MEGA-EVENTS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 179 Matthew J. Burbank University of Utah Greg Andranovich California State University, Los Angeles Charles H. Heying Portland State University180 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 ABSTRACT As cities compete for jobs and capital in the context of limited federal aid and increasing global economic competition, a new and potentially high-risk policy strategy for stimulating local economic growth has emerged. This mega- event strategy entails the quest for a high-profile event to serve as a stimulus to, and justification for, local development. How and why do American cities commit their resources to seeking a mega-event? And, ifa city lands a mega- event, how does that event affect local development policy? To address these questions, we examine the experiences of three American cities which have bid for and organized the Olympics in the contemporary era: Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City. | ee development policy for American cities has traditionally relied on the use of tax incentives or infrastructure investments to lure new businesses or encourage the expansion of existing ones. Changes in the political and economic environment of contemporary American cities in recent decades, however, have led to new public policy strategies for seeking urban growth. In particular, many cities have come to emphasize policies that promote urban tourism (Eisinger, 2000; Gladstone, 1998; Judd & Fainstein, 1999), These policies typically include the development of convention centers, large hotels, restaurants, entertainment facilities, and shopping malls. The similarity of such development projects, however, means that cities must rely on place marketing to project a unique image that will bring visitors and investors to their city (Holeomb, 1999; Law, 1993; Paddison, 1993). We examine one manifestation of the competition for urban tourism and the use of place marketing, the hosting of an urban mega-event. Mega-events are large-scale undertakings, such as an Olympic games or a world’s fair, intended to spur local economic development by attracting tourists and media recognition for the host city. Pursuing a mega-event is a risky policy, however, because it requires a substantial outlay of resources merely to compete, the probability of getting the mega-event is not high, and the potential benefit to the city may be largely intangible. Why, then, do cities pursue mega-events and how do these events influence local development policy? We seek answers to these questions by examining three American cities, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City, that have bid for and organized a modern urban mega-event, the Olympic games.Burbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy MEGA-EVENTS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Seeking out large-scale events, such as an Olympics or a world’s fair, has become part of a deliberate policy strategy for promoting local economic growth by some American cities. Hosting a premier event is desirable as a growth promotion strategy because city leaders can claim credit for generating revenue from tourism, enhancing the city’s image, and perhaps even reshaping the city’s physical structure (e.g., Essex & Chalkley, 1998; Hall, 1996; Paddison, 1993). Despite the enormous amount of attention and controversy that accompany a mega-event, little concern has been paid to the potential consequences of this policy for the host cities. Policy debates over the pursuit of a mega-event tend to focus on its economic impact -- the cost of a stadium, the value of a new hotel, or the tax revenues generated -- but rarely on the broader political and social ramifications (Roche, 1992). The Rise of the Mega-event Strategy The desire to stage a mega-event is not entirely novel. Cities have used events to attract attention for a long time. Still, the rise of the mega-event strategy can be seen as a response to a particular set of political and economic circumstances. Central to the emergence of the contemporary mega-event strategy were two fundamental changes affecting American cities: (1) the growth of the global economy, and (2) changes in federal urban policy. In the 1980s and 1990s, political, economic, and technological developments meant that the global economy had at last become an important feature of the environment within which cities compete for economic growth (Fry, 1995; Knight, 1989). As trade in goods and services became increasingly open and internationally competitive, American cities had to compete with cities from around the world for investment capital, busin , and tourists. The impact of global competition has been most apparent at the top of the urban hierarchy, where cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo have become “global” or “world” cities (Sassen, 1991; Friedmann, 1995). According to the world cities thesis, the rise of a global economy is driving cities to find an economic niche within the regional or world economy. “World cities articulate regional, national, and international economies into a global economy. They serve as the organizing nodes of a global economic system” (Friedmann, 1995, p. 25). The concept of a world 181182 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 city has a cultural dimension as well. As Shachar (1995, p. 157) notes “world cities are richly endowed with the largest variety of cultural and entertainment facilities of the highest quality, such as museums, galleries, opera houses, theaters, and concert halls.” Although only a handful of cities can compete to be truly world cities, the global nature of economic activity affects all cities seeking local economic growth (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998). Even as the global economic environment has become more competitive, U.S. cities have felt the effect of changes in federal urban policy, These changes involved the reduction or elimination of federal aid to urban areas. Beginning with the Great Society initiatives of the 1960s, federal funds had become an important part of the development activities of American cities. During the Reagan administration, however, a number of federal programs designed to assist urban areas were eliminated or greatly reduced (Caraley, 1992; Mollenkopf, 1998). Changes in federal policy had a substantial impact on state and local governments. While some local governments responded to the loss of federal funds by curtailing development activities, others became more entrepreneurial in their approach to economic development (Eisinger, 1988; Clarke & Gaile, 1992, 1998). Indeed, Clarke and Gaile argue that the period after 1984 represents a new “postfederal” era for local development policy. According to Clarke and Gaile (1998: 55-62), the postfederal era marks a “third wave” of local economic development policy. In the first wave, cities used place-specific policy tools, such as clearing land or building infrastructure, to attract businesses. These “smokestack chasing” policies were gradually supplemented by a second wave of policies prompted by the infusion of federal funds in the 1970s. The second wave was a transitional period during which cities used federal money to try more risky, entrepreneurial development strategies such as small-business incubators and below-market loans to businesses. The demise of federal funding for urban programs in the 1980s led to the third wave of development policies characterized by a greater willingness of local governments to take risk, increased cooperation among local governments on a metropolitan or regional level, the pooling of public and private financing, and heavy reliance on public- private partnerships or quasi-public agencies to implement development projects (Clarke & Gaile, 1998: 61-62).Burbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy After 1984, it was evident that the federal government would no longer provide substantial resources to assist with local economic development. Rather, federal policies encouraged cities to seek local growth by using entrepreneurial techniques, a trend that changed little in the 1990s (Mollenkopf, 1998). The Mega-event as Urban Growth Polit One response to the economic and political conditions confronting cities was for cities to diversify their development policies by emphasizing consumption in leisure, entertainment, or sport (Eisinger, 2000; Fainstein & Judd, 1999; Fainstein & Stokes, 1999; Gladstone, 1998; Rich, 1998; Teske & Sur, 1991). As a result of this policy shift, tourism has become an integral part of the development or redevelopment plans of many American cities. The pursuit of a mega-event as an engine for economic growth is one manifestation of the policy shift toward consumption-based development. Mega-events are large-scale, high-profile occurrences of limited duration intended to attract attention and visitors to a host city. The mega-event strategy is an extension of the traditional corporate-center approach to economic development that relies on building convention facilities and amenities for business and convention travelers (Sanders, 1992). The mega-event strategy differs, however, because it relies on obtaining a single event large enough to be seen as a way to generate future economic growth. Many events can bring tourists and attention to a city, a Superbowl or a political convention for example, but the mega-event is sufficiently large that it creates a single focal point and time frame for completing event-related development. The mega-event strategy seeks to attract an event of sufficient magnitude that it can be a stimulus to, or justification for, local development projects. Hosting a mega-event is also akin to the desire by cities to attract or retain professional sports franchises (Bachelor, 1998; Danielson, 1997; Euchner, 1993; Pelissero, Henschen, & Sidlow, 1991; Rosentraub, 1997). Efforts by city governments to provide facilities for professional sports teams and to attract the Olympics share a similar policy logic. Most economic analyses conclude that professional sports teams and sports facilities add little to a city’s economic base (e.g., Baade, 1996; Baim, 1994; Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybyiski, & Mullins, 1994; 183184 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 Zimbalist, 1998). Yet, government subsidies are often justified by city leaders in terms of the need for a sports team to put the city “on the map” or make it a “major league city.” As Euchner (1993: 77) notes “stadiums and sports teams are luxuries that fiscally strapped cities can ill afford -- yet have great difficulty bypassing because of the potency of symbolic notions like ‘renaissance’ and ‘major league status.”” As with professional sports teams, the allure of the Olympics is contingent upon the sense of intangible benefits being delivered to the host city (Cochrane, Peck, & Tickell, 1996; Hall, 1996; Waitt, 1999). Associating the city with a prestigious international sporting event is often seen by city leaders as a priceless asset for promoting an image of the city to tourists or convention goers and, ultimately, to new businesses and new residents. As a result of the international brand name, worldwide television audience, and appeal to corporate sponsors, the Olympic games have become the event of choice for cities seeking to create or enhance a global image (Hall, 1992; Hill, 1996). The importance of a city’s image, particularly the desire for it to be seen as a vital and dynamic place, is a recurrent theme in development politics. “A city’s image is the backdrop against which development occurs; and image creation is frequently a goal of the economic development process... Despite the intangibility of image, it remains critical to local economic development” (Pagano & Bowman, 1995, p. 67). Image is an important factor in consumption-oriented development generally and its significance is magnified in the mega-event strategy. Why do some cities seek to use a mega-event as a part of its development policy? Drawing upon urban regime theory (Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1989, 1993), we hypothesize that the activities necessary to pursue a mega-event are initiated by an active growth regime. Aregime is an informal coalition between local business leaders and city officials that unites the resources of business with the formal authority of government to carry out policies of mutual interest, most commonly economic development (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1993). Because these informal networks draw on the resources of business and the authority of government, they provide a way to overcome the policy inertia associated with the fragmented power of local governments. A regime provides “the capacity to assemble and use needed resources for a policy initiative” (Stone, 1989: 227). Thus, at the local level, we would expect to find that the desire and ability toBurbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy seck a mega-event will be a product of local business leaders and elected officials who want to use an external event to stimulate local development and invigorate the city’s image. CASE STUDIES: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF OLYMPIC MEGA-EVENTS Getting an Olympic mega-event requires a substantial commitment of public and private resources for an extended period of time.' How and why do American cities commit their resources to seeking a mega- event? And, if the city lands a mega-event, how does that event affect urban development? To address these questions, we examine the experiences of three American cities that have bid for and organized the Olympics in the contemporary era: Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City. Multiple sources of evidence were collected and analyzed for each city including official Olympic documents, government documents, selected interviews, public opinion data, local media reports, and other available resources (¢.g., reports from community and regional organizations). In each city, our analysis focuses on two questions: (1) how does the quest for a mega-event originate? and, (2) what impact did the mega-event have on urban development policy? Of course, the three cities that we examine differ in size, social composition, economic base, and politics. Despite these differences, we can learn important lessons about the origins and impacts of mega- events by focusing our comparisons on the process of bidding for and hosting the Olympics in each city. The timing of each city’s Olympic experience differs as well, but these differences illustrate the evolution of the Olympics as an urban mega-event. Creating the Urban Mega-event: The 1984 Los Angeles Games The bid for the 1984 Los Angeles games was initiated in 1977 by the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games (SCCOG). The SCCOG was composed of business leaders from several of LA’s major downtown businesses and other civic notables. Originally organized in 1939, the SCCOG served as the vehicle for a series of bids following the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics (Henry & Yeomans, 1984). In 1977, the SCCOG raised $158,000 in private funds for the first stage of the bid process. After securing its funding, the SCCOG 185186 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 sought the endorsement of Mayor Tom Bradley, the city council, the county board of supervisors, the state legislature, and the governor. In an editorial published by the Los Angeles Times, SCCOG member and Atlantic Richfield vice president Rodney Rood (1977) explained the reasons for hosting the Olympics: (1) the chance for Los Angeles to display its attractions on a global stage; (2) the opportunity to increase revenues from the influx of new visitors; and (3) the “intangibles” that would enhance the city’s position in history and contemporary society. John Argue, a prominent Los Angeles attorney and SCCOG president, publicly noted that the overarching goal was to bring the games to LA at no cost to taxpayers. Los Angeles was selected as America’s choice by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in September 1977. As it turned out, the city’s selection by the USOC essentially secured the Olympics for the city because Los Angeles was the only serious competitor at the international level. Thus, what should have been a contest among cities worldwide, became a negotiation between the Los Angeles bid committee and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The LA bid offered two novel proposals: (1) that the games would be privately funded, and (2) that the host city, not the IOC, would negotiate television rights (Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 1985: 7). In the wake of the enormously expensive 1976 games in Montreal, LA city officials insisted on limiting the city’s financial liability. Their insistence on this point convinced the IOC to waive its rule requiring that the host city be financially responsible for the games. After reaching agreement with the IOC, a private, nonprofit organization was formed to organize the games, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC). Although several prominent bid committee members were name to the LAOOC’s board, Mayor Bradley named an “outsider,” Peter Ueberroth, to be the president and CEO. Ueberroth created a management team dedicated to staging the games using private money and maintained tight control over decision making. Indeed, the 1984 games have been dubbed the “capitalist Olympics” because of the LAOOC’s determination to raise as much money as possible from large corporate sponsors and to minimize the costs of putting on the games (Nixon, 1988: 238). The LAOOC sought to limit costs by using existing facilities, using volunteers rather than paid staff, and requesting sacrifices from Olympic visitors and local communities alike. The LAOOC pursued these goalsBurbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy while keeping corporate sponsors, local governments, and community groups at an “arm’s length” from decisions about staging the games (Reich, 1986). When faced with opposition to its decisions from community residents, the LAOOC either changed sites or provided minor concessions to placate neighborhood interests (Burbank, Heying, & Andranovich, 2000: 340-344). Given the businesslike approach favored by the LAOOC, the 1984 games had a minimal physical impact on Los Angeles. Some new facilities were built, notably a swim stadium and a velodrome which were privately-financed, and venues such as the Los Angeles Coliseum were refurbished. Still, by relying on existing facilities and spreading venues around southern California, organizers were able to stage the games with little new development. Further, given the focus by city officials on avoiding financial problems, the games did not become an opportunity to pursue a broader development agenda. The games were used as a reason to renovate the airport and install new telecommunications infrastructure, but the games did not become a justification for secondary development projects. The Olympics did result in more tourists in 1984, though with some displacement from traditional attractions, and did increase tax revenue (Economic Research Associates, 1984; MacCargar, 1985). Perhaps the most significant achievement of the LA games, however, was the image of a successful, privately-financed, urban Olympics. The LAOOC’s $225 million post-games surplus was tangible evidence of success. After the legacy of massive public debt from the 1976 Montreal games, Los Angeles established the model for a contemporary, entrepreneurial urban mega-event. The 1984 games attracted ample positive publicity for the city and produced short-term tourist revenues, without substantial costs to local taxpayers. Olympic Development: AUlanta and the 1996 Summer Games Unlike Los Angeles, Atlanta was nota city with Olympic experience nor an existing organization in place to initiate a bid. Much of the early work was done by a small group of acquaintances of Billy Payne, a local lawyer who became the city’s Olympic entrepreneur. The task that Payne undertook in 1987 was to convince business leaders and city officials in Atlanta to support an Olympic bid. Getting the support 187188 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 of key leaders was crucial because ten years earlier a fledgling effort to bid for the 1984 games had been stopped in its tracks for lack of local corporate support (Johnson, 1990). Perhaps the most important early convert was Mayor Andrew Young, who swayed when Payne assured him that the Olympics could be staged without sizeable expenditures of city money. After leaving office, Young became chairman of the Georgia Amateur Athletic Foundation (GAAF). The GAAF was the organization that Payne had created to bid for the USOC’s endorsement. In the wake of the successful LA games, a large number of U.S. cities expressed interest in hosting the games. The USOC selected Atlanta as America’s choice to host the 1996 games. After selection by the USOC, a new organization was created for the IOC campaign, the Atlanta Organizing Committee (AOC). With the USOC endorsement, the AOC was able to obtain support from local corporations and government. The AOC relied heavily on these local resources because Atlanta faced stiff competition at the international level. The AOC combined a highly personalized lobbying campaign with a strong technical bid to convince IOC members to select Atlanta for the 1996 summer games. In contrast to the experience in Los Angeles, the issue of who would control decision making for the Atlanta games was closely contested. Mayor Maynard Jackson wanted the city to have a strong voice in development decisions (Turner, 2000b). City officials, however, had neither the resources nor the legal authority to control the Olympic organizing process. Indeed, the city’s legal authority was so weak that during the bid period the Georgia legislature had created a state entity, the Metropolitan Atlanta Olympic Games Authority, with the powers needed to support the bid. Ultimately, however, control over the games organization was assumed by a private, nonprofit organization, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG). ACOG was headed by Olympic entrepreneur Billy Payne and largely staffed by members of the former bid committee (Turner, 2000a). Although the bid committee had self-consciously promoted the Los Angeles model, Atlanta’s Olympic organizers were faced with the reality that Atlanta lacked the existing facilities to host the games (Newman, 1999b: 256). Atlanta’s games thus became an opportunity to promote an aggressive development policy agenda. Between 1990 and 1996, spending on Olympic-related construction in Atlanta amounted to some $650 million (Newman, 1999b: 257). TheBurbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy ACOG spent more than $500 million on construction, including nearly $200 million for the Olympic Stadium, and state and city governments spent millions more on Olympic-related projects. Broadly speaking, Olympic development plans drew one of two responses. Large institutions such as Georgia Tech, the Atlanta University Center, and Stone Mountain were receptive to Olympic proposals and formed partnerships with Olympic planners to serve their interests as well as ACOG’s. In contrast, projects that affected local residents, such as construction of the Olympic Stadium, Centennial Olympic Park, and the Olympic Village, sparked opposition that revived long-standing tensions involving issues of race and class (Burbank et al., 2000: 344- 348). In some cases, ACOG responded quickly to residential concerns, for example by moving the tennis venue out of a suburban area after residents complained. In other cases, such as the Olympic Stadium and Centennial Olympic Park, ACOG pushed ahead with development with only minor concessions to the concerns of residents or small businesses (Newman, 1999a). With the development of the Olympic Village, which was one of the events that precipitated the leveling of the Techwood-Clark Howell public housing, ACOG’s plans led the Atlanta Housing Authority to engineer the wholesale displacement of residents (Keating & Flores, 2000). To a far greater extent than Los Angeles, the Olympics became a justification for the physical redevelopment of parts of Atlanta. Some of this Olympic development was required by the need for sufficient facilities to stage the games, but other projects had little immediate relevance to the games. Perhaps the most notably of these secondary development projects was Centennial Olympic Park, a downtown redevelopment that provided space for major corporate sponsors during the games but was not an Olympic venue (Rutheiser, 1996). The creation of Centennial Olympic Park illustrated that, with support of major players in development politics, the Olympic time schedule could be a powerful incentive to accomplish long-sought development goals. In other ways, however, the city’s efforts to use the Olympics to revitalize urban neighborhoods had limited success. Atlanta’s Corporation for Olympic Development Authority (CODA), created by the city to generate partnerships with the private sector to fund neighborhood redevelopment, got little support from private sources and fell short of its funding goals. In allocating the funds CODA did raise, $65 million of its $72 million budget was spent sprucing up downtown streets and parks that Olympic visitors would see (Hellerman, 1995). Furthermore, 189190 The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 the city’s plan to capitalize on the games by leasing space to small vendors brought the city into direct conflict with ACOG and the IOC. The city made money, but the plan was beset with difficulties that lead to lawsuits against the city and conflict between the mayor and city council (Whitt & Turner, 1996). In contrast with Los Angeles, Atlanta’s Olympics became a vehicle for a broad range of urban development projects. While some of Atlanta’s Olympic-driven developments have created a positive legacy for Atlantans, other projects exacerbated existing tensions within the city over issues of who pays and who benefits. Some developments, such as the Olympic Stadium and Centennial Olympic Park, appeared to provide benefits for corporations and well-off individuals at the expense of local residents (Keating & Flores, 2000; Rutheiser, 1996). As in Los Angeles, the games produced sizable revenues from tourists, but the Atlanta Olympics did not generate the unabashedly positive media attention the 1984 games had. Despite the auspicious circumstances of hosting the centennial games, the image of Atlanta’s Olympics was mixed (Newman, 1999b, pp. 280-282). Atlanta’s image problems stemmed, in part, from a dissatisfaction on the part of IOC leaders with the American approach to funding the games, but also reflected the recurring tensions between city and ACOG leaders over payment for city services, marketing, public access, and other issues. In sum, Atlanta’s experience showed that far from being a panacea, a mega-event can produce the same tension and conflict as other development policies. Subsidizing Development: The 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City Salt Lake City has a long history of Olympic interest, including unsuccessful bids for the 1972 and 1976 winter games. In 1985, just after the Los Angeles games, the city launched a bid for the 1992 games. Although the USOC chose Anchorage, Salt Lake was able to respond quickly when the USOC abruptly reopened competition in 1988. In 1989, Salt Lake was selected by the USOC to compete for the 1998 and, if need be, the 2002 winter games. Salt Lake City lost in the IOC competition for the 1998 games, but was selected in 1995 to host the 2002 winter Olympics. From its inception in 1988, the bid committee spent nearly seven years and an estimated $13 million lobbying to get the games. Its successor, the Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC),Burbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy would spend another seven years and some $1.3 billion preparing for them. The city’s early bids, for the 1972 and 1976 games, were organized by a small group of downtown business boosters and government officials and intended principally to generate publicity for the ski industry. By 1988, the bid process had become a sophisticated campaign involving a broad coalition of local business leaders and key government officials from Salt Lake City and the surrounding region. The bid was launched under the auspices of the Salt Lake mayor’s office, but resources were provided by local businesses and the process was run by a small group of businesspeople and Olympic entrepreneurs. After winning the USOC endorsement, the bid committee reorganized itself to facilitate raising money from large corporations that could provide the resources needed to lobby the IOC. According to supporters, the reasons for attracting the Olympics to Utah were to generate revenue from tourism and provide long-term exposure to boost the city’s and the ski industry’s image (e.g., Jardine, 1989). In response to criticism that none of these benefits would be realized without the games, supporters argued that with or without the games Salt Lake City could become the “winter sports capital” of North America, The debate over the value of pursuing the Olympics came to a head in Utah during a 1989 referendum campaign on the issue of diverting $59 million of sales tax revenues into a fund for the construction of Olympic facilities. The referendum passed with 57 percent of the vote, thus providing public money for Olympic facilities and an enormous boost to the city’s bid. Although not on the same physical scale as Atlanta, preparations for the Olympic mega-event have affected the development agenda in and around Salt Lake City. An estimated $2.66 billion in public and private money was invested in infrastructure related in some way to the 2002 games, with SLOC funding some $246 million in permanent Olympic facilities (Fowler, 1999: 3). These investments included venues, such as a bobsled track and speed-skating oval, that would not have been built absent the mega-event strategy. These facilities were built using the state’s fund with the agreement that SLOC would buy the venues before the games, and turn them over to a private organization after the games, with a $40 million “legacy fund” (Beattie, 2000: 2). A second type of development, both public and private, were projects that used the promise of an Olympic subsidy as justification. The 191192 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 construction of university student housing for an athletes’ village, the renovation of a football stadium, and the massive expansion of the privately-owned Snowbasin ski resort likely would not have occurred without the promise of an Olympic subsidy. The Olympics also have influenced a number of projects that have little to do with hosting the games. For example, the Olympics were used to justify decisions to build or enlarge several downtown hotels. Further, state, city, and SLOC officials have used the Olympics aggressively to leverage federal funds and hasten public development projects. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2000: 49- 50), federal support for Olympic-related projects in Utah is estimated to be $1.3 billion, with the vast bulk going for transportation projects such as light rail and rebuilding an interstate highway. This amount greatly exceeds the approximately $609 million in federal money that Atlanta received for the larger summer games and the $75 million that Los Angeles received in 1999. (U.S, General Accounting Office, 2000). Salt Lake has been successful using the Olympics to obtain federal money to subsidize local development. And, as in LA and Atlanta, the games drew tourists and produced an estimated net tax revenue of $75.9 million (Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, 2000, p. 15). Salt Lake City got only about 6.5 percent of those tax revenues, even though it bore a larger proportion of the cost of Olympic services (Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, 1998: 3). In addition, SLOC struggled to raise money from corporate sponsors, in part as a consequence of the Olympic bribery scandal that started in Salt Lake City in 1998. The bribery scandal certainly tarnished the city’s image and was a recurrent theme in media coverage of the 2002 games. The fund-raising difficulties resulted in a sizable reduction to the Olympic operating budget which exacerbated tensions between the venue communities and the organizing committee over the cost and delivery of services. In sum, Salt Lake City used its Olympic mega-event to subsidize some of the costs of infrastructure improvements. On the other hand, a number of Olympic-related development activities engendered opposition from a variety of citizen groups seeking to mitigate the negative consequences of specific developments (Burbank et al., 2000: 348-352). Given the budgetary uncertainties, lingering effects of the Olympic scandal, and questions about the future economic viability of new Olympic venues, the 2002 winter games may well leave aBurbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy substantial, though not entirely positive, development legacy. DISCUSSION; MEGA-EVENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY Local development policies often raise issues of equity with regard to the costs and benefits for various urban constituencies (Krumholz, 1999). In this regard, the mega-event strategy is no exception. The way the strategy is initiated at the local level and the impact on local development practices raise serious public policy concerns. In each of our cities, the Olympic bid process was initiated and sustained by elements of the local growth coalition. In Los Angeles, prominent members of the downtown business establishment financed the bid and then sought the endorsement of political leaders. Elected officials were so concerned with conducting a “Spartan” games that they effectively ceded the authority for negotiating with the IOC and conducting the games to the private Olympic committees. Similarly, the Olympic bid in Atlanta started in the private sector and only became viable once it had the endorsement of key members of the city’s business and political elite. The Salt Lake City bid was formally originated by the mayor’s office, but in reality it was run by a small group of Olympic entrepreneurs and local businesspeople with resources from corporate contributions. As the Salt Lake case demonstrates, even if public officials want to control the bid process bearing the city’s name, it is not clear they can do so. The advantage of a functioning urban regime is that these informal governing arrangements provide the wherewithal to undertake policy initiatives (Stone, 1989). Since a typical Olympic bid requires millions of dollars and expertise on everything from event budgeting to venue design, it would be impossible for city officials to conduct such an endeavor with public resources alone. The risk of regime politics, on the other hand, is that the public policy agenda reflects first and foremost the interests of key actors in the regime. Thus, the observation that Olympic bids in American cities follow the pattern of growth regime politics is significant because it makes clear that the mega-event strategy serves the goals of pro-growth business leaders more than the desires of elected officials or city residents. Even though the prospect of hosting amega-event has enormous consequences for public policy, the bidding process is conducted in such a way as to limit the accountability of bid organizers to public officials or citizens. 193194 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 Indeed, citizen participation in decision-making concerning the Olympics was minimal. Only in Utah, with the sales tax referendum, were citizens encouraged to participate in Olympic decision making before the games were awarded. Though technically nonbinding, the referendum did at least involve citizens in the debate over bidding for the Olympics and allow them to express their preferences by voting. In Atlanta, citizens were asked to approve a $150 million bond for infrastructure improvements and neighborhood development which was partly related to hosting the games. The issue of taxpayer money for improving infrastructure, however, was not raised publicly until four years after the city was awarded the games. In Los Angeles, city and county officials threatened to use charter amendments to prevent city or county funds from being spent on the games during negotiations with the IOC, but these proposals never appeared on the ballot. After the games were awarded to LA, the city council voted for a small tax increase to cover future city costs. This measure, Proposition N, was placed on the citywide ballot in November 1978 and passed easily. In sum, the process of bidding for an Olympic mega-event is conducted by a private, nonprofit organization whose actions are largely beyond the control of local elected officials. Yet, the purpose of seeking the games and the reality of holding them are such that hosting a mega- event substantially affects the development agenda for the urban area over a considerable period of time. In Los Angeles, which has become the role model for all American cities with Olympic aspirations, the fear of escalating costs kept the Olympics from becoming a catalyst to large-scale development. In Atlanta and Salt Lake City, however, preparation for the games became the justification for a multitude of development projects. The expanding scope of local development associated with hosting the games raises other public policy concerns. Organizers of the 1984 games in Los Angeles created a managerial approach toward staging the games that intentionally limited external involvement in decision making. While this “arm’s length” approach did not encourage citizen involvement, it did fit with the goals of Olympic organizers to finance the games privately and with the concerns of local officials to minimize costs to taxpayers. Thus, in Los Angeles, staging the Olympics was less a mechanism for physical development and more an act of image creation. In contrast, the Atlanta Olympics became a justification for carrying out parts of a long-standing development agenda. In keepingBurbank: Mega-events, Urban Development, and Public Policy with the established nature of urban development politics (e.g., Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989, 1993), those projects that fit the interests of local business or established institutions were accomplished, while efforts by public officials to encourage development projects to benefit local residents fell far short. In Salt Lake City, a broader development agenda was established in advance of actually getting the games. In order to secure the USOC endorsement in 1989, the bid committee convinced the state legislature to create a mechanism to fund the construction of several Olympic venues. After the city was selected by the IOC, Olympic organizers and local public officials used the games aggressively to lobby for more federal money for transportation projects. Private developers, such as the owners of Snowbasin ski resort, also used the Olympics to leverage their own development plans. Finally, it is important to note how using a mega-event as a development strategy has signaled a change in urban development politics. As cities pursue more complex consumption-oriented policy strategies, the nearly exclusive power of the traditional movers and shakers in urban economic development politics has begun to erode. The traditional advocates of local growth, members of the local busines establishment such as bankers, lawyers, publishers, and utility executives, are still crucial to pulling together the resources required to initiate the policy; but, these local elites are no longer able to determine the outcome of the policy. Once the mega-event policy is underway, extra-local interests become increasingly vital to a successful outcome. Hosting a modern Olympic games requires the authority and cooperation of not only the host city, but other state and local governments and federal agencies as well. Moreover, the financial demands of the games require support from local public and private sources, but are increasingly dependent on multinational corporations and the federal government. Yet, as the evidence from Atlanta and Salt Lake City shows, having a more varied public sector presence in mega-event planning does not guarantee a more “public” policy. Consumption-oriented economic development is presently taking place in American cities and will likely continue in the future. The strategy of attracting a mega-event to a city will continue to have enormous appeal as American cities struggle to find ways to generate economic growth ina globally competitive environment.? The promise of worldwide attention paid for by corporate sponsorship would seem 195196 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 to make hosting the Olympics the perfect vehicle for place marketing, city image-making, and tourism development. Given the way in which Olympic mega-events are pursued and used in the context of urban development, however, it appears that the mega-event strategy offers little more than development politics as usual for American cities. NOTES ' In the United States, a city interested in hosting the games must first submit a bid to the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). If selected by the USOC, the city then competes against other cities around the world for selection by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The IOC Charter stipulates that a city is the only entity which can submit a bid to host the games. The final choice of a host city for a future Olympics is made by a secret ballot of IOC members. 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(1996, September 22). False profits: Dreams of Olympic gold turn into nightmare. Atlanta Journal Constitution: p.D6. Zimbalist, A. (1998). The economics of stadiums, teams and cities. Policy Studies Review 15: 17-29. 201202 ‘The Review of Policy Research, Fall 2002 19:3 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Matthew J. Burbank is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Utah. His research interests include citizen. part apeasion and his recent publications have appeared in Political Behavior, Political Geography, and Urban Affairs Review. He is also coauthor, with Greg Andranovich and Charles Heying, of Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega- events on Local Politics (Lynne Rienner). Greg Andranovich teaches political science and public administration at California State University, Los Angeles. His research is e oe m poles and policy making. He is a coauthor of Le Southern California's Suburbs: 1990-1997 California, 2000). His recent eoatie have appeared in Administrative 1 American Behavioral Scientist, and Urban Affairs Review.Copyright © 2003 EBSCO Publishing