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Limitations/restrictions of government
lawyers in the practice of law

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics
Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation
2015-2016
Canon 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in

government services in the discharge of their tasks.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the
firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
RRC Rule 138 Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. - No
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients.
Correct Interpretation
The term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include
an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.
Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have
accepted engagement or employment in a matter which,
by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. -
Olazo v. Justice Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]
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1 PALE. Arellano University School of Law. Dr. Capule Lec. 9-22. SY 2015-2016 (ETBeltran)
General Rule
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private
cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to
the work of their respective offices. - Ramos v. Atty. Jose R.
Imbang, A.C. no. 6788 [2007]
Admonition to government lawyers
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her

public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with
his or her public duties.
We previously held that the restriction extends to all government

lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private
interests. - Olazo v. Justice Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]
“Revolving door” law practice
“[T]he process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it for large
fees in private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government service.“ - PCCG
v. Sandiganbayan and Tan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12 [April 12,
2005]
These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and

"congruent-interest conflicts.
Special considerations, both for and against
disqualification of former government attorney
If service with the government will tend to sterilize an attorney
in too large an area of law for too long a time, or will prevent
him from engaging in practice of the very specialty for which the
government sought his service — and if that sterilization will
spread to the firm with which he becomes associated — the
sacrifices of entering government service will be too great
for most men to make. As for those men willing to make these
sacrifices, not only will they and their firms suffer a restricted
practice thereafter, but clients will find it difficult to obtain
counsel, particularly in those specialties and suits dealing with
the government. - US v.Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G.
Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370
(1992)
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Favors disqualification of former government lawyers
On the other hand, policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B)
which militate toward disqualification include [t]he treachery of
switching sides; the safeguarding of confidential governmental
information from future use against the government; the need to
discourage government lawyers from handling particular
assignments in such a way as to encourage their own future
employment in regard to those particular matters after leaving
government service; and the professional benefit derived from
avoiding the appearance of evil.- US v.Russell White BROTHERS,
Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp.
370 (1992)
Definition of “substantial responsibility”

With these competing policies in mind, the Court turns to the
requirements of Canon 9 which prohibit a former government
attorney from accepting private employment in a matter in which
he had "substantial responsibility" while working for the
government. According to the American Bar Association, a
"substantial responsibility" is "a responsibility requiring the
official to become personally involved to an important, material
degree, in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding
the transactions or facts in question." - US v.Russell White
BROTHERS, Jr., G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers
856 F.Supp. 370 (1992)
Application of C.P.R. on a government lawyer

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers“shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.
Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a

government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for infractions he committed as a government
official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member
of the legal profession. - Ali v. Atty. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018
[2005]
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Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined
as a member of the bar for such misconduct. - Pimentel, Jr. v.
Attys. Llorente and Salayon, A.C. no. 4680 [2000]
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
holds a responsible public office.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private
practice.
It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public
servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As
such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye - Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707 [2006]
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and EmployeesRA
6713 Rule X
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed
in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. -
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
Cont…
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1)
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession
in connection with any matter before the office he used to
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be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
IRR of RA 6713 Rule X
Grounds for Administrative Disciplinary Action
Section 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative
disciplinary action prescribed under existing laws, the acts
and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he
holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-
over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or
prohibited by the Code, shall constitute the grounds for
administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to
criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless

authorized by the, Constitution, law or regulation, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with his official functions;
Cont…
These acts shall continue to be prohibited for a period of one (1)
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of paragraph (c) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
within one year after such resignation, retirement, or
separation, provided that any violation hereof shall be a ground
for administrative disciplinary action upon re-entry to the
government service.
Correct Interpretation
“[s]uch practice" - refer to practice "authorized by the
Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition against
the practice of profession.
The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a

memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued
pursuant to the authority of law.“
- Query of Atty. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
[2009]
Purpose of the Law

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to
avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which
may occur in any transaction between the retired government
employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors
brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue
influence, as the case may be.
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Private practice of law
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
“x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it

consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other
officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice]
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. x x x.”-
Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459.
October 14, 2003
Various ways a government lawyer leaves government

service
1. retirement
2. resignation
3. expiration of the term of office
4. dismissal
5. abandonment
Pro se litigant
The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in
court will not apply when a person is already appearing for
another party. Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-
plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will
not give complainant authority to appear in court. The
undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two
distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency
of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court. - Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M.
No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court

may -- without having to resign from their posts -- conduct
their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their
own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants.
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The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to
litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to
litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her
being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from
her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-
representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right
cannot make one administratively liable. xxx However, it
was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on
behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the
former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing
oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone
else.- Maderada v. Judge Mediodea, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459.
October 14, 2003
Two theories on the disqualification of former government

lawyers in representing a client
“Adverse-interest conflict”
“Congruent-interest representation conflicts."
"Adverse-interest conflicts"
"Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice
is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of
the current and former are adverse.”- PCCG v. Sandiganbayan
and Tan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12 [April 12, 2005]
Adverse-interest conflict
In the “adverse-interest conflict” a former government lawyer is
enjoined from representing a client in private practice when the
matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and if the interests of
the current and former clients are adverse.
It must be observed that the “adverse-interest conflict” applies
to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from
accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the
interests of the former client and the present client are adverse
and the matters involved are the same or substantially
related.
Congruent-interest conflict
In “congruent-interest conflict”, the disqualification does not
really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer
from representing a private practice client even if the interests
of the former government client and the new client are entirely
parallel. The “congruent-interest representation conflict”, unlike
the “adverse-interest conflict”, is unique to former
government lawyers.
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Grounds for Disqualification arising from COI
The fatal taint which would require disqualification arises in two
types of cases:
(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests in violation of
[Canons] undermines the court's confidence in the vigor of
the attorney's representation of his client, or more commonly
(2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to

use privileged information concerning the other side
through prior representation xxx thus giving his present
client an unfair advantage. - US v.Russell White BROTHERS, Jr.,
G. Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers 856 F.Supp. 370
(1992)
PAO to provide free legal assistance

The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal
assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5,
Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in

extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases.
PAO lawyer should not accept any remuneration for his services
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent
with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition
against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Acceptance of money by a government lawyer
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of
an attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession. - Ramos v. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, A.C. no. 6788
[2007]
Query
Why may an incumbent engage in private practice under (b)(2),
assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
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official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is
apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7?
Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public
position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like
myself – who is no longer in a position of possible
abuse/exploitation – cannot?"
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives
preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who
may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as
this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions.
In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired,
resigned, or has been separated from government service like
her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any
matter before the office where she used to work, for a period
of one (1) year from the date of her separation from
government employment.
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits

incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in
the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and
unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on
accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the
Constitution …
Exception
As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions:
1. the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the

law; and
2.the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
official functions.
By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the

Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of
interest must exist between their current duties and the practice
of their profession.
Interpretation
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one
year after the public official or employee’s resignation,
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retirement, or separation from public office, except for the
private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can
already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition
period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the
office the public officer or employee used to work with.
Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office
provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity
that practices law before the courts or conducts business
with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of
normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice
of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review or continuing education centers or similar
institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court
personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while
performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or
executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized
by the Supreme Court.
No lawyer in the Judiciary can practice law

No chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their
profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5,
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing
so.
Clerk of Court status after separation from government
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law
immediately after her separation from the service and without
any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713.
The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her

profession within one year before the office where he or
she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and
an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has
the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to
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the office he or she used to work with and only for a
period of one year.
The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where

specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in
areas where no conflict of interests exists.
Inclusion of name in a business card is “private practice of law”
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera"
with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City
While respondent denied having assumed any position in said

office, the fact remains that his name is included therein which
may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office.
Thus, while he may not be actually and directly employed with
the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as a
partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law
Offices give the impression that he is connected therein
and may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No.
6713. - Samonte v. Atty. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292 [1999]
Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise

known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a
public official or employee to, among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession

unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official
functions."
Preparation of a legal document [Assurance] after separation

from government service
The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value,
the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited
only in the preparation of a single document.
We specifically described private practice of law as one that
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer.
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In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the
definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made
before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was
intended to be presented before it.-Olazo v. Justice Tinga,
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC [2010]
Thank you for your attention!!
Notarial Law Violations

2015-2016
Resolution A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC05 July 2004

Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the
proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted by
the Sub-Committee for the Study, Drafting and Formulation of
the Rules Governing the Appointment of Notaries Public and the
Performance and Exercise of Their Official Functions, of the
Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications.
Eligibility requirements to become a notary public

Rule III SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may
be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified person who
submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and maintains a regular place of work or business in the city
or province where the commission is to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
with clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
Stationary office is required

Rule II SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term
"regular place of work or business" refers to a stationary office in
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the city or province wherein the notary public renders legal and
notarial services.
Notice of Summary Hearing
Rule III SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. - (a) The notice of
summary hearing shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the city or province where the hearing
shall be conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in
the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of
Court. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the
petitioner. The notice may include more than one petitioner.
What is an oath?
Rule II SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term "Affirmation" or
"Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the

contents of the instrument or document.
Jurat
Rule II SEC. 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to
such instrument or document.
What is an acknowledgement?
Acknowledgment refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
integrally complete instrument or document;
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(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for
the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares
that he has executed the instrument or document as his free
and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in
that capacity. (See Section 1, Rule II of 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice) - Testate Estate of the late Alipio Abada v.
Abaja, G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005
Notarized document
Petitioner phrases this issue as to whether the will has to be
“notarized.” A notarized document includes one that is
subscribed and sworn under oath or one that contains a
jurat.– Testate Estate of the late Alipio Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No.
147145. January 31, 2005
Purpose of acknowledgement in a notarial will
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public
that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2)
to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done. Manuel L. Lee v. Atty. Regino B. Tambago,
A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008)
Limitation of Notaries public ex-officio
Notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents
connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may
not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of
documents which bear no relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. – Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-
00-1294, July 31, 2000
Changes of Status of Notary
Rule X SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address.
Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary
public by court order or by marriage, or after ceasing
to maintain the regular place of work or business, the
notary public shall submit a signed and dated notice of
such fact to the Executive Judge.
The notary public shall not notarize until:
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(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the
new name of the notary public and/or change of
regular place of work or business; and
(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps

have been completed, the notary public may continue to use
the former name or regular place of work or business in
performing notarial acts for three (3) months from the
date of the change, which may be extended once for valid and
just cause by the Executive Judge for another period not
exceeding three (3) months.
Resignation as notary public

Rule 10 SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his
commission by personally submitting a written, dated and signed
formal notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial
seal, notarial register and records. Effective from the date
indicated in the notice, he shall immediately cease to perform
notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to personally appear,
the submission of the notice may be performed by his duly
authorized representative.
Publication of Resignation
SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall
immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous
place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of
Court the names of notaries public who have resigned their
notarial commissions and the effective dates of their resignation.
Notarial Certificate
Rule II SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - "Notarial Certificate" refers
to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary public, bears the
notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by
the notary public in a particular notarization as provided for by
these Rules.
Copy Certification
Rule II SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - "Copy Certification" refers to
a notarial act in which a notary public:
(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither
a vital record, a public record, nor publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or
document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
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Copy certification is required by rule of evidence
Rule 132 Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance,:
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Prima facie evidence of the execution
Rule 132 Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved.
Competent Evidence of Identity
Rule II SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase
"competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to
the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
public documentary identification.
NO current identification document issued by an official

agency
1. the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to
the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or
2. the oath or affirmation of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.
______________________________________________________________________
The individual has no current identification document
issued by an official agency
A third party can attest in behalf of the individual under the
following:
1. The credible witness is not privy to the instrument, document
or transaction.
2. The notary public personally knows the credible witness.
3. The credible witness personally knows the individual.
The notary public personally knows the third party.
The notary public does not personally knows the third

party [two witnesses]
1. The 2 credible witnesses are not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction.
2. The 2 credible witnesses each personally knows the
individual and
3. Shows to the notary public documentary identification [of
their real by showing current identification document
issued by an official agency].
“Signature witnessing"
Rule II SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. -The term "signature
witnessing" refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary public.
Term
Rule III SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person
commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court
for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made,
unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under
these Rules and the Rules of Court.
______________________________________________________________________
Rule III SEC. 7 Form of Notarial Commission
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place of

work or business) in (city or province) was on this (date) day of
(month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said
jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first day of
December (year).
_______________
Executive Judge
Use of thumb or other mark

Rule IV SECTION 1. Powers. –
xxx
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a
signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument or
document presented for notarization if:
(1)the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the
notary public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the
thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark:
"Thumb or other mark affixed by (name of signatory by
mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of
witnesses) and undersigned notary public"; and
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other
mark through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature
witnessing.
Prohibited acts of a notary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. –
(a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his
regular place of work or business; provided, however, that
on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act
may be performed at the request of the parties in the
following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where
oaths of office may be administered;
______________________________________________________________________
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the
signing of instruments or documents requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an
instrument or document is confined for treatment; and
Cont…
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document
requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person

involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the

notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or

otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
When a notary public can sign on behalf of a person

SECTION 1. Powers. –
xxx
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a
person who is physically unable to sign or make a
mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or
make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence
of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: "Signature
affixed by notary in presence of (names and addresses of
person and two [2] witnesses)"; and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment
or jurat.
Disqualified to perform notarial act
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from
performing a notarial act if he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be
notarized;
______________________________________________________________________
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission,
fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree.
Prohibition to do a notarial act even if payment is

tendered
Rule IV SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not
perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the
notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the
mind of the notary public reasonable doubt as to the former's
knowledge of the consequences of the transaction requiring a
notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or
her own free will.
Prohibition to do a notarial act

Rule IV SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public
shall not:
execute a certificate containing information known or believed by

the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that

is incomplete.
Notary public should not notarize Improper Instruments

or Documents
Rule IV SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A
notary public shall not notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial
certification.
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Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial Certificate
Rule VIII SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial
Certificate. - The notarial certificate shall include the following:
(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the
commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city where the
notary public is commissioned, the expiration date of the
commission, the office address of the notary public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax receipt
number and the place and date of issuance thereof, and the IBP
membership number.
Schedule of fees
RRC 141 Sec. 12. Notaries. -- No notary public shall charge or
receive for any service rendered by him any fee, remuneration
or compensation in excess of those expressly prescribed in the
following schedule:
(a) For protests of drafts, bills of exchange, or promissory notes
for non-acceptance or non-payment, and for notice thereof,
ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; chan robles virtual law
library
(b) For the registration of such protest and filing or safekeeping
of the same, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(c) For authenticating powers of attorney, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS;
(d) For sworn statement concerning correctness of any account
or other document, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(e) For each oath of affirmation, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00)
PESOS;
(f) For receiving evidence of indebtedness to be sent outside,
ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(g) For issuing a certified copy of all or part of his notarial
register or notarial records, for each page, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS;
(h) For taking depositions, for each page, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS; and
(i) For acknowledging other documents not enumerated in this
section, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS. (11a)
Purpose of physical presence

The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging
______________________________________________________________________
parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act
and deed. – Angeles, et. al. v. Atty. Ibañez, A.C. No. 7860
January 15, 2009
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the
parties personally known to the notary public
That the parties appeared before [notary ex-officio] and that he
interviewed them do not make the parties personally known to
him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe
to their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary
public must at least be acquainted with them. Interviewing the
contracting parties does not make the parties personally
known to the notary public. – Tupal v. Judge Rojo, A.M. No.
MTJ–14–1842, February 24, 2014
Acknowledgement and personal appearance

As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to whether or not the
parties to a conveying instrument must be present before the
notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due
execution. - Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no.
6634, August 23, 2007
Personal knowledge of a false statement or information
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a
false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process
may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents
diminished. Heirs of the late Sps. Lucas and Francisca Villanueva
v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007)
Personal appearance is required
Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a

document:
1. to be personally present,
2. to swear before him that he is that person and ask the
latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.
(Pantoja-Mumar v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 5426, April 3,
2007)
______________________________________________________________________
Notarization is not a ministerial duty
In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan
application were notarized, the proceeds were already released
to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for
notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said
documents was merely done on a ministerial basis, with
proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to
require the personal appearance of every loan applicant
considering the hundreds of loan applications brought to him for
signing. – FO Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. no. 7073,
September 01, 2015
No need for notary to retain a copy of the will
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal
obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives
division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives
division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for
disciplinary action. (Lee v. Atty. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281,
February 12, 2008)
A notary public cannot appear before himself

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his
client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded
by the word "By" which suggests that he did not in any
manner make it appear that those persons signed in his
presence; aside from the fact that his clients authorized him to
sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their
place of residence to that of the respondent and the
reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon
with.
“xxx having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot

swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.”
– Villarin v. Atty. Sabate, Jr.,A.C. No. 3324 February 9, 2000
By respondent’s admission, the affidavit was already signed by

the purported affiant at the time it was presented to him for
notarization. Respondent thus failed to heed his duty as a notary
public to demand that the document for notarization be signed in
______________________________________________________________________
his presence. Traya, Jr. v. Atty.Villamor, A.C. No.4595. February
6, 2004
As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is not required

in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary
Public, which is the case herein. - Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 192280, January 25, 2011
It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no photograph, is no

longer a valid form of identification for purposes of Notarization
of Legal Documents. No less than the Supreme Court itself,
when it revoked the Notarial Commission of a member of the Bar
in Baylon v. Almo, reiterated this when it said:
“As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a

community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who
wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in
the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public
should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing
before them to have their documents notarized.”- Amora, Jr. v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011
The lawyer and the moneys or

properties of his clients
2015-2016
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS

AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client

separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.
______________________________________________________________________
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
Rule 138 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to

fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. xxx
Rule 138 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.

- When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not
be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Rule 138 Sec. 37. Attorneys' liens. - An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
______________________________________________________________________
have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure
the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Lawyer took custody of 2 cars subject of preliminary

attachment
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila,
instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises,
turned them over to Atty. Frial, Lo’s counsel.
Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking

good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the
Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He
did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction
of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them
without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its
authority. - Atty. Salomon Jr. v. Atty. Frial, A.C. No. 7820
[2008]
Lawyer withdraw money deposited to the Branch Clerk of

Court without informing his client
Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida,
sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the
accounting and return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to
reply.
Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he

received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals
intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such
sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his
capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held
the money in trust for complainant.
Con’t…
Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the
trial court’s approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited
rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have
collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his
legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A
lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him
attorney’s fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to
prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to
retain the money.
Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant
despite the latter’s demands gives rise to the presumption that
______________________________________________________________________
he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. -
Almandrez Jr. v. Atty. Langit, A.C. No. 7057 [2006]
Business transaction between lawyer and client is

discourage
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but
the business transaction must be characterized with utmost
honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a
much higher standard that is required in business dealings where
the parties trade at "arms length." Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully
watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by
a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for,
by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorney’s favor. - Chua and Hsia v. Atty.
Mesina Jr., A.C. No. 4904 [2004]
No services rendered, money must be returned

It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step
to assist complainant in her case, charging P56,000.00 is
improper. While giving legal advice and opinion on
complainant’s problems and those of her family constitutes legal
service, however, the attorney’s fee must be reasonable.
Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.
We cannot understand why respondent initially demanded
P8,000.00 as filing fee from complainant when he very well knew
that the docket fee for Civil Case No. 00-044 had been paid. If
it was intended as a docket fee for another case, why did he not
file the corresponding complaint?
Respondent lawyer did not return the money to complainant
despite demand following his failure to file the case. - Dalisay
v. Atty. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 5655 [2006]
Issuing and keeping of receipts are practices of

accountability
Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and
imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and
to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too
aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him
by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability
was by issuing and keeping receipts. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort,
A.C. No. 8253 [2011]
______________________________________________________________________
When to deliver funds of clients
Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the course
of his professional employment, [a lawyer] had the obligation to
deliver such funds to his clients
(a) when they became due, or
(b) upon demand.
- Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]
Lawyer should not deposit the funds in his personal
account
For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal
account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon
demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not
return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a
serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He
reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients
showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular
purposes intended. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253
[2011]
Depositing it in his personal account with the consent of client is

ethical?
Lending money to client
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his
clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]
Purpose of prohibiting lending of money to client

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity
to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No.
6672 [2009]
______________________________________________________________________
Ill-effects of lending money to clients
If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the
client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.
Either of these circumstances may:
a. lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than
that of his client, or
b. to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan
v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]
Rule 16.01 includes money judgment in favor of client

There is no question that the money or property received by a
lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably
with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held
that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the
property and money she has collected for her client. This
obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the
money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable
judgment to his client. - Bayonla v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808
[2011]
Lawyer and client must agree with the amount before

retaining lien is validly applied
In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client
agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees.
In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the
amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees; instead, it should
behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the
necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to
fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a lawyer were allowed
to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of
his claimed compensation even when there is a
disagreement between him and his client would not only
be violative of the trust relationship between them but can
also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than
mindful of their fiduciary duty. - J.K. Mercado and Sons v. Atty.
De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, A.C. No. 3066 [2001]
______________________________________________________________________
Misuse of filing fee violates the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them
in their professional capacity
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent
lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client
and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the
filing fee. - Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, AC No. 99-634 [2002]
Appropriating the entire award is a violation of Canon 16

and Rule 16.01
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for
the legal services he has extended to his client but such right
should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses
everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. - Rivera
v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No. 2519 [2000]
Obligation of lawyer once the money or property intended
for his client is received
should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own
or
be used by him.
- Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000
Misappropriation is not required
The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact
appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario
acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999.
They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly
report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his
professional responsibility.
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the

clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has
adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. - Judge Angeles v.
Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000
Avoid keeping the money of client
Keeping the money in his possession without his client's
knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to
appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This
situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the
bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also
appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system
would remain undisturbed. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C.
No. 5019. April 6, 2000
______________________________________________________________________
Acquisition of properties subject of litigation
2014-2015
Contingent fee arrangement does not violate Article 1491

(5) of the Civil Code
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a
contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under because
the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency
of the litigation but only after judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under
the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may
have a lien over funds and property of his client and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-
68838 [1991]
Limitations of contingent fee

As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his
client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied, or
that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to
amount to extortion, a contract for contingent fee is valid
and enforceable. Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly
sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of
services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and
Murillo. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]
Appearance of impropriety if judge purchase property

after litigation
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his
court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired
the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the
Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the
part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a
portion of a piece of property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a
corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the
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time of such transfer. - Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J
[1982]
The property must be the very subject of litigation for
Article 1491 to apply
It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
prohibits the lawyer from purchasing any interest in the
subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting,
and Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code
prohibits him from acquiring by purchase or assignment the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which he may take part by virtue of his profession. But in those
cases where these provisions were applied, the rights or
properties purchased by the lawyer were the very subject
of the litigation handled by him. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M.
No. 681 [1982]
Levied property in satisfaction of damages can be

properly acquired by lawyer
In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights by
assignment was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in which
he approved (sic) as counsel for Bernabe Flores and others. The
said case was purely one for damages and did not involve the
lot in question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution
after judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Therefore Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did not
apply. Consequently, respondent had not violated the said
provision of law. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]
Con’t…
It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice for
the respondent to acquire the rights and interests of his client to
the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrative
charges because the land was not involved in the litigation he
was handling. The land was acquired by Bernabe Flores in an
execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in the
course of Civil Case No. 2171. The case handled by the
respondent was for damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No.
681 [1982]
Withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay

attorney’s fees violates Article 1491 of the NCC
The withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay
attorney’s fees to petitioner’s counsel, Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,
violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from
acquiring by assignment, property and rights which are the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession. Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Canons of
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Professional Ethics provides that “the lawyer should not purchase
any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting.” The assailed transaction falls within the prohibition
because the Deed assigning the amount of P672,900.00 to Atty.
De Guzman, Jr., as part of his attorney’s fees was executed
during the pendency of this case with the Court of Appeals. In
his Motion to Intervene, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., not only asserted
ownership over said amount, but likewise prayed that the same
be released to him. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846
[2004]
Even if litigant voluntarily assigned the amount
That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned the
subject amount to his counsel did not remove their
agreement within the ambit of the prohibitory provisions. -
Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]
Assignment of property violatesArticle 1491

We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the
prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it
and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration
of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still the
subject of a pending case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte, A.M. No.
3216 [1992]
Prohibition still applies even if lessee is a separate
juridical person
Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed
lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the
partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed
merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease
contracts are covered by the prohibition against any
acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in
litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be
to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in
effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For,
piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical
personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication
that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner,
later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to
benefit from the contractual relationship created between
his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over
properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. -
Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21,
1995
Mortgage contract included in the prohibition
To state that mortgages are not included within the prohibition is
to open the door to an indirect circumvention of that statutory
______________________________________________________________________
injunction, acquisition of the property being merely
postponed till eventual foreclosure.
Respondent asserts further that Article 1491[5] does not apply
to judgment creditors of which, he claims, he was one. Under
ordinary circumstances, the argument of respondent could be
considered plausible. Unfortunately, however, as heretofore
explained, the mortgage was executed in violation of
Article 1491[5] so that this Article has a direct bearing on this
case and respondent cannot escape its provision. Having violated
the same, he cannot be considered in the general run of a
judgment creditor. - Fornilda, et. al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No.
L-72306 [1989]
Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does

not violate the rule
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the
property in litigation since the respondent only made a written
demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to
comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property
does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is
unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of
Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210 [2004]
Certiorari proceeding still bars purchase of property under
Article 1491
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was
still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be
in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. - Valencia v.
Atty. Cabanting, A.M. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 [1991]
Criticisms against the courts and

judges
2014-2015
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
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Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive
or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to
the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS

CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS
TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING
THE COURT.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
Duty of Lawyers
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a
lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and
questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend
to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable
information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it
is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that
it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in
reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public’s trust
in, the judicial system. – Fudot v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No.
171008 October 24, 2008
Requirements when raising grievances against judges
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against
erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper
venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect
for the institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty.
Bagabuyo A.C. No. 7006 [2007]
A scurrilous attack
We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error,
boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the
judicial process. – Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No.
5921, March 10, 2006
Offensive language
They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a “court of
technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared
petition.
They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their
view, “an incompetent judge.”
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The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the case shows
its“impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a
perceived slight on its dignity” and such dismissal“smacks
of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality
and impartiality demanded of the appellate court.”- Asean
Pacific Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al., G.R. No.
162525 [2008]
Intemperate language
His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as
having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as
a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you
could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one
with "perfidious character," although the petitioners as
plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the
decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that the
respondent Judge was "a bit confused — with that confusion
which is the natural product of having been born,
nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded
surroundings of the non-propertied class.
- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January
25, 1995
Foul language
The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the
respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in
Robe," "corrupt justices who were only sowing ‘judicial
terrorism,’" as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom
he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of
acceptable behavior. – Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia
Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005
Proscribed language
Proscribed then are, inter alia:
1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration or
2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by this Court of offensive and
abusive language or
3. abrasive and offensive language or
4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge
or
5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.
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- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25,
1995
Not disrespectful, abusive or slanderous
We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-
informed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. – Francisco, Jr.
v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et. al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October
18, 2007
Constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.”- Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution
Purpose of parliamentary immunity
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for
“it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”
Defensor-Santiago case
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Pobre v. Sen.
Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in

the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to
expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
______________________________________________________________________
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like
her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect

due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith
in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional

dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in
a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule

8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art.
VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
Statements of an accused lawyer
Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked because
of his failure to appear for a criminal trial wherein he was
charged as a defendant with driving while intoxicated. Upon his
release from jail Polk issued to the news media from his law
office the following written statement:
I consider this one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and
unethical district attorney and a perverse judge to
assure me an unfair trial.
Questionable conduct on the part of those charged with
administration of justice does little to foster respect for
the law.
- Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]
______________________________________________________________________
Statements were made as a citizen
The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response
to the manner in which he was treated as a citizen and
not as an attorney. At no time was Polk an attorney of record
or in any way acting in his capacity as an attorney in the
criminal proceedings against him, nor do the remarks
purport to be made in his capacity as an attorney. - Polk v. State
Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]
There is no dichotomy of a lawyer’s personality

There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. –
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September
15, 2004
Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11

Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge
advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the
respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned
that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent
shouted, “Then cite me!”. Judge cited him for direct contempt
and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered
the courtroom and shouted, “Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you! Judge
ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom
and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
Con’t…
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice
system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly
threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability
to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if
true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner
provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts
in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. –
______________________________________________________________________
Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September 28,
2011
Intention and disclaimer not a defense
Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is that he
acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to
defend the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any
intentional disrespect is not a ground for exoneration. His
intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the
language employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have
understood them to mean. – Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-39253
November 24, 1978
Making threats
In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11 of
Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his
motions were not granted, respondent judge would be
administratively charged. To be sure, the threat made against
respondent judge was not a threat to do him bodily harm.
Nonetheless, it was a threat. Needless to say, disrespectful,
abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities,
unfounded accusations, or intemperate words tending to
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the court in administering
justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. –
Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1528,
March 28, 2000
Threat of Impeachment
It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the members
of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice
with investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him in
the regular exercise of official duty subverts and undermines the
independence of the judiciary.
- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against
Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005
Offensive language against complainant proscribed

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive
language in his pleadings in describing complainant and
her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer’s
arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may
be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling
complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a
"vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the
______________________________________________________________________
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. – N.H. Florido v. Atty.
Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004
Statements in form of questions still proscribed
While most of her statements were in the form of questions
instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the
same: they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity
of the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public
in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.
She posed the query, "Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is

justice?)," implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in
her case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No.
157384, June 5, 2009
Direct contempt if submitted in the same court

In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is
submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as
it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily. - Re: Letter
dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-
04-SC. July 22, 2005]
Post litigation criticisms

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation
newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings
and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a
contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if
the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:
(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other
words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a clear and
present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded. – PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
Contempt and Disciplinary proceeding are not the same
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to
vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the
object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the
fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to
preserve and protect the court and the public from the
official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold
such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power
to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the
court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and
not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the
______________________________________________________________________
exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is
to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys
who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty
in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a
subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same
manner an attorney's conviction for contempt was not
collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent
disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor
on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has
likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot
be considered as a notice to show cause why he should
not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that
they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by
the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law
are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy,
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
The test of allowable criticisms of a judge’s decision

Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. –
Lorenzo Shipping Corp., et. al. v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August
31, 2011
Degree of lawyers’ remark or comment
Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark
or comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the
felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of
phrase. – In re: Complaint against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263,
October 28, 1958
Is the judiciary onion-skinned?
“The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the
character of …. public opinion. For it is a prized …. privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and
contempt much more than it would enhance respect.”- Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941)
Admonition to judges
More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges
not to be onion-skinned when confronted by dissatisfied
______________________________________________________________________
lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a
bludgeon to be used for the purpose of exacting silent
submission to their rulings and orders however questionable or
unjust they may be. - Sesbreño v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ-
88-272 February 6, 1990
Free speech in democratic government
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.“ - Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)
Limited freedom of expression?
“It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders
his right to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed
attorney in this state. The Supreme Court has built a substantial
line of cases where the Constitution has been read to limit and
restrain the state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for
attorneys.” - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784
[1974]
Extrajudicial activities of judges

/justices
2014-2015
The previous “Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of

Judicial Conduct is a supplement to the new Code
“Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct”,
promulgated on 5 September 1989, shall take effect on 20
October 1989
This “New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary”
shall take effect on the first day of June 2004
This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the
provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code:
Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of
specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a
suppletory character.
CANON 4PROPRIETYNew Code of Judicial Conduct [2004]
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
______________________________________________________________________
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must

accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual

members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a

case in which any member of their family represents a litigant or
is associated in any manner with the case.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a

member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter or
of other members of the legal profession.
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of

expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal

fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to
be informed about the financial interests of members of their
family.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of
their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.
SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their

judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by for any other
purpose related to their judicial duties.
______________________________________________________________________
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties,
judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning

the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related
matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned

with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract

from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with
the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or

participate in other organizations representing the interests of
judges.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask
for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her
in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or

others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask
for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection
with their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public

disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or
benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made
provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably
be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.
Private practice of law prohibited

Rule 138 RRC Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. - No
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
______________________________________________________________________
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients.
Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: A

judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless
prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the
practice of any other profession provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.
Why a judge cannot practice law

These provisions are based on public policy for there is no
question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the
office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a judge.
It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending special favors to their own private interests and
assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of
their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency
and desire to promote the public interest. - Ziga v. Judge
Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003
Drafting complainant’s affidavit is practice of law

Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant and her father-in-
law when he drafted complainant’s affidavit which became
the basis of a complaint for estafa filed against Heidi Navarra.
By acting as counsel for complainant and the latter’s father-in-
law in a case filed in his court, respondent compromised his
neutrality and independence. How could he then be expected to
decide with objectivity and fairness the cases in which he has
acted as a lawyer for the plaintiff or complainant?
Respondent’s misconduct in this case is further compounded
by the fact that he rendered the legal services in question using
government facilities during office hours. - Biboso v.
Judge Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356. April 16, 2001
Instances when a judge canserving as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The only
exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward
is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service
as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will
______________________________________________________________________
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial
duties.
The Code has defined who may be considered as members of his

immediate family and they are the spouse and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity. – Carual v.
Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999
“Judge’s family”
Includes a judge’s:
1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth
civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and
who lives in the judge’s household.
Rendering legal opinion proscribed
To escape our disciplining wrath, respondent judge argues that
the "resolution" he issued was a mere expression of his legal
opinion and not a judgment or order "which adjudicates and
settles rights and obligations of the parties." He said that the
petition for declaratory relief, earlier quoted, is not a pleading,
but a mere letter-request for a legal opinion. Hence,
complainant Gozun was not entitled to notice and hearing.
Besides, even assuming arguendo that the resolution was a
mere legal opinion, still respondent must know that rendering of
"legal opinions" is not the function of a judge. The function
of the court is limited to adjudication of actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable.
Unlike lawyers, judges cannot render legal advice. Judges are
expressly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law
or from giving professional advice to clients. – Gozun v. Judge
Liangco A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. August 30, 2000
A judge who violates the judicial code of conduct also
violates the lawyer’s oath
We ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral
qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a
judge also reflects the latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge
who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates
the lawyer’s oath. - OCA v. Atty. Liangco, A. C. No. 5355
[2011]
______________________________________________________________________
As attorney-in-fact in actual litigations
Except for the initiatory pleading, respondent Judge signed the
pleadings relative to the civil case and participated in some of
the hearings held relative thereto.
The proscription against the private practice of law, or just giving
professional advice to clients, by Judges is based on public
policy.
The prohibition applies equally well to the appointment of and
acceptance by judges to the post of attorney-in-fact in actual
litigations, a fact which is also, by and large, incompatible with
the high office, functions, prestige and privileges of a judge. It
is of no moment, albeit worse, that the case where he accepts
such designation as attorney-in-fact is one that pends before his
own court. - Sps. Gragera v. Judge Francisco, A. M. No.
RTJ-02-1670. June 26, 2003
A.M. NO. 13-05-05-SC RE: REVISION OFRESTRICTIONS

ON TEACHING HOURS OFJUSTICES, JUDGES AND
PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARYEN BANC RESOLUTION
DATED 01 APRIL 2014
Teaching shall be allowed for not more than ten (10) hours a
week. On regular working days (Monday through Friday),
teaching shall not be conducted earlier than 5:30 p.m.
2. An application for permission to teach if filed by a judge shall

be accompanied by a certification of the Clerk of Court
concerned regarding the condition of the court docket
showing:
(a) the number of pending cases; and
(b) the number of cases disposed of within a three-month
period prior to the start of the semester in his or her
respective sala.
An application for permission to teach filed by ajudge or
justice shall require approval as follows:
If filed by a judge from a lower level court, it shall be subject to
the approval of the executive judge concerned;
b. If filed by an executive judge, it shall be subject to the

approval of the Court Administrator;
c. If filed by an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, the

Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals, it shall be
subject to the approval of the presiding justice concerned;
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d. If filed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the
subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.
An application for permission to teach filed bycourt
personnel shall require approval as follows
a. If filed by court personnel from a lower level court, it shall be
subject to the approval of the executive judge concerned;
b. If filed by court personnel from the Court of Appeals, the
subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the
executive justice concerned, as the case may be;
c. If filed by Supreme Court personnel belonging to a chamber of
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, it shall be
subject to the approval of the Associate Justice concerned,
who will notify the Chief Justice and the Office of
Administrative Services, Supreme Court, of this approval;
d. If filed by other Supreme Court personnel, it shall be subject
to the approval of the Chief Justice.
Disposition of applications
5. The approving authority may deny the application or allow
less than ten (10) hours of teaching a week, depending on
the applicant’s performance record.
6. At the end of every year, an approving authority shall submit

to the Chief Justice a report on the applications submitted
for the year and the respective status of, or action taken on,
each application.
Failure to secure permit to teach
To justify his failure to obtain a permit from the Supreme
Court, he said that the University of the East did not
require him to submit one.
Respondent judge’s failure to accomplish the Request for

Permission to Teach form prescribed in Circular No. 50-97, dated
July 18, 1997 is inexcusable. It is a clear violation of the
judiciary rules and regulations, indicating respondent judge’s
disregard of the authority of the Supreme Court. For no matter
how insignificant or inconsequential the circular may seem to
respondent judge, he should have complied with it. - Jabon v.
Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]
______________________________________________________________________
Proper for judges to attend meetings of members of the
bar
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty
that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable
that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion
of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social
intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the
bar.
A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation

before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or
business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.’”- Abundo v. Judge Manio, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416. August 6, 1999
Judge eating lunch with counsel
For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong
per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible
he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion
that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element
in “determining his judicial course.”
Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an

annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge
should have thought twice about joining counsel for
lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. – Pertierra v.
Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12,
2003
Political activities of judges
Allowed : A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions.
Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship:

1. a judge shall not make political speeches, 2. a judge shall
not contribute to party funds
3. a judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for political
office or participate in other partisan political activities. -
Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Engaging in partisan political activityimproper under Civil

Service Law
Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states:
______________________________________________________________________
Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly
in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote nor shall be use his official authority or influence
to coerce the political activity of any other person or body.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any
officer or employee from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names
of candidates for public office whom he supports: ...
Engaging in political activity

Respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to
electoral constituents in the second district of Bulacan indicating
his intention to run for a congressional seat.
For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while

still a member of the Bench, Respondent took advantage of
his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his
office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. -
Vistan v. Judge Nicolas A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 [1991]
Filing of a certificate of candidacy
When he was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to
uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a
party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving
up his judicial post, Judge Limbona violated not only the law, but
the constitutional mandate that “no officer or employee in the
civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.”
The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political

activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate
for an elective post. - Limbona v. Judge Limbona, A.M. No.
SCC-98-4 March 22, 2011
Limit of judge’s journalistic writing

Complainant alleged that respondent used his newspaper column
to ventilate his biases or personal anger at people or institutions.
Complainant believes that respondent judge should not

engage in active, sensational, and free-for-all journalistic
writing because such act degrades the judicial system and
compromises his impartiality as an administrator of justice.
Con’t…
Respondent’s writing of active and vicious editorials
compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration
______________________________________________________________________
of justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his
office as well as on the public officers that he challenges.
Not only does he act as its contributor or columnist, he is also

its publisher, editor and legal adviser. Although the Code of
Judicial Conduct allows a judge to engage in certain lawful
activities, they should not interfere with the performance of
judicial duties nor detract from the dignity of the court. -
Galang v. Judge Santos G.R. No. MTJ-99-1197 [1999]
Judge cannot be appointed to executive position in any

enterprise
Circular No. 6 dated April 10, 1987 strictly enjoins all Judges,
Clerks of Court and Sheriffs not to accept the position of
director or any other position in any electric cooperative
or other enterprises, or to resign immediately from such
position if they are already holding the same so as not to
prejudice the expeditious and proper administration of justice.
In violation of this circular, Judge Estrada, who was appointed to
the judiciary on May 17, 1994, did not resign from the Board of
Directors of the Rural Bank of Labrador until May 31, 1997. -
Re: Inhibition of Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada A.M. No.
98-1-32-RTC July 29, 1998
Judge should not accept any position in any business
enterprise
RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities
provided that they do not interfere with the performance of
judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:
xxx
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of
a non-profit or non-political educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.
RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a

judge may hold and manage investments but should not
serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of
any business except as director of a family business of the
judge. - Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial
Conduct
Not good for judges to engage in business
Indeed, it is not good for judges to engage in business except
only to the extent allowed by Rule 5.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides:
______________________________________________________________________
Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold
and manage investments but should not serve as an officer,
director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business
except as director of a family business of the judge.
- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443.
July 31, 2002
Limits of financial and business dealings

Refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to:
reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality,

interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court.
- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443. July
31, 2002 citing Rule 5.02 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and the Code of Judicial Conduct
Act of writing a letter to opposing counsel and defending

a right amounts to private practice of law
We also find merit in complainant's contention that respondent's
act of writing to Atty. Cargullo and defending the right of Andres
Bo to possess the lot in dispute amounts to private practice of
law.
The tenor of the letter shows that respondent, as representative

of Andres Bo, was defending the latter's rights over the
disputed property. Respondent's act of representing and
defending the interest of a private individual in the disputed
property constitutes private practice of law. It has been ruled
that "the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court or participation in court proceedings but also includes
preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation,
giving advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. -
Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20,
1999
As agent in the sale of the subject property
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject

property, respondent judge has increased the possibility of
his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the
______________________________________________________________________
event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale
arises.
Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might plead
before his court is not remote and his business dealings with
them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also
to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the
judge’s integrity. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-
1796 February 10, 2006
Financial and business dealings

Judge can engage in financial and business dealings provide:
1. such will not reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality.
2. will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial

activities.
3. will not increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely

to come before the court.
A judge should so manage investments and other financial

interests as to minimize the number of cases giving
grounds for disqualification. - Catbagan v. Judge Barte,
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April 06, 2005
Sheer presence - as a member of the Judiciary - would be

sufficient suggestion of persuasion and influence
As a member of the bench, the respondent judge should realize
that his presence, opinion and participation in any
proceeding could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case
in favor of (the) party he identifies himself with. A judge need
not utter any word for his sheer presence - as a member of the
Judiciary - would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and
influence.
In this case, the respondent judge's presence and
participation in the proceedings were to the advantage of
his relatives, the heirs of Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr. That his
efforts failed to influence the DARAB, for the motion filed by
the Valdez heirs in DARAB Case No. 282-T-93 for contempt was
dismissed, has no relevance. - Garcia, et. al. v. Judge
Valdez, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156 [1998]
Giving moral support to a family member by attending the
hearing is improper
______________________________________________________________________
Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentioned
hearings but explained that he did not sit beside his
brother’s lawyer but in the area reserved for the public;
and that the main reason why he was there was to observe
how election protests are conducted as he has never
conducted one. His other reason was to give moral support
to his brother. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-
05-1591 [2005]
Objection from complainant or counsel is immaterial
Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the
Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind
that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of
preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary.
The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel objected

to the presence of respondent during the hearing is immaterial.
- Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591 [2005]
Use of letterhead by a judge
In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not
per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful
and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the
use of his letterhead and his title. - Ladignon v. Judge Garong,
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]
Hence, respondent judge’s use of the court heading outside of

judicial business warrants disciplinary action for violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly Section 1, Canon 4.
Use of ordinary bond papers and placing his official

station as return address
The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary bond papers and
placed thereon his official station as return address is not
totally without merit.
For, indeed, this is not an unusual practice and it would be

hypocritical to deny its occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary.
For example, some members of the Judiciary may use a social
card with the letterhead of their office to indicate their
address as well as their station within the judicial
hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names,
designation and station. - Ladignon v. Judge Garong, A.M.
No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]
______________________________________________________________________
Use of court’s stationery
The Court also finds respondent Judge liable for violating Rule
2.03 of the Code in using official stationery for his
correspondence with complainant and the latter’s counsel
regarding Lot No. 1470. A court’s stationery, with its official
letterhead, should only be used for official
correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery other than for
official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige
of his office to benefit Guererro (and himself) in violation of Rule
2.0322 of the Code. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-
03-1796 February 10, 2006
Respondent Judge should know that a court’s letterhead should

be used only for official correspondence. - Oktubre v.
Judge Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004
Judge required tenants to pay at MTC

Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when, in his letters to
the tenants, he further required them to pay their rent at
the MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler
building.
By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule
2.03, clearly intended to “use the prestige of his judicial
office” to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs. –
Oktubre v. Judge Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22,
2004
Doctrine of privilege communications in pleadings and

judicial proceedings
2014-2015
Concept of “privileged communication [speech]”

1. Privileged communication as rule of evidence
2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential the
secrets or confidences of client
3. Privileged speech in congress
4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridical
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions
______________________________________________________________________
1. Privileged Communication as rule of evidence
Rule 130 Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
(b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
xxx
Essential factors to establish the existence of the
attorney-client privilege communication
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
- Ma. Luisa Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda, A.C. No.
6711, July 3, 2007
2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential
the secrets or confidences of client
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE

AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or

secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of
the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself,
his employees or associates or by judicial action.
______________________________________________________________________
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,
use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall
he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of
his client, give information from his files to an outside agency
seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the
firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the
client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may
be required to prevent those whose services are utilized
by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of
the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation

about a client's affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been
consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible
conflict of interest.
RPC Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. —

Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative
action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period,
or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in
his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or
solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the
defense of a client or having received confidential information
from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the
opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first
client.
______________________________________________________________________
Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
Limit of privileged communication between client and
lawyer
It is well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of
an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the
"prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will
not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which
is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.“ – PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos.
115439-41 July 16, 1997
3. Privileged speech in congress
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on
the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides:
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”
Defensor-Santiago case
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Probe v. Sen.
Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]
______________________________________________________________________
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in
the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to
expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like
her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect

due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith
in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional

dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in
a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule

8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art.
VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
Purpose of Privilege Speech
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of
the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
______________________________________________________________________
protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.”- Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No.
7399 [2009]
4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridical

proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions
Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American jurisprudence is
the rule that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in
the course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions are absolutely privileged
when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry,
however false or malicious such utterances may be. - Gutierrez
v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982
CPR
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,

use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Certificate of meritorious case
Rue 7 Section 3. The signature of counsel constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
“Honest belief”is a claim of “good faith.”- Alfonso C. Choa vs.

Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063.
August 9, 1996
Pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered
privileged
Pleadings have become part of public record open to the
public to scrutinize, but also due to the undeniable fact that
said...
Pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and
assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the
______________________________________________________________________
disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper
administration of justice and, therefore, of general public
concern.
Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations
substantially true because they can be supported by evidence
presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under
the scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all
improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. – Cuenco
v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
Counsel, parties or witnesses are exempted from liability
in libel or slander
It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties or
witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for
words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with,
or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or
subject of inquiry.
For as aptly observed in one case, while the doctrine of
privileged communication is liable to be abused, and its abuse
may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such
suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater
hardships. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March
31, 1976
Effect of privileged matters

For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters
considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the
presumption. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No.
146848 October 17, 2006
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified
Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of
the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged
communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action.
Examples of these are speeches or debates made by
Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its
committees.
On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of
express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege,
in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or
finding of libel provided the prosecution established the
presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs
"private communications" and "fair and true report without any
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comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions
in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. - GMA Network, Inc. v.
Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006
Importance of doctrine of privileged communications

The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public
policy, which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result it
may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil disposed
and malignant slanderer. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-
62449 July 16, 1984
All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy

In order the matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it
need not be in every case material to the issues presented
by the pleadings.
All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or

pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will
assume the alleged slanderous charges to be true, however
false they may have been in fact. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al.,
G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
There is “no” absolute privilege in pleadings

Absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an attorney in
a pleading filed with the court, as long as the statements alleged
to be defamatory were relevant and pertinent to the issues
in the case. We relied heavily on our earlier decision xxx, in
which we recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to
make statements in pleadings regardless of their truth or the
existence of actual malice on the part of the attorney so long as
the statements were relevant and pertinent to the
pleadings. – Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986)
All forms of communications are privileged
The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications
made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the attorney by other
means. - PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41
July 16, 1997
Professional discipline may still apply
Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we consider it
to be a privilege narrowed closely by the "relevancy" and
"pertinency" requirements, and we note that while the
privilege will prohibit an attorney from being subject to litigation
it will not make him immune from professional discipline,
______________________________________________________________________
when it is appropriate. – Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898
(1986)
...makes a lawyer liable for false allegations in a pleading since

the rule states that a lawyer's signature on a pleading
constitutes a certificate by him that to the best of his knowledge,
there is good ground to support the pleading. – Pogue v.
Cooper, et. al., 680 S.W.2d 698 (1984)
Restriction to the privilege

The Court defined the restriction to the privilege enjoyed by
pleadings thus:
The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise
statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which
they are to be proved. ...
If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and
alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.
The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that
the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient
administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from
beneath which private malice may be gratified. - Gutierrez
v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982
Example of slanderous matters in a pleading

Repeated litigations between the same parties might indeed be
tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is not sufficient cause
for calling another "dirty-minded", and of a "limited mind",
"twisted mind" or to characterize his act as a "devise of
wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's traits.”
It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these
slanderous matters pervade the entire dimension of the
defendants' answer, with almost every paragraph thereof
scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These
imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and
moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly
achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and
ill-will.
The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants,
expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are
palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of
______________________________________________________________________
inquiry and have no place in a pleading. - Gutierrez v. Abila,
et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982
Admonition to lawyers
While indeed lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark
or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold such
remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of
relevancy and propriety. Besides, the language vehicle does
not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. –
Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982
Partners who signed the pleadings are liable
In view of the derogatory implications of that observation, which
was couched in intemperate indecorous and vicious language
and which was baseless, since it was belied by the resolution
itself that stated the reason for requiring the Solicitor General to
proceed with the investigation of the disbarment case, the Court
in that aforementioned October 1 resolution required Attys.
Salandanan and Zosimo G. Linato, who signed the motion
under the firm name of "E. M. Salandanan, Aguilar, Linato &
Associates" to show cause why they should not be adjudged in
contempt of court. – Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347.
November 12, 1975
Libelous remarks?
Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a motion seeking
reconsideration with a counter-motion for contempt against the
appellant for reneging on his commitment to reimburse
appellee's clients and for resorting to dilatory tactics. To that,
Atty. Ceniza, filed his "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration,
Etc." charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication,
and "telling a barefaced and documented lie." Replying to
these remarks, Sesbreno then filed his "REPLY" – Atty. Ramon
B. Ceniza is “an irresponsible person, cannot be trusted,
like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster.”-
subject matter of Ceniza's libel suit.
Balancing act
While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead to
great hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would
give rise to greater hardships.
Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of

pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold,
and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some
infelicities of language. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449
July 16, 1984
______________________________________________________________________
Test to be applied
A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being

considered libelous. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449
July 16, 1984
Metes and bounds of relevancy or pertinency

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined
to be liberal.
The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance
and impropriety.
In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged,
it need not be in every case material to the issues presented
by the pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related
thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it
may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the
trial. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Legitimate answers to accusations are privileged

Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the
pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was
made in legitimate defense of his own and of his client's
interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely
privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel
(Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No.
L-62449 July 16, 1984
Unprofessional conduct
Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and
will not receive any sympathy from this Court. - PP v. Atty.
Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Proper conduct of lawyers

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-
feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each
other or toward suitors in the case.
All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously
avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the
______________________________________________________________________
personal history or the personal peculiarities and
idiosyncracies of counsel on the other side.
Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and
promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided.
Lawyers owe respect not only to the courts and their clients,
but also to other members of the Bar. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno,
G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
Using abrasive and offensive language not proper in

pleadings
Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in the
preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68
SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of
practising attorneys. – PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449
July 16, 1984Privileged
When pleadings are published in newspaper
We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter
should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in
court without remarks nor comments even before an
answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by
the privilege.
This Court ruled before that:

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including
all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions belong to
the class of communication that are absolutely privileged. -
Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976
Issue No. 182, Volume X of "The Republic Daily", bearing
date of August 3, 1958, an article fully reproduced as
follows
Rep. Cuenco Sued
Rep. Miguel Cuenco was yesterday sued by the Bisaya Land
Transportation Company, Inc., for alleged illegal and unlawful
collections made by him on the company, amounting to
thousands of pesos. Part of these collections was allegedly
obtained by the defendant in violation of a constitutional
inhibition. Congressman Cuenco, according to the complaint, had
illegally collected a total of P18,700 from the plaintiff, of which
he was formerly assistant manager in charge of the shipping
department. In the same suit, the transportation firm asked the
court to order the defendant to pay it an additional sum of
P5,600 representing attorney's fees which the plaintiff said it had
obligated to pay its counsel. xxx
______________________________________________________________________
US jurisprudence
Statements made to the media
Appellant sued respondent's companies for wrongful termination,
making a number of allegations in the complaint against
respondent personally. After respondent published a
response to the allegations in the media, appellant sued him
for defamation.
Whether or not statements made to the media regarding

ongoing or contemplated litigation are covered by absolute
privilege. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Whether or not the absolute privilege applies when the
media is the recipient of the statement
These courts have concluded that the policy considerations
underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to
statements made to the media. Statements made to the
media "do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process
in a judicial proceeding.... [They] do not generally encourage
open and honest discussion between the parties and their
counsel in order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements
often do just the opposite.“
"Communications made to newspapers and during press

conferences have been almost universally found to be excluded
from the protection of absolute privilege.”- Jacobs v. Adelson,
325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Not related to judicial proceedings

We have, however, recognized that communications are not
sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when they are made to
someone without an interest in the outcome.
We conclude that assessing the significant interest of the
recipient requires review of the recipient's legal relationship to
the litigation, not their interest as an observer.
Moreover, the nature of the recipient's interest in or connection
to the litigation is a "case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry" that
must focus on and balance the underlying principles of the
privilege.
We conclude that the newspaper does not have a direct interest
in, or connection to, the outcome of the proceedings, other than
as a spectator. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
______________________________________________________________________
A few jurisdictions have held that, under certain
circumstances, an attorney's statements to the media are
absolutely privileged
Extending the privilege to statements made by an attorney
to a reporter after the dismissal of the first lawsuit. Other
jurisdictions have found exceptions to the majority rule based on
unique circumstances. ,
Applying absolute privilege to a statement to a newspaper when
all signs pointed to emerging litigation and the newspaper was
a potential party); ,
Applying absolute privilege to a lawyer's statements to the press
denying allegations and questioning the plaintiff's motives,
where the plaintiff publicly solicited a response; ,
Holding that an attorney's prelitigation statements to the
press are absolutely privileged if a class action lawsuit is
contemplated. – Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Communications made to the media
We adopt the majority view that communications made to the
media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely
privileged, at least when the media holds no more significant
interest in the litigation than the general public.
In order for the absolute privilege to apply to defamatory
statements made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, "(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in
good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) the
communication must be related to the litigation.“
The privilege applies to communications made by either an
attorney or a non-attorney that are related to ongoing litigation
or future litigation contemplated in good faith. - Jacobs v.
Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)
Defamatory statements not privileged when made on

radio and television programs
Stating the judicial proceedings privilege protects statements by
parties and their attorneys related to litigation but does not
extend to protect allegedly defamatory statements made on
radio and television programs. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660
N.W.2d 593 (2003)
A privileged statement, such as one made in a judicial
proceeding, is not privileged for all subsequent publications
by virtue of initially being spoken in a privileged proceeding.
Even an "absolute" privilege does not permit an individual to
categorically republish possibly defamatory statements
without consequence. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593
(2003)
______________________________________________________________________
Statements to third party
But we have also recognized that "[a]n attorney's statements to
someone who is not directly involved with the actual or
anticipated judicial proceeding will be covered by the
absolute privilege only if the recipient of the communication is
“significantly interested” in the proceeding." - Jacobs v.
Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014)

Terminating and Establishing attorney-client relationship
2014-2015
Nature of attorney-client relationship

An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer
acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a
person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance.
It is not essential that the client should have employed the

lawyer on any previous occasion or that any retainer should
have been paid, promised or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for
as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is
sought and received in matters pertinent to his profession. -
Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first
moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise
regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or
charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought.- Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711
July 3, 2007
Verbal agreement
There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient
to create an attorney-client relationship. - Urban Bank Inc. vs.
Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]
Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists
______________________________________________________________________
The relationship of complainant and [counsel] is mainly personal
or business in nature, and that whatever legal services may have
been rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for free were
only incidental to said relationship. Noteworthy also is the fact
that complainant was not able to specify any act or transaction
in which [counsel] acted as her or her husband's counsel. -
Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
There are instances, however, when the Court finds that no
attorney-client relationship exists between the parties, such as
when the relationship stemmed from a personal transaction
between them rather than the practice of law of respondent or
when the legal acts done were only incidental to their personal
transaction. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
Duty once a lawyer-client relationship exist

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, that “a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.”
Non-payment of fees does not diminish a lawyer’s duty
Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not
be a reason not to inform the client of an important
development, or worse, to withhold vital information from
her. - Somosot v. Atty. Lara A.C. No. 7024 [2009]
Remedy for deliberate refusal to pay
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just
compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is
to institute an action before the proper court and such
actuation of the respondent herein did not constitute deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct. - Urban Bank Inc. vs.
Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients

concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Implied duty to finish the case
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an
attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final
and executory. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No.
7421 [2007]
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an

attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
______________________________________________________________________
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.- Francisco v. Atty.
Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006
Terminating the attorney-client relation

CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the
absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at
anytime with or without cause.
ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate

the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a
case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s
written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty.
Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES
ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the
following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; [see
Rule 19.02]
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office
[see Rule 3.03]; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall

withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped
from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law
concurrently.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to

influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
______________________________________________________________________
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
Changing lawyer does not need the approval of the Court
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without
cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter
his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to
change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain
another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a
lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be
dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court. -
Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006
Termination of services without the written consent of
client
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the
written consent of his client must file a petition for
withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon
his client and the adverse party - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty.
Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006
A lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is recorded

before terminating his services
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after
due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should
see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in
the case. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303,
June 15, 2006
Cessation of law practice is not a “good cause” to

withdraw
Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his
failure to file the required brief. Even if it were true that
Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore
the directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from
the records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawn
his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the
case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the
accused-appellant and he is expected to comply with all its
orders and directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C. No.
5486. August 15, 2001]
______________________________________________________________________
The only way to be relieved as counsel
Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either
the written conformity of his client or an order from the
court relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance
with Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. - Balatbat v.
Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007
Duty of lawyer once he is discharged as counsel
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of
the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name of

the new counsel is properly recorded and the records
properly handed over. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No.
1666 [2007]
A simple turnover of the records does not end a lawyer’s

duty
Contrary to respondent’s contention, his professional relations as
a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple
turnover of the records of the case to his clients. - Venterez,
et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
xxx and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly

transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for
the proper handling of the matter. - Rule 22.02
Client refusal to give his consent is still subject to Court’s

discretion
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court
and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should
the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an
application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and
adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to
be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be
based on a good cause. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme,
A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
Consent to withdraw must be given by the litigant
Respondent’s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact
that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981
and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said
______________________________________________________________________
case from respondent or to terminate the latter’s services. -
Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
Pendency of petition for withdrawal does not relieve
lawyer of his duty
The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal
shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record
who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do
what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear
before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing
himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until there is a
withdrawal of record. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme,
A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
A valid cause to withdraw must still be subject to

formalities of withdrawing as counsel
Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as
counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the
complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a
valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot
immediately do so and leave his clients without
representation. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No.
7421 [2007]
Verbal substitution of counsel not allowed

A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly granted by
respondent judge, contravenes Section 26 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which prescribes the requirements for change
of attorneys. Said provision requires that the written consent
of the client should be filed in court and the adverse party should
be given written notice of the substitution. As correctly pointed
out by the OCA, if her intention was to obviate delay, then she
should have ordered the counsel of record, Atty. Nueva, who was
present during the hearing, to file the required comment or
opposition. - Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-
98-1427. November 27, 2000
Death of a partner
Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the
death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client
relationship between said firm and petitioner.
Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have
re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have
withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of
Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
______________________________________________________________________
lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-
41862 [1992]
Grounds to withdraw from a case before its final

adjudication
A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or
from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No.
6155 [2006]
Written contract is not essential in establishing lawyer-

client relationship
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment
of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. -
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Perceived insufficiency of remuneration not a ground to

diminish professional zeal
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case
he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains
unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the
case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his
perceived insufficiency of remuneration. - Francisco v. Atty.
Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Close personal relationship will not bar a lawyer-client

relationship
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding
the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. - Hadjula
v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
Heavy workload
Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for
the withdrawal of her services. - Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C.
No. 6166 [2009]
Lost of confidence
Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no
longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that
there had been "serious differences between them relating to the
manner of private prosecution.”- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C.
No. 3773 September 24, 1997
______________________________________________________________________
“Hurt feelings” is not a valid ground to automatically withdraw
Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's
feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her
words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that
moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's
services. She made this clear when she refused to sign his
"Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.“ - Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar,
A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
Withdrawal must be granted by the court

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in
terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and
leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no
right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted
by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been
approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is
expected by his client as well as by the court to do what
the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the
date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.- Orcino
v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
Lawyer’s responsibility
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of

the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Client should not file the Notice to Withdraw

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who
should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. -
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean

conformity
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to
substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. Mrs.
Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did
not necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s desire to
______________________________________________________________________
withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s speculations on the
professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni
find no support in the records of this case.
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza’s professional
engagement on her behalf despite respondent’s withdrawal did
not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty.
Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303 [2006]
Grounds for disciplinary proceedings

against lawyers
2014-2015
Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the
findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same as
a matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final
say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of
both bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its
own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather
than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an
administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation
and report. – Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614.
June 29, 2000
Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-
law”after disbarment
Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as
an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a
signboard hanging outside the respondent's office display
the title "Attorney-at-Law“ under respondent's name.
Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received
reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by
making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares
for cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500
(Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9,
2014
Resolution
On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty."
preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, and
the signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince
this Court that respondent continues in the practice of
______________________________________________________________________
law, in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that
ordered his disbarment.
Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations of
respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports."
Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without
evidentiary value.
Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the
signboard outside his office showing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U.
Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014
Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order

suspending a lawyer from the practice of law
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended
from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent

shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she
has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared
in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local

Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of

respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a
more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472,
March 30, 2010
______________________________________________________________________
Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic
The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the
end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order
from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472,
March 30, 2010
Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBP

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that
are prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by
the parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further investigation. They may be summarily
dismissed for utter lack of merit.
The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Considering, however, that the question
being raised is simple and that no further factual
determination is necessary, the Court resolves to dispense
with such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the
extensive pleadings already on record, which all show the lack of
merit of the Complaint. - Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No.
4700 [2000]
Confidentiality
Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings
against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.
Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings.

– Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be
private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution
of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in
the Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES
OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES
[took effect on October 1, 2001]
Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or
______________________________________________________________________
Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until
further action of the Supreme Court in the case.
Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or

Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. -
Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified
copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified
copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend
the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may
warrant.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as

amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,
1992
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for:
1. any deceit,
2. malpractice,
3. other gross misconduct in such office,
4. grossly immoral conduct,
5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude,
6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice,
7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated
[Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty.
De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
______________________________________________________________________
Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence
by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera
B.M. No. 793 [2004]
The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of

the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction I
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment
ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment
in the Philippines.
Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that
only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

jurisdiction II
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if
the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.
We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. -
Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
Defenses
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the
Rules of Court which provides:
______________________________________________________________________
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. -
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. -
Ex parte investigation valid

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only
constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts
as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that
he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to
present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in
an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges
against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure
on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an investigation may be
conducted ex parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793
[2004]
Misconduct pertaining to another profession

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting
firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at
the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was
conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as
his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.
Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from
disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
______________________________________________________________________
probity or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040
[1998]
Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate
personality of the corporation to absolve him from
exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by
complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat
his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant.
Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for
the creation of said corporate fiction. - Cordon v. Atty.
Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002
Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which
apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this
administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly
immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard
for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]
Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v.
Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
Anonymous complaints
Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution.
They should not be dismissed outright, however, where their
averments may be easily verified and may, without much
difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent
______________________________________________________________________
evidence. - Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008
Forum shopping
Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,
not to disbarment proceedings. - Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty.
Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006
Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a bar

to administrative proceedings.
The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is
not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.
Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal case (Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara
v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)
Administrative complaint against a member of the bar

does not prescribe
Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty.
Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)
Indefinite suspension
This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if
we have authority to completely exclude a person from
the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then
be left to [respondent] to determine for himself how long
or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. -
(In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970)
The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as
it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as
a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time
of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
______________________________________________________________________
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his
hands the key for the restoration of his rights and
privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C.
No. 2614. June 29, 2000
Censure or reprimand
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act
of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some
minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. -
Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No.
7204 [2007]
Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed
complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the
complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via
cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where
there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant,
he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts
are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty.
Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]
Non-injured party can file a complaint

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The
evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on
Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended
sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C.
No. 313. January 30, 1998
______________________________________________________________________
Alternative penalty not allowed
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in
order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby
directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from
the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n
his DISBARMENT.
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year
suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not
respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed
from another angle, it directs that he shall only be
suspended, subject to the condition that he should make
restitution as prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty.
Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the

imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the
rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the
alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties,
not can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no
reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in
administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also
involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses
III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
Misconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is
of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. – Dinsay v.
Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. Noveernment officialmber 27,
1996
Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the
[Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C.
No. 2995. November 27, 1996
______________________________________________________________________
While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the
same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. -
Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996
A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVE

CASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the respondent in a criminal proceeding
The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the

SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning
in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay
v. Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12,
1986
Definition of Unprofessional conduct

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the
rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.
6697 July 25, 2006
Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude

The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt
does not involve moral turpitude.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s
opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not
bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public
when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case
as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality. - In re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052.
December 11, 2003
No final judgment yet

On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California,
he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the
California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge.
He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end.
We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
______________________________________________________________________
the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint
affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor. –
In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052.
December 11, 2003
Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting

adults
Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under any
impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to
a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching on employees’
personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their
family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M.
No. P-11-2922, 2011
Estrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a
child within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes
that [the court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged
with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct“. -
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years
ago when her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But
as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the
approval of her congregation.
Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards
of her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal
______________________________________________________________________
arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct for which she should be held administratively
liable. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom -
may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must
be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v. Escritor,
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] are

immediately executory
We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect
immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension
should commence on the day respondent judge receives notice
of the decision suspending him from office.
While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a

motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such a
motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order.
– Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. February 4,
2002
Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]

are NOT immediately executory
Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
said motion shall render the decision final and executory. -
Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010
“Res Judicata” applies

The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed the
complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it
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appearing that it involves the same incident and the same
cause of action as Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it
appears that on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court
dismissed a similar complaint filed in Administrative Case No.
3835. – Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825.
February 1, 1996
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases

Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar.
Cont…
Under the same rule, a respondent “may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as member of the Bar.” xxx In other words, an order
to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively
liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a
member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning of “automatic
conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges
to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will
also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by
treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of
the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
lawyer by mere operation of the rule. – Campos, et. al. v. Atty.
Campos, A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014
Definition of Unbecoming conduct

Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical
practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”- ASP
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-
SB-J April 12, 2011
Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
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honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the
practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of
the bar. -Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564,
August 20, 2008
To ensure competence after reinstatement

Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959,
respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability
to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the
Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as
he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth
year review classes in a recognized law school. - In Re:
Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of
Cebu City. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974
SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the

trial court’s decision
At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as
an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court’s
decision. – Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9,
2000
Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanction

Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent
and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
– Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31,
1997
Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation

The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
- Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court
Reconciliation of parties or amicable settlement

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside
the finding of culpability against the respondents merely
because the complainants have decided to forgive them or
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settle matters amicably after the case was completely
evaluated and reviewed by the IBP.
The complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case
does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by
Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that
they had already presented and supported their claims
with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has
promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. – Sps. Amatorio
v. Atty. F. Yap & Atty. W. Yap, A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015
Ex-parte investigation allowed

An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. –
Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 2000
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon

joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given
full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon
reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony

As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of
no moment. Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her
testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe
and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted
as part of complainant’s evidence. – Liwanag v. Judge Lustre,
A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999
Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls
within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether
the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath
and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary
authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry
civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an
inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter
would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary
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authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549,
December 02, 2013
WON the money should be returned to complainant

within the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether the
matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. -
Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14,
2012
If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of

conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or
criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into
the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a
proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably
outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority.
Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry
pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to
remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether
the respondent be directed to return the amount received from
his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary
authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074
August 14, 2012
Sui generis principle

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal
case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.
In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither
will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer.
The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. - Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual and

customary in nature
Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were
merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
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nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant
was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were
given malicious connotations by the complainant. – Atty.
Aquino v. Justice Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2,
2002
Quantum of evidence ]judges]

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct
in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal
trials apply.”- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783.
July 29, 1996
Quantum of evidence [judges]

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary
in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial
evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence:
“Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.”- Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ 98-
1168. April 21, 1999
Quantum of evidence [lawyers]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal

case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly
preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings. – Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No.
4017. September 29, 1999
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Absolute pardon
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case
of In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the
disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had
been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude,
upon the ground that the respondent had been granted plenary
pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches
both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him
to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and
gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M.
No. 126 December 29, 1980
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face,
would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or
misconduct. – Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-
97-1375 October 16, 1997
Preventive suspension for erring lawyer

Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court.
- After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period
therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of
the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of
his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138,
Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until
such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.
Preventive suspension not applicable to judges

Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve
that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite
does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive
suspension of judges, not having been expressly included
in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – Re:
Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
January 31, 2008
______________________________________________________________________
CA or RTC may suspend an attorney
Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice
for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until
Judicial clemency and reinstatement

2014-2015
Forms of clemency
Reinstatement
Commutation
Lifting of disqualification
Reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed under the
following criteria
1. the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and
he has assured the Court that he now possesses the requisite
probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is
worthy to be restored to the practice of law
2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the
application for reinstatement,
3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment,
4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious
organizations
5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the local government officials and
citizens of his community.
6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of
his family. – Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44 February 10,
1989
Cont…
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a
pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of
reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original
admission to the bar, except that the court may require a
greater degree of proof than in an original evidence.
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The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is
whether applicant is 'of good moral character‘. – In re:
Vailoces, A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982
Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall
include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the

penalty1 to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he
still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to
good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual

aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that

may justify clemency. – Re: Letter of Judge Diaz, A.M.
No. 07-7-17-SC September 19, 2007
Absolute and unconditional pardon

Thereafter, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before
this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same
culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961.
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted

petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and
restored him "to full civil and political rights.
True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the

President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.- In
re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982
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Effects of pardon
"When proceedings to strike on attorney’s name from the rolls
are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the
fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has
been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted.“ In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962
“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense.
Effect of conditional pardon

The fact that the respondent was extended conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such
conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to
his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the
ground of professional misconduct for which he had been
convicted by final judgment. In re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C.
No. 407 August 15, 1967
Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion

of his term. It does not reach the offense itself. - In re:
Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No.
L-363. July 31, 1962
Pardon granted before conviction

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching;
If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
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capacity.”- In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962
Grounds for voluntary inhibition and

disqualification of judges
2014-2015
“Judge’s family”
Includes a judge’s:
1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth
civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and
who lives in the judge’s household.
Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. -

If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as
______________________________________________________________________
above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in
writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds
therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial,
or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of
the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith
made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but
no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in favor of his own competency, until after final
judgment in the case.
Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition

1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.
2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the judges
concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid
reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74
[2010]
Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality was

committed
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point
of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under
the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required
needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge
being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not
even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez
from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived
or appreciated. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R.
Nos. 173057-74 [2010]
Evidence required
We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the
assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled
in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that
the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition
to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or
order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or
partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos.
173057-74 [2010]
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Proof of clear and convincing evidence
The bare allegations of the judge’s partiality, as in this case, will
not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and
evidence, and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice
Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]
"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which

he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise...."
The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when
such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however,
miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G.
Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these
cases before the Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice
Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]
A summary of judicial obligations

3.1 A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the
discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,
studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just,
impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of
private influence should administer justice according to law and
should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust;
and he should not allow outside matters or his private
interests to interfere with the prompt and proper
performance of his office.”- Administrative Order No. 162, of
the Department of Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval v.
Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]
Meaning of“ruling in a lower court is the subject of

review” or “in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.”
Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in
the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered
the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been
placed in a position where he had to review his own
decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not
legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v.
Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent

and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing
to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held
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that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and
partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote
public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary.
While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the
case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the
case below constitutes a “just or valid reason,” under Section 1
of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the
case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]
Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition

improper
Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary
inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-
shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge
more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to
the speedy and fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543 [2010]
“Utang na loob” per se not a ground for inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend,
classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears
before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na
loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the
administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value
in Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as
judge. – Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-
3918-RTC October 26, 1987
Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of

record is no ground for disqualification
It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or
friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of
one of the parties to a suit is no ground for
disqualification. xxx We held that the fact "that one of the
counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a
legal ground for the disqualification of said judge.” To
allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom
the case would be transferred.
Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a
judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his
former classmates (and he could have many) appeared." -
Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-
RTC October 26, 1987
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Personally approaching the judge to disqualify himself not
contempt
We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when
petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his
chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a
ground which respondent Judge might consider just or
valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and
another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a
disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. -
Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August
31, 1967
Former associate in practice of law

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his
memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in
asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that
Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law —
is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a
judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be
compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat,
admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the
case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid
reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing
the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the
provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule
137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536
August 31, 1967
Judge was the former public prosecutor who handled the

same case
The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the
undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge of this
sala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein
undersigned discovered and remembered that he handled the
aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Hence,
for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his
previous participation in the above-cited criminal case, up to the
present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor
conducted any full-blown trial in the same. Besides the
private prosecutor did not interpose any objection.
WON respondent judge should be administratively sanctioned.

The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge
hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases
where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the
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like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. xxx The
purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of
interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part
of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal
Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998
without securing the written consent of both the
prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon
the record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he
issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of
the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for
the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted
on the case. - In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas A.M. No.
98-6-185-RTC [1998]
Justice of CA had acted as counsel for respondent but no

sanction
Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the
National Power Corporation in CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then
capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really
begged off from any participation in the decision process
by, indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate
court.
In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained
such failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere
inadvertence and oversight on his part, and when
reminded that he, in fact, had acted as counsel for
respondent NPC as the then Acting Solicitor General, he
then forthwith disengaged himself from further involvement
in the disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R. No.
112884 August 30, 1994
Should a judge whose decision was reversed by the

appellate court voluntarily inhibit herself when the case is
remanded to her sala
The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against
petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this
Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason,
absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to
conclude that the judge was biased and partial against
petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, the
remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial
is not the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is
yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that
are always infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify
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judges who err, for we all err. - Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R.
No. 179583 [2009]
Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in the

practice of law a ground for automatic disqualification
We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his
memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in
asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that
Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is
not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for
disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may
not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty.
Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in
the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid
reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing
the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137. –
Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August
31, 1967
Is being a former classmate of the judge a ground for

inhibition or disqualification?
Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified
because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a
classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal
ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily
burden other trial judges to whom the case would be
transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the
rule advocated, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case
whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have
many) appeared. – Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R.
No. L-26810. August 31, 1970
It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship
between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the
parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. - Query of
Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October
26, 1987
Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the
decision of a judge, after he had voluntarily inhibited himself
from further sitting in the case?
The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions
involving a judge's disqualification here, a judge voluntarily
inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a
motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he
continue with the case.
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However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is
transferred should not resist too much the order of
recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. -
Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-
RTC October 26, 1987
Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused

settle their dispute amicably considering that they are
brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin
Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot
justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that
complainant was not willing to listen to respondent's counsel, the
latter should have recused himself from the case without further
delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on
the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to
settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2)
months is more than enough for respondent to make use
of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to
bring the parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral
influence on them without success, he should have inhibited
himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a
private capacity.
Judge is reprimanded. – Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M. No.
MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998
Would mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge to

proceed with hearing the case
On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an
order denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily
inhibited himself and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of inhibition.
As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge
Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since
the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise
of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has
been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any
matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no
vested right to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its
discretionary nature. – Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 124760
July 8, 1998
Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not proper

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file
the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the
Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of
the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the
required motion for inhibition, an omission which was
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interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the
complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing
subject cases. – Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, A.M. No.
MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERSRule 137

No appeal or stay shall be allowed until after final

judgment in the case is not an absolute rule
Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of
the proceedings where the trial judge rules in favor of her
competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil
cases, and has not precluded a resort in appropriate cases
to the special civil action of certiorari before the higher
courts for determination.
This will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion
for inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the
trial court’s judgment on the merits and there is a clear
showing that the case is an exceptional one. This is not
true in the case of the present petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R.
No. 167899 August 6, 2008
Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of

Court against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the
trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules
in favor of his own competency
Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression,
that such restriction against appeal or stay of the
proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify
himself and rules in favor of his own competency does not
apply in criminal cases where such disqualification is sought
by the prosecution or offended party. - Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969
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When the accused seeks inhibition or disqualification
Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who
seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the general
restriction provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the
proceedings when the judge denies the motion and rules in
favor of his own competency would apply, as it does in civil
cases.
In such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could
raise the correctness of the judge's ruling on his non-
disqualification with his appeal from the decision on the merits;
and were he to be acquitted, he would have no cause for
complaint against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of non-
disqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering
such verdict. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-
23710 September 30, 1969
Rule on restriction against appeal or stay of the

proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to
disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own
competency
When it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the
disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction would
apply – meaning no appeal until final judgment.
When it is the prosecution or offended party in a criminal

case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge such
restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings does not
apply. – otherwise the rule on double jeopardy will apply
against the prosecution or offended party.
In civil and [administrative] cases, no appeal or stay shall be

allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.
Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his

jurisdiction
This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners'
contention, holds that the disqualification of a judge is not a
matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to
render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the
part of a party, to timely interpose such an objection of
disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal
obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v.
Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969
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When to file a motion for disqualification?
The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that
should be timely raised in the first instance, so that it may
properly be raised and considered on appeal.
At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, supra, if
this Court were of the opinion upon a review of the case that
the litigant had not had a fair trial, it would grant a new
trial, although the judge may not have been disqualified under
Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the
best interests of justice.
This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that: "Although a
judge may not have been disqualified under said section,
nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not
given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or
prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it
necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969
“Remittal of Disqualification”
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers independently of the judge’s participation, all agree
in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings. - CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY New Code of Judicial Conduct
Written consent of all the parties is required in “Remittal

of Disqualification”
From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in
any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent
of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no
objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside
over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law.
The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all
the parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit
acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be
signed by them and entered upon the record. - Lorenzo v.
Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988
“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by
common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or
legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the
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modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered
against him. – PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February
10, 1998
Presumption of regularity
Mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, speculations or
hearsay cannot overcome the presumption that the respondent
[judge] has regularly performed his or her duties. - Bautista v.
Ass. Justice Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2,
2006
"Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the

absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear
or favor." - Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
171526, September 1, 2010Presumption of regularity
Duty not to recuse

Judges should not recuse themselves merely because an
unfounded claim of bias or prejudice has been lodged against
them. xxx . [A] judge has an equally strong duty not to
recuse when the circumstances do not require recusal. -
Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar
Association, page 187, 2004
Improper purpose for filing motion to inhibit/disqualify
The rule [on inhibition or disqualification] should “not be used
cavalierly to suit a litigant’s personal designs or to defeat
the ends of justice.”
It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any
conceivable reason, would seek to disqualify a judge for their
own purposes under a plea of bias, hostility, or prejudgment.
It further held that it did not approve of some litigants’ tactic of
filing baseless motions for disqualification as a means of
delaying the case or of forum-shopping for a more friendly
judge. - People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171, 186-87, October 28,
1991, cited by Justice Panganiban in his Extended Explanation
for Inhibition in the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2, 2001
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against judges and justices
2014-2015
Resolution to protect members of judiciary from baseless

complaints
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability
of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to
Protect Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded
Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3,
2003.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious

administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary
for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which
provides:
Cont…
2. If the complaint is
filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal.
If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator

must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10)
days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a
report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from
receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, or, if it is not possible to do so, within six (6)
months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to
be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
Power of the Supreme Court

Article 8 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. –
Philippine Constitution 1987
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By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. – Maceda v. Hon.
Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993
Competence to review a judicial order or decision belongs
to the Court
“No other entity or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.”- De Vera
v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281(2000)
Powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the
Ombudsman
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
xxx
Ombudsman Act of 1989 [R.A. 6770]
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides:
“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
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at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.”
xxx xxx
“Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority,
Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary.
When criminal complaint against a Judge or other court

employee arises from their administrative duties
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other
court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer
the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties. - Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez,
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a

criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's
certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made
first to the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such a determination.
The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. - Maceda v. Hon.
Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation

over the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official
functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative
charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a
criminal or administrative complaint before his office against
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petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public
officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme
Court, for appropriate action. - Fuentes v. Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001
Whether the MTC can take cognizance of a complaint of

reckless imprudence against an incumbent judge pending
the resolution of an administrative complaint arising from
the same facts
On January 31, 2003, complainant filed a letter complaint before
the Ombudsman-Vizayas, charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then
Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental with the crime of murder and the administrative
offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
The complaint arose from the death of complaianant’s husband,
on November 12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap
between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Judge Garcia and the
motorcycle driven by the deceased.
The Graft Investigation Officer found the existence of probable
cause for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide and recommended the filing of the corresponding
charges against Judge Garcia.
Judge Garcia filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
following grounds:xxx; (2) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person;
and,xxx.
Petitioner [judge] argues that respondents violated this Court’s

pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, directing the
Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court; and, in
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, restricting not
only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the
government, but also other official and functionary
thereof in initiating or investigating judges and court
personnel.
Held
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was
in no way related to the performance of his duties as a
judge.
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the
petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above
circumstances.
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is
a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as prescribed by law
and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain
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jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by
judges of the lower courts. – Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409,
March 20, 2009
When to file administrative case against judges

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door
to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge
Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003
Prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final

declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or
bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the
judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the
stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. –
Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3,
2003
Anonymous complaint
First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the letter-
complaint should not be given due course because it is only
anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that the disciplinary proceedings against judges and
justices may be instituted under either of three ways:
1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio;
2. upon a verified complaint; or
3. upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public
records of indubitable integrity.
Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007
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Lack of verification is only a formal defect
As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not
have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-
complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, §1 of
the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys,
suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect
and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the
subject matter of the complaint. "The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct — the court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served." (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero
Jr., A.C. No. 5394, December 02, 2002)
Effect of retirement of respondent judge

Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present
administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him
from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840,
August 2, 2007)
Death of respondent judge

The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan
by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge
Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge
Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose
any administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the
administrative complaint against the respondent Judge,
dismissed, closed and terminated. - RE: Application for
retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret.,
April 22, 2008
Judge also liable if court employee fraternized with

litigant
Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent
Judge Alagar in this case having tolerated unknowingly his
employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no
matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending before
his sala.
Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted
with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants
in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his part in
failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court
employee for the latter’s improper use of his vehicle, to the
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detriment of the court’s image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449. January 18, 2002
Having lunch with counsel

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not
wrong per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as
possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion
that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element
in “determining his judicial course.” Knowing that Atty. Verano,
Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending
before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice
about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at
that. - Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799.
September 12, 2003
Effect of reconciliation of the parties

The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative
proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in
administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of
the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may
have been committed against the public service. (Flores v.
Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)
Conviction in a criminal case

Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the
respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case.
Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically
warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, and each must
be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In other words, the disposition in the first two will not
necessarily govern the third, and vice versa. (Velasco v. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15,
2007)
Effect of resignation from office

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by
the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic
the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court
had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is
not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his
resignation and its consequent acceptance – without prejudice –
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by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of
this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. (Non-disclosure before
the JBC of the administrative case filed against Judge
Jaime V. Quitain, JBC no. 013, August 22, 2007)
Grounds for outright dismissal

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from
the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;
(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before
such filing; and
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M.
Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)
Warning is not a penalty

A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. -
Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001
Gross ignorance of the law

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case
before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that
the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. - Sps.
Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.
September 27, 2000
Rendering an unjust judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal
and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished
under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which
are:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust; and
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(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be
rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be
unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1447. September 27, 2000
There is no liability at all for a mere error

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust
judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for
a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when
required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts
in good faith.
Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering
judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the
sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been
actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or
some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge
Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the

law does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge
Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
When good faith will not be applied
We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate
respondent’s argument which in effect posits that not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment.
Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to
still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which,
hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy
purpose. – Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1447. September 27, 2000
Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is impermissible

if case is appealed
The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant
administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is
permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a notice
of appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing respondent
judge’s decision and his order of execution.
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In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative
case against respondent judge while their appeal and petition
for certiorari challenging his decision and order were still
pending with the RTC. Following our settled pronouncements
cited above, the instant complaint is impermissible. – Camacho
v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17,
2002
Period to decide or resolve the case submitted for

decision
The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted for
decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory
requirement. Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the
erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court may deem
appropriate.
It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those involving
difficult questions of law or complex issues or when the judge is
burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer period to decide
may be allowed but only upon proper application made with
the Supreme Court by the concerned judge.- Dr. Seares v.
Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 November 22, 2000
Judge attended the hearing of his brother
Judge Dojillo “sat beside the counsel of his brother” and “actively
coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now and
then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and
or stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court,
and other similar acts.”
Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing

of his brother’s election protest case just to give moral
support and, in the process, also observe how election
protest proceedings are conducted. Although concern for
family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture,
respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is
also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving
the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety
but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. -
Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14,
2005
Judge is a heckler
The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a
heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory remarks and
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insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the
incident, the subject of this case.
All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down
by the complainants and the latter’s witnesses. He justified his
behavior though as the fulminations of a righteously
outraged citizen which according to him should be
segregated from his function as a judge.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous
behavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. –
Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14,
2004
No dichotomy of personality
Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaon’s
suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a
taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge.
In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of

anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some of
the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It
is highly probable that his invectives took on a greater
imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge,
with all the authority attendant to the office. -Hon. Decena v.
Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14, 2004
Comment on Certiorari filed by public respondent judge

in behalf of private respondent
Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment
with the court on behalf of one of the parties, engaged in
the private practice of law.
Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited
from engaging in the private practice of law.
In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the
provision in the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
“Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where
the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not
appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or
any pleading therein. If either party elevates the case to a
higher court, the public respondents shall be included
therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed, they shall not appear or participate in
the proceedings therein. - Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-
Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]
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Can the members of the Supreme Court be removed from
office only by impeachment?
Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment. Since removal
from office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows
that there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be
disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering that
the power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the
legislative branch of the government, the Court is without
authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member.
He added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage
is not one of the impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated
Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v.
Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-
19-SC : August 11, 2009
Cont…
When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the
mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and
immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done
only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and
responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his
retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and,
consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for
administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The
fact that the Investigating Committee, created per
Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court,
commenced the investigation during the incumbency of
Justice Reyes is of no moment, as he was then not yet a
respondent in an administrative matter against him. - In Re:
Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v.
Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-
19-SC : August 11, 2009
Res ipsa loquitor

misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-
97-1375. October 16, 1997]
Res ipsa loquitor

In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without
further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the
facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability. – Query of Atty.
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Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August
19, 2009
Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct. - In re: Complaint against
Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re: Complaint
against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
Quantum of evidence
It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with
substantial evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v.
Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
Quantum of evidence required for removal of judge from
office
Jurisprudence dictates –

where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or
incompetence. The general rules with regard to admissibility
of evidence in criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge
Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]
Acts of a collegial court

It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31,
2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his
individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court
whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the
filing of charges against a single member of a division of
the appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice
Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done
without the participation of the others, cannot be
considered the act of the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J
August 24, 2010
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“Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not apply to
a collegial court
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of
the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust
judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any
case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the
prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the
decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with
jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of
Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its
Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI
No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
Judge's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily

warrant her suspension
The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door
to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous
criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction
by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension.
We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA,
the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still
enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. - Re:
January 31, 2008
Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the

accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional
presumption of innocence
It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any
evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this
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manner, the presumption of innocence continues. - Re:
January 31, 2008
Preventive suspension not applicable to judges

Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve
that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite
does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive
suspension of judges, not having been expressly included
in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – Re:
January 31, 2008
Collegial court needs to act as one body
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality
of the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted
hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same
venue and were acting within hearing and communicating
distance of one another.
The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division

would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases
tried before it must be made directly available to each and every
one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the
equal and full participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough,
therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division
were within hearing and communicating distance of one
another at the hearings in question, as they explained in
hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them
sat together in session. - ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010
______________________________________________________________________
Affinity and consanguinity as a basis
for disqualification under Canon 3
section 5(f)
2014-2015
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERSRRC Rule 137

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.
Cont…
CANON 3A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES

HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These
cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding;
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(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within
the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for
inhibition.
Definition of affinity
Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of
marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection
existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the
married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of
affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes
husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by
affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa. – PP v. Raul Berana, G.R. No.
123544 July 29, 1999
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal
bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those
commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother,
stepchild and the like. - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05
February 10, 1998
Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood
relatives of the other spouse." It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship,
a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of
marriage and family relations. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]
NCC SUBSECTION 1. - Relationship

Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number
of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either

direct or collateral.
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A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor.

Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from
the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor

and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between

persons who have the same father and the same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who

have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same
mother, but not the same father.
2 legal theories
1. The terminated affinity view holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death
or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between
the parties.
Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive
and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that
created it.
Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such
that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by
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affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood
relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by
affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there
is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is
preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose
veins the blood of both parties is commingled.
2.The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by

affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the
deceased spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even
after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a
result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent
to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “tie of affinity” between
these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
married parties. – Intestate Estate of Gonzales vda. De
Carungcong v. PP, G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
“Blood relatives”
Relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed the
following:
(1) an ascendant;
(2) a descendant;
(3) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister - PP v.
Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998
No affinity
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one
spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related
by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his
wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s
brother and the wife’s sister. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]
Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and
the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and
the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of
one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity?
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the
blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of
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marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by
affinity?
“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by
common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or
legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the
modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered
against him. – PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February
10, 1998
Case 1
Judge is respondent’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s
[judge] aunt is married to an uncle of respondent. The
relationship notwithstanding, Judge did not inhibit himself from
hearing said electoral case.
Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree by affinity
in that the aunt of the judge is married to the uncle of
respondent.
WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.
Judge not disqualified
In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to
his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by
virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that
Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag,
i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree.
But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood
relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws
and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag.
In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of
Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives
of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas.
In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other.
Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137
to hear Election Case. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA
IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]
Being“magbalaes” is not a ground for automatic
disqualification
Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty of
impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself from the case despite
the fact that one of the accused, Lope Panti, Sr., is the father-in-
law of respondent judge’s daughter.
To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti, Sr. are
not, strictly speaking, relatives within the meaning of Rule 137,
§1 of the Rules of Court.
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Nevertheless, the close personal relations between them as
parents of their respective children, being in our culture
known as “magbalaes,” should have cautioned respondent
judge to inhibit himself from the case, lest his impartiality
be placed in doubt. – Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M. No.
MTJ-99-1236. November 25, 1999
Complainant is the judge’s wife
Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant,
knowing that the private complainant therein was his wife,
Atty. Ester Flor. – Tenenan v. Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
06-1995 September 25, 2007
Judge’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel

for the accused
It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited himself from
Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled “People v. Crisostomo
Yalung, Roy Manuel M. Villasor, SG Fernando Tagle, and SG
Ronan Guerrero” because respondent’s nephew, Atty. Cris
Pascua Zafra, is married to the daughter of Atty. P. M.
Castillo, complainants’ defense counsel in that case.
Complainants’ claim that although respondent’s relationship is to
the husband of the daughter of their counsel, they did not want
respondent to try their case because they wanted “to [avoid] any
stigma and/or cloud of doubt on any order/decision” which
respondent may render on the case.
Cont..
In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the
loss of trust on the part of the complainant as to his
impartiality.
When a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or
unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are
eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation,
but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on
his honest actuation and probity in favor of either party,
or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. -
Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563 [2001]
Cont…
In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants to
support their motion, i.e., that respondent’s nephew is the
husband of the daughter of the counsel for the accused;
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that they lacked confidence in respondent’s impartiality xxx
have no merit.
The first is not a ground for mandatory disqualification of

judges under Rule 137, par. 1 since respondent is not even
related to counsel for the accused. - Yalung v. Judge
Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1342 [2001]
Father-in-law of the judge present in the proceeding
The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law
of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was
conspicuously present in the proceedings during which time
he gave consultation to the complainant who was reportedly his
political leader and protégée.
In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to recuse

himself from cases in which his relatives were either involved
or interested, the record shows he did so to favor or protect
the parties. – Siawan v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-
95-1056. May 21, 2001
Discussing the pending case with a brother

By allowing his brother to discuss with him the merits of one
party’s position, Justice Sabio gave his brother the opportunity
to influence him. Any reasonable person would tend to doubt
Justice Sabio’s independence and objectivity after such a
conversation with a close family member who also
happens to hold a high government position. As a
magistrate, Justice Sabio has the duty to prevent any
circumstance that would cast doubt on his ability to decide a
case without interference or pressure from litigants, counsels or
their surrogates. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.,
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, October 15, 2008)
A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
- Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the

record of birth, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010
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against lawyers
2015-2016
Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the
findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same as
a matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final
say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of
both bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its
own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather
than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an
administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation
and report. – Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614.
June 29, 2000
Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-
law”after disbarment
Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as
an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a
signboard hanging outside the respondent's office display
the title "Attorney-at-Law“ under respondent's name.
Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received
reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by
making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares
for cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500
(Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9,
2014
Resolution
On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty."
preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, and
the signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince
this Court that respondent continues in the practice of
law, in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that
ordered his disbarment.
Neither is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations of
respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports."
Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without
evidentiary value.
Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the
signboard outside his office showing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U.
Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014
______________________________________________________________________
Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended
from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent

shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she
has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared
in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local

Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of

respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a
more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be
warranted. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472,
March 30, 2010
Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic

The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the
end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order
from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his
profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472,
March 30, 2010
______________________________________________________________________
Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBP
In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that
are prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by
the parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further investigation. They may be summarily
dismissed for utter lack of merit.
The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Considering, however, that the question
being raised is simple and that no further factual
determination is necessary, the Court resolves to dispense
with such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the
extensive pleadings already on record, which all show the lack of
merit of the Complaint. - Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No.
4700 [2000]
Confidentiality
Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings
against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.
Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings.

– Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be
private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution
of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in
the Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES
OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES
[took effect on October 1, 2001]
Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until
Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or

Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. -
Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified
______________________________________________________________________
copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified
copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend
the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may
warrant.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as

amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13,
1992
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for:
1. any deceit,
2. malpractice,
3. other gross misconduct in such office,
4. grossly immoral conduct,
5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude,
6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice,
7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence

by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera
B.M. No. 793 [2004]

jurisdiction I
______________________________________________________________________
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment
ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment
in the Philippines.
Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that
only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

jurisdiction II
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension
against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Grounds
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer
for disciplinary proceedings against
lawyersmay transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera,
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
Defenses
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the
Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. -
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. -
______________________________________________________________________
Ex parte investigation valid
Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only
constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts
as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that
he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to
present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in
an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges
against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure
on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an investigation may be
conducted ex parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793
[2004]
Misconduct pertaining to another profession

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting
firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at
the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was
conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as
his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice.
Even granting that respondent’s misconduct refers to his
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from
disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040
[1998]
Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate
personality of the corporation to absolve him from
exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by
complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat
his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant.
Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for
the creation of said corporate fiction. - Cordon v. Atty.
Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002
______________________________________________________________________
Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which
apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this
administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly
immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard
for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]
Private phone call to litigant prohibited
If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of judicial
indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly made a private
phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in
the chambers.
It need not be overemphasized that making private phone
calls to, sending for and talking to the complainant in the
judge’s chambers, as in this case, undermines even more the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v.
Judge Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000
Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v.
Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
A single member of a collegial court cannot be charged for

rendering unjust judgment
Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective
decision is “unjust” cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of
charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice
______________________________________________________________________
Hakim S. Abdulwahid, Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No.
06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006
Anonymous complaints
Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution.
They should not be dismissed outright, however, where their
averments may be easily verified and may, without much
difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent
evidence. - Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008
Forum shopping
Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,
not to disbarment proceedings. - Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty.
Salvador N. Moya II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006
Retirement from office

The Court emphasizes at this point that respondent’s
retirement from office does not render the present
administrative case moot and academic; neither does it free
him from liability. Since complainant filed the case when
respondent was still in the service, the Court retains the
authority to investigate and resolve the administrative complaint
against him. - City of Cebu v. Judge Gako Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2111, May 7, 2008
Infraction committed by judge before appointment

This step finds support in Heck v. Santos where the Court held
that while the infraction was committed before the
respondent’s appointment as judge, the Court may still
discipline him therefore. RE: Application for
retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret.,
April 22, 2008
Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a bar

to administrative proceedings.
The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is
not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.
Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal case (Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara
v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)
______________________________________________________________________
Administrative complaint against a member of the bar
does not prescribe
Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not prescribe. (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty.
Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)
This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if
we have authority to completely exclude a person from
the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then
be left to [respondent] to determine for himself how long
or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. -
(In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970)
Censure or reprimand
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act
of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some
minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client. -
Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No.
7204 [2007]
Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed
complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the
complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via
cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where
there were several people in the vicinity considering that
Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant,
he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts
are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant
disbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty.
Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]
______________________________________________________________________
Non-injured party can file a complaint
The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The
evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on
Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended
sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C.
No. 313. January 30, 1998
Alternative penalty not allowed

A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in
order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby
directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from
the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n
his DISBARMENT.
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year
suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not
respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed
from another angle, it directs that he shall only be
suspended, subject to the condition that he should make
restitution as prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty.
Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the
imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the
rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the
alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties,
not can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no
reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in
administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also
involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses
III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]
Misconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is
of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such groun
______________________________________________________________________
d. – Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. Noveernment
officialmber 27, 1996
Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction
by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such
action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated
[Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty.
De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the
[Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C.
No. 2995. November 27, 1996
While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the

same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. -
Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996
A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVE

CASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the respondent in a criminal proceeding
The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the

SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning
in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay
v. Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R-252-P December 12,
1986
Definition of Unprofessional conduct
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the
rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.
6697 July 25, 2006
Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude
The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt
does not involve moral turpitude.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s
opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not
bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public
when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently,
______________________________________________________________________
there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case
as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality. - In re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052.
December 11, 2003
No final judgment yet
On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California,
he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the
California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge.
He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these
explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof.
It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not
shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor. – In re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11,
2003
Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting
adults
Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under any
impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to
a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our
authority to decide on matters touching on employees’
personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their
family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M.
No. P-11-2922, 2011
Estrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a
child within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes
that [the court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged
with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct“. -
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
______________________________________________________________________
She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years
ago when her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But
as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the
approval of her congregation.
Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards
of her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal
arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct for which she should be held administratively
liable. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003
Cont…
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom -
may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must
be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v. Escritor,
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] are

immediately executory
We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect
immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension
should commence on the day respondent judge receives notice
of the decision suspending him from office.
While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a

motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such a
motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order.
– Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530. February 4,
2002
______________________________________________________________________
Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers]
are NOT immediately executory
Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
said motion shall render the decision final and executory. -
Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010
“Res Judicata” applies

The Investigating Commissioner properly dismissed the
complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it
appearing that it involves the same incident and the same
cause of action as Administrative Case No. 3825. Indeed, it
appears that on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court
dismissed a similar complaint filed in Administrative Case No.
3835. – Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No. 3825.
February 1, 1996
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and
as Members of the Philippine Bar.
Cont…
Under the same rule, a respondent “may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as member of the Bar.” xxx In other words, an order
to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively
liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a
member of the bar.
This is the fair and reasonable meaning of “automatic
conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges
to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will
also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by
treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of
the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
lawyer by mere operation of the rule. – Campos, et. al. v. Atty.
Campos, A.C. No. 8644, January 22, 2014
Definition of Unbecoming conduct
______________________________________________________________________
Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical
practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.”- ASP
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-
SB-J April 12, 2011
Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the
practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of
the bar. -Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564,
August 20, 2008
To ensure competence after reinstatement
Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959,
respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability
to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the
Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as
he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth
year review classes in a recognized law school. - In Re:
Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of
Cebu City. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974
SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the
trial court’s decision
At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as
an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court’s
decision. – Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9,
2000
Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanction
Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent
and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his

dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
– Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31,
1997
Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation
______________________________________________________________________
The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
- Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court
Ex-parte investigation allowed
An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when
respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. –
Cottam v. Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 2000
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon

joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given
full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon
reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony
As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of
no moment. Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her
testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe
and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted
as part of complainant’s evidence. – Liwanag v. Judge Lustre,
A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999
Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action
within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether
the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath
and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary
authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry
civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an
inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter
would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is
understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary
authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549,
December 02, 2013
WON the money should be returned to complainant
within the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether the
matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. -
Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14,
2012
______________________________________________________________________
Cont…
If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of
conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or
criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into
the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a
proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably
outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority.
Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry
pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to
remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether
the respondent be directed to return the amount received from
his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary
authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074
August 14, 2012
Sui generis principle
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal
case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.
In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar
finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither
will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer.
The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. - Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999
The indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as
it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as
a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time
of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his
hands the key for the restoration of his rights and
privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C.
No. 2614. June 29, 2000
______________________________________________________________________
“Beso-beso” is merely a form of greeting, casual and
customary in nature
Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were
merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant
was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were
given malicious connotations by the complainant. – Atty.
Aquino v. Justice Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2,
2002
Quantum of evidence
where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct
in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal
trials apply.”- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. No. MTJ-93-783.
July 29, 1996
Quantum of evidence
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal

case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly
preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings. – Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No.
4017. September 29, 1999
Quantum of evidence
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in
deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is
required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence:
“Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.”- Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ 98-
1168. April 21, 1999
______________________________________________________________________
Absolute pardon
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case
of In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the
disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had
been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude,
upon the ground that the respondent had been granted plenary
pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches
both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him
to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and
gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M.
No. 126 December 29, 1980
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine
misconduct. – Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-
97-1375 October 16, 1997
CA or RTC may suspend an attorney
Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice
for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until
To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the

complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that
they had already presented and supported their claims
with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has
______________________________________________________________________
promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. – Sps. Amatorio
v. Sps. Atty. Whelma and Francisco Yap, A.C. no. 5914, March
11, 2015.
______________________________________________________________________

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Limitations/restrictions of government

lawyers in the practice of law

Canon 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in

Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her

We previously held that the restriction extends to all government

These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and

Definition of “substantial responsibility”

Application of C.P.R. on a government lawyer

Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless

The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a

Purpose of the Law

“x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it

Various ways a government lawyer leaves government

Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court

Two theories on the disqualification of former government

(2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to

PAO to provide free legal assistance

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits

1. the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the

By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the

No lawyer in the Judiciary can practice law

The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her

The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where

While respondent denied having assumed any position in said

Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise

"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession

Preparation of a legal document [Assurance] after separation

Notarial Law Violations

Resolution A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC05 July 2004

Eligibility requirements to become a notary public

Stationary office is required

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the

The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps

Resignation as notary public

NO current identification document issued by an official

The notary public does not personally knows the third

This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place of

Use of thumb or other mark

Prohibited acts of a notary

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person

is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or

When a notary public can sign on behalf of a person

Prohibition to do a notarial act even if payment is

Prohibition to do a notarial act

execute a certificate containing information known or believed by

(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that

Notary public should not notarize Improper Instruments

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

Purpose of physical presence

Acknowledgement and personal appearance

A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a

A notary public cannot appear before himself

“xxx having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot

By respondent’s admission, the affidavit was already signed by

As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is not required

It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no photograph, is no