1 G.R. No.

138737 July 12, 2001

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION ​ vs. ​COURT OF APPEALS and USIPHIL
INCORPORATED

Private respondent obtained a fire insurance policy from petitioner covering certain properties, e.g.,
office, furniture, fixtures, shop machinery and other trade equipment. Under the policy issued to
private respondent, petitioner undertook to indemnify private respondent for any damage to or loss
of said properties arising from fire.

Sometime in 1982, private respondent filed with petitioner an insurance claim for the loss of the
insured properties due to fire. Acting thereon, petitioner appointed an adjuster to undertake the
valuation and adjustment of the loss. The adjuster then required private respondent to file a formal
claim and submit proof of loss. In compliance therewith, private respondent submitted its Sworn
Statement of Loss and Formal Claim signed by private respondent’s Manager. Respondent likewise
submitted Proof of Loss signed by its Accounting Manager and countersigned by the adjuster.

Despite repeated demands by private respondent, petitioner refused to pay the insurance claim.
Thus, private respondent was constrained to file a complaint against petitioner for the unpaid
insurance claim. In its Answer, petitioner maintained that the claim of private respondent could not
be allowed because it failed to comply with Policy Condition No. 13 regarding the submission of
certain documents to prove the loss.

Both the trial court and the CA concur in holding that private respondent had substantially complied
with Policy Condition No. 13 which states that the insured ​shall give immediate written notice to the
insurer of any loss within sixty days from the occurrence of the loss.

ISSUE:​ Whether Policy Condition No. 13 is sufficiently complied with by private respondent.

RULING: YES. A perusal of the records shows that private respondent, after the occurrence of the
fire, immediately notified petitioner thereof. Thereafter, private respondent submitted the following
documents: (1) Sworn Statement of Loss and Formal Claim and; (2) Proof of Loss. ​The submission
of these documents, to the Court’s mind, constitutes substantial compliance with the above
provision. Indeed, as regards the submission of documents to prove loss, substantial, not
strict as urged by petitioner, compliance with the requirements will always be deemed
sufficient.

2 G.R. No. 184300 July 11, 2012

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. ​vs. ​PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and
REPUTABLE FORWARDER SERVICES, INC.

Wyeth Philippines, Inc. (Wyeth) and respondent Reputable Forwarder Services, Inc. (Reputable) had
been annually executing a contract of carriage, whereby the latter undertook to transport and deliver
the former’s products to its customers, dealers or salesmen. Under the contract, Reputable
undertook to answer for "all risks with respect to the goods and shall be liable to the COMPANY
(Wyeth), for the loss, destruction, or damage of the goods/products due to any and all causes
whatsoever, including theft, robbery, flood, storm, earthquakes, lightning, and other force majeure
while the goods/products are in transit and until actual delivery to the customers, salesmen, and
dealers of the COMPANY".

Wyeth procured a Marine Policy from respondent Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. (Philippines
First) to secure its interest over its own products. Philippines First thereby insured Wyeth’s products
while the same were being transported or shipped in the Philippines.

The contract also required Reputable to secure an insurance policy on Wyeth’s goods. Thus, on
February 11, 1994, Reputable signed a Special Risk Insurance Policy (SR Policy) with petitioner
Malayan for the amount of P1,000,000.00.

On October 6, 1994, during the effectivity of the Marine Policy and SR Policy, Reputable received
from Wyeth 1,000 boxes of infant formula to be delivered by Reputable to Mercury Drug Corporation
in Quezon City. Unfortunately, on the same date, the truck carrying Wyeth’s products was hijacked
by about 10 armed men.

Philippines First, after due investigation and adjustment, and pursuant to the Marine Policy, paid
Wyeth P2,133,257.00 as indemnity. Philippines First then demanded reimbursement from
Reputable, having been subrogated to the rights of Wyeth by virtue of the payment. The latter,
however, ignored the demand.

Consequently, Philippines First instituted an action for sum of money against Reputable. Reputable
impleaded Malayan as third-party defendant in an effort to collect the amount covered in the SR
Policy. Disclaiming any liability, Malayan argued, among others, that under Section 5 of the SR
Policy, the insurance does not cover any loss or damage to property which at the time of the
happening of such loss or damage is insured by any marine policy and that the SR Policy expressly
excluded third-party liability.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Reputable liable to Philippines First for the amount
of indemnity it paid to Wyeth, among others. In turn, Malayan was found by the RTC to be liable to
Reputable to the extent of the policy coverage.

Dissatisfied, both Reputable and Malayan filed their respective appeals from the RTC decision. The
CA ruled, among others, that: ​the ratable proportion provision of Section 12 applies only in
case of double insurance, which is not present, then it should not be applied and Malayan
should be held liable for the full amount of the policy coverage.

ISSUE: ​Whether there is double insurance in this case such that either Section 5 or Section 12 of
the SR Policy may be applied.

NO. By the express provision of Section 93 of the Insurance Code, double insurance exists where
the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect to the same subject and
interest. The requisites in order for double insurance to arise are as follows:
 1. The person insured is the same;
2. Two or more insurers insuring separately;
3. There is identity of subject matter;
4. There is identity of interest insured; and
5. There is identity of the risk or peril insured against.

In the present case, ​while it is true that the Marine Policy and the SR Policy were both issued
over the same subject matter, i.e. goods belonging to Wyeth, and both covered the same peril
insured against, it is, however, beyond cavil that the said policies were issued to two different
persons or entities. It is undisputed that Wyeth is the recognized insured of Philippines First
under its Marine Policy, while Reputable is the recognized insured of Malayan under the SR
Policy.

Therefore, even though the two concerned insurance policies were issued over the same
goods and cover the same risk, there arises no double insurance since they were issued to
two different persons/entities having distinct insurable interests. Necessarily, over insurance
by double insurance cannot likewise exist. Hence, as correctly ruled by the RTC and CA,
neither Section 5 nor Section 12 of the SR Policy can be applied.

3 G.R. No. 152158 February 7, 2003

WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING INC. and SEACOAST MARITIME CORPORATION vs.
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE INC. and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Private respondent Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc. (Prudential) brought an action
for damages and attorney’s fees against Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (Wallem) and Seacoast
Maritime Corporation (Seacoast). Private respondent Prudential sought the recovery of the sum of
₱995,677.00, representing the amount it had paid to its insured, General Milling Corporation (GMC),
for alleged shortage incurred in the shipment of "Indian Toasted Soyabean Extraction Meal, Yellow,"
with legal interest thereon from the date of filing of the complaint up to and until the same is fully paid
and attorney’s fees.

In its answer, Wallem denied liability for damage or loss to the shipment. It was alleged that the
complaint did not state a cause of action against it; that the damage or loss to the shipment was due
to an act or omission of Prudential or the owner of the goods or their representative, or to
pre-shipment damage, for which Wallem was not liable; that based on the provisions of the bill of
lading, Prudential had the burden of proving the actual quantity of cargo loaded at the loading port;
that the shipment was discharged in the same quantity as when it was loaded at the port of loading;
that any loss incurred during and after discharge from the vessel was no longer the responsibility of
the carrier; and that Wallem could not be made liable for the loss or damage, if any, of the goods
which happened whilst the same were not in its possession and control.
Wallem filed a compulsory counterclaim against Prudential as the complaint was allegedly a clearly
unfounded civil action.

The trial court ruled that private respondent Prudential failed to prove by clear, convincing, and
competent evidence that there was a shortage in the shipment. The trial court said that private
respondent Prudential failed to establish by competent evidence the genuineness and due execution
of the bill of lading and, therefore, the true and exact weight of the shipment when it was loaded unto
the vessel.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the bill of lading was prima facie evidence of
the goods therein described, both notations "said to contain" and "weight unknown" on the bill of
lading being inapplicable to shipments in bulk. Contrary to the opinion of the trial court, it was ruled
by the appeals court that losses were incurred during the loading operations, and that these losses
were the liability of the carrier.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in granting relief to Prudential when the latter
failed to establish his right of action against Wallem though convincing and competent evidence as
the original of the insurance policy was never presented in court.

ISSUE: ​Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s
cause of action, if any, against Wallem.

RULING: ​YES. Wallem cannot be held liable because of the failure of Prudential to present the
contract of insurance or a copy thereof. Prudential claims that it is subrogated to the rights of GMC
pursuant to their insurance contract. For this purpose, it submitted a subrogation receipt and a
marine cargo risk note. However, as the trial court pointed out, this is not sufficient. As GMC’s
subrogee, Prudential can exercise only those rights granted to GMC under the insurance contract.
The contract of insurance must be presented in evidence to indicate the extent of its
coverage. As there was no determination of rights under the insurance contract, this Court’s ruling
in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals is applicable:

The insurance contract has not been presented. It may be assumed for the sake of argument that
the subrogation receipt may nevertheless be used to establish the relationship between the
petitioner [Home Insurance Corporation] and the consignee [Nestlé Phil.] and the amount paid to
settle the claim. But that is all the document can do. By itself alone, the subrogation receipt is not
sufficient to prove the petitioner’s claim holding the respondent [Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc.] liable
for the damage to the engine.​1a\^/phi1.net

....
It is curious that the petitioner disregarded this rule, knowing that the best evidence of the insurance
contract was its original copy, which was presumably in the possession of Home itself. Failure to
present this original (or even a copy of it), for reasons the Court cannot comprehend, must prove
fatal to this petition.
4 G.R. No. 171406 April 4, 2011
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.​ vs. ​MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.

Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags
of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an
invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin
Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright
and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian
Terminals unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the
open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the
Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the bags was completed
on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.

On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC
Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995, after all the
bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order
condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.

On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the
consignee in the amount of ₱643,600.25.

Respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for
damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC
Customs Brokerage. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss
sustained by the shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate
cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores who handled the unloading
of the cargoes from the vessel.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied. In its Decision, the CA agreed
with the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores in
handling and storing the subject shipment.

Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the
insurance contract or policy covering the subject shipment. Petitioner argues that the Subrogation
Receipt presented by respondent is not sufficient to prove that the subject shipment was insured and
that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee. Thus, petitioner submits that
without proof of a valid subrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.

ISSUE: Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s
cause of action.
RULING: NO. ​Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case.
Jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the
trial court or even belatedly before the appellate court.

However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal
because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board the petitioner’s vessel, unlike in
Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages with different parties and it could
not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for
it.

As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in
petitioner’s custody. Moreover, there is no issue as regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy,
such that the presentation of the contract itself is necessary for perusal, not to mention that its
existence was already admitted by petitioner in open court. And even though it was not offered in
evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.

5 G.R. No. 171468 August 24, 2011

NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (PHILS.), INC. vs. ​NYK-FILJAPAN SHIPPING
CORP.

Petitioner New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. (New World) bought three emergency
generator sets which was loaded on a ship owned and operated by NYK Fil-Japan Shipping
Corporation (NYK) for delivery to petitioner New World in Manila.

NYK unloaded the shipment in Hong Kong and transshipped it to another of its ships. On its journey
to Manila, however, ACX Ruby encountered typhoon Kadiang whose captain filed a sea protest on
arrival at the Manila South Harbor respecting the loss and damage that the goods on board his
vessel suffered.

Eventually, on October 20, 1993 customs authorities allowed petitioner’s customs broker to withdraw
the shipment and deliver the same to petitioner New World’s job site in Makati City. An examination
of the three generator sets in the presence of petitioner New World’s representatives revealed that
all three sets suffered extensive damage and could no longer be repaired.

For these reasons, New World demanded recompense for its loss from respondent NYK. While NYK
acknowledged receipt of the demand, both denied liability for the loss.

Since Seaboard covered the goods with a marine insurance policy, petitioner New World sent it a
formal claim. In its reply, Seaboard required petitioner New World to submit to it an itemized list of
the damaged units, parts, and accessories, with corresponding values, for the processing of the
claim. But petitioner New World did not submit what was required of it, insisting that the insurance
policy did not include the submission of such a list in connection with an insurance claim. Reacting to
this, Seaboard refused to process the claim.

Petitioner New World filed an action for specific performance and damages against all the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether Seaboard’s request from petitioner New World for an itemized list is a reasonable
imposition and did not violate the insurance contract between them

RULING: ​The Court does not regard as substantial the question of reasonableness of
Seaboard’s additional requirement of an itemized listing of the damage that the generator
sets suffered. The record shows that petitioner New World complied with the documentary
requirements evidencing damage to its generator sets.

The marine open policy that Seaboard issued to New World was an all-risk policy. Such a policy
insured against all causes of conceivable loss or damage except when otherwise excluded or when
the loss or damage was due to fraud or intentional misconduct committed by the insured. The policy
covered all losses during the voyage whether or not arising from a marine peril.

Here, the policy enumerated certain exceptions like unsuitable packaging, inherent vice, delay in
voyage, or vessels unseaworthiness, among others. But Seaboard had been unable to show that
petitioner New World’s loss or damage fell within some or one of the enumerated exceptions.

6 G.R. No. 131166 September 30, 1999

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC.​ vs. ​SULPICIO LINES, INC.

On December 19, 1987, motor tanker MT Vector left Limay, Bataan, at about 8:00 p.m., enroute to
Masbate, loaded with 8,800 barrels of petroleum products shipped by petitioner Caltex. ​MT Vector is
a tramping motor tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping Corporation, engaged in the business of
transporting fuel products such as gasoline, kerosene, diesel and crude oil. During that particular voyage,
the MT Vector carried on board gasoline and other oil products owned by Caltex by virtue of a charter
contract between them.

On December 20, 1987, at about 6:30 a.m., the passenger ship MV Doña Paz left the port of Tacloban
headed for Manila with a complement of 59 crew members including the master and his officers, and
passengers totaling 1,493 as indicated in the Coast Guard Clearance. The MV Doña Paz is a passenger
and cargo vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. plying the route of Manila/ Tacloban/
Catbalogan/ Manila/ Catbalogan/ Tacloban/ Manila, making trips twice a week.

At about 10:30 p.m. of December 20, 1987, the two vessels collided in the open sea within the
vicinity of Dumali Point between Marinduque and Oriental Mindoro. All the crewmembers of MV
Doña Paz died, while the two survivors from MT Vector claimed that they were sleeping at the time
of the incident.
ISSUE: Is the charterer of a sea vessel liable for damages resulting from a collision between the
chartered vessel and a passenger ship?

RULING: NO. ​Petitioner and Vector entered into a contract of affreightment, also known as a
voyage charter. ​If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner in
possession of the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest
on the owner. The charterer is free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship.

MT Vector is a common carrier. Carriers are deemed to warrant impliedly the seaworthiness of the
ship. ​For a vessel to be seaworthy​, ​it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with
a sufficient number of competent officers and crew​. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition the vessel involved in its contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty
prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

The provisions owed their conception to the nature of the business of common carriers. This
business is impressed with a special public duty. The public must of necessity rely on the care
and skill of common carriers in the vigilance over the goods and safety of the passengers,
especially because with the modern development of science and invention, transportation has
become more rapid, more complicated and somehow more hazardous. For these reasons, a
passenger or a shipper of goods is under no obligation to conduct an inspection of the ship and
its crew, the carrier being obliged by law to impliedly warrant its seaworthiness.

7 G.R. No. L-51221 July 31, 1991

FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. ​HON. HAROLD M.
HERNANDO

Silverio Blanco was the owner of a passenger jeepney which he insured against liabilities for death
and injuries to third persons with petitioner First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc.
The said jeepney driven by Blanco himself bumped a five-year old child, Deogracias Advincula,
causing the latter's death.

A complaint for damages was brought by the child's parents, the Advincula spouses, against Silverio
Blanco. First Insurance was also impleaded in the complaint as the insurer. Petitioner was held in
default and the trial court held petitioner liable to the spouses Advincula and to Blanco.

Ppetitioner contended that the Advincula spouses have no cause of action against it. As parents of
the victim, they may proceed against the driver, Silverio Blanco on the basis of the provisions of the
New Civil Code. However, they have no cause of action against First Insurance, because they are
not parties to the insurance contract.

ISSUE:​ Whether the Advincula spouses have cause of action against petitioner.
RULING: It is settled that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to a
third party, such third party can directly sue the insurer. The liability of the insurer to such third
person is based on contract while the liability of the insured to the third party is based on tort.

The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer. The general
purpose of statutes enabling an injured person to proceed directly against the insurer is to protect
injured persons against the insolvency of the insured who causes such injury, and to give such
injured person a certain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be
liberally construed so that their intended purpose may be accomplished. ​It has even been held that
such a provision creates a contractual relation which inures to the benefit of any and every person
who may be negligently injured by the named insured as if such injured person were specifically
named in the policy​.

First Insurance cannot evade its liability as insurer by hiding under the cloak of the insured. Its
liability is primary and not dependent on the recovery of judgment from the insured.

Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance (third party liability, or TPL) is primarily intended to
provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or
passengers as a result of a negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The victims and/or their
dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of the
motor vehicle owners.

The insurer's liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the injury or event upon which the
liability depends, ​and does not depend on the recovery of judgment by the injured party against the
insured

8 G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ​vs. ​LUISITO D. BUSTINERA

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of
his father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate
number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m,
after which he would return it to ESC Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount
of ₱780.00 per day.

On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not
return it on the same day as he was supposed to. Appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC
Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.
Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.

ISSUE:

RULING: Appellant’s position does not persuade. The Court held in ​Villacorta v. Insurance
Commission that the theft clause of an insurance policy is applicable when one takes the motor
vehicle of another without the latter’s consent ​even if the motor vehicle is later returned​. There is
theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain.

Consequently, where the insured's car is wrongfully taken without the insured's consent, respondent
insurer is liable and must pay insured for the total loss of the insured vehicle under the theft clause
of the policy.

In People v. Bustinera, this Court had the occasion to interpret the "theft clause" of an insurance
policy. In this case, the Court explained that when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the
latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft – there being intent to gain
as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain.

9 G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY ​vs. ​HON. ARMANDO ANSALDO

Private respondent Ramon M. Paterno, Jr. sent a letter-complaint to respondent Commissioner,

alleging certain problems encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of
the Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) as a result of certain practices by said
company.

A hearing on the letter-complaint was held by respondent Commissioner on the validity of the
Contract of Agency complained of by private respondent. In said hearing, private respondent was
required by respondent Commissioner to specify the provisions of the agency contract which he
claimed to be illegal.

Private respondent submitted a letter of specification to respondent Commissioner reiterating his first
letter and praying that the provisions on charges and fees stated in the Contract of Agency executed
between Philamlife and its agents, as well as the implementing provisions as published in the
agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared as null and void.

Philamlife's Senior Assistant Vice-President and Executive Assistant to the President filed a Motion
to Quash Subpoena/Notice on the ground that The Insurance Commission has no jurisdiction over;
(1) the subject matter or nature of the action; and (2) over the parties involved.
Private respondent contends that the Insurance Commissioner has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the complaint in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency falls within the
jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.

RULING: NO. The contract of agency entered into between Philamlife and its agents is not included
within the meaning of an insurance business, Section 2 of the Insurance Code cannot be invoked to
give jurisdiction over the same to the Insurance Commissioner. ​Expressio unius est exclusio alterius​.
The quasi-judicial power of the Insurance Commissioner is limited by law "to claims and complaints
involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable under any kind of
policy or contract of insurance, . . ." Hence, this power does not cover the relationship affecting the
insurance company and its agents but is limited to adjudicating claims and complaints filed by the
insured against the insurance company.

10 G.R. No. 131399 October 17, 2003

ANGELITA AMPARO GO​ vs. ​OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Petitioner Go is the Treasurer and Vice-President of Wear Me Garment Manufacturing Inc. whose
business and factory were gutted down by fire. Petitioner filed separate insurance claims against 14
insurance companies. Feeling that the resolutions of her claims have been unduly delayed,
petitioner sought the assistance of the Insurance Commission. In the conference, the insurers
manifested their official stance to deny the claims of petitioner.

Consequently, petitioner filed with the Commission a complaint for Revocation and/or Suspension of
Licenses against the fourteen insurance companies, docketed as Adm. Case No. RD-156, based on
alleged violation by the insurance companies and their respective adjusters of Section 241 of the
Insurance Code. While Adm. Case No. RD-156 is pending before the Commission, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court a civil case for Specific Performance with Damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-95-23135, against the same defendants in Adm. Case No. RD-156.

ISSUE: ​CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE PENDING BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

BE PURSUED UNABATED AND INDEPENDENTLY DESPITE SUBSEQUENT FILING OF A CIVIL
CASE IN A REGULAR COURT OF JUSTICE WHEREIN IN BOTH CASES, IT (sic) INVOLVE THE
SAME PARTIES AND RELATIVELY INVOLVE THE SAME INCIDENT?

RULING: YES. ​Adm. Case No. RD-156 may proceed alongside Civil Case No. Q-95-23135. ​The
findings of the trial court will not necessarily foreclose the administrative case before the
Commission, or vice versa. True, the parties are the same, and both actions are predicated on the
same set of facts, and will require identical evidence. But the issues to be resolved, the quantum of
evidence, the procedure to be followed and the reliefs to be adjudged by these two bodies are
different.

Petitioner’s causes of action in Civil Case No. Q-95-23135 are predicated on the insurers’ refusal to
pay her fire insurance claims despite notice, proofs of losses and other supporting documents. On
the other hand, the bone of contention in Adm. Case No. RD-156, is the issue of whether or not
there was unreasonable delay or denial of the claims of petitioner, and if in the affirmative, whether
or not that would justify the suspension or revocation of the insurers’ licenses.
11 G.R. No. 138941 October 8, 2001
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY ​vs. ​TANTUCO ENTERPRISES, INC.

Respondent Tantuco Enterprises, Inc. is engaged in the coconut oil milling and refining industry. It
owns two oil mills. Both are located at factory compound at Iyam, Lucena City. It appears that
respondent commenced its business operations with only one oil mill. In 1988, it started operating its
second oil mill. The latter came to be commonly referred to as the new oil mill.

The two oil mills were separately covered by fire insurance policies issued by petitioner American
Home Assurance Co., Philippine Branch. The first oil mill was insured for three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) under Policy No. 306-7432324-3 for the period March 1, 1991 to 1992. The new oil
mill was insured for six million pesos (P6,000,000.00) under Policy No. 306-7432321-9 for the same
term. Official receipts indicating payment for the full amount of the premium were issued by the
petitioner's agent.

A fire that broke out in the early morning of September 30,1991 gutted and consumed the new oil
mill. Respondent immediately notified the petitioner of the incident. The latter then sent its appraisers
who inspected the burned premises and the properties destroyed. Thereafter, in a letter dated
October 15, 1991, petitioner rejected respondent's claim for the insurance proceeds on the ground
that no policy was issued by it covering the burned oil mill. It stated that the description of the
insured establishment referred to another building thus: "Our policy nos. 306-7432321-9 (Ps 6M) and
306-7432324-4 (Ps 3M) extend insurance coverage to your oil mill under Building No. 5, whilst the
affected oil mill was under Building No. 14.”

A complaint for specific performance and damages was consequently instituted by the respondent
with the RTC, Branch 53 of Lucena City. On October 16, 1995, after trial, the lower court rendered a
Decision finding the petitioner liable on the insurance policy.

RULING: In construing the words used descriptive of a building insured, the greatest liberality is
shown by the courts in giving effect to the insurance. In view of the custom of insurance agents to
examine buildings before writing policies upon them, and since a mistake as to the identity and
character of the building is extremely unlikely, the courts are inclined to consider that the policy of
insurance covers any building which the parties manifestly intended to insure, however inaccurate
the description may be. Notwithstanding, therefore, the misdescription in the policy, it is beyond
dispute, to our mind, that what the parties manifestly intended to insure was the new oil mill. This is
obvious from the categorical statement embodied in the policy, extending its protection:

"On machineries and equipment with complete accessories usual to a coconut oil mill
including stocks of copra, copra cake and copra mills whilst contained in the ​new oil
mill building, situate (sic) at UNNO. ALONG NATIONAL HIGH WAY, BO. IYAM,
LUCENA CITY UNBLOCKED.'' (​emphasis supplied​.)

If the parties really intended to protect the first oil mill, ​then there is no need to specify it as new​.
Indeed, it would be absurd to assume that respondent would protect its first oil mill for different
amounts and leave uncovered its second one. As mentioned earlier, the first oil mill is already
covered under Policy No. 306-7432324-4 issued by the petitioner. It is unthinkable for respondent to
obtain the other policy from the very same company. The latter ought to know that a second
agreement over that same realty results in its over insurance.

12 G.R. No. 127897

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. ​vs. ​THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN
HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION

FACTS: Caltex Philippines (Caltex for brevity) entered into a contract of affreightment with the
petitioner, Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., whereby the said common carrier agreed to transport
Caltex’s industrial fuel oil from the Batangas-Bataan Refinery to different parts of the country. Under
the contract, petitioner took on board its vessel, MT Maysun 2,277.314 kiloliters of industrial fuel oil
of Caltex to be delivered to the Caltex Oil Terminal in Zamboanga City. The shipment was insured
with the private respondent, American Home Assurance Corporation.

On August 14, 1986, MT Maysum set sail from Batangas for Zamboanga City. Unfortunately, the
vessel sank in the early morning of August 16, 1986 near Panay Gulf in the Visayas taking with it the
entire cargo of fuel oil.

Subsequently, private respondent paid Caltex the sum of Five Million Ninety-Six Thousand Six
Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P5,096,635.67) representing the insured
value of the lost cargo. Exercising its right of subrogation under Article 2207 of the New Civil Code,
the private respondent demanded of the petitioner the same amount it paid to Caltex.

Due to its failure to collect from the petitioner despite prior demand, private respondent filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 137, for collection of a sum of money.
After the trial and upon analyzing the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on
November 29, 1990 dismissing the complaint against herein petitioner without pronouncement as to
cost. The trial court found that the vessel, MT Maysum, was seaworthy to undertake the voyage as
determined by the Philippine Coast Guard per Survey Certificate Report No. M5-016-MH upon
inspection during its annual dry-docking and that the incident was caused by unexpected inclement
weather condition or ​force majeure​, thus exempting the common carrier (herein petitioner) from
liability for the loss of its cargo.

The decision of the trial court, however, was reversed, on appeal, by the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court gave credence to the weather report issued by the Philippine Atmospheric,
Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA for brevity) which showed that
from 2:00 o’clock to 8:oo o’clock in the morning on August 16, 1986, the wind speed remained at 10
to 20 knots per hour while the waves measured from .7 to two (2) meters in height only in the vicinity
of the Panay Gulf where the subject vessel sank, in contrast to herein petitioner’s allegation that the
waves were twenty (20) feet high. In the absence of any explanation as to what may have caused
the sinking of the vessel coupled with the finding that the same was improperly manned, the
appellate court ruled that the petitioner is liable on its obligation as common carrier to herein private
respondent insurance company as subrogee of Caltex. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
of herein petitioner was denied by the appellate court.