Adam Throne

Module #2

Over the past year, North Korea’s nuclear program has advanced rapidly. In recent weeks,

missile tests have been intertwined with a flurry of aggressive tweets between Kim Jong-un and

President Trump. As a result of this expeditious development, the world has started looking for a

response. Some say that boosting deterrence by arming domestic nuclear missiles and reorganizing

defense systems is the best option. Others claim that a preemptive first strike is the only swift

solution. I argue that, in the specific case of North Korea, traditional nuclear deterrence will be

ineffective. Instead, multilateral collaboration and intelligence sharing should be used to prevent

escalation and proliferation.

Aiming weapons at North Korea in a traditional strategy of deterrence will only cause the

rogue nation to further develop and expand its nuclear arsenal. Why did North Korea develop a

nuclear arsenal in the first place? Yes, maybe it hoped to gain a voice. Maybe it felt that nuclear

development was a necessary step to becoming a recognized nation. However, when it comes down

to it, North Korea was primarily trying to protect its national security interests. The United States

speaks publicly about desiring peace, but its actions suggest differently. Nearly 40,000 United

States personnel are stationed in South Korea. This does not include the massive 7th fleet patrolling

the region. Without a strong economy and advanced military, Nuclear weapons are, in Kim Jong-

un’s mind, the most effective way to ensure that the United States does not use its overwhelming

force to reopen conflict. If the United States or its allies retaliate with their own nuclear threats,

North Korea may respond by advancing its arsenal or making a perilous decision. In a time of

desperation, this could lead to an asymmetrical war. Intimidation in an attempt to deter North

Korean use of nuclear weapons is not an option.

Targeting North Korean weapons in a preemptive first strike is also not an option. The

potential form of deterrence existing on the Korean peninsula is not bilateral like it was between the

United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Instead, the United States is also responsible
for the lives of South Korean and Japanese civilians. It is estimated that North Korea has around 10

capable nuclear missiles at its disposal. The United States could locate most of these using

intelligence operations. It could disarm or destroy them through covert action, a special operation,

or a strike. However, even if everything went according to plan, massive civilian and military

casualties would still occur. Seoul and other northern cities are well within range of North Korean

artillery. It would be impossible to preemptively destroy all North Korean artillery positions and

missiles. Even if an attack capable of this feat was launched, significant damage could be

completed in the minutes between launch and detonation. Without Mutually Assured Destruction at

home, the United States may be willing to make a rash decision. Unfortunately, this would

jeopardize millions of civilian lives and United States relationships with the world.

Ultimately, the risk of an accidental attack or mis-launch is too great to justify keeping

armed nuclear weapons an option in the region. North Korea is rational. The nation is not interested

in self-destruction, nuclear war, or even traditional war. As the United States considers its response,

it needs to take a step back and look at the big picture. In addition to protecting South Korea and

Japan, the United States is also competing to maintain a positive relationship with China in the

South China Sea. Relations with Russia are deteriorating following election meddling allegations.

Deterrence could impact relations with these regional superpowers in two ways. First, both China

and Russia support the defense of North Korea. Russia has already publicly denounced President

Trump for his aggressive comments. If the United States strikes first, it will likely be entering into a

world war. Knowing this, North Korea is not susceptible to traditional deterrence. Second, regional

nuclear defense strategies could be perceived as violations of larger-scale deterrence. The anti-

ballistic missile treaty limits the deployment of defense systems by signatories. Although the

United States has made it clear that its systems are designed to shoot down Korean missiles, China

or Russia could see them as attempts to alleviate Mutually Assured Destruction. If any sort of

nuclear accident occurs in the peninsula, the United States will be held accountable. In the end, the

risk of expanding war beyond the region is too great to authorize the threat of nuclear weapons

against North Korea.

 So, if nuclear deterrence aimed against North Korea is not an effective option, then what is?

Rather than expanding its arsenals and pressuring the situation, the world should look to set an

example by taking a firm non-nuclear response. Other aspiring nations are watching closely to see

how the global superpowers respond to North Korea’s nuclear bid for power. If the United States

does the wrong thing, responds positively to North Korea, or significantly shifts existing nuclear

deterrence strategies, there will be global consequences. Immediately, the strategy should include

sanctions, requests to meet outside of the twitter realm, and recognition in return for

denuclearizing. This will put a time constraint on the tension, limit non-strategic responses, and

work towards the goal of a nuclear-free peninsula. Meanwhile, the United States should take a lead

on working with regional allies and enemies alike to develop a joint task-force aimed at limiting

nuclear weapons. China has already developed a regional framework for this, but the structure of

the United Nations Security Council could also be effective. Meetings should focus on developing

unity through the shared risk of nuclear proliferation and unpredictable strategy of North Korea.

Involving nations from both sides of the Korean War will emphasize that attempts at removing

nuclear weapons are not aimed at dethroning the existing regime. This multi-lateral and liberal

method is the most rounded solution.

In conclusion, nuclear deterrence should play a limited role in resolving North Korean

nuclear ambitions. Increasing surrounding nuclear weapons arsenals will only pressure North Korea

to increase and develop its existing arsenal. A preemptive first strike would result in unacceptable

civilian and military losses in South Korea. The risk of expanding conflict to other regional players

downplays the limited benefits of traditional nuclear deterrence. The options are bleak, but it seems

that a multilateral approach is the best option. The United States should set its personal aspirations

aside and work with China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and other UN Security Council members

to motivate North Korea into intentionally stopping its nuclear weapons program. This could be

achieved through a variety of peaceful and nationalistic tactics. Hopefully the threat will be

alleviated by the South Korea Olympics in February.