Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crminal Law Jurisprudence
Crminal Law Jurisprudence
FELONY
SELF DEFENSE
CONSPIRACY
COMPOSITE CRIME
COMPLEX CRIME
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Question 15: Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others
when they had an argument that soon became heated, causing the
former to leave the group and punctuating his leaving with the warning
that he would be back "to sweep them," the vernacular for killing the
others (Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo). Shortly thereafter,
Macaspac returned to the group wielding a knife, immediately
confronted and directly taunted Jebulan ( Ano?), and quickly stabbed
the latter on the chest, and then fled. May the aggravating
circumstances of treachery be appreciated under the facts of this case?
A: No. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute treachery. He
did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument
between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to
sweep them" had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending
lethal assault. [People v. Roprigo Macaspac, GRN 198954, Feb 22, 2017]
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592, AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98
AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, provides:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term
of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the
following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
Note 1: Under the old law, the convict for the first to the second year of
imprisonment is entitled only allowed five days for each month of good
behavior; during the third to fifth year, he is allowed eight days for each
month of good behavior; then up to the tenth year, he is entitled to ten
days for each month of good behavior, and during the eleventh and
succeeding years, he is entitled to fifteen days for each month of good
behavior.
The amendment further grants the convict good conduct allowance of
15 days for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service, a grant
or privilege not allowed under the old law. More importantly, the
appeal of the accused cannot and does not operate to deprive him of
the good conduct allowance.
Note 2: Prior to the enactment of R.A. 10592, only the prisoner who
escaped from penal institution under the conditions laid down in Article
98 and 158 can be granted special time allowance for loyalty. It was
opined that such rule is unfair, unjust, and did not conform to the spirit
of the law as it encouraged prisoners to escape in order to benefit from
the law. With the present amendment, prisoners are now encouraged
not to escape under the foregoing circumstances with the grant of two-
fifth reduction of the term of their sentence.
Note 3: The mere fact of detention does not automatically entitle the
prisoner to time allowances, which is given depending on his behavior
while being incarcerated. However, once granted either by the Director
of the Bureau of Correction, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, or the Warden of the Provincial, district,
municipal, or city jail, the same cannot be revoked.
Question 18: What is the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages to be imposed upon a convict?
A: In People v. Irenio Jugueta, GRN 202124, Apr 5, 2016, the amount of
civil indemnity, as well as moral and exemplary damages, to be
imposed was summarized as follows:
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime
committed. In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in
Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed,
as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery
with Rape, Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with Arson,
Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with
Homicideor Carnapping with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide,
Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape,
Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and
sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have
died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the
incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise
apply, and that for every additional rape committed, whether against
the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the
same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified
rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty
consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention,
the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
HEINOUS CRIMES
Question 19: What are the crimes considered to be heinous under the
law?
A: Under Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
these crimes are considered heinous and are punishable with the death
penalty:
1. Treason [Art. 114];
2. Qualified Piracy [Art. 123];
3. Qualified Bribery [Art. 211-A],
4. Parricide [Art. 246],
5. Murder [Art. 248],
6. Infanticide [Art. 255],
7. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention [Art. 267],
8. Robbery with Violence against and Intimidation of Persons
[Art. 294],
9. Destructive Arson [Art. 320],
10. Rape [Art. 266-A],
11.Plunder [R.A. 7080],
12.Certain provisions of R.A. 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
later amended as R.A. 9165], particularly:
a. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 4],
b. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution, and/or Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 5],
c. Maintenance of a Den, Dive, or Resort [Sec. 6],
d. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or controlled
precursors [Sec. 8],
e. Section 11 [Possession of Dangerous Drugs [Sec. 11 more
than 10 grams],
f. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous
Drugs or are Sources thereof [Section 16],
g. Unlawful Prescription of Drugs [Section 19],
h. Misappropriation, Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or
Employee for Misapplication, or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals [Sec. 27],
i. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence [Sec. 29].
Note, however that R.A. 9346, subsequently prohibited the imposition
of death penalty, and thus reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua
for those punished under the Revised Penal Code, and to life
imprisonment for those punished under special penal laws.
DIRECT ASSAULT
Under the second form of direct assault, the following elements must
be present, to wit:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a)
is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising. [See Nestor Guelos et al. v. People,
GRN 177000, Jun 19, 2017]
Question 25: A and V were out drinking along with others when they
had an argument that soon became heated, that caused A to leave the
group. As he left, A warned the group saying, “ Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan,
wawalisin ko kayo.” Three minutes later, A returned to the group with a
knife. He immediately confronted V and directly taunted him to a fight,
after which A quickly stabbed V on the chest. After stabbing V, A left.
What crime was committed by A?
A: A committed homicide. Neither treachery nor evident premeditation
attended the killing. When the victim was alerted to the impending
lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between him and
the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former,
treachery cannot be appreciated as an attendant circumstance. Also,
when the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed by its
execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the
crime is homicide, not murder. [People v. Roprigo Macaspac, GRN
198954, Feb 22, 2017]
RAPE
Question 26: The accused had sex with AAA when she was 19 years of
age. When she was 14 years old AAA had her neuropsychiatric
examination which revealed that her Intelligence Quotient was 42 and
her level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation.
Also, she had a mental age of a five-year-and-eight-month-old child.
AAA underwent another mental status examination with another doctor
before being presented as a witness. The examination revealed that she
had a "mild degree of mental retardation." AAA "belonged to sub-
average intellectual with an IQ of 70." Although AAA was already 19
years old at that time, her mental age was that of a child aged five to
seven years. Did the accused’s carnal knowledge of AAA amount to
rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code?
Answer: Yes. Rape is committed when the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 266-A be present. The conditions under Article
266-A should be construed in the light of one's capacity to give
consent. One's capacity to give consent depends upon his or her
mental age and not on his or her chronological age.
If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below
12, the accused remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the
sordid acts. The reason behind the rule is simply that if sexual
intercourse with a victim under 12 years of age is rape, it must thereby
follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a
child below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape. [People
v. Edgar Allan Corpuz, GRN 208013, Jul 3, 2017]
Question 27: When the victim is 22 years of age but has a mental age
of 4-5 years old, would the act of accused in having sex with the victim
amount to statutory rape?
A. No. Accused cannot be convicted of Statutory Rape under Article
266-A, paragraph l(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said provision is
the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an
accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove:
first, the age of the victim; second, the identity of the accused; and last
but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
victim.
The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age.
If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason"
notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person
under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose
mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d), should still be designated as
simple rape under paragraph l(b). [People v. Jonathan Baay, GRN
220143, Jun 7, 2017]
Question 28: The accused is charged with the crime of Rape committed
against his step-daughter. He claims that he should not be convicted
because the prosecution failed to prove the employment of force,
threat, or intimidation under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
He insists that only when "the offended party is either under 12 years of
age or is demented" that the elements of force, threat or intimidation
may be dispensed with. Since AAA was already 15 years old at the time
of the alleged rape, the prosecution should have proven that the
incident was accompanied by force, threat, or intimidation. Is the
contention valid?
A: No. Moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape
committed by a close-kin. In rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.
Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed for rape
to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over his
daughter suffices.
The issue regarding the need to prove actual force or intimidation
becomes superfluous since it was established that the accused was the
common-law partner of the victim's mother. Furthermore, apart from
his moral ascendancy over the victim, it is apparent that he also had
physical advantage over her. Given all these reasons, the victim was left
without any other choice but to succumb to his sordid acts.
Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and
there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person
may react aggressively, while another may show cold indifference. Also,
it is improper to judge the actions of children who are victims of
traumatic experiences "by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. [People v. George Gacusan, GRN
207776, Apr 26, 2017]
Question 31: At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 2006,
AAA, a housemaid, received a text message from the accused asking if
they could meet. He was then working as a security guard near AAA's
place of work. AAA accepted his invitation and met with him in Augusto
San Francisco Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, where they boarded a passenger
jeepney bound for Rizal Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Arriving in Sta.
Cruz, they entered a Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue and ordered
food. They later on went to a nearby Aroma Motel. According to AAA
she was raped by the accused while inside said motel. Accused denied
having committed the crime charged, insisting that they were lovers. Is
the accused guilty of the crime of rape?
A: No. It must be noted first and foremost that the accused and AAA
were adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse. The
established circumstances-their having agreed to go on a lovers' date;
their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board
the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together;
their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the
motel without the complainant manifesting resistance; and their
entering the designated room without protest from her -indicated
beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lovers'
date in bed inside the motel. Although she claimed that he had held
her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing
that she resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to enter
the motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him
towards the motel, and to have entered it without hesitation. What she
did not do was eloquent proof of her consent. [People v. Carlito Claro,
GRN 199894, Apr 5, 2017]
Question 32: The prosecution was able to prove that AAA suffered
bruises and abrasions on her left breast and on her right hand which
tend to prove that there was force employed by the accused on her.
The people thus argue that based on the medico-legal findings of
bruises and abrasions on AAA, it can be concluded that she had been
subjected to some "bodily harm" by the accused to force himself on
her. Is the argument tenable?
A: No. That the medico-legal examination turned up with the findings
of abrasions on AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did
not necessarily mean that the accused had applied force in the context
of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion was, therefore, too
sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality
between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the
demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the
mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude the
giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and
contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the
partners to each other's lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our
minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse resulted from
consensuality between them. [People v. Carlito Claro, GRN 199894, Apr
5, 2017]
Question 33: Appellant contends that while AAA alleged that she was
raped many times in 1999 when she was 8 years old, it was shown by
the medico-legal report however that she had only one laceration in
her hymen which was at 6 o'clock position and deeply healed; and that
there is a possibility that this laceration could have been done by any
other male person aside from appellant since the actual genital
examination was only done in 2005 when the victim was no longer
living with the appellant under the same roof. Is the contention
tenable?
A: No. It is settled that laceration is not an element of the crime of
rape. The absence of lacerations does not negate rape. The presence of
lacerations in the victim's vagina is not necessary to prove rape; neither
is a broken hymen an essential element of the crime.
Accordingly, what is crucial is that AAA's testimony meets the test
of credibility, which serves as the basis for appellant's conviction.
Notably, PSI Cabrera, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, in his cross examination, had clarified
that it is possible that a person being raped or a hymen, or a vagina
being penetrated by a penis would create a laceration at the same spot
just like a lightning hitting on the same spot. Therefore, AAA's
straightforward testimony that appellant had raped her twice is not at
all negated by a finding of only one laceration in her hymen. We have
been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims
especially in sensitive cases of rape, as no young girl would concoct a
tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and
undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.
[People v. Ludigario Belen, GRN 215331, Jan 23. 2017]
Note: The Supreme Court has also held that "hymenal lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration.
And when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is
consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established. [See People v. Rommel Ronquillo, GRN 214762, Sep 20,
2017]
Question 34: In a case for rape, the prosecution was able to establish
that accused was an 18-year old man who had sexual intercourse with
"AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However,
there was no evidence to prove that accused used force, threat or
intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that
accused and his 14-year old companion named Meneses are her good
friends. Thus, she frequented the house of accused. At around 7:00 p.m.
of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of accused and
chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up
to about 11 p.m. when she took a nap, there is no showing that accused
or Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her.
Is the accused guilty of rape?
A. No. The prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused by presenting evidence that would establish the
elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force,
threat or intimidation.
In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or
intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the
element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking.
The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually
employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do
so is fatal to its cause.
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate
the purposes which the accused had in mind. On the other hand,
intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at
that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear
caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or
accused employed force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim
was ever made that accused physically overpowered, or used or
threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening words to
"AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the table
nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere
product of her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife
was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot
even ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an
effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented
nor described in court. [People v. Juan Richard Tionloc, GRN 212193,
Feb 15, 2017]
Question 35: It was established that when “AAA” felt something painful
minutes during their sexual intercourse she tried to resist by moving
and repositioning her body. Did her resistance result to the crime of
Rape being committed against her?
A: No. Three things are clear from the testimony of "AAA:" first, accused
never employed the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her;
second, "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when accused
asked her to have sex with him; and, third, accused did not act with
force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest pain and
tried to move during their sexual congress.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not,
and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of
accused's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual
congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as
an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's
sexual advances.
Resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to
resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman
defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was
sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment accused’s
evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to
convict a man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving
him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent
and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in
the middle and charged him with rape. [People v. Juan Richard Tionloc,
GRN 212193, Feb 15, 2017]
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
Question 38: What are the elements of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom?
A: In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish
the following elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person;
[second,] he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived
another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or detention was
illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
[People v. Elmer Avancena, et al, GRN 200512, Jun 7, 2017]
Question 39: Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention may be committed by any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty. If the kidnapping was committed by agents of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, what is the crime committed?
A: Even if the accused were employed by the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, detaining any private person for the purpose of
extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as
within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious
illegal detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for
any criminal act. [People v. Elmer Avancena, et al, GRN 200512, Jun 7,
2017]
ESTAFA
Question 41. What are the two essential elements in the crime of Estafa?
A: Fraud and injury are the two essential elements in every crime of
estafa.
The elements of estafa in general are:
1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.
Question 45: Art. 332 of the RPC provides that “No criminal, but only
civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives
by affinity in the same line; 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall
have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters
and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption
established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Cite examples of cases involving relatives by affinity covered by
Art. 332.
A: In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it
has been held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law,
stepparents and adopted children. By virtue thereof, no criminal liability
is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against
his stepson; by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;
by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson; by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather; by the accused who swindles
his sister-in-law living with him; and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.
Question 48: Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
A: No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with
the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the
felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable
language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply
where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong,
GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 50: The accused argued that ultimately it is the crime of estafa
for which he would be convicted if proven. Considering that the
accused could not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, he
argues that he should also be absolved from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. Is
the argument correct?
A: No. True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public document is required for a proper
conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document, as held by the Supreme Court in an earlier case. It means
that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the
falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the
crime of estafa.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its
right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain
family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined
with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is
involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. Thus, the action provided under the said provision
simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members
and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public
document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public
dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender
resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory
cause under Article 332. [Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de
Carungcong, GRN 181409, Feb 11, 2010]
Question 51: If under the same case, Sato instead directly induced
Manolita to sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in
favor of third parties, would he be allowed to avail of the benefit of Art
332.?
A: Yes. When the offender commits in a public document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of
the same Code. The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the
Information show that the falsification of public document was
consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita
who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with
her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution
of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato
later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties
sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or
prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as
no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the
time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document
was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
The situation is different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor
or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been
caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the
document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would
only have been the simple crime of estafa. On the other hand, absent
any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her
signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA),
the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.
[Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong, GRN
181409, Feb 11, 2010]
PREMATURE MARRIAGE
LIBEL
Question 54: Petitioner contends that in serving and filing the Omnibus
Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not intend to expose it to
third persons, but only complied with the law on how service and filing
of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the said
motion by Michael, the duly authorized representative and son of the
respondent in the estafa case, as well as the two staff of the OCP -
Flores and Enseo - did not constitute publication within the meaning of
the law on libel because they cannot be considered as "third persons to
whom copies of the motion were disseminated." Is the argument valid?
A: No. In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus
Motion to third persons, but only complied with the law on how service
and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the
defamatory statements in it were made known to someone other than
the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the
motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to
expect that persons other than the one defamed would be able to read
the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with
the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent
in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in
Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is
not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record
when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his act,
petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and
service of his Omnibus Motion.
The Omnibus Motion although contained in a sealed envelope
was addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, San Pablo City. As
such, the accused fully well knows that the sealed envelope will be
opened at the receiving section, and will be first read by the staff of the
Office before the private complainant gets hold of a copy thereof. In
fine, the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to the private
complainant - the person [to] whom it is written, but passed through
other persons in the Office of the City Prosecutor. At the time the
accused mailed the sealed envelope containing the Omnibus Motion
addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, he knew that there exists
not only a reasonable but strong probability that it will be exposed to
be read or seen by third persons.
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of
publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a communication
of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the
Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and
representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is
clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman.
[Medelarnaldo B. Belen v. People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
Question 59: Petitioner moreover argues that the reliance of the court
on the statements or opinions of ordinary witnesses like Michael, Flores
and Enseo is contrary to Sections 48 and 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, because they are incompetent to testify on whether the
statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman in the Omnibus Motion
constituted malicious imputations against her person. Is the contention
meritorious?
A: No. As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the
facts testified to. Opinion evidence or testimony refers to evidence of
what the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute,
as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves.
In this case, however, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo
barely made a conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statements
in petitioner's Omnibus Motion, but merely testified on their own
understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People, the Court stated the twin rule for the
purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous: (1) that construction must be adopted which will give to the
matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered; and (2) the published matter alleged to libelous must be
construed as a whole. "In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of
the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered
explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be from the words used in the
publication." As the persons who, aside from ACP Suñega-Lagman, had
also read the Omnibus Motion, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores
and Enseo are competent to testify on their own understanding of the
questioned statements, and their testimonies are relevant to the trial
court's determination of the defamatory character of such statements.
[Medelarnaldo B. Belen v. People, GRN 211120, Feb 13, 2017]
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
PROBATION LAW
OTHER UPDATES:
Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of
Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines
Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act
No. 3815, Otherwise Known as “The Revised Penal Code”, as Amended,
29 August 2017, provides:
Section 3. Article 114 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Art. 114. Treason.— Any Filipino citizen who levies war against
the Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed Four million pesos
(₱4,000,000).
Section 6. Article 136 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
6968, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 140. Penalty for sedition.— The leader of sedition shall suffer
the penalty of prisión mayorin its minimum period and fine not
exceeding Two million pesos (₱2,000,000).
Section 10. Article 143 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and
similar bodies.— The penalty of prisión correccional or a fine ranging
from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or
fraud, prevents the meeting of Congress or of any of its committees or
subcommittees, Constitutional Commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or
board.”
Section 11. Article 144 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 12. Article 147 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 13. Article 148 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 14. Article 149 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 15. Article 150 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 16. Article 151 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 17. Article 153 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order;
Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance.—
The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or
establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb public performances,
functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included
in the provisions of Article 131 and 132.
“The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
in any meeting, association, or public place, shall make any outcry
tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display
placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.
“The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000) shall be imposed upon these person who in violation of
the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with
pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.”
Section 18. Article 154 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 19. Article 155 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any
firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm
or danger;
“2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari
or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public
tranquility;
“3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged
in any other nocturnal amusements, shall disturb the public peace; or
“4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any
disturbance or scandal in public places: Provided, That the
circumstances of the case shall not make the provisions of Article 153
applicable.”
Section 20. Article 163 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4202, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins.— Any
person who make, imports, or utters false coins, in connivance with
counterfeiters, or importers, shall suffer:
Section 21. Article 164 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 22. Article 166 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“2. By prisión mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed
one million pesos (₱1,000,000), if the falsified or altered documents is a
circulating note issued by any banking association duly authorized by
law to issue the same.
“3. By arresto mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed one
million pesos (₱1,000,000), if the falsified or counterfeited document
was issued by a foreign government.
“4. By prisión mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000), when the forged or altered
document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign bank duly
authorized therefor.”
Section 23. Article 167 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 24. Article 170 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 25. Article 171 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 26. Article 172 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent
to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article; and
“3. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in
the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this
article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.”
Section 27. Article 174 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his
profession, shall issuee a false certificate; and
“2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit of
service, good conduct or similar circumstances.”
“Any person who, with the intention of using them, shall have in his
possession any of the instruments or implements mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree
than that provided therein.”
Section 29. Article 178 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name.— The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
publicly use a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading the execution of a judgment or causing damage.
“Any person who conceals his true name and other personal
circumstances shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not to
exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).”
Section 30. Article 180 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if the defendant in said case shall
have been sentenced to death;
“2. The penalty of prisión mayor, if the defendant shall have been
sentenced to reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua;
“3. The penalty of prisión correccional, if the defendant shall have been
sentenced to any other afflictive penalty; and
“4. The penalty of arresto mayor, if the defendant shall have been
sentenced to a correctional penalty or a fine, or shall have been
acquitted.
Section 31. Article 181 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 32. Article 182 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases.— Any person found guilty
of false testimony in a civil case shall suffer the penalty of prisión
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed One million
two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000), if the amount in controversy
shall exceed One million pesos (₱1,000,000), and the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000), if the amount in controversy shall not exceed said amount
or cannot be estimated.”
Section 33. Article 187 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Any stamp, brand label, or mark shall be deemed to fail to indicate the
actual fineness of the article on which it is engraved, printed, stamped,
labeled or attached, when the test of the article shows that the quality
or fineness thereof is less by more than one-half karat, if made of gold,
and less by more than four one-thousandth, if made of silver, than what
is shown by said stamp, brand, label or mark. But in case of watch cases
and flatware made of gold, the actual fineness of such gold shall not be
less than more than three one-thousandth than the fineness indicated
by said stamp, brand, label, or mark.”
“3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.”
Section 35. Article 202 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Any person found guity of any of the offenses covered by this article
shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000), and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor
in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, in the discretion of the court.”
Section 36. Article 209 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 37. Article 213 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses.
— The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium period to prisión
mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000) to Two milion pesos (₱2,000,000), or both, shall be
imposed upon any public officer who:
“1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to
furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or
settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall enter
into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use
of any other scheme, to defraud the Government;
“2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other
imposts, shall be guilty of any of the following acts or omissions:
Section 38. Article 215 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 39. Article 216 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but
does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
“In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the toal value of the property
embezzled.
Section 42. Article 219 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 43. Article 221 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by
competent authority to deliver any property in his custody or under his
administration, shall refuse to make a delivery.
“The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing:
Provided, That it shall not be leas than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000).”
Section 44. Article 226 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000), whenever serious damage shall have been
caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
Section 45. Article 227 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 227. Officer breaking seal.— Any public officer charged with
the custody of papers or property sealed by proper authority, who shall
break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties
of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, temporary
special diqualification and a fine not exceeding Four hundred thousand
pesos (₱400,000).”
Section 46. Article 228 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 47. Article 229 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 48. Article 230 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 49. Article 231 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 50. Article 233 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 51. Article 234 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 52. Article 235 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 53. Article 236 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 54. Article 237 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 55. Article 239 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 56. Article 242 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 57. Article 243 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial
authority.— Any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000).”
Section 58. Article 244 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 59. Article 259 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 60. Article 265 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries.— Any person who shall
inflict upon another physical injuries not described in the preceding
articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten
(10) days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same
period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor.
“Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with
the manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or under
circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, in addition to the
penalty of arresto mayor, a fine not exceeeding Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000) shall be imposed.
“Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender’s parents,
ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or
persons in authority, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its
minimum and medium periods: Provided, That in the case of persons in
authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such
persons.”
Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. By arresto mayor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) days
to nine (9) days, or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.
“3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five
thousand pesos (₱5,000) when the offender shall ill-treat another by
deed without causing any injury.’
Section 62. Article 268 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 18, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the
place for the perpetration of the crime.
Section 63. Article 269 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 64. Article 271 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two (2)
preceding articles shall be the father or the mother of the minor, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000), or both.”
Section 65. Article 276 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the
culprit shall be punished by prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been in danger
only, the pnealty shall be prisión correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
“The provisions contained in the two (2) preceding paragraphs shall not
prevent the imposition of the penalty provided for the act committed,
when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.”
Section 66. Article 277 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“The same penalty shall be imposed upon the parents who shall neglect
their children by not giving them the education which their station in
life requires and financial condition permits.”
Section 67. Article 278 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen (16) years
of age to perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength,
or contortion.
“3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next
preceding paragraph who shall employ any descendsant of his under
twelve years (12) years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
“If the delivery shall have been made in consideration of any price,
compensation, or promise, the penalty shall in every case be imposed
in its maximum period.
“In either case, the guardian or curator convicted shall also be removed
from office as guardian or curator; and in the case of the parents of the
child, they may be deprived, temporarily or perpetually, in the
discretion of the court, of their parental authority.
“5. Any person who shall induce any child under sixteen (16) years of
age to abandon tthe home of its ascendants, guardians, curators or
teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned
in paragraph 2 hereof, or to accompany any habitual vagrant or
beggar.”
Section 68. Article 280 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who
shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some
serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third
person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other
public houses, while the same are open.”
Section 69. Article 281 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 70. Article 282 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 282. Grave threats.— Any person who shall threaten another
with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of
his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
“1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the
threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even
though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose.
If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by
two (2) degrees shall be imposed.
“2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000), if the threat shall not have been made
subject to a condition.”
Section 71. Article 285 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such
weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
“2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another
with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts
shows that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat: Provided,
That the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the
provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
“3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not
constituting a felony.”
Section 72. Article 286 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7890, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 73. Article 287 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 74. Article 288 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay
the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him, by means of
tokens or objects other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines, unless expressly requested by the laborer or employee.”
Section 75. Article 289 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 76. Article 290 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000).
Section 78. Article 292 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 79. Article 299 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the
robbery was committed, by any of the following means:
“Or if—
“When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property
taken exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000), the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.
“The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the
value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000).
“When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property
taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000), they shall suffer
the penalty prescribed in the two (2) next preceding paragraphs, in its
minimum period.
“1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended
for entrance or egress.
“2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
“3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys,
picklocks or other similar tools.
“When the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000), the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
“In the cases specified in Articles 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, and 302 of
this Code, when the property taken is mail matter or large cattle, the
offender shall suffer the penalties next higher in degree than those
provided in said articles.”
Section 81. Article 309 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than One million two hundred
thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱2,200,000); but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one (1) year for
each additional One million pesos (₱1,000,000), but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
“5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over Five hundred
pesos (₱500) but does not exceed Five thousand pesos (₱5,000).
“6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value
does not exceed Five hundred pesos (₱500).
“8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine of not exceeding Five
thousand pesos (₱5,000), when the value of the thing stolen is not over
Five hundred pesos (₱500), and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.”
Section 82. Article 311 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 83. Article 312 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights
in property.— Any person who, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or
shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition
to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall
be punished by a fine from fifty (50) to one hundred (100) per centum
of the gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (₱15,000).
“If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)
shall be imposed.”
Section 84. Article 313 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No.
818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand
pesos (₱2,400,000).
“4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount
is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One
million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
“5th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not
exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
Section 86. Article 318 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“Art. 318. Other deceits.— The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of
not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this Chapter.
“Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make
forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public
in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor or
a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).”
Section 87. Article 328 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“2. Bv arresto mayor if such value does not exceed the abovementioned
amount but is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and
“3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000).”
“1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the damage caused exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000);
“2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value
is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000); and
“3. By arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), if the
amount involved does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or
cannot be estimated.”
Section 89. Article 331 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 90. Article 347 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall
conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to cause such child
to lose its civil status.
Section 91. Article 355 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 92. Article 356 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 93. Article 357 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 94. Article 358 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 96. Article 364 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 97. Article 365 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1790, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be
Less than Five thousand pesos (₱5,000).
“A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40.000) and censure shall
be imposed upon any person, who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
“In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
“1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which
case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
“The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give.”
Section 100. Retroactive Effect.— This Act shall have retroactive effect to
the extent that it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence
by final judgment.
FINAL NOTE: These updates are intended only to boost the morale of
the students and to give them the sense of confidence knowing that
they are fully apprised of the most recent developments in criminal law.
GOOD LUCK!