April-June 2011 PHILJA NEWS 1

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April to June 2011 Volume XIII, Issue No. 50

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2 PHILJA NEWS
Launch of the Sourcebook on
Environmental Rights and Legal Remedies
and the Helpbook on Human Rights Issues:
Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances
The Supreme Court of the Philippines and the
Philippine Judicial Academy, together with the Program
Management Office (PMO), and in partnership with the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and The Asia Foundation (TAF), held a back-to-
back launching of the books Access to Environmental Justice:
A Sourcebook on Environmental Rights and Legal Remedies and
the Helpbook on Human Rights Issues: Extralegal Killings and
Enforced Disappearances on June 10, 2011, at the New
Building Lobby, Supreme Court, Manila.
The Access to Environmental Justice: A Sourcebook on
Environmental Rights and Legal Remedies was produced along
with a Capacity Assessment Report on Environmental
Justice, both outcomes of the UNDP project entitled
“Development of Framework and Capacity Assessment
on Environmental Justice” under the Enhancing Access
to the Pillars of Justice Component of the UNDP’s
Fostering Democratic Governance Programme. The
Sourcebook lays down the principles and framework of
environmental justice in the Philippines, identifies the
emerging trends in environmental jurisprudence and best
practices, and recommends strategies to remedy policy
gaps and to promote and enhance Environmental Justice
in the Philippine legal system.
On the other hand, the Helpbook on Human Rights Issues:
Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances, funded by
the USAID, through The Asia Foundation, focuses on state
responsibility, human rights and humanitarian law, the
doctrine of command responsibility, extralegal killings
PHILJA Bulletin
(ELK) and enforced disappearances (ED). It is intended
to (a) further disseminate the knowledge shared during
the PHILJA seminar-workshops on extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances; (b) provide applicable laws,
systems, and processes to guide the different pillars of
the justice system, the NGOs, and the community on how
best to address the needs of victims of human rights
violations with the view of effectively resolving cases of
ELKs and EDs; and (c) identify gaps in the legal system
and processes of concerned agencies and make
recommendations on how to address these gaps.
In his message, UNDP Country Director Renaud
Meyer described the book, Access to Environmental Justice:
A Sourcebook on Environmental Rights and Legal Remedies as
“a rich and valuable sourcebook on the access points to
and the procedures of Environmental Justice” and
emphasized that it is “not only for the judicial courts, but
also for government departments, international
organizations, communities, and individuals, all of whom
now have the tools with which to implement
Environmental Justice themselves.”
USAID Deputy Chief Mr. Daniel Miller, in his message,
acknowledged the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
the Philippine Judicial Academy for making the Helpbook
on Human Rights Issues: Extralegal Killings and Enforced
Disappearances available and expressed the hope that the
Helpbook will serve as a user-friendly reference for a
better response of all to cases of human rights violations.
TAF Country Representative Dr. Steven Rood
commended the hard work, research and thorough
discussions of representatives of various sectors from
all over the country that led to the production of this
“important and useful work x x x written as a guide for all
stakeholders” and in clear and easy to understand
language.
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, in his keynote
address, acknowledged the support of the UNDP and
the USAID, and congratulated the PHILJA for initiating
the training of judges, prosecutors, and other key
stakeholders in order to build their capacity to hear
and adjudicate environmental and human rights cases.
The event was attended by Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals Justices, Supreme Court officials,
PHILJA officials and staff, and representatives from the
Alternative Law Groups (ALG), Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), Ateneo Human Rights Center (AHRC),
Ateneo Law School, Australian Embassy, Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), Department of Energy and Natural
Resources (DENR), Department of Justice (DOJ), Families
of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances (FIND),
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Alliance
of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP), The Asia
Foundation (TAF), United Nations Development
Programme-Philippines (UNDP), United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), and Upholding
Life and Nature (ULAN).
 April-June 2011 PHILJA NEWS
‹ Seminar-Workshop on Dangerous Drugs Law
for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcers of
Regions IX, X, XI, and XII
Development Partners: DDB
Date: April 5 to 7, 2011
Venue: Royal Mandaya Hotel, Davao City
Participants: 134 comprising RTC and SHCC judges,
prosecutors and law enforcers of Regions 9 to 12
‹ Convention and Seminar and Election of
Officers of the Sheriffs’ Confederation of the
Philippines (SCOPHIL)
Theme: Tapat sa Tungkulin, Sapat na Kaalaman, Susi
sa Pagbabago
Date: April 5 to 7, 2011
Venue: Ibalong Center for Recreation, Legazpi Terminal
Compound, Bitano, Legazpi City
Participants: 689 court sheriffs
‹ Third Seminar-Workshop on the Special Rules
of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
Date: April 12 to 14, 2011
Venue: Montebello Villa Hotel, Cebu City
Participants: 29 RTC judges from Regions 3, 6, 7, and 8
‹ Eighth National Convention and Election of
Officers of the Process Servers Association of
the Philippines (PROSAPHIL)
Theme: The Role of Process Servers in the Speedy
Administration of Justice
Date: April 13 to 15, 2011
Venue: Brokenshire Resort and Convention Center,
Madapo, Davao City
Participants: 414 process servers
‹ Seminar-Workshop on Land Valuation and Just
Compensation for Special Agrarian Court
Judges
Development Partners: DAR, LBP
Date: April 13 to 15, 2011
Venue: Taal Vista Hotel, Tagaytay City
Participants: 61 comprising Special Agrarian Court
Judges of NCJR and Regions 1 to 5 and LBP Lawyers
Date: May 17 to 19, 2011
Venue: Flushing Meadows Resort, Panglao, Bohol
Participants: 57 Special Agrarian Court Judges and
representatives of DAR and LBP from Regions 6 to 12
3
‹ “Constitution and Peace: Lessons from Peace
Agreements” – A Roundtable Discussion
Development Partners: Conciliation Resources
International Alert, Ateneo Law School
Date: April 15, 2011
Venue: En Banc Conference Room, Supreme Court,
Manila
Participants: 14 comprising Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals justices, PHILJA officials and Academic
Council Curricular Departments chairpersons,
representatives from International Alert and other
guests
‹ Seminar-Workshop on the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases for NCJR and Luzon
Development Partners: USAID, ABA-ROLI
Date: April 26, 2011
Venue: Traders Hotel, Pasay City
Participants: 44 comprising MeTC, MTC, and MCTC
judges and clerks of court of NCJR and Luzon Regions
‹ Multi-Sectoral Capacity Building on
Environmental Laws and the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases
Development Partners: DENR, USAID, United States-
Department of the Interior, PMO
Date: April 27 to 29, 2011
Venue: Imperial Palace Suites, Quezon City
Participants: 96 comprising RTC and MTCC judges and
branch clerks of court, prosecutors, PAO lawyers,
representatives from DENR, BFAR, PCG, PNP, LGU,
NGO of CALABARZON Region
Date: May 25 to 27, 2011
Venue: Holiday Inn Clark, Pampanga
Participants: 89 comprising RTC and MTCC judges and
branch clerks of court, prosecutors, PAO lawyers,
representatives from BFAR, PCG, Federation of Philippine
Industries, and PNP of Region 3
‹ Seminar-Workshop on CEDAW and Gender
Sensitivity for the Judges, Clerks of Court, Legal
Researchers, and Interpreters
Development Partners: CGRJ, Sub committee on Training
and Capacity Building, AHRC
City of Dumaguete
Date: April 28 to 29, 2011
Venue: Plaza Maria Luisa Suites Inn, Dumaguete City
Participants: 56 comprising RTC and MTCC judges,
clerks of court, court legal researchers, and court
interpreters
 4 PHILJA NEWS
Province of Palawan
Date: May 12 to 13, 2011
Venue: Hotel Fleuris, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
Participants: 49 comprising RTC, MTCC, MTC and MCTC
judges, clerks of courts, court legal researchers and
court interpreters
National Capital Judicial Region
Date: June 2 to 3, 2011
Venue: Century Park Hotel, Manila
Participants: 44 comprising selected RTC judges and
clerks of court
‹ Information Dissemination Through a Dialogue
between Barangay Officials and Court Officials
City of Dipolog
Date: May 5, 2011
Venue: Atrium, Top Plaza Hotel, Dipolog City
Participants: 102 barangay officials
City of Oroquieta
Date: May 6, 2011
Venue: Farmers Cultural and Training Center,
Provincial Capitol, Oroquieta City
Participants: 154 barangay officials
Municipalities of Ipil and Imelda and the City of
Zamboanga
Date: June 2, 2011
Venue: Grand Astoria Hotel, Zamboanga City
Participants: 388 barangay officials
City of Antipolo
Date: June 9, 2011
Venue: Ynares Sports Complex, Antipolo City
Participants: 177 barangay officials
City of Isabela, Basilan
Date: June 30, 2011
Venue: Querexeta Formation Center, Isabela City,
Basilan
Participants: 76 barangay officials
‹ Seminar on Speedy Trial and Disposition of
Cases
Development Partners: USAID, ABA-ROLI
Date: May 13, 2011
Venue: Pryze Plaza Hotel, Cagayan de Oro City
Participants: 52 comprising RTC and MTCC judges from
Regions 9 to 12
‹ Sixth National Convention and Seminar of the
Court Stenographers Association of the
Philippines (COSTRAPHIL)
Theme: COSTRAPHIL: Moving Forward to a Sustained
Growth and Leadership through Professionalism and
Integrity
PHILJA Bulletin
Date: May 18 to 20, 2011
Venue: Grand Men Seng Hotel, Davao City
Participants: 2174 court stenographers
‹ Orientation Conference with Stakeholders on
Court-Annexed Mediation (Isabela Mediation
Program)
Date: May 24, 2011
Venue: The Hotel Andrea, Cauayan City, Isabela
Participants: 95 comprising RTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC
judges, clerks of court, branch clerks of court, and
stakeholders from the province of Isabela
‹ Convention and Seminar of the Court Librarians
Association of the Philippines (CLAPHIL)
Theme: The Challenges and Information Services
Delivery of Court Libraries in an Environment of
Change and Reforms
Date: May 25 to 27, 2011
Venue: Santa Monica Beach Resort, Dumaguete City
Participants: 20 court librarians
‹ Judicial Settlement Conference for Judges on
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)(Skills-Based
Course)
Development Partner: IBP Davao Chapter
Date: May 31 to June 2, 2011
Venue: Grand Regal Hotel, Davao City
Participants: 41 RTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC judges
from Davao and Misamis Oriental
‹ Orientation of Clerks of Court, Public
Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, and Law
Practitioners of Davao on Judicial Dispute
Resolution
Development Partner: IBP Davao Chapter
Date: June 1, 2011
Venue: Grand Regal Hotel, Davao City
Participants: 98 RTC, MTCC, MTC, and MCTC clerks of
court, public prosecutors, public attorneys and law
practitioners of Davao
‹ Seminar-Workshop on Combating Human
Trafficking in the Philippines
Development Partners: US Department of Justice Criminal
Division, USAID, ABA-ROLI
Date: June 15 to 16, 2011
Venue: Waterfront Insular Hotel, Davao City
Participants: 45 comprising RTC judges and prosecutors
from Regions 9 to 12
April-June 2011 PHILJA NEWS 5
 6 NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
New Ruling
REMEDIAL LAW
Law on Evidence–DNA Evidence; DNA testing
order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide
the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
“prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures,
protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to
the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well
as the probative value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to
ensure that the evidence gathered, using various
methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and
properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused
and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that
DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public.”
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to
the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected
to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant
to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA
testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding
of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence,
the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained –
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal,
the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before
a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test,
a show cause hearing must be held in which the
court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied
in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that
the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity
for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance
of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
result would only be corroborative, the court may, in
its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
(Nachura, J., Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710,
June 6, 2011.)
April-June 2011
NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Contracts involving expenditure of public funds;
requirements to be valid.
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly
prohibits the entering into contracts involving the
expenditure of public funds unless two prior
requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an
appropriation law authorizing the expenditure
required in the contract. Second, there must be
attached to the contract a certification by the proper
accounting official and auditor that funds have been
appropriated by law and such funds are available.
Failure to comply with any of these two requirements
renders the contract void.
In several cases, the Court had the occasion to apply
these provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
In these cases, the Court clearly ruled that the two
requirements – the existence of appropriation and the
attachment of the certification – are “conditions sine
qua non for the execution of government contracts.”
In COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, we stated:
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language
of the law that the existence of appropriations
and the availability of funds are indispensable
prerequisites to or conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts. The obvious
intent is to impose such conditions as a priori
requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.
The law expressly declares void a contract that
fails to comply with the two requirements, namely,
an appropriation law funding the contract and a
certification of appropriation and fund availability.
The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure
that government contracts are never signed unless
supported by the corresponding appropriation law
and fund availability.
The three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon do
not comply with the requirement of a certification of
appropriation and fund availability. Even if a
certification of appropriation is not applicable to PNR
if the funds used are internally generated, still a
certificate of fund availability is required. Thus, the
three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon are void
for violation of Sections 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987, as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
(Carpio, J., Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182967, April 6, 2011.)
PHILJA NEWS
7
Casual or temporary employees enjoy security
of tenure.
By the nature of their employment, casual
employees were deemed to be not covered by the
security of tenure protection as they could be removed
from the service at anytime, with or without cause.
Then came the recent case of Moral, which was the
basis of the CA Decision where the Court resolved the
issue of whether or not a shuttle bus driver could be
terminated from his casual employment without
cause. Pertinent portions of the said en banc
Resolution reads:
Article IX (B) of the Constitution
SEC. 2. x x x
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.
xxxx
(6) Temporary employees of the Government
shall be given such protection as may be
provided by law.
The Civil Service Law
SEC. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. – (a) No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law after due process.
Further, Civil Aeronautics Administration v. IAC held
that “the mantle of protection against arbitrary
dismissals is accorded to an employee even if
he is a non-eligible and holds a temporary
appointment.”
Hence, a government employee holding a casual
or temporary employment cannot be terminated
within the period of his employment except for
cause. [Emphases supplied]
The Court further stated in Moral that since there
was no evidence supporting the charge of gross neglect
of duty on the part of respondent, the recommendation
of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) for his
dismissal on the ground that he was a mere casual
employee could not be sustained. The Court wrote
that:
x x x. Even a casual or temporary employee enjoys
security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except
for cause enumerated in Sec. 22, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations and
other pertinent laws. [Emphasis supplied]
Despite this new ruling on casual employees, it is
not the intention of the Court to make the status of a
casual employee at par with that of a regular
(Continued on next page)
 8 NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (continued)
employee, who enjoys permanence of employment.
The rule is still that casual employment will cease
automatically at the end of the period unless renewed
as stated in the Plantilla of Casual Employment.
Casual employees may also be terminated anytime
though subject to certain conditions or qualifications
with reference to the abovequoted CSC Form No. 001.
Thus, they may be laid off anytime before the
expiration of the employment period provided any of
the following occurs: (1) when their services are no
longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3)
the project has already been completed/finished; or
(4) their performance are below par.
Equally important, they are entitled to due
process especially if they are to be removed for more
serious causes or for causes other than the reasons
mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. This is pursuant to
Section 2, Article IX(B) of the Constitution and Section
46 of the Civil Service Law. The reason for this is that
their termination from the service could carry a
penalty affecting their rights and future employment
in the government.
In the case at bench, the action of petitioners
clearly violated Lapid’s basic rights as a casual
employee. As pointed out by the CSC itself, Lapid was
NEVER formally charged with the administrative
offenses of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
and Grave Misconduct. According to the CSC, the
Formal Charge, was even unsigned, and it
categorically stated that PCSO failed to observe due
process.
Lapid moved for the reconsideration of Resolution
No. 340. In Resolution No. 401, Series of 2005, the Board
of Directors of PCSO, upon the recommendation of
the Assistant General Manager for Online Lottery
Sector and the Manager of the Northern and Central
Luzon, denied said motion for reconsideration. It was
only in the said resolution that it was belatedly stated
that her services was no longer needed per the list of
Plantilla of Casual Appointment. This was an empty
statement, however, as this was not substantiated.
Section 3(2), Article XIII of the Constitution
guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms
of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful
concerted activities, the right to strike with
qualifications, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage but also to security of tenure. Likewise,
Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides
that “no officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
by law.” Apparently, the Civil Service Law echoes this
constitutional edict of security of tenure of the
employees in the civil service. Thus, Section 46 (a) of
the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law after
due process.” [Emphases supplied]
(Mendoza, J., Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Board of
Directors and Reynaldo P. Martin v. Marie Jean C. Lapid, G.R.
No. 191940, April 12, 2011.)
Misconduct; definition of; distinguished from
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., the Court emphatically
ruled:
In order to be considered as “misconduct,” the
act must have a “direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official
duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge
the duties of the office. Misconduct in office has
been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon
in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: “Misconduct in
office has a definite and well-understood legal
meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of
his duties as an officer and not such only as
affects his character as a private individual. In
such cases, it has been said at all times, it is
necessary to separate the character of the man
from the character of the officer x x x. It is settled
that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from office of an officer must
have direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the
office x x x. More specifically, in Buenaventura v.
Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against
a judge of the court of first instance, the present
Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring ‘to
a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer.’” [Emphasis ours, citations excluded]
In Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform, the
Court sustained the ruling of the CSC that the offense
committed by the employee in selling fake Unified
Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his
officemates during office hours was not grave
misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. In Mariano v. Roxas, the Court
held that the offense committed by a CA employee in
forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual
obligations was not misconduct but conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because
April-June 2011 PHILJA NEWS
NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (continued)
her acts had no direct relation to or connection with
the performance of her official duties.
Accordingly, the complained acts of respondent
Mayordomo constitute the administrative offense of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
which need not be related to or connected with the
public officer’s official functions. As long as the
questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity
of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may
be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no
concrete description of what specific acts constitute
the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence, however, is
instructive on this point. The Court has considered
the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of
office, failure to report back to work without prior
notice, failure to safekeep public records and property,
making false entries in public documents and
falsification of court orders. The Court also considered
the following acts as conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, to wit: a Judge’s act of
brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants
during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter ’s
participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in
the latter’s family.
(Mendoza, J., Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
and Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General
Manager of the GSIS v. Arwin T. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218,
May 31, 2011.)
LABOR LAW
Gross insubordination; elements thereof.
Bascon v. Court of Appeals outlines the elements of
gross insubordination as follows:
As regards the appellate court’s finding that
petitioners were justly terminated for gross
insubordination or wilful disobedience, Article 282
of the Labor Code provides in part:
An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by
the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection
with his work.
However, wilful disobedience of the employer’s
lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an
9
employee, envisages the concurrence of at least
two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been wilful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made
known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, petitioner’s adamant refusal to transfer,
coupled with her failure to heed the order for her to
return the company vehicle assigned to her and, more
importantly, allowing her counsel to write letters
couched in harsh language to her superiors
unquestionably show that she was guilty of
insubordination, hence, not entitled to the award of
separation pay.
(Carpio Morales, J., Juliet G. Apacible v. Multimed Industries
Incorporated and the Board of Directors of Multimed Industries,
The President Mr. Joselito Tambunting, Managers Marlene L.
Orozco, Veronica C. Timog, Olga F. Marino and Ma. Luz B. Yan,
G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011.)
LAND REGISTRATION LAW
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or
destroyed; mandatory character of the requirements
of Republic Act No. 26.
Our jurisprudence is replete with rulings
regarding the mandatory character of the
requirements of RA No. 26. As early as 1982, the
Supreme Court ruled:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled “An act providing a
special procedure for the reconstitution of
Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed”
approved on September 25, 1946 confers
jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First
Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the
special requirements and mode of procedure that
must be followed before the court can properly
act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority
over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for. These requirements and procedure
are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution
must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts;
the notice of hearing must be published in the
Official Gazette and posted in particular places
and the same sent or notified to specified
persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide
specifically the mandatory requirements and
procedure to be followed.
Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not
apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further
underscore the mandatory character of these
jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not
apply to land registration cases. In all cases where the
(Continued on next page)
10 NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
LAND REGISTRATION LAW (continued)
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction
is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is
mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or
the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it
lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
All the proceedings before the trial court, including
its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are
void for lack of jurisdiction.
(Carpio, J., Bienvenido Castillo v. Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 182980, June 22, 2011.)
CRIMINAL LAW
Probable cause; definition of.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Probable
cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances,
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In
determining probable cause, the average person
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion, but it requires less than evidence that would
justify a conviction.
A finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. The term does not mean “actual and positive
cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A trial
is intended precisely for the reception of prosecution
evidence in support of the charge. The court is tasked
to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on
the evidence presented by the parties at a trial on the
merits.
(Nachura, J., Clay & Feather International, Inc., Raul O. Arambulo,
and Adam E. Jimenez III (for themselves and for Clay and Feather
Int’l., Inc. v. Alexander T. Lichaytoo and Clifford T. Lichaytoo,
G.R. No. 193105, May 30, 2011.)
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
REMEDIAL LAW
Certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the party; verification; pleadings that require
verification.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
pointed out that:
A party’s failure to sign the certification against
forum shopping is different from the party’s
failure to sign personally the verification. The
certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the party, and not by counsel. The certification
of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on
verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to
secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party
need not sign the verification. A party’s
representative, lawyer or any person who
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in
the pleading may sign the verification.
In the case before us, we stress that as a general
rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a
law or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples
of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all
pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) petition for review
from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court
raising only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2;
(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42,
Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial
bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section
5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule
47, Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction under Rule
58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section
4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver under
Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente
lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari
against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
constitutional commissions under Rule 64, Section 2;
(12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under
Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto
under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for
expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition
for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from
the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions
involving intra-corporate controversies under the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate
April-June 2011
NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
REMEDIAL LAW (continued)
Controversies; (17) complaint or petition for
rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the
Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18)
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as
well as petition for summary proceedings under the
Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions,
applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be
accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping,
first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-
94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on
by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is
not disputed herein that respondent’s complaint for
damages was accompanied by such a certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases
required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to
secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are done in good faith or are true and correct and not
of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant,
the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.
(Leonardo-De Castro, J., Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Jocelyn Catubig,
G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011.)
Jurisdiction of the Commission on the Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP).
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979,
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an
administrative body established as a means of
providing a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers,
landowners and members of the cultural minorities
to avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates
the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Commission
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate
action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the
Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and
resolve land problems or disputes
PHILJA NEWS
11
which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the
large number of the parties involved,
the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and
pasture lease agreement holders or
timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and
government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and
public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release
and/or subdivision of lands of the
public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave
urgency and magnitude.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are
tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield
powers which are specifically granted to it by its
enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the
COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to
the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to
(e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in
nature, taking into account the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest,
or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction
over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the
case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need
for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent
injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the
COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of respondents’ complaint. The
present case does not fall under any of the cases
enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (e) of
E.O. No. 561. The dispute between the parties is not
critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a
large number of parties, nor is there a presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly
be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal,
including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency,
(Continued on next page)
12 NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
REMEDIAL LAW (continued)
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations
therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant
is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Respondents’ cause of action before the COSLAP
pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject
property, which is an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein,
the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional
Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending
on the assessed value of the subject property.
The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems, applied by the CA and invoked by the
respondents, is inapplicable to the present case. Banaga
involved parties with conflicting free patent
applications over a parcel of public land and pending
with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of
Land’s inaction within a considerable period of time
on the claims and protests of the parties and to conduct
an investigation, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction
and resolved the conflicting claims of the parties. The
Court held that since the dispute involved a parcel of
public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP had
jurisdiction over that case. In the present case, there is
no showing that the parties have conflicting free patent
applications over the subject parcel of land that would
justify the exercise of the COSLAP’s jurisdiction.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
action, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision rendered, are null and void. A judgment
issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction
is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it
would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves
the parties in the position they were before the
proceedings.
(Peralta, J., Celia S. VDA. De Herrera v. Emelita Bernardo, Evelyn
Bernardo as Guardian of Erlyn, Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo,
G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011.)
Ruling of the Secretary of Justice not binding on
courts once a case is filed with the court. Double
jeopardy; its requisites.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed
with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to
dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial
court should not rely solely and merely on the findings
of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently
the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.
In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004
Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that
the RTC judge failed to make his own determination
of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold
respondents for trial. He failed to make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits
of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the
manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor
when he should have been more circumspect and
judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information especially so when the
prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and
irresolute on whether to indict respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October
24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC
judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely
awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is
evident from the general tenor of the Order and
highlighted in the following portion thereof:
As discussed during the hearing of the Motion
for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it
depending on the outcome of the Petition for
Review. Considering the findings of the
Department of Justice reversing the resolution
of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable
action to the Motion for Reconsideration.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary,
the trial court abdicated its judicial power and
refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse
of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to
due process. They were void, had no legal standing,
and produced no effect whatsoever.
This Court must therefore remand the case to the
RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the
case to determine if a prima facie case exists and
consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information anew.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set
in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
April-June 2011 PHILJA NEWS
NEW RULINGS AND DOCTRINAL REMINDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrinal Reminders
REMEDIAL LAW (continued)
has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order
granting the motion to dismiss was committed with
grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or
termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which
requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused,
or the dismissal of the case without the approval of
the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has
not set in.
(Nachura, J., Joseph C. Cerezo v. People of the Philippines, Juliet
Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia, G.R. No.
185230, June 1, 2011.)
Summary judgment; when proper.
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of
the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the
answer filed by the defendant does not tender a
genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A deeper
understanding of summary judgments is found in
Viajar v. Estenzo:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to
expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits.
But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there
be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties,
neither one of them can pray for a summary
judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place
of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show
that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty
one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary
hearing after the filing of a motion for summary
judgment by one party supported by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documents, with
notice upon the adverse party who may file an
opposition to the motion supported also by
affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x.
In spite of its expediting character, relief by
summary judgment can only be allowed after
compliance with the minimum requirement of
vigilance by the court in a summary hearing
considering that this remedy is in derogation of
a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At
any rate, a party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact,
or that the issue posed in the complaint is so
patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the
13
existence of such an issue is resolved against
the movant.
“A summary judgment is permitted only if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the]
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” The test of the propriety of rendering summary
judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact,
“as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim.” “[A] factual issue raised by a party is
considered as sham when by its nature it is evident
that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party
tendering the same has neither any sincere intention
nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually
happens in denials made by defendants merely for
the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay,
taking advantage of the fact that their answers are
not under oath anyway.”
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and
hence the propriety of rendering a summary
judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings,
but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or
their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted
with the motion and the corresponding opposition.
Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper
so long as “the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues
are not genuine.”
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing
on the motion are therefore important because these
enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the
motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers
and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of
law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no
defense to the action. The non-observance of the
procedural requirements of filing a motion and
conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants
the setting aside of the summary judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to
render summary judgment with neither of the parties
filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself
filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to
file the motion for summary judgment. Respondent
insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact.
Under these circumstances, it was improper for the
trial court to have persisted in rendering summary
judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary
judgment is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary
trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the
parties’ rights over their objections.
(Continued on page 35)
14 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 47-2011
TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL OF
THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST SOLICITATION
FOR CONTRIBUTIONS BY COURT PERSONNEL
Reports had reached this Court that despite
prohibition, solicitations for contributions/donations
by court personnel from lawyers and litigants remain
rampant.
Accordingly, all court personnel of the first and
second level courts are hereby REMINDED to strictly
observe the mandate of (a) Section 2, Canon I and
Section 2(e), Canon III of Administrative Matter No.
03-06-13-SC (Code of Conduct for Court Personnel) on
improper solicitation; and (b) Circular No. 4-91, dated
May 31, 1991 (Re: Letter-Complaint Against
Solicitations for Contributions by Court Personnel),
to quote:
xxxx
Henceforth, all personnel of the lower courts
under the administrative supervision of the
Office of the Court Administrator are strictly
enjoined from making any form of solicitation for
contributions as it is strictly prohibited by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, all those found soliciting for and/
or receiving contributions, in cash or in kind, from
any person, whether or not a litigant or lawyer,
will be dealt with severely in accordance with the
sanctions prescribed by law.
Further, all court’ personnel are reminded that
committing improper solicitation is an offense which
merit a grave penalty. Under Section 52(A)(11) of Rule
IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, dismissal is the penalty for improper
solicitation at the first offense. Section 58(a) of the same
Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry
with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification of
reemployment in the government service, unless
otherwise provided in the decision.
April 1, 2011.
(Sgd.) JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
Court Administrator
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 51-2011
TO: THE JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND
BRANCH CLERKS OF COURT OF ALL REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS AND FIRST LEVEL COURTS
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED
GUIDELINES TO IMPLEMENT THE EXPANDED
COVERAGE OF COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION
(CAM) AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(JDR)
WHEREAS, in a Resolution dated January 11,
2011, in A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, the Court En
Banc approved the Consolidated and Revised
Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of
Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) (hereinafter, “Guidelines”);
WHEREAS, as stated in the Guidelines, “[t]he
diversion of pending court cases both to CAM and to
JDR is plainly intended to put an end to pending
litigation through a compromise agreement of the
parties and thereby help solve the ever-pressing
problem of court docket congestion”;
WHEREAS, all Judges, Clerks of Court, and Branch
Clerks of Court must be informed of said Guidelines,
particularly, of the need to collect mediation fees as
contribution to promote mediation although no
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Units have as yet
been established in some courts;
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the Guidelines,
the Clerks of Court are mandated to collect mediation
fees in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00)*
upon the filing of the following:
(1) Complaint or an Answer with a mediatable
permissive counterclaim or cross-claim, complaint-
in-intervention, third-party complaint, fourth-
party complaint, etc., in civil cases, a Petition, an
Opposition, and a Creditors’ Claim in Special
Proceedings;
(2) Complaint/Information for offenses with
maximum imposable penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period or six years imprisonment,
except where the civil liability is reserved or is
subject of a separate action;
(3) Complaint/Information for estafa, theft, and libel
cases, except where the civil liability is reserved
or is subject of a separate action;
(4) Complaint/Information for Quasi-Offenses under
Title 14 of the Revised Penal Code;
(5) Intellectual Property cases;
*
No mediation fees shall be collected from the accused.
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 15

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued) Annex “A” of A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA

(6) Commercial or corporate cases; and CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED GUIDELINES TO

IMPLEMENT THE EXPANDED COVERAGE OF
(7) Environmental cases. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION (CAM) AND
Further, all Judges and Branch Clerks of Court are JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (JDR)
directed to inform the Clerks of Court of the filing of
an Answer with a mediatable permissive TABLE OF CONTENTS
counterclaim or cross-claim, complaint-in- PART ONE
intervention, third-party complaint, fourth-party GENERAL PROVISIONS AND COVERAGE
complaint, etc., in civil cases, and a Creditors’ Claim
in Special Proceedings, for the proper assessment and 1. Concept of court diversion of pending cases
collection of legal fees and mediation fees.
1.1 Indigenous ADR under CAM
For your information and guidance, copies of the
1.2 The Three Stages of Diversion
Guidelines and list of courts where PMC Units have
been established are attached hereto as Annexes “A” 2. Rationale for expanded mediation jurisdiction over
and “B,” respectively. the civil liability arising from more serious offenses
For strict compliance. 3. Mandatory Coverage for Court-Annexed
Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute Resolution
April 6, 2011.
(JDR)
(Sgd.) JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
Court Administrator PART TWO
COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION
EN BANC
NOTICE Procedure
Sanctions
Sirs/Mesdames: Duration of mediation proceedings in the PMCO
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Suspension of Periods
Resolution dated January 11, 2011, which reads as Settlement
follows:
PART THREE
A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA (Re: Consolidated and JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (JDR)
Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded
Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation [CAM] Mandate
and Judicial Dispute Resolution [JDR]). – The Procedure
Court resolved to Sanctions
(a) NOTE the Letter dated December 20, 2010 Duration of JDR Proceedings
of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor, Suspension of periods
PHILJA, transmitting, among others, BOT Settlement
Resolution No. 10-29 approving the Pre-trial proper
Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to Trial and Judgment
Implement the Expanded Coverage of
Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and PART FOUR
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR); and
COMMON PROVISIONS FOR CAM AND JDR
(b) NOTE the aforesaid BOT Resolution No. 10-
29, dated November 23, 2010. Confidentiality
Role of Lawyers in Mediation and JDR proceedings
The Court further Resolved to APPROVE the
Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to
PART FIVE
Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-
Annexed Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute SC-PHILJA-PMC MEDIATION TRUST FUND
Resolution (JDR), herein attached as “Annex A.”
(151) PART SIX
THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER OFFICE
Very truly yours,
(PMCO)
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL AND MEDIATION CENTER UNITS
Clerk of Court (Continued on next page)
16 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
Manila
TO: 1. ALL COURTS WHERE PHILIPPINE
MEDIATION CENTER UNITS HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED.
2. ALL COURTS IN THE PROVINCES OF
PAMPANGA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BENGUET,
LA UNION, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, MAKATI CITY,
AND SUCH OTHER AREAS TO BE ESTABLISHED
FOR JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (JDR)
[FORMERLY UNDER THE JUSTICE REFORM
INITIATIVES SUPPORT (JURIS) PROJECT]
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED
GUIDELINES1 TO IMPLEMENT THE EXPANDED
COVERAGE OF COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION
(CAM) AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(JDR)
PART ONE
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND COVERAGE
Concept of court diversion of pending cases
The diversion of pending court cases both to Court-
Annexed Mediation (CAM) and to Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) is plainly intended to put an end to
pending litigation through a compromise agreement
of the parties and thereby help solve the ever-pressing
problem of court docket congestion. It is also intended
to empower the parties to resolve their own disputes
and give practical effect to the State Policy expressly
stated in the ADR Act of 2004 (RA No. 9285), to wit:
to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution
of disputes or the freedom of the parties to make their
own arrangement to resolve disputes. Towards this
end, the State shall encourage and actively promote
the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as
an important means to achieve speedy and impartial
justice and de-clog court dockets.
1.1 Indigenous ADR under CAM
Such State Policy promoting party autonomy
would necessarily include recognition of indigenous
modes of dispute resolution.
1
Consolidation entailed the integration of the original
guidelines separately governing Court-Annexed Mediation
(CAM) and Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), together with
all their respective amendments and revisions into a single
consolidated guidelines that will supplant said earlier
issuances that are in conflict or inconsistent with these
consolidated guidelines.
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1.2 The Three Stages of Diversion
Simply stated, court diversion is a three-stage
process. The first stage is the Court-Annexed Mediation
(CAM) where the judge refers the parties to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) for the mediation
of their dispute by trained and accredited mediators.
Upon failing to secure a settlement of the dispute
during the first stage, a second attempt is made at the
JDR stage. There, the JDR judge sequentially becomes a
mediator-conciliator-early neutral evaluator in a
continuing effort to secure a settlement. Still failing
that second attempt, the mediator-judge must turn
over the case to another judge (a new one by raffle or
nearest/pair judge) who will try the unsettled case.
The trial judge shall continue with the pre-trial proper
and, thereafter, proceed to try and decide the case.
The third stage is during the appeal where covered
cases are referred to the PMC-Appeals Court Mediation
(ACM) unit for mediation.
The ultimate common end of both the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law and Court-Annexed
Mediation is to restore the role of the judiciary as the
forum of last recourse to be resorted to only after all
prior earnest efforts to arrive at private
accommodation and resolution of disputes have failed.
Rationale for expanded mediation jurisdiction over
the civil liability for more serious offenses
Deterrence, which is achieved from a consistent
and swift imposition of the appropriate penalty
imposed for the crime committed, is the principle upon
which societal security rests. It is for this reason that
Article 2034 of the Civil Code provides that:
There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising
from the offense, but such compromise shall not
extinguish the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty.
It is significantly important to note that the above-
quoted statutory provision does not restrict the crime
mentioned to the gravity of the imposable penalty as
a condition for allowing a compromise agreement to
be reached on the civil liability arising from the crime.
Presumably, therefore, the allowed compromise of civil
liability applies to all crimes, subject only to the policy
considerations of deterrence variables arising from the
celerity, certainty and severity of punishment actually
imposed.2
Expansion of mediation jurisdiction over less
grave felonies (punishable by correctional penalties
2
The English Utilitarian posits that of the three variables,
severity of penalty is the least important.
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 51-2011 (continued)
of not exceeding six years) 3 is justified since,
presumably, the deterrent effect upon which societal
security rests is not the principal purpose of
correctional penalties. They are intended for the
rehabilitation and correction of the offender. It is for
this reason that offenses punishable by correctional
penalties are subject to probation.4
The qualified offender granted probation is given
conditional freedom and released to society. It is
further relevant and significant to note that the
Department of Justice has initiated and is running a
program of training prosecutors to be mediators for
criminal cases where the imposable penalty does not
exceed six years.5
In contrast, the penalties classified under the
Revised Penal Code as afflictive and capital6 are explicit
that their purpose is punishment. Probation is denied
to convicts who are imposed said afflictive penalties,
thereby showing that isolation from society through
imprisonment is necessary for the protection of
society. Thus, the imposition of afflictive punishment
for grave offenses is surely the underlying basis for
achieving the principle of deterrence, not only of the
person punished but also of the general public, through
the principle of exemplarity.
Further, the expansion to less grave offense is
needed if a greater impact of court diversion of
pending cases is to be achieved. This is so since civil
cases constitute only a small 16 percent of all cases
filed in court, while special proceedings constitute
even a smaller 7.6 percent.7
Under the expanded jurisdiction of the first level
courts,8 all less grave felonies will fall under their
original and exclusive jurisdiction.9
3 (9) All civil cases involving title to or possession of
Article 9, in relation to Article 25, Revised Penal Code.
4
The Probation Law, Act No. 4221, as amended.
5
DOJ mediation program.
6
Article 25 of the RPC categorizes these penalties as those
punishable with prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
perpetua and death (six years and one day, 20 years and life
imprisonment to death). See Table of Penalties under Article
76.
7
Summary Report of Cases for 2006 shows that only 108,855
civil cases were pending at the end of the period, while
524,685 criminal cases were similarly pending.
8
RA No. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the first level courts
to crimes punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six
years, irrespective of the amount of fine.
9
Section 32(2), BP Blg. 129, The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980.
17
3. Mandatory Coverage for Court-Annexed
Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR)
The following cases shall be 1) referred to Court-
Annexed Mediation (CAM) and 2) be the subject of
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) proceedings:
(1) All civil cases and the civil liability of criminal
cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
including the civil liability for violation of BP Blg.
22, except those which by law may not be
compromised;
(2) Special proceedings for the settlement of estates;
(3) All civil and criminal cases filed with a certificate
to file action issued by the Punong Barangay or the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo under the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law;10
(4) The civil aspect of Quasi-Offenses under Title 14
of the Revised Penal Code;
(5) The civil aspect of less grave felonies punishable
by correctional penalties not exceeding six
years imprisonment, where the offended party is
a private person;
(6) The civil aspect of estafa, theft and libel;
(7) All civil cases and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, brought on appeal from the
exclusive and original jurisdiction granted to the
first level courts under Section 33, par. (1) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;11
(8) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
brought on appeal from the exclusive and original
jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under
Section 33, par. (2) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980; 12
real property or an interest therein brought on
appeal from the exclusive and original jurisdiction
granted to the first level courts under Section 33,
par.(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;
13
and
(Continued on next page)
10
Chapter 7, Local Government Code of 1991, RA No. 7160,
essentially re-enacts the Katarungang Pambarangay Law with
some revisions and, therefore, is referred to as the Revised
KB Law.
11
A.M. No. 08-9-10-SC-PHILJA-Re: Guidelines to Implement
Mediation in the Regional Trial Courts Acting as Appellate
Courts in Appeals from First Level Courts approved by the
Court En Banc on February 10, 2009.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
18 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
(10) All habeas corpus cases decided by the first level
courts in the absence of the Regional Trial Court
judge, that are brought up on appeal from the
special jurisdiction granted to the first level courts
under Section 35 of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980;14
The following cases shall not be referred to CAM
and JDR:
1. Civil cases which by law cannot be compromised
(Article 2035, New Civil Code);
2. Other criminal cases not covered under
paragraphs 3 to 6 above;
3. Habeas Corpus petitions;
4. All cases under Republic Act No. 9262 (Violence
Against Women and Children); and
5. Cases with pending application for Restraining
Orders/Preliminary Injunctions.
However, in cases covered under 1, 4, and 5 where
the parties inform the court that they have agreed to
undergo mediation on some aspects thereof, e.g.,
custody of minor children, separation of property, or
support pendente lite, the court shall refer them to
mediation.
PART TWO
COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION (CAM)
TO: ALL JUDGES OF COURTS WHERE PHILIPPINE
MEDIATION CENTER (PMC) UNITS HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED
Procedure
1. After the last pleading has been filed, the judge
shall issue an order requiring the parties to
forthwith appear before the concerned Philippine
Mediation Center (PMC) Unit staff to start the
process for the settlement of their dispute through
mediation. On the same date, the court shall give
to the PMC a copy of the Order for mediation.
2. Individual parties are required to personally
appear for mediation. In the event they cannot do
so, they can send their representatives who must
be fully authorized to appear, negotiate and enter
into a compromise, through a Special Power of
Attorney.
3. Corporations, partnerships, or other juridical
entities shall be represented by a ranking
corporate officer fully authorized by a Board
14
Ibid.
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PHILJA Bulletin
Resolution to offer, negotiate, accept, decide and
enter into a compromise agreement, without need
of further approval by or notification to the
authorizing party.
4. The Order issued shall include a clear warning
that sanctions may be imposed upon a party for
failure to comply therewith, in accordance with
the Section below on sanctions.
5. On the date set in the Order, the parties shall
proceed to select a mutually acceptable mediator
from among the list of accredited mediators. If no
agreement is reached, the PMC Unit Staff shall, in
the presence of the parties and the Mediators,
choose by lot the one who will mediate the dispute
from among the Mediators inside the Unit, ensuring
a fair and equal distribution of cases: Provided,
however, that in exceptional circumstances where
special qualifications are required of the mediator,
the parties shall be given an opportunity to select
from the entire list of accredited mediators.
6. The Mediator shall be considered an officer of the
court while performing his duties as such or in
connection therewith.
7. The concerned Mediator shall forthwith start the
mediation process, unless the parties and mediator
agree to reset the initial mediation conference,
which shall not be later than five days from the
original date.
8. At the initial conference, the Mediator shall explain
to both parties the mediation process, stressing
the benefits of an early settlement of their dispute
based on serving their mutual interests, rather
than the legal positions taken by them.
9. With the consent of both parties, the Mediator may
hold separate caucuses with each party to
determine their respective real interests in the
dispute. Thereafter, another joint conference may
be held to consider various options that may
resolve the dispute through reciprocal concessions
and on terms that are mutually beneficial to both
the parties.
10. The Mediator shall not record in any manner the
proceedings of the joint conferences or of the
separate caucuses. No transcript or minutes of
mediation proceedings shall be taken. If personal
notes are taken for guidance, the notes shall be
shredded and destroyed. Should such record
exists, they shall not be admissible as evidence in
any other proceedings.
11. If no settlement has been reached at the end of the
period given, the case must be returned to the
referring judge.
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OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
Sanctions
The court, upon recommendation of the Mediator,
may impose sanctions upon a party who fails to
appear before the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
Unit as directed by the referring judge, or upon any
person who engages in abusive conduct during
mediation proceedings, as provided for in the Rules of
Court as part of the Pre-Trial and other issuances of
the Supreme Court, including, but not limited to
censure, reprimand, contempt, requiring the absent
party to reimburse the appearing party his costs,
including attorney’s fees for that day up to treble such
costs, payable on or before the date of the re-scheduled
setting. Sanctions may also be imposed by the referring
judge upon his own initiative or upon motion of the
interested party.
Upon justifiable cause duly proved in the hearing
called on the motion to reconsider filed by the absent
party, concurred in by the concerned mediator, the
sanctions imposed may be lifted or set aside in the
sound discretion of the referring judge.
Duration of Mediation in the PMC
The Mediator shall have a period of not exceeding
30 days to complete the mediation process. Such period
shall be computed from the date when the parties first
appeared for the initial conference as stated in the
Order to appear. An extended period of another 30
days may be granted by the court, upon motion filed
by the Mediator, with the conformity of the parties.
Suspension of periods
The period during which the case is undergoing
mediation shall be excluded from the regular and
mandatory periods for trial and rendition of judgment
in ordinary cases and in cases under summary
proceedings.
Settlement
If full settlement of the dispute is reached, the
parties, assisted by their respective counsels, shall
draft the compromise agreement which shall be
submitted to the court for judgment upon compromise
or other appropriate action. Where compliance is
forthwith made, the parties shall instead submit a
satisfaction of claims or a mutual withdrawal of the
case and, thereafter, the court shall enter an order
dismissing the case.
If partial settlement is reached, the parties shall,
with the assistance of counsel, submit the terms
19
thereof for the appropriate action of the court, without
waiting for resolution of the unsettled part.
In relation to the unsettled part of the dispute, the
court shall proceed to conduct JDR proceedings in
accordance with PART THREE hereof where JDR is
available.
PART THREE
JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
I. Mandate
Unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Court,
all judges who have undergone orientation in JDR
procedures and completed their training in mediation,
conciliation and neutral evaluation, are authorized to
conduct JDR proceedings in accordance with these
guidelines for the settlement of disputes pending in
their courts, after the parties failed to settle their
disputes during Court-Annexed Mediation at the
Philippine Mediation Center Units (PMCU).
II. Procedure
Judicial proceedings shall be divided into two
stages: (1) from the filing of a complaint to the conduct
of CAM and JDR during the pre-trial stage, and (2) pre-
trial proper to trial and judgment. The judge to whom
the case has been originally raffled, who shall be called
the JDR Judge, shall preside over the first stage. The
judge, who shall be called the trial judge, shall preside
over the second stage.
At the initial stage of the pre-trial conference, the
JDR judge briefs the parties and counsels of the CAM
and JDR processes. Thereafter, he issues an Order of
Referral of the case to CAM and directs the parties and
their counsels to proceed to the PMCU bringing with
them a copy of the Order of Referral. The JDR judge
shall include in said Order, or in another Order, the
pre-setting of the case for JDR not earlier than 45 days
from the time the parties first personally appear at
the PMCU so that JDR will be conducted immediately
if the parties do not settle at CAM.
All incidents or motions filed during the first stage
shall be dealt with by the JDR judge. If JDR is not
conducted because of the failure of the parties to appear,
the JDR judge may impose the appropriate sanctions
and shall continue with the proceedings of the case.
If the parties do not settle their dispute at CAM,
the parties and their counsels shall appear at the preset
date before the JDR judge, who will then conduct the
JDR process as mediator, neutral evaluator and/or
conciliator in order to actively assist and facilitate
(Continued on next page)
20 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
negotiations among the parties for them to settle their
dispute. As mediator and conciliator, the judge
facilitates the settlement discussions between the
parties and tries to reconcile their differences. As a
neutral evaluator, the judge assesses the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case and
makes a non-binding and impartial evaluation of the
chances of each party’s success in the case. On the
basis of such neutral evaluation, the judge persuades
the parties to a fair and mutually acceptable
settlement of their dispute.
The JDR judge shall not preside over the trial of
the case15 when the parties did not settle their dispute
at JDR.
III. Courts
1. Multiple Sala Court – If the case is not resolved
during JDR, it shall be raffled to another branch for
the pre-trial proper16 up to judgment.
For cases with pending applications for
restraining orders/preliminary injunctions, the judge
to whom the case was raffled shall rule on the said
applications. During the pre-trial stage, the judge refers
the case to CAM, but if the parties do not settle at CAM,
the case will be raffled to another branch for JDR. If
the parties do not settle at JDR, the case will be returned
to the branch that ruled on the applications for the
pre-trial proper and up to judgment.17
2. Single Sala Court – Unless otherwise agreed upon
as provided below, the JDR proceedings will be
conducted by the judge of the pair court, if any,
otherwise, by the judge of the nearest court as
determined by the concerned Executive Judge. The JDR
proceedings shall be conducted at the station where
the case was originally filed. The result of the JDR
proceedings shall be referred to the court of origin for
appropriate action, e.g., approval of the compromise
agreement, trial, etc.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, before the
commencement of the JDR proceedings, the parties
may file a joint written motion requesting that the
court of origin conduct the JDR proceedings and trial.
15
Parties will be more spontaneous once they are assured that
the JDR judge will not be the one to try the case. This is so
because, the JDR judge may have elicited confidential
information that may create bias and partiality that could affect
the judgment.
16
Rule 18, Sec. 2, paragraphs b, c, d, e, f, g, and i.
17
Includes post-judgment proceedings, e.g., motion for
reconsideration, execution, etc.
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3. Family Courts – Unless otherwise agreed upon as
provided below, the JDR proceedings in areas where
only one court is designated as a family court, shall be
conducted by a judge of another branch through raffle.
However, if there is another family court in the same
area, the family court to whom the case was originally
raffled shall conduct JDR proceedings and if no
settlement is reached, the other family court shall
conduct the pre-trial proper and trial.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, before
commencement of the JDR proceedings, the parties
may file a joint written motion requesting that the
family court to which the case was originally raffled
shall conduct the JDR proceedings and trial.
Despite the non-mediatable nature of the principal
case, like annulment of marriage, other issues such as
custody of children, support, visitation, property
relations and guardianship, may be referred to CAM
and JDR to limit the issues for trial.
4. Commercial, Intellectual Property, and
Environmental Courts – Unless otherwise agreed upon
as provided below, the JDR proceedings in areas where
only one court is designated as commercial/intellectual
property/environmental court, hereafter referred to
as special court, shall be conducted by another judge
through raffle and not by the judge of the special court.
Where settlement is not reached, the judge of the
special court shall be the trial judge. Any incident or
motion filed before the pre-trial stage shall be dealt
with by the special court that shall refer the case to
CAM.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, before
commencement of the JDR proceedings, the parties
may file a joint written motion requesting that the
special courts to which the case was originally raffled
shall conduct the JDR proceedings and trial.
IV. JDR During Trial
Cases may be referred to JDR even during the trial
stage upon written motion of one or both parties
indicating willingness to discuss a possible
compromise. If the motion is granted, the trial shall be
suspended18 and the case referred to JDR, which shall
be conducted by another judge through raffle in
multiple sala courts.
If settlement is reached during JDR, the JDR court
shall take appropriate action thereon, i.e., approval/
disapproval of the compromise agreement. If
settlement is not reached at JDR, the case shall be
returned to the referring court for continuation of trial.
18
Paragraph 1, Article 2030 of the Civil Code.
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
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OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
In single sala courts, the JDR shall be conducted
by the nearest court (or pair court, if any) regardless
of the level of the latter court. The result of the JDR
proceedings shall be referred to the court of origin for
appropriate action, e.g., approval of the compromise
agreement, trial, etc.
The parties may, by joint written motion, despite
confidential information that may be divulged during
JDR proceedings, file a request that their case be not
transferred to other courts for JDR and that they agree
to have the trial judge continue the trial should the
case not be settled through JDR.
V. Settlement Period
Any Settlement Period declared by the Supreme
Court is understood to include JDR and, therefore, half
of all cases referred to mediation shall be for JDR
settlement. The procedure shall be as stated in Roman
Numeral IV above, except that no written motion is
required from the parties for their case to be referred
to JDR.
VI. Party Participation
1. Individual Party Litigants
The party litigants shall personally attend all
mediation conferences or through duly authorized
representatives. The authority of the representatives
shall be in writing and shall state that they are fully
empowered to offer, negotiate, accept, decide, and enter
into a compromise agreement without need of further
approval by or notification to the authorizing parties.
2. Corporate Party Litigants
In case of corporations, the representatives must
be senior management officials with written authority
from the Board of Directors to offer, negotiate, accept,
decide, and enter into compromise agreement without
need of further approval by or notification to the
authorizing parties.
VII. Judgments/Decisions in JDR
Decisions/Judgments approving the compromise
agreements of the parties, through the efforts of the
judge as a mediator, conciliator or neutral evaluator,
shall contain a statement to the effect that the
Judgments/Decisions were achieved through JDR. This
is to distinguish Judgments/Decisions approving
compromise agreements secured through CAM. Copies
of said Judgments/Decisions shall be submitted to the
Philippine Mediation Center Unit for documentation
purposes.
21
VIII. Sanctions
A party who fails to appear on the date set for JDR
conference, may forthwith be imposed the appropriate
sanction as provided in Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court and relevant issuances of the Supreme Court
including, but not limited to censure, reprimand,
contempt, and requiring the absent party to reimburse
the appearing party his costs, including attorney’s fees
for that day up to treble such costs, payable on or before
the date of the re-scheduled setting. Sanctions may be
imposed by the JDR judge upon motion of the
appearing party or motu proprio.
Upon justifiable cause duly proved in the hearing
of the motion to reconsider filed by the absent party,
the sanctions imposed may be lifted, set aside, or
modified in the sound discretion of the JDR judge.
A representative who appears on behalf of an
individual or corporate party without the required
authorization by special power of attorney or board
resolution, respectively, may similarly be imposed
appropriate sanctions.
IX. Duration of JDR proceedings
To complete the JDR process, judges of the First
Level Courts shall have a period of not exceeding 30
days, while judges of the Second Level Courts shall
have a period of not exceeding 60 days. A longer period,
however, may be granted upon the discretion of the
JDR judge if there is a high probability of settlement
and upon joint written motion of the parties. Both
periods shall be computed from the date when the
parties first appeared for JDR proceedings as directed
in the respective Orders issued by the judge. As far as
practicable, JDR conferences shall be set not more than
two weeks apart so as to afford the parties ample time
to negotiate meaningfully for settlement.
In criminal cases covered by CAM and JDR, where
settlement on the civil aspect has been reached but
the period of payment in accordance with the terms of
settlement exceeds one year, the case may be archived
upon motion of the prosecution, with notice to the
private complainant and approval by the judge.
X. Suspension of periods
The period during which the case undergoing JDR
proceedings shall be excluded from the regular and
mandatory periods for trial and rendition of judgment
in ordinary cases and in cases under summary
proceedings.
(Continued on next page)
22 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
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XI. Settlement
A. Civil Cases
If full settlement of the dispute is reached, the
parties, assisted by their respective counsels, shall
draft the compromise agreement which shall be
submitted to the court for a judgment upon
compromise, enforceable by execution.
Where full compliance with the terms of the
compromise is forthwith made, the parties, instead of
submitting a compromise agreement, shall submit a
satisfaction of claims or a mutual withdrawal of the
parties’ respective claims and counterclaims.
Thereafter, the court shall enter an order dismissing
the case.
If partial settlement is reached, the parties shall,
with the assistance of counsel, submit the terms
thereof for the court’s approval and rendition of a
judgment upon partial compromise, which may be
enforced by execution without waiting for resolution
of the unsettled part.
In relation to the unsettled part of the dispute, the
court shall proceed to conduct trial on the merits of
the case should the parties file a joint motion for him
to do so, despite confidential information that may
have been divulged during the conciliation/mediation
stage of the proceedings. Otherwise, the JDR Judge shall
turn over the case to a new judge by re-raffle in
multiple sala courts or to the originating court in single
sala courts, for the conduct of pre-trial proper and
trial.
B. Criminal Cases
If settlement is reached on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the parties, assisted by their respective
counsels, shall draft the compromise agreement which
shall be submitted to the court for appropriate action.
Action on the criminal aspect of the case will be
determined by the Public Prosecutor, subject to the
appropriate action of the court.
If settlement is not reached by the parties on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the JDR judge shall
proceed to conduct the trial on the merits of the case
should the parties file a joint written motion for him
to do so, despite confidential information that may
have been divulged during the JDR proceedings.
Otherwise, the JDR Judge shall turn over the case to a
new judge by re-raffle in multiple sala courts or to the
originating court in single sala courts, for the conduct
of pre-trial proper and trial.
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XII.Pre-trial Proper
Where no settlement or only a partial settlement
was reached, and there being no joint written motion
submitted by the parties, as stated in the last
preceding paragraphs, the JDR judge shall turn over
the case to the trial judge, determined by re-raffle in
multiple sala courts or to the originating court in
single sala courts, as the case may be, to conduct pre-
trial proper, as mandated by Rules 18 and 118 of the
Rules of Court.
XIII. Trial and Judgment
The trial judge to whom the case was turned over,
shall expeditiously proceed to trial after the pre-trial
and, thereafter, render judgment in accordance with
the established facts, evidence, and the applicable
laws.
PART FOUR
PROVISIONS COMMON
TO BOTH CAM AND JDR
I. Confidentiality
Any and all matters discussed or
communications made, including requests for
mediation, and documents presented during the
mediation proceedings before the Philippine
Mediation Center or the JDR proceedings before the
trial judge, shall be privileged and confidential, and
the same shall be inadmissible as evidence for any
purpose in any other proceedings. However, evidence
or information that is otherwise admissible does not
become inadmissible solely by reason of its use in
mediation or conciliation.
Further, the JDR judge shall not pass any
information obtained in the course of conciliation and
early neutral evaluation to the trial judge or to any
other person. This prohibition shall include all court
personnel or any other person present during such
proceedings. All JDR conferences shall be conducted
in private.
II. Role of Lawyers in Mediation19 and in JDR
Proceedings
Lawyers may attend mediation proceedings in
the role of adviser and consultant to their clients,
dropping their combative role in the adjudicative
process, and giving up their dominant role in judicial
trials. They must accept a less directive role in order
to allow the parties more opportunities to craft their
own agreement.
19
Guidelines for Parties’ Counsel in Court-Annexed Mediation
Cases, A.M. No. 04-3-15-SC PHILJA, March 15, 2004.
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
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OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
In particular, they shall perform the following
functions:
1. Help their clients comprehend the mediation
process and its benefits and allow them to assume
greater personal responsibility in making
decisions for the success of mediation in resolving
the dispute.
2. Discuss with their clients the following:
• The substantive issues involved in the
dispute.
• Prioritization of resolution in terms of
importance to client.
• Understanding the position of the other side
and the underlying fears, concerns, and
needs underneath that position.
• Need for more information or facts to be
gathered or exchanged with the other side for
informed decision making.
• Possible bargaining options but stressing
the need to be open-minded about other
possibilities.
• The best, worst, and most likely
alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
3. Assist in preparing a compromise agreement that
is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy so that the same
may be approved by the court, paying particular
attention to issues of voluntary compliance of
what have been agreed upon, or otherwise to
issues of enforcement in case of breach.
4. Assist, wherever applicable, in the preparation
of a manifestation of satisfaction of claims and
mutual withdrawal of complaint and
counterclaim as basis for the court to issue an
order of dismissal.
PART FIVE
SC-PHILJA-PMC MEDIATION TRUST FUND
I. Creation of Trust Fund
The Mediation Fees collected and collectible,
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 141, as amended, of the
Rules of Court, and all income therefrom shall
constitute a special fund, to be known as the SC-
PHILJA-PMC Mediation Trust Fund, which shall be
administered and disbursed in accordance with
guidelines set by court issuances, for purposes
enumerated in Section 9, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
23
All revenues of the PMC Office from sources other
than the mediation fees above shall form part of its
Special ADR Fund (SAF), which shall be administered
and disbursed by PHILJA in accordance with the
existing guidelines approved by the Supreme Court.
II. Collection of Mediation Fees
(Section 9 of Rule 141, A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC)
A. Trial Courts
The Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts
and the First Level Courts shall collect the amount of
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) upon the filing of
the following:
(1) Complaint or an Answer with a mediatable
permissive counterclaim or cross-claim, complaint-
in-intervention, third-party complaint, fourth-
party complaint, etc., in civil cases, a Petition, an
Opposition, and a Creditors’ Claim in Special
Proceedings;
(2) Complaint/Information for offenses with
maximum imposable penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period or six years imprisonment,
except where the civil liability is reserved or is
subject of a separate action;
(3) Complaint/Information for estafa, theft, and libel
cases, except where the civil liability is reserved
or is subject of a separate action;
(4) Complaint/Information for Quasi-Offenses under
Title 14 of the Revised Penal Code;
(5) Intellectual Property cases;
(6) Commercial or corporate cases; and
(7) Environmental cases.
The Clerks of Court of the First Level Courts shall
collect the amount of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00)
upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal with the Regional
Trial Court.
The Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Court
shall collect the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal with
the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan.
B. Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals
The Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals and
Court of Tax Appeals shall collect the amount of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) upon the filing of a
mediatable case, petition, special civil action, a
comment/answer to the petition or action, and the
appellee’s brief. The Clerk of Court of the Court of Tax
(Continued on next page)
24 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
Appeals shall also collect the amount of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) for the appeal from
the decision of a CTA Division to the CTA En Banc.
Provided that, in all cases, a pauper litigant shall
be exempt from contributing to the Mediation Fund.
Despite such exemption, the court shall provide that
the unpaid contribution to the Mediation Fund shall
be considered a lien on any monetary award in a
judgment favorable to the pauper litigant.
And, provided further, that an accused-appellant
shall also be exempt from contributing to the
Mediation Fund.
The amount collected shall be receipted and
separated as part of a special fund, to be known as the
“Mediation Fund,” and shall accrue to the SC-PHILJA-
PMC Fund, disbursements from which are and shall
be pursuant to guidelines approved by the Supreme
Court.
The Fund shall be utilized for the promotion of
court-annexed mediation and other relevant modes
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), training of
mediators, payment of mediator’s fees, and operating
expenses for technical assistance and organizations/
individuals, transportation/communication expenses,
photocopying, supplies and equipment, expense
allowance, and miscellaneous expenses, whenever
necessary, subject to auditing rules and regulations.
In view thereof, the mediation fees shall not form part
of the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) under PD No.
1949 nor of the special allowances granted to justices
and judges under Republic Act No. 9227.
III. Utilization and Disbursement
(A.M. No. 05-3-25-SC-PHILJA, dated April 26,
2005)
A. Purpose and Utilization of the Mediation Fund
The Fund shall be used for:
a. Establishment of PMC Units;
b. Training seminars/workshops/internship
programs for Mediators;
c. Payment of Mediators’ Fees, including the
PMC Unit Staff;
d. Payment of operating expenses;
e. Advocacy and promotion of court-annexed
mediation and other relevant modes of
ADR;
f. Such other expenses as authorized by
Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
The Fund shall be managed by PHILJA subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
B. Deposit of the Mediation Fund
The Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) has
already closed the SC PHILJA TRUST FUND Peso
Current Account No. 3472-1001-30 as of March 30,
2009. Hence, all mediation fees collected are to be
deposited solely under SC PHILJA PMC Rule 141 Peso
Current Account (CA) No. 3472-1000-08.20
IV. Mediation Fee, Mediator’s Fee and Mediation
Fund, distinguished
The mediation fee is the amount collected from the
parties. The amount is added to the mediation fund
from where disbursements are made for the authorized
expenditures stated above. The mediation fee is not
collected for mediation services rendered or to be
rendered. It is intended as a contribution to promote
mediation. The mediator’s fee is the authorized amount
paid from the mediation fund for services rendered by
a mediator.
PART SIX
THE PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER OFFICE
(PMCO)
AND MEDIATION CENTER UNITS
(A.M. No. 33-2008, February 12, 2008)
I. Philippine Mediation Center Office and PMC
Units
The Philippine Mediation Center Office shall
primarily be responsible for the expansion,
development, implementation, monitoring, and
sustainability of SC ADR mechanisms, namely:
a. Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM)
b. Appellate Court Mediation (ACM)
c. Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
d. Mobile Court-Annexed Mediation (MCAM)
e. Court-Annexed Arbitration (CAA) and other
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms
The PMCO shall likewise be primarily tasked with
the organization of PMC units, as it may deem
necessary, throughout the country. It shall be under
the operational control of and supervision of PHILJA,
in coordination with the Office of the Court
Administrator, through the Executive Judges.
20
OCA Circular No. 28-2009, dated April 13, 2009.
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 25

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued) b. Appellate Court Mediation (ACM)

• Mediation Staff Officer VI
II. Organizational Structure
• Mediation Staff Officer IV
The Philippine Mediation Center Office shall be
composed of: • Mediation Staff Assistant II
a) Executive Committee 21 – The powers and • Mediation Aide
authority of the PMC Office shall be vested in and
• Accredited Mediators
exercised by an Executive Committee composed
of: c. Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
PHILJA Chancellor – Chairperson • Mediation Staff Officer V
Four regular members, namely: • Mediation Staff Assistant II
1. Dean Eduardo D. De los Angeles • Mediation Aide
2. Dean Pacifico A. Agabin d. Mobile Court-Annexed Mediation (MCAM)
3. Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan Every bus of the Justice on Wheels (JOW)
deployed for mediation in selected areas is
4. Atty. Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla
considered as a PMC Unit, thus, it is entitled to
Four ex officio members, namely: the following:
Court Administrator • Mediation Staff Officer V
Executive Secretary, PHILJA22 • Mediation Staff Assistant II
PHILJA Chief of Office for PMC • Mediation Aide
Chairperson, PHILJA ADR Department • Accredited Mediators
b) PHILJA Chief of Office for PMC- Chief of Office of III. Powers and Functions of the PMCO
the Philippine Mediation Center Office
The PMC Office shall exercise the following
c) PHILJA Assistant Chief of Office for PMC powers and functions in order to accomplish its
d) CENTRAL OFFICE mandate under A.M. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA:

a. Mediation Planning and Research Division a. Develop and promulgate rules and regulations
that it may deem necessary, subject to the
b. Mediation Resource Management Division approval of the Supreme Court, upon
recommendation of the Executive Committee and
c. Mediation Education, Training and
the PHILJA Board of Trustees;
Monitoring Division
b. Implement, in coordination with the Office of the
e) Mediation Center Units, composition
Court Administrator, rules and policies of the
a. Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) Supreme Court on ADR mechanisms, namely,
Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM), Appellate
• Mediation Staff Officer V Court Mediation (ACM), Judicial Dispute
• Mediation Staff Assistant II Resolution ( JDR), Mobile Court-Annexed
Mediation (MCAM), and eventually Court-
• Mediation Aide Annexed Arbitration (CAA) and other Alternative
Dispute Resolution mechanisms;
• Accredited Mediators
c. Establish such PMC Units as may be necessary;
21
Court En Banc Resolution, dated June 3, 2008, under A.M.
No. 08-2-5-SC-PHILJA. d. Provide a system for the recruitment, screening,
training, and accreditation of Mediators;
22
Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., PHILJA [Vice] Chancellor,
changed to Justice Marina L. Buzon, Executive Secretary, e. Monitor and evaluate the performance of
per Board Resolution No. 08-18, dated May 15, 2008, of the Mediators, such as in settling disputes and in
PHILJA Board of Trustees.
(Continued on next page)
26 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)
observing the Code of Ethical Standards for
Mediators, upgrade their mediation skills, and
oversee their further development. Such
evaluation shall be the basis for the renewal of
their accreditation as Mediators;
f. Provide a grievance mechanism and procedure for
addressing complaints against Mediators and
PMC Unit Staff;
g. Promote and sustain the programs and activities
of Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM), Appellate
Court Mediation (ACM), Judicial Dispute
Resolution ( JDR), Mobile Court-Annexed
Mediation (MCAM), and eventually Court-
Annexed Arbitration (CAA), and other Alternative
Dispute Resolution mechanisms;
h. Call on any government agency, office,
instrumentality, commission or council to render
such assistance as may be necessary for the
efficient performance of its functions; and
i. Exercise such other functions necessary in
furtherance of its mandate.
PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
Upcoming Activities
(Continued from page 36)
„ Career Enhancement Program for Clerks of Court
(Region 2)
September 14-16, Tuguegarao City
„ Orientation Seminar-Workshop on Comparative
Analysis between the Family Code and the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws
September 19-21, Dipolog City
„ Increasing Judicial Efficiency: Seminar-Workshop for
Judges on the Effective Use of the Benchbook for
Philippine Trial Courts (Revised and Expanded) for
National Capital Judicial Region (Batch 1)
September 20, Pasay City
„ Increasing Judicial Efficiency: Seminar-Workshop for
Judges on the Effective Use of the Benchbook for
Philippine Trial Courts (Revised and Expanded) for
National Capital Judicial Region (Batch 2)
September 21, Pasay City
„ Roundtable Discussion on Combating Human Trafficking
in the Philippines for Selected Appellate Court Justices
(Manila, Cebu and Cagayan de Oro)
September 22, Manila
„ Information Dissemination Through A Dialogue
between Barangay Officials of the Province of Antique
and Court Officials
September 22, San Jose, Antique
„ Information Dissemination Through A Dialogue
between Barangay Officials of the Municipality of Kalibo
and Court Officials
September 23, Kalibo, Aklan
„ Ninth Multi-Sectoral Capacity Building on
Environmental Laws and the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases
September 28-30, Davao City
Annex “B”
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 27

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

(Continued on next page)

28 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 29

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

(Continued on next page)

30 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 31

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

(Continued on next page)

32 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS PHILJA Bulletin
PHILJA Bulletin
 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS 33

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

(Continued on next page)

34 PHILJA NEWS PHILJA Bulletin

OCA CIRCULAR. NO. 51-2011 (continued)

 April-June 2011 RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS
PHILJA NEWS
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 65-2011
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE SECOND LEVEL COURTS
SUBJECT: REITERATION OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF
CIRCULAR NO. 39-97, DATED JUNE 19, 1997 (RE:
GUIDELINES IN THE ISSUANCE OF HOLD-
DEPARTURE ORDERS)
In his May 5, 2011 letter, Commissioner Ricardo
A. David, Jr. of the Bureau of Immigration requests the
reiteration of Circular No. 39-97, dated June 19, 1997
(Re: Guidelines in the Issuance of Hold-Departure Orders). It
appears that despite the issuance of OCA Circular No.
18-2003 dated February 20, 2003 (Re: Reiteration of Par.
3, Circular No. 39-97, dated June 19, 1997), the Bureau still
encounters the same problem where passengers with
namesakes complain of being withheld for secondary
inspection due to lack of middle name and date of
birth entries in the Hold-Departure Orders issued by
the courts.
To address the concern of the Bureau and enable it
to effectively implement the Hold-Departure Orders
issued by the courts, all concerned Judges are again
hereby REMINDED to strictly observe the guidelines
set forth in Circular No. 39-97, particularly paragraph
3 thereof:
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the
following information:
a. The complete name (including the middle name),
the date and place of birth and the place of last
residence of the person against whom a Hold-
Departure Order has been issued or whose
departure from the country has been
enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the
case in which the Hold-Departure Order was
issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the person
against whom a Hold-Departure has been issued
or whose departure from the country has been
enjoined should also be included” (italics
supplied).
May 20, 2011.
(Sgd.) NIMFA C. VILCHES
Deputy Court Administrator
and
Officer-in-Charge
Office of the Court Administrator
35
Doctrinal Reminders
REMEDIAL LAW (continued from page 13)
More importantly, by proceeding to rule
against petitioners without any trial, the trial and
appellate courts made a conclusion which was
based merely on an assumption that petitioners’
defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and
that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer
(e.g., open and continuous possession of the
property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven
at all. This assumption is as baseless as it is
premature and unfair. No reason was given why
the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be
proven during trial. The lower courts merely
assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove
their defense and factual allegations, without first
giving them an opportunity to do so.
It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards
for the rendition of a summary judgment were all
ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a
judgment based on nothing else but an
unwarranted assumption and a violation of
petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they
can present their evidence and prove their defense.
(Del Castillo, J., Aniceto Calubaquib, Wilma Calubaquib,
Edwin Calubaquib, Alberto Calubaquib, and Eleuterio Faustino
Calubaquib v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170658,
June 22, 2011.)
JUSTICE ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Chancellor
PROFESSOR SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA
Editor in Chief
Editorial and Research Staff
ATTY. ORLANDO B. CARIÑO
ATTY. MA. MELISSA DIMSON-BAUTISTA
ARSENIA M. MENDOZA
ARMIDA M. SALAZAR
JOCELYN D. BONDOC
RONALD P. CARAIG
JUDITH P. DEL ROSARIO
CHRISTINE A. FERRER
JOANNE NARCISO-MEDINA
CHARMAINE S. NICOLAS
SARAH JANE S. SALAZAR
JENIFFER P. SISON
Circulation and Support Staff
ROMEO A. ARCULLO
LOPE R. PALERMO
DANIEL S. TALUSIG
Printing Services
LETICIA G. JAVIER AND PRINTING STAFF
The PHILJA Bulletin is published quarterly by the Research, Publications and
Linkages Office of the Philippine Judicial Academy, with office at the 3rd Floor of
the Supreme Court Centennial Building, Padre Faura Street corner Taft Avenue,
Manila. Tel: 552-9524; Fax: 552-9621; E-mail: research_philja@yahoo.com;
philja@sc.judiciary.gov.ph; Website: http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph
 36 PHILJA NEWS
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2011 Upcoming PHILJA Events