SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA [G. R. No.

92013, July 25, 1990]

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome
Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956.The properties
and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during World War II.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine
government.

2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell
the Roppongi property.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio
vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Petition is granted.
DAVAO SAWMILL vs. CASTILLO

FACTS:
The Davao Saw Mill is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government. It has operated a
sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land
upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person.

On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of
the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were
placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease stipulated that on the expiration
of the period agreed upon, or if the Lessee should leave or abandon the land leased, all the
improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the Lessee shall pass to the exclusive ownership
of the Lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings;
which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements. In another action, Davao
Light & Power Co., Inc., vs. Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., a judgment was rendered in favor of the Davao Light
and a writ of execution issued for the properties now in question to be levied upon as personality by the
sheriff. Davao Light, the winning bidder, proceeded to take, possession of the machinery and other
properties described in the certificates of sale executed in its favor by the, sheriff of Davao. As
connecting up with the facts, Davao Saw Mill Co. has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as
personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons.

One of such persons is Castillo, an appellee by assignment from the original mortgagees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the machinery real or personal?

HELD:

As a rule, the machinery should be considered as personal, since it was not placed on the land by the
owner of the said land. Immobilization by destination or purpose cannot generally be made by a person,
whose possession of the property is only temporary, otherwise we will be forced to presume that he
intended to give the property permanently away in favor of the owner of the premises. In the case at
bar, when Davao Saw placed the machinery in a building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor
on the expiration or abandonment of the land leased, it in effect shows that the lessee also treated the
machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery
was levied upon by the sheriff as personality pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any
protest being registered, therefore the machinery must be classified as personal property. Machinery
which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the
property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.