INTERPRETATION OF THE WILLS

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)

Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a will executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs
and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and personal
properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition where
she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the
partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows: a. the legitime computed for
each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based
on the will b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash/properties to
complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were
to receive considerably less
DOCTRINE: The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative.
Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent
noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral
and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be
paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same.
This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing
that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
Her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that
said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in
the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before
I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased."
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of their
legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they
can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-
appellee.

Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the
moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows:
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for
the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix.
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having
begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor.

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to
its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was
to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the
further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during
her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second
("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only
the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate
in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñë

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties
bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so
doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .

SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of an instrument
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all." .

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament should
not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in
ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage
of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only
remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following: .

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use
them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.

HELD:

The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he
provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having
begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property.
Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her
estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator
wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should
belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition
 Vda. de Villafl or v. Juico L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962

FACTS: In the will of the testator, he gave certain properties to his wife for her “use and possession while still living and
she does not remarry, otherwise the properties will pass to my grandniece.” The widow lived for 34 more years but
never remarried. On the widow’s death, the grandniece wanted to get said properties. It was contended that since the
widow never remarried, the grandniece cannot get the properties.

HELD: The grandniece can get the property, despite the fact that the widow never remarried. It would have been
different had OWNERSHIP over the properties been given to the widow. In such a case, since there was no remarriage,
the grandniece cannot inherit. However, as will be observed, what had been granted to the widow were only the “use
and possession” of the properties “while living,” the clear intent of the testator being only to grant her a life interest or
usufructuary interest — an interest which could have ceased even during her lifetime had she remarried. Art. 791 of the
Civil Code requires that each word of the will be given some effect

AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTIES –ACCRUALS OF THE ESTATE SINCE THE OPENING OF SUCCESSION

BLAS ET AL VS SANTOS ET AL
1 SCRA 899 – SUCCESSION – PROMISE

Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He also had grandchildren
from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children)
but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of
debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she
intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half
of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or
choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her estate. In the same
year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon
Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed
not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property precisely because Maxima promised that
they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.

HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a
donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’
estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal
properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-
half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be
conjugal properties in the will of the husband.

Justice Bautista Angelo, dissenting:

It should be noted that Maxima Santos’ promise to transmit is predicated on the condition that she can freely choose and
select from among the heirs and legatees of her husband those to whom she would like to give and bequeath depending
on the respect, service and companionship that they may render to her. Her commitment is not an absolute promise to
give to all but only to whom she may choose and select. And here this promise has been substantially complied with when
she disposed one-tenth of the property to some legatees named in Simeon’s will.
 It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is
“future inheritance.” To us future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the
time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit
“A” are well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as
belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife’s actual share in the conjugal properties
may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit “A” was executed.
 Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit “A” is a worthless piece of paper because it is not a will nor a
donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated above, it is a compromise and at the same time a contract
with a sufficient cause or consideration. It is also contended that it deals with future inheritance. We do not think that
Exhibit “A” is a contract on future inheritance. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of
her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal
properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit “A”
on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband’s
estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her
husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit “A” is
not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October
8, 1915, thus:

 DISSENTING OPINION:
It has been contended that the doctrine thus stated confuses future inheritance (herencia futura) with
futureproperty (bienes futuros). This is a misapprehension. In construing the term “future inheritance” as the contingent
universality or complex of property rights and obligations that are passed to the heirs upon the death of the grantor, the
rule advocated merely correlates the prohibition against contracts over “future inheritance” with the definition of
“inheritance” given in Article 659 of the Spanish Civil Code, which is now Article 776 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death.
The inheritance of a person may, and usually does, include not only property that he already owns at a given time, but
also his future property, that is to say, the property that he may subsequently acquire. But it may include only future
property whenever he should dispose of the present property before he dies. And future inheritance may include only
property he already owns at any given moment, if he should thereafter acquire no other property until his death. In any
case, the inheritance or estate cons of the totality of and liabilities he holds at the time of his demise, and not what he at
any other time. If the questioned contract envisages all or a fraction of that contingent mass, then it is a contract over
herencia futurall otherwise it is not. The statutory prohibition, in other words, is not so much concerned with the process
of transfer as with the subject matter of the bargain. It is addressed to “future inheritance”, not “future succession.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY – ELEMENTS

DE GUZMAN v INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ

On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased
Francisco Benitez, filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a petition for administration of his intestate estate
and for the issuance of letters of administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been
administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his person and property duly appointed on January 22, 1957

Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual Benitez, and Camila
Valenzuela whose brother was the father of private respondents, Dionisia Valenzuela and Melquiades Valenzuela.
He died single at the age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without descendants, nor ascendants, nor brothers and
sisters.

He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14) parcels of coconut land in Laguna, with a total area of 34 hectares, a
residential lot on S. Crisostomo Street in the poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna, and a small savings account
(P3,843.08) in the Philippine National Bank.

The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the deceased left a will
bequeathing his entire estate to him

In support of the petition for probate (SC-352), the petitioner Fidel de Guzman and two attesting witnesses of the will,
Pelagio Lucena and Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave evidence.

The oppositors (petitioners for administration in SC-347) presented six (6) witnesses, namely, Marcial Mendoza,
Pedro Cabela, Porfirio Reyes, Dionisia Valenzuela, Honoria Recalde Leonardo and Prudencio Leonardo, who
identified the transcript of the testimony given on January 22, 1957 by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez (since deceased) in the
proceedings (SC-29) for the guardianship of Francisco Benitez for incompetence on account of insanity. Various
documentary exhibits were presented by both sides.

In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that Court carefully weighed the evidence on the
question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling
reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility
of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of
witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in
observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence,
shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners Fidel, Crisencia and
Rosalia de Guzman.

FORM OF WILLS – NOTARIAL WILLS

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
 JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 andEVANGELISTA S. YUIPCO,
Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.

ISSUE; Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its
face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a
forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
 Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley, married Marcelina
Salvador in 1923.They were childless.
 They reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in
his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married Marcelina in
1923).
 Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran’s widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government.
 Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad. Agapito also
became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953
 It should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding.
Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that
she was unfaithful to Agapito

 the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted
to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who
brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. SP-08654-
R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married
Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668
J.B. Roxas Street.
 Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years old. That will, which
is in English, was thumb marked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were
also thumb marked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed
granddaughter Marilyn.
 Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundry woman of Marcelina (p. 97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn’s husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina’s alleged will.

 Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the
testratrix’s house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
 That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina’s estate.
She and the other occupants of the decedent’s house filed on April 18 in the said proceedings a motion to set aside the
order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent’s son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he
has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito’s guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito’s daughter nor the
decedent’s granddaughter
 In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her
contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in
English which is not known to her (pp. 208, 209, Record).
 Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to withdraw from
various banks the deposits of Marcelina.
 She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record of the
probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his
decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be
decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because
she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal Government.
HELD: We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate
case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent’s legal heirs and not the instituted heiress
in the void will should have inherited the decedent’s estate.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumb marked by an
obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix.
But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.”
(p. 16, Record of testate case) That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must
be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the
Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660)
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina
Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix.”
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the
will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing
at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that
the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate
of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES, petitioner-administrator-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL,

 This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga
Vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.
 the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing
therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was
written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind
when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.

Issues: : 1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will (Exhibit "C") are genuine; 2) whether or
not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was written; and 3) whether or not
the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.

ANSWER: THE WILL IS VALID.

1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner presented as witnesses the three
persons who attested to the execution of the will. These witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the
deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had
signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each
other. This is the substance of what they have testified and from an examination of their testimony to the court entertains
no doubt that they had told the truth. There is nothing in their testimony which may in any way reflect against their
credibility nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give rise to the suspicion that they testified out
of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. They have impressed the court as simple persons who had intervened in
the execution of the will out merely of deference to the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to
be a good and respectable woman.

Jose G. Villanueva, who made a comparative analysis of the signatures appearing in the will in relation to some genuine
signatures of the deceased, and in fact testified on the analysis and study he has made of said signatures and submitted a
memorandum on the study and comparison he has made. And in his testimony as well as in his memorandum, this witness
has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is not the same
hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and which he used as basis of his analytical study, thereby
concluding that said signatures are not genuine. The lower court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert
witness, and decreed as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate.

The selection of the proper standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and the
state of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. a signature affixed in 1941 may involved characteristics
different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is because the passing of time and the increase in age
may have a decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. It for this reasons that the authorities of the
opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. But such was
observed in the study made by Espinosa. He followed the standard practice in handwriting analysis. It is for this reason
that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves more weight and consideration.

2. There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would indicate that the
testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question. But, in our opinion, this
failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important requirement of the law has not been complied with,
it appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this technical omission. In the first place, we have the
undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several
trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by
the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give
rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written, which presumption
should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this
presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the
testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation
clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased
knew the language in which the will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on
this ground.

3. the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental
witnesses have said on this point. Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before the signing
of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she was of the impression that the deceased was of sound mind at the
time. To the same effect is the testimony of Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her impression when the deceased
signed the will was that she could still talk and read, only that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it.
These statements had not been contradicted. They give an idea of the mental had not contradicted. They give an idea of
mental condition of the deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state
of health rather than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of genuineness.

In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased

ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al.,

ISSUE: The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten
statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of law
prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?

ANSWER: NO

It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"), which is sought to be probated, is written in the
Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages (pages 4 and 5 of the record) double space. The first page is
signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten "Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate
A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the second page appears the signature of three (3)
instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the
signature of T. de los Santos and below his signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the
said testament. On the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is the last page of said last Will and Testament, also appears the
signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second page on the left margin appears the signature of
Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following phrase, "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'. The will
is duly acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney Timoteo de los Santos. (Emphasis supplied)

The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witness in the presence of the testator and of one another. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence and by his express direction," is practically the same as the provisions of Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge
or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the
testator's name must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Applying this
provision this Court said in the case of Ex Parte Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil., 700:
 It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure that where the testator does
not know how, or is unable, to sign, it will not be sufficient that one of the attesting witnesses signs the will at
the testator's request, the notary certifying thereto as provided in Article 695 of the Civil Code, which, in this
respect, was modified by section 618 above referred to, but it is necessary that the testator's name be written
by the person signing in his stead in the place where he could have signed if he knew how or was able to do so,
and this in the testator's presence and by his express direction; so that a will signed in a manner different than
that prescribed by law shall not be valid and will not be allowed to be probated.

Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will himself, it shall be signed in
the following manner:

John Doe by the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: "By the testator, John Doe, Richard Doe." All this must be
written by the witness signing at the request of the testator.

Therefore, under the law now in force, the witness Naval A. Vidal should have written at the bottom of the will
the full name of the testator and his own name in one forms given above. He did not do so, however, and this is
failure to comply with the law is a substantial defect which affects the validity of the will and precludes its
allowance, notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared to oppose it.

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said Abellana
herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the
testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction.

It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained to declare that the said
will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.

In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943.
The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was signed by
himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages
thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and
understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them
were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and
each and every one of us witnesses.
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty three,
(1943) A.D.
Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier as he
wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will. HOWEVER, immediately after Antero
Mercado’s will, Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states that all pages of the will
were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and
each and every one of us witnesses.” The attestation clause however did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercado’s
name.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid since there is an X mark in attestation clause. THE WILL IS DISALLOWED.
HELD: No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier
to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But is there really a need for such to be included in the attestation clause considering that even though Javier signed for
Antero, Antero himself placed his signature by virtue of the “X” mark, and by that, Javier’s signature is merely a surplusage?
That the placing of the “X” mark is the same as placing Antero’s thumb mark.
No. It’s not the same as placing the testator’s thumb mark. It would have been different had it been proven that the
“X” mark was Antero’s usual signature or was even one of the ways by which he signs his name. If this were so, failure
to state the writing by somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would be considered to have signed the
will himself.
HELD FULL TEXT: the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals)
argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a
sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner’s theory is that the cross is as
much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the
ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a
thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to
the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator
and of each other.

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO,

ISSUE: What is the true test of the testator’s or the witness’ presence in the signing of a will? Whether one of the
subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in
a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible
for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures
to the instrument.

HELD: AFFIRMED.

“The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw
each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental
and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.”
The decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses
to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes
were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction
they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner
of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the
code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to probate as the last will and
testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with costs of this instance against the appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),

ISSUE: For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting
witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?

ANSWER: Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

“Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

“The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

“The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the with and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

“If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.”

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs
at the “end” but all the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another
because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page,
where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for
the extrinsic validity of the will that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the will after the signature of the
testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the
signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties
of human nature.

We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written
by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator’s execution of the will in order to see
and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a
fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses’ names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will
which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies
the purpose of identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the
testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity
of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, “the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This
objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103).
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were it not for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he
would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of
the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang
to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have
been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed
by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina dos”
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page.”

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the
attestation clause must state the number of pages used:

“The law referred to is Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the
number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility
of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of
Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or
passes composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad
and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.”

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach: ” . . . Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses, did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the
seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted
as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attest to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz 1459, at 1479 (decision on
reconsideration) ‘witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.'”

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted.

Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest

Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the
evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left
in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead
when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this
proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is
deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy
duplicate was regular in all respects.

Icasiano v. Icasiano Digest

Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the
evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left
in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead
when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this
proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is
deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy
duplicate was regular in all respects.

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

Tirona, Gutierrez and Adorable for appellant.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don
Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed. In the court
below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing
in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that,
if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as
such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted
therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud
or trick.

In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court a quo erred in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was
executed in all particulars as required by law." To this objection is added the alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit
"A" was written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous objection of the oppositor.

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic
numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of
its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by
other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by
the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the
second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his
testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two
contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any
possibility be taken for other than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan,supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.

Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the
merits we do not believe that the appellant's contention deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are
set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which
they occurred.
 Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show that the contradictions of witnesses generally occur in
the details of a certain incident, after a long series of questioning, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith.
Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions they should not agree
in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.)

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis."
While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or
suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A
statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.)

With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to
offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case and after the
opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further
evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it
is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a
nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion, or
demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed.
(64 C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it
has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally,
additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is
to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present
evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.

Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the
testament. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This
Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator
knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court
said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.

The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed,

81 PHIL 429 – Succession – Pagination of the Will – Witnesses to a Will – Language of the Will – Thumb Mark as Signature

In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin Liboro questioned the validity of the said will based on the
following ground, among others:

1. The first sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals.
2. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
3. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
4. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by Don Sixto Lopez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD: Yes, the will is valid.

1. The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional
numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the
contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last
sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned
“Testamento”.
2. The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboro’s appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of the
witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.
3. Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from “partial paralysis.”
There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or
preference. Both ways are good.
4. There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used therein. It
is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.

G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978

ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR
DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO
NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA,respondents.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo for petitioners.

Romulo S. Brion & Florentino M. Poonin for private respondents.

81 SCRA 393 – Succession – Prevarication – Lawyer’s Testimony vs Witness’ Testimony

The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one of the instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to
admit the will to probate. The petition was opposed by Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors claimed that they were the legally
adopted children of Danila; that the said will sought to be probated by Nista was obtained through fraud.

The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially stated that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The
compromise agreement was approved by the trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and devisees – intervened. The trial court
allowed the intervention and set aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they
abandoned Danila and committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the Guerras. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
probate court. The CA ruled that there was a failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental witnesses when she signed the will – this
was because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified in court that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their
signatures.

HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and who assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the
testimony of the two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and the three instrumental witnesses were in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them.
Another lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the will, corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in not allowing the will to probate.

HELD: No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their admissions of the due execution of the will and thus
preventing them from prevaricating later on by testifying against the will’s due execution.

The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity
surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. There is a presumption in the
regularity of the performance of a lawyer with his duty as a notary public. There has been no evidence to show that Barcenas has been remiss in his duty
nor were there any allegations of fraud against him. In fact, the authenticity of Danila’s and the witnesses’ signature was never questioned.

The attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in
signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all
the time present during the execution.

Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead
the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the others. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due execution of the will,
or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of
seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant
of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.

ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR
DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO
NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA,respondents.

DECISION

GUERRERO, J:

Appeal by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49915-R, entitled “Adelaida Nista, Petitioner-Appellee, versus
Buenaventura Guerra, et al., Oppositors-Appellants,” denying and disallowing the probate of the second last will and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila
previously declared probated by the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch III at San Pablo City.

The facts are stated in the appealed decision, the pertinent portions of which state:

“It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista, who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and
testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit H) and codicil dated April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner
prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and codicil be probated and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as
administrator of the testatrix’s estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00,
said estate be summarily settled in accordance with the Rules.

“Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra, filed an opposition on July 18, 1966 and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to
the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila (Exhibit
1); that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H and L) were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required
by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the
free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951, her last will and testament (Exhibit
3) which was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified
to act as administratrix of the estate.

“On November 4, 1968, the petitioner and the oppositors, assisted by their respective counsels, entered into a Compromise Agreement with the following
terms and conditions, thus:

‘1. That oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina (Martina) Guerra are the legally adopted son and daughter, respectively, of the deceased spouses,
Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila;

‘2. That Florentino Guerra pre-deceased Eugenia Danila; that Eugenia Danila died on May 21, 1966, at San Pablo City but during her lifetime, she had
already sold, donated or disposed of all her properties, some of which to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra, as indicated and confirmed in paragraph 13 of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. SP-620, entitled Marcelina Guerra versus Adelaida Nista, et al., and which we hereby likewise admit and confirm;

‘3. That, however, with respect to the parcel of riceland covered by TCT No. T-5559 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City, which oppositors believe
to be the estate left and undisposed of at the time of the death of the owner thereof, Eugenia Danila, it now appears that there is a Deed of Donation
covering the same together with another parcel of coconut land situated at Barrio San Ignacio, San Pablo City with an area of 19,905 sq. m., and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 31286, executed by the late Eugenia Danila in favor of Adelaida Nista, as per Doc. No. 406, Page No. 83, Series of 1966 under
Notarial Register III of Notary Public Pio Aquino of San Pablo City;
‘4. That inasmuch as the above-mentioned parcel of coconut land has been earlier donated inter vivos and validly conveyed on November 15, 1965 by
the late Eugenia Danila to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra as shown by Doc. No. 237, Page No. 49, Series of 1965, under Notarial Register XV of Notary
Public Atty. Romulo S. Brion of San Pablo City, the inclusion of said parcel in the subsequent donation to Adelaida Nista is admittedly considered a mistake
and of no force and effect and will in no way prejudice the ownership and right of Marcelina (Martina) Guerra over the said parcel; that as a matter of fact,
whatever rights and interests Adelaida Nista has or may still have thereon are already considered waived and renounced in favor of Marcelina (Martina)
Guerra;

‘5. That in view of the fact that the riceland mentioned in paragraph 3 of the foregoing appears to have already been disposed of by Eugenia Danila in
favor of petitioner Adelaida Nista, which the parties hereto do not now contest, there is therefore no more estate left by the said deceased Eugenia Danila
to be disposed of by the will sought to be probated in this proceedings; that consequently, and for the sake of peace and harmony among the relations
and kins and adopted children of the deceased Eugenia Danila, and with the further aim of settling differences among themselves, the will and codicil of
Eugenia Danila submitted to this Honorable Court by the petitioner for probate, are considered abrogated and set aside;

‘6. That as the late Eugenia Danila has incurred debts to private persons during her lifetime, which in addition to the burial and incidental expenses amounts
to SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P6,800.00) her adopted daughter, Marcelina (Martina) Guerra is now determined to settle the same, but
herein petitioner Adelaida Nista hereby agrees to contribute to Marcelina (Martina) Guerra for the settlement of the said indebtedness in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P3,400.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be delivered by Adelaida Nista to Marcelina (Martina)
Guerra at the latter’s residence at Rizal Avenue, San Pablo City, on or about February 28, 1969;

‘7. That should there be any other property of the deceased Eugenia Danila, that may later on be discovered to be undisposed of as yet by Eugenia Danila
during her lifetime, the same should be considered as exclusive property of her adopted children and heir Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina (Martina)
Guerra, and any right of the petitioner and signatories hereto, with respect to said property or properties, shall be deemed waived and renounced in favor
of said Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) Guerra; and

‘8. That with the exception of the foregoing agreement, parties hereto waived and renounce further claim against each other, and the above entitled case.”
(Exh. 6)

“This Agreement was approved by the lower court in a judgment reading as follows:
“WHEREFORE, said compromise agreement, being not contrary to public policy, law and moral, the same is hereby approved and judgment is hereby
rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the above-quoted compromise agreement which is hereby made an integral part of the
dispositive portion of this decision, and the parties are strictly enjoined to comply with the same. (Exh. 7)

“On November 16, 1968, Rosario de Ramos, Miguel Danila, Felix Danila, Miguel Gavino, Amor Danila, Consolacion Santos and Miguel Danila, son of the
late Fortunato Danila, filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners alleging that being instituted heirs or devisees, they have rights and interests
to protect in the estate of the late Eugenia Danila. They also filed a reply partly admitting and denying the material allegations in the opposition to the
petition and alleging among other things, that oppositors repudiated their institution as heirs and executors when they failed to cause the recording in the
Register of Deeds of San Pablo City the will and testament dated November 5, 1951 (Exhibit 3) in accordance with the Rules and committed acts of
ingratitude when they abandoned the testatrix and denied her support after they managed, through fraud and undue influence, to secure the schedule of
partition dated January 15, 1962. The Intervenors prayed for the probate and/or allowance of the will and codicil (Exhibits H and L), respectively and the
appointment of any of them as administrator of said estate.

“On December 6, 1968, the intervenors also filed a motion for new trial and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set aside the judgment based
on compromise dated November 5, 1968. The oppositors interposed an opposition to the motion to which the intervenors filed their reply.

“The lower court resolved the motions in an order the dispositive portion reading, thus:

‘FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby makes the following dispositions —

(1) Movants Rosario de Ramos, Miguel G. Danila, Miguela Gavino, Amor Danila, Consolacion Santos, Miguel A. Danila and Raymundo Danila are allowed
and admitted to intervene to this proceeding as Party Petitioners; and likewise admitted in their reply to the amended opposition of November 11, 1968;

(2) The compromise agreement dated October 15, 1968 by and between Petitioner Adelaida Nista and oppositors Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina
Guerra (Martina), is disapproved, except as regards their respective lawful rights in the subject estate; and, accordingly, the judgment on compromise
rendered by this Court on November 5, 1968 is reconsidered and set aside; and

(3) The original Petition and amended opposition to probate of the alleged will and codicil stand. xxx xxx xxx

“The lower court also denied the motion for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the intervenors. xxx xxx xxx
“A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order was filed by the intervenors co-petitioners but the motion was denied.
xxx xxx xxx

“On February 9, 1971, a motion for the substitution of Irene, Crispina, Cristino, Casiano, Eriberto, Felisa, Guerra in place of their father, the oppositor
Buenaventura Guerra who died on January 23, 1971, was filed and granted by the lower court.”

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dated July 6, 1971 allowing the probate of the will. In that decision, although two of the
attesting witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see the testatrix Eugenia Danila sign the will but that the same was
already signed by her when they affixed their own signatures thereon, the trial court gave more weight and merit to the “straight-forward and candid”
testimony of Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public who assisted in the execution of the will, affirming that the testatrix and the three (3) instrumental
witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other, and that with respect to the codicil, the same manner was likewise observed as corroborated to
by the testimony of another lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero who was also present during the execution of the codicil.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, it appearing that the late Eugenia Danila had testamentary capacity when she executed the will, Exh. H., and the codicil, Exh. L, and that
said will and codicil were duly signed by her and the three attesting witnesses and acknowledged before a Notary Public in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law, the said will and codicil are hereby declared probated. No evidence having been adduced regarding the qualification and fitness of any
of the intervenors-co-petitioners to act as executors, the appointment of executors of the will and codicil is held pending until after due hearing on the
matter.

SO ORDERED”

Oppositors Marcelina Guerra and the heirs of Buenaventura Guerra appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of Appeals. The latter court, in its decision
dated May 12, 1975 ruled that the lower court acted correctly in setting aside its judgment approving the Compromise Agreement and in allowing the
intervenors-co-petitioners to participate in the instant probate proceedings; however, it disallowed the probate of the will on the ground that the evidence
failed to establish that the testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witnesses in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil
Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.
In this present appeal, petitioners vigorously insists on constitutional grounds the nullity of the decision of respondent court but We deem it needless to
consider the same as it is not necessary in resolving this appeal on the following assigned errors:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO THE ATTESTATION THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL, ANNEX
B (PETITION AND INSTEAD IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN ATTESTATION CLAUSES
AND THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC; AND

(B) THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DENIED THE PROBATE OF THE WILL AND CODICIL DESPITE CONVINCING EVIDENCE
FOR THEIR ALLOWANCE.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the trial court allowing probate of the will and codicil in question.

The main point in controversy here is whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of
the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing
witnesses testified to the contrary.

Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the will and codicil which were signed by the instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of
the deeds, thus, preventing the said witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners further maintain that it is error
for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of the biased witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the
testimonial account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom, right after, the deeds were acknowledged.

Private respondents, on the other hand, reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two surviving witnesses Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that
the will was not signed by the testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by two photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the
act of signing, there being no picture of the same occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where there was
an opportunity to take pictures, it is not understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the absence of
the latter’s picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in
the presence of each other.

The oppositors’ argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince Us that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with
the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero. The execution of
the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity
surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. 2 If there should be any stress
on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as members
of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently,
respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the
attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove
their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3)
attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that
these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before
a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not easily by the mere expediency of the
negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix sigh the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing
with a positive assertion, and faced with the convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this
regard —
“It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in
the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they
really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the others.
This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit silent, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing,
forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing.” 3

Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause which, significantly, is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it affirms that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had
been observed. This Court had previously held that the attestation clause basically contradicts the pretense of undue execution which later on may be
made by the attesting witnesses. 4 In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper
execution of the will, and their signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of the testatrix’s
signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. 5 By signing the will, the witnesses impliedly certified to the truth
of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like. 6

In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the will. Under this circumstance, they become “forced witnesses”
and their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not bind the proponent, hence, the latter may present other proof of due execution even if
contrary to the testimony of some or all of the attesting witnesses. 7 As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due execution
of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied
from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by
law. 8Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, to deserve full credit,
their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise, it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 9

In the case at bar, the records bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one hand, and the Notary Public,
Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was contradicted by his own admission. Though his admission to the effect that
“when Eugenia Danila signed the testament (he) and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada were present” (t.s.n., Feb. 12,
1970, p. 115) was made extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired upon during the trial.

With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas. The records show that this attesting
witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as witness to a will. Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed
was all about. Although he performed his function as an attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his
testimony, “half-hearted” as that of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind fully attentive to the details of the
execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct witness himself, was purposely there to oversee the accomplishment
of the will and codicil. His testimony is an account of what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no evidence to show
that this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take sides or that his statement is truth perverted.

It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a
will. 10 In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary
Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. 11 An appraisal of a lawyer’s participation has been succinctly
stated by the Court in Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra, this wise:

“In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of
seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant
of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.”

One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testatrix, Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will. The fact that the only pictures available are those
which show the witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the
will before the presence of the witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they did not speak
of including the events they failed to capture. The probate of a will is a special proceeding not imbued with adversary character, wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence “to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible” should be presented to the court before
a purported will may be probated or denied probate. 12
We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the will does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary
value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation
of other competent evidence intended to confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court having
satisfied itself that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and there being no indication of abuse of discretion
on its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the
deeds in question.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeal is hereby in so far as it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil. With costs against
respondents.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL OF GREGORIO GATCHALIAN, deceased. PEDRO REYES GARCIA, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
FELIPE GATCHALIAN, AURORA G. CAMINS, ANGELES G. COSCA, FEDERICO G. TUBOG, VIRGINIA G. TALANAY and ANGELES G.
TALANAY, oppositors-appellees.

E. Debuque for petitioner-appellant.

E. L. Segovia for oppositors-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2623 denying the allowance of
the will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian, on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it before a notary public, as required by law.

On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of
the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above named court for the probate of said alleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Felipe
Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the
ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; and that the deceased
was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will.

After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to
comply with the mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.

An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.

Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:

Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the
document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed,

Cruz v. Villasor Digest

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the
will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted
the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public
was one of them.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The
notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit
such situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the
attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980

JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and NELDA G. ENCLONAR, respondents-appellees.

Ignacio A. Calingin for appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp.

The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its "decision" of December 28, 1977 in Special Proceeding No. 41 for the probate of the will of the late Rogaciano
Gabucan, dismissed the proceeding (erroneously characterizes as an "action")

The proceeding was dismissed because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the notarial acknowledgment in the will and, hence, according to
respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code, which reads:

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be stamped and
which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or
any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.

No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to
documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.

The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is subject to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed in section 225 of the Tax
Code, now section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code.

Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner's manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp to the original of
the will. (See Mahilum vs. Court of Appeals, 64 O. G. 4017, 17 SCRA 482, 486.)

The case was brought to this Court by means of a petition for mandamus to compel the lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from its decision. In this Court's
resolution of January 21, 1980 the petition for mandamus was treated in the interest of substantial and speedy justice as an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440
as well as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate"
and, consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed".

What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial
acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that document.

That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp,
subsists only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."

Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena 49 Phil. 749). If
the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff's tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs.
Martinez, 5 Phil. 67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate such
document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet 12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar 16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)

WHEREFORE, the lower court's dismissal of the petition for probate is reversed and set aside. It is directed to decide the case on the merits in the light of the
parties' evidence. No costs.

Garcia v. Vasquez Digest

Garcia v. Vasquez
G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969
Fernando, J (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The other will was executed in December
1960 consisting of only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by the testatrix
before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.

2. The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective that she could not have read the
provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator is blind or incapable of
reading, he must be apprised of the contents of the will for him to be able to have the opportunityto object if the provisions therein are not in accordance
with his wishes.

The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and being fitted with the lenses, this did not
improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at the
time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will to probate is therefor erroneous.

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices,
Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.

Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.

Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1
now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
2

admitting to probate the last will and testament with codicil of the late Brigido Alvarado.
3 4

On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and
expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.

As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the
final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator,
the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan
ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some
dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory
clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the
reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna. 5Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will
sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed
under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick.

When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an
appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin"
and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the
deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.

On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will
and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read
aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The
appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the
testator the contents of the drafted will was served.

The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If
so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with?

Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However,
his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even
prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.

The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public
before whom the will is acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it
is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute
of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa,
whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize
7

fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of
his first consultation. 8

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed
but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a
quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.

We agree with petitioner in this respect.

Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this
was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary for
private respondent to do the actual reading for him.

The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to
wit:

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is
illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)."
Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his
instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.

Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary
public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to
give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted
the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the
contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.

We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and
inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary
public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing
and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made
known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had
affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the
will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose
of securing his conformity to the draft. 15

Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty.
Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator
whether the contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word
for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to
him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were
persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known
to him since childhood.

The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to
insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator's will. 17

As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following
pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be
disregarded (emphasis supplied).

Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast
these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered
unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been
accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time
that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.

16. GIL vs. MURCIANO

"does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano, 66
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do
not allow evidence aliunde(from elsewhere) to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should
appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to ascertain its meaning or
to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty
and ought to banish any fear of dire results."

17. CANEDA vs. CA

However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form
part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. 18 The
last paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said
witnesses.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the
manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and
once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law
has been observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the
20

execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such
facts may still be proved. 21

should state (1) the number

Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, 22
of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that theattesting witnesses witnessed the
signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.

The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; 23 whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and
the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the
very same instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. 24

The
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. 25
attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity
thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is left
26 27

unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent
occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses. 28

2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively, with
the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the
testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the
other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. 30 Since it is the proverbial
bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference:

We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do
hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will
consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each
page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation"
and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to
attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper
published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. 31

It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil
Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they,
the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree.

3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed
therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article
805. In this regard, however, the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself without
resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.

35
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the
defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned
attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by
the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
 "does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano, 66
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do
not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will
itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the
existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to
banish any fear of dire results."

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.