues, Frederick and N a p o l e o n , and the related critical literature.
T h e n o n e will find that these are mere bagatelles that I have criticized in Caesar's
writings and eliminated. Even in the case of Frederick, w h o m we justly praise for his
very high d e g r e e of truthfulness, the weakness of shifting the army strengths some-
7
what to the higher glory of the Prussians is established on many occasions, and in
o t h e r respects, too, there is no lack of errors and contradictions, both biased and
unintentional. Scharnhorst, to cite also this illustrious name, in his "Report on the
Battle of Auerstadt and J e n a " ("Bericht von der Schlacht bei Auerstadt u n d Jena"),
states the strength of the Prussians as 9 6 , 8 4 0 combatants; later H ö p f n e r , working
from the official d o c u m e n t s , arrived at a strength of 141,911 m e n . I have already
cited above (p. 43) an e x a m p l e from Moltke. With respect to N a p o l e o n , everybody
knows and has always known how indifferent he was to historical accuracy. For a
special study of this subject, however, I now r e c o m m e n d the history of the official
report on the battle of M a r e n g o , which H ü f f e r has recently given in his introduction
to Sources for the History of the War of 1800 (Quellen zur Geschichte des Krieges von 1800).
In this way o n e can also b e c o m e convinced as to how little weight lies in the objec-
tion that contemporary publications must necessarily be completely accurate because
otherwise they could be disavowed by persons knowing the facts w h o are still living.
As an authority for how o n e m a n e u v e r s and how o n e g o e s about winning battles,
certainly N a p o l e o n cannot be surpassed, and I believe that I was right in supporting
my j u d g m e n t of the events at Alesia t h r o u g h his o p i n i o n . But w h e n Kromayer cites
Napoleon's authority because N a p o l e o n believed Caesar's statement of the losses at
Pharsalus, I believe that Kromayer has overlooked the point that here N a p o l e o n the
bulletin-composer would have o v e r s t e p p e d somewhat in the area of the military his-
torian and that a certain subconscious self-defense influenced his accounts of ancient
battles, accounts that are in o t h e r respects very m u c h to the point. J u d g i n g from my
k n o w l e d g e of military history, and on the basis of the o n e - s i d e d testimony of the
victorious c o m m a n d e r , I cannot regard as credible either the victory of 1,000 cavalry
and 6 cohorts over 7,000 cavalry and many lightly armed m e n , or the victory of
2 2 , 0 0 0 R o m a n infantry o v e r 4 7 , 0 0 0 R o m a n infantry, or the w i n n i n g of such a vic-
tory with a loss of 2 0 0 killed.
T h e reproach that can be m a d e against Caesar because of such biased, e r r o n e o u s

n u m b e r s is, subjectively, no very crushing o n e , first of all because it is a question of
a c o m m o n h u m a n weakness, but m o r e importantly for the reason that the R o m a n s
were, after all, accustomed to hearing e v e n m o r e strongly contrasting figures. T h e
Caesarian officer w h o later described the African war e v o k e d no particular objec-
tion to his report that in the battle of T h a p s u s C a e s a r s forces had slaughtered
8
5 0 , 0 0 0 of the e n e m y and in d o i n g so had themselves lost only 50 m e n . W h e n H a n -
nibal at Cannae had his troops cut d o w n the 5 0 , 0 0 0 encircled Romans, that still cost
him at least 5,700 d e a d from his o w n force. After all of this, it is hardly necessary to
go into all the tricks of interpretation with the help of which Kromayer tries to do
away with the testimony in Livy, Appian, and Plutarch. According to Kromayer, the
85 cohorts (instead of 110) that Livy says P o m p e y had in the battle are to be consid-
ered only as the cohorts of R o m a n citizens, whereas there were 22 additional
cohorts at hand. He arrives at these numbers, however, by interpreting Caesar's o w n
statement (3. 4)—to the effect that P o m p e y had filled out his legions with m e n from
Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaea, and Epirus and had also incorporated the Caesarian sol-
diers u n d e r Antony's c o m m a n d w h o had b e e n taken prisoner—as meaning that he
had f o r m e d special filler cohorts. T h e passage in Caesar (3. 6) reads: "Praetera
m a g n u m n u m e r u m ex Thessalia, Boeotia, Achaja, Epiroque supplementi n o m i n e in
legiones distribuerat, his Antonianos milites admiscuerat." ("Besides, he had distrib-
uted a large n u m b e r of reinforcements from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaea, and
Epirus by n a m e to the legions, and to these he had j o i n e d Antony's soldiers.") T h a t
replacements form special units before they are assigned is natural and is occasion-
ally reported; but that p e r m a n e n t replacement cohorts should have been assigned to
the legions, instead of bringing the existing cohorts as close as possible to normal
strength, is neither objectively credible nor d o e s it correspond to the sense of o u r
passage. T h i s point is not contradicted by the fact that, according to Caesar's report,
the soldiers of the Spanish army, w h o after being discharged by Caesar had g o n e
over to their old c o m m a n d e r , Pompey, f o r m e d their o w n cohorts. T h e loyalty of
these warriors was h o n o r e d by leaving them together instead of distributing t h e m as
n e w c o m e r s a m o n g unfamiliar t r o o p units. But the newly recruited m e n and the
prisoners had to be b l e n d e d into the old units in order to make them m o r e or less
usable; that is, they were "incorporated" ("unterstecken"), as it was called in the eight-
e e n t h century. It would have b e e n too d a n g e r o u s to form t h e m into their o w n bat-
talions.
Kromayer has attempted to give a new solution for the topographical question,
which, h o w e v e r , was immediately c o n s i d e r e d as suspect by R. S c h n e i d e r in the
Göttingische gelehrle Anzeigen, 169 (June 1907): 4 3 8 ; Victor Dusmanis, Major on the
Greek General Staff, in Beihefte mm Militär-Wochenblatt), 7th issue, 1909, "Observa-
tions on the Determination of the Location of the Thessalian Battle B e t w e e n Caesar
and Pompey" ("Bemerkungen zur B e s t i m m u n g der Oertlichkeit d e r Thessalischen
Schlacht zwischen Cäsar u n d Pompejus"), claims, on the basis of a book on History
and Geography of Thessaly from the Military Viewpoint (Geschichte und Geographie Thes-
saliens in militärischer Beziehung), that the battlefield is located not at all in the vicinity
of the town of Pharsalus (which Caesar d o e s not n a m e at all) but s o m e 40 kilometers
farther to the west, near Karditsa.
At first glance g e n u i n e criticism and arbitrary treatment of the sources, true pro-
fessional k n o w l e d g e and mere playing with military concepts are not so easily distin-
guished. Kromayer and Veith base their concepts mutually on each other; the scho-
lar calls for support on the authority of the military man, the military man on the
authority of the scholar. T h a t appears to be the most favorable imaginable coopera-
tion; nevertheless, as we have seen t h r o u g h o u t this volume, n o t h i n g has resulted
from this but distorted and confusing ideas. W h y this is we may learn from two
series of conclusions that the two authors d e v e l o p with respect to the battle of Phar-
salus. T h e contrast may well serve as a prime e x a m p l e of how easy it is to d e d u c e
the opposite m e a n i n g from an historical source w h e n a person has at his disposition
only a certain cleverness and has not b e c o m e accustomed to strict objective analysis.
In Kromayer 2: 4 3 1 , we read: "We have no statement as to w h e t h e r the hand-to-
hand combat of the legions lasted for a long time. At n o o n everything was already
decided (Bell. Civ. 3. 95), whereas in the m o r n i n g Caesar had already packed up in
o r d e r to march to Scotussa (Bell. Civ. 3. 85), w h e n suddenly the prospects for a bat-
tle a s s u m e d a favorable form. Only then did he m o v e out for the battle—the dis-
tance required almost an hour (p. 4 0 5 ) — a n d the d e p l o y m e n t is also to be estimated
as requiring several hours. T h i s leaves by no means very m u c h time for the battle,
but particularly the decisive action on the flank itself must have taken place very
quickly."
" T h e withdrawal of Caesar's cavalry, the flanking attack of the six cohorts are
things which are to be c o u n t e d as lasting minutes, or at most, quarter-hours. A n d if
o n e still assumes, like Delbrück, that the attack of the P o m p e i a n cavalry took place
before Caesar's attack with the legions, then the time for the close combat of the
latter is still further shortened."
Kromayer therefore claims that the battle was very brief, and specifically so in
o r d e r to prove that Caesar's statement that he lost only 2 0 0 m e n in the battle can be
c o n s i d e r e d as completely credible.
B u t Veith writes (Klio 7. 3 3 2 ) : " T h e battle of Pharsalus lasted—without counting
the fight for the c a m p and the pursuit—from m o r n i n g until n o o n . . . . T h e reported
length of the battle can only be explained if we assume a fight varying in times and
locations, consisting of n u m e r o u s localized and brief phases. . . . A n d in this way, of
course, the battle of the main bodies near Pharsalus could last for several hours."
Veith, therefore, holds that the battle lasted for a long time, a n d specifically so in
o r d e r to prove that the R o m a n battle order did not form a simple, cohesive line,
e v e n in the battle, but that it was based on m u c h m o r e complicated tactics.
Let us note also that Veith claims that Caesar's antesignani did not participate in
the cavalry combat of the battle and that Kromayer contradicts him on this point;
that Veith explains that even a victory by his cavalry would not have brought Pom-
pey victory in the battle, whereas Kromayer takes the opposite viewpoint—thus the
cleavage between the two b e c o m e s wider and wider, and we arrive at the pressing
suspicion that it is here not just a question of differences of detail, such as those that
always occur e v e n between scholars w h o hold the same overall o p i n i o n s from the
objective viewpoint, but that we have here a d e e p e r , organic disorder. This suspicion
will b e c o m e a certainty when we now realize that the two of t h e m with their conclu-
sions not only contradict o n e another but that each of t h e m contradicts himself, and
that they themselves have not e v e n noticed this. Veith is completely right in believ-
ing that a long-drawn-out fight is appropriate to his concept of a Roman battle with
small, separated infantry units—but then a loss of only 2 0 0 m e n at Pharsalus is im-
possible, and Caesar's credibility insofar as n u m b e r s are c o n c e r n e d , which Veith
otherwise supports very strongly, is badly shaken. Kromayer is correct w h e n , be-
cause of the small losses, he postulates a very short duration for the battle, but with
this point Veith's concept of cohort tactics, which, as we have seen, Kromayer has
accepted (pp. 4 0 8 , 4 2 3 , above) falls by the wayside. T h i s self-contradiction is the d e -
cisive point, and it arises from the basic error in m e t h o d , namely, that each question
is treated only in isolation but is not seen in its relation to military history in general
a n d is not thought t h r o u g h to the e n d and thoroughly w o r k e d out in its conse-
q u e n c e s on all sides. Only he w h o has accomplished this task is capable of true objec-
tive analysis. Kromayer, despite his broad readings of m o d e r n military writers, has
not d o n e this and is therefore just as little qualified for military critical analysis as is
Veith for philological source criticism. For each of these scholars the sources form
only a kind of wax that they shape to their o w n e n d s in o n e way or another accord-
ing to the n e e d s of the m o m e n t . T h e professor w h o has a phalanx of 15,000 m e n
m o v e 6 0 0 meters backwards and the first lieutenant w h o proves his concept of the
R o m a n tactics " a c c o r d i n g to t h e s o u r c e s " by m e a n s of t h e "terminus technicus
quincunx" ("technical t e r m : c h e s s b o a r d form"), w h i c h s t e m s f r o m the s i x t e e n t h
c e n t u r y — t h e two of them are not to be found in the temple of learning, but only in
its vestibule.
( A d d e d in the third edition.) H e r e , too, I again copy this polemic explanation, but
at the same time I refer the reader to what I have said above, on pp. 3 1 3 , 331 and
389, where I have noted in the cases of both authors considerable progress in their
understanding of ancient warfare, and I point out even m o r e specifically what I
have to say below, on Caesar's African campaign.
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R I X
1 . Frontinus 2 . 3 .
2. M u c h has already b e e n written c o n c e r n i n g t h e credibility of t h e
Commentaries. As particularly effective in this r e g a r d I s h o u l d like to
cite P f a n n s c h m i d t " O n the H i s t o r y o f t h e P o m p e i a n Civil W a r "
("Zur Geschichte des P o m p e j a n i s c h e n B ü r g e r k r i e g e s " ) , Weissenfels
P r o g r a m , 1888.
3 . Dio Cassius 4 1 . 5 5 . Bell. Civ. 3 . 82.
4. Z a n g e m e i s t e r , in the preface to his edition of O r o s i u s , p. xxv.
5 . Bell. Civ. 3 . 101.
6. Dio Cassius 4 1 . 54. 2.
7. A. Ritter, On the Reliability of the Place, Strength, and Time Indica-
tions in the Military History Works of Frederick the Great (Uber die
Zuverlässigkeit der Orts-, Zahl- und Zeitangaben in den kriegsge-
schichtlichen Werken Friedrichs des Grossen), Berlin dissertation, 1911
( W e r n i g e r o d e : Rudolf Vierthaler).
8 . A c c o r d i n g t o P l u t a r c h . T h e m a n u s c r i p t s o f t h e Bellum
Africanum give X instead of L, which has b e e n retained, a p p a r e n t l y
incorrectly, by t h e m o r e recent editors.
Chapter X
The Last Campaigns
of the Civil War
T h e c a m p a i g n i n G r e e c e a n d t h e battle o f P h a r s a l u s , t h e c o m b a t
o f R o m a n s against R o m a n s u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d o f t h e i r two most
famous leaders, f o r m t h e h i g h p o i n t of t h e art of w a r in antiquity.
While it is t r u e t h a t Caesar's following c a m p a i g n s a r e rich in indi-
vidual events, they offer n o t h i n g new in principle, no f u r t h e r d e -
v e l o p m e n t . If up to now t h e sources have also s e e m e d to be too
u n c e r t a i n to w a r r a n t their e v a l u a t i o n from t h e viewpoint of military
history, we may say t h a t this s h o r t c o m i n g has n o w b e e n r e m o v e d .
B y l i n k i n g t o p o g r a p h i c a l r e s e a r c h with c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s o f t h e
sources, Veith has s u c c e e d e d in p r o d u c i n g a very clear a n d com-
pletely plausible p i c t u r e of t h e African c a m p a i g n . T h e only point to
which I take e x c e p t i o n in his excellent p r e s e n t a t i o n is his r e p e a t e d
polemic against m e , which is g r o u n d l e s s , since I a g r e e completely
with his o p i n i o n e x c e p t t h a t I believe he has occasionally highlight-
ed his p i c t u r e too sharply.
After Pharsalus, C a e s a r himself, of course, did not describe any
of his f u r t h e r c a m p a i g n s for us, b u t this was d o n e , r a t h e r , by a few
of his officers of varying talent a n d m u c h grosser bias t h a n Caesar
himself. T h e Bellum Africanum c o m e s to us from a line officer of
limited perceptiveness, w h o s e w o r k , however, we can fill o u t by ref-
e r e n c e to the accounts of Dio Cassius a n d P l u t a r c h , which have re-
tained the description of Asinius Pollio, an a u t h o r a d e p t at recog-
nizing the strategic relationships.
C a e s a r i n t e n d e d to besiege T h a p s u s , which was situated on an
i s t h m u s between t h e sea a n d a lake. Scipio a t t e m p t e d to block the
i s t h m u s on both sides. A n d a l t h o u g h it is t r u e that Caesar d o m i -
n a t e d the sea, nevertheless, since this action took place at t h e be-
g i n n i n g of F e b r u a r y , this f o r m e d a very u n c e r t a i n base. If his con-
556
The Last Campaigns of the Civil War 557
tact by land was completely cut off, he could have fallen into a most
precarious situation. Caesar's intelligence service was so alert, how-
ever, that he l e a r n e d of the a p p r o a c h of t h e e n e m y in the n o r t h ,
attacked him before he could c o m p l e t e his fortifications, a n d threw
him back. Immediately after this blow to half of the e n e m y a r m y ,
Caesar d r o v e out against the o t h e r half, 10 kilometers away at the
s o u t h e r n e n t r a n c e to the isthmus, r e a c h e d it before the defeated
a r m y from t h e n o r t h could again link up with it, a n d caused it to
break up without any f u r t h e r fighting.
T h e r e a d e r is r e f e r r e d to Veith for t h e details. Of the greatest
general interest is his supposition, which has a s s u m e d a very high
d e g r e e of probability, that Scipio, a b o u t whose lack of ability Caesar
himself j o k e d , was only nominally the c o m m a n d e r in chief a n d that
the real l e a d e r s h i p was exercised by L a b i e n u s . If t h e n the Pharsalus
c a m p a i g n a p p e a r s as a d u e l between the two most famous com-
m a n d e r s of their time, t h e African c a m p a i g n is interesting in that
h e r e Caesar was o p p o s e d by his own t o p general from t h e Gallic
W a r . Veith has d e t e r m i n e d , a p p a r e n t l y with complete justification,
that Labienus p r o v e d himself a t h o r o u g h l y worthy disciple of his
master. His o p e r a t i o n s w e r e e x t r e m e l y energetic, well t h o u g h t out,
a n d decisive. If, nevertheless, he did finally go d o w n to defeat, it
was not that he was facing only C a e s a r but also Caesar's t r o o p s ,
against w h o m his newly formed African legions could not m e a s u r e
u p . T h e defeat at T h a p s u s was, at first, from the tactical viewpoint,
n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n a n u n s u c c e s s f u l u n d e r t a k i n g , a n d i t only
t u r n e d into a c a t a s t r o p h e because the u n b e a t e n troops w e r e panic-
stricken, a b a n d o n e d their c a m p , a n d took flight. W h e n those w h o
h a d been b e a t e n in t h e n o r t h t h e n arrived on the scene, expecting
to find a refuge, they discovered that their c o m r a d e s w e r e g o n e ,
w h e r e u p o n they wished to s u r r e n d e r , b u t they were cut d o w n by
Caesar's b a t t l e - r o u s e d legionaries. T h e y w e r e R o m a n legions o n
both sides, b u t their c h a r a c t e r was that of m e r c e n a r i e s , a n d , as we
shall see again in the later volumes, m e r c e n a r i e s in no way s p a r e
each o t h e r mutually. At Ilerda Caesar h a d still b e e n able to p r e v e n t
a massacre, b u t h e r e he could no longer do so.
EXCURSUS
1. T H E BATTLE OF RUSPINA
T h i s battle n e e d s to be considered, for the reason that it gives the impression
— a n d it has been so understood by m o d e r n scholars—that Caesar's tactics here re-
ally did accomplish something completely new, that is, that they provided a means of
escape from the kind of situation in which Crassus in Mesopotamia and Caesar's
general Curio, o n e year earlier, in Africa, had perished with their entire armies. T h e
relationship, however, must be conceived of differently.
With three legions and a small accompanying force of cavalry a n d sharpshooters
Caesar had made a foraging march into the interior from his c a m p near the port
city of Ruspina, in eastern T u n i s , w h e n he was attacked in the o p e n plain by the
N u m i d i a n cavalry and sharpshooters u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Labienus. He had his
infantry take up the shallowest possible formation, facing in all four directions, and
repelled the e n e m y attacks by having the cohorts, with the s u p p o r t of the small
n u m b e r of cavalry present, storm out from time to time and drive back the e n e m y
skirmishers with a volley of javelins. According to the account of the Pseudo-Hirtius,
as we shall call the author of the Bellum Africanum, the e n g a g e m e n t e n d e d in a vic-
tory as the cohorts, s u m m o n i n g up their last o u n c e of strength, finally drove the
nimble e n e m y away over the nearest hills. According to A p p i a n (2. 95), however,
Caesar was beaten, and it was only because of sluggishness that the e n e m y did not
complete their victory. Since with m e n like Labienus and Petreius such a reason d o e s
not s e e m acceptable, we are at a loss for a satisfactory explanation. Nevertheless, it is
to be found without difficulty in the account of Pseudo-Hirtius himself, if we re-
m e m b e r what X e n o p h o n reports in the Anabasis c o n c e r n i n g a similar situation of the
T e n T h o u s a n d . It was nightfall that saved the hard-pressed infantry from the ar-
rows of the m o u n t e d sharpshooters. Antony, too, w h e n he was pressed by the Par-
thians d u r i n g his retreat, was h e l p e d out of this situation by the night, as we have seen
in the account of his campaign of 36 B . C . T h e account in the Bellum Africanum, to
the effect that the cohorts finally drove off the e n e m y with their offensive, is incred-
ible because we cannot understand why they did not do that at the very start, if they
were capable of d o i n g so. T h e i r real accomplishment—-presumably with considerable
losses, if A p p i a n ' s s o u r c e was able to p i c t u r e the e n g a g e m e n t as a d e f e a t for
Caesar—consisted of holding out for the entire day, until the fall of darkness. Dur-
ing the night the e n e m y h o r s e m e n m o v e d far back, in order not to e x p o s e t h e m -
selves to a surprise attack, a n d since Caesar was o n l y 3 , 0 0 0 paces (passus)—4½
kilometers—from his camp, he was now able to pull back to it without difficulty. He
still accomplished the military feat of maintaining the morale and the good o r d e r of
his troops in this painful situation and, by forming them in a kind of square with the
longest and thinnest possible lines, provided the largest possible operating space for
the use of the pilum, the only effective w e a p o n in this situation, while giving the least
possible chances for the effectiveness of the e n e m y arrows and javelins. Since there
is always s o m e t h i n g uncertain about a thin formation, this shows how m u c h confi-
d e n c e Caesar had in his troops and how excellent their conduct was under his lead-
ership. T h e decisive point, however, was the closeness of the c a m p , and, since this
was in winter, also the shortness of the day, which prevented the crisis from lasting
too very long. Curio, w h o had b e e n wiped out in the previous year in the same kind
of situation, had marched out while it was still night (about the fourth night watch
[Bell. Civ. 2. 29]) and had covered 16,000 paces (passus)—24 kilometers—fighting
n u m e r o u s skirmishes u n d e r way, w h e n he e n c o u n t e r e d the e n e m y main body. His
cavalrymen even had a night march b e h i n d them already and were completely ex-
hausted. Even if they had held out until e v e n i n g (the battle took place in midsum-
mer), they w o u l d still have had no possibility of returning to their c a m p during the
night. A n d so the soldiers were o v e r c o m e with despair, they gave up the resistance,
and were cut down.
T h e tactical m o v e m e n t s which Caesar had his m e n m a k e in o r d e r to d e f e n d

against the e n e m y skirmishers have been interpreted in greatly varying ways; the
three most important military m e n w h o have studied the account in recent times,
Göler, Rüstow, and Stoffel, have all given very different pictures of the battle, and
the only solution that the philologists have found has b e e n an altering of the text.
T h e following explanation s e e m s to me the most natural o n e : W h e n Caesar sud-
denly got the report that the e n e m y was approaching en masse and the cloud of dust
The Last Campaigns of the Civil War 559
could already be seen c o m i n g closer, he first had his three legions form up in o n e
echelon with his weak cavalry on the two flanks. T h i s unusual formation in a single
e c h e l o n s e e m e d to be called for because it o f f e r e d a certain protection against
e n e m y outflanking action and for its o w n part threatened the e n e m y with an e n -
v e l o p m e n t . As a normal procedure, this was not permissible, because o n e c o u l d
never be sure of being able to throw back the e n e m y infantry with the first e c h e l o n ;
hence the second and third echelons in the rear, to be e m p l o y e d , as n e e d e d , either
to reinforce the front or for flanking m o v e m e n t s . In this case, however, where they
were not dealing with heavy infantry but with massed bands of lightly armed sol-
diers, it was possible to rely on the fact that the line would need no reinforcement
from the rear, and the front could therefore be m a d e as long as possible.
T h e e n e m y , however, did not allow the situation to d e v e l o p into a regular battle
but contented himself with a sharpshooting combat, while his cavalry simultaneously
e n v e l o p e d the R o m a n front, long as it was, and, by driving back the few o p p o s i n g
h o r s e m e n , threatened the line from the rear. N o w the R o m a n s had to face in both
directions, and that would have broken up all the tactical units as they m a d e sorties,
now in this direction, now in that. In order to prevent that, Caesar o r d e r e d every
second cohort to face about and to place itself b e h i n d its neighboring cohort, fight-
ing back to back with the latter. T h e intervals were filled by having each cohort
spread out within itself and thereby occupy a d o u b l e d width. If then the cohorts had
at first stood 8 ranks d e e p , let us say, now they were only 4 ranks in d e p t h . In the
middle, between the two fronts, there was naturally left a certain space in which the
vehicles that were possibly on hand were placed, into which the unhorsed cavalry-
m e n could retire, and where the higher officers could m o v e back and forth freely.
Individual soldiers were forbidden to spring out of ranks, in order to attack, for e x -
a m p l e , a n e n e m y s h a r p s h o o t e r w h o m i g h t h a v e a p p r o a c h e d t o o boldly. Entire
cohorts, however, and especially the cohorts on the flanks, in conjunction with the
cavalry, m a d e sorties which now and then broke the circle of the s u r r o u n d i n g attack-
ers, and Pseudo-Hirtius puffed these momentary successes up into full-fledged vic-
tories. But since the c o h o r t s m a k i n g these sallies always had to fall back again
promptly on the main body, for fear of falling into an ambush, we may be allowed
to p r e s u m e that the fleeing foes, too, immediately turned a r o u n d again, for the au-
thor tells us himself that the fight lasted until sunset, when it automatically had to
break up.
T h e principal passage (Chapter 17) reads: "Caesar interim consilio hostium cog-
nito iubet aciem in l o n g i t u d i n e m quam m a x i m a m porrigi et alternis conversis cohor-
tibus, ut una post alteram signa tenderet, ita coronam hostium d e x t r o sinistroque
cornu m e d i a m dividit." T h i s is to be translated as follows: "Caesar, after recognizing
the enemy's plan [to encircle him], o r d e r s the battle line to stretch out as m u c h as
possible and every other cohort to face about a n d place itself b e h i n d its neighbor,
from which position he breaks t h r o u g h the e n e m y ring with his right and left
w i n g s . " T h e c h a n g e w h i c h has b e e n p r o p o s e d — " u t una post, altera ante signa
contendere!"—says the same thing in the final analysis but drops the m o v e m e n t be-
hind o n e another of the cohorts and thereby obscures the action instead of clarifying
it. It is therefore to be rejected, as has b e e n d o n e by Stoffel, with whose concept I
also agree, in the main, in other respects, with the difference that I do not assume
any intervals between the cohorts, but rather, as Göler has already u n d e r s t o o d it, I
interpret the stretching out of the front in length as a lessening of the n u m b e r of
ranks. Furthermore, Stoffel himself has already explained, in the Revue de philologie
1: 154, that he did not m e a n such large intervals as are s h o w n on his sketch but had
in mind only the small intervals that have to be left quite naturally between the tacti-
cal units for the sake of g o o d order. W h e n he reproaches Fröhlich for this misun-
derstanding, that is really not justified, since in his book he did not state in what
m a n n e r he t h o u g h t the holes were filled that had been caused by the pulling out of
the 15 cohorts.
See also Rüstow, Caesar's Military Organization and Conduct of War (Heerwesen und
Knegsführung Cäsars) 2d ed., p. 133. Göler, (Cäsars gallischer Krieg) 2d ed., 2: 2 7 2 .
Stoffel, Civil War (Guerre civile), 2 : 2 8 4 . Domaszewski, The Banners of the Roman Army
(Die Fahnen im römischen Heer) p. 3. Fröhlich, Caesar's Method of Waging War
(Kriegswesen Cäsars) p. 194.
( A d d e d in the third edition.) Veith, in Ancient Battlefields (Antike Schlachtfelder) Vol.
3, Part 1, p. 7 8 4 , has the same concept as I; w h e n he, nevertheless, as he says, "en-
ters a sharp protest against my source-contradicting reconstruction," that can only be
based on a very hasty reading, since the differences that he so strongly o p p o s e s sim-
ply are not there, unless Veith evaluates the success of Caesar's counterblows more
highly than I d o . I have not c h a n g e d a single word of the second edition.
3. N o b o d y has yet s u c c e e d e d in establishing a credible picture of the battle of
M u n d a from the reports. A few authors show Caesar personally deciding the battle
in a completely fantastic m a n n e r . But it is perhaps noteworthy that, as at Pharsalus,
1
not only did the cavalry (in which Caesar had the superior strength at M u n d a )
force the decision on the o n e flank, but o u r sources also obviously went out of their
way to attribute to that arm only indirect credit, while giving the real palms of vic-
tory to the legions. T h e author of the Bell. Hisp. tells us that the T e n t h L e g i o n press-
ed its o p p o n e n t s so strongly that it was planned to bring a legion to their aid from
the other flank. Caesar's cavalry took advantage of this opportunity to attack and
thereby p r e v e n t e d the p l a n n e d maneuver. Dio Cassius (43. 38) recounts that the d e -
cision was brought on by the fact that, although neither of the phalanxes would
yield to the other, the N u m i d i a n King Boguas, outside the battle line, attacked the
Pompeian c a m p , w h e r e u p o n Labienus pulled five cohorts out from the front and
sent them to the aid of the c a m p . T h e other soldiers had presumably believed that
their marching out of the line was the start of a flight from the battlefield and had
lost their courage. Are we to believe that the best general of the Caesarian school, in
the m o m e n t of crisis, withdrew troops from the battle in order to protect the bag-
gage? I believe that it would not be too bold to assume a m o r e direct influence on
the c o u r s e of the battle by the N u m i d i a n cavalry, an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t that the
jealousy of the various branches of the arms a m o n g themselves, and of the R o m a n s
vis-a-vis the barbarian allies, has sought to hide from us.
N O T E FOR C H A P T E R X
1. Bell. Hisp., C h a p t e r 3 0 , can probably n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d in any

o t h e r sense; it w o u l d also be s u r p r i s i n g if t h e s u p e r i o r i t y which
C a e s a r naturally h a d in this a r m h a d not p r o v e n itself in any of t h e
t h r e e g r e a t battles of t h e civil war. At M u n d a , in a d d i t i o n to his
Gallic a n d G e r m a n i c cavalry, h e also h a d N u m i d i a n h o r s e m e n .
Chapter XI
The Elephants
T h e last battle of antiquity in which e l e p h a n t s w e r e used was t h e
battle of T h a p s u s . It m i g h t t h e r e f o r e be a p p r o p r i a t e at this p o i n t to
consider e v e r y t h i n g that we h a v e l e a r n e d now from o u r observa-
tion of t h e military use of t h e s e a n i m a l s in antiquity in all t h e bat-
tles in which they a p p e a r .
T h e battle on t h e H y d a s p e s gave us occasion to r e m a r k that it
m u s t have b e e n quite difficult for t h e M a c e d o n i a n s to o v e r c o m e
t h e e l e p h a n t s , since we see later to w h a t pains they themselves w e n t
to a d o p t this i n s t r u m e n t of warfare. If we now consider, h o w e v e r ,
t h e q u e s t i o n of success, we s e e m to arrive at t h e o p p o s i t e conclu-
sion, since we do n o t find a single c o r r o b o r a t e d battle in which t h e
e l e p h a n t s accomplished s o m e t h i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y ,
usually t h e side t h a t was s t r o n g e r in e l e p h a n t s was d e f e a t e d . It is
u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t t h e r e p o r t s o n t h e most f a m o u s e l e p h a n t battles
have all c o m e d o w n to us m o r e or less in only l e g e n d a r y or a n e c -
dotal form. T h e only o n e for which we can establish an historically
useful p i c t u r e is still t h e first o n e , t h e battle on t h e H y d a s p e s . T h e
battles of t h e Diadochi, t h e battles in which P y r r h u s p a r t i c i p a t e d ,
the battles of the First Punic War—all offer us no reliable gain in
this respect. At Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a a n d T h a p s u s we m a y well be told
that e l e p h a n t s w e r e on h a n d in s u p p o s e d l y large n u m b e r s , b u t we
learn nothing of their accomplishments, and their c o m m a n d e r s
w e r e d e f e a t e d . If we take all of t h e r e p o r t s , as they s t a n d , t h e bal-
a n c e o f victories a n d defeats speaks against t h e e l e p h a n t s . T h e y a r e
involved in t h e victories of I p s u s , A n t i o c h u s I over t h e Gauls, of
H e r a c l e a , A s c u l u m , T u n i s , H a m i l c a r over t h e M e r c e n a r i e s , o n t h e
1
Tajo (Hannibal over the Spaniards), on the Trebia, at Cynos-
c e p h a l a e a n d Pydna. B u t e v e n t h o u g h they w e r e p r e s e n t o n t h e
o n e side only, o r i n g r e a t p r e p o n d e r a n c e o n o n e side, they did not
p r e v e n t defeat on t h e H y d a s p e s , at P a r a e t a c e n e , at G a b i e n e , Gaza,
561
2
B e n e v e n t u m , A g r i g e n t u m , P a n o r m u s , R a p h i a , H i m e r a , Baecula,
3
M e t a u r u s , Z a m a , Magnesia, M u t h u l , T h a p s u s . N o e x a m p l e what-
ever is r e p o r t e d of an occasion w h e r e e l e p h a n t s p e n e t r a t e d closed
i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s . O n t h e only occasion t h a t c o u l d c o m e into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a t C y n o s c e p h a l a e , i t i s e x p r e s s l y said t h a t t h e
M a c e d o n i a n s w e r e not yet d r a w n u p i n battle f o r m a t i o n w h e n the
R o m a n s attacked t h e m a n d t h e e l e p h a n t s scattered t h e m .
At Z a m a t h e R o m a n s a r e r e p o r t e d to h a v e left intervals between
their m a n i p l e s , so t h a t t h e e l e p h a n t s could go t h r o u g h t h e s e pas-
sages. At T u n i s they w e r e d r a w n u p , on t h e c o n t r a r y , in a very
d e e p f o r m a t i o n , a n d Polybius (1. 3 3 . 10) specifically praises this ar-
r a n g e m e n t as o n e suitable for use against e l e p h a n t s . As we know,
b o t h of these r e p o r t s go back to unsatisfactory sources; t h e most
valuable point is probably t h e j u d g m e n t of Polybius, w h o a p p r o v e s
the d e e p f o r m a t i o n a n d consequently d o e s not credit t h e e l e p h a n t s
with t h e p o w e r to b r e a k t h r o u g h it. A c c o r d i n g to his own account,
however, t h e e l e p h a n t s h a d nevertheless c a u s e d considerable havoc
in t h e foremost r a n k s of t h e R o m a n p h a l a n x , b u t this account must
after all have b e e n e x a g g e r a t e d , since otherwise we w o u l d necessar-
ily h a v e h e a r d similar accounts r a t h e r often in t h e later battles.
T h e really well-confirmed effectiveness of e l e p h a n t s is only that
against cavalry, w h e r e they frighten t h e h o r s e s , a n d against light
infantry.
T h e best testimony for t h e i r usefulness in c o m b a t still r e m a i n s ,
h o w e v e r , t h e fact t h a t e v e n t h e g r e a t c o m m a n d e r s always used
t h e m a g a i n a n d again, especially H a n n i b a l a n d also Caesar, w h o at
least, Cicero says o n c e (Philippics 5. 17. 46), p r o c u r e d e l e p h a n t s for
t h e P a r t h i a n W a r . I n reality, h e d i d not use t h e m . After t h e Second
Punic W a r , w h e n t h e R o m a n s h a d established close relations with
t h e N u m i d i a n kings, w h o p r o v i d e d t h e m with these animals, they
used t h e m d u r i n g the entire second century B . C , although of
4
c o u r s e only in conjunction with allies a n d in small n u m b e r s . T h e y
5
used t h e m not only against t h e M a c e d o n i a n s b u t also i n S p a i n , a n d
against t h e Gauls. A l t h o u g h they a r e s u p p o s e d t o h a v e p e r f o r m e d
6
very well against t h e n o r t h e r n b a r b a r i a n s , strangely e n o u g h they
no l o n g e r a p p e a r even in t h e C i m b r i a n W a r or in Caesar's Gallic
W a r . W h e n t h e N u m i d i a n K i n g J u b a used e l e p h a n t s against h i m i n
Africa, C a e s a r h a d animals sent to h i m f r o m Sicily in o r d e r to ac-
c u s t o m his soldiers a n d h o r s e s t o t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e a n d t o train
t h e m to fight with t h e m .
If we c o n s i d e r t h e e n t i r e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e military history of an-
t i q u i t y , w e m a y say t h a t t h e u s e f u l n e s s a n d t h e a c t u a l u s e o f
The Elephants 563
e l e p h a n t s for battle may u n d e r any circumstances not be r a t e d too
highly. Against p e o p l e s w h o w e r e still not at all familiar with t h e m
a n d against cavalry a n d s h a r p s h o o t e r s t h e y h a d s o m e successes,
which w e r e , h o w e v e r , as in t h e case of t h e battles against P y r r h u s ,
for e x a m p l e , very greatly e x a g g e r a t e d by t h e losers in o r d e r to find
7
a n excuse for t h e i r d e f e a t . T r o o p s w h o a r e familiar with t h e m a n d
do not fear t h e m , w h o know how to avoid t h e m a n d how to attack
t h e m p r o p e r l y , a r e able to deal with t h e m , as A l e x a n d e r h a d al-
ready d o n e o n t h e H y d a s p e s , not t h r o u g h s o m e kind o f r u s e o r
flaming a r r o w s or by f r i g h t e n i n g t h e m , b u t by skillful use of t h e i r
w e a p o n s . We can recognize what this e x p e r t use of their w e a p o n s
m u s t have b e e n like w h e n we consult t h e works on n a t u r a l sciences
describing t h e characteristics of these animals.
A c c o r d i n g to these works, t h e e l e p h a n t is n o t at all i n v u l n e r a b l e
b u t even has a r a t h e r sensitive h i d e , a n d e v e n if spears a n d a r r o w s
do not kill h i m o u t r i g h t , they still p e n e t r a t e so deeply t h a t they r e -
8
m a i n i m b e d d e d i n his b o d y , a n d t h e p a i n m a k e s t h e a n i m a l s u n -
c o n t r o l l a b l e a n d c a u s e s t h e m t o shy away. I t i s r e p o r t e d o f t e n
e n o u g h that they t h e n p e n e t r a t e into t h e r a n k s o f t h e i r o w n t r o o p s ,
throw t h e m i n t o confusion, a n d b r i n g a b o u t defeats, as, for e x a m -
9
ple, on o n e occasion for the R o m a n s in front of N u m a n t i a . As t h e
ultimate m e a n s of dealing with such cases, t h e m a h o u t s , as we have
already m e n t i o n e d above (p. 372), each h a d a s h a r p steel w e d g e ,
which they d r o v e with a h a m m e r into t h e animal's neck in o r d e r to
kill h i m a n d r e n d e r h i m harmless.
EXCURSUS
T h e statement appearing again and again in the writings of the ancients, that the
Indian elephant was superior to the African (also in Livy's account of Magnesia, 37.
39), we have likewise already rejected above (p. 2 4 6 ) as a mere fable.
T h e authors on the subject of tactics, Asclepiodotus, Aelian, and Arrian, make no
m e n t i o n of the e m p l o y m e n t of elephants.
All the reports from antiquity on the use of elephants are collected in the work of
A. W. Schlegel a p p e a r i n g in the Indian Library (Indische Bibtiothek), 1: 129, and espe-
cially in the very useful work of P. Armandi, knight of the Legion of H o n o r , former
colonel of artillery, Military History of Elephants from the Earliest Times to the Introduction
of tirearms [Histoire militare des elephants depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqua'a
l'introduction des armes a feu) (Paris, 1843).
See also p. 2 2 1 , above, and the notes 8 and 9 to B o o k III, Chapter V I I .
N O T E S FOR C H A P T E R X I
1. Polybius 3. 14.
2. Livy 2 5 . 4 1 .
3. Sallust,Jugurtha, Chapter 53.

4. A c c o r d i n g to t h e observation by Fröhlich in The Significance of
the Second Punic War (Die Bedeutung des zweiten punischen Krieges), p.
20.
5. Valerius M a x i m u s 9. 3. A p p i a n , Iberia, C h a p t e r 4 6 .
6. O r o s i u s 5. 13. Florus 1. 37.
7. Schubert, in Pyrrhus, p. 2 2 2 , calls a t t e n t i o n to t h e fact t h a t in
t h e a c c o u n t o f P y r r h u s ' c a m p a i g n i n Sicily, w h i c h goes back t o
Timaeus, hardly any mention is m a d e of the elephants.
8. J. C h r . D. S c h r e b e r , in The Mammals (Die Saugetiere) ( E r l a n g e n ,
1775), 1: 2 4 5 , which is still today t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e w o r k on descrip-
tive z o o l o g y , s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s this p o i n t a n d says t h a t t h e
e l e p h a n t is e v e n sensitive to t h e bite of a fly. In V o l u m e 6 of t h e
s a m e work, by J. A. W a g n e r (1835), p. 2 6 5 , it is r e c o u n t e d how the
javelins of h u n t e r s r e m a i n i m b e d d e d in t h e b o d y a n d g r a d u a l l y kill
t h e e l e p h a n t . Baker, in The Albert Nyanza, 1: 2 8 4 , tells h o w skilled
h u n t e r s can kill an e l e p h a n t directly by a stab with a s p e a r from
below.
9. A p p i a n , Iberia, C h a p t e r 4 6 .
Conclusion
T h e art of w a r in antiquity r e a c h e s its peak with Caesar. N o t t h a t

we would place h i m personally above Miltiades or A l e x a n d e r , H a n -
nibal or Scipio—an observation or c o m p a r i s o n of this type would
be j u s t as p r e p o s t e r o u s as it was f r u i t l e s s — b u t a m o n g all t h e s e
g r e a t artists he is the o n e w h o h a d at his disposition simultaneously
t h e most c o m p l e t e a n d the vastest m e a n s . T h e c o h o r t of his time is
a n i m m e a s u r a b l y finer i n s t r u m e n t t h a n t h e old, simple p h a l a n x o r
even t h e triple-wave p h a l a n x .
T h e c o h o r t s w o r k i n g i n o r g a n i c c o o r d i n a t i o n with effectively
t r a i n e d s h a r p s h o o t e r s , s t r o n g cavalry, field fortifications, a n d sys-
tematic s u p p l y p r o c e d u r e s — t h a t is t h e a r m y Caesar controlled with
t h e p e r s o n a l c o u r a g e of t h e soldier a n d t h e strategy of t h e accom-
plished c o m m a n d e r . In the a r m y itself t h e r e is n o t h i n g new; b e f o r e
his time we a r e familiar with all t h e individual e l e m e n t s as well as
with their c o o r d i n a t i o n . To this e x t e n t it could be said that C a e s a r
did n o t play a decisive role at all in t h e history of t h e a r t of war.
Miltiades, Pericles, E p a m i n o n d a s , A l e x a n d e r , the m a n i p u l a r
p h a l a n x , H a n n i b a l , Scipio, Marius—all stand for p a r t i c u l a r innova-
tions, original t h o u g h t s i n t h e m a n n e r o f leading a n a r m y . C a e s a r
finds e v e r y t h i n g , t h e m e a n s as well as t h e ideas, already at h a n d ,
b u t h e b r i n g s t h e m t o their ultimate expression a n d t h e a c m e o f
c o o r d i n a t i o n in the richest variety, to t h e greatest d e g r e e , a n d in
t h e most p e r f e c t e d f o r m .
A favorite saying of his has c o m e d o w n to us in t h e writings, t h a t
1
h e w o u l d r a t h e r c o n q u e r b y m e a n s o f h u n g e r t h a n with i r o n , a n d
the t e n d e n c y has b e e n to i n t e r p r e t that as m e a n i n g t h a t he p r e -
f e r r e d to subject the e n e m y not by d e f e a t i n g h i m b u t by a m e r e p r o -
cess of attrition. Every step of his c a r e e r as a c o m m a n d e r shows
t h a t this saying m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d differently. T h e strategy of at-
trition can only be p u r s u e d justifiably in a situation w h e r e , accord-
2
ing to Clausewitz' e x p r e s s i o n , t h e will a n d t h e p o w e r a r e n o t suffi-
cient for a g r e a t decision. B u t Caesar's circumstances w e r e always
of such a kind that b o t h his s t r e n g t h a n d his will w e r e a p p r o p r i a t e
for a c o m p l e t e d e f e a t o f his e n e m y , a n d t h e n a t u r a l m e a n s o f
565
d o i n g this is by attacking t h e e n e m y ' s m a i n force, t h e decisive bat-

tle. Caesar always h a d this in m i n d , b u t his saying can nevertheless,
for this very r e a s o n , quite well be t r u e . T h e m a n n e r of b r i n g i n g on
a g r e a t decision d o e s n o t consist of a blind c h a r g i n g in b u t of t h e
skillful provision of favorable conditions. To this e n d the difference
between h u n g e r a n d a d e q u a t e rations has played a principal role in
every p e r i o d , b u t in Caesar's case to an u n u s u a l l y h i g h d e g r e e . I n -
d e e d , his c o n c e r n for s u p p l y p r o c e d u r e s is n o t to be evaluated as a
w e a k e n i n g but r a t h e r as a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the c o n c e p t of destruc-
tion, a n d this is t h e v i e w p o i n t t h a t we m u s t t a k e if we wish to
characterize h i m as a strategist.
In Gaul it was t h e superiority of t h e R o m a n s u p p l y system that
e n a b l e d Caesar to avoid fighting against t h e g r e a t Gallic masses a n d
to win t h e decision by pitting his e n t i r e force against fractions of
t h e e n e m y forces. T o this e x t e n t h e could say t h a t h e c o n q u e r e d
primarily by m e a n s of h u n g e r r a t h e r t h a n by iron.
In t h e civil w a r it was different. H e r e it was t h e field fortifica-
tions t h a t gave t h e characteristic s t a m p to t h e strategy. Caesar obvi-
ously h a d a n a t u r a l inclination t o w a r d the technical; he was a b o r n
e n g i n e e r . We can see with what affection his w o r k s a n d installations
a r e described in t h e Commentaries: t h e fortifying of t h e b a n k of the
R h o n e against t h e Helvetii, the c a m p o n t h e Aisne, t h e invention o f
t h e l o n g sickles i n t h e n a v a l w a r a g a i n s t t h e V e n e t i , t h e R h i n e
bridges, the siege e n g i n e s at A d u a t u c a , A v a r i c u m , Massilia, t h e ob-
stacles a r o u n d Alesia, t h e water c o n d u i t at U x e l l o d u n u m , t h e artifi-
cial ford across t h e Sicoris, t h e gigantic installation for the encir-
cling of P o m p e y at D y r r h a c h i u m . But it is not j u s t t h e p e r s o n a l tal-
e n t a n d inclination o f this c o m m a n d e r t h a t give t h e s e t h i n g s s o
m u c h e m p h a s i s i n his c o n d u c t o f w a r ; r a t h e r , i t i s t h e n a t u r a l
course o f events that b r i n g s this a b o u t . T h e old R o m a n campcraft,
like every technical subject, t e n d e d to p e r f e c t a n d b r o a d e n itself
t h r o u g h new i n v e n t i o n s . T h i s c a m p c r a f t gave s u c h a d e g r e e of
superiority to t h e defensive that even the smaller force could hold
its own in the o p e n field. If no mistake was m a d e , it was impossible
for a battle to d e v e l o p unless b o t h sides wished it so. If t h e w e a k e r
side avoided a decision a n d s o u g h t to p r o l o n g t h e war, the coun-
t e r m e a s u r e for t h e s t r o n g e r side was t h e besieging of the e n e m y
c a m p — a n d thus, once again, the conduct of war by means of
h u n g e r : in t h e o n e case as the e x p r e s s i o n of the cultural a n d or-
ganizational superiority of t h e R o m a n s o v e r t h e b a r b a r i a n s , in the
o t h e r t h e e x p e d i e n t of t h e offensive against the technical s u p e r i o r -
Conclusion 567
ity of the defensive. In n e i t h e r case, however, does this m e t h o d of
warfare c o n t r a d i c t the strategy of total victory b u t r a t h e r it only
forms a m e a n s for c a r r y i n g o u t that strategy in the most certain
e n e r g e t i c , a n d c o m p l e t e possible m a n n e r . T h e dissolution o f t h e
a r m y o f the Belgae t h r o u g h t h e c a m p o n the Aisne a n d t h e starv-
ing o u t of t h e P o m p e i a n forces at I l e r d a w e r e b o t h g r e a t strategic
successes that o u t w a r d l y r e s e m b l e each o t h e r to a certain e x t e n t b u t
nevertheless, in the final analysis, s t e m m e d from different causes.
On t h e Aisne Caesar was n o t willing to risk an o p e n battle against
t h e a s s e m b l e d forces o f t h e B e l g a e , a n d h e r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e
superiority o f t h e R o m a n c a m p c r a f t a n d supply system t h e m e a n s
of first obliging the e n e m y to split his forces. At I l e r d a it was he
w h o h a d t h e s u p e r i o r force a n d his e n e m i e s w h o a v o i d e d t h e bat-
tle; for this r e a s o n he t h r e a t e n e d t h e m with a siege, fought against
t h e r e p r o v i s i o n i n g o f t h e i r t r o o p s , a n d i n this way m a n a g e d t o
b r i n g t h e situation to t h e p o i n t w h e r e finally, w h e n the o p p o r t u n i t y
for a battle offered itself, it was no l o n g e r necessary.
If H a n n i b a l , in his time, h a d b e e n able to o p e r a t e in this way a n d
h a d h e b e e n able t o besiege a n d starve o u t t h e R o m a n a r m i e s that
a v o i d e d his attack, t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d w o u l d n o t h a v e b e c o m e a
Latin o n e . B u t H a n n i b a l ' s m e a n s of c o n d u c t i n g war w e r e n o t suffi-
cient for this; he c a m e right up to t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point of victory
b u t t h e n slowly slipped back again. Caesar's offensive p o w e r was
still s u p e r i o r to the strongest defensive a n d was able to b r e a k it. He
won o n e victory after a n o t h e r ; it was as if his wars knew no time;
his strategy was lightning-like; t h r o u g h his c o m b i n a t i o n of s w o r d
a n d h u n g e r h e b r o u g h t every war, i n t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s
w h e r e it took place, to an e n d with a single c a m p a i g n . His original-
ity lay in this gigantic e n h a n c e m e n t of t h e art. We can no d o u b t
establish a parallel in a d e v e l o p m e n t of the most r e c e n t p e r i o d .
T h e i m p r o v e m e n t of firearms s e e m e d at first to work to the a d v a n -
tage of t h e defensive; against m o d e r n infantry a n d artillery fire an
attack over o p e n g r o u n d is no l o n g e r possible—-just as little so as it
was possible for R o m a n legions to m a k e an attack against a R o m a n
field fortification. B u t the increased effectiveness of w e a p o n s allows
the m o d e r n attacker, on his side, to e x t e n d his lines at will, even to
move to t h e attack in widely s e p a r a t e d c o l u m n s from different di-
rections a n d by m e a n s of e n v e l o p m e n t to win fire superiority for
himself. A n d t h u s the a d v a n t a g e of the defense is shifted over into
an a d v a n t a g e for t h e offense—like t h e R o m a n field fortification,
which first p r o t e c t s t h e a r m y t h a t is n o t willing to fight b u t t h e n
gives t h e e n e m y m o r e t h a n ever the possibility of forcing t h e final
d e c i s i o n by a siege, t h u s t u r n i n g to his a d v a n t a g e . ( W r i t t e n in
1908.)
T h e W o r l d W a r s h o w e d t h a t even this d e v e l o p m e n t could o n c e
a g a i n b e s u r p a s s e d . S o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e d t h a t n o theorist h a d b e e n
able to foresee: the battle lines w e r e e x t e n d e d until they s t r e t c h e d
to t h e obstacles of absolute b o r d e r s a n d could n o t be e n v e l o p e d by
a n y f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s : from the English C h a n n e l to the Swiss bor-
d e r ; from t h e Baltic to R o m a n i a . A n d t h u s it was necessary to t u r n
back again from the tactics of e n v e l o p m e n t to t h e frontal attack,
t h e p e n e t r a t i o n , from t h e superiority of the offensive to that of the
defensive. (Written in 1920.)
Caesar's was a constantly active intelligence; he h a d s t u d i e d in
R h o d e s a n d for a while h a d c o n c e r n e d himself with s t u d y i n g a n d
writing a b o u t questions of g r a m m a r . T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t he also
took pains to familiarize himself theoretically with t h e whole r e a l m
of t h e a r t of w a r ; in incidental r e m a r k s h e r e a n d t h e r e it is r e -
3
p o r t e d t h a t h e h a d r e a d X e n o p h o n ' s Cyropaedia, a n d writings con-
4
c e r n i n g A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t . I n his o w n works, h o w e v e r , t h e o r e t i -
cal reflections a r e h a r d l y to be f o u n d at all, so that F r e d e r i c k t h e
G r e a t was able t o m a k e t h e r e m a r k a b l e s t a t e m e n t t h a t the soldier
5
c o u l d not really l e a r n a n y t h i n g from h i m , a n d N a p o l e o n , m u c h a s
he r e c o m m e n d e d t h e study of Caesar, also still c o m p l a i n e d on o n e
occasion a b o u t his lack of clearness, saying t h a t his battles h a d no
n a m e s — a n d it is, of c o u r s e , obvious t h a t strategic study can derive
little from a c a m p a i g n as l o n g as its g e o g r a p h i c a l location is not es-
tablished. A n d in a d d i t i o n to these points we also have all the im-
possible n u m e r i c a l relationships. B u t those a r e defects t h a t a r e ex-
plained by t h e political p u r p o s e that C a e s a r was p u r s u i n g with his
books, s h o r t c o m i n g s that nevertheless d e t r a c t e d b u t little from the
effectiveness of his writings. T h e s e deficiences, m o r e o v e r , a r e suscep-
tible to filling in a n d c o r r e c t i n g by t h e p r o g r e s s of r e s e a r c h a n d have
actually b e e n so e m e n d e d . If Frederick e x p r e s s e d himself m u c h m o r e
strongly o n this subject t h a n did N a p o l e o n , t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s
for that, which we shall h a v e occasion to e x p l a i n w h e n we discuss
this m a s t e r himself. In his works Caesar d i d n o t i n t e n d to p r e s e n t
his subject f r o m a didactic v i e w p o i n t d e a l i n g especially with t h e
military, a n d h e t h e r e f o r e o m i t t e d t h e details, motives, a n d reflec-
tions that w o u l d h a v e b e e n necessary for such a p u r p o s e . It is from
t h e facts themselves that we learn, a n d not from t h e w o r d s . On a
few occasions, h o w e v e r , t h e philosophical mentality of t h e t h i n k e r
still b r e a k s t h r o u g h t h e easy flow o f t h e a c c o u n t a n d r e v e a l s
Conclusion 569
theoretical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a k i n d that we do n o t yet find in the
case of t h e reflective military writers of antiquity, X e n o p h o n a n d
Polybius. W h e n C a e s a r r e p o r t s in his a c c o u n t of t h e battle of P h a r -
salus how P o m p e y h a d c o m m a n d e d his soldiers to await t h e attack
o n t h e spot, h e c o n d e m n s this viewpoint a n d e m p h a s i z e s , a s w e
would e x p r e s s it today, the m o r a l e value of the offensive. In the
c l e a r e r m a n n e r o f e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e o f a n t i q u i t y , his
words were:
It seems to us that P o m p e y was not wise in d o i n g this, for the

r e a s o n that in each m a n t h e r e is a certain i n n a t e passion a n d
spiritual stimulus t h a t is s p a r k e d by t h e e x c i t e m e n t of battle.
C o m m a n d e r s s h o u l d n o t s u p p r e s s t h e s e feelings b u t s h o u l d
s t r e n g t h e n t h e m ; a n d it is n o t for n o t h i n g that t h e c u s t o m has
c o m e d o w n to us from o l d e n days t h a t the t r u m p e t s blow a n d
the battle cry is raised from all sides, because it was believed
t h a t t h e e n e m y was f r i g h t e n e d b y this a n d o n e ' s o w n m e n
were emboldened.
( Q u o d nobis q u i d e m nulla r a t i o n e factum a P o m p e i o vid-
e t u r , p r o p t e r e a q u o d est q u a e d a m a n i m i incitatio a t q u e alac-
ritas n a t u r a l i t e r i n n a t a o m n i b u s , q u a e s t u d i o p u g n a e incen-
d i t u r . H a n c n o n r e p r i m e r e , sed a u g e r e i m p e r a t o r e s d e b e n t ,
n e q u e frustra a n t i q u i t u s i n s t i t u t u m est, ut signa u n d i q u e con-
cinerent, c l a m o r e m q u e universi tollerent: quibus rebus et
hostes t e r r e r i et suos incitari existimaverunt.)
We can see a n o t h e r theoretically significant reflection in t h e fact

that C a e s a r particularly liked to e m p h a s i z e what a role c h a n c e plays
i n w a r . T h e c o m p a r i s o n o f s t r a t e g y with chess, which has often
b e e n m a d e previously, is t h e r e f o r e t h e o p p o s i t e of the c o r r e c t o n e ,
because this g a m e is based on t h e most all-inclusive a n d r e f i n e d es-
timations, w h e r e a s strategy also d e p e n d s on mastery of t h a t which
is b e y o n d estimation. F o r this r e a s o n , exercise of the a r t of c o m -
m a n d d e m a n d s not only t h e intelligence b u t also t h e e n t i r e p e r s o n -
ality of the m a n , w h o even pits himself against c h a n c e , c o u n t e r s it
continuously with new i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d t h e r e b y m a s t e r s capricious
luck a n d ties it to his chariot. We m u s t look u p o n T h u c y d i d e s as
the first o n e to clarify this aspect of t h e c o n d u c t of war. We h a v e
already cited above t h e w o r d s that he places in t h e m o u t h of Peri-
cles: " t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s in w a r do not wait." B u t he also has t h e
C o r i n t h i a n s saying ( 1 . 122), ". . . W a r p r o c e e d s only in the smallest
way in a c c o r d a n c e with definite laws; its principal p a r t it creates for
itself by itself, d e p e n d i n g on t h e circumstances t h a t arise," a n d , on
a n o t h e r occasion, King A r c h i d a m u s of S p a r t a (2. 1 1 . 3): ". . . T h e
c o u r s e of w a r is h i d d e n , a n d m u c h comes a b o u t from very small
6
t h i n g s , a n d passion brings a b o u t a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . " T h e s e a r e t h e
basic t h o u g h t s of Clausewitz' philosophy of w a r t h a t a r e a p p e a r i n g
h e r e for the first t i m e , t h e recognition t h a t t h e r e is an irrational
e l e m e n t in war, to which t h e c o m m a n d e r m u s t d a r e to trust his
f a t e . A l r e a d y i n C i c e r o ' s w r i t i n g s w e find t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o
"scientia rei militaris, virtus, auctoritas" ("knowledge of military things,
c o u r a g e , a u t h o r i t y " ) , he also calls for "felicitas" ("good fortune") as a
7
quality of t h e g r e a t l e a d e r , a n d C a e s a r writes (Bell. Civ. 3. 68): "Sed
f o r t u n a , q u a e p l u r i m u m potest q u u m i n reliquis r e b u s turn
p r a e c i p u e i n bello, parvis m o m e n t i s m a g n a s r e r u m c o m m u t a t i o n e s
efficit." ("But f o r t u n e , which influences m a n y a t h i n g , b o t h in o t h e r
m a t t e r s a n d especially in war, p r o d u c e s t h e greatest c h a n g e s with
small impulses.")
C a e s a r has q u i t e often e v o k e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t h e t r u s t e d al-
t o g e t h e r too m u c h to luck, that he challenged it like a g a m b l e r , a n d
it is certain t h a t he d i d believe in his star, like N a p o l e o n . T h e ac-
c o u n t as to how, in t h e midst of t h e stormy sea, he consoled t h e
sailor with the i n f o r m a t i o n that he was t r a n s p o r t i n g Caesar a n d his
luck, may be literally t r u e , even if he himself has not r e c o u n t e d this
to us. It w o u l d be incorrect, however, j u s t as in N a p o l e o n ' s case, to
see n o t h i n g b u t boldness in him, w h e t h e r it be to praise or to con-
d e m n . We have convinced ourselves that, step by step, this quality
was always paralleled by wise awareness a n d w e i g h i n g of the situa-
tion. T h e ancients, t o o , already realized this. S u e t o n i u s praises h i m
( C h a p t e r 5 8 ) — " . . . in obeundis expeditionibus dubium cautior an
audentior" ("in e n t e r i n g u p o n his e x p e d i t i o n s it was a question as to
w h e t h e r he was mainly cautious or b o l d " ) — a n d j u s t as in t h e case
of m o d e r n c o m m a n d e r s , his strategy was based principally on t h e
decisive p o i n t o f h a v i n g n u m e r i c a l superiority o n t h e battlefield.
We have p o i n t e d o u t t h a t he always h a d such superiority in Gaul
a n d a t I l e r d a i n S p a i n . T h a p s u s was n o t a p i t c h e d b a t t l e ; o n
M u n d a we have no reliable figures, b u t t h e r e can hardly be any
d o u b t a t all t h a t C a e s a r , w h o was t h e n a l r e a d y e m p e r o r , levied
m o r e m e n t h a n his e n e m i e s , w h o only h a d a single c o u n t r y at their
disposition. If we overlook the completely s t r a n g e circumstances in
Egypt a n d the f i v e - d a y c a m p a i g n against P h a r n a c e s , which comes
b u t little into c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e n t h e battle of Pharsalus is t h e only
o n e in which C a e s a r was victorious with p r e s u m a b l y considerably
smaller forces. He c o u l d still have avoided this battle a n d awaited
Conclusion 571
the arrival of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , 1½ legions from Hellas a n d 2 from

Illyria. B u t i f h e h a d d o n e t h a t first, P o m p e y w o u l d surely n o
l o n g e r have a c c e p t e d battle, b u t t h a n k s to his ships, w o u l d h a v e
t r a n s f e r r e d his a r m y a n d the w a r to some o t h e r area. After all, t h e
e n e m y ' s superiority at sea h a d also p r e v e n t e d Caesar from t h e very
start of this c a m p a i g n from t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of t h e superiority in
land t r o o p s that was theoretically at his disposal. He h a d to use the
larger half of his m a n p o w e r , t h o u g h admittedly the less effective
p o r t i o n , t h e newly f o r m e d legions, to p r o t e c t Italy, Gaul, Spain,
a n d Sicily, a n d as early as at D y r r h a c h i u m , in o r d e r to accomplish
a n y t h i n g at all of a positive n a t u r e , he h a d d e t a c h e d so m a n y
t r o o p s that against P o m p e y himself he was in t h e minority. F r o m
every point of view it is i m p o r t a n t to establish clearly the fact a n d
the r e a s o n t h a t Caesar f o u g h t specifically t h e decisive battle, a n d
this battle alone, with n u m e r i c a l inferiority. T h e sea p o w e r of t h e
P o m p e i a n s , t h r o u g h its indirect effects, i m p o s e d such s t r o n g fetters
o n C a e s a r ' s c o n d u c t o f o p e r a t i o n s t h a t h e d i d n o t h a v e a free
choice between alternatives; b u t C a e s a r personally shows up all the
g r e a t e r h e r e in that, as highly as he estimated the i m p o r t a n c e of
n u m b e r s , b a s e d on c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e situation, he p u t t h a t con-
cern" aside a n d t r u s t i n g only in t h e quality of his t r o o p s a n d his
own l e a d e r s h i p accepted the decisive battle.
T h e R o m a n art of war, as it a p p e a r s to us in C a e s a r as t h e m a -
t u r e d fruit of a d e v e l o p m e n t that h a d lasted for centuries, d i d n o t
die o u t again with h i m b u t lived on in the R o m a n w o r l d as his be-
quest. After h i m g r e a t areas, particularly t h e Alps, t h e c o u n t r i e s
south o f t h e D a n u b e , a n d E n g l a n d w e r e c o n q u e r e d for t h e R o m a n
E m p i r e . Finally two nations set the limits for the world c o n q u e r o r s ;
of the o n e people, the Parthians, we have already previously
s p o k e n . T h e o t h e r s w e r e t h e G e r m a n s . W e shall start t h e s e c o n d
p a r t o f o u r w o r k with the G e r m a n s ' military system a n d c o n d u c t o f
war. Of w h a t type was this p o w e r t h a t was able to stand up to t h e
R o m a n a r t of war?
N O T E S FOR C O N C L U S I O N
1. F r o n t i n u s , 4. 7. 1. Similarly, Bell. Afric, C h a p t e r 3 1 .

2. Vom Kriege, Book 7, C h a p t e r 16.
3. Suetonius, Chapter 88.
4. Plutarch, Chapter 11.
5. In t h e preface to his t r e a t m e n t of the Commentaries of F o l a r d
on Polybius, 1755.
6. T h e excellent b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r of t h e t h r e e citations in the

w o r k o f Adolf B a u e r , " T h u c y d i d e s ' Views o n the C o n d u c t o f W a r "
("Ansichten d e s T h u c y d i d e s ü b e r Kriegführung"), Philologus 50:
416.
7. In t h e o r a t i o n " P r o lege Manilla" in the year 66 B . C .
Index
Abisares: in battle on Hydaspes, 2 2 9 Aetolia, battle of, 4 2 6 B.C., 127; de-
n.4 feat of D e m o s t h e n e s in, 127
Acarnania: victory of Agesilaus at, Aetolians: use of sarissa, 4 0 1 ; light
152 infantry with Caesar, 5 4 8
A c a r n a n i a n s : l i g h t i n f a n t r y withAfranius: Pompeian legate in Spain,
Caesar, 548 5 1 7 ; d e f e n s e o f Ilerda, 5 1 8 - 1 9 ;
Accensi, 2 9 2 m o v e m e n t out of Ilerda, 520-22,
Accensi velati, 2 6 6 ; clerks for a d - 5 2 4 ; surrender to Caesar, 5 2 2 - 2 3
ministration, 2 8 8 A g e d i s t i n c t i o n : in a s s i g n m e n t to
A c h a e a n s : in battle of M a n t i n e a , maniples, 292
247-49 Agesilaus: victory at Acarnania,
Achaemenidae, 447 152; action against Persian caval-
A d e i m a n t u s : p l a n for b a t t l e o f ry, 1 5 4 - 5 5 ; action at C o r o n e a ,
Salamis, 104; recognized by 155
Corinthians as victor of Salamis, Agis: action at Mantinea, 4 1 8 B.C.,
104, 108 131; march against Athens, 132
Administration: Roman attention to Agmen pilatum: R o m a n march col-
details of, 2 8 8 ; accensi velati as umn, 294
clerks, 288 Agmen quadratum: Roman approach
Aedui: appeal to Romans for help march formation, 294
against Helvetii, 4 6 4 ; failure to A g r i a n i a n s : peltasts of A t t a l u s at
deliver p r o m i s e d supplies, 4 6 5 ; Gaugamela, 2 1 5
factions among, 464, 467;Agrigentum: elephants in battle of,
Caesar's concern for betrayal by, 304
471-72; invasion of region of Aisne River: Caesar's fortified camp
Belgae, 4 9 0 ; w o n over by Ver- on, against Belgae, 4 8 8 - 8 9
cingetorix, 4 9 6 - 9 7 ; Caesar's plan Alcetas: battle of Cretopolis, 237-38
against, 4 9 8 Alesia: besieged by Caesar, 4 9 8 - 5 0 7 ;
A e m i l i u s P a u l l u s , L.: a t C a n n a e , r e f u g e for V e r c i n g e t o r i x , 4 9 8 ;
3 1 5 , 3 2 8 - 3 0 ; on camps, 2 8 5 ; at interval between towers in con-
Pydna, 395 travallation line, 4 5 7
A e n e a s ( S t y m p h a l i a n ) : first c o m - A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t : s l i n g e r s i n
p r e h e n s i v e work on military a r m y , 184 n . 1 0 ; rear a r e a s e -
theory, 163 cured through pacification of
G r e e k s , 187; b a t t l e o n t h e 2 6 3 ; Hannibal's attempt to win
Granicus, 185-90; Greeks in over, 339; importance to Rome,
a r m y of, 1 8 7 ; c o m p o s i t i o n o f 3 4 2 - 4 3 ; percentage in army and
army on Granicus, 190 n.2; delay fleet, 3 4 9 , 4 1 3 ; organization simi-
in Cilicia, 196; strategic disadvan- lar t o R o m a n s ' u n d e r M a r i u s ,
tage at Issus, 196; deployment at 418
Issus, 197; disorder in ranks at A l s e n : D a n i s h d e f e n s e at, 1 2 9 ;
Issus, 198; l e a d e r s h i p at Issus, comparison with Sphacteria, 129
2 0 2 ; reconnaissance before Issus, A m a n u s Mountains: role of, in bat-
206; subjugation of Phoenicia, tle of Issus, 195-96
Syria, Egypt, 210; sieges of Tyre, Ambrones: defeated by Marius near
Gaza, 2 1 0 ; crossing of Euphrates, Aquae Sextiae, 4 1 4
Tigris, 2 1 1 ; strength of army at A m o m p h a r e t u s : a c t i o n s of, at
Gaugamela, 210; double depth Plataea, 115, 287
of formation at Gaugamela, 2 1 3 ; A m p h i p o l i s : battle of, 1 3 1 ; C l e o n
flank positions of cavalry, light at, 131; Brasidas at, 131, 138
infantry at Gaugamela, 213; Amphitryon: d e f e n s e of Hercules as
formation at Gaugamela, 215; archer, 158-59
d e p l o y m e n t at Gaugamela, 215; Anabasis: t e x t b o o k on politics and
p u r p o r t e d lateral m o v e m e n t at art of war, 159; historical aspects
Gaugamela, 217; losses at of, not realistic, 159
Gaugamela, 2 1 9 n.6; strength of Anaptyssein: question of interpreta-
army on the Hydaspes, 2 2 0 , 2 2 8 tion of, in account of battle of
n . l ; c r o s s i n g o f the H y d a s p e s , Gaugamela, 2 1 5
2 2 1 ; formation and battle plan Ancient Greek Military Periods: basis
on the Hydaspes, 222; alleged for scholarly knowledge of Greek
letter on battle of H y d a s p e s , art of war, 2 8
2 2 4 - 2 5 ; bulletin b y m e m b e r o f A n n i h i l a t i o n : s t r a t e g y of, n o r m a l
entourage, 225-27; c o m m a n d of before Peloponnesian War, 135-
left wing on Hydaspes, 2 2 5 - 2 7 ; 36
losses on Hydaspes, 2 2 4 ; assess- Antepilani, 291
ment of, as military c o m m a n d e r , Antesignani: at P h a r s a l u s , 5 3 8 - 4 2 ,
2 3 0 - 3 4 ; victories d u e to com- 546, 549
b i n e d arms, professional army, A n t i g o n u s : battle of Sellasia, 2 3 8 ,
siegecraft, 2 3 0 ; e x p l o i t a t i o n o f 2 4 1 - 4 6 ; battle of Cretopolis,
victory, political base, 2 3 1 ; d e - 237-38; battle of Ipsus, 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 .
p e n d e n c e o n m a r c h e s , pursuit, See also E u m e n e s A n t i o c h u s I:
231, 233 n.2; unique ac- use of e l e p h a n t s against Gauls,
c o m p l i s h m e n t as strategist and 238, 2 4 1 ; battle of Raphia, 238,
c o m b a t a n t , 2 3 1 ; s u c c e s s o r s of, 246-47
2 3 5 - 2 5 2 ; comparison of successes Antiochus the Great (king of Syria):
with R o m a n lack of s u c c e s s in analysis by Kromayer, 399-401
East, 4 4 6 - 4 7 Antiochus VII (king of Syria): losses
Allier River, 4 6 4 at hands of Parthians, 4 4 7
Allies, R o m a n : not f o r m e d in le- A n t o n y , Mark: c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t
gions, 2 6 3 ; formed one-half of a Parthians, 2 1 6 , 4 4 3 - 4 9 ; size and
Roman army, 2 6 3 ; furnished c o m p o s i t i o n of army, 4 4 3 - 4 4 ;
twice as much cavalry as R o m e , campaign plan, 4 4 4 ; defeat of
Index 575
train with siege engines, 444-45; Caesar in account of Helvetian

attempt to capture Phraaspa, campaign, 4 6 0 ; Roman policy to
4 4 5 ; decimation of two cohorts, g e t a l o n g with, 4 6 7 ; h e l d h o s -
445-46; forced to withdraw, 446; t a g e s f r o m Gallic t r i b e s , 4 6 7 ;
question as to route followed into Caesar's intention to defeat,
Media, 4 4 8 ; e x a g g e r a t e d report 469-70, 477 n.7; c a m p a i g n
of losses, 4 4 9 ; fallacious aspects against Caesar, 479-87; coordina-
of Kromayer's study, 4 4 9 ; com- tion o f cavalry, light i n f a n t r y ,
mand of Caesar's residual forces 479; setting up of wagon de-
at B r u n d i s i u m , 5 3 0 ; successful fenses, 4 7 9 - 8 0 ; battle against
crossing of Adriatic, 530-31 Caesar, 4 8 0 - 8 1 ; army not larger
Apollonia: captured by Caesar, 5 2 9 than Caesar's, 4 8 1 - 8 2 ; forced to
Appian: false a c c o u n t of battle of u s e light infantry with regular
C a n n a e 3 2 8 - 3 1 ; ' f o u r strata- infantry, 4 8 1 ; uncertainty as to
gems" at Cannae, 3 3 1 ; fictitious re- location of battle, 482-87;
port o n i n d i v i d u a l c o m b a t b e - capabilities of, 4 8 3
tween Hannibal and Scipio, 377; Aristobulus: source for Arrian, 3 0 2
a c c o u n t o f battle o f M a g n e s i a , Ariston: command of Paeonian
398-99; o p p o s i n g strengths at cavalry at Gaugamela, 2 1 5
Pharsalus, 5 4 4 - 4 9 A r m s : arma antesignana, 2 8 2 n.9;
A q u a e S e x t i a e : victory o f Marius arma postsignana, 2 8 2 , n.9
over T e u t o n e s and A m b r o n e s , Army Organization and Conduct of
414 War by the Greeks: Dr. H.
Archelaus, 4 3 9 Droysen, 2 8 ; basis for scholarly
Archers: respected in Greece, 55; of knowledge of Greek military art,
secondary i m p o r t a n c e to spear, 28
55; importance in Persian army, A r m y strengths: starting point for
6 7 ; range of, 89 n.6; action at military-historical study, 3 3 ; criti-
Plataea, 114; auxiliary aspect of, cal t r e a t m e n t o f h i s t o r i c a l ac-
in Greek tactics, 124; Delbrück counts impossible without con-
opinion of A t h e n i a n , as elite, cept of, 33; false impressions of,
well trained corps, 124; qualities 33-35, 70; Greek, at Plataea, 36,
r e q u i r e d of, 1 2 4 ; u n i t s of, 112; Greek, at Marathon, 3 7 , 6 4 ,
c r e a t e d b y S p a r t a n s , 132 n . l ; 70; Athenian, reported by
H e r c u l e s as p r i m e e x a m p l e of, Thucydides in speech by Pericles,
158; m o u n t e d , in Alexander's 39-42; Athenian, at Delium, 4 1 ;
army against Darius, 177; inactiv- garrison troops in Athens, 4 2 - 4 4 ;
ity of Persian, on Granicus, 188; Greek, estimate of, 63; misstate-
Briso's, in A l e x a n d e r ' s army at m e n t of, at G r a v e l o t t e - S a i n t -
Gaugamela, 2 1 5 Privat, by Moltke, 4 3 ; p o p u l a r
l e g e n d c o n c e r n i n g , 69; Persian,
Archidamus (king of Sparta): belief
at Marathon, 72, 82, 87; of Alex-
in chance in war, 5 7 0
ander and Persians on
Aretes: c o m m a n d of Paeonian
Granicus, 185-86; c o m m a n d e r s '
cavalry at Gaugamela, 2 1 5
tendency to understate, 357;
A r g i v e s : elite unit o f 1,000 m e n
Caesar's numerical superiority in
among, 146
battles in Gaul, 4 7 1 , 4 8 1 - 8 2 , 4 9 1 ;
Ariovistus: domination of Gaul by,
Caesar at Alesia, 4 9 9 , 5 0 5 n . l ;
4 6 0 , 4 6 7 ; not m e n t i o n e d by
Vercingetorix at Alesia, 4 9 9 - 5 0 5 ; of fleet in 4 9 0 B . C . , 72; evacua-
o p p o s i n g forces at Pharsalus, tion of, before battle of Salamis,
5 4 4 - 4 9 ; Prussian in 1776, 37 103; lack of statesmen in, after
Arrian: careless in account of battle Pericles, 138; losses on Sicily, 143
o n H y d a s p e s , 2 2 6 - 2 8 ; false ac- n . l ; organization into tribes, trit-
count of Alexander's reorganiza- tyes, d e m e s , 144; general citizen
tion of army, 2 3 2 - 3 3 ; sources of, levy very rare, 144; potential in-
in Ptolemy and Aristobulus, 3 0 2 e q u a l i t i e s in g e n e r a l levy, 144;
Arrows: r e p o r t o f b u r n i n g arrows wages paid in longer campaigns,
in battle of B e n e v e n t u m , 3 0 0 144; military wages provided by
Artabazus: failure to take part in allies, 144; gradual change from
battle of Plataea, 117 citizens to professional soldiers,
Artaphernes: at Marathon, 72 144-45; Nicias' reminder to pro-
Artavasdes (king of Armenia): allied fessional soldiers of, at Syracuse,
with Antony, 4 4 4 ; withdrawal be- 1 4 5 ; e l i m i n a t i o n o f class divi-
fore joining Romans, 4 4 5 sions, 146; city dwellers favored
A r t a v a s d e s ( k i n g o f M e d i a [At- in levy, 147 n.5
ropatene]): attacked by A n t o n y , A t r e b a t e s : final e f f o r t t o d e f e a t
4 4 4 - 4 5 ; destroyed Antony's train, Caesar, 491
4 4 4 ; d e f e n d e d Phraaspa against Atropatene. See Media
siege, 4 4 5 - 4 6 ; p u r s u e d A n t o n y , Attalus: command of peltasts
446 (Agrianians) at Gaugamela, 2 1 5
A r t a x e r x e s : i n battle o f C u n a x a , Attica: population of, 37-49; slaves
154 and mercenaries in population
Artemisium, battle of, 98-101 of, 141-42
Arverni: capital town (Gergovia) at- Attrition: strategy of, in Peloponne-
tacked by Caesar, 4 9 6 ; j o i n e d by sian W a r , 1 3 5 - 3 6 ; H a n n i b a l ' s
Gallic tribes against Caesar, 496; strategy, 3 3 8
warlike virtues, 5 0 9 Aufidus River: question as to which
A s c u l u m , battle of, 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ; c o n - bank, battle of Cannae, 3 2 4
tradictory reports, 2 9 9 Aurelius Scaurus: defeated near
Asinius Pollio: source of report on Arausio, 105 B . C . , 4 1 4
strength of Helvetii, 4 7 5 ; source Auxilia, 4 1 8
of reports on civil war, 5 3 6 n.5, A v a r i c u m ( B o u r g e s ) : c a p t u r e d by
5 3 6 n.6; nature of strength re- Caesar, 4 9 6
p o r t s , 5 4 3 - 4 9 ; 5 5 1 ; s o u r c e for
Caesar's African campaign, 5 5 6
Assault run: Athenians at Bacula I, battle of, 3 7 8
Marathon, 74-76; theories of Bacula II, battle of, 3 7 8
Hauvette on, at Marathon, 83- Bagradas valley: followed by Scipio
8 5 ; Nervii o n S a m b r e , 8 8 n . 3 ; before Zama-Naraggara, 381
Gauls against R o m a n c a m p , 88 Balearics: with Mago in Africa, 3 8 1 ;
n . 3 ; Caesar's infantry at Phar- mercenaries in Roman army,
salus, 86; Danes at Lundby, 75 4 1 3 ; a m o n g Caesar's auxilia in
A t h e n s : p o p u l a t i o n of, 3 7 - 4 9 ; Helvetian campaign, 478 n . l l ;
militarily qualified m e n in, 3 7 - with Caesar against Belgae, 4 8 8
4 9 ; import of grain into, 4 9 ; lack Bang, M.: The Germanic Warriors in
Index 577
the Service of Rome, 5 4 4 ; G e r - Bibrax (Vieux-Laon or Bievres): in-

manic foot t r o o p s at Pharsalus, vested by Belgae, 4 8 9
545 Bituriges: loss of capital, Avaricum,
Barbarians: inability to maintain to Caesar, 4 9 6 ; warlike virtues,
large army, 4 8 8 ; comparison of, 509
as warriors, with R o m a n s , 5 0 8 - B l ü c h e r : c o m p a r i s o n with S c i p i o ,
13; n o t n u m e r i c a l l y s t r o n g e r 385
than R o m a n s , 5 0 8 - 1 3 ; Caesar's B o a r d i n g bridge: invented by Ro-
n e e d t o u n d e r s t a t e t h e i r ac- mans, 303
c o m p l i s h m e n t in civil war, 5 5 0 Boeotia: appreciation of cavalry in,
B a u e r , A d o l f , D r . : Ancient Greek 152; d e v e l o p m e n t of hamippen in,
Military Periods, 28 152
Beilan Pass: role of, before battle of B o g u a s (king of Numidia): in battle
Issus, 192 of Munda, 5 6 0
Belgae: account of Caesar's subjec- B o i i : i n b a t t l e with C . S u l p i c i u s ,
tion of, 4 8 8 - 9 4 ; inability to main- 279; Cisalpine, uprising, 3 5 3 ;
tain large army, 4 8 8 ; s t r e n g t h , flank attack of, against Caesar at
4 9 0 ; dissolution of army, defeat, Bibracte, 4 7 1 - 7 3 ; relationship to
4 9 0 - 9 1 ; final e f f o r t b y t h r e e tribes on lower Garonne, 4 7 8 n.9
tribes, 491 Brasidas: troops of, at Amphipolis,
Bellovaci: outstandingly courageous, 131; victory at Amphipolis, 138;
509 campaign in T h r a c e , 82; c o m p o -
B e l o c h , J u l i u s : Population of the sition of army in T h r a c e , 1 4 6 ;
Greco-Roman World, 38; estimates representative of transition to
o f p o p u l a t i o n o f Gallic t r i b e s , professional officer status, 149;
493 d i s t i n c t i o n of, b e t w e e n G r e e k
B e n e v e n t u m , battle of, 300; reports and barbarian m e t h o d s of war-
worthless, 3 0 0 ; reported use o f fare, 175; g o o d discipline of
burning arrows at, 3 0 0 Helots under, 287
Berry-au-Bac: excavations of B r i s o : a r c h e r s of, in A l e x a n d e r ' s
Caesar's c a m p on Aisne, 4 8 9 army at Gaugamela, 2 1 5
Besançon: relation to battle between Britain: war effort in N a p o l e o n i c
Caesar a n d A r i o v i s t u s , 4 8 2 - 8 6 ; era, 3 5 0
p o s s i b l e u s e of, as b a s e for B r u n d i s i u m : embarkation port for
Caesar against Gauls, 497 C a e s a r , 5 2 9 ; l o n g wait in, for
Bessi: at Pharsalus, 5 4 6 r e m a i n d e r of Caesar's force,
Bial: Chemins de la Gaulle, 4 6 4 529-30
Bibliography of Roman military sys- Byzantium: siege of, by Philip II of
tem: Römische Staatsverwaltung, Macedon, 181
268
Bibracte, 4 6 2 , 4 6 5 ; account of battle
of, 4 7 0 - 7 6 ; strength of Caesar's Caepio: defeated near Arausio 105
f o r c e s at, 4 7 1 ; flank attack by B.C., 4 1 4
Boii and Tulingeri at, 4 7 1 ; suc- Caesar, C. J u l i u s : e s t i m a t e of his
cess of Roman echelon tactics at, generalship, 4 5 3 ; source mate-
4 7 1 ; disagreement on location of rials on campaigns of, 4 5 3 ; bib-
battle of, 4 7 2 - 7 6 liography on, 454-57; replace-
ment system, 4 5 5 ; cavalry in 5 1 8 - 1 9 ; bloodless victory in

a r m y of, 4 5 7 - 5 8 ; c a m p a i g n Spain, 520-27; strength after vic-
against H e l v e t i i , 4 5 9 - 7 8 ; o m i s - tory a t I l e r d a , 5 2 8 ; m o v e t o
sions and distortions in account E p i r u s , 5 2 9 ; inferiority at sea,
of Helvetian campaign, 460, 5 2 8 - 2 9 ; divided army in Epirus,
465-66, 469-70, 474-75; peace Hellas, 5 3 1 ; siege of Dyr-
negotiations with Helvetii, 4 6 5 , r h a c h i u m , d e f e a t , 5 3 1 - 3 3 ; esti-
468; informed in Rome of Hel- mate of e n e m y ' s courses of ac-
vetii's intentions, 4 6 7 - 6 8 ; intention, 5 3 3 - 3 4 ; m o v e to Thessaly,
tion to replace h e g e m o n y of 534; strength of army facing
Ariovistus by his own, 4 6 8 ; rein- Pompey, 5 3 4 - 3 5 ; formation and
forced by cavalry of Aedui, 468; strategy at Pharsalus, 5 3 8 - 3 9 ,
followed Helvetii, 4 6 8 ; moved 5 5 1 ; support of cavalry by heavy
toward Bibracte, 4 6 9 ; attacked by infantry, 540; high morale of
Helvetii, 4 6 9 ; caution in relying troops at Pharsalus, 5 4 1 ; victory
on Commentaries of, 4 7 0 ; defeated at Pharsalus, 541-42; figures for
Helvetii at Bibracte, 4 7 1 ; accom- losses in civil war, 543; little em-
p a n i e d by auxilia in H e l v e t i a n phasis on barbarians in his army
campaign, 478 n . l l ; campaign in civil war, 550; bias and distor-
against Ariovistus, 4 7 9 - 8 7 ; estab- tions i n s t r e n g t h f i g u r e s , 3 5 7 ,
lishment of camps, 4 7 9 - 8 0 ; battle
5 5 2 ; African campaign, 5 5 6 - 6 0 ;
w i t h A r i o v i s t u s , 4 8 0 - 8 1 ; not
battle of T h a p s u s , 556-57; battle
numerically inferior to Ariovis-
o f Ruspina, 5 5 7 - 5 9 ; r e p r e s e n t s
tus, 4 8 1 - 8 2 ; uncertainty as to lo-
peak of art of war in antiquity,
cation of battle against Ariovis-
565; "conquer by hunger," 565-
tus, 4 8 2 - 8 7 ; subjection of Belgae,
66; natural inclination toward
488-94; strength against Belgae,
t h i n g s technical, 5 6 6 ; p e r s o n a l
4 8 8 ; fortified camp on Aisne,
characteristics of, 5 6 8 - 6 9 ; belief
4 8 8 - 8 9 ; defeat of Belgae without
in chance, 569-70; estimate of
major battle, 4 9 0 ; numerical
Pompey, 5 6 9
s u p e r i o r i t y in b a t t l e s in G a u l ,
Caius Aurelius, Consul, 4 3 4
4 9 1 - 9 2 , 4 9 5 , 5 1 1 - 1 2 , 5 6 7 ; at-
Caius Gracchus: c h a n g e s in re-
tacked by three tribes on
Sambre, 4 9 1 ; c a m p a i g n against quired service, 417
Vercingetorix, 4 9 5 - 5 0 7 ; caution Callisthenes: account of battle of Is-
i n Gallic w a r s , 4 9 5 ; r e s o r t t o sus, 2 0 3
sieges, 4 9 6 ; setbacks at Gergovia, Caltrops: reported use of, by Per-
Paris, 4 9 6 ; attacked on march by sians at Gaugamela, 2 1 2
Vercingetorix, 498; pursuit of Camps: Roman, 284-85; Greek,
Vercingetorix, 498; siege of 2 8 4 ; A e m i l i u s Paullus o n , 2 8 5 ;
Alesia, 498-507; strategy of con- heavy burden for Roman soldier,
c e n t r a t i o n o f forces, 5 0 8 , 5 6 7 ; 285; gates, 2 9 4 ; shape, 294 n.3,
different conditions in civil war stakes for, 2 9 5 n.4; d e f e n s e of,
from Gallic war, 5 1 5 ; s t r e n g t h by Iphicrates, 2 9 4 , n.2; gave de-
and strategy in civil war, 515-16, fensive superiority, 566-67
5 2 5 n . l ; initially i n f e r i o r i n Cannae, battle of, 3 1 5 - 3 3 3 ; Hanni-
s t r e n g t h , 5 1 6 ; s i e g e o f Ilerda, bal possibly a u t h o r of a c c o u n t ,
3 1 1 ; sets pattern of tactics for
Index 579
Second Punic War, 3 1 3 ; Roman 366; impregnable, 380; broken
strength, 315, 325-27; Roman treaty with Rome, 3 8 1 ; no siege
losses, 3 2 0 - 3 2 5 ; R o m a n forma- possible after Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a ,
tion, 3 1 5 ; flank on Aufidus river, 3 8 4 . See also Hannibal
315; cavalry on both flanks, 315; Carthaginians: sieges by, of Selinus,
Carthaginian strength, 316, 326; Himera, Acragas, Gela, 153; flex-
C a r t h a g i n i a n l o s s e s , 3 2 0 ; Car- ibility of tactics in Second Punic
thaginian formation, 316-17; War, 3 3 6 . See also Hannibal
Carthaginian cavalry, 3 1 7 ; Has- Casualty figures: false, in
drubal's cavalry in, 317; phalanx N a p o l e o n i c W a r s , 3 4 ; wars o f
b a t t l e , 3 1 7 - 1 8 ; c a v a l r y attack liberation, 34; French and Aus-
from rear decisive, 319; flanking trian at Aspern, 3 4 ; Burgundians
attack b y A f r i c a n s , 3 1 9 - 2 0 ; at Granson, 34
placement of Hannibal's troops, Catapults: use of, by Machanidas at
3 2 0 - 2 1 ; importance of timing, Mantinea, 247
3 2 1 ; reasons for Hannibal's vic- Cato: 2 6 4 , at Dyrrhachium, 545
tory, 3 2 2 ; q u e s t i o n as to which C a v a l r y : no u s e of, by G r e e k s
bank of A u f i d u s , 3 2 4 ; strength against Persians, 57; lack of, in
analysis, Delbrück, 326-27; false G r e e c e , 5 9 ; n o m e n t i o n of, a t
account by A p p i a n , 3 2 8 - 3 1 ; va- Marathon, 81; assumed presence
lidity of sources, 3 3 1 - 3 3 ; curved of, at Marathon, 82-83; Persian,
Carthaginian front, 3 3 3 ; side- at Plataea, 116; influence of Per-
ward shift of Romans, 333; ran- sian, on Greek tactics, 124; con-
s o m o f R o m a n prisoners taken ditions in Athens and Sparta not
in, 340-41 favorable for formation of, 124;
Cantalupi, P.: account of battle of role of, at Delium, 131; role of,
Cannae, 325 at M a n t i n e a , 1 3 1 ; r o l e of, at
Canusium, 324 Syracuse, 131; use of, by Gylip-
Capite censi, 4 1 9 pus, 132; creation of, by Spar-
Cappadocians: at Pharsalus, 5 4 6 t a n s , 1 3 2 n . l ; p r o g r e s s of, i n
Capua: weak infantry, strong caval- f o u r t h c e n t u r y B.C., n o t clear,
ry, 2 5 7 , 2 7 0 n.3; defection from 1 5 2 ; u s e o f hamippen w i t h , i n
Roman alliance, 339; besieged by Boeotia, 152; writings on, by
Romans, 3 4 2 ; Hannibal's attempt X e n o p h o n , 176; Macedonian,
to lift siege, 342-43; connotation first real tactical u n i t s , 177;
of name, 3 4 3 - 4 4 M a c e d o n i a n , hetairoi ("Compan-
Caput contubernii, 4 3 2 ions"), 176-77; Xenophon's con-
Cardaces: hoplites of, at Issus, 192; cept of arms and equipment for,
176; importance of, in Macedo-
flight of, at Issus, 198
nian army, 180; of right flank,
Carnutes: warlike virtues, 5 0 9
d e c i s i v e blow in Philip's army,
C a r t h a g e : art o f l a n d w a r f a r e
180-81; use of shields by
learned from X a n t h i p p u s , 3 0 3 ;
Macedonian, 183 n.5; in Darius'
peace at e n d of First Punic War,
army at Gaugamela, 2 1 1 - 1 2 ;
304; victory against mercenaries,
m a x i m u m feasible s t r e n g t h o f
305 n.4; cavalry superiority use-
d i v i s i o n of, 2 1 9 n . 3 ; o n b o t h
less i n s i e g e s , 3 3 8 ; d e f e a t of,
flanks on Hydaspes, 221;
m a d e R o m a n E m p i r e possible,
M a c e d o n i a n , fear o f e l e p h a n t s , of, by Kromayer, 182; battle of,
2 2 2 - 2 3 ; m o u n t e d combat in early b e t w e e n Sulla and Mithridates,
Italy, 2 5 6 ; i m p o r t a n c e of, i n 4 3 8 ; strengths and losses at, 513
Capua, 2 5 7 , 2 7 0 n.3; not divided Chalybes: length of spears, 401
into juniores, seniores, 2 6 0 - 6 1 ; of Chance, element of, 569-70
R o m a n allies t w i c e a s s t r o n g , Chariots, scythed: appraised by
2 6 3 ; history of Roman, 267; at- X e n o p h o n , 162; at G a u g a m e l a ,
tack from rear decisive at Can- 2 1 1 ; earlier success with, by
nae, 319; of no assistance to Pharnabazus, 212-13; unique
Carthaginians in sieges, 338; vic- r o l e of, a t G a u g a m e l a , 2 1 8 ;
tory a n d h e a d l o n g p u r s u i t b y c a s u a l t i e s c a u s e d by, 2 1 9 n . 5 ;
Romans at Zama-Naraggara, used by Gauls against Antiochus,
3 7 1 ; timely return of Romans at 2 4 1 ; in battle of Magnesia, 3 9 9
Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a , 3 7 4 ; part o f Charolais, 462
Roman citizens in, after Second Cilicia: delay of Alexander in, 196
Punic War, 4 2 4 ; allocation of, to Cimbri: d e f e a t e d by Marius, 4 1 4 ;
l e g i o n s , u n d e r Caesar, 4 5 6 ; i n fantasy in battle account, 4 3 8 - 3 9 ;
Caesar's army, 4 5 7 - 5 8 ; n e e d for battles with R o m a n s , 4 8 3 ; di-
history of d e v e l o p m e n t of, 4 5 7 - v i d e d c a m p a i g n into Italy with
58 Teutones, 488
Celtiberians. at Cannae, 3 2 9 - 3 1 ; ex- Cincius Alimentus: report of H a n -
cellent swords of, 306; stratagem nibal's losses, 3 5 9
of 500 in Appian's account of Cisalpine Gauls: conquered by Ro-
Cannae, 329-31 mans, 3 0 5 - 7 ; doubtful accounts
Celtic: cavalry in battle on the T r e - by Polybius, 3 0 5
bia, 3 6 1 ; infantry in Hannibal's Civilization: military a d v a n t a g e s
army after battle on the Trebia, over barbarians, 510-11
361 Civil war, Roman: opposing
Centurions, 288, 429-36; unique strengths, 515-16; war in Spain,
position, 429; characteristics, 517-27; campaign in Greece,
431-36; Spurius Ligustinus, 528-37
4 3 4 - 3 6 ; disciplinary base of Ro- Class divisions: Servian distinctions
man power, 288, 438; modern eliminated, 2 6 4
comparison, 4 5 6 Classes: no mention by Thucydides
Century, Roman: overall organiza- of, in Athens, 4 9 - 5 0 ; exaggerated
tion, 2 5 9 ; juniores, 260-61; c o n c e p t of, i n R o m a n h i s t o r y ,
seniores; 2 6 0 - 6 1 ; gradual separa- 49-50; four, by property in fifth
tion of double purpose, 2 6 2 ; in century B.C., 6 4 ; lack of political
older period administrative unit, significance, 64; specific military
2 6 3 ; error in n u m b e r of, 2 6 4 ; of obligations of various, 6 4 ; divi-
knights, 265; names of oldest sion into, eliminated by shift to
cavalry units, 2 6 6 ; auxiliary (ac- mercenary army, 146
censi velati), 266 Classis, 2 6 9
Chaeronea: battle of, between Philip C l a u d i u s Q u a d r i g i a r i u s : distorted
II and Greeks, 181-82; disputed report o f b a t t l e o f Asculum, 2 9 9
l o n g m o v e m e n t in b a c k s t e p at, Cleander: at Gaugamela, 2 1 5
181-82; description of battlefield Clearchus: discipline of fear, 287
Index 581
Cleombrotus: at Leuctra, 168 Corinth: number of hoplites in, 63;
C l e o m e n e s : battle of Sellasia, 2 3 8 , battle of, 155
2 4 1 - 4 6 ; use of sarissa, 4 0 3 C o r i n t h i a n s : p a r t i c i p a t i o n of, at
Cleon: significance of, at Sphacteria, Salamis, 108
1 2 7 - 3 0 , 1 4 1 ; action of, at A m - C o r o n e a : battle of, 155; Agesilaus
phipolis, 131 at, 1 5 5 ; h o l d i n g back o f left
Cleruchs: inclusion of, in total of flank at, 170
A t h e n i a n citizens, 4 4 ; n u m b e r s Cotta (consul): punishment of rela-
of, vis-a-vis Thêtes, 45 tive, 2 9 6 n . l l
Clipei, 265 Crannon, battle of, 2 3 7 - 3 8
Clitus: killed by Alexander, 402 Crassus (father): campaign against
Clustuminian tribe, 150, 2 5 9 , 2 6 4 - Parthians, 4 4 1 - 4 3 ; strength of
65 army, 4 4 1 , 546; defeat of son of,
C. Marius. See Marius, C. 4 4 2 ; forced to withdraw, 4 4 2 ; re-
Coenus: c o m m a n d of right wing on treat slowed, losses increased by
Hydaspes, 2 2 2 , 225-28 l a r g e size o f a r m y , 4 4 3 ; m u r -
Cohort, Roman: formed under dered during negotiations, 4 4 3
Marius, 4 1 5 ; flexibility, 4 1 5 - 1 6 ; Crassus, Publius (son): in c o m m a n d
V e i t h ' s c o n c e p t o f tactics of, of Caesar's cavalry against
423-24 Ariovistus, 4 8 1 ; defeated by
Colchians: combat of, against T e n Parthians, 4 4 2 ; strength against
T h o u s a n d , 150-51 Parthians, 5 4 6
C o l o m b , G.: on location of battle Crastinus: e x a m p l e of evocati, 4 5 6 -
b e t w e e n Caesar and Ariovistus, 57, 551
4 8 5 - 8 7 ; "Caesar's C a m p a i g n Craterus. See E u m e n e s
against Ariovistus," 487 n.2 Cretans: mercenaries in R o m a n ar-
Combat arms: interrelationship of my, 4 1 3 ; a m o n g Caesar's auxilia
under Alexander, 236 in Helvetian campaign, 4 7 8 n . l l ;
Commander's foresight: Alexander with Caesar against Belgae, 4 8 8 ;
o n Hydaspes, 2 2 4 - 2 5 with Caesar at Alesia, 4 9 9
C o m p a n i o n s of the King. See Cretopolis, battle of, 237-38
Hetairoi C. Sulpicius: in battle with Boii,
C o n s t i t u t i o n , R o m a n : r e f o r m of, 279-80
179 B . C , 2 6 4 ; continuity in de- Ctesiphon, 444
velopment of, 2 6 9 n . l ; breached C u n a x a : b a t t l e of, 1 5 4 - 5 5 ; A r -
in S e c o n d Punic War, 367; dis- taxerxes at, 154; Cyrus at, 154;
cussed by Polybius, 3 3 9 army strengths, 513
Consuls: shared c o m m a n d , 2 6 3 , 271 Cunctator, 343
n.8; daily alternation of c o m - Curio: defeat in Africa, 5 5 8
m a n d , 271 n.8; power of, 2 8 8 Curtius: confused in account of bat-
C o n t e m p o r a r y historical r e p o r t s : tle on Hydaspes, 228, 2 2 8 n.l
credibility of, 84; necessity to bal- Cynoscephalae, battle of, 2 3 8 , 3 9 4 ,
a n c e , with objective interpreta- 397-98; influence of elephants,
tion, 84 398; Livy's account, 3 9 8
Corcyraeans: fleet of 60 triremes of, Cyrus: in battle of Cunaxa, 154
at Salamis. 104 Cythera: failure of Pericles to oc-
Corfinium: besieged by Caesar, 5 1 6 cupy, 140
Damis: defense against elephants at Diadochi, 2 3 5 - 5 2 ; founding of sub-
Megalopolis, 241 empires by, 2 3 5 ; d e p e n d e n c e of,
Dardani: at Pharsalus, 5 4 6 on mercenary armies, 2 3 5 ; ques-
Darius C o d o m a n n u s : army of, at Is- tions raised d u r i n g period of—
s u s , 1 9 2 ; a l l e g e d e r r o r of, i n elephants, sarissa, relationship of
s e l e c t i n g t e r r a i n at Issus, 195; combat arms, 2 3 5 - 3 6 ; unable to
flight of, at Issus, 198; position c o p e w i t h G a u l s , 2 3 6 ; little
and armament of, at Gaugamela, change from Alexander's
2 1 1 ; scythed chariots in army of, m e t h o d s , 2 3 6 ; battles of, 2 3 7 - 5 2
at Gaugamela, 2 1 1 ; elephants in Dio Cassius: source for Caesar's Gal-
a r m y of, a t G a u g a m e l a , 2 1 1 ; lic wars, 4 8 3 ; source for Caesar's
cavalry in army of, at Gaugame- African campaign, 5 5 6
la, 211-12; uncertain a m o u n t of Dionysius the Elder (tyrant of Syra-
infantry in army of, at Gaugame- cuse): d e v e l o p m e n t of siege e n -
la, 2 1 2 ; weakness of Persian Em- gines, 153
pire, 4 4 7 - 4 8 Dioscuri: patrons of knighthood,
Datis: at Marathon, 72 268
Decani, 4 3 2 Dipaea, battle of: role of soothsayer,
D e f e n s e o f m o u n t a i n passes: c o n - 118; A r c h i d a m u s ' use of au-
cept of, in m o d e r n strategy, 9 2 - guries in, 118
9 3 ; e n v e l o p m e n t , always possible, Discipline: R o m a n 2 5 7 , 2 8 3 , 2 8 6 - 9 0 ;
9 2 ; Bactrians', against King Ni- prerequisite for manipular
n u s , 9 3 ; t h e o r y of, k n o w n t o phalanx, 2 7 4 ; d i f f e r e n c e s be-
Greeks, 9 3 ; most recent concept tween Greeks and Romans, 2 8 6 -
of, m o d i f i e d b e c a u s e o f h u g e 87; Phocion on Greek, 286;
m o d e r n armies, 97 n . l Spartan, 2 8 6 - 8 7 ; based on c o m -
D e f e n s e of walls: numbers required m a n d authority in Roman army,
for, of Athens, 47 286-87; Pausanias at Plataea, 287
Dejotarus: at Pharsalus, 5 4 6 Divitiacus (prince of Aedui): secret
Delbrück: "Mind and Mass in His- request for R o m a n aid, 4 6 7
tory," 513 Dolopes: light infantry with Caesar,
Deli-Tschai River: Issus battlefield 548
not along, 192, 2 0 2 , 2 0 7 n.l Domaszewski: " T h e A r m i e s o f the
D e l i u m : battle of, 130; cavalry at, Civil Wars in the Years 49 to 42
131 B.C.," 525-26; The Banners of the
Dellius: source for account of A n - Roman Army, 5 6 0
t o n y ' s c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t Par- Domitius: c a m p a i g n against Scipio
thians, 4 4 8 ; trivial aspects of ac- ( P o m p e i a n ) , 5 3 3 ; a l m o s t inter-
count, 4 4 8 cepted by Pompeians, 5 3 4
Demetrius: battle of Gaza, 2 3 7 , 2 4 0 ; Domitius Ahenobarbus: besieged by
b a t t l e o f 3 1 2 B . C , 2 3 8 ; battle Caesar in Corfinium, 5 1 6
against Cassander, 2 3 8 ; battle of Drill: R o m a n , 2 8 3 - 8 4 ; required by
I p s u s , 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 ; battle o f 2 8 8 m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x , 2 8 3 - 8 4 ; re-
B.C, 238 finement of, a m o n g Greek mer-
D e m o s t h e n e s : defeat of, in Aetolia, cenaries, 149-50; place of
1 2 7 ; victory of, at O l p a e , 1 3 0 ; enomotarch in Spartan, 150; role
representative of transition to of, in retreat of the T e n
professional officer status, 149 T h o u s a n d , 150; use of, to enable
Index 583
hoplite m o v e against cavalry of o n M a c e d o n i a n horses, 2 2 2 - 2 3 ;

Pharnabazus, 150 action in battle on H y d a s p e s ,
Droysen, H., Dr.: Army Organization 2 2 3 - 2 7 ; trampled o w n infantry,
and Conduct of War by the Greeks, 224; wounded, captured, 224;
28 number exaggerated, 225; use
Druids: hierarchy in Gaul, 5 0 9 of, by Diadochi, 236-37; in battle
Dumnorix: facilitated move of Hel- of Paraetacene, 239; in battle of
vetii, 4 6 4 ; h o p e d t o o v e r c o m e Gaza, 240; at siege of
Ariovistus without R o m a n help, Megalopolis, 2 4 1 ; in battle of Ip-
467; mentioned by Caesar, 4 7 2 sus, 2 4 1 ; u s e of, by A n t i o c h u s
Dyrrhachium: occupied by Pompey, against Gauls, 2 4 1 ; in battle of
5 2 9 ; b e s i e g e d b y Caesar, 5 3 1 ; Raphia, 2 4 6 - 4 7 ; c o m p a r i s o n o f
victory for Pompey, 533 I n d i a n and African, 2 4 6 ; c o m -
b i n e d w i t h c a v a l r y at R a p h i a ,
2 4 7 ; introduced in Macedonian
Ebert, C: On the Origin of the Bellum army by Pyrrhus, 297; in battle
of Heraclea, 299; in battle of As-
Gallicum, 4 8 7
culum, 300; at Agrigentum, 3 0 4 ;
Eburones: annihilation of 1½ Ro-
R o m a n s ' f e a r of, 3 0 4 ; i m p o r -
man legions, 508, 512-13
tance in Carthage's victory over
Ebro River: role in siege of Ilerda,
mercenaries, 3 0 5 ; in Hannibal's
518-27
army at Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a , 3 7 0 -
Echelon formation: characteristics,
7 1 ; u n u s u a l u s e of, a t Z a m a -
372-74
N a r a g g a r a , 3 7 1 - 7 2 ; killed by
Echelon tactics: first significant use
mahouts when out of control,
of, at Zama-Naraggara, 3 7 2 , 376;
3 7 2 ; broke up sarissa phalanx at
p r e c u r s o r s of, 3 7 4 ; d e p e n d e n t
Cynoscephalae, 398; in battle of
on soldiers' trust in leaders, 375;
Magnesia, 3 9 9 - 4 0 0 ; summary o f
lack of mass pressure counterbal-
effectiveness of, 561-64; last use
anced by military training, 3 7 5 ;
in antiquity at Thapsus, 5 6 1 ; loss-
d e p e n d e n t on professional sol-
es a n d victories, 5 6 1 - 6 2 ; effec-
diers, officers, 375; second eche-
tive against cavalry, light infan-
lon equivalent to a reserve, 375-
try, 5 6 2 ; i n e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t
76; d e v e l o p e d by Scipio in Spain,
p h a l a n x , 5 6 2 ; v u l n e r a b i l i t y of,
3 7 6 ; u s e d by Scipio on "Great
563
Plains," 3 7 6 , 389; not developed
by R o m a n s until S e c o n d Punic Eleusis, Bay of: true location of bat-
W a r , 3 8 9 ; s u c c e s s of, a g a i n s t tle of Salamis, 106
Helvetii at Bibracte, 4 7 1 ; success Elinga, battle of. See Bacula II, bat-
of, against Ariovistus, 481 tle o f
Efforts, War. See War efforts Enomotys: in Spartan organization,
Eichheim, Max: The Struggles of the 153
Helvetii, Suebi, and Belgae against E n n i u s : epic served as s o u r c e for
C. Julius Caesar: N e w L o o k s at Polybius, 377
Old Stories, 4 7 3 Envelopment: double, by Carthagin-
E l e p h a n t s : u s e of, by D a r i u s at ians at Cannae, 3 1 8 ; p r e v e n t e d
Gaugamela, 2 1 1 ; in Porus' army in World War (I) by extension to
on Hydaspes, 221; formation absolute borders, 5 6 8
with phalanx, 2 2 1 , 225; effect of, E p a m i n o n d a s , 1 6 5 - 1 7 1 ; creator o f
p h a l a n x flank battle, 180; fun- Fabius M a x i m u s . See Quintus

damental innovation: reinforce- Fabius Maximus
m e n t of left flank, 165; use of Fabius Pictor: source for Polybius in
cavalry to protect flank, 165; first First Punic War, 3 0 1 - 2 ; s o u r c e
to use coordinated attack of infor Second Punic War, 332
fantry and cavalry, 165-67; Fantasy in battle accounts: Marius
p e n e t r a t e d Spartans with d e e p against Cimbri, T e u t o n e s , 4 3 8 -
left flank at Mantinea, 166; use 39; Sulla against Archelaus, 4 3 9
of cavalry on both flanks at De- Fifth Legion (Alauda), 526
l i u m , 1 6 6 ; use of hamippen at First Punic War, 301-7; account by
Mantinea, 166, 170; strong dis- Polybius, 301; sources of
c i p l i n e i n T h e b a n a r m y , 167; Polybius, 301-2; distortion in oral
"Sacred Band" at Leuctra, 167 tradition, 3 0 1 ; d e p e n d e n c e o n
E p h i a l t e s : t r e a c h e r y of, at T h e r - P o l y b i u s ' j u d g m e n t , 3 0 2 ; not
mopylae, 92 purely a land power-sea power
Epibatae: i n c l u s i o n of, in s h i p s ' struggle, 302; e n d e d with tolera-
crews, 41 ble peace for Carthage, 304; sizes
Epidaurus: failure of Pericles' cam- of fleets exaggerated, 3 0 5
paign against, 140 Flaminius (Consul): in battle against
Epirotes: alternation with Italians Gauls, 2 2 3 B . C , 3 0 7 , 4 1 0
in Pyrrhus' army, 396 Fleet maneuverability: difficulty of,
Equites: similar to medieval knights, with large fleets, 101-2
267 Fleet s t r e n g t h s : A t h e n i a n , in 4 3 1
Eucleides: in battle of Sellasia, 2 4 2 - B.C., 3 9 - 4 1 , 48-49, 6 4 ; Athenian,
43 mainly c o m p o s e d of citizens, 51
Eumenes: against Craterus, 237-38; n.13
against A n t i g o n u s at Orcynii, Ford: Caesar's attempt to lower wa-
237; against Antigonus at ter level at Ilerda, 519-20, 5 2 5
Paraetacene, 237; against An- Fortification: art of, very primitive
tigonus at Gabiene, 2 3 7 , 2 4 0 in P e l o p o n n e s i a n War, 126;
E u r i p i d e s : r e f e r e n c e s by, to Her- thrown up by Caesar against
cules as archer, 158 Helvetii, 460-61
E u r y b i a d e s : p l a n for b a t t l e o f Fort l'Ecluse, 4 6 0
Salamis, 104 F r e d e r i c k the Great: t e n d e n c y t o
Eutropius: account of b u r n i n g ar- understate own strength, 357
rows in battle of B e n e v e n t u m , Fröhlich, Franz: Caesar's Method of
3 0 0 ; army strengths at Pharsalus, Waging War, 4 5 4 ; Delbrück's dif-
544-49 f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n with, c o n -
Evocati, 4 2 2 - 2 3 , 4 2 8 n . 2 1 ; distinc- cerning Caesar, 4 5 5 - 5 7 ; Caesar's
tion b e t w e e n , first a n d s e c o n d Credibility in his Report on the Cam-
centuries B . C , 4 5 6 . See also Cras- paign against the Helvetii, 4 7 5
tinus
Gabiene, battle of, 2 3 7 , 2 4 0

Fabius: initial c o m m a n d of Caesar's Gaesatae: in battle of T e l a m o n , 305
troops at Ilerda, 5 1 8 - 1 9 Galatians: at Pharsalus, 5 4 6
F a b i u s C u n c t a t o r . See Q u i n t u s Gardthausen: Augustus and his Times,
Fabius Maximus 448
Index 585
G a u g a m e l a , b a t t l e of, 2 1 0 - 1 9 ; 385
strength of Alexander's army at, Gladius hispanus, 281 n.7
2 1 0 ; position and a r m a m e n t o f Göler, Baron A u g u s t von: Caesar's
Persians at, 2 1 1 ; no mention of Gallic War and Parts of his Civil
Persian phalanx at, 2 1 1 ; scythed War, 454; concept of location of
chariots in Darius' army at, 2 1 1 , Caesar's battle with A r i o v i s t u s ,
2 1 4 , 2 1 8 , 2 1 9 n.5; elephants in 4 8 4 ; location o f Caesar's c a m p
D a r i u s ' a r m y at, 2 1 1 , 2 1 4 ; on Aisne, 489; Caesar's plan for
cavalry in Darius' army at, 2 1 1 - base at Besançon, 497; on Ilerda,
14; uncertain amount of Persian 524-25; Caesar's strength in civil
infantry at, 2 1 2 ; reports of bat- war, 545
tle, great variation in reliability, Gomphi, 5 5 0
2 1 2 ; caltrops and pitfalls at, 2 1 2 ; Granicus, battle on the, 185-90;
report of cleared terrain at, 2 1 2 ; similarity of o p p o s i n g armies,
double depth of Alexander's 187; o p p o s i n g strengths, 187-88;
formation at, 2 1 3 ; flank positions terrain in area of, 188, 190; use
of cavalry, light infantry at, 2 1 3 ; of river as frontal o b s t a c l e by
penetration by Persian and In- Persians, 188; information on,
dian cavalry at, 2 1 4 ; pressure on incomplete, 189; losses of oppos-
Parmenio at, 2 1 4 ; flank battle at, ing forces in, 189; Persian inten-
right v i c t o r i o u s , 2 1 4 ; M a c e d o - tions in, 190
n i a n l o s s e s at, 2 1 4 , 2 1 9 n . 6 ; Great Plains, battle of the, 376, 3 8 9
M a c e d o n i a n f o r m a t i o n at, 2 1 5 , Greece in Roman civil war: strength
217; Alexander's deployment at, and strategy of Caesar, Pompey,
2 1 5 ; Alexander's p u r p o r t e d lat- 5 2 8 - 2 9 ; losses in, 543
eral m o v e m e n t at, 217; location Greek history: general works on, by
of battlefield, 2 1 8 Busolt, Beloch, Duncker, Grote,
Gaul: domination of, by Ariovistus, 29
460 Greek infantry: ability of, to m e e t
Gauls: mercenaries in Roman army, Persians in o p e n field, 154; use
4 1 3 ; cavalry with Caesar against o f f l a n k b a t t l e by, c r e a t e d b y
Ariovistus, 4 7 9 ; cavalry with Epaminondas, 180; hoplite mer-
Caesar against Belgae, 4 8 8 ; c e n a r i e s in Persian army, 186,
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of, in C a e s a r ' s 192; flight of, after Issus, 2 0 1 ;
time, 509; at Pharsalus, 546; escape of, after Issus, 206
cavalry with Caesar at M u n d a , Greek military art: basis for schol-
5 6 0 n.l arly knowledge of, 27-29
Gaza: siege of, by Alexander, 181; Greek military authors, 28-29
battle of, 2 3 7 , 240-41 Greek tactics: before Peloponnesian
Gergovia: unsuccessfully attacked by War, 123-33; hoplite phalanx the
Caesar, 4 9 6 basis of, throughout fifth century
G e r m a n i c cavalry: with Caesar at B . C , 1 2 3 ; i n f l u e n c e o f fear o f
A l e s i a , 4 9 9 ; with P o m p e y a t Persian cavalry o n , 124; lack of
P h a r s a l u s , 5 4 6 ; with Caesar at c h a n g e in, to guard against
Munda, 5 6 0 n . l cavalry, 124
Germany: war effort 1914-18, 3 5 0 Gröbe: Festschrift für Otto Hirschfeld,
Gerunium, 3 2 4 526-27
Gneisenau: comparison with Scipio, G u i s c h a r d : Critical and Historical
Commentaries on Several Points of itial skirmishing at Zama

Ancient Military History, 5 2 4 Naraggara, 372; formation in
Gutschmidt: History of Iran, 4 4 8 two echelons at Zama-Naraggara,
Gylippus: action at Syracuse, 132; 372; escape from Zama-
use of cavalry, 132; representa- Naraggara battlefield, 374;
tive of transition to professional r e a s o n for r e m a i n i n g in Italy,
officer status, 149 3 8 0 ; r e t u r n t o Africa, 3 8 0 - 8 1 ;
headquarters in Hadrumet, 3 8 1 ;
like N a p o l e o n , retained greatness
Hagios Georgios, island of: identical in defeat, 385; equaled by Scipio,
with Psyttalea, 106; i m p o r t a n c e 385; relations with King An-
of, in battle of Salamis, 106 t i o c h u s , 4 0 1 ; lack o f m e a n s o f
Halicarnassus: siege of, by Alexan- warfare later available to Caesar,
der, 181 567
Hamilcar Barca: c o n q u e r e d muti- Hasdrubal: cavalry attack at Can-
n o u s mercenaries, 3 0 5 ; plan to nae, 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 - 2 0 ; his attack part
create superior land army, 3 1 2 ; o f Hannibal's battle plan, 3 2 0 ;
campaign to conquer Spain, 312 march from Spain in 2 0 7 B.C.,
Hamippen: development of, in 3 4 6 , 3 6 5 ; s t r e n g t h o f army i n
B o e o t i a , 1 5 2 ; a b s e n c e of, i n 207 B.C., 3 4 9 ; beaten by Romans
Macedonian army, 177 on M e t a u r u s , 3 6 5 ; d e f e a t e d by
H a n n i b a l : p o s s i b l y a u t h o r o f ac- Scipio on "Great Plains," 376
count of Cannae, 3 1 1 ; placement Hasta: arm of triarii, 277
of troops at Cannae, 3 2 0 - 2 1 ; im- Hastati: in manipular phalanx for-
portance of timing at Cannae, mation, 2 7 2 ; position of, 272-73;
3 2 1 ; belief in star, 3 2 1 ; position main burden of battle, 277
during battle of Cannae, 3 2 2 ; in- Hauvette, A m é d é e : Hérodote, histo-
fluenced by A l e x a n d e r , 3 2 2 - 2 3 ; rien des guerres médiques, 83;
r e a s o n s for victory at C a n n a e , theories on assault run and
3 2 3 ; unable to attain final victory march pace, 8 3 - 8 6 ; on strength
through sieges, 337; strength af- of Persian army, 118; differences
ter Cannae, 337; cavalry of research and methodology
superiority useless in sieges, 338; with Delbrück, 119
strategy o f attrition, 3 3 8 ; pur- Helots: ratio of, to Spartiates, 36-
p o s e t o win allies f r o m R o m e , 3 7 ; r o l e in Brasidas' T h r a c i a n
339; gradual dwindling of forces, c a m p a i g n , 146; g o o d discipline
343; march on Rome, 344; under Brasidas, 287
reason for taking land route, H e l v e t i a n c a m p a i g n , 4 5 9 - 7 8 ; Del-
3 5 2 ; war treasury, 3 5 2 ; avoided brück's interpretation of, 4 6 7 - 7 0
battle with Scipio near R h o n e , Helvetii: Caesar's campaign against,
355-56; estimates of situation val- 4 5 9 - 7 8 ; migration, 4 5 9 - 6 0 ; rela-
id, 356; brass tablet at T e m p l e of tionship to Ariovistus, 4 6 0 ; popu-
H e r a Lacinia, 3 5 7 ; s t r e n g t h o f lation and army s t r e n g t h , 4 6 1 ,
a r m y , losses e n r o u t e , 3 5 7 - 6 2 ; 4 7 0 , 4 7 4 - 7 5 , 4 9 3 - 9 4 ; length and
strategy of attrition in S e c o n d speed of march column, 461,
Punic War, 3 6 2 ; pass used cross- 474; attacked by Caesar on
ing Alps, 3 6 3 n . l ; prolonged in- Saône, 4 6 3 , 4 6 8 ; doubt as to in-
Index 587
tended destination, 4 6 4 , 4 7 4 - 7 5 ; mored men, 56; m o u n t e d , 59-60;
peace negotiations with Caesar, cost of equipment of, 63; zeugitae
465, 468; movement along as, 63; number in Spartan army,
Saône, into mountains, 4 6 8 ; at- 6 3 ; t e n d e n c y to m o v e to right,
tack on Caesar, 4 7 0 - 7 1 ; w a g o n 123; normally in parallel battle
barricade, 4 7 0 - 7 1 ; withdrawal w i t h o u t unit a r t i c u l a t i o n , 1 2 3 ;
and surrender, 4 7 1 ; relationship d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n this service
to tribes on lower Garonne, 4 7 8 and sea duty, 144-45; o n e man
n.9; outstandingly courageous, from each family, 145; composi-
509 tion of force in Sicilian expedi-
Heraclea, battle of, 2 9 8 - 9 9 ; doubt- tion, 145; gradual d e v e l o p m e n t
ful nature of account, 2 9 8 ; dif- of mercenary aspect, 145-46;
fering account by Zonaras, 2 9 9 strong running training in
Hera Lacinia, T e m p l e of: brass tab- Lacedaemonia, 151-52
let e r e c t e d b y H a n n i b a l , 3 5 7 ; Horses: Persian use of, at
t r o o p list o f H a n n i b a l ' s a r m y , Marathon, 8 1 ; special ships for,
357-62; questionable aspect of in Persian army, 81
Polybius' report, 3 5 9 Hüffer: Sources for the History of the
H e r c u l e s : use o f bow a n d arrow, War of 1800, 552
158; description of, in Euripides' Hussite armies: strength of, 34
tragedy, 159 Hydaspes, battle on, 220-29;
Hetairoi: "Companions of the King," strength of Alexander's army,
176-77; use of shields by, 183 n.5 2 2 0 ; bitterly fought, 2 2 3 ; confu-
Hippias: aid to Persians at sion as to positions of Alexander
Marathon, 72 and Coenus, 2 2 5 - 2 2 8 ; "bulletin"
Hirshfeld, Otto: "Aquitania in the by member of Alexander's en-
Roman Period," 4 7 8 tourage, 2 2 4 - 2 8
Historiography, Roman, 2 5 5 Hypaspists: in M a c e d o n i a n a r m y ,
History of art of war: place in uni- 1 7 9 ; a r m s a n d e q u i p m e n t of,
versal history, 27; start of investi- 182; in battle on the Hydaspes,
gation of, in p e r i o d of Persian 402-3
Wars, 27
History of Greek Warfare from the Old-
est Times to Pyrrhus: basis f o r Iacetani, 5 1 9
scholarly k n o w l e d g e of Greek Iapygians: in Roman army at Can-
military art, 28 nae, 3 2 8
History of the Infantry: Rüstow, W., Iberians: mercenaries in Roman
28 army, 4 1 3
History of Military Science, Principally Ilai: s q u a d r o n s of M a c e d o n i a n
in Germany: Jähns, Max, 29 cavalry, 177
H o l m e s , T. Rice: Caesar's Conquest of Ilerda: siege of, 5 1 5 - 2 7
Gaul, 4 5 4 ; concept of migration Ilipa, battle of. See Bacula II, battle
o f Helvetii, 4 6 6 of
H o p l i t e : physical t r a i n i n g of, 4 6 ; Ill River, 4 8 3
G r e e k a r m y c o m p o s e d of, 5 3 ; Illurgavonensi, 5 1 9
arms and armor in Greek Illyrians: battle of Philip II against,
p h a l a n x , 5 3 ; assisted by u n a r - 3 5 9 B . C , 181
Infantry: i m p r o v e m e n t in quality strategic a d v a n t a g e s o f Persian

of, in fourth century B.C., 150; position, 195; reversed positions
uncertain amount of, in Persian at, 196, 205; flanking m o v e m e n t
army at Gaugamela, 2 1 2 ; an aux- b y A l e x a n d e r , 197; p h a l a n x
iliary arm in I n d i a n f o r m a t i o n c o m b a t at, 1 9 8 ; o p p o s i t e at-
on Hydaspes, 2 2 2 ; mission of, on t i t u d e s o f o p p o s i n g a r m i e s at,
H y d a s p e s , to prevent e l e p h a n t s 199; feigned flight of Thessalian
from turning back, 2 2 9 n.5; with cavalry, 199-200; casualties, 2 0 1 ,
Alexander in crossing of 2 0 3 ; sequence of marches before,
Hydaspes, 2 2 9 n.6; m o r e impor- 205; Macedonian reconnaissance
tant t h a n c a v a l r y i n D i a d o c h i before, 206; exaggeration of Per-
armies, 237; m o v e m e n t through sian strength by Arrian, 2 0 8
phalanx intervals, 2 7 5 ; question Italy: population density in 6 0 0 B.C.,
as to Vercingetorix' use of, 504- 270; population in Caesar's time,
492
5; in support of cavalry at Phar-
salus, 5 3 9 - 4 0
Insubres: battle with Romans, 3 0 5 -
6; bent swords, 306 Jähns, Max: History of Military Sci-
Intervals: in manipular phalanx, ence, 4 5 5 ; Caesar's Commentaries
2 7 3 , 2 8 3 , 2 9 1 ; allowed passage of and their Literary and Military Sci-
light infantry, sharpshooters, ence Consequences, 4 5 5
2 7 5 ; between individuals, 2 9 3 ; in Juniores: in c e n t u r y o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
Macedonian phalanx, 4 0 4 , 4 0 6 ; 260-61
between legionaries, 404, 406; Jura, 4 6 0 , 4 6 3
K r o m a y e r ' s f a l s e c o n c e p t s of,
4 0 6 - 1 0 ; Veith's c o n c e p t s of, in
cohort tactics, 4 2 3 - 2 4 , 4 2 7 n.8 Kahrstedt, Ulrich: book on Second
Ionian Greeks: lack of trustworthi- Punic War useless, 3 1 4
ness of, after Salamis, 1 0 9 ; re- Karditsa, 5 5 3
ports from, on readiness to de- Kings, Roman, 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; Servius Tul-
f e c t , 1 1 2 ; a d e f e c t i o n of, at lus, 2 5 6 ; N u m a Pompilius, 2 6 4
Mycale, 118 Knights: d i s m o u n t e d combat in
Iphicrates: accomplishment of pel- Middle A g e s , 60; m o u n t e d com-
tasts, 151; discipline of, 151, 288; bat in early Italy, 2 5 6 ; liberation
victory over L a c e d a e m o n i a n s at of R o m e from foreign domi-
Lechaeum, 152; victory at nance, 258; centuries, 265;
Abydos, 152; d e v e l o p m e n t of names of centuries, 266; similar-
peltasts u n d e r , 153; d e f e n s e of ity of Roman equites to medieval
c a m p , 294 knights, 267; Dioscuri, patrons of
Ipsus, battle of, 2 3 8 , 241 Roman knighthood, 2 6 8
Iskenderon, Bay of (Alexandretta), Krain: ancient Celtic forge, 3 0 6
191 K r o m a y e r : false a s s u m p t i o n s a n d
Issus, battle of, 191-209; terrain of worthless account of Mantinea
battlefield, 194, 2 0 2 - 4 , 2 0 6 ; dis- (418 B . C ) , 170-71; battlefield of
p o s i t i o n o f o p p o s i n g f o r c e s at, Sellasia. 241-44; false concept of
194, 2 0 3 , 208-9; Persian flanking battle of Sellasia, 2 4 2 - 4 4 ; rejec-
f o r c e at, 1 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 9 7 , 2 0 0 ; tion of Polybius, 2 4 4 ; t o p o -
Index 589
graphic description of battlefield tified as Psyttalea, 106
of Mantinea, 247; fallacious Leonidas: reason for small size of
reasoning and translation errors army a t T h e r m o p y l a e , 9 5 ; u n -
on battle of Mantinea (207 B . C ) , d e r s t a n d i n g of his mission, 9 5 -
2 4 7 , 2 4 9 , 2 5 0 - 5 1 ; excellent mate- 9 6 ; symbol of morale e l e m e n t in
rial on Second Punic War, 3 1 3 - war, 96; analysis of qualities of,
14; v a r y i n g a t t i t u d e t o w a r d 118
Polybius, 332-33, 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ; on in- Leotychides: co-commander of
tervals, 406-10; on Pharsalus, Greek fleet after Salamis, 112
5 5 1 - 5 5 ; Rome's Struggle for World L e u c t r a , b a t t l e of, 1 6 6 - 6 9 ; a r m y
Supremacy, 3 1 3 strengths, 167, 169; Pelopidas
a n d " S a c r e d B a n d " at, 1 6 7 ;
C l e o m b r o t u s at, 1 6 8 ; t e r r a i n ,
Labienus: failure of attempt to en- 168; w h e e l i n g m o v e m e n t of
velop Helvetii, 469; position dur- Spartans, 167; true account given
ing battle on Saône, 477; unsuc- by X e n o p h o n , despite prejudice,
cessful march against Paris, 4 9 6 ; 170; interpretation of report on
defeat o f Gauls o n M o u n t R é a , battle, 216; Spartan d e p l o y m e n t
5 0 1 , 5 0 6 n.5; at Pharsalus, 538- at, 2 1 6
39, 547; at T h a p s u s , 557; at Levy: unusual Athenian application
Ruspina, 558-59; at Munda, 5 6 0 in 431 B.c. and 4 2 8 B.C., 4 0 ; city
Lamachus: representative of transi- dwellers favored in, in A t h e n s ,
tion to professional officer status, 147 n.5; in Rome, 2 6 0 ; phalanx,
149 258-59; gradually replaced in
Lammert, E d m u n d : Die Entwicklung R o m e by recruiting, 2 6 2 , 4 1 7
der römischen Taktik, 268 Libo: attempt to blockade Brun-
Lance: m e t h o d of thrusting, 176 disium, 530
Langres: Caesar's march in vicinity Liers, H u g o : Military Organization of
of, 4 9 6 - 9 7 the Ancients, 28
L a u m e s , plain of: night attack by Light infantry: through intervals in
Gauls, 5 0 1 - 2 manipular phalanx, 2 7 5 ; uses of,
L. Cassius: defeated in 107 B.C. on 276; rorarii, 2 7 8 ; veliti, 278; spe-
upper Garonne, 4 1 4 cial corps of archers and slingers
Legati, 4 3 0 ; functions under Caesar, under Marius, 4 1 5 ; with cavalry
456 i n A r i o v i s t u s ' a r m y , 4 7 9 ; with
Legionary, Roman: armor of, 280; Caesar at Pharsalus, 5 3 8 - 3 9
m e t h o d of fighting, 406-10; load Lightly armed m e n : allocation to
carried by individual, 4 2 5 maniples, 291
Legions, Roman: strength, 261; Ligurians: with Mago in Africa, 381
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e units, 2 6 3 , 4 1 6 ; Lingones: Helvetii withdrawal into
c o m p o s i t i o n , 2 6 4 - 6 5 ; formation a r e a of, 4 7 2 ; C a e s a r ' s m a r c h
and strength, 2 9 0 - 9 1 ; organiza- through territory of, 4 9 6 - 9 7
tion of new units, 345-46; legiones Liparian Islands, 296 n.l 1
urbanae, 3 4 5 , 414; understrength Livy: a c c o u n t o f b a t t l e o f C y n o -
units, 3 4 8 scephalae, 398; account of battle
Lehmann, Max, 4 2 1 - 2 2 of Magnesia, 398-99; source for
Leipsokutali, island of: falsely iden- battle of Pharsalus, 536 n.5
Load of individual soldier: Roman 3 2 2 ; j o i n e d Hannibal in Africa

legionary, 4 2 5 with Balearics, Ligurians, Celts,
Lochi: in Spartan organization, 153 381
Locrians: complaint against conduct M a h o u t s : i n battle o n H y d a s p e s ,
of Scipio's soldiers, 3 6 9 n.7 2 2 3 ; skill of Indians in battle of
Loire River, 4 6 4 , 4 6 6 Raphia, 2 4 6 ; m e t h o d o f killing
L. Papirius Cursor: disciplinary ac- m a d d e n e d elephants, 372
tion, 2 8 9 Maissiat: Jules Cesar en Gaule, 4 6 4
L u c a n u s : used Livy as s o u r c e for Mallius M a x i m u s : d e f e a t e d near
battle of Pharsalus, 536 n.5 Arausio, 105 B.C., 4 1 4
Luceres: ancient R o m a n cavalry Maniple, 2 7 2 ; formation, 2 7 3 ; as-
century, 266 signment by age, 277, 292;
Lucullus: defeated Mithridates, 4 4 0 ; depth, 2 7 7 - 7 8 ; width, 2 7 8 ; simi-
defeated King T i g r a n e s , 4 4 0 ; larity between Roman and
strength and losses at battle of Macedonian, 290; strength,
Tigranocerta, 513 2 9 0 - 9 1 ; confusion in names, 2 9 2 ;
Lycus: derision by, of Hercules as false description by Livy, 2 9 2 - 9 3 ;
archer, 158 uniform strength under Marius,
Lysander: representative of transi- 415
tion to professional officer status, Manipular phalanx, 2 7 2 - 8 1 ; works
149 o n , 2 6 8 - 6 9 ; flexibility, 2 7 2 - 7 3 ;
regular intervals, 2 7 3 ; alternate
squeezing, pulling apart, 273-74;
Macedon: agrarian state, 175; loca- Roman discipline prerequisite
t i o n o f Pella, c a p i t a l , 175; for, 2 7 4 ; required firm leader-
m o u n t e d military nobility, 175; ship, 2 7 4 ; combined strength of
development of, by Philip II, 176 phalanx with ease of movement,
M a c e d o n i a n : military system, 175- 275; armament and combat
84; peltasts: auxiliaries of caval- methods, 2 7 6
ry, 175; cavalry (hetairoi- Manius Acilius, 4 3 5
" C o m p a n i o n s " ) , 176-77; discip- Manlius (Consul): execution of son,
line of cavalry, 177; cavalry 289
armed with sarissa, 177; m o m e n - Mantinea, battle of, 4 1 8 B.C., 131;
t u m o f p h a l a n x , 179; c o m p o s i - o p p o s i n g strengths, 169-70; ac-
tion o f army, 1 7 9 - 8 0 ; c o o p e r a - tion of King Agis, 131; action of
tion of arms, 180; discipline, 2 8 8 cavalry, 131; account by
Macedonians: principal o p p o n e n t s T h u c y d i d e s , 133 n.7; t r u e ac-
of R o m e after Second Punic War, count by X e n o p h o n , despite pre-
3 9 3 ; use of close phalanx and judice, 170
sarissa, 3 9 3 ; at Pharsalus, 5 4 6 Mantinea, battle of, 2 0 7 B.C., 2 4 7 -
Machanidas: in battle of Mantinea, 4 9 ; t o p o g r a p h i c d e s c r i p t i o n by
2 4 7 - 4 9 ; use of catapults by, at Kromayer, 247; use of defensive
Mantinea, 247 trench, 247, 248;' strengths of
Maconnais, 4 6 2 opposing sides, 2 4 8 ; questionable
Magnesia, battle of, 3 9 8 - 4 0 1 ; aspect of reports, 2 4 7 - 4 9
Kromayer's analysis, 399-401 Marathon, battle of, 72-90; position
M a g o : with H a n n i b a l at C a n n a e , of Athenians, 73-76; assault run
Index 591
of Athenians, 74-76. 79: position 4 1 4 ; creator of new military

of soros, 76; preliminaries to bat- f o r m a t i o n , 4 1 4 , 4 2 6 n . 2 ; re-
tle, 76-78; attack initiated by Per- forms, 4 1 5 ; new system of direct
sians, 77; Marathona valley, 78; recruiting, 4 1 8 ; Sallust's account
delay o f Persian attack, 7 6 - 7 8 ; of reforms, 421; exaggerated
Persian strength, 78; weakness of battle accounts, 4 3 8 - 3 9
Persian archers, 79; battle beside Masinissa: defection to Scipio, 3 7 0 ;
ships, 79-80; pursuit by Athe- brought N u m i d i a n cavalry from
n i a n s , 8 0 ; A t h e n i a n losses, 8 0 ; Atlas Mountains and oases, 3 7 1 ;
Persian losses, 80; action of Mil- move by Scipio to meet, 3 8 3
tiades, 80, 86; burial m o u n d s for Massilia: possible base for R o m a n
slaves, 8 1 ; pause between en- army, 3 5 4
gagements, 82; formation of M. Claudius Marcellus: elected con-
Athenians, 86-87, 88 n.1 sul repeatedly, 367; c o m m a n d as
Marches, bold: by Scipio before proconsul, 367
Zama-Naraggara, 3 8 3 ; by Silesian Media (Atropatene): invaded by An-
army from Mulde River in 1813, tony, 4 4 4
3 8 3 ; withdrawal from Ligny to- Medjerdja valley. See Bagradas val-
ward Wavre in 1815, 3 8 3 ; by ley
Moltke into Bohemia, 383-84 Megalopolis: elephants at siege of,
March formation: of Roman army, 241
294; of Helvetii, 4 6 1 - 6 3 Menidas: subordinate cavalry com-
March length of units: Persian, m a n d e r in Alexander's army at
118-120; complications caused Gaugamela, 215
by, 118-20; of Helvetii, 4 6 1 - 6 3 Mequinenza. See Octogesa
March p a c e : H a u v e t t e o n , 8 3 - 8 5 ; Mercenaries: Athenian, in Pelopon-
d e v e l o p m e n t of, by Captain de nesian War, 51 n.12, 141, 144-
R a o u l , 8 3 - 8 5 ; Prussian r e g u l a - 4 8 ; shift to, eliminated class divi-
tions on, 86 sions in Athens, 146; wages of, in
Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, 2 6 4 A t h e n s , 147 n . l ; r e f i n e m e n t of
Marcus Claudius Marcellus, 433 drill among, 149; benefit to pel-
Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, 2 6 4 , 4 3 3 tasts as, 1 5 1 ; Scythian and In-
Marcus Popillius, 433-434 dian, in Persian army at
Gaugamela, 2 1 2 ; d e p e n d e n c e o f
Marcus Porcius Cato (Consul), 4 3 4
Diadochi on, 235; in Roman ar-
M a r d o n i u s : c o m m a n d o f Persian
my, 4 1 3
army after Salamis, 109; threat
to Athens, 111; abandonment of Metaurus, battle on the: Hasdrubal
Attica, 112; .weaker than Greeks defeated, 365; uncertain reports
at Plataea, 112-13; use of sooth- of, 368 n.l
sayer at Plataea, 115; policy of Metics: n u m b e r s of, i n A t h e n i a n
attrition, 117 army, 39; military obligation of,
Marhabal: at Cannae, 3 3 0 6 4 ; service of, as fleet oarsmen,
Marius, C : defeat and destruction 146-47
of T e u t o n e s and Ambrones near Military Organization of the Ancients:
Aquae Sextiae, 414; defeat of Liers, H u g o , 28; basis for schol-
Cimbri and Tigurini near Vercel- arly k n o w l e d g e of Greek art of
lae, 4 1 4 ; f a m e a m o n g R o m a n s , war, 2 8
Military service obligation: in R o m e N a p o l e o n I: impractical proposal of,

in S e c o n d Punic War, 3 4 8 ; infor cork soles, 161; tendency to
compatible with continuous state understate own strength, 357;
o f war, 4 1 2 - 1 3 ; gradual c h a n g e division o f forces o n march t o
t o selective r e c r u i t i n g , 4 1 7 - 1 8 ; M a r e n g o , 3 8 8 ; f o u n d Helvetian
Delbrück's concept, 4 1 8 - 2 3 ; an- campaign incomprehensible, 4 6 6 ;
nual assemblage, 4 2 0 ; in Euro- lack of knowledge of locations of
pean nations of e i g h t e e n t h and Caesar's battles in Gaul, 4 8 3 ; es-
nineteenth centuries, 4 2 1 - 2 2 timate of Vercingetorix' strength
Miltiades: at Marathon, 7 3 - 8 9 ; fig- in A l e s i a , 5 0 1 ; Memorial de
ure of, as field c o m m a n d e r , 80; Sainte-Hélene, 5 5 0 ; disregard of
analysis of qualities of, 118 historical accuracy, 552
Missile-type w e a p o n s : relative u n - N a p o l e o n I I I : Life of Caesar, 4 5 4 ;
importance of, vis-a-vis phalanx, concept of migration of Helvetii,
5 5 - 5 6 ; a u x i l i a r y a s p e c t of, i n 4 6 6 ; concept of location of battle
G r e e k tactics o f fifth c e n t u r y b e t w e e n Caesar and Ariovistus,
B . C , 124; p r e d o m i n a n c e of 4 8 4 ; excavations o n Aisne, 4 8 9 ;
Rhodes slingers, 125 belief in Caesar's plan for base at
Mithridates, 4 3 7 - 4 0 ; b a c k g r o u n d , Besançon, 497
437; war against R o m e , 4 3 7 - 4 0 ; Naraggara. See Zama-Naraggara
size of army, 4 3 8 ; d e f e a t e d by Neoptolemus: defeated by
Sulla, 4 3 8 ; defeated by Lucullus Eumenes, 238
and Pompey, 4 4 0 Nervii: final effort to defeat Caesar,
M. Junius Silanus: defeated by Al- 4 9 1 ; strength and losses, 4 9 1 - 9 2 ;
lobroges, 109 B . C . , 4 1 4 outstandingly courageous, 5 0 9
Moltke: bold march into B o h e m i a , Nicias: refusal to march to Syracuse,
383-84, 389 131; victory at Syracuse, 131-32;
M o m m s e n : on Helvetian campaign, reminder to Athenian profes-
466 sional soldiers at Syracuse, 145,
Mont Maneu, 524-25 147 n.3
Mosynoeci: size of spears, 401 N i e s e : c o n t r o v e r s y with D e l b r ü c k
M o u n t Oeta: relationship to battle c o n c e r n i n g slaves i n A t h e n i a n
o f Thermopylae, 9 2 fleet, 141
Mount Réa: night attack by Gauls, N u m a Pompilius (king), 2 6 4
501 Numidians: with Hannibal at Can-
Munda, battle of, 5 6 0 nae, 317; cavalry under
Murten, battle of: confusion on bat- M a s i n i s s a at Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a ,
tle of, d u e to false assumption on 3 7 1 ; m e r c e n a r i e s in R o m a n ar-
"battle Chapel," 106 my, 4 1 3 ; a m o n g Caesar's auxilia
Mutina, battle of, 4 0 8 in Helvetian campaign, 4 7 8 n . l l ;
Muttines: source for battle of Can- with Caesar against Belgae, 488;
nae, 3 3 2 with Caesar at Alesia, 4 9 9 ; with
Mycale, battle of, 118 Labienus at Ruspina, 558-59; in
Myriandrus: Alexander's c a m p , 192 battle of Munda, 560
Naevius: rhymed chronicle of First Oblique order: created by

Punic War, 301 Epaminondas, 166
Index 593
Octogesa, 5 2 0 - 2 1 , 524-25 lenic culture o n , 4 4 7 ; resistance
Officer corps: professional in H a n - to Antiochus VII, 4 4 7
nibal's army at Cannae, 3 3 6 ; pro- Pass: u s e d b y H a n n i b a l c r o s s i n g
f e s s i o n a l in S c i p i o ' s a r m y at Alps, 363 n.l
Zama-Naraggara, 3 6 8 Patrician class: combination of war-
Olpae, battle of, 130; D e m o s t h e n e s rior superiority and financial
in, 130 power, 2 5 8 ; simplicity of life, 2 6 2
Oppius Statianus: defeated by Pausanias: use of o m e n s at Plataea,
Parthians, 4 4 4 - 4 5 114, 116; analysis of characteris-
O p t i m a t e p a r t y : s e n a t o r s fled t o tics of, 1 1 8 ; d i s c i p l i n e of, at
Greece, 5 1 6 Plataea, 287
Optio, 432 Pelopidas: with "Sacred B a n d " at
Orchomenians: at battle of Leuctra, 167
Coronea, 170 Peloponnesian War: Pericles'
O r c h o m e n u s , battle of, 4 3 8 strategy in, 135-43; similar arms
Orcynii, battle of. See E u m e n e s a n d tactics on both sides, 1 3 5 ;
Ordo, 291 Athenian superiority at sea, 135;
O r g e t o r i x (Prince of Helvetii): in- Spartan superiority on land, 135;
t r i g u e for s u b j e c t i o n o f G a u l , first example of strategy of attri-
4 6 6 ; proposed migration of Hel- tion, 135-36; influence of plague
vetii, 467; s u d d e n death of, 4 6 7 o n , 138; objective of A t h e n s in,
Oricum: captured by Caesar, 5 2 9 138; lack of Athenian statesmen
Orosius: account of burning arrows in, after Pericles, 138; no n e w
i n battle o f B e n e v e n t u m , 3 0 0 ; forms of art of war in, 149; de-
losses at Dyrrhachium, 5 4 3 ; army v e l o p m e n t of professional mili-
strengths at Pharsalus, 544 tary status in, 149
P e l t a s t s : c o m b a t b r a n c h of, a s
spear-throwers, 125; equipment,
Pajas River. See Pinarus River 1 2 5 , 1 5 2 ; e f f e c t i v e n e s s against
Palisade: in battle of Sellasia, 2 4 2 , flanks and rear of phalanx, 125;
244-45 versatility, 125; d i s t i n c t i o n be-
P a p i r u s C a r b o : d e f e a t e d by G e r - tween, unarmored men, and
mans in Noricum, 4 1 3 - 1 4 lightly a r m e d m e n , 126; sailors
Paraetacene, battle of, 2 3 7 , 2 3 8 - 4 0 as, u n d e r T h r a s y l u s , 133 n . 4 ;
Paralus (ship of state): m a n n e d e x - utilization of, by T e n T h o u s a n d
clusively by freemen, 142 against C o l c h i a n s , 1 5 0 - 5 1 ; i m -
P a r m e n i o : Beloch's c o n c e p t of, as p r o v e m e n t of, in mercenary ar-
real strategist of M a c e d o n i a n s , my, 151; characteristics, 151; ac-
204; pressure on, at Gaugamela, complishments under Iphicrates,
214 1 5 2 - 5 3 ; lack o f u n i f o r m a r m s
Parthians, 4 4 1 - 4 9 ; tactics and c o m - a m o n g Thracians, 152; Macedo-
position of army, 4 4 1 ; defeated nian, auxiliaries of cavalry, 175;
son of Crassus near Carrhae, Agrianian, of Attalus, at
4 4 2 ; pursued and routed Ro- G a u g a m e l a , 2 1 5 ; use of sarissa,
mans, 4 4 2 - 4 3 ; killed Crassus dur- 402-3
ing negotiations, 4 4 3 ; contrasted Pentecostys: strength of, 66 n.2; place
with Persians w h o o p p o s e d Alex- in Spartan organization, 153
ander, 4 4 6 - 4 8 ; influence of Hel- Penteremes: built by Rome in First
Punic War, 303 sus, 192; defensive attitude of, at
Perdiccas: position of, in battle on Issus, 199
Hydaspes, 227 P e r s i a n e m p i r e : c o m p o s i t i o n of,
P e r i c l e s : s p e e c h of, r e p o r t e d b y 6 8 - 6 9 ; role o f P h o e n i c i a n a n d
Thucydides, 39-44; test o f Greek sailors in, 68; c o m m o n re-
s t a t e s m a n s h i p of, 4 6 ; war plan ligion as b o n d , 68; warlike ele-
of, the correct one, 4 8 , 136-38; m e n t s of, f o r m e d o f n o m a d i c
s t r a t e g y of, in P e l o p o n n e s i a n branches, 68; weakness, 4 4 7 - 4 8 ;
War, 135-43; evacuation of contrasted with Parthians, 447-48
A t h e n s o r d e r e d by, 1 3 6 - 3 7 ; Persian fleet: withdrawal after
theory of, to exploit "opportunity Salamis, 108-9
that d o e s n o t w a i t , " 1 3 6 - 3 7 ; Persian wars: start of investigation
w a r n i n g by, a g a i n s t n e w c o n - of history of art of war in, 2 7 ;
quests, 138; flaws in execution of treatment of, in Persian Wars and
war plan, 140 Burgundian Wars, 28; unreliable
Perinthus: siege of, by Philip II of f i g u r e s f o r P e r s i a n a r m i e s in,
Macedon, 174 35-36
Perioeci: number of, at Plataea, 36; Persian Wars and Burgundian Wars:
participation of, in phalanx, 55; H a n s Delbrück, 2 8 - 2 9 ; military
n u m b e r of, in Spartan army, 63 history problem of Persian wars,
Perseus, 2 3 9 ; at Dium, 4 0 0 28
Persian army: c o m p o s i t i o n of, 67; Petreius: Pompeian legate in Spain,
e q u i p m e n t , 6 7 ; lack o f tactical 517; d e f e n s e of Ilerda, 5 1 8 - 1 9 ;
unit in, 67, 69; lack of large mass- m o v e m e n t out of Ilerda, 520-22,
es, 68; quality of, 68-69; similar- 524; surrender to Caesar, 5 2 2 - 3 3
ity of, to Arabs, 68; contradiction Pezetairoi: M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y —
c o n c e r n i n g s t r e n g t h of, 6 8 - 6 9 ; "foot companions," 178
professional character of, 69-70; P h a l a n x : size a n d d i m e n s i o n s o f
controversial aspect of Delbrück's Greek, 53-54, 63-64; relative ad-
estimate of, 7 0 - 7 1 ; strength of, at vantages of depth and length of,
Marathon, 72, 78; options of, at 53; function of various ranks of,
Marathon, 77-78; delay at 5 4 - 5 5 ; weak point of, in flanks
Marathon, 78; success in reem- 5 7 ; vulnerability of, to cavalry,
barking at Marathon, 78; losses 57; origins of, 57-58; importance
at Marathon, 80; situation of, in o f m a i n t a i n i n g g o o d o r d e r of,
Greece after Salamis, 109; 5 8 - 5 9 ; size of Greek formation
s t r e n g t h a t Plataea, 1 1 2 , 1 1 8 ; d e t e r m i n e d b y cost o f e q u i p -
g r e a t e r m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y of, at ment, 6 3 ; importance of, as tacti-
Plataea, 113; Hauvette's analysis
cal body, 67; Greek tactics based
of strength of, 118-20; strength
o n , t h r o u g h fifth c e n t u r y B.C.,
on Granicus, 185-86; concept of
123; logical f o r m a t i o n for citi-
massive size r e j e c t e d , 185; n u -
zens' militia, 1 2 3 ; t e n d e n c y to
cleus of, formed by warrior class,
m o v e to right, 123; battle of, ba-
186; inclusion of Greek merce-
sically parallel, without articula-
nary h o p l i t e s in, 186; s t r e n g t h
tion, 123; division of, into multi-
and composition of, at Issus, 191,
ple c o l u m n s b y T e n T h o u s a n d
2 0 8 n.5; Greek infantry in, at Is-
against Colchians, 150-51; prob-
Index 595
lem of relationship of breadth to cepts, 175; influence of monar-

depth, 160; problem of coordina- chical authority on Macedonian
tion of, w i t h s h a r p s h o o t e r s , cavalry, 176-77; reasons for
160-61; Xenophon's appraisal of, adopting Macedonian phalanx,
still main arm, 162-63; Macedo- 179; decisive blow by cavalry of
nian, tighter formation than right flank, 181; reforms of, re-
Greek, 178; difference between flected in Alexander's conduct of
Doric and M a c e d o n i a n , 179; war, 181; battle against Illyrians,
flank b a t t l e of, i n v e n t e d by 181; battle of Chaeronea, 181
E p a m i n o n d a s , 180; n o m e n t i o n Philip V (of Macedon): tactics, arms,
of, in Persian army at Gaugame- formation, 3 9 7 ; in battle of
la, 2 1 1 ; formation with elephants Cynoscephalae, 238, 397-98
on H y d a s p e s , 2 2 1 ; an auxiliary P h i l o p o e m e n : in battle of Sellasia,
arm on Hydaspes, 222; in battle 2 4 4 ; in battle of Mantinea, 247-
o f Sellasia, 2 4 4 - 4 6 ; relation t o 4 9 , 251 n.7
general levy in Rome, 258; type Phliasians: at Plataea, 115
of, in R o m e , 2 6 3 ; arms of an- Phocion: on Greek discipline, 286
cient Roman, 265; manipular, Phraaspa (Tachti-Suleiman), 4 4 4 - 4 5
bibliography, 268-69; comparison Phraates IV (king of Parthia), 4 4 6
Physical condition: of Greek soldiers
of Roman and Greek, 278; final
appearance in Second Punic at Marathon, 85-86
War, 3 1 1 ; inflexibility of Romans Pilum (part of maniple), 2 9 1 - 9 2
at Cannae, 318-19; change from Pilum (spear): in manipular
mass pressure to echelons, 3 7 2 - phalanx, 2 7 6 , 281 n.8; intro-
76; used by Macedonians in sec- d u c e d by Scipio, 3 7 6 ; use of
o n d century B.C., 393-96; influ- amentum ( s t r a p ) w i t h , 4 5 7 ; in
ence of sarissa on, 393-95, 401-6; storming of Pompey's camp, 548;
intervals in, 4 0 1 - 4 1 0 ; description effectiveness of, at Ruspina, 558
by Polybius, 403; method of Pinarus River: scene of battle of Is-
fighting, 4 0 6 - 4 1 0 , d e v e l o p m e n t sus, 192, 2 0 7 n . l ; investigation
u n d e r R o m a n s , 4 1 6 . See also of, by Senior Engineer Hossback,
Manipular phalanx 194, 206-7; Alexander's crossing
Pharnabazus: cavalry of, attacked by point of, 197
hoplites o f the T e n T h o u s a n d , Pipers: used by Heraclidae against
150; success of, in use of scythed Sparta in Polyaenus, 58; used by
chariots, 213 Spartans, 58-59
Pharsalus, battle of, 5 3 8 - 5 5 ; P o m - Pisistratus: professional bodyguard,
peian formation, 5 3 8 ; positions 149; mercenaries of, not Greeks
of opposing cavalry, 538; but Scythians, 156 n.l
Caesar's strategy, 5 3 8 - 3 9 ; o u t - Pitfalls: u s e d by P e r s i a n s at
come, 541-42; losses, 5 4 3 ; oppos- Gaugamela, 212
ing strengths, 544-49; site of bat- Plague: loss of Athenians in, 4 1 , 47;
tle, 5 5 3 ; length of battle, 553-54 i n f l u e n c e of, in P e l o p o n n e s i a n
Philinus: source for Polybius in First War, 38
Punic War, 301 Plataea: battle of, 111-120; differ-
Philip II (of Macedon): further de- ences between Athens and Sparta
velopment of Epaminondas' con- before battle, 111-12; position of
Peloponnesian Army on Mount ready for battle, 535; formation

Cithaeron, 112; Persian assump- and strategy at Pharsalus, 5 3 8 -
t i o n o f tactical s u p e r i o r i t y at, 39, 5 5 1 ; defeat at Pharsalus, 5 4 1 ;
112; Greek reinforcements from reaction to defeat, 541-42; army
fleet, 112; strength of Greek ar- strength at Pharsalus, 544-49
my, 112; strength of Persian ar- P o p u l a r l e g e n d : q u a l i t y vis-a-vis
my, 112-13; Herodotus' account quantity in, 69
of, unreliable, 113; study of ter- Population: Attica in 4 9 0 B.C. 38;
rain by Grundy, 114; night with- Thebes, 38; Boeotia, 38-39;
drawal of Greeks, 115; sequence Lacedaemon, 38-39; Beloch's
of action, 115-16; analogy of, to work on, of Greco-Roman
M a r a t h o n , 1 1 6 ; s i e g e of, in World, 3 8 ; C o r i n t h , 3 9 , 4 8 - 4 9 ;
Peloponnesian War, 132 Megara, 39; Messenia, 38; Ger-
Plutarch: account of battle of Man- man Empire in 1898, 39; of
tinea, 2 4 8 Athens in 4 2 8 B.C., 40; of Athens
Polybius: account of battle of Man- i n 4 3 1 B . C , 1 3 9 ; o f militarily
tinea, 2 4 7 - 4 9 ; a c c o u n t of First qualified men in Athens, 427
Punic War, 3 0 1 - 3 ; s o u r c e s for B . C , 4 0 - 4 2 ; D e l b r ü c k ' s estimate
First Punic War, 301-2; scholars' tor Athens in 431 B.C., 45; Spar-
d e p e n d e n c e o n his j u d g m e n t , ta, 4 5 ; Delbrück's d i s a g r e e m e n t
307; at best in account of Second with Eduard Meyer on Attican,
Punic War, 3 1 1 ; in entourage of 4 5 ; inclusion of zeugitae in, 4 6 ;
Scipio the Younger, 3 1 2 ; varying d e n s i t y of, i n A n c i e n t G r e e c e
attitude of Kromayer toward, and s o m e m o d e r n E u r o p e a n
3 3 2 - 3 3 , 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ; interlude in ac- countries and cantons, 5 0 n . l l ;
count of Second Punic War: dis- Laconia and Messenia, 65; Rome,
cussion o f R o m a n c o n s t i t u t i o n , 2 6 0 ; militarily qualified m e n in
3 3 9 ; q u e s t i o n a b l e aspect o f his R o m e 260; density of, in Italy in
report of Hannibal's strength 6 0 0 B.C., 2 7 0 ; of Italy at time of
and losses, 3 5 7 - 6 2 ; Delbrück's Caesar, 4 9 2 - 9 3 ; of Germania,
controversy with Hirschfeld over B e l g i u m , a n d Gaul a t t i m e o f
reliability of, 358-62; account of Caesar, 4 9 2 ; of Helvetii, 4 9 3
Zama-Naraggara open to ques- Porta praetoria: main gate of Roman
tion, 377; comparison of Roman camp, 294
and Macedonian tactics, 3 9 5 Porus, 220-25; strength of army,
Polycrates o f S a m o s : p r o f e s s i o n a l 220; battle plan, 2 2 1 ; captured,
bodyguard, 149 224; expected aid from Abisares,
Pompey: defeat of Mithridates, 440; 2 2 9 n.4
defeat of King Tigranes, 440; Potidaea, battle of, 126
strength and strategy in civil war, Primus pilus, 4 3 2 - 3 5
515-16; defeat in Spain, 517-27; Principals, 432
superiority at sea, 528-29; seizure Principes: in m a n i p u l a r p h a l a n x
o f D y r r h a c h i u m , 5 2 9 ; possible formation, 2 7 3 - 7 3 ; position, 273
m o v e s , 5 3 2 - 3 3 ; victory at Dyr- Professional army: gradual de-
rhachium, 533; move to plain of v e l o p m e n t from R o m a n citizen-
Thessaly, 534; strength and soldier army, 4 1 1 - 2 5 ; basic con-
strategy in Thessaly, 5 3 4 - 3 5 ; tradiction of R o m a n constitution,
Index 597
4 1 2 - 1 3 ; prerequisite for c o h o r t Publius Licinius: consul, 4 3 3 - 3 5

tactics, 4 1 6 Publius Sulpicius: consul, 4 3 4
Professional officers: d e v e l o p m e n t Punic Wars. See First Punic War,
of, in Greece, 149; recruitment Second Punic War
o f G r e e k , for a r m y o f C y r u s , Punishments: in Roman army,
149; in Hannibal's army, 3 2 3 ; in 286-90, 295-96
Scipio's army, 367-68 Pursuit: Greek at Marathon, 81-82;
Province, the Roman: hasty fortifi- Frederick at Soor, 82; d e v e l o p -
cations by Caesar to d e f e n d , m e n t of, b y A l e x a n d e r , 2 3 1 ;
4 6 0 - 6 1 ; role in Caesar's c a m - early examples of, 233 n.3; after
paign against Vercingetorix, battle of Raphia, 246-47
496-98 Pydna. battle of: 3 9 4 . 398
Prussia: war effort in 1813, 3 5 0 Pyrrhus, 297-300; imitator of Alex-
P s e u d o - H i r t i u s : Bellum Africanum, ander, 297, 396; elephants in
558; account of battle of Ruspi- army, 297; unable to conquer
na, 5 5 8 - 5 9 ; limited p e r c e p t i v e - R o m e , 2 9 7 - 9 8 ; in battle of
ness of, 556 Heraclea, 2 9 8 - 9 9 ; in battle of As-
Psiloi: interpretation of, 126 culum, 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ; in battle of B e n -
Psyttalea, island of: identical with e v e n t u m , 3 0 0 ; no use of sarissa
H a g i o s G e o r g i o s , 106; identity phalanx, 3 9 6 ; m i x e d formation
d e t e r m i n e d by Beloch, 106; im- of Epirotes, Italians, 396
portance of location of, in battle
of Salamis, 106
P t o l e m y : s o u r c e for A r r i a n , 3 0 2 ; Qualities of field c o m m a n d e r , 159
battle of Gaza, 237, 240; battle of Q u i n c u n x tactics: no application to
Raphia, 2 3 8 , 251-52 Zama-Naraggara, 390; Veith's
Publius Aurelius: punished by Cot- concept of, 5 5 4
ta, 296 n . l l Q u i n t u s Fabius M a x i m u s , 2 6 7 ;
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus: strategy, 3 4 3 , 3 6 3 ; "Cunctator,"
elected g e n e r a l with consular 343; elected consul repeatedly,
powers, 367; retained in com- 367; c o m m a n d as proconsul, 367
m a n d in violation of Roman con- Q u i n t u s Fabius Rullianus: discipli-
stitution, 367; to Africa, 370, nary action against, 2 8 9
3 8 0 ; use of two e c h e l o n s at Q u i n t u s F u l v i u s Flaccus: e l e c t e d
Zama-Naraggara, 374; developed consul repeatedly, 367; com-
echelon tactics in Spain, 376; in mand as proconsul, 367; in
Africa two years before H a n n i - Spain, 4 3 5
bal's return, 380; situation critical
before Zama-Naraggara, 381;
d e c i s i o n t o m o v e i n t o interior, Rabutin Brook: in night attack by
3 8 3 , 3 8 9 ; a c c e p t e d peace offer Labienus, 501
after Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a , 384; Ramnes: ancient Roman cavalry cen-
equal of Hannibal, 385; descrip- tury, 2 6 6
tion of, by M o m m s e n , 386; reluc- Raphia, battle of, 238, 2 4 6 - 4 7
tance to report bold m o v e to j o i n Rappoltsweiler: p u r p o r t e d location
Masinissa, 3 8 8 ; controversy over of battle between Caesar and
m o v e to Naraggara, 3 8 9 Ariovistus, 484-87
Rauchenstein, H.: Caesar's Campaign Rome: historiography, 255; political
against the Helvetii, 4 7 3 system, 255; legendary aspect of
Reconnaissance: Macedonians', be- early history, 2 5 5 ; continuity of
fore Issus, 206 political law a n d military c o n -
Recruiting: replaced general levy in stitution, 255-56; patrician class,
Rome, 262 256; organization and discipline,
Regulus: defeated in Africa, 304-5 257; early domination by Etrus-
Remi: allies of Caesar against Bel- can p r i n c e s , 2 5 8 ; liberated by
gae, 4 8 9 knights, 2 5 8 ; kings, 258-59; divi-
Reserves: institution of, e n d e d ac- sion into tribes, centuries, 2 5 9 ,
tive participation of field c o m - 2 6 3 ; military organization, 2 5 9 ;
mander in battle, 2 3 2 ; use of, by austerity, 259; Clustuminian
X e n o p h o n , 3 7 4 ; represented by tribe, 259; population, 260; gen-
second echelon, 3 7 5 eral levy, 260; political organiza-
tion, v o t i n g by c e n t u r i e s , 2 6 0 ;
Rhine River: relation to battle be-
universal military service, 2 6 1 - 6 2 ;
tween Caesar and Ariovistus,
granting citizenship, 263-64; con-
483-87
stitutional r e f o r m of 179 B.C.,
Rivarroja, 524-25
2 6 4 ; arms o f a n c i e n t p h a l a n x ,
Roloff: differences with Kromayer,
265; history of cavalry, 267; con-
2 5 0 n.4; 251 n.7, n.10; 252 n.12
tinuity in d e v e l o p m e n t of c o n -
R o m a n : drill, 2 8 3 - 8 4 ; c a m p c r a f t ,
stitutional history, 2 6 9 n . l ; re-
283-86; discipline, 257, 2 7 4 , 2 8 3 ,
gistration lists, 2 7 0 - 7 1 ; construc-
286-90; administrative measures,
tion of penteremes in First Punic
288; punishments, 2 8 8 - 8 9 ; camp
War, 3 0 2 - 3 ; victorious on land
gates, 294; camp shape, 2 9 4 n.3;
and sea in First Punic War, 3 0 3 ;
constitution discussed by Polybius invention of boarding bridge,
in account of Second Punic War, 3 0 3 ; victory d u e t o Italian al-
339-40; constitution breached, liance, 3 0 3 ; remained greater sea
367; citizenship, 418; culture re- p o w e r i n S e c o n d P u n i c War,
sponsible for army superiority, 3 1 2 ; stiffness of tactical forma-
510-11 tion in Second Punic War, 3 3 6 ;
R o m a n army: basically only 4 le- masses of m e n available, 3 3 6 ;
gions strong after Second Punic protected by Servian Wall, 338;
War, 4 1 3 ; d e f e a t s a t h a n d s o f population and army strength in
Germans, 413-14; officer and Second Punic War, 3 4 0 , 345-48;
noncommissioned ranks, 4 3 0 - 3 2 ; sieges of defected allies, 3 4 3 ; ex-
centurion, 429-36; comparison treme effort in Second Punic
of, with b a r b a r i a n s , 5 0 8 - 1 3 ; War, 3 4 1 , 3 4 5 - 5 0 ; importance of
composition of, in Caesar's time, allies, 342-43; gradual
510; superiority based on army s t r e n g t h e n i n g of forces vis-a-vis
organization as a whole, 510-11 Hannibal, 3 4 3 ; feint by Hannibal
R o m a n c o n s t i t u t i o n : at o d d s with a g a i n s t , 3 4 4 ; r e c r u i t i n g , levy,
professional army, 4 1 2 - 1 3 , 4 1 8 348; economic aspects of recruit-
R o m a n military effort: in S e c o n d ing, 3 4 8 ; military obligation in
Punic War, 48 Second Punic War, 348; propor-
Roman social structure, 4 2 9 - 3 0 ; in tion o f R o m a n s a n d allies i n
general, 429-30; in army, 4 3 0
Index 599
army and fleet, 349; fantasy vic- P e r s i a n f l e e t a f t e r b a t t l e of,

tories in Second Punic War, 3 5 0 108-9
n.6; a p p a r e n t indecisiveness, Sallust: account of Marius' reforms,
r e a s o n s for delay, 3 5 3 ; knowl- 421
e d g e of Hannibal's plan, 354; S a m b r e River: R o m a n s a t t a c k e d
weakness of consular armies, while setting up camp on, 491
3 5 4 ; l e a k s i n p l a n s , 3 5 6 ; esti- Santones: area of, p u r p o r t e d goal
mates of Hannibal's capabilities of Helvetii, 4 5 9 , 4 6 3
invalid, 356; wins upper hand in Saône River: c r o s s e d by Helvetii,
Second Punic War, 3 6 5 - 6 9 ; 4 6 2 ; provided route for Helvetii,
changes between Cannae and 4 6 2 , 4 6 3 - 6 4 ; b r i d g e built b y
Zama, 3 6 6 - 6 8 ; gigantic materiel Caesar, 4 6 4 ; Caesar's march to,
superiority, 413; disorder in 498
Empire, 4 3 7 ; reasons for failing Sarissa: u s e of, by M a c e d o n i a n
to equal A l e x a n d e r ' s success in cavalry, 177; use of, by Macedo-
East, 4 4 6 - 4 8 nian infantry, 178, 4 0 2 ; de-
Rorarii: in older legion 278, 292 v e l o p m e n t of, u n d e r D i a d o c h i ,
Ruspina, battle of, 556-59; unusual 2 3 6 ; in Macedonian phalanx of
formation at, 5 5 9 s e c o n d c e n t u r y , B.C., 3 9 3 - 9 5 ,
Rüstow, W.: History of the Infantry, 401-6; lengths, 394-95, 401-6;
29; C. Julius Caesar's Military Or- not yet used in Pyrrhus' phalanx,
ganization and Conduct of War, 3 9 6 ; u s e d b y peltasts, 4 0 3 , b y
454 hypaspists, 403
Rüstow, W., Köchly, H.: History of Schambach: The Cavalry in Caesar's
Greek Warfare from the Oldest Times Army, 457
to Pyrrhus, 28; Greek Military Au- Scharnhorst: concept of main ser-
thors, 28 vice o f m o d e r n s t a n d i n g army,
509; error in strength report,
552
Scipio (Africanus). See Publius Cor-
Sacred Band. See Pelopidas nelius Scipio Africanus
Saguntum: surrender of, 353-54 Scipio (father of Publius Cornelius
Sailors: as peltasts under Thrasylus, Scipio): t o S p a i n , 3 5 4 ; l a n d i n g
133 n.4 near Marseilles, 3 5 5
Salamis: evacuation of A t h e n s be- Scipio (Pompey's subordinate):
fore battle of, 103; Greek uncer- move from Syria, 528; sought by
tainty w h e r e t o m e e t P e r s i a n Caesar, 5 3 1 ; evasive action 5 3 3 -
fleet, 104-5; recent discovery as 3 4 ; at Thapsus, 556-57
to location, of battle of, 106; bat- Scuta, 265
tle of, in Bay of E l e u s i s , 1 0 6 ; Sea duty: no regular list for obli-
14-day interval between occupa- gated, 145; difference of, from
t i o n o f A t h e n s a n d b a t t l e of, hoplite service, 145; mercenary,
106-7, 109 n.2; Persian plan at, in Athens, 145
to attack from both sides, 107; Sebusiani, 477 n.5
s t r a t e g y o f T h e m i s t o c l e s at, Second Punic War, 3 1 1 - 3 9 0 ; epoc-
107-8; observation point of hal nature, 3 1 1 ; final period of
X e r x e s at, 1 0 8 ; w i t h d r a w a l o f hoplite phalanx, 3 1 1 ; recounted
by Polybius, 311-12; brought out T y r e , Gaza by A l e x a n d e r , 181;

n e w tactics, 3 1 1 ; basic strategic of R o m e impossible for Hanni-
problem, 336; Carthaginian bal, 337; of Phraaspa by Antony,
superiority, 3 3 6 ; flexibility of 4 4 5 - 4 6 ; of Alesia by Caesar,
Carthaginian formation, 336; 498-507
R o m a n stiffness, 3 3 6 ; Rome's ex- S i e g e c r a f t : a p p l i c a t i o n of, very
t r e m e effort in, 3 4 1 , 3 4 5 , 3 4 9 - primitive in Peloponnesian War,
5 0 ; strategic prelude to, 3 5 2 - 6 2 ; 126; significant Greek progress
equilibrium reached: Hannibal in, d u r i n g f o u r t h century B . C ,
superior in o p e n field, R o m e 152-53; application of, at Selinus,
held cities, 365; gradual Roman Himera, Acragas, Gela by Carth-
gains in secondary theaters, 365; aginians, 153; d e v e l o p m e n t of,
climax at Zama, 3 6 6 ; changes be- by Dionysius the Elder, 153; de-
tween Cannae and Zama, 366-67; v e l o p m e n t of, i n M a c e d o n i a n
first use by R o m a n s of e c h e l o n army, 181
tactics, 3 8 9 Signifer, 4 3 2
Segusiavi, 463 Silenos: in Hannibal's retinue, 322,
Seleucia, 4 4 4 332
Sellasia, battle of, 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 - 4 6 ; to- Silpia, battle of. See Bacula II, battle
pographical description by of
Kromayer, 2 4 1 - 4 2 ; use of fortifi- Sixth Legion, 5 0 5 n . l , 505-6, n.4
cations in, 2 4 2 , 2 4 4 - 4 5 Slaves: role of, in A t h e n i a n army,
S e m p r o n i u s : s t r e n g t h o f army o n 125; inclusion of, in population
the Trebia, 326; to Sicily, 353-54 of Attica, 141; role of, in Athe-
Seniores: in c e n t u r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , nian fleet, 142; Hyccaran, in
260-61 Athenian fleet, 142; incorporated
Sequani: relationships with Helvetii, in Roman army by Marius, 4 1 8
4 6 0 ; passage of Helvetii through Slingers: in army of Alexander, 184
area of, 4 6 4 ; Caesar's m o v e to- n.10
ward r e g i o n of, 4 9 7 ; participa- Soldiers: professional, in Hannibal's
tion in rebellion, 5 0 5 n.4 army at Cannae, 3 2 3 ; veterans of
S e r v i a n : class d i s t i n c t i o n s e l i m i - 14 years in Scipio's army at Za-
nated, 264; wall, 2 7 0 n.6, 3 3 8 ma,. 3 6 8
Servilius: at Cannae, 3 2 8 - 3 0 Sophists: lectures by, on art of war,
Servius Tullus (king), 256 159
Sharpshooters: use of, in conjunc- Soros: nature of, as burial m o u n d ,
tion with phalanx, 160-61; n u m - 76, 81 n . l ; position of, 82 n.6
bers of, usuable against hoplites, Spain in civil war: Pompeian situa-
67-68 tion and strategy, 517; siege of
Shields, 2 6 5 , 2 9 0 ; clipei, 2 6 5 , 2 9 0 ; Ilerda, 517-27; strength of Pom-
scuta, 2 6 5 , 2 9 0 ; u s e by sarissa peian forces, 5 4 2
fighter, 394-95 Spartans: real source of strength of,
Sicoris River: role in siege of Ilerda, 69; creation of cavalry units by,
518-27 1 3 2 ; tactical o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d
Siege: of Perinthus, by Philip of drill of, 153
Macedon, 181; of Byzantium, by Spartiates: ratio of, to accompany-
Philip, 181; of Halicarnassus, i n g H e l o t s , 3 6 ; first r a n k s o f
Index 601
phalanx m a n n e d by, 54; number 4 8 8 , 4 9 0 ; Caesar against Ver-

of h o p l i t e s , 6 3 ; s t r e n g t h of, at cingetorix, 505 n.4
Mantinea in 4 1 8 B.C., 131; Swiss: e f f e c t i v e n e s s of small army
strength of, at T h e r m o p y l a e , 95 of, in fifteenth century, 186
Spartolus, battle of, 4 2 9 B.C., 127 Swords: R o m a n , 2 7 6 , 281 n.7;
Spears, 3 9 4 - 9 5 , 401-6; length of, in gladius hispanus, 2 8 1 n.7; b e n t
various armies, 178 swords of Gauls, 3 0 6 ; f o r g e at
Sphacteria: defeat of Spartans on, Krain, 3 0 6 ; excellent swords of
127-30; Delbrück controversy Celtiberians, 306
with Meyer over, 127-30; signifi- Sybel, Heinrich von, 421-22
cance of Cleon and T h u c y d i d e s Syphax: taken prisoner by Romans,
in account of battle of, 127-30; 370; defeated by Scipio on
d e f e n s e of, 127-30; topographi- "Great Plains," 376
cal study of, by Grundy, 128 Syracuse: first battle of, 131; Nicias
Spurius Ligustinus, 4 3 4 - 3 6 at, 1 3 1 - 3 2 ; r o l e o f c a v a l r y i n ,
Standards: in R o m a n maniple, 275; 132; action of Gylippus in, 132;
use in training, 275; purpose and d e f e c t i o n from R o m e , 3 3 9 ; be-
position, 2 7 8 - 7 9 ; role in battle in sieged by Romans, 343
cohort formation, 2 7 9 Syrians: in battle of Magnesia, 398-
Stipendium, 2 6 9 4 0 1 ; at Pharsalus, 5 4 6
S t o f f e l C o l o n e l : History of Julius Syrian Gates: strategic influence of,
Caesar, Civil War, 4 5 4 ; The War on battle of Issus, 196-97
between Caesar and Ariovistus and
Caesar's First Operations in the Year
702, 4 5 4 ; on strength of Caesar's T a b l e t , b r a s s . See H e r a L a c i n i a ,
l e g i o n s , 4 5 5 - 5 6 ; o n location o f Temple of
battle between Caesar and Tactics: Polybius' c o m p a r i s o n of
Ariovistus, 4 8 4 - 8 7 ; on Ilerda, Roman and Macedonian, 395.
524-25, 5 4 2 See also Xenophon, Aeneas
Stolle, Franz: on location of battle (Stymphalian)
between Caesar and Ariovistus, Tarentines: formed light cavalry in
4 8 5 - 8 7 ; Where did Caesar Defeat battle of Mantinea, 247
Ariovistus?, 4 8 7 n . 2 ; The Camp Tarentum: defection from Rome,
and Army of the Romans, 487 339; besieged by Romans, 343
Strategy: p r e l u d e to S e c o n d Punic Tarquinius Superbus, 2 6 0
War, 3 5 2 - 6 3 ; of attrition on both T e l a m o n , battle of, 3 0 5 ; action of
sides in Second Punic War, 3 6 2 - Gaesatae in, 305
63 T e m p e Pass: relationship of, to bat-
Strengths, army. See Army strengths tle o f T h e r m o p y l a e , 9 2 ; A t h e -
Sub signis, 291 nian army u n d e r T h e m i s t o c l e s
Sulla, 438-40; in battle of to, 9 6 ; evacuated by Perseus in
Chaeronea, 4 3 8 ; in battle of Or- 169 B.C., 400-401
c h o m e n u s , 4 3 8 ; in siege of T e n t h Legion, 5 5 0
A t h e n s , 4 3 8 ; e x a g g e r a t e d ac- Terentius Varro: at Cannae, 3 1 5 ,
counts of battles, 4 3 8 - 3 9 , 513 328-31
Supply problems: Caesar against Terrain: failure of Greeks to utilize
Helvetii, 4 6 9 ; B e l g a e o n A i s n e , properly, 141
Tesserarius, 4 3 2 at, 95-96; T h e s p i a n s at, 97; T h e -

T e u t o n e s : d e f e a t e d by M a r i u s at bans at, 97
A q u a e Sextiae, 102 B . C . , 4 1 4 ; T h e s p i a n s : p a r t i c i p a t i o n of, at
fantasy in battle account, 4 3 8 - 3 9 ; T h e r m o p y l a e , 97
split up campaign into Italy with Thessalians: at Pharsalus, 546
Cimbri, 4 8 8 Thêtes: inclusion of, in Pericles' fi-
T h a p s u s , b a t t l e of: a c c o u n t of, g u r e s , 4 2 , 4 4 - 4 6 ; n u m b e r s of,
556-57; losses, 553 vis-a-vis cleruchs, 45; lack of ini-
T h e b a n s : participation of, at Ther- tial military obligation of, 63; la-
mopylae, 97 ter service of, as ships' crews, 6 3 ;
Thebes: number of hoplites in, 63 field service of, as u n a r m o r e d
T h e m i s t o c l e s : i n t e n t i o n of, to o p - men, 64
pose Persians with fleet only, 94; Thracians: at Pharsalus, 546
f e i g n e d t r e a c h e r y of, b e f o r e Thrasylus: use of sailors as peltasts
Salamis, 105; address to Greeks by, 133 n.4
b e f o r e battle o f S a l a m i s , 107; T h u c y d i d e s : s p e e c h of Pericles in
s t r a t e g y of, at S a l a m i s , 1 0 7 ; 431 B . C . cited by, 39-44; test of
proposal of, to destroy Persian authoritativeness of, 46; analysis
bridges on Hellespont, 111; re- by, of Cleon's role at Sphacteria,
p l a c e m e n t of, by Aristides and 127-30; j u d g m e n t of, on C l e o n
Xanthippus, 111; analysis of and Pericles' war plan, 141
qualities of, 118 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus
T h e o r y of warfare: d e v e l o p m e n t of, (praetor), 4 3 5
158; X e n o p h o n first to analyze, T i c i n u s , battle o n : cavalry battle,
159; lectures on, by Sophists, 333
159; warfare not a science, d e - Tigranes (king of Armenia): de-
pends on whole man, 159; tactics feated by Lucullus and Pompey,
only a small part of art of war, 440
159; Anabasis, 159; p r o b l e m of T i g r a n o c e r t a , battle of: s t r e n g t h s
breadth/depth relationship in and losses at, 513
phalanx, 160; first c o m p r e h e n - Tigurini: defeated by Marius near
sive w o r k o n , b y S t y m p h a l i a n Vercellae, 4 1 4 ; separated from
Aeneas, 163 Helvetii on Saône, 462
T h e r m o p y l a e : c o m b i n e d action o f Tissaphernes: Persian cavalry of, at
l a n d a r m y a n d f l e e t at, 9 1 ; Cunaxa, 154
strategy of, influenced by politi- Tities: ancient R o m a n cavalry cen-
cal considerations, 9 1 ; treachery tury, 2 6 6
of Ephialtes at, 9 2 ; outflanking Titus Quinctius Flaminius, 4 3 4
m o v e m e n t s of pass at, by Gauls T o w e r s : w o o d e n assault, following
in 2 7 8 B . C . , Romans in 191 B . C . , phalanx, 162
92; strategy of Greeks at, a com- Trasimeno, Lake, battle of: surprise
promise, 94; Athenian man- attack d u r i n g march, 3 3 4
p o w e r in a r e a of, w h o l l y with Trebia, battle on the, 3 3 3 ; d o u b l e
fleet, 94; defense of, a secondary cavalry e n v e l o p m e n t , 3 3 3 ; sur-
part of strategic plan, 9 4 ; reason r o u n d e d R o m a n s break out,
for small size of Leonidas' army 333-34
at, 95-97; full m e a n i n g of defeat Treitschke, Heinrich von, 4 2 1 - 2 2
Index 603
Trévoux, 462 Vercingetorix: campaign against

Triarii: in m a n i p u l a r phalanx for- Caesar, 4 9 5 - 5 0 7 ; strength and
mation, 2 7 2 ; position, 2 7 3 ; early strategy, 4 9 5 - 9 6 ; characteristics
position, e r r o n e o u s l y r e p o r t e d , of, 4 9 6 ; a t t a c k e d C a e s a r o n
291-92 march, 498; took refuge in
Tribunes, war: functions of, 4 5 6 Alesia, 4 9 8 ; efforts to break
Tribuni militum, 4 3 0 siege, 4 9 8 - 5 0 7 ; strength at
T u l i n g e r i : flank attack by, at Bib- Alesia, 4 9 9 - 5 0 5 ; training and dis-
racte, 4 7 1 - 7 3 cipline in army of, 5 0 6 n.6
Tyre: siege of, 181 Vermina: cavalry force j o i n e d Scipio
after Zama-Naraggara, 3 8 9
V e r o m a n d u i : final effort to defeat
U n a r m o r e d m e n : use of, to assist Caesar, 491
hoplites, 56; auxiliary combat Vibullius Rufus: visit to P o m p e i a n
duties of, 56; no change in func- leaders at Ilerda, 5 1 8
tion of, t h r o u g h fifth c e n t u r y "Virtus, opus, arma," 285-86
B . C . , 1 2 5 ; slaves a m o n g , a t Vrana Valley: position of Athenians
Athens, 125; distinction between in, at Marathon, 73-74, 78; width
peltasts and lightly armed m e n , of, 8 1 ; distance of, from Soros,
126; in maniple, 2 7 2 8 1 ; division of, by brook, 89 n.4
Universal military service: in R o m e ,
261-62
Urmia, Lake, 4 4 8 Wages: Athenian hoplite, 147 n.l
U x e l l o d u n u m : Caesar's water con- Wall: Servian, 2 7 0
duit at, 566 War efforts: Roman, in Second
Punic War, 3 4 1 , 3 4 5 - 4 6 , 350;
British, in Napoleonic era, 3 5 0 ;
Valerius Antias: d i s t o r t e d report of Prussian, in 1813, 350; German,
battle of Asculum, 2 9 9 1914-18, 3 5 0
V a r r o : P o m p e i a n legate in Spain, War treasury: Hannibal, 3 5 2
517 Wellington: comparison with Scipio,
Veii, 260; siege of, 2 6 2 385
Veith, G.: d e f e n s e of Polybius, 387; Winkler: The Location of the Battle be-
disagreement with Delbrück, tween Caesar and Ariovistus, 4 8 7
387-90; concept of cohort tactics,
4 2 3 - 2 4 , 4 2 7 n . 8 ; History of C.
Julius Caesar's Campaigns, 4 5 5 ; on Xanthippus: co-commander of
Pharsalus, 5 5 1 - 5 5 ; clear picture Greek fleet after Salamis, 112;
o f Caesar's A f r i c a n c a m p a i g n , instructor for Carthaginians on
556 land warfare, 303
Veliti: light infantry, 278; separation X e n o p h o n : role of, in using multi-
of combatants and orderlies by ple c o l u m n s against C o l c h i a n s ,
Marius, 4 1 5 , 4 2 6 n.5 150-51; first to analyze conduct
Veneti: invention of long sickles in of warfare, 159; Anabasis, 159;
naval war against, 5 6 6 unrealistic aspects of theories of,
Vercellae: Cimbri and Tigurini de- 1 6 0 - 6 1 ; r e g u l a t i o n for military
feated by Marius at, 4 1 4 police in rear to prevent straggl-
ing, 161; concept of reserve, s u p e r i o r i t y i n cavalry, 3 7 0 ;
161-62; scythed chariots, 162; at- elephants with Hannibal's army,
tack towers, 162; story of Cyrus' 3 7 0 - 7 2 ; initial skirmishing pro-
experiment: clubs vs. clods, 162; l o n g e d by H a n n i b a l , 3 7 2 ; first
conviction of, phalanx still main significant use of echelon tactics,
arm, 163; writings of, 163; 176; 372-74; sources less definite than
truest accounts of battles of for C a n n a e , 3 7 6 - 7 7 ; Hannibal's
Leuctra and Mantinea, 170; con- first line: sharpshooters, 377-78;
cept of arms, e q u i p m e n t for army strengths, 378; alleged
cavalry, 176; discipline in army peace negotiations a fantasy from
of, 287; use of reserve an early Ennius, 3 8 2 ; significance of bat-
form of e c h e l o n tactics, 3 7 4 ; tle, 3 8 4 - 8 5 ; b r o k e p o w e r o f
strengths at Cunaxa, 5 1 3 C a r t h a g e , 3 8 5 ; c o n f u s i o n as to
Xerxes: strength of army of, accord- location of battle, 383
ing to H e r o d o t u s , 35; conversa- Zeugitae: inclusion of, in population
tion of, with Demaratus, 69; false figures, 4 6 ; service of, as h o p -
report of T h e m i s t o c l e s to, 105; lites, 6 3 - 6 4 ; military o b l i g a t i o n
return of, to Asia after Salamis, of, 6 4
1 0 8 - 9 ; s t r e n g t h of army of, in Ziehen: The Latest Attack on Caesar's
4 8 0 B.C., 112-13 Credibility, 4 7 5 ; Delbrück d i s -
agreement with, 4 7 5 - 7 6
Zonaras: a c c o u n t of battle of
Zama-Naraggara, battle of: climax Heraclea, 2 9 8 - 9 9 ; account of bat-
o f S e c o n d Punic War, 3 6 6 ; ac- de of Asculum, 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ; account
count of, 370-78; Roman of battle of B e n e v e n t u m , 3 0 0
About the Author:
HANS DELBRUCK (1848-1929) was the editor of the Prussian Annals from
1883 to 1919 and Professor of History at Berlin University from 1896 to
1921. A member of the German delegation to the Paris Peace Conference,
Delbrück served as an expert on the question of German responsibility for
World War I.
About the Translator:
WALTER J. RENFROE, JR. retired as a Brigadier General in the United

States Army and as Professor of Foreign Languages at the United States
Military Academy at West Point.
"Delbriick is internationally regarded as the first modem military histo
rian. History ofthe Art of War, considered a classic, is his foundational
achievement. Renfroe's translation retains the spirited erudition of the
original German and renders it into el--· -_ ..
a doubt a landmark in twentieth-centl
Bucholz, author of Hans Delbrikk and
"Undergraduates, military buffs, profe_mmU sOlwerS, is well as historians

will all enjoy this readable and often elegant translation ... of a classic
history.... Highly recommended." -Choice. "This intensive study will
be useful for those familiar with the military and political history used by
the author as background. In an excellent translation ... Renfroe has
pointed out the very rare errors or oversights within the body of the text;
his highly readable translation manages to retain the flavor of the origi
nal." -LibraryJournal.
Hans Delbriick's four-volume History ofthe Art of War is recognized

throughout the world as the definitive work on the subject. Appearing in
an English-language paperback edition for the first time, Volume I an
alyzes in vivid detail the military tactics and strategies used by the great
warriors of antiquity. Delbriick disputes some points in classical history
and separates fact from legend in his objective reconstruction ofcele
brated battles stretching from the Persian Wars to the Peloponnesian War,
Alexander's campaign to conquer Asia, the Second Punic War and Han
nibal's crossing of the Alps, and the triumph of the Roman legions and Ju
lius Caesar. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., based his much-praised English trans
lation on the third (1920) edition of Volume I.
Cover design by Jennifer Manson
ISBN 0-8032-9199-X $16.95
IIIIII~I~IIII
9!808J~!9199~ 111111
90000

Hans Delbruck The Warfare in Antiquity

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hans Delbruck The Warfare in Antiquity

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, VOLUME I

HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR

Translated from the German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.

University of Nebraska Press

First Bison Book printing: 1990

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reprinted by arrangement with Greenwood Press, Inc.

Originally titled HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK

Figure 2. Battle of Issus 193

Figure 3. Battle of Z a m a - N a r a g g a r a 382

F i g u r e 4. Battle b e t w e e n C a e s a r a n d Ariovistus 484

Figure 5. Siege of Alesia 503

Figure 6. Siege of I l e r d a 521

uses G e r m a n miles, his figures have b e e n c o n v e r t e d into English

have these practical skills, w h o a r e familiar with these things or ac-

servation, must constantly enlighten a n d control one another.

this position I h a d not only t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to gain a certain direct

sens"). I did not yet v e n t u r e to i n t r o d u c e antiquity into this lecture.

principally on t h e objective m e t h o d as it has b e e n practiced a n d r e -

historical e x a m p l e s . T h i s book, however, does not p r e t e n d to such

o n d edition of these first two volumes has t h e r e f o r e consisted of

T h e historian of antiquity w h o r e a d s only the first v o l u m e , the

Berlin-Grunewald, 12 July 1908

ficient for the p u r p o s e s of a history of the art of war. We recognize

T h e basis for the scholarly k n o w l e d g e of the Greek military art is formed, e v e n

Burgunderkriege). T w o c o m b i n e d military-historical studies with a s u p p l e m e n t on the

of t h e fortifications in the t h e a t e r of war, N a p o l e o n h a d 440,000

impossible. An excellent e x a m p l e of this is p r o v i d e d by a recently

way. Even if a p a r t of t h e Persian a r m y h a d r e m a i n e d b e h i n d in

the a r m y a n d its supply, is an absurdity. It probably h a d its origin

included in that total or in addition to it, is given as 1,000 m e n .

O N T H E P O P U L A T I O N O F ATTICA A N D O F T H E O T H E R GREEK STATES.

few forts, which we may estimate at some 4 , 0 0 0 to 6 , 0 0 0 men. From this n u m b e r we

N o w we have found a n u m b e r forming a standard against which the passage in

actually shown them as such while, on the o t h e r h a n d , omitting the cleruchs, w h o

1,200 mounted men

F r o m t h e first edition of the s e c o n d volume ( p p . 1 ff.) I t r a n s -

T h e first is the interpretation of T h u c y d i d e s 2. 13 as to the population of Attica at

a. Citizens and metics in 431 B . C . about 4 4 , 0 0 0

T h e s e 9 , 0 0 0 m e n , with the addition of partially qualified m e n from category "c,"

position might be t h r e a t e n e d . Certainly there was n e v e r a situation with evenly

T h i s becomes e v e n clearer if we go back to the period of the Persian Wars. Meyer

r o n e o u s idea of the significance of the division of the p e o p l e into classes. By

1. Beitzke, History of the German Wars of Liberation (Geschichte der

wirtschaft an d e r J a h r h u n d e r t w e n d e " ) , Preussische Jahrbücher, Feb-

STATE INHABITANTS PER

12. As early as in t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ,

stronger."* T h e C o r c y r a e a n s ' fleet at Sybota was for t h e most p a r t

Greek Arms and Tactics

A t h e n i a n citizen b r o u g h t o u t in his defense in a trial the fact that

pace. C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h we find such an e m p l o y m e n t of p r o -

hoplites in o r d e r to arrive at the s t r e n g t h of t h e a r m y . T h e correct

g a t e d p a r t of t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n a r e a , w e r e t h e first not only to

On most occasions it is clear that the m o u n t e d warriors could contribute m u c h m o r e

1. Adolf B a u e r , Section 4 0 , says t h r e e m e t e r s . On this point, see

sarissa, whose p a r t i c u l a r combat position consisted in the "closeness

Helbig, Mémoires de I'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1902, p.

1. In view of the n u m b e r s that we arrived at in the first chapter, it seems remark-

If this concept is correct, then an Athenian hoplite army in 4 9 0 B . C . cannot have

T h e extent of the service obligation of the metics is uncertain. For o u r purposes

1. T h a t seems to be p r o v e d by Plato in Menexenus, w h e r e it is in-

2. Adolf B a u e r d o e s not d r a w up any total figure, b u t does esti-

T h e Persian a r m y was of a type completely opposite that of the