What was Bipolarity? R. Harrison Wagner International Organization, Volume 47, Issue. 1 (Winter, 1993), 77-106. Stable URL: fip:flinks jstor-org/sic sici=0020-B 183928 199324920473 1%3C77%3AW WB%3E2.0.COWIBLO, ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ftp fuk jtor-orgfaboutferms html, ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in pat, cat unless you have ‘obiained prior permission, you ray not downloact an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you ‘may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Each copy of any part of a JSTOR twansmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sercen or lnted page of such transmission. International Organization is published by The MIT Ptess. Please contact the publisher for futher permissions ‘regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at fup:fuk-jstor-org/journals/mitpress. ml International Organization ©1993 The MIT Press ISTOR and the ISTOR logo are trademarks of ISTOR, and are Registered in the US. Patent and Trademark Office. For mote information on ISTOR contact jstor@mimas.ac.uk. ©2003 IsTOR hupsfuk.jstor.org/ Wed Mar 5 11:04:48 2003What was bipolarity? R. Harrison Wagner During the cold war the distinction between bipolar and multipolar interna- tional systems became commonplace in both popular and academic discussions ‘of international polities! Often this distinction has served merely as a shorthand way of describing the alliance behavior of states during the cold war period as distinguished from behavior during ather periods. Its importance for the academic literature on international politics, however, lies notin its use asa description of states’ behavior but as an explanation af it. Used in this way, “ipolarity” refers to the distribution of power among states after World War I; and, it is that peculiar distribution af power, some scholars claim, that accounts for bath the antagonism that developed between the United States and the Saviet Union and the fact that that antagonism, though intense, did not lead to 2 major war between them. It explains, in ather words, why there was a “war” between Fast and West and also why that war remained “cold.”” ‘The economic problems of the Soviet Union, which led to the independence of Eastern Furope and the reunification of Germany, have changed the distribution of power among states. As much of the literature on bipolarity would lead us to expect, this change in the distribution of power was accompanied by the end of the cold war. However, there has been a debate about how to describe the new distribution of power and what effect it will have ‘onthe likelihood of future international conflict. Is the international order now multipolar, for example, or is it, as some have suggested, “unipolar” or, T would ike co thank Joseph Greco snd Jobn Oéell or helpful suggestions af ways ta inprove Ine presentation ofthe veasn this rte, [would also like to acknowledge the helpful eamments ‘of Rayrnond Duvall and otter members ofthe audience at the Graduate Institut of International ‘Studies atthe University of Geneva, and participants ie panel sesion atthe anaual meeting of the International Stucies Associaton ip Vancouver, Whet= eatier versions of the ideas in this arlile were presected, 1 Iebas even been employed as a base concept by some historians. See, for example, Paul Kennedy, The Rhe and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1687), ard John Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stabiliy (a the Postwar International stem ia S.C Lyra-Sones, ed, The Cold War ana! Afer- ropes er Peace (Cambridge, Mass MIT Pees, 199)) Iusrstional Organization 47,1, Winter 1983 161998 by che World Pesce Fauncation and the Masrachvsets Insitute of Technalony78 International Organization perhaps, something else? Moreover, while bipolarity has disappeared, nuclear weapons have not. Thus, if we now live in a multipolar world, will we soon be “back in the 19307s, with the addition of a new dimension of strength which would increase the pressures upon status quo powers to make piecemeal concessions,” as Kenneth Waltz once characterized a multipolar system with ‘nuclear weapons?” Or, should we be more hopeful about the future, and if so, why? ‘Answering these questions is harder than it ought be, because no one has ever stated clearly the difference between a bipolar system and others or the relationship berween the bipolarity of the postwar system and the distribution of nuclear weapons technology. Many people will greet this statement with skepticism, since the word “bipotarity” is nat only widely used but is also at the center of so-called structural thearies af international polities. One purpose of this article is to show that, in spite ofits widespread use, the ¢erm “‘bipolarity” hhas no clear meaning, and therefore the distinction between bipolar and ‘multipolar systems is not well defined. Twill argue that one reason the meaning, of bipolarity seems unjustfiably clear is that the same word has been used ta ‘mean different things in different contexts, IE bipolarity were merely a way of describing the behavior of states, its precise definition would not matter and it would be silly 0 quibble over its use. If bipolarity is supposed to explain the behavior of states, however, then we ‘must be able 0 deduce the behavior to be explained from propositions containing the word “bipolarity,” and this is impossible without a precise definition. Moreover, if the definition of bipolarity that is used to derive behavioral predictions is different from the definition that describes the international system, then any predictions derived from the condition of bipolarity will be true only by accident. Twill argue that much that has been ‘written about the distinction between bipolar and multipolar systems sulfers from precisely this problem. Twill also argue, however, that a second reason the meaning of bipolatity seems so clear is that it reflects widely shared intuition that there was something distinctive about the distribution of power among states during the ‘cold war that helps explain their behavior during that period, and that this 2. Kengeth Wall, ‘The Stailtyof a Bipolar World," Beads 98 (Sumer 1968) pp, 881-503. "The quotation is deawn from p 886. Walt seems 1 have chnged hs views on this question over the years fs his original antile con bipolarty, he suggested thal a suliplar orld of clear powers would bea dangecous an Uineable place. More recently, however, he has argued thatthe spread af nuclear weapors likely Wwouls ave # subilzing influence on international poles; see Kenneth Walt, Tae Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Mare May be Bator, Adelphi Papers No, 171 (London Inreqitsonal Institute of Strategie Stadies, 1981). Fora representative collection of alictes that discs the effec of the 0d of bipalarityan the likelihood of war, see Sean M. Lyrn-lones, The Cald Yar and Afr Waltz has been especially instent on (I) the importance of distinguishing between dletening the behavior of states and explaining and (2) the signcarce of bipolay In teapitining some of the most important feature of sate Pehavior since World War I. See Keanech ‘Wats, Theory of Inerarianal Poles (Reading, Mass Addison-Wesley, 1979.Bipolarity 79 intuition is correct. However, none of the various ways of distinguishing between bipolar and multipolar systems adequately captures what was truly distinctive about the distribution of power during that period. ‘The distinctive feature of the postwar distribution of power, Twill argue, was not that two states were more powerful than the others (as the literature on bipalarity would suggest), but that one state, the Soviet Union, occupied in peacetime a pasition of neat-dominance on the Purasian continent, « position that states in the past had been able to achieve only after a series of military victories, This fact, I will argue, explains the behavior that others have sought to explain by bipolarity, as well as behavior that is inconsistent with what common definitions of bipolarity would lead one ta expect. This analysis is based on balance-of-power theory and is supported by a simple model of a multiactor international system. No model, however, supports the idea that there is something special about an international system in which two actors simply are ‘more powerful than the others. Bipolarity was one of three related and unexpected features of international polities after World War IT that people struggled to understand. The other two Were the cold war and the emergence of nuclear weapons technology. In the next section of this article, I will discuss che development of the concept of bipolarity in the context of these other features af the postwar system, identify its various meanings, and criticize its use as an explanatory concept. I will then discuss a different way of characterizing the post-World Wat II distribution. of power based on traditional thinking about the balance of power. I will argue that this alternative characterization explains the unesnected features of the behavior of states after World War II that others have tried to explain by bipolarity in its various guises. Next I will discuss yet another way of capturing ‘what was distinctive about the postwar international system based not on the distribution af conventional military power but on nuclear weapons technology, which Iwill argue is unsatisfactory as an explanation of the behavior of states during the cold war. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications ‘of the argument both for structural theories of international politics and for controversies about what lies aktead. Understanding the post-World War II international system Since the term “bipolarty” was from the beginning associated with efforts to understand another surprising feature of postwar international polities, the cold war, let us begin by reminding ourselves what that conflict was all about, and how it was thought (0 be related to bipalarity. At the end of World War Il, ‘everyone's expectations of postwar international politics were influenced by the experience of World War [. Most people assumed that, as before, the war would be followed by complex negotiations that would lead to a peace treaty with the defeated countries and a reconstruction of the international system,80 Intetnational Organization Nearly a decade passed before it became clear that such a settlement would nat take place, but soon after the end of the war it was apparent chat disagreements between the U.S. and the Soviet governments shout its provisions were much greater than had been anticipated. The term “‘cald was” was coined by Walter Lippmann to describe that initial confusing period of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the shape of the postwar warld.5 This was a time of considerable debate in the United States over who was responsible for those disagreements and how setious they were, a debate that was cnded by the Korcan War and reopened by the wat in Vietnam, ‘The phrase “the cold war” eventually came to stand for a vague, undifferen- tiated relationship of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, However, the main points of dispute between the two nations continued to be ‘centered’ around issues about ending the second world war The most important of these issues concerned the future of Germany and Japan. The ‘German question proved the more intractable of the two, because Soviet troops ‘controlled part of Germany at the end of the war, whereas there were no Soviet ‘troops in Japan.* Thus, as Lippmann argued in his articles om the cofd war, the future of Geemany became the main issue between the United States and the Soviet Union: Until a settlement which results in [Russian] withdrawal is reached, the Red Army at the center of Purope will cantral eastern Europe and will threaten western Europe. In these circumstances American power must be available... to hold the whole Russian military machine in check, and to exect mounting presstie in support of a diplomatic policy which has as its concrete objective a settlement that means withdrawal.” Teook longer to achieve that objective than most people anticipated at tte time Lippmana wrate those words; indeed, by the time it was achieved most peaple in the West had come to assume that it would never happen. The cold war nonetheless can best be understood as a prolonged substitute for the post World War II peace conference that never took place. The partial Furopean settlement that led to the Helsinki accords did not end the eold war (contrary ta the expectations of many) because it did not alter the situation Lippmann described; therefore it was possible (a believe that that settlement. might not be permanent. The cold war did end, however, when Soviet control aver Easterit Europe collapsed and the Soviet military threat fo Western Europe ceased to be such a pressing concern, 5 Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in US. Rereign Policy (New York: Harper ‘Torchbooks, 1972), Lippmatn’s book fest appeared as series of newspaper artiles ering George Kena’s tamousatiele (whieh was writen under the pscudenym “%") called "The Soucees of Saviet Conduct." Kennan’s article was, of course, where the es of contanent 25 ‘ist sketched out forthe general pub'ic ‘6, Fors ditevtion of the relation between the file to agrec onthe fatue of Germany and the initiation of the cold war, see R. Haron Wagner, "The Desiion to Davide Germany and the ‘Origins ofthe Cald War," nematonalSees utr 4 (Ime 1980), pp. 158-198. 7 Lippman, Tie Caid War 9p. 1-52Bipolarity 81 Bipotariey ‘Accompanying the appearance of the cold war was the division of the world into two hostile camps separated by an ideological divide. To many people this ‘was an ominous development, since it implied not only that the interests of these twa blocs were in conflict but also that that conflict was not mitigated by any other cleavages cutting across the line dividing the two blocs. Thus the conflict was severe, and the use of shifting alliances to redress imbalances of power between coalitions was no longer possible. Somme people used the fet) “hipolacity” to characterize the situation. Kenneth Waltz, in a famous article, argued that that analysis failed to distinguish between (1) the polarization of the world into two campeting blocs and (2) a distribution of power among individual states such that wo Were much more powerful than the others. Waltz claimed that it was in the latter sense that the world after World War II was bipolar, not the former, and that this was good, not bad * Because the United States and the Soviet Union were so much more powerful than other states, allies wete of little importance to them. The two could therefore avoid the dangers associated with a confronta- ‘ion between blocs (the policies of whict tended to be daminated by their most vulnerable members) and instead deal freely and divectly with one another. At the same time, their relations were not characterized by the uncertainty that was associated with a system of cttanging alliances, ic., one in which it was never entirely clear who was opposed to wham. Wale used World Wars [and If to illustrate the two cangers of a multipolar ‘world. Before World War I, he suggested, the major powers were polarized into ‘vo opposing blocs, and therefore conflict was hard (0 avoid because 1 state was willing (0 abandon jts allies. Before World War Il, on the other hand, conflict was hard to avoid because it was not clear in advance which states would join tagether to oppase the growing power of Germany. Peace, Waltz claimed, requires both clarity about who the participants in a conflict will be ‘and the willingness of thase states to compromise. Only it bipolar systems, he argued, are both properties likely to be found together. Te was because the United States and the Soviet Union could not rely on other states to defend their interests after World War IT that neither could have any doubt about who its opponent would be, Thus, international politics after World War IT were characterized by what Waltz called an absence of peripheries, wide-ranging competition, and recurrent crises. But, because of the great power of the two countries, no individual crisis could have a decisive impact on the competition between them, Thus, Waltz argued, constant tension led to a clarification of the limits of each country’s tolerance rather than towar. From the very beginning, then, the word “bipolarity” has been used in ¢wo very different ways: (1) as a shortband for the “polarization” of the world inta 5, See Walt, “The Staily of 2 Bipolar World.82. International Organization (so hastile camps as a result of the cold war and (2) as a description of the distribution of power among individual states. Some scholars (notably Waltz) have been careful to distinguish between those two meanings, but many others have not. Although we will see that this is not the only ambiguity that characterizes the use of the word, it remains an important one. It can easily Jead ta confusion between two different theses about the relation between bipolarity and the old war. According to the fist meaning, bipolarity was the result of the cold war, in that the extension of Soviet influence led (0 che ‘organization of an opposing bloc; it is nat surprising, then, that bipolarity should end when the cold war did. According to the second meaning, the cold ‘war was the result of bipolarity, since the positions of the United States and the. Soviet Union in the international system meant that each saw the other as its principal adversary. ‘Thus it would not be surprising if the end of bipolarity ‘should lead to the end of the cold war. Nuclear weapons ‘The other major unexpected event affecting international politics after World War Il was the development of nuclear weapons, Nuclear weapons represented the convergence of two trends in military technology: the continu- ing development of new means of bomibarding the enemy from the ait, and the development of weapons with greater and greater explosive power. What was revolutionary about nuclear Weapons, however, was not the technology ot which they were based but the fact that they had two properties that distinguished them from previous weapons: they made it possible ta destroy the ‘enemy completely without first destroying the enemy's military foreess and, in the case of a secure second-strike capability, there was no defense against ‘hem, Military strategy in the West tad previously focused on how to use one’s rilitary forces to destroy the military forces of the enemy. The new weapons required a new kind of military stcategy. Some argued that nuclear weapons must also [cad to a transformation of international polities. Arthur Lee Burns, for example, claimed that the hydrogen bomb fad changed the international system from one that operated according ta the principles of balance-of-power theary to @ qualitatively different type of system, in which alliances in the traditional sense could 110 longer operate.” This was because traditional alliances were forged for the purpose of combining states’ military forces to do battle against the military forces of other states. With nuclear weapons, however, each state with the requisite economic and technological base was able unilaterally to guarantec its ‘own security; states without suck a base, on the other hand, were unable to use alliances to eampensate. for that weakness, as states htad dane in the past 9. Arthur Lee Burns, "Frori Balance to Decercence: A Thearetical Analyse” Ward Poti 9 uly 1966), pp. 44928,Bipolacity 83 Moreover, the mere acquisition of nuclear technology was not enough to transforma state into what Bums called a “global-deterrent Power.” What was required, rather, was an economic and technological capacity great enough to ‘counter other states’ continuing attempts to achieve a tecknological break- through that would make their opponents’ forces vulnerable to attack, Bipolarity versus nuclear weapons Since only the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to have the means cf attaining the status of a global-deterrent power, itis natural to wonder ‘whether the postwar international system could best be explained by nuclear ‘weapons technology rather than by bipolarity. Walz considered that possibility ‘but rejected it, claiming that bipolarity and all its effects would exist even ‘without nuclear weapons. Jn trying to refute the claim that nuclear technology was the fundamental cause of thte change in the role of alliances in the period after World War TI, however, Waltz tended to confuse it with anather claim, namely, that nuclear technology could function as an equalizer of states and thus could be used to ‘overcome the bipolar distribution of power. The following passage illustrates ‘the confusion: Nuclear weapons did not cause the condition of bipolacity; other states by acquiring them cannot change the condition. Nuclear weapons de not equalize the power of nations because they do not change the economic bases of a nation’s power. .. . Even without nuclear technology the United States and the Soviet Union would have developed weapons of immense destructive power. They are set apart from the others not by particular ‘weapons systems but by their ability to exploit military technology on a large. scale and at the scientific frontiers.!® Burns, however, would agree that other states would find it difficult to match the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even so, he claimed that what was special about their role in international polities was not simply the fact that they were more powerful than ather states but that they alone had the economic base to follow a strategy of global deterrence, Moreever, the fact that exactly two states had the economic means £0 support such a strategy was, to Burns, unimportant, since the nature of international politics would not necessarily be much altered if other states could do so as well. Forsuppose a third statc had capabilities comparable to the USS. and Soviet capabilities. Even so, it still would be possible for cach of the three nuclear states to possess a secure sccond-strike capability against the combined nuclear forces of the other two. Thus, alliances among them could not have. the significance they would have had in a world of conventional ‘weapons. 0, Wale, Theory of Intemational Pale, op. 180-8184 International Organization In trying to support his contention that the United States and the Soviet Union were destined to remain alone at the top, Waltz seemed implicitly to, concede that it was nuclear technology and not the distribution of power that was fundamental: In the old days weaker powers could improve theic positions through alli- ance, by adding the strength of foreign armies (o their own. Cannot some of the middle states do together what they are unable to da alone? For «wo decisive reasons, the answer is no. Nuclear forces do not add up. The tech- nology of warheads, of delivery vehicles, of detection and surveillance de- vices, of command and control systems, count more than the size of forces. Combining separate national forces is not much help. To reach top techno- logical levels would require complete collaboration by, say, several Buro- pean states. To achieve this has proved completely impossible. Yet, this is precisely why Burns argued that nuclear weapons abolished the balance of power. But this reasoning implies that there is nothing special about the fact that anly two states tad capabilities on the scale of those of the United States and the Soviet Union, since even if there were more than two, theit nuclear forces might not “add up”; and therefore alliances would play no role in the relations among then, In spite of the reasoning in the passage just quoted, Waltz maintained that bipolarity and nuclear technology were independent factors influencing post- ‘war international politics. Of the two, he believed that bipolarity was the more fundamental in that it would exist even without nuclear technology, and it alone had the effects summarized above, This was also the view of John Herz, Who discussed bath these factors in a book published in 1959. Herz and Waltz agreed hat, as a result of bipolarity, alliances in the postwar period were not like earlier alliances. Instead, they were arrangements facilitating the extension of security guarantees by the superpowers to the states they had chosen to defend. Herz, however, did not share Waltz’s optimism about the effects of combining bipolarity with nuclear technology. What was bipolarity? We have now encountered three meanings of the word “bipolarity”: a condition in which most states are organized into two hostile coalitions, with 10 ‘cross-cutting cleavages; a condition in which there are only two states capable 11, Welt, Theory of Puernattonal Poles pp. 181-82. 12, See Joh Herz, buemational Plier the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Herz claimed that bipolarty, in addition 10 aholsing the tradicional halance of power mechnsnofshifiag alfances, nad led 10.2 dinutian nthe sovereign of stats that were sociated withthe twa supergveers. Ts was true not only for satellites ofthe Sowet Union bot also for alles of the United States, as evidenced by ceraln provisions of the agreements that {governed stationing US. «roope abroad. Here claimed that those provisions compromised the {erritarial segs ofthe aes (pp. {11-43},Bipolarity 5 of pursuing what Burns called a “strategy of global deterrence” (or, using terminology that became more common, there are only «wo nuclear superpaw- ers); and a condition in which military capability, whether conventianal at nuclear, is distributed in such a way that two states are much more powerful than all the others. In ordinary usage, these meanings aré often not cleatiy distinguished. In the theoretical literature, however, the last uteaning, which derives from the work of Herz and Waltz, has become the dominant one. This is also clearly the meaning of bipolarity that is assumed in discussions of the significance of the end of bipolarity, since (1) the polarization of the world into two hostile camps commonly is assumed to have ended long before bipolaity did; (2) bipolarity commonly is assumed to be a goad, not a bad, thing: and (3) no one would claim that there will soon be more than ¢wo nuclear superpow- e1s.!? Unfortunately, it is precisely this meaning of bipolarity that has never been cleatly specified. This is true even of the works of Waltz just mentioned, which provide the most extensive justification of the idea that the distribution of power afier ‘World War II was bipolar and that this bipolar power distribution explains much of the behavior of states during the cold war. While Waltz writes at length about what is wrong with other people’s definitions of bipotarity, victualy all he has 10 offer by way of explanation of his own is the statement that “counting sgrcat powers of an craiis about as difficult, or as easy, as saving how many majot firms populate an oligopolistic sector of an ecomomy. The question is an empirical one, and common sense can answer it." However, te question of hhow to reengnize a bipolar system is different from the question of how to define one, and common sense is no substitute for a definition. In the passage from which the preceding quotation was taken, Waltz seems fo equate ranking the states in a system according to their power with determining whether a system is bipolar; and it is clear, of course, that in a bipolar system two states must be more powerful than the others. What is aot clear, htowever, is how muck mare powerful they have (0 be, since in every system in which the three most powerful states are not exactly equal and there are no ties for second place, there must be two states that are more powerful than all the athers, This problem frequently is obscured by the fact that many of the features of international politics attributed by Waltz and others to Dipolarity seem not to be derived from a particular distribution of power among, many states. Instead the underlying assumption seems to be a system 15. However, cscusions about the signieance of the end of bipaarty often associat the [North Atlantic Teesty Onpasization (NATO) with te bipalaiy of tbe posawer sytem see, for example, Gaddls “The Long Peace," p. Il; and John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Futue: Testteliy 9 Europe Alter the Cod Wan” in Lyon-Tones, The Cald War and Af, pp 141-8, ‘Ths, some writers aparently beieve there ea Feation between polarizatian 2nd a bipolar power distribution AS we shall se, there 'S a good reason for this. Nonetheless, the reasons why polarration sppesrebenige eather hae dangerous seem toe those aniulaced by Walt, based on the coacentation of power in the Urated Ststes and te Save! Union 18. Wale, Pear of Ineraauonal Poles, pL86 International Organization comprising only two staces—an ambiguity that is often concealed by defining a bipolar system as a system with only ovo great powers, where “great power” is an undefined term, Indeed, this seems to be Walt’s own definition. This introduces a fourth possible definition of the distinction between bipolarity and multipotarity: a bipolar system is one containing only two states, and a multipolar systent is one containing mote than twa states. It is clear that there are major differences berween two-actor and multiactor systems, just as there are major differences between two-person and n-persan games. However, this is wat an adequate way of distinguishing between the international system before World War II and the international system after World War II, neither ‘of which was a system of only two states. Thuis if only two-member international systems have the properties commonly attributed to bipalarity, then the international system after World War IT could not have had those properties." Because everyone agrees that the distribution of power during the cold war ‘was bipolar, the fuzziness of the concept is exposed only when one asks witich other systems, if any, were bipolar, and how one would recognize when the contemporary system ceased to have that property. Jack Levy concluded that the international system was bipolar from 1495 to 1556,!” Ted Hopf recently has claimed that it was bipolar from 1521 to 1559. Both authors claim to be employing Waltz’s definition of the term but ignore Waltz’s unambiguous statement that “until 1945 the nation-state system was multipolar, and always with five or more pawers, In all of madern history the structure of international politics has changed but ance. We have only two systems to observe." It is not at all clear how one could tell who was right. Moreover, vatious writers proclaimed the end of bipolarity well before the end of the cold war, ata time when Waltz was claiming that bipolarity would outlast the twentiett century, 15, Walt, Thory of uemasional Plies, pp. 130-31. For another example, sez Glenn Snyder ard Paul Diesing, Confer mong Nomans: Bargavang, Decision Mading, and Stem Strnure ot TIntersaional Cree Princeton, SU: Prneoton University Pres, 1977), pp. 28-29. My dscussion is fevsed sa heavily on Walt writings because ta one has discussed the [sues wih wich Tan cancered more extensively than he. Furtber, noone [know af bas written anything an the subjest that is roc open ta the samo criticisms levied ogaine Wale. Taus, if Wall's discussin is not islet, te can bese thal no one elses either The skeptical reader can easly check his by first, ooking carefully at bow the distinction Between bipolarty anc mulkiplarity ha been defined by other writers: second, checking 2 See what properties these wns have atlebuted co bipolar stems; and third, exacining How those properties have been derived from the definiion. ‘Attention to tha [ast question wil tvea! that Waltz was eovrect in claunng that many discussions ‘ths subject merely deserve state behavior wthoct attempting fo explain’ t. Examples of wetinns ‘ot thes sar include Morton Kaplan, Sicm and Precast In Tuersonat Poles (New Yank: TORR Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 36-45; 2nd Raymond Aon, Peace and War: Theory of Intemational Retaions (Neve York Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 136-49. 16, This ean example of wing one definition ofa term to derive tome conclusions znd another definision zo derive others. 17, Tack Lev, “The Poiarty of the System ard Tcernational Stsbity: An Empvial Anas” in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed, Polarity and War" The Changing Siucure of Dutmationel Cafict (Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1985) 18, Ted Hop, "Polar, the Offease-Detense Balance, and W: Resiew $5 (Line 1991), pp. 475-94. 19, Waltz, Theory oF erationa! Paleo, 16) American Poiticat SconceBipolarity 87 Waltz claimed that “wars that eliminate enough rival great powers ate systemctransforming wars, In modem history anly World War Il has done this.” But, what great powers were eliminated by World War II? The only possible candidate is Germany, which would imply that the reunification of Germany would lead to the end of bipolarity. Yet, in discussing, how the international system might be transformed into a multipolar one again, Waltz claimed that the most likely possibility was the political unification of all of Europe, since only a polity of that size would have the economic and {echnotogical base (o compete on equal terms with the United States and the Soviet Union. If Burns was right, and nuclear technology was the cause of the post-World War II revolution in international politics, chen itis clear what the {ustificacion for this claim would be; bus Walz contended chat the system would have been bipolar even without nuclear technology, in which case it isnot clear why Germany could have been a great power before World War IT but not after* Moreover, if what is important is the size of a country’s econorny (28 Waltz contends at many points), then itis not clear how World War IT could have precipitated bipolarity, since it caused na more than a temporary interruption in the long-term growth rates of the great powers.” In the course of discussing the stability of bipolarity, Waltz pointed out that with half of the US. grass national product “fthe Saviet Union] ... has to run hhard to stay in the race. One may think that the question to ask is nat whether a third or fourth country will enter the cirele of great pawers in the foreseeable future but rather whether the Soviet Union can keep up.”?* This was a question that Waltz did not pursue, however. He cannot be criticized for not foresecing the economic collapse of the Seviet Union, since few people were more prescient. But perhaps because hte, like everyone else, did not consider that Collapse to be very likely, he failed ro discuss what consequences it would have for the structure of the international system. There are two questions to which 20. Wale, Theoy of Iuemational Polis . 198 D1: The earliest se af the tem "bipolan' hat Uhave fou ijn Wiliam. R. Fors book, The Superspowert Te United Steen, Brin, andthe Soviet Union Paes Responubiy fr Peace (New ‘York area, rece, and Company, 19), pp. 97-98. (Note thal sceatding vo Fox, tere would bee superpowers afer the var: the United Staves, the Soviet Union, and Britain; be called ‘hem "super-powets" because of their influence if mate than egien) By “bipolar, Fox meant the dawinance at ternational polities by the Anglo-American allanee onthe ane hare and the Soviet Union te other, and he belleved that “a tipolr'systern” was “uot . beyond he teal. fof possbinty.” Ir iteveloped, 1 wauld be because the three sopexpowers could not agree 00 ontrollag Germany, which would lead tots erecegence a third "pate" Thus, Pox sa ony Wo Possiilfes: superpower agreement and the postwar control of Germany, or superpower {Usageeement and the re-emergence of Germary as a major power. He overlooked the posi tat Geemaay would be divided 2s 4 resul a the ably ofthe perpemers ta agree how i should be controlled. ae grateful o Robert Priedneim for reminding me of Ue relevance of Fox's ‘rook 22. In discussions ofthis question, there is a tendency o confuse the state ofthe world in 1985, wen many counts lay prastrate fam the efects of Wold Wat TI, with eandiions in 2, 1970, by whch line the counties that had paztipated in World War I had tecovered, enough the world was stil cnsidered ta be bipolar 24. Welle, Thany af ematinal Poltis, pp. 179-80,88 International Organization Waltz’s discussion of bipalacity therefore provides no answers: (1) How small did the Soviet economy have to become before the structure of the interna- tional system could be said to have changed? and (2) If structural change is the result of the collapse of one of the two great powers rather than the rise of & third, how are we to characterize the resulting stcucture? Waltz recognized only two types of system: bipolar and multipolar. Could there be a unipolar system, as some peaple have recently suggested? And if so, what would its properties be? One possible interpretation of what Waltz and others meant by a bipolar power distribution is a distribution such that each of the two most powerful states can defend itself against any combination of other states, and therefore neither has any need for allies.®* Perhaps one could argue (thougin no one has done this) that a system with such a property is equivalent to a system with anly two states. Waltz, for example, offered the examples of China and France to support the claim that “in a bipolar world, .. . third parties are not able to tlt the balance of power by withdrawing from one alliance ot by joining the other."® What was true for China and France, however, may not have been true for other states—notably Germany.* If it tad been generally accepted that a shift of West Germany from the side of the United States to the side of the Soviet Union would not “tilt the balance of power,” it seems unlikely that the cold war would have occurred. Int his original article on bipotarity, Waltz wrote that the acccetion of power the Soviet Union would enjoy by adding, say, West Germany's capabilities to her awn would be immensely important; and one such gain might easily cad to others. Most gains from outside, however, can add relatively little to the strength of the Soviet Union or the United States ‘There are, then, few single losses that would be crucial, which is astate- ‘mest that points to a tension within our argument. Bipolarity encourages cach giant to focus upon crises, while rendering most of them of relative inconsequence.” Most people would agree that other issues between the United States and the Soviet Union were less important than the future of Germany; but that does not tell us how important the future of Germany was. Walt2’s chesis implies that Soviet control over Europe after World War II would have concerned U.S. leaders less than German control over Burape prior to the war, and that shis would have heen true even had nuclear weapans not existed. Yet, nowhere does he 24, Hopf, relying on a remark by Waltz, defines a bipolar system as one in which “na third power" is "able to challenge the top 0 sue Hopt, "Polarity, the Oflense-Defense Balance, 203 ‘Wan 478, Nevertheless, this leaves unclear what sor of challenge might be raade by alizrees ot lesser states Tris ako nat clear what "being soe 0 challenge” meats, 2S. Wale, They of PucrarionalPoits p. 183 25, Moreoier, France dd not withdraw from the North Asiatic alliance; i merely withdtew its forces from the NATO integeatedsamrans. ‘25 Wales, “The Stabliigof 2 Bipolar World" p. 903.