BELUSO vs THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY

GR No. 153974 August 7, 2006

FACTS:

The municipality of Panay issued a resolution authorizing the municipal government to

expropriate parcels of land owned by petitioners. Petitioners contend among others that the
expropriation was based on a resolution and not an ordinance contrary to Sec. 19 of the LGC.

ISSUE:

WON RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE THE LAWFUL POWER TO ACQUIRE THE
SUBJECT LANDS THROUGH EMINENT DOMAIN, IT BEING EXERCISED BY MEANS OF A
MERE RESOLUTION AND NOT THROUGH AN ORDINANCE AS REQUIRED BY LAW

RULING:

The Court ruled in favour of the petitioner.

LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Although they may
exercise the power to expropriate private property, it must be authorized by Congress and is
subject to its control and restraints. Under Sec. 19 of the LGC, for LGUs to exercise the power of
eminent domain, there are several requisites which must concur:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local

chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article

III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property. A
resolution is temporary in nature and is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance on the other hand is a law which possesses
permanent character.

As respondent’s expropriation was based merely on a resolution, such is clearly

defective.