CRIMPRO Rule 112

Title G.R. No. 108431.

RARO V. SB July 14, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Oscar G. Raro – Petitioner The Honorable SB, (Second Division), The Honorable Ombudsman
And People Of The Philippines – Respondent
FACTS
1. July 30, 1987, the PCSO, through Atty. Reynaldo E. Ilagan of the Special Projects Department, authorized Elmec Trading and
Management Corporation (ELMEC) to operate the STL in the province of Camarines Norte. ELMEC in turn employed Luis (Bing) F.
Abao, a resident of Daet, Camarines Norte, as Provincial Manager of the experimental STL in said province.
2. May 20, 1988, Abao alleged in a complaint with the Tanodbayan that petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate
Secretary of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, petitioner was the Acting Manager of the Special Projects
Department that was in charge of the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL), in his capacity as PCSO Corporate Secretary,
personally and directly intervened in the operation of said lottery to his financial benefit and advantage in violation of
Section 3 (d)(e)(h) of the AntiGraft Law;
3. Abao maintained further that petitioner got mad at him when he gave petitioner a check instead of cash, which petitioner later used
to accuse Abao of issuing a bouncing check notwithstanding that the check was not encashed. Abao added that petitioner was not
only dishonest but displayed such dishonesty. The complaint filed by Abaos counsel was verified and subscribed before a notary
public, and docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman which was endorsed to the NBI for investigation. September 19, 1990, the NBI
recommended the prosecution of petitioner based on Abao’s complaint.
4. May 1991, Graft Investigating Officer (GIO) II Caraos, formally directed petitioner to file his counteraffidavit and controverting
evidence to the complaint of May 1988, with a warning that his failure to do so shall be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard
and the preliminary investigation shall proceed accordingly. Petitioner filed his counteraffidavit on October 25, 1991 denying the
allegations of Abao.
5. November 29, 1991, GIO II Caraos issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Raro for Violation of R.A. 3019 based on a
finding of probable cause has been established by the clear and positive testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses and also
upon recommendation of the NBI report which also recommended the filing of proper criminal charge against the petitioner Raro.
6. June 11, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer I (SPO I) Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit, after reviewing the Resolution of GIO II Caraos,
issued a Memorandum finding that said Resolution did not fully discuss the evidence that would support the particular charges
recommended to be filed against petitioner. After analyzing each of the charges, SPO I Barreras-Sulit concluded that petitioner
should only be charged with violation of Section 3 (b) of R.A. 3019 as there was prima facie case that petitioner received the total
amount of P116,000.00 on four different occasions. Attached to the Memorandum was the information charging petitioner with
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
7. July 2, 1992, an information dated May 19, 1992 prepared by SPO I Barreras-Sulit was filed with the SB, accusing petitioner with
violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
8. July 6, 1992, the SB issued an order for petitioner’s arrest and fixed bail in the amount of P12,000.00. On the same day, petitioner
applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26, which forthwith approved the application.
9. July 8, 1992, petitioner filed with the SB a manifestation and motion for the lifting of the order of arrest. Accordingly, the SB recalled
its order of arrest the following day.
10. Petitioner subsequently filed with the SB a motion for the reinvestigation of the Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 11 June 1992
on the grounds that there was prejudicial and indecent delay in the preliminary investigation violated his constitutional rights; he was
not furnished a copy of the resolution on which the information was based; that the resolution of June 11, 1992 was a picture of legal
and factual infirmities as no evidence supported the complaint; and that the complaint was based solely on the affidavit of Abao and
mere hearsay witnesses. The SB granted the petitioners motion for reinvestigation in a Resolution dated July 28, 1992, and ordered
the defense to file a motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman, and the prosecution to
conduct such reinvestigation
11. August 14, 1992, SPO III Berbano issued an Order stating that the grounds and issues raised in petitioner’s motion for
reinvestigation were clearly matters of defense to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. Hence, he recommended
the denial of the motion for reinvestigation, which recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman.
12. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner on September 8, 1992 was cancelled considering that the reinvestigation ordered by the SB
had not yet been terminated. Arraignment was reset and the petitioner again failed to appear as he was ill. The SB reset the
arraignment for October 12, 1992.
13. On that date, petitioner filed with the SB a motion to quash the information,on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction in
view of violations of accuseds constitutional rights during the preliminary investigation. To which SPO III Berbano opposed the
motion to quash, arguing that all the pleadings filed by petitioner were duly considered. The SB denied the motion to quash for lack
of merit. The SB stressed that its authority to determine probable cause is limited only for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest,
and not for the purpose of justifying the filing or nonfiling of the Information.
14. Petitioner again filed for a motion for reconsideration to which the SB denied and set petitioners arraignment.
15. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 17800.
16. The SC gave due course to the instant petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. Meanwhile, the SB
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 17800 on account of the pendency of the instant petition.

17. Petitioner alleges in this petition for certiorari and prohibition that:
(a) the determination of probable cause in Criminal Case No. 17800 was constitutionally defective because the Ombudsman, before
filing the information, and the SB, before issuing the warrant of arrest, failed to examine the complainant under oath;
(b) the preliminary investigation was hasty, malicious, persecutory and based on inadmissible evidence thereby violating his right to
due process of law, and
(c) the unexplained 4year delay in resolving the preliminary investigation, coupled with the favorable consideration of the complaint
albeit manifestly false and politically motivated, violated his constitutional rights to speedy trial and to due process of law
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the SB gravely abused its discretion in denying a motion to quash an information on the ground that the preliminary
investigation allegedly violated the right of the accused to due process of law. - NO
RATIO
At the outset, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take
an appeal in the manner authorized by law. It is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an
appeal that the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.

In the case at bar, there is no showing of such special circumstances. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the complaint i s not even
questioned by petitioner as his motion to quash the information is based on the allegedly highly anomalous preliminary investigation that
amounted to a denial of his rights to due process and to speedy disposition of the charge against him. However, an incomplete preliminary
investigation or the absence thereof may not warrant the quashal of an information. In such cases, the proper procedure is for the SB to
hold in abeyance any further proceedings conducted and to remand the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation or
completion thereof. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition must fail. However, in the interest of justice, we shall resolve the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the
preliminary investigation erroneously and irregularly.

1. Determination of probable cause by the Ombudsman was not defective

The mandate to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees* of the Government is restated in
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), approved into law on November 17, 1989. The same authority to act
on complaints in any form, either verbal or in writing, is also reiterated in Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Clearly in consonance with the provision that the complaint may be in any form, the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure does
not require that the complaint be subscribed only before the Ombudsman or his duly authorized representative. In any event, the issue of
the sufficiency in form of the complaint was rendered moot and academic by petitioners filing of a counter-affidavit wherein he controverted
the allegations in the complaint.

The referral of the complaint to the NBI does not mean that the Ombudsman abdicated its constitutional and statutory duty to conduct
preliminary investigations. Under the circumstances of this case, the Ombudsman’s failure to personally administer oath to the complainant
does not mean that the Ombudsman did not personally determine the existence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information.
Neither did the SB violate petitioner’s right to due process of law by its failure to personally examine the complainant before it issued the
warrant of arrest. In a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a court is not required to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. What is required is that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause. In the absence of evidence that the SB did not personally
evaluate the necessary records of the case, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official business shall stand. Citing Cruz Jr v
People, it must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. In determining probable
cause, an inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to warrant conviction is not required. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

2. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was not hasty, malicious and persecutory
Petitioner emphasizes the fact that while the Resolution recommending the filing of the information was issued on June 11, 1992, the
information was already prepared almost a month earlier on May 19, 1992. This may show oversight in the handling of the documents
pertinent to this case considering that the date of the information should have been corrected to conform to the date of the resolution
where its filing was approved by the prosecutor’s superiors. However, such faux pas did not violate petitioners substantive rights. The error
in the date of the information did not affect its validity, especially since the recommendation to file it was with the imprimatur of the
Ombudsman himself. Neither is there factual support to petitioners claim that the 4year delay in the completion of the preliminary
investigation is unexplained. The record clearly shows that the Ombudsman exerted utmost effort to determine the veracity of Abaos
allegations against petitioner. That it took the NBI almost two years to complete its report on the matter does not mean that petitioners right
to speedy disposition of the charge was brushed aside. The length of time it took before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation may
only be attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman and the NBI to the rules of procedure and the rudiments of fair play.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the SB are
hereby AFFIRMED. The SB is DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 17800.

*Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution: The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/december2007/151785.htm 2S 2016-17 (MATIENZO)