European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)

Published online 31 July 2007 in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.462

Counterfactual thinking following negative outcomes:

Evidence for group and self-protective biases

SEAN M. MCCREA*
University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

Abstract

Despite the robustness of self-serving and group-serving biases in attribution, there has been only
limited evidence for these effects in counterfactual thinking. The present studies demonstrate that,
following a negative outcome, individuals counterfactualize external factors relatively more than
internal factors when they are identified with the target (i.e. ingroup members or the self) than when
they are not. However, these effects are found only for external factors that are in some way
disadvantageous to the target and could have led to the negative outcome. Implications of these
findings for understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and judgments of
causality, blame and affect are discussed. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Counterfactual thoughts indicate how a past event could have happened differently. Imagining
alternatives to reality can have a number of important consequences for judgment and emotion.
Consider, for example, the 1999 Champions League final of European soccer. After trailing 1–0 for
almost the entire game, Manchester United scored twice in the final three minutes of extra time to
defeat Bayern Munich. One can easily imagine the counterfactual thoughts the devastated Bayern
players and fans likely had: ‘If only we could have held out for a few more minutes, we would have
won!’ or ‘If only the referee had ended the game earlier!’ As seen in this example, counterfactual
thoughts can be psychologically quite powerful, offering a salient standard against which to compare
the obtained outcome (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).
Indeed, the thought that changing one or two features of the event would have prevented a negative
outcome can heighten judgments of blame (Branscombe, Owen, Garstka, & Coleman, 1996;
Branscombe, Wohl, Owen, Allison, & N’Gbala, 2003; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Nario-Redmond
& Branscombe, 1996) and amplify emotional reactions (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Landman, 1987).
To the extent that counterfactuals mutate aspects of the self following negative outcomes, the
experience of shame and regret is increased and psychological well-being undermined (Branscombe
et al., 2003; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Sevdalis & Kokkinaki, 2006).

*Correspondence to: Sean M. McCrea, Department of Psychology, Fach D-39, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz,
Germany. E-mail: Sean.McCrea@uni-konstanz.de

Received 17 July 2006

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 27 June 2007
 Group and self-protective bias 1257

It is of interest then to examine whether, following a negative event, individuals might choose to
generate counterfactuals that shift blame away from the self and thereby mitigate negative affect. The
present work specifically investigates whether individuals are more likely to generate counterfactual
thoughts pointing to external factors (e.g. the actions of others) rather than internal factors (e.g. one’s
own actions) as having prevented their own success or the success of important others. Thus the
question is whether, in the example above, fans and players of Bayern may have counterfactualized the
actions of the other team or the referee more than their inability to defend a narrow lead, in order to
minimize the pain of their loss.
One of the more robust effects in the attribution literature is the self-serving bias, or beneffectance.
Individuals tend to attribute their own success to internal causes but their failure to external causes,
whereas this pattern is not observed for the outcomes of others (for reviews, see Campbell & Sedikides,
1999; Malle, 2006; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman,
1979). A recent meta-analysis demonstrates that this effect is large and observed in most
subpopulations (Mezulis et al., 2004). Evidence also indicates these biases serve to protect and enhance
self-esteem, and predict greater psychological well-being (for reviews see Mezulis et al., 2004; Taylor
& Brown, 1988).This bias also extends to groups to which we belong. Alternately referring to the
‘ultimate attribution error’ (Pettigrew, 1979), ethnocentrism (Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Taylor & Jaggi,
1974), or group-serving bias (Branscombe, N’Gbala, Kobrynowicz, & Wann, 1997; Sherman & Kim,
2005), numerous studies have found that the failure of a group with which one is identified (or a
member of this ingroup) is more likely to be attributed to external factors than to internal factors,
relative to the failure of an outgroup. Conversely, the success of an in group is more likely to be
attributed to internal factors than external factors, relative to the success of an outgroup (for a review
see Hewstone, 1990). The bias is particularly strong for individuals high in group identification (Taylor
& Doria, 1981). Findings of group-serving bias support tenets of social identity theory (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987) that individuals strive to maintain a positive social identity, as well as the notion that individuals
manage self-evaluation and public impressions through their group memberships and relationships to
close others (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986; Tesser, 1988). Consistent with this reasoning,
group-serving attribution patterns result in more positive evaluations of the ingroup (Chatman & von
Hippel, 2001; Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993). In addition, individuals demonstrating group-serving
biases are themselves more positively evaluated by other ingroup members (Taylor & Tyler, 1986).

REASONS FOR EXPECTING SELF AND GROUP-PROTECTIVE

BIASES IN COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT

Are there reasons to expect similar biases in counterfactual thinking? Several theorists have proposed
that counterfactual thinking directly determines causal attributions (e.g. Gavanski & Wells, 1989;
Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Lipe, 1991; Wells & Gavanski, 1989), suggesting the answer is yes. On the
other hand, there are important differences between attribution and counterfactual thinking. Whereas
counterfactual thinking focuses on how an outcome could have been prevented, attributions explain
what brought about the outcome (Goerke, Möller, Schulz-Hardt, Napiersky, & Frey, 2004; Mandel &
Lehman, 1996; Spellman & Mandel, 1999). Thus, these processes can focus on different features of an
event: one might say the destruction of the house was caused by a fire, but a quicker response by the fire
department would have prevented this outcome.
In addition to these links between counterfactual thinking and causal judgments, the amplification of
affect as a result of counterfactual thinking is likely to motivate self and group-protective biases. As

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
1258 Sean M. McCrea

discussed earlier, self-referent thoughts increase the experience of regret and shame (Niedenthal et al.,
1994; Sevdalis & Kokkinaki, 2006). Conversely, counterfactuals identifying a self-handicap have been
shown to protect self-esteem following failure (McCrea, 2007). Thus, individuals may be motivated to
mutate external factors more than internal factors following negative self-relevant outcomes, as this
would serve to maintain self-esteem and reduce self-blame and regret. Similar arguments can be made
for expecting a group-protective bias. Assuming the individual strongly identifies with the group, such
a bias should serve to maintain collective self-esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Rubin & Hewstone,
1998) and reduce regret and blame following a negative outcome.
Finally, past research has shown that counterfactual mutation can be influenced by similar
motivations, including repairing mood (Markman et al., 1993; Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001;
Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005), supporting existing attitudes and world views (Crawford & McCrea,
2004; Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) and denying responsibility for
poor outcomes (Markman & Tetlock, 2000).
In spite of the robust findings of self and group-serving biases in attribution and the proposed basis
for expecting similar biases in counterfactual thought, there has been little work examining this issue,
and this research has been contradictory.

SELF-SERVING BIASES IN COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING

The most compelling studies on this topic were conducted by Roese and Olson (1993). Two studies
demonstrated that high self-esteem individuals listed more self-referent counterfactuals following an
imagined success than did low self-esteem individuals, whereas high self-esteem individuals listed
fewer self-referent counterfactuals following an imagined failure than did low self-esteem individuals.
These findings were replicated in a more recent study by Goerke et al. (2004). They found that
managers considering the performance of a subordinate counterfactualized the subordinate’s actions
more than their own actions, but only when this person’s performance was considered poor.
In contrast to these supportive findings, Branscombe et al. (1997) failed to find evidence of a
self-serving bias in counterfactual thinking. Participants reading about an auto accident mutated the
self as frequently as or more frequently than the other driver. Despite these findings, participants
assigned less blame to the self than to the other driver. Similarly, research suggests that individuals
often focus on actions of the self more than the actions of others following traumatic events such as a
rape or death of a significant other (Branscombe et al., 2003; Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, &
Thompson, 1995). Counterfactuals also tend to focus on controllable aspects of the situation
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Markman & Weary, 1996). On the other hand,
these studies did not vary the valence or self-relevance of the outcome, leaving the implications for
self-serving bias unclear.
Several limitations of past studies of self-serving bias also bear mentioning. First, none of these
studies examined spontaneous counterfactuals to an experimentally created negative outcome, utilizing
imagined scenarios (Branscombe et al., 1997; Roese & Olson, 1993) or recalled experiences (Goerke
et al., 2004). Second, past research has shown that unexpected outcomes (whether success or failure)
are more likely to be attributed to the situation (Feather, 1969; Miller & Ross, 1975). Given that past
studies of self-serving bias in counterfactual thinking have relied on a manipulation of outcome
valence, supportive findings could reflect the more surprising nature of a poor performance. Therefore,
a demonstration that individuals show bias towards the self but not others would provide stronger
evidence of self-serving bias in counterfactual thought (Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979).

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
 Group and self-protective bias 1259

A final issue is the operational definition of self-serving bias in these studies. Separate comparisons
were made between self-referent and the other-referent counterfactuals or between self-referent and
situation-referent counterfactuals.1 Thus, counterfactuals mutating external factors were not combined,
despite the fact that such an inclusive definition of the external dimension is more consistent with
previous studies in the attribution literature (Mezulis et al., 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman,
1979). Analyses classifying thoughts in this manner would likely have been supportive of a self-serving
bias in all of these studies, including those by Branscombe et al. (1997).

GROUP-SERVING BIASES IN COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING

In the only study of group-serving biases in counterfactual thinking conducted to date, Branscombe
et al. (1997) asked college students identified or not identified with the school basketball team to read a
description of a loss by the team to a rival school. Although individuals demonstrated group-serving
biases on attribution measures, no differences were observed in counterfactual mutations. However,
some of the same limitations noted in the research on self-serving bias also exist in this study.
Specifically, counterfactuals were generated in response to an imagined scenario and group-serving
bias was defined by the limited comparison of ingroup and outgroup-referent counterfactuals.
Furthermore, identification with the group was measured rather than manipulated. As a result,
participants likely differed in their knowledge of basketball generally and the team specifically. Indeed,
counterfactual mutation appeared to be largely determined by knowledge of the team.

PRESENT RESEARCH

The current studies sought to provide stronger evidence for group and self-protective biases in
counterfactual generation, examining reactions to both real and imagined negative outcomes. To rule
out the alternative explanation that perceived likelihood of success influenced counterfactual thinking,
the self-relevance of the event was varied. Furthermore, paralleling past work on self and group-serving
bias in the attribution literature, all external counterfactuals were analysed, not just other-referent
thoughts.
A distinction was also made between counterfactuals that mention factors that could have facilitated
the obtained outcome, and those that could have hindered it. Given the open-ended nature of
thought-listing tasks, participants may often mutate factors that do not explain why the poor outcome
obtained. Furthermore, the consequences of listing such facilitating factors for judgments of blame
likely differ depending on whether they are internal or external to the actor. Mentioning internal
advantageous factors (e.g. ‘At least they kept the score close, it could have been a blowout’) do not
serve to excuse the actor from responsibility. Likewise, mentioning external advantageous factors (‘At
least the fans supported the team . . .’) would tend to increase blame by indicating that a poor outcome
was obtained despite the presence of these facilitating factors. Thus, only counterfactuals mentioning
disadvantageous external factors should excuse a poor performance. As a result, a group or
self-protective bias should only be observed between mutations of internal factors and external
1
In a footnote, Roese and Olson (1993, footnote 8) did report evidence of self-serving bias when classifying counterfactuals along
an internal-external dimension.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
1260 Sean M. McCrea

disadvantageous factors. In the present studies, counterfactuals were coded taking these differences
into account.

STUDY 1: SELF AND GROUP-PROTECTIVE BIASES

IN COUNTERFACTUAL GENERATION

An initial study investigated self and group-protective bias in counterfactual thinking with these
concerns in mind. Participants generated counterfactuals for a negative outcome in a game of chance in
which both internal and external counterfactuals were available. The study included a manipulation of
the self-relevance of the outcome, such that participants experienced either a self-relevant outcome or
the outcome for a previous player. The similarity between the other player and the self was also varied.
It was predicted that participants would generate the fewest internal and most external counterfactuals
for the self, and the fewest external disadvantageous and most internal counterfactuals for the dissimilar
other player. In addition to this self-protective bias, participants were expected to show a
group-protective bias towards the similar other, as this person was an ingroup member by virtue of their
both being students at the same university. However, this bias was expected to be weaker than the
self-protective bias, given the relative low importance of the participants’ relationship to this person.
Thus, it was predicted that the number of internal and external disadvantageous thoughts generated for
the similar other would fall in between those generated for the self and dissimilar other.

Method

Participants

Eighty-three students (32 men, 51 women) at the University of Konstanz participated in return for
2.50 Euros or a half-hour of participation credit. They were randomly assigned to the self, similar other,
or dissimilar other conditions. Participants in the two other player conditions were randomly assigned
to view a ‘left wheel’ spin or a ‘right wheel’ spin.

Materials and Procedure

The procedure was adapted from Markman et al. (1995). Participants were told that the experiment
involved how people make judgments in games of chance, and that the experimenters had constructed a
computer game in which participants could win lottery tickets. A random drawing of the lottery tickets
would take place to distribute several prizes (i.e. a university logo T-shirt, a steel coffee mug, a wooden
chess and checker set, or two writeable DVDs with a case). These prizes were each valued at
approximately 5 Euros.
The game involved two wheels that would be ‘randomly’ spun by the computer (see
Figure 1a and b). The player was to decide which wheel would determine the number of lottery
tickets received. The wheels each had the same eight values, ranging from 0 to 35, but in a different
order. There was also a pointer next to each wheel used to determine the outcome of the spin. The
starting position of the wheels was displayed on the computer.
Participants in the self condition were told that they would be allowed to play the wheel game once,
and that they were to choose which wheel would be spun. They were told that they would still see both

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
 Group and self-protective bias 1261

Figure 1. (a) Outcome of left wheel spin. (b) Outcome of right wheel spin

wheels being spun, such that they would learn what the outcome would have been had they chosen the
other wheel. Participants in the other player conditions were told that they would not be given a chance
to play the wheel game, but that they would observe the wheel spin of a previous participant.
Specifically, participants in the similar other condition were told that they would be viewing the wheel
spin of a previous participant named R. H., who was a student at the same university. Participants in the
dissimilar other condition were told that R. H. worked at an insurance agency in the United States. In
both conditions, participants were told that they would learn the wheel choice of the other player, but
that they would still see both wheels being spun.
The participant was then asked how motivated she (self condition) or the previous participant
(similar and dissimilar other player conditions) was to win one of the prizes using a 1 (not at all) to 5
(very much) scale, as well as how likely it was that at least a few lottery tickets would be won using a 1
(very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) scale. Participants in the self condition then selected the wheel they
wished to spin, whereas participants in the two other player conditions were randomly assigned to
watch either a left wheel spin or a right wheel spin. The computer then displayed the wheel spin. The
outcome was in fact pre-determined to yield the same result regardless of which wheel had been
selected (see Figure 1a and b). The chosen wheel always stopped such that the player received 5 lottery
tickets, but narrowly missed winning 30 tickets. In addition, the non-chosen wheel would have also
yielded 30 lottery tickets. Thus, the player would have won more lottery tickets had the wheel spun
slightly differently or had the other wheel had been chosen (see also Markman et al., 1995). The
computer indicated the number of lottery tickets won, and participants were then asked to generate up
to five counterfactual thoughts concerning this outcome (see Appendix).

Results

There were no effects of which wheel (i.e. left or right) determined the outcome (all Fs < 2.28,
ps > .10), and so this factor is not discussed further.2 There were no differences between the self and

2
Individuals in the self condition chose the left wheel 42% of the time, and this rate did not differ from chance (x2 < 1, n.s.).

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
1262 Sean M. McCrea

Figure 2. Counterfactual generation (Study 1)

other player conditions in perceived probability of winning (F ¼ 1.35, n.s., overall M ¼ 3.76), or in
reported motivation (F < 1, n.s., overall M ¼ 3.78).

Counterfactual Thoughts

Two coders blind to the hypotheses identified and coded all thoughts indicating how the outcome of the
wheel spin could have been better or worse.3 Internal content categories were wheel choice and wheel
control. The latter included thoughts concerning how the person could have influenced the wheel spin
in other ways (e.g. pressing the wheel choice button sooner, later, softer, or harder, or using a strategy).
External disadvantageous categories were wheel spin, luck, ordering of the wheel numbers, external
control over the wheel spin (e.g. computer program, or experimenter), number of opportunities given to
spin the wheel, and miscellaneous thoughts. Participants did not appear to generate any counterfactual
thoughts about external advantageous factors. Inter-rater agreement was 82% for these judgments, and
disagreements were resolved through discussion.4
A 3 (target: self vs. similar other vs. dissimilar other)
2 (counterfactual thought category: internal
vs. external) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the number of counterfactual thoughts, see
Figure 2. The main effect of counterfactual thought type was significant, F(1,80) ¼ 18.14, p < .001,
h2 ¼ .18, indicating that more internal (overall M ¼ 2.35) than external counterfactuals (overall
3
The direction of the counterfactual thoughts (i.e. whether the thoughts concerned how the outcome could have been better or
worse for the losing team) was also examined in both studies. The vast majority of counterfactual thoughts concerned how the
outcome could have been better (i.e. 88% of all thoughts in Study 1 and 87% of all thoughts in Study 2). In both studies, the same
pattern of results was obtained for downward (i.e. thoughts identifying a worse alternative outcome) and upward (i.e. thoughts
identifying a better alternative outcome) counterfactual thoughts. Furthermore, restricting the analyses to include only upward
counterfactual thoughts revealed the same significant effects. Therefore, the main analyses included all counterfactual thoughts
generated by participants.
4
Most disagreements over content involved whether the thought was coded as ‘miscellaneous’ or as belonging to one of the other
categories. Agreement for whether the thought was classified into one of the internal or external categories was high in both
studies (Study 1: 92%; Study 2: 89%).

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
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 Group and self-protective bias 1263

M ¼ 1.25) were generated. The overall target by thought category interaction was not significant,
F(2,80) ¼ 2.18, p ¼ .12, h2 ¼ .05. To more specifically test the predicted interaction pattern, difference
scores between the number of internal and external counterfactual thoughts were calculated and two
planned comparisons on this measure were conducted. A planned comparison of the difference scores
for the self and the dissimilar other player (i.e. the predicted interaction of counterfactual type and
target, also equivalent to a test of the predicted linear trend for the target variable) was significant,
t(80) ¼ 2.02, p < .05, h2 ¼ .05. However, a comparison of the similar and dissimilar other conditions
revealed no differences, t < 1, n.s., h2 ¼ .00. Simple effects tests were also conducted within each target
condition. Participants generated significantly more internal than external counterfactuals for both the
similar other, t(29) ¼ 3.07, p < .01, h2 ¼ .25 and dissimilar other, t(26) ¼ 3.41, p < .01, h2 ¼ .31, but not
for the self, t < 1, n.s., h2 ¼ .03.

Discussion

Individuals demonstrated a self-protective bias by generating more internal than external

disadvantageous counterfactual thoughts for the dissimilar other but not for the self. These effects
were clearly driven by differences in the number of internal counterfactuals generated, although the
means were also in the predicted order for external disadvantageous counterfactuals. Observing effects
on only one dimension is common in the attribution literature, and the overall difference between
internal and external attributions is generally considered indicative of bias (for reviews see Campbell &
Sedikides, 1999; Mezulis et al., 2004; Zuckerman, 1979). The relatively low number of external
counterfactuals in the present study was likely a result of the thought listing instructions which stressed
using ‘I’ or ‘R. H.’ in order to ensure that thoughts were written from the correct perspective.5
There was only limited evidence for a group-protective bias in Study 1. As hypothesized, the
numbers of internal and external disadvantageous thoughts generated in the similar other condition fell
between those generated in the self and dissimilar other conditions. However, counterfactuals
generated for the similar and dissimilar others did not significantly differ. Participants may not have
strongly identified with a student from the same university. Study 2 was therefore conducted utilizing a
more powerful manipulation of group identification.

STUDY 2: GROUP-PROTECTIVE BIASES IN COUNTERFACTUAL GENERATION

Study 2 was based on the design of Branscombe et al. (1997, Study 1). Individuals identified or not
identified with the German national soccer team generated counterfactuals in response to an imagined
loss in an important game. To control for differences between high and low-identified participants (such
as knowledge about soccer) and effects of perceived likelihood of success, the identities of the teams
playing in the game were manipulated. Specifically, participants read about a German loss to Holland,
or about a Mexican loss to Costa Rica. Thus, participants generated thoughts about a game in which the
losing team was either relevant (i.e. the German national team) or non-relevant (i.e. the Mexican
national team) to their social identity.

5
Indeed, in a pretest using less specific thought listing instructions, participants generated more external than internal
counterfactuals for the wheel spin outcome.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
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1264 Sean M. McCrea

Predictions

Participants highly identified with the German national team were expected to generate more
counterfactuals mutating external disadvantageous than internal factors when reading about a loss by the
German team to Holland, but not when reading about a loss by the Mexican team to Costa Rica. No
differences were expected among those low in identification with the German team. Furthermore, highly
identified participants were expected to generate more counterfactual thoughts mutating external
disadvantageous factors, and fewer thoughts mutating external advantageous factors, when considering a
German loss than a Mexican loss. Again, no differences were expected for those low in identification.

Method

Participants

Ninety-four (42 women, 52 men) students at the University of Konstanz were recruited to participate.
They received 2.50 Euros or a half-hour of research participation credit as compensation. Participants
were classified as high or low in identification on the basis of an initial questionnaire. They were
randomly assigned to either the relevant (i.e. Germany loses to Holland) or non-relevant (i.e. Mexico
loses to Costa Rica) scenario condition.

Game Scenario

A detailed description of a future quarterfinal World Cup soccer match was created. In the relevant
condition, the match was between Holland and Germany. In the non-relevant condition, the match was
between Costa Rica and Mexico. These teams were selected due to their similar playing styles and
regional rivalries. The game descriptions were identical with the exception that teams’ and players’
names were varied across the two relevance conditions. Germany (or Mexico) loses a close 4–3 game in
the final minute of play.
A number of events and features of the game were included to give participants a rich set of potential
counterfactual thoughts. These were designed to be either internal or external to the losing team (i.e.
Germany or Mexico) and either favourable or unfavourable to the losing team. Advantageous internal
factors included the excellent play of the goalkeeper and striker. Disadvantageous internal factors included
poor play by a defender and poor passing. Advantageous external factors included weather conditions and
fan support. Disadvantageous external factors included high expectations and pressure on the team, poor
referee decisions, coaching decisions by the opposition team and excellent play of the opposition striker.

Procedure

Participants were first asked a number of questions concerning their interest in the German and
Mexican national soccer teams. They answered four trivia questions concerning the German national
soccer team (e.g. ‘Who is the current trainer of the team?’; ‘How many times has Germany won the
World Cup?’). Participants also rated how important the success of the German national team was to
them and how happy they would be if Germany won the World Cup using 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)
scales, and how frequently they watched the team play using a 1 (never) to 7 (always) scale. Participants
completed the same three items concerning the Mexican national soccer team.

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 Group and self-protective bias 1265

Following the identification questionnaire, participants completed an unrelated task for 10 minutes
and were then given one of the two game descriptions. They were asked six questions about the game to
ensure they had carefully read the description (e.g. ‘Who scored two goals during the game?’).
Participants could refer to the description when answering. They then completed the counterfactual
generation task. Instructions were as follows:
When people think about past events such as a soccer game, they often have thoughts such as ‘if
only . . .’ or ‘what if . . .’. These thoughts can be about how the outcome could have been better or
worse than expected. ‘If only we had passed the ball better, we would have won the game’ or ‘What
if we had not shot on goal? We would have lost the game’ are examples of these thoughts. Please
write thoughts like those just described that you are having about the soccer game.

Participants could list up to 15 thoughts for up to 4 minutes, after which they were debriefed and the
experiment ended.

Results

Identification and Knowledge Measures

Individuals rating the importance of the German team’s success, their happiness if Germany won the
World Cup, and their frequency of viewing the German team games as three or higher on the 7-point
scale, and rating the importance of the Mexican team’s success, their happiness if Mexico won the
World Cup, and their frequency of viewing the Mexican team games as five or lower on the 7-point
scale, and correctly answering at least three of the four trivia questions about the German team, were
classified as high identifiers with the German team. All others were classified as low identifiers.
A 2 (identification: high vs. low)
2 (team: Germany vs. Mexico) repeated measures ANOVA was
computed on each of the happiness, importance and frequency of viewing measures. Results of these
analyses are presented in Table 1. The main effects of team (Fs > 139.32, ps < .001) and identification
(Fs > 12.42, ps < .001) were significant for all three measures, and were qualified by significant
interactions of Identification
Team (all Fs > 20.83, ps < .001). High-identified participants were
reliably more identified with the German team than the Mexican team across all three measures
(ts > 12.39, ps < .001). Low-identified participants also identified more with the German team than the
Mexican team, but this effect was reduced: importance: t(50) ¼ 4.84, p < .001; happy t(50) ¼ 5.62,
p < .001; viewing t(50) ¼ 11.25, p < .001. High-identified participants (M ¼ 90.8%) also correctly
answered more trivia questions than did low-identified participants (M ¼ 38.3%), t(92) ¼ 10.69,
p < .001.

Recall of Scenario

Participant’s recall of the six items concerning the details of the scenario did not differ by relevance
condition (Fs < 1, n.s.). However, high-identified participants (M ¼ 93.8%) correctly recalled more
items than did the low-identified participants (M ¼ 88.9%), F(1,90) ¼ 4.96, p < .05.6 This difference
6
Recall performance did not correlate with the number of thoughts in any of the three categories (rs < .11, ps > .32). Furthermore,
the reported three-way interaction on thought content remained significant when conducting an ANCOVA with recall
performance as a covariate.

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1266 Sean M. McCrea

Table 1. Identification measures (Study 2)

Importance Happy Watch

High identified
Germany 5.28 6.40 5.14
Mexico 2.21 3.07 1.79
Low identified
Germany 3.22 4.67 3.41
Mexico 1.92 3.10 1.55

could reflect the fact that high-identified participants were more knowledgeable of or more interested in
soccer and therefore more easily recalled the scenario.

Counterfactual Thoughts

Two independent coders blind to the hypotheses identified thoughts indicating how the outcome of the
game could have been better or worse for the losing team. Internal content categories were the ability of
the losing (i.e. Germany or Mexico) team, the play of the losing team, coaching decisions of the losing
team and the fitness or training of the losing team. External disadvantageous categories were the ability
of the winning (i.e. Holland or Costa Rica) team, the play of the winning team, coaching decisions of
the winning team, the referee, the importance of the game and media pressure, or other miscellaneous
factors. External advantageous categories were fan support and the weather. Inter-rater agreement for
these judgments was 85%, and any disagreements were resolved through discussion.
A 2 (identification: high vs. low)
2 (relevance: relevant vs. non-relevant)
3 (counterfactual
thought category: internal, external disadvantageous, or external advantageous) repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on the number of counterfactual thoughts, see Table 2. The main effect of
thought category was significant, F(2,180) ¼ 80.67, p < .001, h2 ¼ .47, indicating participants
generated external disadvantageous counterfactuals the most, followed by internal counterfactuals and
external advantageous thoughts the least. More importantly, the predicted three-way interaction of
identification, relevance and thought category was significant, F(2,180) ¼ 6.39, p < .01, h2 ¼ .07.
Consistent with the first hypothesis, simple-effects tests revealed that high-identified participants
generated significantly more external disadvantageous than internal counterfactuals for the relevant
team (i.e. Germany), t(20) ¼ 3.51, p < .01, h2 ¼ .38, but not for the non-relevant team (i.e. Mexico),
t(21) < 1, n.s., h2 ¼ .01. In contrast, low-identified individuals generated significantly more external
disadvantageous than internal counterfactuals for the non-relevant team (i.e. Mexico), t(25) ¼ 3.18,
p < .01, h2 ¼ .29, but not for the relevant team (i.e. Germany), t(24) < 1, n.s., h2 ¼ .01. Thus, only
high-identified participants demonstrated bias towards the relevant team, and they showed no such bias
towards a non-relevant team.
Supporting the second hypothesis, high-identified participants listed significantly more external
disadvantageous thoughts for the relevant team than for the non-relevant team, t(41) ¼ 2.06, p < .05,
h2 ¼ .09. In contrast, they tended to generate fewer external advantageous thoughts for the relevant
team than for the non-relevant team, t(41) ¼ 1.91, p ¼ .06, h2 ¼ .08. No differences were observed for
low-identified participants on external advantageous, t(49) ¼ 1.16, n.s., h2 ¼ .03, or disadvantageous
thoughts, t(49) ¼ 1.12, n.s., h2 ¼ .02.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
 Group and self-protective bias 1267

Table 2. Number of counterfactual thoughts generated (Study 2)

Internal External disadvantageous External advantageous n

High identified
Relevant team (Germany loses) 2.00 3.14 0.05 21
Non-relevant team (Mexico loses) 2.41 2.18 0.20 22
Low identified
Relevant team (Germany loses) 2.08 2.28 0.36 25
Non-relevant team (Mexico loses) 1.19 2.73 0.35 26

Discussion

Consistent with a group-protective bias, individuals highly identified with the German team generated
more counterfactual thoughts concerning external disadvantageous factors than internal factors, but
only when considering a loss by the German team. In contrast, low-identified individuals tended to
demonstrate a reverse bias. This latter result was not predicted, yet was consistent with a
group-protective bias given that at least some of the low-identified participants were more identified
with the Mexican team than the German team. The effects of team relevance rule out the possibility that
these biases were actually due to other differences between low and high-identified participants, such as
soccer knowledge, or the surprising nature of the game outcome.
Furthermore, high-identified individuals generated more external counterfactual thoughts for the
relevant (German) team than the non-relevant (Mexican) team, but only when these thoughts concerned
disadvantageous factors. This pattern was reversed for external advantageous factors. Combining these
types of counterfactual thoughts into a single index would have obscured the group-protective bias. It is
also important to note that group-protective bias was defined in a manner consistent with past work on
attributions (Hewstone, 1990; Mezulis et al., 2004; Pettigrew, 1979), in that all external counterfactuals
were examined, not just those concerning the other team. Indeed, in the present study the poor decisions
of the referee were a favourite target of the high identifiers in the relevant condition. Nonetheless, the
reported three-way interaction remained significant when including only thoughts about the two teams,
and again demonstrated clear evidence of group-protective bias.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In two studies, support for self and group-protective biases were observed in the generation of
counterfactual thoughts. Individuals were likely to counterfactualize more external disadvantageous
than internal factors for the self and important ingroups than for dissimilar others and non-relevant
groups after a poor outcome. The present studies provide the first evidence to date of group-protection
concerns playing a role in counterfactual mutation, and also support and extend the findings of previous
research demonstrating self-serving biases in counterfactual thinking (e.g. Goerke et al., 2004; Roese &
Olson, 1993). Specifically, evidence of protective biases was found for both hypothetical (Study 2) and
actual events (Study 1), and when manipulating identification with the target. This latter finding rules
out the possibility that bias effects are due to the surprising nature of failure.
The present research also suggests a few explanations for the lack of consistent findings in this
literature. First, studies of self and group-serving biases comparing only self and other-referent (or
ingroup and outgroup-referent) counterfactuals may fail to capture important ways in which

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
1268 Sean M. McCrea

individuals externalize blame for negative outcomes. Second, the open-ended nature of counterfactual
thought listings can lead to an inappropriate aggregation of thoughts concerning disadvantageous and
advantageous external factors. Advantageous factors (whether internal or external) likely do not shift
blame away from the target, as the negative outcome occurred despite these factors, whereas
considering external disadvantageous factors likely does decrease blame.

Implications and Future Directions

The findings of these studies again highlight the close relationship between counterfactual thinking and
causal reasoning (see also Spellman & Mandel, 1999; Wells & Gavanski, 1989), and add to a growing
literature demonstrating that the content of counterfactual mutation is affected by motivational
considerations (e.g. Crawford & McCrea, 2004; Markman et al., 1993; Markman & Tetlock, 2000;
Sanna et al., 2001; Tetlock et al., 2000). The present studies also suggest that self and group-protective
biases are likely to mitigate the amplified negative affect associated with counterfactual thinking.
Although these predictions were not directly tested here, past research has shown that self-referent
counterfactuals increase regret, shame and guilt after negative outcomes (e.g. Branscombe et al., 2003;
Niedenthal et al., 1994). Thus, a self-protective bias in counterfactual thinking would presumably serve
to minimize increased regret and self-blame, as well as maintain and enhance self-esteem (see also
McCrea, 2007). Similarly, one could predict that a group-protective bias would maintain and enhance
collective self-esteem. Future studies should examine these predictions more closely.
An additional limitation to the current work that should be noted is that only reactions to negative
outcomes were examined. The focus of the present work was therefore on the self and group-protective
aspects of counterfactual thinking. Previous work has found evidence supportive of a self-serving bias
when comparing negative and positive outcomes, and so future studies should extend this research to
examine effects of self and group-relevance for successful outcomes. Such evidence would strengthen
the conclusion that these effects are truly motivated (Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979), as
well as demonstrate that counterfactual thinking can serve to enhance positive affect and increase
personal and collective self-esteem following success. A closer consideration of the locus of
counterfactual thoughts may therefore yield a better understanding of their consequences for
self-esteem, social identity, affect and behaviour.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks Ute Ehinger, Ruprecht Lindhorst, Susanne Lübeck and Andrea Tietz for serving as
coders for the present studies, and Peter Gollwitzer for his helpful suggestions in this research. This
research was completed with the support of a grant to the author from the University of Konstanz (AFF
13/05).

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APPENDIX

Self Condition Thought Listing Instructions (Study 1)

After an event such as the wheel game, people sometimes think about how it could have been better or
worse. They have thoughts such as ‘If I had only . . .’, ‘If I were only . . .’, or ‘If only it had happened
such and such a way . . .’. Please write five thoughts of this type: write how in your opinion you could
have won more or fewer lottery tickets. Please write your thoughts in the following form:
‘If I had only . . ., I would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

‘If I were only . . ., I would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

‘If it had only . . ., I would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

These should be your own thoughts, and not what someone else could have thought.

Similar and Dissimilar Other Condition Thought Listing Instructions (Study 1)

After an event such as the wheel game, people sometimes think about how it could have been better or
worse. They have thoughts such as ‘If he had only . . .’, ‘If he were only . . .’, or ‘If only it had happened
such and such a way . . .’. Please write five thoughts of this type: write how in your opinion R. H. could
have won more or fewer lottery tickets. Please write your thoughts in the following form:
‘If R. H. had only . . ., R. H. would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

‘If R. H. were only . . ., R. H. would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

‘If it had only . . ., R. H. would have won more/fewer lottery tickets’.

These should be your own thoughts about R. H., and not what R. H. could have thought.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1256–1271 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp