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‘ PEP Web - The Concept of Countertransference as Therapeutic Instrument: Its Early Hist... Page 1 of 12 Emsbergor, C. (1979). The Concept of Counterransference as Thetapeute Instrument: Ils Early. Mod, Psychoanal, 4:141-164 Ws eetoanl Psychoanalysis (1979), Modem Paebesnaae, 44-164 The Concept of Countertransference as Therapeutic Instrument: Its Early History Claire Ernsberger ® In current psychoanalytic literature, scarcely a paper containing clinical material fails to take account of countertransference, at least in passing. That some countertransference is objective and may be a useful therapeutic tool is by now the prevailing view. Writings on countertransference by psychoanalysis of nearly all schools commonly refer to such well-known proponents of that view as Winnioott, Spotnitz, Racker, and Scaries. ‘The modern school, which began with the work of Spotnitz, accepts the idea of objective countertransference as one of its bases and has studied and continues to study and develop a theory of technique that utilizes the objective countertransference responses not only as a way of understanding the patient but also as the source {or interventions meant to resolve resistances. This was not, of course, always the state of things. From 1910, when Freud coined the word (Gugeniibertragung) and admonished the therapist to “recognize this ... in himself and overcome i,” unti! about the end of the 1960's, an evolution in psychoanalytic thinking occurred—from the early belief that countertransference was simply a hindrance to treatment, to the currently prevailing view. The valuable work that has been done since 1969—and there has been a great deal—has proceeded in an atmosphere of general willingness to consider these ideas and of general concurrence in at least the basic premises. WARNING! This texts ponte forthe personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web anc is copyright to the Journal in which it originally ‘appeared. Its ilegal o copy, distribute or circulate itn any form whatsoever. oat ‘The purpose of this article is to explore the work of some of the earlier analysts who laid the foundation for the current understanding of objective countertransference as a therapeutic instrument ‘Among Freud's early students and colleagues, Sandor Ferenczi was the first to see countertransference as something other than a manifestation of the repressed unconscious conflicts of the analyst and thus a hindrance to the work of analysis. Ferenczi (1919) addresses an inescapable contradiction in two of Freud's injunctions about the analyst's behavior in the analytic situation: fist, to use the unconscious to understand the patient's unconscious: and second, to suppress feelings, so as not to impose them on the analytic situation, Mastering the countertransference by controling one’s affects, Ferenczi points out, may lead to an inability to give free rein to the unconscious processes out of which are to arise an understanding of the patient, Ferenczi expresses this: Indeed he may not even yield inwardly o his own affects; tobe influenced by affects, not to mention passions, Creates an atmosphere unfavorable forthe taking of anal proper handling of analytic data, As the doctor, however, is always a human being and as such liable to moods, sympathies and untipathies, as well as impulses—without such susceptibilities he would of course have no understanding for te patient's psychic conflicts—he has constantly to perform a double task during the analysis: on the one hand. he must observe the patient, scrutinize what he relates, and construct his unconscious from his information and his behavior: on the other hand, he must «ai the same time, consistently control his own attitude towards the patient, and when mecessary correct it. (pp. 186- 187) In further discussing the problem, Ferenczi reaches the conclusion that through personal analysis and constant self-analysis during the analytic session, the analyst will be able to separate out those feelings that are too extreme, that “overstep the right limits in either a positive or negative sense” (p. 189), without giving up the feelings that are conducive to the treatment. In other papers, notably the WARNING! This texts printed forthe personal use of the subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright othe Journal in which it originally ‘appeared. I is legal 6 Copy. dsirbute or oreulte kn any form whalsoever. 142 hitp://\www-pep-web.org/document. php i 8/1/2008 PEP Web - The Concept of Countertransference as Therapeutic Instrument: Its Early Hist... Page 2 of 12 papers on “Active Technique” (1920, 1925) and "The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique” (1928), Ferenczi concludes that most, if not all, patients develop transferences to the analyst as either the indulgent mother or the stern father or both; and that the analyst's behavior toward the patient will De informed by his countertrans- ference and should be, at various times and for various speeific purposes, like that ofthe original objects or the ‘opposite to it. This view is @ forerunner of both Alexander's (1950) “corrective emotional experience” and the later view of modern psychoanalysis. The impression created in reading Ferenczi is that he saw certain feelings and attitudes which arise in the analyst as induced by the patient and not at all connected to the analyst's own past history, that, indeed, the analyst is provoked into having the feelings the patient has transferred. This assumplion is confirmed by Izette de Forest (1942), who states uncquivocally that Ferenczi recognized this and, therefore, saw countertransference as a therapeutic instrument of great value to the analyst. What is also apparent, from Ferenczi's writings and from the later, retrospective comments of Michael Balint (1967). is that Ferenczi did not completely comprehend the phenomenon he described, and thus his attempts to make use of counteriransference in his psychoznalytic experiments were not entirely successful. Nonetheless, Ferenczi's perception led him to consider that negative countertransference had more to do with patients and thelr {ransferences than with unresolved conflicts in the analyst. Ferenczi was also the frst analyst to advocate telling the patient of the analyst's feelings and confessing the analyst's mistakes as a part of psychoanalytic technique. In one of the eariest papers in the literature to discuss counter-transference, Helene Deutsch (1926) provides the germ of the idea that countertransference might be a phenomenon composed of two elements: one ‘connected to the analyst's past, the other to the patient's. In discussing “occult processes" In psychoanalysis, Deutsch considers countertransference to consist of much more than the analyst's transference to the patient. She sees the analyst's task as receiving the patient's associations, sifting them through the analyst's own unconscious, and then intellectually processing the material ‘She claims that in this way the emotional content of the patient's associations WARNING! This textis printed forthe personal use ofthe subscriber to PEP Web ard is copyright tothe Journal in which torignaly ‘appeared. Its illegal copy, distbute o crate it in any form whatsoever “143, becomes an inner experience for the analyst and that in the intellectual processing of t the analyst comes to recognize it as belonging to the patient. ‘The argues that these processes are the essence of intuition and intultive empathy and supports her assertions by pointing out that the psychie structure of the analyst is formed by the same general developmental processes as is the psychic structure of the patient. Deutsch further proposes two other components of the countertransferential process. In one, the analyst ‘emotionally identifies with the patients (infantile) ego. In the second, as the patient transfers the altitudes and feelings of early objects onto the analyst, the analyst identifies with those objects. She calls this the “complementary” attitude: However, countertransference is not limited to an identification with certain portions ofthe patient’ ego, which ‘happen to be cathecied in an infantile manner. [also entails the presence of certain other unconscious auttudes, which F would like to designate by the torm “complementary attitude.” We know that the patient tends to direct his ungratified mfantile-ibidinous wishes at his analyst, who, thus, becomes identified with the original objects of these wishes. This implies that the analyst 1s under the obligation of renouncing hs real personality even in kis ‘own unconscious attitudes. so as o be able to identfy himself with these imagines in a manner compatible with the transference fantasies of his patient. {call this pracess “the complementary attitude.” ... Only a combination of both of these identifications constitutes the essence of “unconscious counter-transference.” The utilization and ‘goal-directed mastery of this counter-iransference are some of the most important duties of the analyst. This tnconscious countertransference is not to be confused, however, with the analyst's gross, affective, conscious relationship to the patient. (Devereux translation, 1982. pp. 137-138) ‘The resemblance of these ideas expressed in 1926 to the much later modem psychoanalytic conception of objective narcissistic counter-transference (Spotnitz, 1969) is stiking. Edward Glover (1927), who reviews countertransference in connection with the stages of psycho-sexval development of the analyst, WARNING! This texts printed forth personal use ofthe subscriber to PEP Web and is copyright to the Journal in which it originally ‘appeares. Is ilogal copy, ismbute or ceulate lin ary form whatsoever. vide makes a major contribution to the total evolution of the concept of countertransference. He recognizes and ‘emphasizes that counterresistance is not exactly the same phenomenon as countertransference. Glover clearly http://www. pep-web.org/document.php?id-mpsa,004.014 lagetype-hitlist&enum=4&query=... 8/1/2008 PEP Web - The Concept of Countertransference as Therapeutic Instrument: Its Early Hist... Page 3 of 12 sees both countertransference and counterresistance as reactions to the patient's transference and ‘communications—but coming always from unresolved conflicts in the analyst. Nonetheless, he makes important distinctions between countertransference as feeling and ‘counterresistance as behavior, he specifies ways in which the analyst can recognize the presence of counterresistance; and he distinctly and explicity separates the analyst's transference to the patient from his countertransference. He says, “Should the patient be the object, or more strictly, should the patient be identified with objects of the analyst's own sadistic impulse, the reactions will differ from those appearing when [the analyst) identifies himself with his patient and guards vicariously against sadistic aggression’ (p. 511, emphasis in the original), Glover also introduces the concept of negative countertransference and states that itis @ direct result of the patient's negative transference; he also warns that it will often masquerade as positive. Fanny Hann-Kende (1933) maintains that if analysts, through their own analysis, can sublimate their libidinal ‘and destructive tendencies, then the countertransference may be brought into equilibrium with the patient's, transference. She further states that if this occurs, the “Counter-transference not only does not inhibit, but, on the contrary, actually facilitates analytic work" (p. 167). Hann-Kende doesn't clearly specify how the analyst's countertransference is brought into equilibrium with the patient's transference, but she seems to imply that the operating factor is the making conscious of unconscious memory traces in the analyst which correspond to the patient's transference Barbara Low (1935), writing ofthe “Psychological Compensations of the Analyst,” says that the presumption that the analyst is someone who can always recognize and “handle satisfactorily the bias of his own Unconscious, and is able to remain master of his own psyche throughout the analysis" (p. 1) is fanciful. She also says that itis only through the analyst's own emotional activity that a correct interpretation and translation of the patient's material can take place. She describes Strachcy's (1934) “mutative interpretation” as @ WARNING! This texts printed forthe personal use of he subsober to PEP Web and is copyright tothe Jour in which it criginaly ‘appeared [ts legal to copy, cistrbu or crculate tin any form whatsoever. ar product of the analyst's insight, And the analyst's insight, she says, “ts born of direct free contact with his own emotions. This, as | suggest, affords the possibilty of vision to the analyst” (p. 3). She further states that itis impossible to assume that the analyst can repress his emotions and that its @ danger to the analyst's own health if he attempts to maintain the fiction of immunity from emotion in the analytic process" (p. 7) Karen Horncy's position on countertransference is colored by her general renunciation of many concepts of traditional psychoanalysis. However, her interest in understanding the ongoing relationship between analyst and patient led her to some observations that are appropriate to the theory now under discussion. ‘She (1939) advises analysts to beware of adhering too rigidly to Freud's mode! of the analyst as the “mirror image" as it may lead to denial of emotional reactions to patients. She says that the analyst will inevitably have ‘emotional reactions to certain attitudes and behaviors of the patient and that the analyst shall use these reactions by “asking himself whether the reactions he feels are not exactly those the patient wants to effect, thus, ‘obtaining some clue as to the process going on (p. 166). This idea has an important place in later theories which propose that induced countertransference can be a way of understanding the nature of the patient's repetition (of maladaptive infantile patterns) with the analyst. Sterba (1941) warns that the “objective attitude of the analyst can easily be carried too far and the ‘consequences to the analysis may then perhaps be graver than the occasional acting-out of the analyst in an uncontrolled counter-transference” (p. 340). His thesis is that this attitude—maintaining “objectivity” by suppressing feelings—is counterresistance to the analyst's own feelings, and that if adhered to too closely is just as detrimental to the treatment as unchecked and unanalyzed countertransference. Izette deForest in "The Therapeutic Technique of Sandor Ferenczi” (1942) outlines both her understanding of Ferencz''s theories and her own use of them in treatment. She advocates using the countertransference as a technical tool and says that itis “impossible to imagine and ludicrous to assert that an emotional relationship on both sides must not inevitably develop” (p. 136), She further states that ‘the difference in quality between the analyst's feelings for the WARNING! This textis printed forthe pereonal use ofthe eubscibor to PEP Web and is copyright to te Journal in which it origina ‘appeared Its legal to copy, citinsta or circulate it in any form whatsoever, “a6 patient and the patient's for the analyst lies in the safeguarding fact that the analyst understands his own ‘emotional reactions” (p. 136). ht Iw. pep-web.org/document.php?id-mpsa.004.014]a&type-hitlist&num=4&query=... 8/1/2008

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